Loopholes You Could Drive a Truck Through: Systematic Circumvention of Section 4(f) Protection of Parklands and Historic Resources: 1999 R. Marlin Smith Student Writing Competition Award Winner

Urban Lawyer

Volumn 32, Issue 1, 2000, Pages 121-156

  Gerken, D J ^a  

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EID: 0347607146     PISSN: 00420905     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
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References (208)

1. Department of Transportation Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-670, 80 Stat. 931-50 (1966).
2. See, e.g., Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 412-13 (1971) (discussing congressional legislation and concluding that it reflects the national importance of preserving parkland); Stop H-3 Ass'n v. Coleman, 533 F.2d 434, 437-38 (9th Cir. 1976) (recognizing that congressional legislation reflected powerful public interest in preservation of historic resources), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 999 (1976); San Antonio Conservation Soc'y v. Texas Highway Dep't, 446 F.2d 1013, 1020-21 (5th Cir. 1971) (noting congressional intent, as reflected in enacted legislation, to protect parklands and environmental resources), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 933 (1972).
3. See Comment, Protecting Public Parkland from Indirect Federal Highway Intrusion, 62 IOWA L. REV. 960, 960-61 (1977) (noting that preservation of parklands is threatened by competing objective of developing a federal-aid system for highway projects).
4. See William A. Thomas, Comment, The Road to Overton Park: "Parklands Statutes" in Federal Highway Legislation, 39 TENN. L. REV. 433, 434 n.3 (1977) (recognizing comparative convenience of constructing highway projects on publicly owned land rather than on private land acquired for that purpose).
5. See Roger Nober, Federal Highways and Environmental Litigation: Toward a Theory of Public Choice and Administrative Reaction, 27 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 229, 247 (1990).
6. Id.
7. See Kevin A. Bowman, The Short Term Versus the Dead Hand: Litigating our Dedicated Public Parks, 65 U. CIN. L. REV. 595 (1997); Ferdinand S. Tinio, Construction of Highway Through Park as Violation of Use to Which Park Property May Be Devoted. 60 A.L.R.3d 581 (1975).
8. See Kevin A. Bowman, The Short Term Versus the Dead Hand: Litigating our Dedicated Public Parks, 65 U. CIN. L. REV. 595 (1997); Ferdinand S. Tinio, Construction of Highway Through Park as Violation of Use to Which Park Property May Be Devoted. 60 A.L.R.3d 581 (1975).
9. See id. See also, e.g., Starr Burying Ground Ass'n v. North Lane Cemetery Ass'n, 58 A. 467, 469 (Conn. 1904) (stating that land dedicated to public use may be converted to inconsistent purpose only if authorized by statute); Lage v. Pottawattamie County, 5 N.W.2d 161, 166 (Iowa 1942) (recognizing that general power of eminent domain is insufficient to condemn public land).
10. See Bowman, supra note 7.
11. See Lois G. Forer, Preservation of America's Parklands: The Inadequacy of Present Law, 41 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1093, 1103-05 (1966) (arguing for stronger preservation laws because of inadequacy of existing common law protections).
12. Department of Transportation Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-670, 80 Stat. 931-50 (1966) (current version at 49 U.S.C. § 101). As provided by § 1(b) of Pub. L. No. 97-449, 96 Stat. 2419 (1983), § 4(f) of the Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1653(f), is now codified at 49 U.S.C. § 303. Congress slightly reworded the new statute, yet did not intend to affect any substantive change. See Department of Transportation Act of 1983, Pub. L. No. 97-449, § 1(a), 96 Stat. 2413 (1983) (stating that revision and codification of transportation law occurred without substantive change).
13. Department of Transportation Act of 1966, 49 U.S.C. § 303(c) states: The Secretary [of Transportation] may approve a transportation program or project requiring the use of publicly owned land from a public park, recreation area, or wildlife refuge of national, State, or local significance or any land of an historic site of national, State, or local significance (as determined by the Federal, State or local officials having jurisdiction over the park, area, refuge, or site) only if -(1) there is no prudent and feasible alternative to using that land; and (2) the program or project includes all possible planning to minimize harm to the park, recreation area, wildlife and waterfowl refuge, or historic site resulting from the use.
14. The Secretary's section 4(f) evaluation is conducted as part of the larger Environmental Impact Statement. FHWA is required to distribute the draft EIS statement containing the section 4(f) analysis to the public for comments. See 23 C.F.R. § 771.123 (1999). The section 4(f) study must also be circulated for comment to the Department of Interior and local officials having jurisdiction of the affected section 4(f) lands.
15. See Barbara Miller, Department of Transportation's Section 4(f): Paving the Way Toward Preservation, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 633 (1987) (describing accounts of the fate of the Overton Park project and other proposed highways after section 4(f) challenges as those outcomes were described in a hearing before Senate Subcommittee on Transportation).
16. 49 U.S.C. § 303(c) (1999). See Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1968, 23 U.S.C. § 138 (1999) (containing language identical to that contained in section 4(f) with respect to national policy).
17. 49 U.S.C. § 303(c).
18. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (1970) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1982)).
19. See Nober, supra note 5, at 251.
20. See id.
21. See id.
22. 49 U.S.C. § 303(c).
23. See Nober, supra note 5, at 252.
24. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 411 (1971).
25. See 49 U.S.C. § 303(c).
26. See 23 C.F.R. § 771.135(h) (1999).
27. See Volpe, 401 U.S. at 411-13.
28. See id.
29. See id.
30. See id.
31. See id. at 412-13.
32. See Louisiana Envtl. Soc'y, Inc. v. Coleman, 537 F.2d 79, 86 (5th Cir. 1976) (ruling that feasible and prudent alternative inquiry is only half of the section 4(f) substantive mandate).
33. 49 U.S.C. § 303(c)(2).
34. See Louisiana Envtl. Soc'y, 537 F.2d at 85-86.
35. See id.
36. See, e.g., Coalition for Canyon Preservation v. Bowers, 632 F.2d 774, 785 (9th Cir. 1980).
37. 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3499-3500 (emphasis added).
38. See Volpe, 401 U.S. at 402.
39. See, e.g., Stop H-3 Ass'n v. Coleman, 533 F.2d 434, 439 & 445 (9th Cir. 1976).
40. 49 U.S.C. § 303(c).
41. 49 U.S.C. § 303(c).
42. The Highway Trust Fund was created by section 209 of the Highway Revenue Act of 1956, which was Title II of the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956, ch. 462, Tit. II, 70 Stat. 397. The Federal-Aid Highway Act, 70 Stat. 374, as amended, is codified in 23 U.S.C. § 101, et seq.
43. 23 U.S.C. § 120 (1999).
44. See Financing Federal-Aid Highways, Federal Highway Administration, FHWA-P.L.-99-015, at 2 (Aug. 1999) [hereinafter Financing Federal-Aid Highways].
45. See id. at 8.
46. Pub. L. No. 105-178 (1998).
47. See Financing Federal-Aid Highways, supra note 43, at 8.
48. See id. at 28.
49. See id. at 13.
50. See id.
51. See id. at 16.
52. 23 U.S.C. § 118(a) (1999).
53. 23 U.S.C. § 118(b)(2).
54. See Financing Federal-Aid Highways, supra note 43, at 24.
55. See id. at 25.
56. See id.
57. See id. at 19.
58. See id.
59. See Financing Federal-Aid Highways, supra note 43, at 20.
60. Pub. L. No. 105-178, § 1102(c)(6) (1998).
61. 23 U.S.C. § 105 (1999).
62. Id. § 106(a)(2).
63. See, e.g., Letter to Katherine Slaughter, Mayor, City of Charlottesville from Roberto Fonseca-Martinez, Division Administrator, Federal Highway Administration (Dec. 22, 1997) ("In Virginia, VDOT routinely requests FHWA take the lead on the development of environmental documents even though VDOT may have not yet made a commitment to use Federal-aid funds for any aspect of that project.").
64. 23 U.S.C. § 135 (1999).
65. Id. § 134.
66. Id. § 135(c)(1) (1999).
67. Id. § 135(f)(2)(A) (1999).
68. Id. § 135(f)(4) (1999).
69. 23 U.S.C. § 135(f)(4) (1999).
70. 23 C.F.R. § 771 (1999).
71. Id. § 771.105(a) (1999).
72. See Edward V. A. Kussy, Environmental Considerations in Highway Planning, C933 ALI-ABA 257, 261 (1994).
73. See id. at 262.
74. See id.
75. See id.
76. 23 U.S.C. §§ 106(a)(3) & 110 (1999).
77. This is demonstrated by: Protection of State sovereignty. - The authorization of the appropriation of Federal funds or their availability for expenditure under this chapter shall in no way infringe on the sovereign rights of the States to determine which projects shall be federally financed. The provisions of this chapter provide for a federally assisted State program.
78. U.S.C. § 145(a) (1999).
79. Id. § 145(a).
80. Id. § 135(f)(2)(E).
81. Id. § 135(f)(2)(F)(ii).
82. Id. § 135(f)(5).
83. Telephone discussion with John Grounds, Finance Manager, Virginia Division, Federal Highway Administration, Nov. 5, 1999.
84. See, e.g., Letter to Katherine Slaughter, supra note 62. In Virginia, VDOT routinely requests FHWA take the lead on the development of environmental documents even though VDOT may not have yet made a commitment to use Federal-aid funds for any aspect of that project. VDOT takes this approach in order to retain the flexibility to use Federal-aid highway funds or any other funding sources that may become available in the later states of a project as project scheduling and funding priorities become more defined. Id.
85. The Federal Highway Administration has recently explained this practice for the Charlottesville-Albemarle Metropolitan Planning Organization (MPO). The MPO had not yet included a major project (dubbed the Route 29 bypass) into its transportation improvement plan (TIP). The state, however, had shown "accrual" of funds for the project in its state transportation improvement plan (STIP). The MPO was concerned that the state was overriding the MPO's funding decision and asked the FHWA to explain. In response, FHWA said: Virginia, like many other States, routinely shows accrual of Federal funds for a project that may be built someday. This practice has no real standing except as a way of letting the public know funds are being set aside for the project; it does not constitute the obligation of the funds for construction. . . . If the state and MPO conclude the environmental analysis by deciding not to construct the Route 29 Bypass, the accrued funds can simply be used elsewhere. Letter to Sally Thomas from George E. Schoener, Director, Metropolitan Planning and Programs, Federal Highway Administration (Aug. 18, 1999).
86. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Volpe, 351 F. Supp. 1002 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
87. 446 F.2d 1013 (5th Cir. 1971).
88. See id. at 1027.
89. Id.
90. As was discussed above, 23 U.S.C. § 145(a) reserves to states the right to designate those highway projects for which they will request federal funding.
91. 23 C.F.R. § 771 (1999).
92. 337 F. Supp. 221 (N.D. Cal. 1971).
93. See id.
94. See id. at 224.
95. See id. at 226-27.
96. See id. at 227.
97. La Raza, 337 F. Supp. at 231.
98. See id.
99. 23 C.F.R. § 771 (1999).
100. La Raza, 337 F. Supp. at 230 (referring to 39 Fed. Reg. 35,234 (1970)).
101. Id.
102. Id. at 227.
103. 351 F. Supp. 1002 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
104. Id. at 1007.
105. 359 F. Supp. 611 (E.D. Va. 1973).
106. See id. at 632-33.
107. See id.
108. See id. at 633 (referring to Ely v. Velde, 363 F. Supp. 277 (E.D. Va. 1973), which found insufficient evidence to sustain plaintiff's argument that prison remained federal project even though state shifted to state rather than federal funds and, while accepting the argument that a diversion of federal funds intended for the project in question to other state projects would constitute impermissible shifts, concluded that such a shift did not occur in this case where federal funds were diverted to local not state projects).
109. James River, 359 F. Supp. at 633.
110. 376 F. Supp. 806 (D. Conn. 1974).
111. See id. at 810-11.
112. See id. at 812.
113. See id. at 813.
114. See id. at 812.
115. See Citizens for a Balanced Environment, 376 F. Supp. at 812.
116. 808 F.2d 1039 (4th Cir. 1986).
117. See id. at 1043.
118. See id. at 1040.
119. See id. at 1043.
120. See id.
121. FHWA's regulations state that section 4(f) review should be "evaluated early in the development of the action when alternatives to the proposed action are under study." 23 C.F.R. § 771.135(b). The FHWA regulations also require that "[t]o the fullest extent possible, all environmental investigations, reviews, and consultations be coordinated as a single process. . . ." 23 C.F.R. § 771.105(a).
122. 906 F.2d 1477 (10th Cir. 1990).
123. Id. at 1482.
124. Id. at 1480.
125. This strategy has also been applied recently by state transit authorities in Massachusetts. When section 4(f) threatened to delay a light rail project, the state segmented the project, after years of developing it as a federal-aid project, into federally funded and state funded segments in an effort to avoid the prohibitions of section 4(f). See Lyndsey Layton, Rail Line Avoids Major Hurdle, THE PATRIOT LEDGER, Quincy, MA, Feb. 16, 1996 ("For years, the [transit authority] had said the entire . . . rail project . . . would be 80 percent federally funded. . . . But state Transportation Secretary James Kerasiotes shocked observers when he announced in June that the state would not use federal money to pay for the Greenbush branch."); Tiffany Vail, Lawyer: State Errs on Greenbush Says Segmenting Rail Project Violates Preservation Law, THE PATRIOT LEDGER, Quincy, MA, Aug. 25, 1995.
126. This strategy has also been applied recently by state transit authorities in Massachusetts. When section 4(f) threatened to delay a light rail project, the state segmented the project, after years of developing it as a federal-aid project, into federally funded and state funded segments in an effort to avoid the prohibitions of section 4(f). See Lyndsey Layton, Rail Line Avoids Major Hurdle, THE PATRIOT LEDGER, Quincy, MA, Feb. 16, 1996 ("For years, the [transit authority] had said the entire . . . rail project . . . would be 80 percent federally funded. . . . But state Transportation Secretary James Kerasiotes shocked observers when he announced in June that the state would not use federal money to pay for the Greenbush branch."); Tiffany Vail, Lawyer: State Errs on Greenbush Says Segmenting Rail Project Violates Preservation Law, THE PATRIOT LEDGER, Quincy, MA, Aug. 25, 1995.
127. 49 U.S.C. § 303(c).
128. See, e.g., Citizen Advocates for Responsible Expansion, Inc. (I-CARE) v. Dole, 770 F.2d 423, 441 n.23 (5th Cir. 1985) (discussing broad application of constructive use doctrine recognized by most courts); Louisiana Envtl. Soc'y, Inc. v. Coleman, 537 F.2d 79, 84-85 (5th Cir. 1976) (approving of decisions espousing broad interpretations of section 4(f) that adopt the constructive use doctrine).
129. See Federal Highway Administration, Section 4(f) Policy Paper, at Question 14.
130. See, e.g., Stop H-3 Ass'n v. Coleman, 533 F.2d 434, 439 & 445 (9th Cir. 1976); Monroe County Conservation Council v. Adams, 566 F.2d 419, 424 (2d Cir. 1977); Louisiana Envtl. Soc'y, 537 F.2d at 85.
131. See Miller, supra note 14, at 641.
132. 23 C.F.R. § 771.135(p)(iii) (1999).
133. Id. § 771.135(p)(2).
134. Id. § 771.135(p)(5)(v). In addition to this exception for highways planned concurrently with protected resources, the regulations also create an exception to the constructive use doctrine for highway projects where a project was planned or approved before the protected resource was established or designated. Id. § 771.135(p)(5)(iv) (1999).
135. Id. § 771.135(p)(4).
136. 948 F.2d 568 (9th Cir. 1991).
137. Id. at 574 (citing S. REP. NO. 89-1659, at 5-6 (1966)) (emphasis added).
138. See id.
139. See id. at 575.
140. See Section 4(f) Policy Paper, supra note 126.
141. Id. at Question 14.
142. See General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141 (1976).
143. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
144. Sierra Club, 948 F.2d at 575 n.7.
145. See id. at 573.
146. See id.
147. See id.
148. See id.
149. See Section 4(f) Policy Paper, supra note 126.
150. 105 Stat. 1914 § 1065(d).
151. Id. § 1065(a)(2).
152. Letter to Cole Hendrix, City Manager, City of Charlottesville, from Debra A. Switzer, Environmental Specialist Sr. Fld. 1 (May 14, 1993) (arguing that planned federal-aid highway, the Meadowcreek Parkway, is exempt from section 4(f) review because in 1975 the City of Charlottesville, Virginia, had set aside a right-of-way for a future highway in Mclntire Park, a park that had been public ownership and active use since 1925); Finding of No Significant Impact, Mclntire Road Extension, M-5104 (108), Bruce Turner, Apr. 13, 1995, Message and Comment (same).
153. See, e.g., Louisiana Envtl. Soc'y, 537 F.2d at 84; Township of Springfield v. Lewis, 702 F.2d 426, 430 (3d Cir. 1982) (asserting that any park use, regardless of its degree, invokes § 4(f)); Falls Road Impact Comm., Inc. v. Dole, 581 F. Supp. 678, 690 (E.D. Wis. 1984) (holding that physical taking of parkland, no matter how small, is a use of § 4(f) lands).
154. 23 C.F.R. § 771.135(f) (1999).
155. Id. § 771.135(g)(2).
156. Id. § 771.135(g)(2).
157. Id. § 771.135(f)(1).
158. 766 F.2d 28 (1st Cir. 1985).
159. See id. at 31-32.
160. See id.
161. See id. at 32.
162. Stanley D. Olesh, The Road Through Our Ruins: Archaeology and Section 4(f) of the Department of Transportation Act, 28 WM. & MARY L. REV. 155, 169 (1986).
163. Pub. L. No. 89-574, 80 Stat. 766 (1966).
164. 112 CONG. REC. 17,631 (1966).
165. Id.
166. Pub. L. No. 89-574, 80 Stat. 766, 771 (1966).
167. 112 CONG. REC. 19,098, 26,565 (1966).
168. 112 CONG. REC. 26,651 (1966).
169. Id.
170. See Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-495, § 18(a), 82 Stat. 823 (1968) (current version at 23 U.S.C. § 138 (1999)).
171. Congressman Chester Holifield of California described the intent of section 4(f): "In 1966 a dedicated Congress told these [highway] interests: 'You may go so far and no farther.' " 114 CONG. REC. 19,916 (1968).
172. 112 CONG. REC. 26,651 (1966).
173. 49 U.S.C. § 303(c).
174. See Harrisonburg Coalition Against Ruining Env't v. Volpe, 330 F. Supp. 918 (D. Pa. 1971).
175. See Arlington Coalition on Transp. v. Volpe, 458 F.2d 1323 (4th Cir. 1972).
176. See Benton Franklin Riverfront Trailway & Bridge Comm. v. Lewis, 701 F.2d 784, 788 (9th Cir. 1983); Citizen Advocates for Responsible Expansion, Inc. (I-CARE) v. Dole, 770 F.2d 423, 438 (5th Cir. 1985) (ruling that property that is merely eligible for listing on the National Register is protected under § 4(f) to the same extent as properties that are actually listed).
177. See Pennsylvania Envtl. Council, Inc. v Bartlett, 454 F.2d 613 (3d Cir. 1971).
178. See San Antonio Conservation Soc'y. v Texas Highway Dep't, 446 F.2d 1013 (5th Cir. 1971).
179. See Stop H-3 Ass'n v. Coleman, 533 F.2d 434, 443-44 (9th Cir. 1976) (finding § 4(f) applicable where Secretary of Interior declared a historic site eligible for inclusion in National Register but state authority found site insignificant). See also Town of Belmont v. Dole, 766 F.2d 28, 33 (1st Cir. 1985); San Antonio Conservation Soc'y, 446 F.2d at 1025 (applying § 4(f), where City Council of San Antonio deemed city-owned parkland significant).
180. 533 F.2d at 439-42.
181. See id.
182. See, e.g., Concerned Citizens on I-90 v. Secretary of Transp., 641 F.2d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 1981) (ruling that § 4(f) was inapplicable where a local body had determined that a reservoir was not a significant recreation resource).
183. See David Karp, Politics Holding Up School's Nomination as Historic Landmark, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Dec. 17, 1995, at 9B.
184. See, e.g., 12/14/91 CONG. Q. WKLY. Rep. 3675 (listing registration of lobbyist group, McConnell/Ferguson Group, with a stated interest in § 4(f)).
185. See Virgil Tipton & Robert L. Jownig, Action by Congress Boosts Page Avenue Extension Plan Still Lacks Approval Key Federal Agencies, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Oct. 23, 1992, at 3A; John Danforth, Editorial, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Oct. 18, 1992, at 2B (responding to criticism of the legislative exemption).
186. See Virgil Tipton & Robert L. Jownig, Action by Congress Boosts Page Avenue Extension Plan Still Lacks Approval Key Federal Agencies, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Oct. 23, 1992, at 3A; John Danforth, Editorial, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Oct. 18, 1992, at 2B (responding to criticism of the legislative exemption).
187. Packard Undermines Parklands Rule, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 5, 1992, at Metro B.
188. Much of the information in this section is taken from a time line found in two briefing documents prepared for the Charlottesville City Council by the City Attorney, Clyde Gouldman. See Clyde Gouldman, Meadowcreek Parkway: The Best Alternative? (Aug. 29, 1997) [hereinafter Gouldman, Best Alternative]; Meadowcreek Parkway: Another Funding Route? (Oct. 10, 1997) [hereinafter, Gouldman, Funding Route]. Where information is drawn from another source, such as a letter or original document, the source is indicated.
189. See Gouldman, Funding Route, supra note 184. This fact has also been recognized by the FHWA. See Letter from Roberto Fonseca-Martinez, Division Administrator, Federal Highway Administration to Katherine Slaughter, Mayor, City of Charlottesville 2 (Dec. 22, 1997) [hereinafter FHWA letter to Slaughter, Dec. 22, 1997].
190. Resolution Thanking Paul Goodloe McIntire for the Gifts of Two Parks and Playgrounds to the City of Charlottesville, Charlottesville City Council (Jan. 18, 1926).
191. See Corby Barefoot, A Car Culture and Meadowcreek Parkway Timeline, C-VILLE WEEKLY, Dec. 16-22, 1997, at 17 [hereinafter C-VILLE].
192. See id. at 20.
193. See id. at 21.
194. See Letter to Eugene W. Cleckly, Chief, Environmental Operations Division, HEV-11 from Joseph Canny, Director, Office of Transportation and Regulatory Affairs, Federal Highway Administration.
195. See Letter to James M. Tumlin, Division Administrator from Robert E. Gatz, Director, Office of Planning and Program Development, Baltimore, Maryland (Feb. 10, 1986).
196. See Letter to James M. Tumlin, Division Administrator, Federal Highway Administration from Bruce Blanchard, Director, Environmental Project Review, Department of Interior 1 (Feb. 14, 1986); Letter to R. L. Hundley, Environmental Engineer, Virginia Department of Highways and Transportation from Lawrence Levine, Regional Environmental Officer, U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (Mar. 6, 1986).
197. See Letter to Cole Hendrix, City Manager, City of Charlottesville from Debra A. Switzer, Environmental Specialist Sr. Fld. 1 (May 14, 1993).
198. See Letter to Debra A. Switzer, Environmental Specialist, Department of Transportation from Eugene M. German, Director, City of Charlottesville Department of Parks and Recreation 1 (Apr. 8, 1993).
199. See Letter to Mr. Satyendra Sing Huja, Department of Community Development, Director of Planning and Community Development from Debra A. Switzer, Environmental Specialist Sr. Fld. 1 (Mar. 9, 1995).
200. Finding of No Significant Impact, McIntire Road Extension, M-5104(108), Bruce Turner, Apr. 13, 1995, Message and Comment.
201. Id.
202. See discussion of political exceptions to § 4(f) above.
203. 16 U.S.C. §§ 4601-4 to 4601-11.
204. See generally Peter A. Fahmy, Conversion Restrictions of the Federal Land and Water Conservation Fund, 21 COLO. LAW. 1417 (1992).
205. See id.
206. Letter to Richard Collins from Linda Peacock, Assistant City Manager for the City of Charlottesville (Nov. 17, 1999).
207. MASS. CONST. art. XLIX, § 179.
208. See 45 Op. Mass. Att'y Gen. 139 (1973).