Arms control is not enough

Orbis

Volumn 40, Issue 1, 1996, Pages 71-84

  Clark, Mark T ^a,b,c  

^a National Security Studies Program

^b CALIFORNIA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c US Marine Corps ^*

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0347547483     PISSN: 00304387     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0030-4387(96)90085-X     Document Type: Article

References (50)

1. President Bill Clinton, address to the General Assembly of the United Nations, New York, Federal News Service [online], Sept. 27, 1993.
2. Office of the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Report on Nonproliferation and Counterproliferation Activities and Programs (hereafter RNCAP) (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, May 1994), p. 1.
3. Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to the President and the Congress (hereafter DOD Annual Report 1995) (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, Feb. 1995), p. 74.
4. Compare DOD Annual Report 1995, p. 74, with RNCAP, passim.
5. For a more complete discussion of the authors and their ideas on cooperative security, see Mark T. Clark, "The Future of Clinton's Foreign and Defense Policy: Multilateral Security," Comparative Strategy, Spring 1994, pp. 181-95; and Mark T. Clark, "The Trouble with Collective Security," Orbis, Spring 1995, pp. 237-58.
6. For a more complete discussion of the authors and their ideas on cooperative security, see Mark T. Clark, "The Future of Clinton's Foreign and Defense Policy: Multilateral Security," Comparative Strategy, Spring 1994, pp. 181-95; and Mark T. Clark, "The Trouble with Collective Security," Orbis, Spring 1995, pp. 237-58.
7. See Clark, "The Future of Clinton's Foreign and Defense Policy"; and Clark, "The Trouble with Collective Security."
8. See Clark, "The Future of Clinton's Foreign and Defense Policy"; and Clark, "The Trouble with Collective Security."
9. Ashton B. Caner, William J. Perry, and John D. Steinbruner, A New Concept of Cooperative Security (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1992), pp. 20-21.
10. Ibid., pp. 4, 5.
11. Ibid., p. 7.
12. Ibid., p. 8.
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid., p. 36.
16. Ibid., p. 8.
17. Ibid., p. 19.
18. DOD Annual Report 1995, p. 85.
19. For a fuller discussion of this and the tension it produces in the interpretation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), see Henry Sokolski, "What Does the History of the NPT Tell Us About Its Future?" (paper presented at "Challenges to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime in the Early Nineties," the annual convention of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, Atlanta, Ga., Feb. 17, 1995).
20. DOD Annual Report 1995, pp. 86, 91.
21. Ibid., p. 89.
22. Ibid., pp. 57, 58.
23. William J. Perry, "Desert Storm and Deterrence," Foreign Affairs, Fall 1991, pp. 66, 81. While it is probably correct that nuclear deterrence of the traditional bilateral U.S.-Soviet type, and all that it implies, would not work in the same way with new nuclear countries, some forms of deterrence may still work and ought to be considered. See Keith B. Payne, "Post-Cold War Deterrence and Missile Defense," Orbis, Spring 1995, pp. 201-23.
24. William J. Perry, "Desert Storm and Deterrence," Foreign Affairs, Fall 1991, pp. 66, 81. While it is probably correct that nuclear deterrence of the traditional bilateral U.S.-Soviet type, and all that it implies, would not work in the same way with new nuclear countries, some forms of deterrence may still work and ought to be considered. See Keith B. Payne, "Post-Cold War Deterrence and Missile Defense," Orbis, Spring 1995, pp. 201-23.
25. DOD Annual Report 1995, pp. 84-85.
26. Ibid., p. 83; Department of Defense, Office of International Security Affairs, United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region (hereafter USSS-EAPR) (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, Feb. 1995), p. 21.
27. Ibid., p. 83; Department of Defense, Office of International Security Affairs, United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region (hereafter USSS-EAPR) (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, Feb. 1995), p. 21.
28. See, for example, the White House, A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement (hereafter NSSEE 1994) (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, July 1994), p. 12; DOD Annual Report 1995, p. 10.
29. See, for example, the White House, A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement (hereafter NSSEE 1994) (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, July 1994), p. 12; DOD Annual Report 1995, p. 10.
30. See Meet the Press, National Broadcast Company, Apr. 3, 1994, transcript provided by Burrelle's Information Services (Livingston, N.J.). According to several professional staffers of the Senate Armed Services Committee, about a month after the broadcast, Perry admitted privately to senators that it had been a mistake to state this publicly. However, a reasonable function of deterrence is to make intentions known. Without a public commitment to extended nuclear deterrence, it is reasonable to assume that the North Koreans no longer believe in the credibility of U.S. extended nuclear deterrence guarantees.
31. Carter, Perry, and Steinbruner, Cooperative Security, p. 26.
32. Les Aspin, Address to a discussion meeting of the Atlantic Council of the United States, "Understanding the New Security Environment," Federal News Service [online], Jan. 6, 1992.
33. Carter, Perry, and Steinbruner, Cooperative Security, p. 19. Vertical proliferation is the expanding of existing nuclear arsenals, whereas horizontal proliferation refers to the acquiring of nuclear capability.
34. Ibid., p. 13.
35. Compare NSSEE 1994, p. 12 with DOD Annual Report 1995. p. 10.
36. Compare NSSEE 1994, p. 12 with DOD Annual Report 1995. p. 10.
37. Carter, Perry, and Steinbruner, Cooperative Security, p. 9.
38. NSSEE 1994, pp. 11-12.
39. USSS-EAPR, p. 12.
40. DOD Annual Report 1995, p. 85.
41. Compare DOD Annual Report 1994, p. 40, with DOD Annual Report 1995, p. 25.
42. Compare DOD Annual Report 1994, p. 40, with DOD Annual Report 1995, p. 25.
43. NSSEE 1994, p. 12.
44. Steven A. Hildreth, The ABM Treaty and Theater Missile Defense: Proposed Changes and Potential Implications, CRS Report 94-374 F, May 2, 1994, p. 1. Although the proceedings of the Standing Consultative Commission are secret, much has been released or discussed publicly.
45. For a more thorough discussion of these criticisms, as well as responses, see the study Proliferation, Potential TMD Roles, Demarcation and ABM Treaty Compatibility, directed by Keith Payne (Alexandria, Va.: National Institute for Public Policy, Sept. 1994).
46. Steven A. Hildreth, Theater Missile Defense: Issues for the 104th Congress, CRS Issue Brief IB95012, June 9, 1995, p. 10.
47. See reprints of letters to the president by members of the House and Senate in "Mischief in Moscow, Crisis in Washington: Will Clinton Defy Congress on Missile Defense?" Decision Brief No. 95-D 30 (Washington, D.C.: Center for Security Policy, May 8, 1995).
48. The ABM Treaty and its 1974 protocol allow for one site with one hundred missile interceptors to be deployed. Currently, only Russia has deployed such a system, around Moscow.
49. See "The Rising 'Crimson Tide' Lifts the Case for Missile Defense," Decision Brief No. 95-D 35 (Washington, D.C.: Center for Security Policy, May 19, 1995).
50. Patrick E. Tyler, "China Warns US About Deploying Asian Missiles," Orange County Register, Feb. 17, 1995.