A Modernization of "Peerless Homogeneity": The Creation of Russian Smokeless Gunpowder

Technology and Culture

Volumn 44, Issue 4, 2003, Pages 677-702

  Gordin, Michael D ^a,b  

^a PRINCETON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 0347544121     PISSN: 0040165X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Review

References (172)

1. Among the numerous valuable studies that make this claim, see, in particular: Wiebe E. Bijker, Thomas P. Hughes, and Trevor J. Pinch, eds., The Social Construction of Technological Systems: New Directions in the Sociology and History of Technology (Cambridge, Mass., 1987); Donald MacKenzie and Judy Wajcman, eds., The Social Shaping of Technology, 2d. ed. (Philadelphia, 1999); Merritt Roe Smith and Leo Marx, eds., Does Technology Drive History? The Dilemma of Technological Determinism (Cambridge, Mass., 1994); and Eric Schatzberg, Wings of Wood, Wings of Metal: Culture and Technical Choice in American Airplane Materials, 1914-1945 (Princeton, N.J., 1999). For an interesting attempt to move beyond this deconstruction of the myth toward an alternative account of technology's reliability, see Edward W. Constant II, "Reliable Knowledge and Unreliable Stuff: On the Practical Role of Rational Beliefs," Technology and Culture 40 (1999): 324-57.
2. Among the numerous valuable studies that make this claim, see, in particular: Wiebe E. Bijker, Thomas P. Hughes, and Trevor J. Pinch, eds., The Social Construction of Technological Systems: New Directions in the Sociology and History of Technology (Cambridge, Mass., 1987); Donald MacKenzie and Judy Wajcman, eds., The Social Shaping of Technology, 2d. ed. (Philadelphia, 1999); Merritt Roe Smith and Leo Marx, eds., Does Technology Drive History? The Dilemma of Technological Determinism (Cambridge, Mass., 1994); and Eric Schatzberg, Wings of Wood, Wings of Metal: Culture and Technical Choice in American Airplane Materials, 1914-1945 (Princeton, N.J., 1999). For an interesting attempt to move beyond this deconstruction of the myth toward an alternative account of technology's reliability, see Edward W. Constant II, "Reliable Knowledge and Unreliable Stuff: On the Practical Role of Rational Beliefs," Technology and Culture 40 (1999): 324-57.
3. Among the numerous valuable studies that make this claim, see, in particular: Wiebe E. Bijker, Thomas P. Hughes, and Trevor J. Pinch, eds., The Social Construction of Technological Systems: New Directions in the Sociology and History of Technology (Cambridge, Mass., 1987); Donald MacKenzie and Judy Wajcman, eds., The Social Shaping of Technology, 2d. ed. (Philadelphia, 1999); Merritt Roe Smith and Leo Marx, eds., Does Technology Drive History? The Dilemma of Technological Determinism (Cambridge, Mass., 1994); and Eric Schatzberg, Wings of Wood, Wings of Metal: Culture and Technical Choice in American Airplane Materials, 1914-1945 (Princeton, N.J., 1999). For an interesting attempt to move beyond this deconstruction of the myth toward an alternative account of technology's reliability, see Edward W. Constant II, "Reliable Knowledge and Unreliable Stuff: On the Practical Role of Rational Beliefs," Technology and Culture 40 (1999): 324-57.
4. Among the numerous valuable studies that make this claim, see, in particular: Wiebe E. Bijker, Thomas P. Hughes, and Trevor J. Pinch, eds., The Social Construction of Technological Systems: New Directions in the Sociology and History of Technology (Cambridge, Mass., 1987); Donald MacKenzie and Judy Wajcman, eds., The Social Shaping of Technology, 2d. ed. (Philadelphia, 1999); Merritt Roe Smith and Leo Marx, eds., Does Technology Drive History? The Dilemma of Technological Determinism (Cambridge, Mass., 1994); and Eric Schatzberg, Wings of Wood, Wings of Metal: Culture and Technical Choice in American Airplane Materials, 1914-1945 (Princeton, N.J., 1999). For an interesting attempt to move beyond this deconstruction of the myth toward an alternative account of technology's reliability, see Edward W. Constant II, "Reliable Knowledge and Unreliable Stuff: On the Practical Role of Rational Beliefs," Technology and Culture 40 (1999): 324-57.
5. Among the numerous valuable studies that make this claim, see, in particular: Wiebe E. Bijker, Thomas P. Hughes, and Trevor J. Pinch, eds., The Social Construction of Technological Systems: New Directions in the Sociology and History of Technology (Cambridge, Mass., 1987); Donald MacKenzie and Judy Wajcman, eds., The Social Shaping of Technology, 2d. ed. (Philadelphia, 1999); Merritt Roe Smith and Leo Marx, eds., Does Technology Drive History? The Dilemma of Technological Determinism (Cambridge, Mass., 1994); and Eric Schatzberg, Wings of Wood, Wings of Metal: Culture and Technical Choice in American Airplane Materials, 1914-1945 (Princeton, N.J., 1999). For an interesting attempt to move beyond this deconstruction of the myth toward an alternative account of technology's reliability, see Edward W. Constant II, "Reliable Knowledge and Unreliable Stuff: On the Practical Role of Rational Beliefs," Technology and Culture 40 (1999): 324-57.
6. Abbreviations: ADIM - Arkhiv-Muzei D. I. Mendeleeva (D. I. Mendeleev Museum-Archive); MS - D. I. Mendeleev, Sochineniia, 25 vols. (Leningrad, 1934-1956); RGAVMF - Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Voenno-Morskogo Flota (Russian State Archive of the Navy). All archives are in St. Petersburg, Russia, and are widely accessible to researchers. ADIM contains a fairly complete collection of documents authored by or addressed to D. I. Mendeleev in his various scientific and political activities, while reprints of many published documents are in MS. RGAVMF contains the complete documentation of navy material from Peter the Great to the Soviet period. The Russian Julian calendar lagged twelve days behind the Western Gregorian calendar in the nineteenth century, and thirteen in the twentieth. All dates are in the "Old Style" unless indicated by (N.S.). Transliterations according to the modified Library of Congress standard.
7. Unless specified as "black powder," "gunpowder" throughout this article refers to a substance's function - propelling projectiles out of a firearm. That is, smokeless powder, a chemical substance distinct from traditional black powder, will often be denoted as "gunpowder." This convention is suspended only in certain direct quotations, and I supply differentiation where ambiguous.
8. Similar accounts have been offered for military technology by Ken Alder, Engineering the Revolution: Arms and Enlightenment in France, 1763-1815 (Princeton, 1997); Donald A. MacKenzie, Inventing Accuracy: A Historical Sociology of Nuclear Missile Guidance (Cambridge, Mass., 1990) and Knowing Machines: Essays on Technical Change (Cambridge, Mass., 1996); and Michael H. Armacost, The Politics of Weapons Innovation: The Thor-Jupiter Controversy (New York, 1969).
9. Similar accounts have been offered for military technology by Ken Alder, Engineering the Revolution: Arms and Enlightenment in France, 1763-1815 (Princeton, 1997); Donald A. MacKenzie, Inventing Accuracy: A Historical Sociology of Nuclear Missile Guidance (Cambridge, Mass., 1990) and Knowing Machines: Essays on Technical Change (Cambridge, Mass., 1996); and Michael H. Armacost, The Politics of Weapons Innovation: The Thor-Jupiter Controversy (New York, 1969).
10. Similar accounts have been offered for military technology by Ken Alder, Engineering the Revolution: Arms and Enlightenment in France, 1763-1815 (Princeton, 1997); Donald A. MacKenzie, Inventing Accuracy: A Historical Sociology of Nuclear Missile Guidance (Cambridge, Mass., 1990) and Knowing Machines: Essays on Technical Change (Cambridge, Mass., 1996); and Michael H. Armacost, The Politics of Weapons Innovation: The Thor-Jupiter Controversy (New York, 1969).
11. Similar accounts have been offered for military technology by Ken Alder, Engineering the Revolution: Arms and Enlightenment in France, 1763-1815 (Princeton, 1997); Donald A. MacKenzie, Inventing Accuracy: A Historical Sociology of Nuclear Missile Guidance (Cambridge, Mass., 1990) and Knowing Machines: Essays on Technical Change (Cambridge, Mass., 1996); and Michael H. Armacost, The Politics of Weapons Innovation: The Thor-Jupiter Controversy (New York, 1969).
12. Edward Jones-Imhotep, "Disciplining Technology: Electronic Reliability, Cold-War Military Culture and the Topside Ionogram," History and Technology 17 (2000): 125-75; David A. Hounshell and John Kenly Smith Jr., Science and Corporate Strategy: Du Pont R&D, 1902-1980 (Cambridge, 1988); Walter Vincenti, "The Air-Propeller Tests of W. F. Durand and E. P. Lesley: A Case Study in Technological Methodology," Technology and Culture 20 (1979): 712-51.
13. Edward Jones-Imhotep, "Disciplining Technology: Electronic Reliability, Cold-War Military Culture and the Topside Ionogram," History and Technology 17 (2000): 125-75; David A. Hounshell and John Kenly Smith Jr., Science and Corporate Strategy: Du Pont R&D, 1902-1980 (Cambridge, 1988); Walter Vincenti, "The Air-Propeller Tests of W. F. Durand and E. P. Lesley: A Case Study in Technological Methodology," Technology and Culture 20 (1979): 712-51.
14. Edward Jones-Imhotep, "Disciplining Technology: Electronic Reliability, Cold-War Military Culture and the Topside Ionogram," History and Technology 17 (2000): 125-75; David A. Hounshell and John Kenly Smith Jr., Science and Corporate Strategy: Du Pont R&D, 1902-1980 (Cambridge, 1988); Walter Vincenti, "The Air-Propeller Tests of W. F. Durand and E. P. Lesley: A Case Study in Technological Methodology," Technology and Culture 20 (1979): 712-51.
15. Exemplary historicization of such invocations can be found in Alder; Gabrielle Hecht, The Radiance of France: Nuclear Power and National Identity after World War II (Cambridge, Mass., 1998); and Peter Galison and Barton Bernstein, "'In Any Light': Scientists and the Decision to Build the Superbomb, 1952-1954," Historical Studies in the Physical and Biological Sciences 19 (1989): 267-347.
16. Exemplary historicization of such invocations can be found in Alder; Gabrielle Hecht, The Radiance of France: Nuclear Power and National Identity after World War II (Cambridge, Mass., 1998); and Peter Galison and Barton Bernstein, "'In Any Light': Scientists and the Decision to Build the Superbomb, 1952-1954," Historical Studies in the Physical and Biological Sciences 19 (1989): 267-347.
17. See Seymour H. Mauskopf, "From Rumford to Rodman: The Scientific Study of the Physical Characteristics of Gunpowder in the First Part of the Nineteenth Century," in Gunpowder: The History of an International Technology, ed. Brenda J. Buchanan (Bath, 1996), 277-93, and "Chemistry and Cannon: J.-L. Proust and Gunpowder Analysis," Technology and Culture 31 (1990): 398-426, on 404. On Lavoisier, see Mauskopf, "Gunpowder and the Chemical Revolution," Osiris 4 (1988): 93-118; Jean-Pierre Poirier, Lavoisier: Chemist, Biologist, and Economist, trans. Rebecca Balinski (Philadelphia, 1993), 89-94, 117-19; and Robert P. Multhauf, "The French Crash Program for Saltpeter Production, 1776-94," Technology and Culture 12 (1971): 163-81.
18. See Seymour H. Mauskopf, "From Rumford to Rodman: The Scientific Study of the Physical Characteristics of Gunpowder in the First Part of the Nineteenth Century," in Gunpowder: The History of an International Technology, ed. Brenda J. Buchanan (Bath, 1996), 277-93, and "Chemistry and Cannon: J.-L. Proust and Gunpowder Analysis," Technology and Culture 31 (1990): 398-426, on 404. On Lavoisier, see Mauskopf, "Gunpowder and the Chemical Revolution," Osiris 4 (1988): 93-118; Jean-Pierre Poirier, Lavoisier: Chemist, Biologist, and Economist, trans. Rebecca Balinski (Philadelphia, 1993), 89-94, 117-19; and Robert P. Multhauf, "The French Crash Program for Saltpeter Production, 1776-94," Technology and Culture 12 (1971): 163-81.
19. See Seymour H. Mauskopf, "From Rumford to Rodman: The Scientific Study of the Physical Characteristics of Gunpowder in the First Part of the Nineteenth Century," in Gunpowder: The History of an International Technology, ed. Brenda J. Buchanan (Bath, 1996), 277-93, and "Chemistry and Cannon: J.-L. Proust and Gunpowder Analysis," Technology and Culture 31 (1990): 398-426, on 404. On Lavoisier, see Mauskopf, "Gunpowder and the Chemical Revolution," Osiris 4 (1988): 93-118; Jean-Pierre Poirier, Lavoisier: Chemist, Biologist, and Economist, trans. Rebecca Balinski (Philadelphia, 1993), 89-94, 117-19; and Robert P. Multhauf, "The French Crash Program for Saltpeter Production, 1776-94," Technology and Culture 12 (1971): 163-81.
20. See Seymour H. Mauskopf, "From Rumford to Rodman: The Scientific Study of the Physical Characteristics of Gunpowder in the First Part of the Nineteenth Century," in Gunpowder: The History of an International Technology, ed. Brenda J. Buchanan (Bath, 1996), 277-93, and "Chemistry and Cannon: J.-L. Proust and Gunpowder Analysis," Technology and Culture 31 (1990): 398-426, on 404. On Lavoisier, see Mauskopf, "Gunpowder and the Chemical Revolution," Osiris 4 (1988): 93-118; Jean-Pierre Poirier, Lavoisier: Chemist, Biologist, and Economist, trans. Rebecca Balinski (Philadelphia, 1993), 89-94, 117-19; and Robert P. Multhauf, "The French Crash Program for Saltpeter Production, 1776-94," Technology and Culture 12 (1971): 163-81.
21. See Seymour H. Mauskopf, "From Rumford to Rodman: The Scientific Study of the Physical Characteristics of Gunpowder in the First Part of the Nineteenth Century," in Gunpowder: The History of an International Technology, ed. Brenda J. Buchanan (Bath, 1996), 277-93, and "Chemistry and Cannon: J.-L. Proust and Gunpowder Analysis," Technology and Culture 31 (1990): 398-426, on 404. On Lavoisier, see Mauskopf, "Gunpowder and the Chemical Revolution," Osiris 4 (1988): 93-118; Jean-Pierre Poirier, Lavoisier: Chemist, Biologist, and Economist, trans. Rebecca Balinski (Philadelphia, 1993), 89-94, 117-19; and Robert P. Multhauf, "The French Crash Program for Saltpeter Production, 1776-94," Technology and Culture 12 (1971): 163-81.
22. Mauskopf, "Chemistry and Cannon," 423, and "Bridging Chemistry and Physics in the Experimental Study of Gunpowder," in Instruments and Experimentation in the History of Chemistry, ed. Frederic L. Holmes and Trevor H. Levere (Cambridge, Mass., 2000), 335-65.
23. Mauskopf, "Chemistry and Cannon," 423, and "Bridging Chemistry and Physics in the Experimental Study of Gunpowder," in Instruments and Experimentation in the History of Chemistry, ed. Frederic L. Holmes and Trevor H. Levere (Cambridge, Mass., 2000), 335-65.
24. John B. Bernadou, Smokeless Powder, Nitro-Cellulose, and Theory of the Cellulose Molecule(New York, 1901), 164; Bruce W. Manning, Bayonets before Bullets: The ImperialRussian Army, 1861-1914 (Bloomington, Ind., 1992), 104-6; Manuel Eissler, A Handbook of Modern Explosives (London, 1897), 181; Frederick Abel, "Smokeless Explosives," Nature 41 (1890): 328-30, 352-55; and Charles E. Munroe, "On the Development of Smokeless Powder," Journal of the American Chemical Society 18 (1896): 819-46, on 824 and 838-39.
25. John B. Bernadou, Smokeless Powder, Nitro-Cellulose, and Theory of the Cellulose Molecule(New York, 1901), 164; Bruce W. Manning, Bayonets before Bullets: The ImperialRussian Army, 1861-1914 (Bloomington, Ind., 1992), 104-6; Manuel Eissler, A Handbook of Modern Explosives (London, 1897), 181; Frederick Abel, "Smokeless Explosives," Nature 41 (1890): 328-30, 352-55; and Charles E. Munroe, "On the Development of Smokeless Powder," Journal of the American Chemical Society 18 (1896): 819-46, on 824 and 838-39.
26. John B. Bernadou, Smokeless Powder, Nitro-Cellulose, and Theory of the Cellulose Molecule(New York, 1901), 164; Bruce W. Manning, Bayonets before Bullets: The ImperialRussian Army, 1861-1914 (Bloomington, Ind., 1992), 104-6; Manuel Eissler, A Handbook of Modern Explosives (London, 1897), 181; Frederick Abel, "Smokeless Explosives," Nature 41 (1890): 328-30, 352-55; and Charles E. Munroe, "On the Development of Smokeless Powder," Journal of the American Chemical Society 18 (1896): 819-46, on 824 and 838-39.
27. John B. Bernadou, Smokeless Powder, Nitro-Cellulose, and Theory of the Cellulose Molecule(New York, 1901), 164; Bruce W. Manning, Bayonets before Bullets: The ImperialRussian Army, 1861-1914 (Bloomington, Ind., 1992), 104-6; Manuel Eissler, A Handbook of Modern Explosives (London, 1897), 181; Frederick Abel, "Smokeless Explosives," Nature 41 (1890): 328-30, 352-55; and Charles E. Munroe, "On the Development of Smokeless Powder," Journal of the American Chemical Society 18 (1896): 819-46, on 824 and 838-39.
28. John B. Bernadou, Smokeless Powder, Nitro-Cellulose, and Theory of the Cellulose Molecule(New York, 1901), 164; Bruce W. Manning, Bayonets before Bullets: The ImperialRussian Army, 1861-1914 (Bloomington, Ind., 1992), 104-6; Manuel Eissler, A Handbook of Modern Explosives (London, 1897), 181; Frederick Abel, "Smokeless Explosives," Nature 41 (1890): 328-30, 352-55; and Charles E. Munroe, "On the Development of Smokeless Powder," Journal of the American Chemical Society 18 (1896): 819-46, on 824 and 838-39.
29. Bernadou, 1-2; I. S. Dmitriev, "'Osobaia missiia' Mendeleeva: Fakty i argumenty," Voprosy Istorii Estestvoznaniia i Tekhniki, no. 3 (1996): 126-41, on 133; Eissler, v-vi. For a general overview of this history, see John Bernadou, "The Development of Smokeless Powder," a lecture delivered at the U.S. Naval War College on 20 July 1897, in Bernadou, app. 4.
30. Bernadou, 1-2; I. S. Dmitriev, "'Osobaia missiia' Mendeleeva: Fakty i argumenty," Voprosy Istorii Estestvoznaniia i Tekhniki, no. 3 (1996): 126-41, on 133; Eissler, v-vi. For a general overview of this history, see John Bernadou, "The Development of Smokeless Powder," a lecture delivered at the U.S. Naval War College on 20 July 1897, in Bernadou, app. 4.
31. Bernadou, 1-2; I. S. Dmitriev, "'Osobaia missiia' Mendeleeva: Fakty i argumenty," Voprosy Istorii Estestvoznaniia i Tekhniki, no. 3 (1996): 126-41, on 133; Eissler, v-vi. For a general overview of this history, see John Bernadou, "The Development of Smokeless Powder," a lecture delivered at the U.S. Naval War College on 20 July 1897, in Bernadou, app. 4.
32. Bernadou, 1-2; I. S. Dmitriev, "'Osobaia missiia' Mendeleeva: Fakty i argumenty," Voprosy Istorii Estestvoznaniia i Tekhniki, no. 3 (1996): 126-41, on 133; Eissler, v-vi. For a general overview of this history, see John Bernadou, "The Development of Smokeless Powder," a lecture delivered at the U.S. Naval War College on 20 July 1897, in Bernadou, app. 4.
33. On these French powders, see M. Barral, "Etudes des Poudres de Chasse Françaises et Recherche d'une Nouvelle Poudre de Chasse sans Fumée," Mémorial des Poudres et Salpêtres 5 (1892): 189-225; P. M. E. Vieille, "Researches upon the Nitraction of Cotton, " in Bernadou, app. 1; M. Berthellot and P. M. E. Vieille, "Rapport sur l'Étude du Nitrate de Diazobenzol," Mémorial des Poudres et Salpêtres 1 (1882-1883): 99-108; P. M. E. Vieille, "Note sure l'Hydrocellulose et sur le Composé Nitré qui en Dérive," Mémorial des Poudres et Salpêtres 2 (1884-1889): 21-35; and Vieille, "Recherches sur la Nitrification du Coton," Mémorial des Poudres et Salpêtres 2 (1884-1889): 212-24. For a biography of Vieille, including a discussion of his formulation of the "shock wave," see Louis Médard, "L'oeuvre scientifique de Paul Vieille (1854-1934)," Revue d'Histoire des Sciences 48 (1995): 381-404.
34. On these French powders, see M. Barral, "Etudes des Poudres de Chasse Françaises et Recherche d'une Nouvelle Poudre de Chasse sans Fumée," Mémorial des Poudres et Salpêtres 5 (1892): 189-225; P. M. E. Vieille, "Researches upon the Nitraction of Cotton, " in Bernadou, app. 1; M. Berthellot and P. M. E. Vieille, "Rapport sur l'Étude du Nitrate de Diazobenzol," Mémorial des Poudres et Salpêtres 1 (1882-1883): 99-108; P. M. E. Vieille, "Note sure l'Hydrocellulose et sur le Composé Nitré qui en Dérive," Mémorial des Poudres et Salpêtres 2 (1884-1889): 21-35; and Vieille, "Recherches sur la Nitrification du Coton," Mémorial des Poudres et Salpêtres 2 (1884-1889): 212-24. For a biography of Vieille, including a discussion of his formulation of the "shock wave," see Louis Médard, "L'oeuvre scientifique de Paul Vieille (1854-1934)," Revue d'Histoire des Sciences 48 (1995): 381-404.
35. On these French powders, see M. Barral, "Etudes des Poudres de Chasse Françaises et Recherche d'une Nouvelle Poudre de Chasse sans Fumée," Mémorial des Poudres et Salpêtres 5 (1892): 189-225; P. M. E. Vieille, "Researches upon the Nitraction of Cotton, " in Bernadou, app. 1; M. Berthellot and P. M. E. Vieille, "Rapport sur l'Étude du Nitrate de Diazobenzol," Mémorial des Poudres et Salpêtres 1 (1882-1883): 99-108; P. M. E. Vieille, "Note sure l'Hydrocellulose et sur le Composé Nitré qui en Dérive," Mémorial des Poudres et Salpêtres 2 (1884-1889): 21-35; and Vieille, "Recherches sur la Nitrification du Coton," Mémorial des Poudres et Salpêtres 2 (1884-1889): 212-24. For a biography of Vieille, including a discussion of his formulation of the "shock wave," see Louis Médard, "L'oeuvre scientifique de Paul Vieille (1854-1934)," Revue d'Histoire des Sciences 48 (1995): 381-404.
36. On these French powders, see M. Barral, "Etudes des Poudres de Chasse Françaises et Recherche d'une Nouvelle Poudre de Chasse sans Fumée," Mémorial des Poudres et Salpêtres 5 (1892): 189-225; P. M. E. Vieille, "Researches upon the Nitraction of Cotton, " in Bernadou, app. 1; M. Berthellot and P. M. E. Vieille, "Rapport sur l'Étude du Nitrate de Diazobenzol," Mémorial des Poudres et Salpêtres 1 (1882-1883): 99-108; P. M. E. Vieille, "Note sure l'Hydrocellulose et sur le Composé Nitré qui en Dérive," Mémorial des Poudres et Salpêtres 2 (1884-1889): 21-35; and Vieille, "Recherches sur la Nitrification du Coton," Mémorial des Poudres et Salpêtres 2 (1884-1889): 212-24. For a biography of Vieille, including a discussion of his formulation of the "shock wave," see Louis Médard, "L'oeuvre scientifique de Paul Vieille (1854-1934)," Revue d'Histoire des Sciences 48 (1995): 381-404.
37. On these French powders, see M. Barral, "Etudes des Poudres de Chasse Françaises et Recherche d'une Nouvelle Poudre de Chasse sans Fumée," Mémorial des Poudres et Salpêtres 5 (1892): 189-225; P. M. E. Vieille, "Researches upon the Nitraction of Cotton, " in Bernadou, app. 1; M. Berthellot and P. M. E. Vieille, "Rapport sur l'Étude du Nitrate de Diazobenzol," Mémorial des Poudres et Salpêtres 1 (1882-1883): 99-108; P. M. E. Vieille, "Note sure l'Hydrocellulose et sur le Composé Nitré qui en Dérive," Mémorial des Poudres et Salpêtres 2 (1884-1889): 21-35; and Vieille, "Recherches sur la Nitrification du Coton," Mémorial des Poudres et Salpêtres 2 (1884-1889): 212-24. For a biography of Vieille, including a discussion of his formulation of the "shock wave," see Louis Médard, "L'oeuvre scientifique de Paul Vieille (1854-1934)," Revue d'Histoire des Sciences 48 (1995): 381-404.
38. On these French powders, see M. Barral, "Etudes des Poudres de Chasse Françaises et Recherche d'une Nouvelle Poudre de Chasse sans Fumée," Mémorial des Poudres et Salpêtres 5 (1892): 189-225; P. M. E. Vieille, "Researches upon the Nitraction of Cotton, " in Bernadou, app. 1; M. Berthellot and P. M. E. Vieille, "Rapport sur l'Étude du Nitrate de Diazobenzol," Mémorial des Poudres et Salpêtres 1 (1882-1883): 99-108; P. M. E. Vieille, "Note sure l'Hydrocellulose et sur le Composé Nitré qui en Dérive," Mémorial des Poudres et Salpêtres 2 (1884-1889): 21-35; and Vieille, "Recherches sur la Nitrification du Coton," Mémorial des Poudres et Salpêtres 2 (1884-1889): 212-24. For a biography of Vieille, including a discussion of his formulation of the "shock wave," see Louis Médard, "L'oeuvre scientifique de Paul Vieille (1854-1934)," Revue d'Histoire des Sciences 48 (1995): 381-404.
39. Munroe, 830.
40. P. A. Abel, "Researches on Gun-Cotton," parts 1 and 2, Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society 156 (1866): 269-308; 157 (1867): 181-253; Paul Everson and Wayne Cocroft, "The Royal Gunpowder Factory at Waltham Abbey: The Field of Archaeology of Gunpowder Manufacture," in Buchanan (n. 7 above), 377-94, on 392; and Ivan Ivanovich Vernidub, "One Hundred Years of Russian Smokeless (Nitrocellulose) Powder Industry," in Buchanan, 395-400, on 396. Attempts had been made to arm with smokeless powder even before these three types had emerged, although with dubious success. Leading the way was Austria-Hungary, which introduced guncotton in 1874 and then speedily abandoned it. The form they were using was a compactly wound thread for field guns, but it proved disastrous in the field and the Austrian factory in Hirtenburg blew up for undetermined reasons. Experiments had begun at Woolwich Arsenal in England even earlier (1867-1868) with compressed guncotton, but field usage led to so many problems that "much evidently remained to be accomplished before the requisite uniformity of action could have been secured." Eissler, 75. On Hirtenburg, see Munroe, 827.
41. P. A. Abel, "Researches on Gun-Cotton," parts 1 and 2, Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society 156 (1866): 269-308; 157 (1867): 181-253; Paul Everson and Wayne Cocroft, "The Royal Gunpowder Factory at Waltham Abbey: The Field of Archaeology of Gunpowder Manufacture," in Buchanan (n. 7 above), 377-94, on 392; and Ivan Ivanovich Vernidub, "One Hundred Years of Russian Smokeless (Nitrocellulose) Powder Industry," in Buchanan, 395-400, on 396. Attempts had been made to arm with smokeless powder even before these three types had emerged, although with dubious success. Leading the way was Austria-Hungary, which introduced guncotton in 1874 and then speedily abandoned it. The form they were using was a compactly wound thread for field guns, but it proved disastrous in the field and the Austrian factory in Hirtenburg blew up for undetermined reasons. Experiments had begun at Woolwich Arsenal in England even earlier (1867-1868) with compressed guncotton, but field usage led to so many problems that "much evidently remained to be accomplished before the requisite uniformity of action could have been secured." Eissler, 75. On Hirtenburg, see Munroe, 827.
42. P. A. Abel, "Researches on Gun-Cotton," parts 1 and 2, Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society 156 (1866): 269-308; 157 (1867): 181-253; Paul Everson and Wayne Cocroft, "The Royal Gunpowder Factory at Waltham Abbey: The Field of Archaeology of Gunpowder Manufacture," in Buchanan (n. 7 above), 377-94, on 392; and Ivan Ivanovich Vernidub, "One Hundred Years of Russian Smokeless (Nitrocellulose) Powder Industry," in Buchanan, 395-400, on 396. Attempts had been made to arm with smokeless powder even before these three types had emerged, although with dubious success. Leading the way was Austria-Hungary, which introduced guncotton in 1874 and then speedily abandoned it. The form they were using was a compactly wound thread for field guns, but it proved disastrous in the field and the Austrian factory in Hirtenburg blew up for undetermined reasons. Experiments had begun at Woolwich Arsenal in England even earlier (1867-1868) with compressed guncotton, but field usage led to so many problems that "much evidently remained to be accomplished before the requisite uniformity of action could have been secured." Eissler, 75. On Hirtenburg, see Munroe, 827.
43. P. A. Abel, "Researches on Gun-Cotton," parts 1 and 2, Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society 156 (1866): 269-308; 157 (1867): 181-253; Paul Everson and Wayne Cocroft, "The Royal Gunpowder Factory at Waltham Abbey: The Field of Archaeology of Gunpowder Manufacture," in Buchanan (n. 7 above), 377-94, on 392; and Ivan Ivanovich Vernidub, "One Hundred Years of Russian Smokeless (Nitrocellulose) Powder Industry," in Buchanan, 395-400, on 396. Attempts had been made to arm with smokeless powder even before these three types had emerged, although with dubious success. Leading the way was Austria-Hungary, which introduced guncotton in 1874 and then speedily abandoned it. The form they were using was a compactly wound thread for field guns, but it proved disastrous in the field and the Austrian factory in Hirtenburg blew up for undetermined reasons. Experiments had begun at Woolwich Arsenal in England even earlier (1867-1868) with compressed guncotton, but field usage led to so many problems that "much evidently remained to be accomplished before the requisite uniformity of action could have been secured." Eissler, 75. On Hirtenburg, see Munroe, 827.
44. P. A. Abel, "Researches on Gun-Cotton," parts 1 and 2, Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society 156 (1866): 269-308; 157 (1867): 181-253; Paul Everson and Wayne Cocroft, "The Royal Gunpowder Factory at Waltham Abbey: The Field of Archaeology of Gunpowder Manufacture," in Buchanan (n. 7 above), 377-94, on 392; and Ivan Ivanovich Vernidub, "One Hundred Years of Russian Smokeless (Nitrocellulose) Powder Industry," in Buchanan, 395-400, on 396. Attempts had been made to arm with smokeless powder even before these three types had emerged, although with dubious success. Leading the way was Austria-Hungary, which introduced guncotton in 1874 and then speedily abandoned it. The form they were using was a compactly wound thread for field guns, but it proved disastrous in the field and the Austrian factory in Hirtenburg blew up for undetermined reasons. Experiments had begun at Woolwich Arsenal in England even earlier (1867-1868) with compressed guncotton, but field usage led to so many problems that "much evidently remained to be accomplished before the requisite uniformity of action could have been secured." Eissler, 75. On Hirtenburg, see Munroe, 827.
45. P. A. Abel, "Researches on Gun-Cotton," parts 1 and 2, Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society 156 (1866): 269-308; 157 (1867): 181-253; Paul Everson and Wayne Cocroft, "The Royal Gunpowder Factory at Waltham Abbey: The Field of Archaeology of Gunpowder Manufacture," in Buchanan (n. 7 above), 377-94, on 392; and Ivan Ivanovich Vernidub, "One Hundred Years of Russian Smokeless (Nitrocellulose) Powder Industry," in Buchanan, 395-400, on 396. Attempts had been made to arm with smokeless powder even before these three types had emerged, although with dubious success. Leading the way was Austria-Hungary, which introduced guncotton in 1874 and then speedily abandoned it. The form they were using was a compactly wound thread for field guns, but it proved disastrous in the field and the Austrian factory in Hirtenburg blew up for undetermined reasons. Experiments had begun at Woolwich Arsenal in England even earlier (1867-1868) with compressed guncotton, but field usage led to so many problems that "much evidently remained to be accomplished before the requisite uniformity of action could have been secured." Eissler, 75. On Hirtenburg, see Munroe, 827.
46. Quotation from Menning, 104. See also Vernidub, 397; Dmitriev, 134; and A. Ia. Averbukh, "D. I. Mendeleev i Nauchno-tekhnicheskaia laboratoriia Morskogo vedomstva," Trudy Instituta Istorii Estestvoznaniia i Tekhniki 39 (1962): 222-47, on 231.
47. As he argued in an 1891 report to the navy, Okhtenskii's strong French design influence built in numerous flaws that could have been averted if a critical eye had been trained on the French. In his private 1890 laboratory notebook, Mendeleev wrote: "Everything is from the French, but stupidly done"; and "[The army] believes the French at their word, but they can swindle." Quotations from t. 2, l. 17a and t. 4, l. 13a of Mendeleev's gunpowder notebooks, reproduced in A. la. Averbukh, "Issledovaniia D. I. Mendeleeva v oblasti nitratsii: Otkrytie pirokollodiia," Trudy Leningradskogo Tekhnologicheskogo Instituta 30 (1954): 69-95, on 80. For the 1891 report's condemnation of French involvement, see MS, vol. 9, 48. On Mendeleev's interest in explosives, see Gordin, "No Smoking Gun: D. I. Mendeleev and Pyrocollodion Gunpowder," in Troisièmes journées scientifiques Paul Vieille: Instrumentation, expérimentation et expertise des matériaux énergétiques (poudres, explosifs et pyrotechnie), du XVIe siècle à nos jours (Paris, 2000), 73-96, on 76-77.
48. As he argued in an 1891 report to the navy, Okhtenskii's strong French design influence built in numerous flaws that could have been averted if a critical eye had been trained on the French. In his private 1890 laboratory notebook, Mendeleev wrote: "Everything is from the French, but stupidly done"; and "[The army] believes the French at their word, but they can swindle." Quotations from t. 2, l. 17a and t. 4, l. 13a of Mendeleev's gunpowder notebooks, reproduced in A. la. Averbukh, "Issledovaniia D. I. Mendeleeva v oblasti nitratsii: Otkrytie pirokollodiia," Trudy Leningradskogo Tekhnologicheskogo Instituta 30 (1954): 69-95, on 80. For the 1891 report's condemnation of French involvement, see MS, vol. 9, 48. On Mendeleev's interest in explosives, see Gordin, "No Smoking Gun: D. I. Mendeleev and Pyrocollodion Gunpowder," in Troisièmes journées scientifiques Paul Vieille: Instrumentation, expérimentation et expertise des matériaux énergétiques (poudres, explosifs et pyrotechnie), du XVIe siècle à nos jours (Paris, 2000), 73-96, on 76-77.
49. As he argued in an 1891 report to the navy, Okhtenskii's strong French design influence built in numerous flaws that could have been averted if a critical eye had been trained on the French. In his private 1890 laboratory notebook, Mendeleev wrote: "Everything is from the French, but stupidly done"; and "[The army] believes the French at their word, but they can swindle." Quotations from t. 2, l. 17a and t. 4, l. 13a of Mendeleev's gunpowder notebooks, reproduced in A. la. Averbukh, "Issledovaniia D. I. Mendeleeva v oblasti nitratsii: Otkrytie pirokollodiia," Trudy Leningradskogo Tekhnologicheskogo Instituta 30 (1954): 69-95, on 80. For the 1891 report's condemnation of French involvement, see MS, vol. 9, 48. On Mendeleev's interest in explosives, see Gordin, "No Smoking Gun: D. I. Mendeleev and Pyrocollodion Gunpowder," in Troisièmes journées scientifiques Paul Vieille: Instrumentation, expérimentation et expertise des matériaux énergétiques (poudres, explosifs et pyrotechnie), du XVIe siècle à nos jours (Paris, 2000), 73-96, on 76-77.
50. S. P. Vukolov, "D. I. Mendeleev i bezdymnyi porokh," Zhurnal Prikladnoi Khimii 7 (1934): 1535-38, on 1535.
51. RGAVMF f. 421, op. 2, d. 678, l. 89. See also Vice Admiral Pilkin and Manager Dmitriev to the General Administration of Shipbuilding and Equipment, 28 December 1890, RGAVMF f. 421, op. 2, d. 722, ll. 8-18; and Chikhachev to Minister of War P. S. Vannovskii, 19 February 1892, RGAVMF f. 421, op. 2, d. 768, l. 29. The problem with the Ministry of War's powder was that it was designed for small-caliber weapons like rifles, which inflicted 90 percent of land-combat fatalities; given that only 5 percent of fatalities came from cannon fire, it was understandable that the army had not focused on the unique problems posed by larger-caliber weapons. Mendeleev, Chel'tsov, and Fedotov to Chikhachev, 16 October 1890, MS, vol. 9, 37.
52. Overtures were made about establishing some sort of information clearinghouse for the two ministries, but I could detect no traces of anything actually being instituted. For an example of such an effort to establish "a defined order in the exchange of information and the communality (obshchenie) of both departments in questions of trials of smokeless gunpowder," see the report of the Technical Committee of the Artillery of the Ministry of the Navy to the Chief Artillery Administration, 18 January 1890, RGAVMF f. 421, op. 2, d. 678, l. 20ob.
53. P. M. Luk'ianov, Istoriia khimicheskikh promyslov i khimicheskoi promyshlennosti Rossii do kontsa XIX veka, v. 5 (Moscow, 1961), 354.
54. I. Chel'tsov, "K izucheniiu bezdymnogo porokha," 24 April 1890, RGAVMF f. 421, op. 2, d. 678, ll. 83-84. See also L. Fedotov, "Ob ustroistve laboratorii dlia ispytaniia bezdymnykh porokhov," 30 April 1890, RGAVMF f. 421, op. 2, d. 678, ll. 85-87.
55. I. Chel'tsov, "K izucheniiu bezdymnogo porokha," 24 April 1890, RGAVMF f. 421, op. 2, d. 678, ll. 83-84. See also L. Fedotov, "Ob ustroistve laboratorii dlia ispytaniia bezdymnykh porokhov," 30 April 1890, RGAVMF f. 421, op. 2, d. 678, ll. 85-87.
56. For more on Mendeleev's reformist activities in the Russian bureaucracy, see Michael D. Gordin, "The Ordered Society and Its Enemies: D. I. Mendeleev and the Russian Empire, 1861-1905" (Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, 2001), especially chap. 6.
57. Gordin, "No Smoking Gun" (n. 15 above), 73-74.
58. On the reforms of the army, see Peter von Wahlde, "Russian Military Reform: 1862-1874," Military Review 39 (1960): 60-69; Dietrich Beyrau, Militär und Gesellschaft im vorrevolutionären Russland (Köln, 1984); Forrestt A. Miller, Dmitrii Miliutin and the Reform Era in Russia (Nashville, Tenn., 1968). Although Miliutin is often given credit for the reforms of the military, one can see the genesis of many of the subsequent policies under Sukhozanet, his predecessor. See E. Willis Brooks, "Reform in the Russian Army, 1856-1861," Slavic Review 43 (1984): 63-82. For a criticism of the decentralization policies as a panacea, see John L. H. Keep, Soldiers of the Tsar: Army and Society in Russia, 1462-1874 (Oxford, 1985), 355. Perhaps the only military branches to escape overhauling were the artillery and engineering corps, both of which were already well-organized in terms of expertise and merit under Nicholas I, and so were not distracted by the martinet-like orders of Nicholaevan officers who valued presentation above performance. See Miller, 62; Peter Kenez, "A Profile of the Prerevolutionary Officer Corps," California Slavic Studies 7 (1973): 121-58, on 136; John Shelton Curtiss, The Russian Army under Nicholas I, 1825-1855 (Durham, N.C., 1965), 148-51; and John Bushnell, "The Tsarist Officer Corps, 1881-1914: Customs, Duties, Inefficiency," American Historical Review 86 (1981): 753-80.
59. On the reforms of the army, see Peter von Wahlde, "Russian Military Reform: 1862-1874," Military Review 39 (1960): 60-69; Dietrich Beyrau, Militär und Gesellschaft im vorrevolutionären Russland (Köln, 1984); Forrestt A. Miller, Dmitrii Miliutin and the Reform Era in Russia (Nashville, Tenn., 1968). Although Miliutin is often given credit for the reforms of the military, one can see the genesis of many of the subsequent policies under Sukhozanet, his predecessor. See E. Willis Brooks, "Reform in the Russian Army, 1856-1861," Slavic Review 43 (1984): 63-82. For a criticism of the decentralization policies as a panacea, see John L. H. Keep, Soldiers of the Tsar: Army and Society in Russia, 1462-1874 (Oxford, 1985), 355. Perhaps the only military branches to escape overhauling were the artillery and engineering corps, both of which were already well-organized in terms of expertise and merit under Nicholas I, and so were not distracted by the martinet-like orders of Nicholaevan officers who valued presentation above performance. See Miller, 62; Peter Kenez, "A Profile of the Prerevolutionary Officer Corps," California Slavic Studies 7 (1973): 121-58, on 136; John Shelton Curtiss, The Russian Army under Nicholas I, 1825-1855 (Durham, N.C., 1965), 148-51; and John Bushnell, "The Tsarist Officer Corps, 1881-1914: Customs, Duties, Inefficiency," American Historical Review 86 (1981): 753-80.
60. On the reforms of the army, see Peter von Wahlde, "Russian Military Reform: 1862-1874," Military Review 39 (1960): 60-69; Dietrich Beyrau, Militär und Gesellschaft im vorrevolutionären Russland (Köln, 1984); Forrestt A. Miller, Dmitrii Miliutin and the Reform Era in Russia (Nashville, Tenn., 1968). Although Miliutin is often given credit for the reforms of the military, one can see the genesis of many of the subsequent policies under Sukhozanet, his predecessor. See E. Willis Brooks, "Reform in the Russian Army, 1856-1861," Slavic Review 43 (1984): 63-82. For a criticism of the decentralization policies as a panacea, see John L. H. Keep, Soldiers of the Tsar: Army and Society in Russia, 1462-1874 (Oxford, 1985), 355. Perhaps the only military branches to escape overhauling were the artillery and engineering corps, both of which were already well-organized in terms of expertise and merit under Nicholas I, and so were not distracted by the martinet-like orders of Nicholaevan officers who valued presentation above performance. See Miller, 62; Peter Kenez, "A Profile of the Prerevolutionary Officer Corps," California Slavic Studies 7 (1973): 121-58, on 136; John Shelton Curtiss, The Russian Army under Nicholas I, 1825-1855 (Durham, N.C., 1965), 148-51; and John Bushnell, "The Tsarist Officer Corps, 1881-1914: Customs, Duties, Inefficiency," American Historical Review 86 (1981): 753-80.
61. On the reforms of the army, see Peter von Wahlde, "Russian Military Reform: 1862-1874," Military Review 39 (1960): 60-69; Dietrich Beyrau, Militär und Gesellschaft im vorrevolutionären Russland (Köln, 1984); Forrestt A. Miller, Dmitrii Miliutin and the Reform Era in Russia (Nashville, Tenn., 1968). Although Miliutin is often given credit for the reforms of the military, one can see the genesis of many of the subsequent policies under Sukhozanet, his predecessor. See E. Willis Brooks, "Reform in the Russian Army, 1856-1861," Slavic Review 43 (1984): 63-82. For a criticism of the decentralization policies as a panacea, see John L. H. Keep, Soldiers of the Tsar: Army and Society in Russia, 1462-1874 (Oxford, 1985), 355. Perhaps the only military branches to escape overhauling were the artillery and engineering corps, both of which were already well-organized in terms of expertise and merit under Nicholas I, and so were not distracted by the martinet-like orders of Nicholaevan officers who valued presentation above performance. See Miller, 62; Peter Kenez, "A Profile of the Prerevolutionary Officer Corps," California Slavic Studies 7 (1973): 121-58, on 136; John Shelton Curtiss, The Russian Army under Nicholas I, 1825-1855 (Durham, N.C., 1965), 148-51; and John Bushnell, "The Tsarist Officer Corps, 1881-1914: Customs, Duties, Inefficiency," American Historical Review 86 (1981): 753-80.
62. On the reforms of the army, see Peter von Wahlde, "Russian Military Reform: 1862-1874," Military Review 39 (1960): 60-69; Dietrich Beyrau, Militär und Gesellschaft im vorrevolutionären Russland (Köln, 1984); Forrestt A. Miller, Dmitrii Miliutin and the Reform Era in Russia (Nashville, Tenn., 1968). Although Miliutin is often given credit for the reforms of the military, one can see the genesis of many of the subsequent policies under Sukhozanet, his predecessor. See E. Willis Brooks, "Reform in the Russian Army, 1856-1861," Slavic Review 43 (1984): 63-82. For a criticism of the decentralization policies as a panacea, see John L. H. Keep, Soldiers of the Tsar: Army and Society in Russia, 1462-1874 (Oxford, 1985), 355. Perhaps the only military branches to escape overhauling were the artillery and engineering corps, both of which were already well-organized in terms of expertise and merit under Nicholas I, and so were not distracted by the martinet-like orders of Nicholaevan officers who valued presentation above performance. See Miller, 62; Peter Kenez, "A Profile of the Prerevolutionary Officer Corps," California Slavic Studies 7 (1973): 121-58, on 136; John Shelton Curtiss, The Russian Army under Nicholas I, 1825-1855 (Durham, N.C., 1965), 148-51; and John Bushnell, "The Tsarist Officer Corps, 1881-1914: Customs, Duties, Inefficiency," American Historical Review 86 (1981): 753-80.
63. On the reforms of the army, see Peter von Wahlde, "Russian Military Reform: 1862-1874," Military Review 39 (1960): 60-69; Dietrich Beyrau, Militär und Gesellschaft im vorrevolutionären Russland (Köln, 1984); Forrestt A. Miller, Dmitrii Miliutin and the Reform Era in Russia (Nashville, Tenn., 1968). Although Miliutin is often given credit for the reforms of the military, one can see the genesis of many of the subsequent policies under Sukhozanet, his predecessor. See E. Willis Brooks, "Reform in the Russian Army, 1856-1861," Slavic Review 43 (1984): 63-82. For a criticism of the decentralization policies as a panacea, see John L. H. Keep, Soldiers of the Tsar: Army and Society in Russia, 1462-1874 (Oxford, 1985), 355. Perhaps the only military branches to escape overhauling were the artillery and engineering corps, both of which were already well-organized in terms of expertise and merit under Nicholas I, and so were not distracted by the martinet-like orders of Nicholaevan officers who valued presentation above performance. See Miller, 62; Peter Kenez, "A Profile of the Prerevolutionary Officer Corps," California Slavic Studies 7 (1973): 121-58, on 136; John Shelton Curtiss, The Russian Army under Nicholas I, 1825-1855 (Durham, N.C., 1965), 148-51; and John Bushnell, "The Tsarist Officer Corps, 1881-1914: Customs, Duties, Inefficiency," American Historical Review 86 (1981): 753-80.
64. On the reforms of the army, see Peter von Wahlde, "Russian Military Reform: 1862-1874," Military Review 39 (1960): 60-69; Dietrich Beyrau, Militär und Gesellschaft im vorrevolutionären Russland (Köln, 1984); Forrestt A. Miller, Dmitrii Miliutin and the Reform Era in Russia (Nashville, Tenn., 1968). Although Miliutin is often given credit for the reforms of the military, one can see the genesis of many of the subsequent policies under Sukhozanet, his predecessor. See E. Willis Brooks, "Reform in the Russian Army, 1856-1861," Slavic Review 43 (1984): 63-82. For a criticism of the decentralization policies as a panacea, see John L. H. Keep, Soldiers of the Tsar: Army and Society in Russia, 1462-1874 (Oxford, 1985), 355. Perhaps the only military branches to escape overhauling were the artillery and engineering corps, both of which were already well-organized in terms of expertise and merit under Nicholas I, and so were not distracted by the martinet-like orders of Nicholaevan officers who valued presentation above performance. See Miller, 62; Peter Kenez, "A Profile of the Prerevolutionary Officer Corps," California Slavic Studies 7 (1973): 121-58, on 136; John Shelton Curtiss, The Russian Army under Nicholas I, 1825-1855 (Durham, N.C., 1965), 148-51; and John Bushnell, "The Tsarist Officer Corps, 1881-1914: Customs, Duties, Inefficiency," American Historical Review 86 (1981): 753-80.
65. On the reforms of the army, see Peter von Wahlde, "Russian Military Reform: 1862-1874," Military Review 39 (1960): 60-69; Dietrich Beyrau, Militär und Gesellschaft im vorrevolutionären Russland (Köln, 1984); Forrestt A. Miller, Dmitrii Miliutin and the Reform Era in Russia (Nashville, Tenn., 1968). Although Miliutin is often given credit for the reforms of the military, one can see the genesis of many of the subsequent policies under Sukhozanet, his predecessor. See E. Willis Brooks, "Reform in the Russian Army, 1856-1861," Slavic Review 43 (1984): 63-82. For a criticism of the decentralization policies as a panacea, see John L. H. Keep, Soldiers of the Tsar: Army and Society in Russia, 1462-1874 (Oxford, 1985), 355. Perhaps the only military branches to escape overhauling were the artillery and engineering corps, both of which were already well-organized in terms of expertise and merit under Nicholas I, and so were not distracted by the martinet-like orders of Nicholaevan officers who valued presentation above performance. See Miller, 62; Peter Kenez, "A Profile of the Prerevolutionary Officer Corps," California Slavic Studies 7 (1973): 121-58, on 136; John Shelton Curtiss, The Russian Army under Nicholas I, 1825-1855 (Durham, N.C., 1965), 148-51; and John Bushnell, "The Tsarist Officer Corps, 1881-1914: Customs, Duties, Inefficiency," American Historical Review 86 (1981): 753-80.
66. On the reforms of the army, see Peter von Wahlde, "Russian Military Reform: 1862-1874," Military Review 39 (1960): 60-69; Dietrich Beyrau, Militär und Gesellschaft im vorrevolutionären Russland (Köln, 1984); Forrestt A. Miller, Dmitrii Miliutin and the Reform Era in Russia (Nashville, Tenn., 1968). Although Miliutin is often given credit for the reforms of the military, one can see the genesis of many of the subsequent policies under Sukhozanet, his predecessor. See E. Willis Brooks, "Reform in the Russian Army, 1856-1861," Slavic Review 43 (1984): 63-82. For a criticism of the decentralization policies as a panacea, see John L. H. Keep, Soldiers of the Tsar: Army and Society in Russia, 1462-1874 (Oxford, 1985), 355. Perhaps the only military branches to escape overhauling were the artillery and engineering corps, both of which were already well-organized in terms of expertise and merit under Nicholas I, and so were not distracted by the martinet-like orders of Nicholaevan officers who valued presentation above performance. See Miller, 62; Peter Kenez, "A Profile of the Prerevolutionary Officer Corps," California Slavic Studies 7 (1973): 121-58, on 136; John Shelton Curtiss, The Russian Army under Nicholas I, 1825-1855 (Durham, N.C., 1965), 148-51; and John Bushnell, "The Tsarist Officer Corps, 1881-1914: Customs, Duties, Inefficiency," American Historical Review 86 (1981): 753-80.
67. There is debate about the degree of social leveling. Some historians have argued that it was in fact quite substantial: see Kenez; Roberta Thompson Manning, The Crisis of the Old Order in Russia: Gentry and Government (Princeton, N.J., 1982), 31; John S. Bushnell, Mutiny amid Repression: Russian Soldiers in the Revolution of 1905-1906 (Bloomington, Ind., 1985), chap. 1; and Walter M. Pintner, "The Burden of Defense in Imperial Russia, 1725-1914," Russian Review 43 (1984): 231-59, on 257. This view is contested by Seymour Becker, who argues that when measured accurately, and accounting for expansion of forces, the decline of the nobility in the officer corps is easily exaggerated. See his Nobility and Privilege in Late Imperial Russia (DeKalb, Ill., 1985), 109. On ideological stability amid social transformation, see the excellent account in A. V. Fedorov, Russkaia Armiia v 50-70 gg. XIX v. (Leningrad, 1959), chap. 4. For an interesting analysis of radicalism in the military during the period of Mendeleev's involvement, see Norman M. Naimark, Terrorists and Social Democrats: The Russian Revolutionary Movement under Alexander III (Cambridge, Mass., 1983), chap. 5.
68. There is debate about the degree of social leveling. Some historians have argued that it was in fact quite substantial: see Kenez; Roberta Thompson Manning, The Crisis of the Old Order in Russia: Gentry and Government (Princeton, N.J., 1982), 31; John S. Bushnell, Mutiny amid Repression: Russian Soldiers in the Revolution of 1905-1906 (Bloomington, Ind., 1985), chap. 1; and Walter M. Pintner, "The Burden of Defense in Imperial Russia, 1725-1914," Russian Review 43 (1984): 231-59, on 257. This view is contested by Seymour Becker, who argues that when measured accurately, and accounting for expansion of forces, the decline of the nobility in the officer corps is easily exaggerated. See his Nobility and Privilege in Late Imperial Russia (DeKalb, Ill., 1985), 109. On ideological stability amid social transformation, see the excellent account in A. V. Fedorov, Russkaia Armiia v 50-70 gg. XIX v. (Leningrad, 1959), chap. 4. For an interesting analysis of radicalism in the military during the period of Mendeleev's involvement, see Norman M. Naimark, Terrorists and Social Democrats: The Russian Revolutionary Movement under Alexander III (Cambridge, Mass., 1983), chap. 5.
69. There is debate about the degree of social leveling. Some historians have argued that it was in fact quite substantial: see Kenez; Roberta Thompson Manning, The Crisis of the Old Order in Russia: Gentry and Government (Princeton, N.J., 1982), 31; John S. Bushnell, Mutiny amid Repression: Russian Soldiers in the Revolution of 1905-1906 (Bloomington, Ind., 1985), chap. 1; and Walter M. Pintner, "The Burden of Defense in Imperial Russia, 1725-1914," Russian Review 43 (1984): 231-59, on 257. This view is contested by Seymour Becker, who argues that when measured accurately, and accounting for expansion of forces, the decline of the nobility in the officer corps is easily exaggerated. See his Nobility and Privilege in Late Imperial Russia (DeKalb, Ill., 1985), 109. On ideological stability amid social transformation, see the excellent account in A. V. Fedorov, Russkaia Armiia v 50-70 gg. XIX v. (Leningrad, 1959), chap. 4. For an interesting analysis of radicalism in the military during the period of Mendeleev's involvement, see Norman M. Naimark, Terrorists and Social Democrats: The Russian Revolutionary Movement under Alexander III (Cambridge, Mass., 1983), chap. 5.
70. There is debate about the degree of social leveling. Some historians have argued that it was in fact quite substantial: see Kenez; Roberta Thompson Manning, The Crisis of the Old Order in Russia: Gentry and Government (Princeton, N.J., 1982), 31; John S. Bushnell, Mutiny amid Repression: Russian Soldiers in the Revolution of 1905-1906 (Bloomington, Ind., 1985), chap. 1; and Walter M. Pintner, "The Burden of Defense in Imperial Russia, 1725-1914," Russian Review 43 (1984): 231-59, on 257. This view is contested by Seymour Becker, who argues that when measured accurately, and accounting for expansion of forces, the decline of the nobility in the officer corps is easily exaggerated. See his Nobility and Privilege in Late Imperial Russia (DeKalb, Ill., 1985), 109. On ideological stability amid social transformation, see the excellent account in A. V. Fedorov, Russkaia Armiia v 50-70 gg. XIX v. (Leningrad, 1959), chap. 4. For an interesting analysis of radicalism in the military during the period of Mendeleev's involvement, see Norman M. Naimark, Terrorists and Social Democrats: The Russian Revolutionary Movement under Alexander III (Cambridge, Mass., 1983), chap. 5.
71. There is debate about the degree of social leveling. Some historians have argued that it was in fact quite substantial: see Kenez; Roberta Thompson Manning, The Crisis of the Old Order in Russia: Gentry and Government (Princeton, N.J., 1982), 31; John S. Bushnell, Mutiny amid Repression: Russian Soldiers in the Revolution of 1905-1906 (Bloomington, Ind., 1985), chap. 1; and Walter M. Pintner, "The Burden of Defense in Imperial Russia, 1725-1914," Russian Review 43 (1984): 231-59, on 257. This view is contested by Seymour Becker, who argues that when measured accurately, and accounting for expansion of forces, the decline of the nobility in the officer corps is easily exaggerated. See his Nobility and Privilege in Late Imperial Russia (DeKalb, Ill., 1985), 109. On ideological stability amid social transformation, see the excellent account in A. V. Fedorov, Russkaia Armiia v 50-70 gg. XIX v. (Leningrad, 1959), chap. 4. For an interesting analysis of radicalism in the military during the period of Mendeleev's involvement, see Norman M. Naimark, Terrorists and Social Democrats: The Russian Revolutionary Movement under Alexander III (Cambridge, Mass., 1983), chap. 5.
72. There is debate about the degree of social leveling. Some historians have argued that it was in fact quite substantial: see Kenez; Roberta Thompson Manning, The Crisis of the Old Order in Russia: Gentry and Government
73. Joseph Bradley, Guns for the Tsar: American Technology and the Small Arms Industry in Nineteenth-Century Russia (DeKalb, Ill., 1990), 13-14, 21, and passim; Menning (n. 9 above), 30-31. Russia also had extensive arms dealings with Krupp. See Maurice Pearton, The Knowledgeable State: Diplomacy, War and Technology since 1830 (London, 1982), 83.
74. Joseph Bradley, Guns for the Tsar: American Technology and the Small Arms Industry in Nineteenth-Century Russia (DeKalb, Ill., 1990), 13-14, 21, and passim; Menning (n. 9 above), 30-31. Russia also had extensive arms dealings with Krupp. See Maurice Pearton, The Knowledgeable State: Diplomacy, War and Technology since 1830 (London, 1982), 83.
75. Joseph Bradley, Guns for the Tsar: American Technology and the Small Arms Industry in Nineteenth-Century Russia (DeKalb, Ill., 1990), 13-14, 21, and passim; Menning (n. 9 above), 30-31. Russia also had extensive arms dealings with Krupp. See Maurice Pearton, The Knowledgeable State: Diplomacy, War and Technology since 1830 (London, 1982), 83.
76. John S. Bushnell, "Miliutin and the Balkan War: Military Reform vs. Military Performance," in Russia's Great Reforms, 1855-1881, ed. Ben Eklof, John Bushnell, and Larissa Zakharova (Bloomington, Ind., 1994), 139-58; Menning, 85; and Carl Van Dyke, Russian Imperial Military Doctrine and Education, 1832-1914 (New York, 1990), 84.
77. John S. Bushnell, "Miliutin and the Balkan War: Military Reform vs. Military Performance," in Russia's Great Reforms, 1855-1881, ed. Ben Eklof, John Bushnell, and Larissa Zakharova (Bloomington, Ind., 1994), 139-58; Menning, 85; and Carl Van Dyke, Russian Imperial Military Doctrine and Education, 1832-1914 (New York, 1990), 84.
78. John S. Bushnell, "Miliutin and the Balkan War: Military Reform vs. Military Performance," in Russia's Great Reforms, 1855-1881, ed. Ben Eklof, John Bushnell, and Larissa Zakharova (Bloomington, Ind., 1994), 139-58; Menning, 85; and Carl Van Dyke, Russian Imperial Military Doctrine and Education, 1832-1914 (New York, 1990), 84.
79. Judicial and administrative reform of the navy included ending arbitrary sentencing (1867), abolishing corporal punishment (1863), and substantially unifying naval administration. Aurele J. Violette, "The Grand Duke Konstantin Nikolayevich and the Reform of Naval Administration, 1855-1870, " Slavonic and East European Review 52 (1974): 584-601; Violette, "Judicial Reforms in the Russian Navy during the 'Era of Great Reforms': The Reform Act of 1867 and the Abolition of Corporal Punishment," Slavonic and East European Review 56 (1978): 586-603.
80. Judicial and administrative reform of the navy included ending arbitrary sentencing (1867), abolishing corporal punishment (1863), and substantially unifying naval administration. Aurele J. Violette, "The Grand Duke Konstantin Nikolayevich and the Reform of Naval Administration, 1855-1870, " Slavonic and East European Review 52 (1974): 584-601; Violette, "Judicial Reforms in the Russian Navy during the 'Era of Great Reforms': The Reform Act of 1867 and the Abolition of Corporal Punishment," Slavonic and East European Review 56 (1978): 586-603.
81. Jacob W. Kipp, "Consequences of Defeat: Modernizing the Russian Navy, 1856-1863," Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas 20 (1972): 210-25. On the 1882 buildup, see Anthony J. Watts, The Imperial Russian Navy (London, 1990), 14-16; and David Woodward, The Russians at Sea: A History of the Russian Navy (New York, 1965), 117. The year 1859 was in fact a historic watershed for navies in general: it was the last year in which navies measured their strength by the number of wooden line-of-battle ships. After this, ironclads became the staple of the modern fleet. Woodward, 107.
82. Jacob W. Kipp, "Consequences of Defeat: Modernizing the Russian Navy, 1856-1863," Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas 20 (1972): 210-25. On the 1882 buildup, see Anthony J. Watts, The Imperial Russian Navy (London, 1990), 14-16; and David Woodward, The Russians at Sea: A History of the Russian Navy (New York, 1965), 117. The year 1859 was in fact a historic watershed for navies in general: it was the last year in which navies measured their strength by the number of wooden line-of-battle ships. After this, ironclads became the staple of the modern fleet. Woodward, 107.
83. Jacob W. Kipp, "Consequences of Defeat: Modernizing the Russian Navy, 1856-1863," Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas 20 (1972): 210-25. On the 1882 buildup, see Anthony J. Watts, The Imperial Russian Navy (London, 1990), 14-16; and David Woodward, The Russians at Sea: A History of the Russian Navy (New York, 1965), 117. The year 1859 was in fact a historic watershed for navies in general: it was the last year in which navies measured their strength by the number of wooden line-of-battle ships. After this, ironclads became the staple of the modern fleet. Woodward, 107.
84. Jacob W. Kipp, "Consequences of Defeat: Modernizing the Russian Navy, 1856-1863," Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas 20 (1972): 210-25. On the 1882 buildup, see Anthony J. Watts, The Imperial Russian Navy (London, 1990), 14-16; and David Woodward, The Russians at Sea: A History of the Russian Navy (New York, 1965), 117. The year 1859 was in fact a historic watershed for navies in general: it was the last year in which navies measured their strength by the number of wooden line-of-battle ships. After this, ironclads became the staple of the modern fleet. Woodward, 107.
85. On Makarov and the torpedo battle of 25 May 1877, see Fred T. Jane, The Imperial Russian Navy: Its Past, Present, and Future, rev. ed. (London, 1904), 200. On naval arms, see Menning, 273. The Russian navy was idiosyncratic in its preference for light artillery. Russians opted for 3-inch shells instead of the European standard of 4.7-inch, and 10-inch where other European powers used 12-inch. Jane, 154. Naval rearmament was occasionally buffeted by disaster. In 1894 the new warship Sissoi Velikii was sent to the Mediterranean, where its gun turret blew off during a training exercise. Apparently the turret was armed with two different guns, and the experimental one, whose breech-block was unlocked, looked much like the standard gun when locked. The experimental gun was fired by accident, the breechblock blew off, and several sailors died. In general, however, naval Obukhov guns did not burst. Jane, 286, 520.
86. On Makarov and the torpedo battle of 25 May 1877, see Fred T. Jane, The Imperial Russian Navy: Its Past, Present, and Future, rev. ed. (London, 1904), 200. On naval arms, see Menning, 273. The Russian navy was idiosyncratic in its preference for light artillery. Russians opted for 3-inch shells instead of the European standard of 4.7-inch, and 10-inch where other European powers used 12-inch. Jane, 154. Naval rearmament was occasionally buffeted by disaster. In 1894 the new warship Sissoi Velikii was sent to the Mediterranean, where its gun turret blew off during a training exercise. Apparently the turret was armed with two different guns, and the experimental one, whose breech-block was unlocked, looked much like the standard gun when locked. The experimental gun was fired by accident, the breechblock blew off, and several sailors died. In general, however, naval Obukhov guns did not burst. Jane, 286, 520.
87. Mendeleev's gunpowder notebooks, t.4, ll. 4-5, reproduced in Averbukh, "Issledovaniia D. T. Mendeleeva v oblasti nitratsii" (n. 15 above), 78.
88. MS, vol. 9, 38.
89. ADIM II-Zh-51-1-1, quoted in Averbukh, "D. I. Mendeleev i Nauchno-tekhnicheskaia laboratoriia Morskogo vedomstva" (n. 14 above), 231-32, ellipses added. Mendeleev listed as potential members of this committee: Leon Nikolaevich Shishkov, former professor of the artillery academy; Aleksei Romanovich Shuliachenko, chemist at the engineering academy; Chel'tsov; and Grigorii Aleksandrovich Zabudskii.
90. Mendeleev's first letter to Chikhachev, on 2 May 1890, in fact mentions the need for a fully equipped laboratory (ADIM Alb. 2/474). The "consultant" position was meant for someone who was "especially well-known for his works in the field of the physicochemical sciences," and it was essentially tailor-made for Mendeleev after he had already been selected. RGAVMF f. 421, op. 2, d. 722, ll. 8-18. As a consultant, Mendeleev was also freer to quit at will. Mendeleev mentioned in his 1898 commentary on his curriculum vitae that the charter of the laboratory "was put together by Chikhachev, generally following my suggestions"; "Spisok sochinenii," reproduced in Arkhiv D. I. Mendeleeva: Avtobiograficheskie materialy, sbornik dokumentov (Leningrad, 1951), 90. On personnel issues in the laboratory, see P. M. Luk'ianov, "O neizvestnykh pis'makh D. I. Mendeleeva i arkhivnykh dokumentakh, kasaiushchikhsia ego rabot po pirokollodiinomu porokhu," Nauchnoe Nasledstvo 2 (1951): 257-68, on 257-58.
91. Mendeleev's first letter to Chikhachev, on 2 May 1890, in fact mentions the need for a fully equipped laboratory (ADIM Alb. 2/474). The "consultant" position was meant for someone who was "especially well-known for his works in the field of the physicochemical sciences," and it was essentially tailor-made for Mendeleev after he had already been selected. RGAVMF f. 421, op. 2, d. 722, ll. 8-18. As a consultant, Mendeleev was also freer to quit at will. Mendeleev mentioned in his 1898 commentary on his curriculum vitae that the charter of the laboratory "was put together by Chikhachev, generally following my suggestions"; "Spisok sochinenii," reproduced in Arkhiv D. I. Mendeleeva: Avtobiograficheskie materialy, sbornik dokumentov (Leningrad, 1951), 90. On personnel issues in the laboratory, see P. M. Luk'ianov, "O neizvestnykh pis'makh D. I. Mendeleeva i arkhivnykh dokumentakh, kasaiushchikhsia ego rabot po pirokollodiinomu porokhu," Nauchnoe Nasledstvo 2 (1951): 257-68, on 257-58.
92. Report of Chief Engineer-Builder of St. Petersburg Port, 12 June 1890, RGAVMF f. 421, op. 2, d. 678, ll. 108-10. For the specifications of the laboratory, see Vice Admiral Kaznakov, "Izmenennyi proekt polozheniia o laboratorii Morskogo Ministerstva dlia issledovaniia porokhov i vzryvchatykh veshchestv" (fall 1890), RGAVMF f. 421, op. 2, d. 678, ll. 179-82.
93. Mendeleev and Chel'tsov to the Chief Inspector of Naval Artillery, 5 February 1892, RGAVMF f. 421, op. 2, d. 768, ll. 6-7.
94. Chel'tsov to Chief Inspector of Naval Artillery, 14 September 1898, RGAVMF f. 421, op. 2, d. 1089, l. 58ob.
95. MS, vol. 9, 31.
96. Vukolov (n. 16 above), 1536; MS, vol. 9, 36. Ballistite did possess just the right amount of oxygen for total burning, however, which meant that it could burn independently of specific external conditions (p. 34). Mendeleev would try to replicate this property.
97. Vukolov (n. 16 above), 1536; MS, vol. 9, 36. Ballistite did possess just the right amount of oxygen for total burning, however, which meant that it could burn independently of specific external conditions (p. 34). Mendeleev would try to replicate this property.
98. P. P. Rybtsov, "Ocherk deiatel'nosti Dm. Iv. Mendeleeva v oblasti izucheniia vzryvchatykh veshchestv," in Trudy pervago mendeleevskogo s"ezda po obshchei i prikladnoi khimii, sostoiavshagosia v S.-Peterburge s 20-go po 30-go dekabria 1907 g., ed. V. E. Tishchenko (St. Petersburg, 1909), 152-61, on 157.
99. P. P. Rybtsov, "Ocherk deiatel'nosti Dm. Iv. Mendeleeva v oblasti izucheniia vzryvchatykh veshchestv," in Trudy pervago mendeleevskogo s"ezda po obshchei i prikladnoi khimii, sostoiavshagosia v S.-Peterburge s 20-go po 30-go dekabria 1907 g., ed. V. E. Tishchenko (St. Petersburg, 1909), 152-61, on 157.
100. Quoted in Vukolov, 1537. Mendeleev detailed the production process of pyrocollodion from cellulose on the first page of his Morskoi Sbornik article (MS, vol. 9, 257, 264), which only articulated the process and the theoretical reasoning, keeping the formula still secret. ADIM Bib. I-1032-12, l. 1, quoted in Averbukh, "D. I. Mendeleev i Nauchno-tekhnicheskaia laboratoriia Morskogo vedomstva" (n. 14 above), 236.
101. Quoted in Vukolov, 1537. Mendeleev detailed the production process of pyrocollodion from cellulose on the first page of his Morskoi Sbornik article (MS, vol. 9, 257, 264), which only articulated the process and the theoretical reasoning, keeping the formula still secret. ADIM Bib. I-1032-12, l. 1, quoted in Averbukh, "D. I. Mendeleev i Nauchno-tekhnicheskaia laboratoriia Morskogo vedomstva" (n. 14 above), 236.
102. I use "rhetoric" here in its original sense of language employed for the sake of persuasion.
103. Mendeleev, "Pyrocollodion Smokeless Powder," app. 2 in Bernadou (n. 9 above), 97-98.
104. MS, vol. 9, 185 n. 3.
105. Mendeleev to Chikhachev, June 1895, MS, vol. 9, 196.
106. MS, vol. 9, 254 n. 1.
107. "Gunpowder," Quarterly Review 125 (1868): 106-33, on 131-32. Ellipses added.
108. Popov to the Russian Society for the Production and Sale of Gunpowder, 29 January 1892, RGAVMF f. 427, op. 2, d. 305, l. 27.
109. Mendeleev to Chikhachev, June 1895, MS, vol. 9, 183. See also Mendeleev to Chikhachev, 5 May 1893, RGAVMF f. 421, op. 2, d. 821, ll. 134-39.
110. Mendeleev to Chikhachev, 5 May 1893, RGAVMF f. 421, op. 2, d. 821, ll. 134ob.-135; Mendeleev to Chikhachev, 18 June 1892, RGAVMF f. 421, op. 2, d. 768, l. 178. See also MS, vol. 9, 171.
111. RGAVMF f. 427, op. 2, d. 527, ll. 29-32.
112. RGAVMF f. 421, op. 2, d. 1233, l. 51. See also the letter to the Chief Inspector of Naval Artillery, 8 May 1895, RGAVMF f. 421, op. 31 ("art. chast'"), d. 41, 1895, l. 3, reproduced in Luk'ianov, "O neizvestnykh pis'makh D. I. Mendeleeva i arkhivnykh dokumentakh" (n. 33 above), 265.
113. "Zhurnal morskago tekhnicheskago komiteta po artillerii," 21 June 1895, RGAVMF f. 427, op. 2, d. 527, ll. 262-63.
114. Vice Admiral Pilkin of the navy sent the report to Mendeleev on that same day and asked for Mendeleev's response as soon as his health improved: "Zhurnal komissii, obrazovannoi po prikazaniiu Nachal'nika Okhtenskikh porokhovykh zavodov, dlia razsmotreniia dokladnoi zapiski professora Mendeleeva, predstavlennoi Upravliaiushchemu Morskim ministerstvom," 29 January 1894, RGAVMF f. 421, op. 2, d. 879, ll. 84-86, quotation and Pilkin's handwritten referral both on 84. Mendeleev responded that Okhtenskii had never produced a homogeneous pyroxylin. Mendeleev to Chikhachev, 5 February 1894, RGAVMF f. 421, op. 2, d. 879, ll. 101-13.
115. S. O. Makarov, "O trudakh professora Mendeleeva i Nauchno-tekhnicheskoi laboratorii M. V. po vyrabotke tipa pushechnago bezdymnago porokha," 15 March 1894, RGAVMF f. 421, op. 2, d. 879, ll. 337-45.
116. Mendeleev to Chikhachev, 17 October 1892, RGAVMF f. 421, op. 2, d. 931, l. 2ob.
117. Mendeleev continued to argue this point even after he left the navy. See his letter to M. I. Dragomirov, 11 March 1899, quoted in A. la. Averbukh, "D. I. Mendeleev i sozdanie bezdymnogo porokha," Voprosy Istorii Estestvoznaniia i Tekhniki, no. 1 (1974): 51-54, on 52.
118. Luk'ianov, "O neizvestnykh pis'makh D. I. Mendeleeva i arkhivnykh dokumentakh" (n. 33 above), 260. For more detailed breakdowns, see Luk'ianov, Istoriia khimicheskikh promyslov i khimicheskoi promyshlennosti Rossii (n. 19 above), 324-55.
119. Luk'ianov, "O neizvestnykh pis'makh D. I. Mendeleeva i arkhivnykh dokumentakh" (n. 33 above), 260. For more detailed breakdowns, see Luk'ianov, Istoriia khimicheskikh promyslov i khimicheskoi promyshlennosti Rossii (n. 19 above), 324-55.
120. L. G. Beskrovnyi, Armiia i flot Rossii v nachale XX v.: Ocherki voenno-ekonomicheskogo potentsiala (Moscow, 1986), 105.
121. The French did not have to do this, since their factories were located near other acid-production sites. Vukolov (n. 16 above), 1538.
122. Ushkov, a graduate of Kazan University, was clearly Mendeleev's favorite for taking on pyrocollodion production. Mendeleev made several trips to Elagub to negotiate a contract, and Ushkov delivered on early samples before the navy canceled the orders. See RGAVMF f. 421, op. 2, d. 821, l. 133; f. 421, op. 2, d. 821, ll. 336-37; and the actual contract, which names Mendeleev as the official negotiator and liaison, f. 421, op. 2, d. 821, l. 509. Mendeleev repeatedly cited Ushkov in his economic writings as a good example of a chemical entrepreneur for a new Russia, and even wrote an obituary for him. See, for example, MS, vol. 9, 54 n. 1, 77, 86; MS, vol. 21, 318; MS, vol. 18, 243 and 296; MS, vol. 15, 630 (the obituary, dated 26 January 1898); and Mendeleev's chapter on the chemical industry in Departament Torgovli i Manufaktur Ministerstva Finansov, Fabrichnozavodskaia promyshlennost' i torgovlia Rossii. Vsemirnaia Kolumbova vystavka 1893 g. v Chikago (St. Petersburg, 1893), 279. For Ushkov's biography, see G. S. Vozdvizhenskii, Stranitsy iz istorii kazanskoi khimicheskoi shkoly (Kazan, 1960), 21.
123. Ushkov, a graduate of Kazan University, was clearly Mendeleev's favorite for taking on pyrocollodion production. Mendeleev made several trips to Elagub to negotiate a contract, and Ushkov delivered on early samples before the navy canceled the orders. See RGAVMF f. 421, op. 2, d. 821, l. 133; f. 421, op. 2, d. 821, ll. 336-37; and the actual contract, which names Mendeleev as the official negotiator and liaison, f. 421, op. 2, d. 821, l. 509. Mendeleev repeatedly cited Ushkov in his economic writings as a good example of a chemical entrepreneur for a new Russia, and even wrote an obituary for him. See, for example, MS, vol. 9, 54 n. 1, 77, 86; MS, vol. 21, 318; MS, vol. 18, 243 and 296; MS, vol. 15, 630 (the obituary, dated 26 January 1898); and Mendeleev's chapter on the chemical industry in Departament Torgovli i Manufaktur Ministerstva Finansov, Fabrichnozavodskaia promyshlennost' i torgovlia Rossii. Vsemirnaia Kolumbova vystavka 1893 g. v Chikago (St. Petersburg, 1893), 279. For Ushkov's biography, see G. S. Vozdvizhenskii, Stranitsy iz istorii kazanskoi khimicheskoi shkoly (Kazan, 1960), 21.
124. Ushkov, a graduate of Kazan University, was clearly Mendeleev's favorite for taking on pyrocollodion production. Mendeleev made several trips to Elagub to negotiate a contract, and Ushkov delivered on early samples before the navy canceled the orders. See RGAVMF f. 421, op. 2, d. 821, l. 133; f. 421, op. 2, d. 821, ll. 336-37; and the actual contract, which names Mendeleev as the official negotiator and liaison, f. 421, op. 2, d. 821, l. 509. Mendeleev repeatedly cited Ushkov in his economic writings as a good example of a chemical entrepreneur for a new Russia, and even wrote an obituary for him. See, for example, MS, vol. 9, 54 n. 1, 77, 86; MS, vol. 21, 318; MS, vol. 18, 243 and 296; MS, vol. 15, 630 (the obituary, dated 26 January 1898); and Mendeleev's chapter on the chemical industry in Departament Torgovli i Manufaktur Ministerstva Finansov, Fabrichnozavodskaia promyshlennost' i torgovlia Rossii. Vsemirnaia Kolumbova vystavka 1893 g. v Chikago (St. Petersburg, 1893), 279. For Ushkov's biography, see G. S. Vozdvizhenskii, Stranitsy iz istorii kazanskoi khimicheskoi shkoly (Kazan, 1960), 21.
125. Ushkov, a graduate of Kazan University, was clearly Mendeleev's favorite for taking on pyrocollodion production. Mendeleev made several trips to Elagub to negotiate a contract, and Ushkov delivered on early samples before the navy canceled the orders. See RGAVMF f. 421, op. 2, d. 821, l. 133; f. 421, op. 2, d. 821, ll. 336-37; and the actual contract, which names Mendeleev as the official negotiator and liaison, f. 421, op. 2, d. 821, l. 509. Mendeleev repeatedly cited Ushkov in his economic writings as a good example of a chemical entrepreneur for a new Russia, and even wrote an obituary for him. See, for example, MS, vol. 9, 54 n. 1, 77, 86; MS, vol. 21, 318; MS, vol. 18, 243 and 296; MS, vol. 15, 630 (the obituary, dated 26 January 1898); and Mendeleev's chapter on the chemical industry in Departament Torgovli i Manufaktur Ministerstva Finansov, Fabrichnozavodskaia promyshlennost' i torgovlia Rossii. Vsemirnaia Kolumbova vystavka 1893 g. v Chikago (St. Petersburg, 1893), 279. For Ushkov's biography, see G. S. Vozdvizhenskii, Stranitsy iz istorii kazanskoi khimicheskoi shkoly (Kazan, 1960), 21.
126. Ushkov, a graduate of Kazan University, was clearly Mendeleev's favorite for taking on pyrocollodion production. Mendeleev made several trips to Elagub to negotiate a contract, and Ushkov delivered on early samples before the navy canceled the orders. See RGAVMF f. 421, op. 2, d. 821, l. 133; f. 421, op. 2, d. 821, ll. 336-37; and the actual contract, which names Mendeleev as the official negotiator and liaison, f. 421, op. 2, d. 821, l. 509. Mendeleev repeatedly cited Ushkov in his economic writings as a good example of a chemical entrepreneur for a new Russia, and even wrote an obituary for him. See, for example, MS, vol. 9, 54 n. 1, 77, 86; MS, vol. 21, 318; MS, vol. 18, 243 and 296; MS, vol. 15, 630 (the obituary, dated 26 January 1898); and Mendeleev's chapter on the chemical industry in Departament Torgovli i Manufaktur Ministerstva Finansov, Fabrichnozavodskaia promyshlennost' i torgovlia Rossii. Vsemirnaia Kolumbova vystavka 1893 g. v Chikago (St. Petersburg, 1893), 279. For Ushkov's biography, see G. S. Vozdvizhenskii, Stranitsy iz istorii kazanskoi khimicheskoi shkoly (Kazan, 1960), 21.
127. Ushkov, a graduate of Kazan University, was clearly Mendeleev's favorite for taking on pyrocollodion production. Mendeleev made several trips to Elagub to negotiate a contract, and Ushkov delivered on early samples before the navy canceled the orders. See RGAVMF f. 421, op. 2, d. 821, l. 133; f. 421, op. 2, d. 821, ll. 336-37; and the actual contract, which names Mendeleev as the official negotiator and liaison, f. 421, op. 2, d. 821, l. 509. Mendeleev repeatedly cited Ushkov in his economic writings as a good example of a chemical entrepreneur for a new Russia, and even wrote an obituary for him. See, for example, MS, vol. 9, 54 n. 1, 77, 86; MS, vol. 21, 318; MS, vol. 18, 243 and 296; MS, vol. 15, 630 (the obituary, dated 26 January 1898); and Mendeleev's chapter on the chemical industry in Departament Torgovli i Manufaktur Ministerstva Finansov, Fabrichnozavodskaia promyshlennost' i torgovlia Rossii. Vsemirnaia Kolumbova vystavka 1893 g. v Chikago (St. Petersburg, 1893), 279. For Ushkov's biography, see G. S. Vozdvizhenskii, Stranitsy iz istorii kazanskoi khimicheskoi shkoly (Kazan, 1960), 21.
128. Mendeleev to Chikhachev, 5 May 1893, RGAVMF f. 421, op. 2, d. 821, ll. 134-39, on 137; MS, vol. 9, 53.
129. MS, vol. 9, 49. This proposal was similar to how cordite production was organized in England, which is helpfully analyzed in R. C. Trebilcock, "A 'Special Relationship': Government, Rearmament, and the Cordite Firms," Economic History Review 19 (1966): 364-79.
130. MS, vol. 9, 49. This proposal was similar to how cordite production was organized in England, which is helpfully analyzed in R. C. Trebilcock, "A 'Special Relationship': Government, Rearmament, and the Cordite Firms," Economic History Review 19 (1966): 364-79.
131. Peter Gatrell, Government, Industry and Rearmament in Russia, 1900-1914: The Last Argument of Tsarism (Cambridge, 1994), 63 and chap. 6, "The Economics and Politics of Defence Procurement," which mostly focuses on the post-1905 period. On naval procurement after the Russo-Japanese War, see Gatrell, "After Tsushima: Economic and Administrative Aspects of Russian Naval Rearmament, 1905-1913," Economic History Review 43 (1990): 255-70, and "Defence Industries in Tsarist Russia, 1908-13: Production, Employment and Military Procurement," in Economy and Society in Russia and the Soviet Union, 1860-1930: Essays for Olga Crisp, ed. Linda Edmondson and Peter Waldron (New York, 1992), 131-51.
132. Peter Gatrell, Government, Industry and Rearmament in Russia, 1900-1914: The Last Argument of Tsarism (Cambridge, 1994), 63 and chap. 6, "The Economics and Politics of Defence Procurement," which mostly focuses on the post-1905 period. On naval procurement after the Russo-Japanese War, see Gatrell, "After Tsushima: Economic and Administrative Aspects of Russian Naval Rearmament, 1905-1913," Economic History Review 43 (1990): 255-70, and "Defence Industries in Tsarist Russia, 1908-13: Production, Employment and Military Procurement," in Economy and Society in Russia and the Soviet Union, 1860-1930: Essays for Olga Crisp, ed. Linda Edmondson and Peter Waldron (New York, 1992), 131-51.
133. Peter Gatrell, Government, Industry and Rearmament in Russia, 1900-1914: The Last Argument of Tsarism (Cambridge, 1994), 63 and chap. 6, "The Economics and Politics of Defence Procurement," which mostly focuses on the post-1905 period. On naval procurement after the Russo-Japanese War, see Gatrell, "After Tsushima: Economic and Administrative Aspects of Russian Naval Rearmament, 1905-1913," Economic History Review 43 (1990): 255-70, and "Defence Industries in Tsarist Russia, 1908-13: Production, Employment and Military Procurement," in Economy and Society in Russia and the Soviet Union, 1860-1930: Essays for Olga Crisp, ed. Linda Edmondson and Peter Waldron (New York, 1992), 131-51.
134. MS, vol. 9, 52 n. 2.
135. MS, vol. 9, 129. Had Mendeleev's plan been instituted, it would probably not have generated the desired results. As historian Jacob Kipp has noted in the case of rearmament with a screw-propelled navy, government devolution to private industry generated a hothouse effect, whereby private industry became dependent on the Imperial state's orders and thus lost the economic advantage. The newer the technology, the worse the effect, as seen in the cases of large maritime steam engines and heavy, rifled, breech-loading steel artillery. See Kipp, "The Russian Navy and the Problem of Technological Transfer: Technological Backwardness and Military-Industrial Development," in Eklof, Bushnell, and Zakharova (n. 26 above), 115-38, on 133. As one of the T&C referees pointed out, the state/private combination was similar to the naval construction methods employed in contemporary England and France. Mendeleev was almost certainly aware of the foreign examples.
136. MS, vol. 9, 129. Had Mendeleev's plan been instituted, it would probably not have generated the desired results. As historian Jacob Kipp has noted in the case of rearmament with a screw-propelled navy, government devolution to private industry generated a hothouse effect, whereby private industry became dependent on the Imperial state's orders and thus lost the economic advantage. The newer the technology, the worse the effect, as seen in the cases of large maritime steam engines and heavy, rifled, breech-loading steel artillery. See Kipp, "The Russian Navy and the Problem of Technological Transfer: Technological Backwardness and Military-Industrial Development," in Eklof, Bushnell, and Zakharova (n. 26 above), 115-38, on 133. As one of the T&C referees pointed out, the state/private combination was similar to the naval construction methods employed in contemporary England and France. Mendeleev was almost certainly aware of the foreign examples.
137. L. G. Beskrovnyi, Russkoe voennoe iskusstvo XIX v. (Moscow, 1974), 356; G. P. Meshcheriakov, Russkaia voennaia mysl' v XIX v. (Moscow, 1973), 258-59.
138. L. G. Beskrovnyi, Russkoe voennoe iskusstvo XIX v. (Moscow, 1974), 356; G. P. Meshcheriakov, Russkaia voennaia mysl' v XIX v. (Moscow, 1973), 258-59.
139. Note by A. Brink on the margin of Chel'tsov's letter to the Chief Inspector of Naval Artillery, 5 April 1893, RGAVMF f. 421, op. 2, d. 821, l. 52: "These questions [of storage] are very important and I consider it helpful to discuss them together with the Army...." See also Mendeleev to Chikhachev, 5 May 1893, RGAVMF f. 421, op. 2, d. 821, l. 135; and MS, vol. 9, 159 on uniting both forces with a joint laboratory.
140. MS, vol. 9, 58.
141. Michael D. Gordin, "Making Newtons: Mendeleev, Metrology, and the Chemical Ether," Ambix 45 (1998): 96-115; and Nathan M. Brooks, "Mendeleev and Metrology," Ambix 45 (1998): 116-28.
142. Michael D. Gordin, "Making Newtons: Mendeleev, Metrology, and the Chemical Ether," Ambix 45 (1998): 96-115; and Nathan M. Brooks, "Mendeleev and Metrology," Ambix 45 (1998): 116-28.
143. RGAVMF f. 427, op. 2, d. 527, l. 409.
144. On Mendeleev's activities after leaving the navy, see Gordin, "The Ordered Society and Its Enemies" (n. 21 above), 437-38.
145. Quoted in T. S. Kudriavtseva, "Novye dannye ob issledovaniiakh D. I. Mendeleeva v oblasti porokhodeliia," in Materialy po istorii otechestvennoi khimii, ed. N. A. Figurovskii et al. (Moscow, 1953), 234-241, on 241. Ellipses in Kudriavtseva.
146. Quoted in Vukolov (n. 16 above), 1538; Averbukh, "D. I. Mendeleev i sozdanie bezdymnogo porokha" (n. 56 above), 54.
147. Quoted in Vukolov (n. 16 above), 1538; Averbukh, "D. I. Mendeleev i sozdanie bezdymnogo porokha" (n. 56 above), 54.
148. Luk'ianov, "O neizvestnykh pis'makh D. I. Mendeleeva i arkhivnykh dokumentakh" (n. 33 above), 268; and Vernidub (n. 13 above), 399.
149. Luk'ianov, "O neizvestnykh pis'makh D. I. Mendeleeva i arkhivnykh dokumentakh" (n. 33 above), 268; and Vernidub (n. 13 above), 399.
150. Vukolov, 1537. Mendeleev was not a complete military outsider. Perhaps unbeknownst to Vukolov, he had taught courses at the Nikolaevskii military academy and to the Cadet corps. See L. G. Beskrovnyi, Russkaia armiia i flot v XIX veke: Voenno-ekonomicheskii potentsial Rossii (Moscow, 1986), 192. Vukolov's comments also point to Mendeleev's at times prickly personality, which repeatedly caused problems for his career.
151. Vukolov, 1537. Mendeleev was not a complete military outsider. Perhaps unbeknownst to Vukolov, he had taught courses at the Nikolaevskii military academy and to the Cadet corps. See L. G. Beskrovnyi, Russkaia armiia i flot v XIX veke: Voenno-ekonomicheskii potentsial Rossii (Moscow, 1986), 192. Vukolov's comments also point to Mendeleev's at times prickly personality, which repeatedly caused problems for his career.
152. Elting Morison, Men, Machines, and Modern Times (Cambridge, Mass., 1966), chap. 2.
153. For an example, see MS, vol. 25, 444. Mendeleev's employee at the laboratory, P. P. Rybtsov, echoed that view in 1907, showing the persistence of such rhetoric; Rybtsov (n. 39 above), 152. This was quite common practice among contemporary gunpowder scientists. For example, Frederick Abel commented that smokeless powder "can scarcely fail to change more or less radically many of the existing conditions under which engagements are fought"; Abel (n. 9 above), 355.
154. For an example, see MS, vol. 25, 444. Mendeleev's employee at the laboratory, P. P. Rybtsov, echoed that view in 1907, showing the persistence of such rhetoric; Rybtsov (n. 39 above), 152. This was quite common practice among contemporary gunpowder scientists. For example, Frederick Abel commented that smokeless powder "can scarcely fail to change more or less radically many of the existing conditions under which engagements are fought"; Abel (n. 9 above), 355.
155. Navy officers frequently used the language of technical autonomy. See D. Fillipov on new ships' motors, RGAVMF f. 421, op. 2, d. 1522, ll. 21-64, esp. 50ob. On the debates over smokeless gunpowder, see Meshcheriakov (n. 66 above), 267.
156. Meshcheriakov, 232-44; Menning (n. 9 above), 125; von Wahlde (n. 23 above), 61-63; Beskrovnyi, Russkoe voennoe iskusstvo XIX v. (n. 66 above), passim; and V. D'iakov,"O razvitii russkoi voenno-istoricheskoi mysli v poslednei chetverti XIX veka," Voenno-Istoricheskii Zhurnal 5 (1959): 60-72.
157. Meshcheriakov, 232-44; Menning (n. 9 above), 125; von Wahlde (n. 23 above), 61-63; Beskrovnyi, Russkoe voennoe iskusstvo XIX v. (n. 66 above), passim; and V. D'iakov,"O razvitii russkoi voenno-istoricheskoi mysli v poslednei chetverti XIX veka," Voenno-Istoricheskii Zhurnal 5 (1959): 60-72.
158. Meshcheriakov, 232-44; Menning (n. 9 above), 125; von Wahlde (n. 23 above), 61-63; Beskrovnyi, Russkoe voennoe iskusstvo XIX v. (n. 66 above), passim; and V. D'iakov,"O razvitii russkoi voenno-istoricheskoi mysli v poslednei chetverti XIX veka," Voenno-Istoricheskii Zhurnal 5 (1959): 60-72.
159. Meshcheriakov, 232-44; Menning (n. 9 above), 125; von Wahlde (n. 23 above), 61-63; Beskrovnyi, Russkoe voennoe iskusstvo XIX v. (n. 66 above), passim; and V. D'iakov,"O razvitii russkoi voenno-istoricheskoi mysli v poslednei chetverti XIX veka," Voenno-Istoricheskii Zhurnal 5 (1959): 60-72.
160. Meshcheriakov, 232-44; Menning (n. 9 above), 125; von Wahlde (n. 23 above), 61-63; Beskrovnyi, Russkoe voennoe iskusstvo XIX v. (n. 66 above), passim; and V. D'iakov,"O razvitii russkoi voenno-istoricheskoi mysli v poslednei chetverti XIX veka," Voenno-Istoricheskii Zhurnal 5 (1959): 60-72.
161. N. P. Mikhnevich, "Taktika i ee evoliutsiia v zavisimosti ot uslovii komplektovaniia voisk i tekhnicheskikh izobretenii dannoi epokhi," in Russkaia voenno-teoreticheskaia mysl' XIX i nachala XX vekov, ed. L. G. Beskrovnyi (Moscow, 1960), 441-51, on 444; see also the excerpt from Mikhnevich's most important discussion of gunpowder, "Vliianie noveishikh tekhnicheskikh izobretenii na taktiku voisk," 415-40. A substantial portion of this document discusses the exact changes smokeless powder would bring about on the battlefield. By the end of the nineteenth century, the Nikolaevskii academy had switched to Mikhnevich's textbook on strategy, Istoriia voennago iskusstva s drevneishikh vremen do nachala deviatnadtsatago stoletiia (St. Petersburg, 1896). Summaries in English of Mikhnevich's thought can be found in Van Dyke (n. 26 above), 117-18, and Menning, 132.
162. N. P. Mikhnevich, "Taktika i ee evoliutsiia v zavisimosti ot uslovii komplektovaniia voisk i tekhnicheskikh izobretenii dannoi epokhi," in Russkaia voenno-teoreticheskaia mysl' XIX i nachala XX vekov, ed. L. G. Beskrovnyi (Moscow, 1960), 441-51, on 444; see also the excerpt from Mikhnevich's most important discussion of gunpowder, "Vliianie noveishikh tekhnicheskikh izobretenii na taktiku voisk," 415-40. A substantial portion of this document discusses the exact changes smokeless powder would bring about on the battlefield. By the end of the nineteenth century, the Nikolaevskii academy had switched to Mikhnevich's textbook on strategy, Istoriia voennago iskusstva s drevneishikh vremen do nachala deviatnadtsatago stoletiia (St. Petersburg, 1896). Summaries in English of Mikhnevich's thought can be found in Van Dyke (n. 26 above), 117-18, and Menning, 132.
163. N. P. Mikhnevich, "Taktika i ee evoliutsiia v zavisimosti ot uslovii komplektovaniia voisk i tekhnicheskikh izobretenii dannoi epokhi," in Russkaia voenno-teoreticheskaia mysl' XIX i nachala XX vekov, ed. L. G. Beskrovnyi (Moscow, 1960), 441-51, on 444; see also the excerpt from Mikhnevich's most important discussion of gunpowder, "Vliianie noveishikh tekhnicheskikh izobretenii na taktiku voisk," 415-40. A substantial portion of this document discusses the exact changes smokeless powder would bring about on the battlefield. By the end of the nineteenth century, the Nikolaevskii academy had switched to Mikhnevich's textbook on strategy, Istoriia voennago iskusstva s drevneishikh vremen do nachala deviatnadtsatago stoletiia (St. Petersburg, 1896). Summaries in English of Mikhnevich's thought can be found in Van Dyke (n. 26 above), 117-18, and Menning, 132.
164. M. Dragomirov, "Uchebnik taktiki," in Beskrovnyi, Russkaia voenno-teoreticheskaia mysl', 339-47; Menning, 39. Compare this with the contemporary French doctrine of the role of élan in determining the outcome of conflicts. See Richard D. Challener, The French Theory of the Nation in Arms, 1866-1939 (New York, 1955).
165. M. Dragomirov, "Uchebnik taktiki," in Beskrovnyi, Russkaia voenno-teoreticheskaia mysl', 339-47; Menning, 39. Compare this with the contemporary French doctrine of the role of élan in determining the outcome of conflicts. See Richard D. Challener, The French Theory of the Nation in Arms, 1866-1939 (New York, 1955).
166. M. Dragomirov, "Uchebnik taktiki," in Beskrovnyi, Russkaia voenno-teoreticheskaia mysl', 339-47; Menning, 39. Compare this with the contemporary French doctrine of the role of élan in determining the outcome of conflicts. See Richard D. Challener, The French Theory of the Nation in Arms, 1866-1939 (New York, 1955).
167. Menning, 85; Bradley (n. 25 above), 124; Kenez (n. 23 above), 124.
168. Menning, 85; Bradley (n. 25 above), 124; Kenez (n. 23 above), 124.
169. Menning, 85; Bradley (n. 25 above), 124; Kenez (n. 23 above), 124.
170. RGAVMF f. 417, op. 1, d. 1967, l. 160. Bernadou often stressed how he worked out his gunpowder independently from Mendeleev at the Naval Torpedo Station at Newport, Rhode Island, in 1895-1896. Bernadou (n. 9 above), 28, 174 n. Claims of treachery or espionage are dearly unfounded.
171. Dmitriev (n. 10 above), 139.
172. She wrote to Mendeleev on 26 December 1899 (N.S.), "Will you kindly tell me the name of the smokeless gunpowder which you invented in 1896 and its advantages over other high explosives?" Mendeleev's polite response in English on 28 January 1900 (N.S.) was to tell her to look it up in Morskoi Sbornik, reprints of which he was unable to send her. ADIM II-A-52-2-B.