Violence and the Paradox of Democratic Renewal: A Preliminary Assessment

Terrorism and Political Violence

Volumn 12, Issue 3-4, 2000, Pages 261-286

  Le Vine, Victor T ^a  

^a WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

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EID: 0347304363     PISSN: 09546553     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/09546550008427579     Document Type: Article

References (79)

1. Julian P. Boyd (ed.), The Papers of Thomas Jefferson (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1955) vol.12, pp.356-7.
2. Barère was a leading member of the Committee of Public Safety that ruled Revolutionary France during the period of the Jacobin dictatorship (1793-94). His harsh policies against those suspected of royalist tendencies made him one of the most feared revolutionaries. For details, see Leo Gershoy, Bertrand Barère: A Reluctant Terrorist (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1962). David Rapoport (private communication, 5 Sept. 1997) adds that Barère 'was a major figure in the terror and that the terror aimed at purifying the community [by] making people fit for a republic'. See Michael Phillip Carter, 'The French Revolution: Jacobin Terror', in David C. Rapoport and Yonah Alexander (eds), The Morality of Terrorism, Religious and Secular Justifications (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989, 2nd ed.) pp.133-51. It should be added that Jefferson, for all his sympathy for the French Revolution, was nevertheless revulsed by the excesses of the Terror.
3. Barère was a leading member of the Committee of Public Safety that ruled Revolutionary France during the period of the Jacobin dictatorship (1793-94). His harsh policies against those suspected of royalist tendencies made him one of the most feared revolutionaries. For details, see Leo Gershoy, Bertrand Barère: A Reluctant Terrorist (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1962). David Rapoport (private communication, 5 Sept. 1997) adds that Barère 'was a major figure in the terror and that the terror aimed at purifying the community [by] making people fit for a republic'. See Michael Phillip Carter, 'The French Revolution: Jacobin Terror', in David C. Rapoport and Yonah Alexander (eds), The Morality of Terrorism, Religious and Secular Justifications (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989, 2nd ed.) pp.133-51. It should be added that Jefferson, for all his sympathy for the French Revolution, was nevertheless revulsed by the excesses of the Terror.
4. Barère was a leading member of the Committee of Public Safety that ruled Revolutionary France during the period of the Jacobin dictatorship (1793-94). His harsh policies against those suspected of royalist tendencies made him one of the most feared revolutionaries. For details, see Leo Gershoy, Bertrand Barère: A Reluctant Terrorist (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1962). David Rapoport (private communication, 5 Sept. 1997) adds that Barère 'was a major figure in the terror and that the terror aimed at purifying the community [by] making people fit for a republic'. See Michael Phillip Carter, 'The French Revolution: Jacobin Terror', in David C. Rapoport and Yonah Alexander (eds), The Morality of Terrorism, Religious and Secular Justifications (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989, 2nd ed.) pp.133-51. It should be added that Jefferson, for all his sympathy for the French Revolution, was nevertheless revulsed by the excesses of the Terror.
5. 'He [Jefferson] was not blind ⋯ to the almost inevitable consequences of this great political movement. He predicted "that a lively resistance would be manifested by the tyrants and absolutists of the North; but definitely that man's condition throughout the civilized world would be considerably ameliorated by it."' Memoirs of Bertrand Barère (London: H. S. Nichols, 1896, transl. by De V. Payne-Payne) Vol. IV p.212. The above appears in Barère's biographical sketch of Jefferson, one of many of prominent political personalities of the day Barère described and discussed in his memoirs. See also William Howard Adams, The Paris Years of Thomas Jefferson (New Haven, CN: Yale University Press, 1997).
6. 'He [Jefferson] was not blind ⋯ to the almost inevitable consequences of this great political movement. He predicted "that a lively resistance would be manifested by the tyrants and absolutists of the North; but definitely that man's condition throughout the civilized world would be considerably ameliorated by it."' Memoirs of Bertrand Barère (London: H. S. Nichols, 1896, transl. by De V. Payne-Payne) Vol. IV p.212. The above appears in Barère's biographical sketch of Jefferson, one of many of prominent political personalities of the day Barère described and discussed in his memoirs. See also William Howard Adams, The Paris Years of Thomas Jefferson (New Haven, CN: Yale University Press, 1997).
7. Daniel Shays and others led a rebellion of debt-stricken farmers in Western Massachusetts (1786-87, prior to that state's ratification of the Constitution) to protest excessive taxes, debt foreclosures and debtors' imprisonment by the Massachusetts government. In January 1987 Shays led a force of about 1, 200 men in an attack on the federal arsenal at Springfield, which was quickly repulsed. After the rebellion had been put down by the state militia, Shays and a dozen others were tried and condemned to death. In 1788 he petitioned for a pardon, which was soon granted. In his old age. Shays was given a pension for his services during the Revolutionary War. For a full account of Shay's Rebellion, see G. R. Minot, The History of the Insurrections in Massachusetts in 1787 (New York: De Capo Press, 1971).
8. For one, my departmental colleague Robert H. Salisbury. Dumas Malone, one of Jefferson's principal biographers, denies any suggestion that the phrase was hyperbole. While it '⋯ has been tortured by later interpreters who have quoted it out of context, its essential truthfulness cannot be questioned by anyone familiar with course of human history': Dumas Malone, Jefferson and his Time. Vol 3: Jefferson and the Ordeal of Liberty (New York: Little Brown/Back Bay Books, 1962) p.49. So too Parrington, offering an expansive interpretation: 'An occasional revolution, he commented grimly apropos of the hue and cry over Shays's Rebellion, is salutary; if it does not come of itself it might well be brought about ⋯ The longest delayed revolutions are the gravest': Vernon L. Parrington, Main Currents in American Thought. Vol. I: The Colonial Period, 1620-1800 (New York: Harcourt Brace/Harvest Books, 1954) pp.357-8.
9. For one, my departmental colleague Robert H. Salisbury. Dumas Malone, one of Jefferson's principal biographers, denies any suggestion that the phrase was hyperbole. While it '⋯ has been tortured by later interpreters who have quoted it out of context, its essential truthfulness cannot be questioned by anyone familiar with course of human history': Dumas Malone, Jefferson and his Time. Vol 3: Jefferson and the Ordeal of Liberty (New York: Little Brown/Back Bay Books, 1962) p.49. So too Parrington, offering an expansive interpretation: 'An occasional revolution, he commented grimly apropos of the hue and cry over Shays's Rebellion, is salutary; if it does not come of itself it might well be brought about ⋯ The longest delayed revolutions are the gravest': Vernon L. Parrington, Main Currents in American Thought. Vol. I: The Colonial Period, 1620-1800 (New York: Harcourt Brace/Harvest Books, 1954) pp.357-8.
10. The first English translation of Fanon's book, by Constance Farrington, had it titled The Damned (Paris: Présence Africaine, 1963), given its original title, Les damnés de la terre. In the first part of the book ('Concerning Violence'), Fanon argues that violence not only unifies a colonized people, but 'At the level of individuals ⋯ is a cleansing force' (ibid., p.73) necessary to purge the consequences of colonial tyranny's own violence.
11. The first English translation of Fanon's book, by Constance Farrington, had it titled The Damned (Paris: Présence Africaine, 1963), given its original title, Les damnés de la terre. In the first part of the book ('Concerning Violence'), Fanon argues that violence not only unifies a colonized people, but 'At the level of individuals ⋯ is a cleansing force' (ibid., p.73) necessary to purge the consequences of colonial tyranny's own violence.
12. Paul de Armond examines the ideological bases of the militant American right, including the militias and 'Patriots' in 'The Anti-democratic Movement - more than militias'. Public Goods Reports (June, August 1995) at http://nwcitizen.com/ publicgood/reports/nullify.htm. For a recent appraisal of the militia movement, see Morris Dees, Gathering Storm: America's Militia Threat (New York: Harper-Collins, 1996).
13. Paul de Armond examines the ideological bases of the militant American right, including the militias and 'Patriots' in 'The Anti-democratic Movement - more than militias'. Public Goods Reports (June, August 1995) at http://nwcitizen.com/ publicgood/reports/nullify.htm. For a recent appraisal of the militia movement, see Morris Dees, Gathering Storm: America's Militia Threat (New York: Harper-Collins, 1996).
14. Jefferson to William Stevens Smith, loc. cit.
15. Ibid. As a result of the Rebellion, the Massachusetts legislature passed laws easing the economic conditions of debtors, in effect in part remedying the grievances which led to the Rebellion in the first place.
16. I have been seeking the origins of the 'tree of liberty' metaphor, and thus far have only come up with its New England version, cited, for example, in an 1889 compendium of 'Fact, Fancy, and Fable': In 1763 the 'Sons of Liberty' were organized under the 'Liberty Tree, ' - a wide-spreading, beautiful elm, which stood in front of a grocery, near what is now the corner of Essex and Washington Streets, Boston, a tablet on the present building marking the spot: and here were exposed the effigies of those men who had opposed the odious Stamp Act. During the exciting period which followed, nearly all the great political meetings of the 'Sons of Liberty' called together by the hoisting of a flag on the staff extending through the branches of the tree, were held under its waving boughs and in the square about it. During the siege of Boston, about the last of August, 1775, this tree was cut down by a gang in the pay of the British soldiers and the Tories, after standing one hundred and nineteen years. This compendium of trivia itself (Henry F. Redall, compiler, Fact, Fancy, and Fable: A New Handbook for Ready Reference on Subjects Commonly Omitted from Cyclopaedias ⋯ (Chicago: A. C. McClurg & Co., 1889) pp.321-2) attributes one 'King' as the source of this description. Other encyclopaedic and historical sources confirm the factual outlines of this story, identify one Silas Downer as dedicating another Tree of Liberty in Rhode Island in 1766, and note that the most famous was one in New York. See also Thomas Paine's poem, The Liberty Tree (July 1977). Another suggestion in the literature is that the Tree of Liberty is a version of the Liberty Pole, which became part of the symbolism of the French Revolution, and the two are sometimes mentioned interchangeably, since both poles and trees were used for the same purpose in America. The French expression arbre de liberté (per Larousse) may in fact refer to the Liberty Pole rather than the tree itself; that may have been Barère's meaning as well. Roman tradition was that newly manumitted slaves celebrated their freedom by parading with a pole surmounted by a so-called 'Phyrgian' cap, which, as freemen, they were thereafter entitled to wear. The Phyrgian cap frequently appears in pictures of the French revolution. As for the redemptive, or cleansing, or purifying, or 'refreshing', power of blood, particularly sacrificial blood, Jewish and Christian tradition offer sufficient evidence (see, inter alia, Eph. 1:7), as does (James G.) Fraser's Golden Bough (New York: Macmillan, 1935, 3rd. ed.) esp. vol.1 p.85 et seq. Tertullian (Apologeticus 39), paraphrasing Saint Jerome, offers another use for the blood of martyrs, the generative: 'semen est sangiris christianorum' (often rendered as 'the blood of the martyrs is the seed of the Church'). should add that a similar, though much more expansive, generative metaphor is in Sura 96 of the Koran ('The Blood Clot', the first of the revelations to Muhammad): 'Recite: In the Name of thy Lord who created/created Man of a blood-clot ⋯': A. J. Arberry, The Koran Interpreted (New York: Macmillan, 1955) p.344.
17. I have been seeking the origins of the 'tree of liberty' metaphor, and thus far have only come up with its New England version, cited, for example, in an 1889 compendium of 'Fact, Fancy, and Fable': In 1763 the 'Sons of Liberty' were organized under the 'Liberty Tree, ' - a wide-spreading, beautiful elm, which stood in front of a grocery, near what is now the corner of Essex and Washington Streets, Boston, a tablet on the present building marking the spot: and here were exposed the effigies of those men who had opposed the odious Stamp Act. During the exciting period which followed, nearly all the great political meetings of the 'Sons of Liberty' called together by the hoisting of a flag on the staff extending through the branches of the tree, were held under its waving boughs and in the square about it. During the siege of Boston, about the last of August, 1775, this tree was cut down by a gang in the pay of the British soldiers and the Tories, after standing one hundred and nineteen years. This compendium of trivia itself (Henry F. Redall, compiler, Fact, Fancy, and Fable: A New Handbook for Ready Reference on Subjects Commonly Omitted from Cyclopaedias ⋯ (Chicago: A. C. McClurg & Co., 1889) pp.321-2) attributes one 'King' as the source of this description. Other encyclopaedic and historical sources confirm the factual outlines of this story, identify one Silas Downer as dedicating another Tree of Liberty in Rhode Island in 1766, and note that the most famous was one in New York. See also Thomas Paine's poem, The Liberty Tree (July 1977). Another suggestion in the literature is that the Tree of Liberty is a version of the Liberty Pole, which became part of the symbolism of the French Revolution, and the two are sometimes mentioned interchangeably, since both poles and trees were used for the same purpose in America. The French expression arbre de liberté (per Larousse) may in fact refer to the Liberty Pole rather than the tree itself; that may have been Barère's meaning as well. Roman tradition was that newly manumitted slaves celebrated their freedom by parading with a pole surmounted by a so-called 'Phyrgian' cap, which, as freemen, they were thereafter entitled to wear. The Phyrgian cap frequently appears in pictures of the French revolution. As for the redemptive, or cleansing, or purifying, or 'refreshing', power of blood, particularly sacrificial blood, Jewish and Christian tradition offer sufficient evidence (see, inter alia, Eph. 1:7), as does (James G.) Fraser's Golden Bough (New York: Macmillan, 1935, 3rd. ed.) esp. vol.1 p.85 et seq. Tertullian (Apologeticus 39), paraphrasing Saint Jerome, offers another use for the blood of martyrs, the generative: 'semen est sangiris christianorum' (often rendered as 'the blood of the martyrs is the seed of the Church'). should add that a similar, though much more expansive, generative metaphor is in Sura 96 of the Koran ('The Blood Clot', the first of the revelations to Muhammad): 'Recite: In the Name of thy Lord who created/created Man of a blood-clot ⋯': A. J. Arberry, The Koran Interpreted (New York: Macmillan, 1955) p.344.
18. I have been seeking the origins of the 'tree of liberty' metaphor, and thus far have only come up with its New England version, cited, for example, in an 1889 compendium of 'Fact, Fancy, and Fable': In 1763 the 'Sons of Liberty' were organized under the 'Liberty Tree, ' - a wide-spreading, beautiful elm, which stood in front of a grocery, near what is now the corner of Essex and Washington Streets, Boston, a tablet on the present building marking the spot: and here were exposed the effigies of those men who had opposed the odious Stamp Act. During the exciting period which followed, nearly all the great political meetings of the 'Sons of Liberty' called together by the hoisting of a flag on the staff extending through the branches of the tree, were held under its waving boughs and in the square about it. During the siege of Boston, about the last of August, 1775, this tree was cut down by a gang in the pay of the British soldiers and the Tories, after standing one hundred and nineteen years. This compendium of trivia itself (Henry F. Redall, compiler, Fact, Fancy, and Fable: A New Handbook for Ready Reference on Subjects Commonly Omitted from Cyclopaedias ⋯ (Chicago: A. C. McClurg & Co., 1889) pp.321-2) attributes one 'King' as the source of this description. Other encyclopaedic and historical sources confirm the factual outlines of this story, identify one Silas Downer as dedicating another Tree of Liberty in Rhode Island in 1766, and note that the most famous was one in New York. See also Thomas Paine's poem, The Liberty Tree (July 1977). Another suggestion in the literature is that the Tree of Liberty is a version of the Liberty Pole, which became part of the symbolism of the French Revolution, and the two are sometimes mentioned interchangeably, since both poles and trees were used for the same purpose in America. The French expression arbre de liberté (per Larousse) may in fact refer to the Liberty Pole rather than the tree itself; that may have been Barère's meaning as well. Roman tradition was that newly manumitted slaves celebrated their freedom by parading with a pole surmounted by a so-called 'Phyrgian' cap, which, as freemen, they were thereafter entitled to wear. The Phyrgian cap frequently appears in pictures of the French revolution. As for the redemptive, or cleansing, or purifying, or 'refreshing', power of blood, particularly sacrificial blood, Jewish and Christian tradition offer sufficient evidence (see, inter alia, Eph. 1:7), as does (James G.) Fraser's Golden Bough (New York: Macmillan, 1935, 3rd. ed.) esp. vol.1 p.85 et seq. Tertullian (Apologeticus 39), paraphrasing Saint Jerome, offers another use for the blood of martyrs, the generative: 'semen est sangiris christianorum' (often rendered as 'the blood of the martyrs is the seed of the Church'). should add that a similar, though much more expansive, generative metaphor is in Sura 96 of the Koran ('The Blood Clot', the first of the revelations to Muhammad): 'Recite: In the Name of thy Lord who created/created Man of a blood-clot ⋯': A. J. Arberry, The Koran Interpreted (New York: Macmillan, 1955) p.344.
19. I have been seeking the origins of the 'tree of liberty' metaphor, and thus far have only come up with its New England version, cited, for example, in an 1889 compendium of 'Fact, Fancy, and Fable': In 1763 the 'Sons of Liberty' were organized under the 'Liberty Tree, ' - a wide-spreading, beautiful elm, which stood in front of a grocery, near what is now the corner of Essex and Washington Streets, Boston, a tablet on the present building marking the spot: and here were exposed the effigies of those men who had opposed the odious Stamp Act. During the exciting period which followed, nearly all the great political meetings of the 'Sons of Liberty' called together by the hoisting of a flag on the staff extending through the branches of the tree, were held under its waving boughs and in the square about it. During the siege of Boston, about the last of August, 1775, this tree was cut down by a gang in the pay of the British soldiers and the Tories, after standing one hundred and nineteen years. This compendium of trivia itself (Henry F. Redall, compiler, Fact, Fancy, and Fable: A New Handbook for Ready Reference on Subjects Commonly Omitted from Cyclopaedias ⋯ (Chicago: A. C. McClurg & Co., 1889) pp.321-2) attributes one 'King' as the source of this description. Other encyclopaedic and historical sources confirm the factual outlines of this story, identify one Silas Downer as dedicating another Tree of Liberty in Rhode Island in 1766, and note that the most famous was one in New York. See also Thomas Paine's poem, The Liberty Tree (July 1977). Another suggestion in the literature is that the Tree of Liberty is a version of the Liberty Pole, which became part of the symbolism of the French Revolution, and the two are sometimes mentioned interchangeably, since both poles and trees were used for the same purpose in America. The French expression arbre de liberté (per Larousse) may in fact refer to the Liberty Pole rather than the tree itself; that may have been Barère's meaning as well. Roman tradition was that newly manumitted slaves celebrated their freedom by parading with a pole surmounted by a so-called 'Phyrgian' cap, which, as freemen, they were thereafter entitled to wear. The Phyrgian cap frequently appears in pictures of the French revolution. As for the redemptive, or cleansing, or purifying, or 'refreshing', power of blood, particularly sacrificial blood, Jewish and Christian tradition offer sufficient evidence (see, inter alia, Eph. 1:7), as does (James G.) Fraser's Golden Bough (New York: Macmillan, 1935, 3rd. ed.) esp. vol.1 p.85 et seq. Tertullian (Apologeticus 39), paraphrasing Saint Jerome, offers another use for the blood of martyrs, the generative: 'semen est sangiris christianorum' (often rendered as 'the blood of the martyrs is the seed of the Church'). I should add that a similar, though much more expansive, generative metaphor is in Sura 96 of the Koran ('The Blood Clot', the first of the revelations to Muhammad): 'Recite: In the Name of thy Lord who created/created Man of a blood-clot ⋯': A. J. Arberry, The Koran Interpreted (New York: Macmillan, 1955) p.344.
20. As does even Malone: see the quote in note 4.
21. Lynne B. Iglitzin, 'Violence and American Democracy', Journal of Social Issues 26/1 (1970) pp.184-5.
22. Ernest van de Haag, Political Violence and Civil Disobedience (New York: Harper and Row, 1971) p.20 (italics in original).
23. Ibid., p.29
24. Ibid., p.30.
25. In its simplest forms, it is 'What might have been', or 'had y happened instead of x, then ⋯' propositions in the natural and social sciences. A broad discussion is by David K. Luis, Counterfactuals (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1973). For recent explorations of counterfactual argument, see Philip E. Fetlock and Aaron Balkan (eds), Counterfactual Thought Experiment in World Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996).
26. In its simplest forms, it is 'What might have been', or 'had y happened instead of x, then ⋯' propositions in the natural and social sciences. A broad discussion is by David K. Luis, Counterfactuals (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1973). For recent explorations of counterfactual argument, see Philip E. Fetlock and Aaron Balkan (eds), Counterfactual Thought Experiment in World Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996).
27. Menachem Begin, The Revolt (Los Angeles, CA: Nash Publishing, 1972) pp.xi-xiii. Meir Kahane, founder of the Jewish Defense League and proponent of anti-Arab violence, contributed a prefatory note to the book in which he praised Begin's generation which had 'watered the soil of their own land with blood' (ibid., p.iii).
28. Menachem Begin, The Revolt (Los Angeles, CA: Nash Publishing, 1972) pp.xi-xiii. Meir Kahane, founder of the Jewish Defense League and proponent of anti-Arab violence, contributed a prefatory note to the book in which he praised Begin's generation which had 'watered the soil of their own land with blood' (ibid., p.iii).
29. Charles Foley (ed.), The Memoirs of General Grivas (New York: Frederick Praeger, 1964). The Spiridon quote is at p. 18.
30. By 'violent challenges' I mean those activities which come to question the very legitimacy of the democratic system in which they occur. Here I would certainly include insurrections, secessionist rebellions, large-scale 'coercive' civil disobedience (see van den Haag, above), general strikes (with apologies to Georges Sorel), large-scale or pervasive oppositional terrorism, attempted coups, large-scale military mutinies and the like, plus civil violence which, for whatever reasons, grows to threaten the capacity of the state to deal with it.
31. The Survey has been published annually since the 1970s; our data are from the 1995-96 edition, on the Internet at http://www.freedomhouse.org/Political. The Survey's methodology section (at p.6 of printout) provides a functional definition of democracy, with which I concur: 'At a minimum, democracy is a political system in which the people choose their authoritative leaders freely from among competing groups and individuals who were not chosen by the government.' The same section also distinguishes democracy from freedom: 'Putting it broadly, freedom is the chance to act spontaneously in a variety of fields outside the control of government and other centers of potential domination.' Thus (suggests the Survey), a democracy can be free in form, but not in substance, or 'partly free', such as El Salvador and Guatemala, which replaced military governments but had not yet completed their transitions to liberal democracies.
32. Henry Bienen and Nicholas Van de Walle, 'Time and Power in Africa', American Political Science Review 83/1 (March 1989) pp.19-33. Their data spans the period from independence to October 1987. In spite of the wave of some eight 'national conferences', mainly in francophone Africa beginning in 1989, which upset several entrenched dictatorships, I suspect their conclusions generally still hold up. What reinforces their analysis is the fact that at least two dictators hung on to power after sponsoring 'national conferences' (Mobutu in Zaire and Eyadema in Togo), and two others (Matthew Kérekou in Bénin and Didier Ratsiraka in Madagascar) returned to power, albeit with refurbished democratic credentials, after democratic interludes.
33. Five central American republics - Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua - gained their formal independence with the dissolution of the Confederation of Central America in 1838. The Confederation itself, however, was created in 1824, three years after a revolt which ended Spanish rule in the five territories.
34. Adam Przeworski, Michael Alvarez, Jose Antonio Cheibub and Fernando Limongi, 'What Makes Democracies Endure?', Journal of Democracy 7/1(1996) pp.39-55. Also relevant is Transitions to Democracy', in Adam Pzreworski, Democracy and the Market (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991) ch.2 pp.51-99.
35. Adam Przeworski, Michael Alvarez, Jose Antonio Cheibub and Fernando Limongi, 'What Makes Democracies Endure?', Journal of Democracy 7/1(1996) pp.39-55. Also relevant is Transitions to Democracy', in Adam Pzreworski, Democracy and the Market (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991) ch.2 pp.51-99.
36. A view espoused, for example, in 'Coerciveness of Political Regimes and Political Violence', in James F. Kirkham et al., Assassination and Political Violence: A Staff Report to the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence (New York: Bantam Books, 1970) pp. 182-6; and by Raymond Tanter, 'International War and Domestic Turmoil', and Ted Robert Gurr, 'A Comparative Study of Civil Strife' , both in Hugh Davis Graham and Ted Robert Gurr, The History of Violence in America: A Report to the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence ('Kerner Commission') (New York: Bantam Books, 1969) pp.550-72 and 572-632, respectively. See also R. J. Rummel, 'Political Systems, Violence, and War', a paper presented in June 1988 at the US Institute of Peace Conference, Airlie House, Airlie, VA, on the Internet at http://shadeslanding.com/firearms/rummel.war.html.
37. A view espoused, for example, in 'Coerciveness of Political Regimes and Political Violence', in James F. Kirkham et al., Assassination and Political Violence: A Staff Report to the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence (New York: Bantam Books, 1970) pp. 182-6; and by Raymond Tanter, 'International War and Domestic Turmoil', and Ted Robert Gurr, 'A Comparative Study of Civil Strife' , both in Hugh Davis Graham and Ted Robert Gurr, The History of Violence in America: A Report to the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence ('Kerner Commission') (New York: Bantam Books, 1969) pp.550-72 and 572-632, respectively. See also R. J. Rummel, 'Political Systems, Violence, and War', a paper presented in June 1988 at the US Institute of Peace Conference, Airlie House, Airlie, VA, on the Internet at http://shadeslanding.com/firearms/rummel.war.html.
38. A view espoused, for example, in 'Coerciveness of Political Regimes and Political Violence', in James F. Kirkham et al., Assassination and Political Violence: A Staff Report to the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence (New York: Bantam Books, 1970) pp. 182-6; and by Raymond Tanter, 'International War and Domestic Turmoil', and Ted Robert Gurr, 'A Comparative Study of Civil Strife' , both in Hugh Davis Graham and Ted Robert Gurr, The History of Violence in America: A Report to the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence ('Kerner Commission') (New York: Bantam Books, 1969) pp.550-72 and 572-632, respectively. See also R. J. Rummel, 'Political Systems, Violence, and War', a paper presented in June 1988 at the US Institute of Peace Conference, Airlie House, Airlie, VA, on the Internet at http://shadeslanding.com/firearms/rummel.war.html.
39. A view espoused, for example, in 'Coerciveness of Political Regimes and Political Violence', in James F. Kirkham et al., Assassination and Political Violence: A Staff Report to the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence (New York: Bantam Books, 1970) pp. 182-6; and by Raymond Tanter, 'International War and Domestic Turmoil', and Ted Robert Gurr, 'A Comparative Study of Civil Strife' , both in Hugh Davis Graham and Ted Robert Gurr, The History of Violence in America: A Report to the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence ('Kerner Commission') (New York: Bantam Books, 1969) pp.550-72 and 572-632, respectively. See also R. J. Rummel, 'Political Systems, Violence, and War', a paper presented in June 1988 at the US Institute of Peace Conference, Airlie House, Airlie, VA, on the Internet at http://shadeslanding.com/firearms/rummel.war.html.
40. A view espoused, for example, in 'Coerciveness of Political Regimes and Political Violence', in James F. Kirkham et al., Assassination and Political Violence: A Staff Report to the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence (New York: Bantam Books, 1970) pp. 182-6; and by Raymond Tanter, 'International War and Domestic Turmoil', and Ted Robert Gurr, 'A Comparative Study of Civil Strife' , both in Hugh Davis Graham and Ted Robert Gurr, The History of Violence in America: A Report to the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence ('Kerner Commission') (New York: Bantam Books, 1969) pp.550-72 and 572-632, respectively. See also R. J. Rummel, 'Political Systems, Violence, and War', a paper presented in June 1988 at the US Institute of Peace Conference, Airlie House, Airlie, VA, on the Internet at http://shadeslanding.com/firearms/rummel.war.html.
41. Those first few years in a democratic transition are even more perilous than my analysis suggests. Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snider argue ('Democratization and War', Foreign Affairs (May/June 1995) pp.79-97) that states undergoing democratization are at much greater risk of going to war with another state than those without regime change. The critical period for the democracies is during the first 10 years. Add that to the other factors of real and potential instability, including the violence of the transition itself, the dangers of disintegration faced by democracies with violent inceptions increases manyfold. I have not attempted to assess the effect of an early war as a possible stimulus to subsequent violent challenges; that must be left to individual case studies and later analyses.
42. Christopher J. Anderson, 'System Support in Old and New Democracies', (unpublished paper) presented at the American Political Science Association Annual Meeting, 28-31 August 1997, Washington, DC.
43. Dennis Austin, Democracy and Violence in India and Sri Lanka (New York: RIAA/Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1995) p.57.
44. Przeworski el al. (note 21); and Londregan and Poole (see note 27).
45. Przeworski et al. (note 21) pp.42-3.
46. John B. Londregan and Keith T. Poole, 'Poverty, the Coup Trap, and the Seizure of Executive Power', World Politics 42 (1990) pp.151-83.
47. Niger, which became independent in 1960, had civilian rule until 1974, when the regime of President Hamani Diori was overthrown by a junta led by CoI. Segni Kountche. The military stayed in power for 17 years; in 1991 a national conference ushered in a democratic regime, but it was overthrown by another military coup in January 1996. Sierra Leone, independent in 1961, to date (July 1997) has six military regimes and three democratically elected governments. Congo/Brazzaville became independent in 1960, succumbed to four military coups and five military regimes; a national conference in 1991 ushered in democratic governance under Pascal Lissouba, challenged again (in mid-1997) by one of the former military presidents, Denis Sassou-Nguesso.
48. Some francophone Africans who remember the pre-1960 period have confided to me over the years that while independence ended French rule in Africa, they were never so 'free' as during the 1946-1960 period, when there were elections to local legislatures, to the French National Assembly, the Assemblies of the French Union and (later) the Community, and every francophone territory, fielded political parties and candidates by the dozen. That period is covered in Ruth Schachter Morgenthau's definitive Political Parties in French West Africa (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964).
49. See Pearl Robinson, 'The National Conference Phenomenon', Society for the Comparative Study of Society and History 36/3 (1994);
50. La Nation (Benin, February 1992), special edition, 'Deux ans aprés ⋯ Les dossiers de la Conférence';
51. Seydou Mamadou Diarrah Totoh, Le Mouvement démocratique malien (Bamako: no publisher given, 1996);
52. Fabien Eboussi Boulanga, Les conférences nationales en Afrique Noire (Paris: Karthala, 1993).
53. For examples, see 'O Patriotic Hymns! You Enslave Us With Blood Lust and Self-Praise', New York Times, Sunday, 13 July 1997. The article cites passages from the national anthems of France, Vietnam, Mexico, Denmark, Belgium, China, Guatemala and Libya to make its point.
54. And, it should be added, it is not just violent victory that nations remember, but sometimes defeat: the national myth of Serbia is the Battle of Kosovo (at the so-called 'Field of the Blackbirds'), where, on 15 June 1389, an Ottoman army led by Sultan Murad I decisively defeated the Serbs under their Prince Lazar. During the civil war of the 1990s, many Serbs labelled their Bosnian Muslim enemies 'Turks', and fought to avenge Kosovo. (For a graphic account of this phenomenon, see John Kifner's article, 'Through the Serbians' Mind Eye', New York Times, 10 April 1994.)
55. My own choices among the lot are: Ted Robert Gurr's classic Why Men Rebel (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1970), which remains a solid point of reference; Anatol Rapoport in his The Origins of Violence: Approaches to the Study of Conflict (New York: Paragon House, 1989)
56. My own choices among the lot are: Ted Robert Gurr's classic Why Men Rebel (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1970), which remains a solid point of reference; Anatol Rapoport in his The Origins of Violence: Approaches to the Study of Conflict (New York: Paragon House, 1989)
57. who offers a synoptic view of the subject, as does Ekart Zimmerman, in his comprehensive review Political Violence, Crises, & Revolution:Theories and Research (Cambridge, MA: Schenkman, 1983). An older anthology still has much to recommend it: Ivo K. Feieraband, Rosalind L. Feierabend and Ted Robert Gurr (eds), Anger, Violence, and Politics (Engelwood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1973).
58. Who offers a synoptic view of the subject, as does Ekart Zimmerman, in his comprehensive review Political Violence, Crises, & Revolution:Theories and Research (Cambridge, MA: Schenkman, 1983). An older anthology still has much to recommend it: Ivo K. Feieraband, Rosalind L. Feierabend and Ted Robert Gurr (eds), Anger, Violence, and Politics (Engelwood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1973).
59. I have no wish to enter the lists of those arguing particular single, or multiple, causes of the fall of the Weimar Republic. While it is undoubtedly true that the Germans had little inkling what a National Socialist future would bring them, it remains that many, if not most, were attracted by the xenophobic, self-affirming message of the Nazis, and were apparently willing to tolerate the violence which they knew the Nazis would bring with them to power. As it tuned out, the Nazis did institutionalize a culture of violence amounting to an almost complete negation of the norms that governed Weimar in its best days. Hermann Rauschning, Die Revolution der Nihilismus [The Revolution of Nihilism] (Zurich: Europa Verlag, 1938) forcefully makes that argument.
60. Gurr (note 32); Mark N. Cooper, 'A re-interpretation of the causes of turmoil: the effects of culture and modernity', Comparative Political Studies 7/3 (Oct. 1973) pp.267-91; Douglas A. Hibbs, Mass political violence: a cross-national analysis (New York: Wiley, 1973); Hebron Elliot Adams, The Origins of Insurgency, PhD Dissertation, University of Lancaster, 1970; Raymond Duval and Mary Welfling, 'Social mobilization, political institutionalization in Black Africa, a simple dynamic model', Journal of Conflict Resolution 17/4 (Dec. 1973) pp.673-702.
61. Gurr (note 32); Mark N. Cooper, 'A re-interpretation of the causes of turmoil: the effects of culture and modernity', Comparative Political Studies 7/3 (Oct. 1973) pp.267-91; Douglas A. Hibbs, Mass political violence: a cross-national analysis (New York: Wiley, 1973); Hebron Elliot Adams, The Origins of Insurgency, PhD Dissertation, University of Lancaster, 1970; Raymond Duval and Mary Welfling, 'Social mobilization, political institutionalization in Black Africa, a simple dynamic model', Journal of Conflict Resolution 17/4 (Dec. 1973) pp.673-702.
62. Gurr (note 32); Mark N. Cooper, 'A re-interpretation of the causes of turmoil: the effects of culture and modernity', Comparative Political Studies 7/3 (Oct. 1973) pp.267-91; Douglas A. Hibbs, Mass political violence: a cross-national analysis (New York: Wiley, 1973); Hebron Elliot Adams, The Origins of Insurgency, PhD Dissertation, University of Lancaster, 1970; Raymond Duval and Mary Welfling, 'Social mobilization, political institutionalization in Black Africa, a simple dynamic model', Journal of Conflict Resolution 17/4 (Dec. 1973) pp.673-702.
63. Gurr (note 32); Mark N. Cooper, 'A re-interpretation of the causes of turmoil: the effects of culture and modernity', Comparative Political Studies 7/3 (Oct. 1973) pp.267-91; Douglas A. Hibbs, Mass political violence: a cross-national analysis (New York: Wiley, 1973); Hebron Elliot Adams, The Origins of Insurgency, PhD Dissertation, University of Lancaster, 1970; Raymond Duval and Mary Welfling, 'Social mobilization, political institutionalization in Black Africa, a simple dynamic model', Journal of Conflict Resolution 17/4 (Dec. 1973) pp.673-702.
64. Gurr (note 32); Mark N. Cooper, 'A re-interpretation of the causes of turmoil: the effects of culture and modernity', Comparative Political Studies 7/3 (Oct. 1973) pp.267-91; Douglas A. Hibbs, Mass political violence: a cross-national analysis (New York: Wiley, 1973); Hebron Elliot Adams, The Origins of Insurgency, PhD Dissertation, University of Lancaster, 1970; Raymond Duval and Mary Welfling, 'Social mobilization, political institutionalization in Black Africa, a simple dynamic model', Journal of Conflict Resolution 17/4 (Dec. 1973) pp.673-702.
65. Gurr (note 32) pp.160-83.
66. Surely the most comprehensive such study, in both categories is the 1969-70 Kerner Commission Report, including its staff studies and contract research. (For references, see note 22.)
67. Elizabeth Picard, 'The Lebanese Shi'a and Political Violence in Lebanon', in David E. Apter (ed.), The Legitimization of Violence (Washington Square, NY: New York University Press, 1997) pp.189-233, especially pp.208-15.
68. Bey: a Turkish survival, usually translated as 'lord', but also as 'chief/master'. Zaim: Lebanese-Arabic, usually translated as 'boss' or sometimes, 'godfather'. These leaders, often titular heads of important families, clans, militias and the like, run self-contained enclaves occasionally resembling mini-states, complete with their own militaries, welfare systems, taxation, banking and bureaucracies.
69. Ibid., p.209.
70. By its terms, inter alia, the President would always be a Maronite Christian, the Prime Minister a Sunni Muslim, the Speaker of the National Assembly a Shi'a Muslim, and the Cabinet divided in a ratio of 6:5, Christians to non-Christians. For details of the arrangement, see David and Audrey Smock, The Politics of Pluralism: A Comparative Study of Lebanon and Ghana (New York: Elsevier, 1975); Michael Hudson, The Precarious Republic: Political Modernization in Lebanon (New York: Random House, 1968); and Samir Khalaf, Lebanon's Predicament (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987).
71. By its terms, inter alia, the President would always be a Maronite Christian, the Prime Minister a Sunni Muslim, the Speaker of the National Assembly a Shi'a Muslim, and the Cabinet divided in a ratio of 6:5, Christians to non-Christians. For details of the arrangement, see David and Audrey Smock, The Politics of Pluralism: A Comparative Study of Lebanon and Ghana (New York: Elsevier, 1975); Michael Hudson, The Precarious Republic: Political Modernization in Lebanon (New York: Random House, 1968); and Samir Khalaf, Lebanon's Predicament (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987).
72. By its terms, inter alia, the President would always be a Maronite Christian, the Prime Minister a Sunni Muslim, the Speaker of the National Assembly a Shi'a Muslim, and the Cabinet divided in a ratio of 6:5, Christians to non-Christians. For details of the arrangement, see David and Audrey Smock, The Politics of Pluralism: A Comparative Study of Lebanon and Ghana (New York: Elsevier, 1975); Michael Hudson, The Precarious Republic: Political Modernization in Lebanon (New York: Random House, 1968); and Samir Khalaf, Lebanon's Predicament (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987).
73. I include myself among the optimists. I had visited Lebanon twice during the late 1960s and early 1970s, and thought I knew it well enough to share in the optimism expressed by many of my well-placed Lebanese friends. I was in good company: David and Audrey Smock, American social scientists who knew Lebanon much better than I did, even published a book comparing Ghana and Lebanon, in which Lebanon was extolled as a shining model of the possibilities of consociational democracy (The Politics of Pluralism). Unfortunately, the book was published in 1975, just as the Lebanese civil war was breaking out.
74. Disobedience and Disorder (New York: Vintage, 1968)
75. David E. Apter, 'Political Violence in Analytical Perspective', in David E. Apter (note 37) p.3.
76. Remarks to the panel on 'Democracy and Violence' at the International Political Science Association congress, Seoul, Korea, August 1997.
77. For details, see Michael Bratton and Nicolas van de Walle, Democratic Experiments in Africa: Regime Transitions in Comparative Perspective (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997) pp.97-127 and 194-210.
78. Howard W. French, 'Mali's Slips Reflect Stumbling African Democracy', New York Times, 7 Sept. 1997.
79. Nor did I intend to suggest that the transition - that is, the succession - problem occurs only in democracies: it remains on one of the most vexing problems facing all political systems. (For useful comments on this problem, see Rapoport's article on elections and violence in this volume.) Democratic transitions, that is, both transitions to democracy and within democracies, however achieved, are of special interest at the end of the twentieth century for two reasons: first, because so many transitions to democracy occurred unannounced in Africa, Latin America and Europe during the 1990s; and secondly, because the institutionalized forms of leadership succession which democracies provide appear to offer, at least in part, one of most promising programmes for mitigating, even lessening, the seemingly endemic civil violence afflicting these countries during the past 50 years.