The case of Medea - A view of fetal-maternal conflict

Journal of Medical Ethics

Volumn 23, Issue 1, 1997, Pages 19-25

  Reid, Matthew C ^a   Gillett, Grant ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF OTAGO   (New Zealand)

Author keywords

Abortion; Fetal maternal conflict

Indexed keywords

ARTICLE; CONFLICT; HUMAN RIGHTS; INDUCED ABORTION; INFANTICIDE; MORALITY; MOTHER FETUS RELATIONSHIP; MOTIVATION;

EID: 0347303547     PISSN: 03066800     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1136/jme.23.1.19     Document Type: Article

References (38)

1. We will use this phrase because of its popularity in the literature but it may be quite misleading to visualise the fetus and the pregnant woman as being in an adversarial relationship.
2. Rawls J. A theory of justice Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971.
3. Euripides. Medea and other plays. Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1963: 55.
4. See reference 3: 56.
5. Gillett G. The pause and the principles. In: Gillon R, Lloyd A, eds. Principles of health care ethics. Chichester, Sussex: John Wiley & Sons, 1993.
6. Quoted in Dumezil G. Gods of the ancient Northmen. Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1973: 59.
7. See reference 6: 60.
8. On this see Skegg P. Law, ethics and medicine Oxford: Clarendon, 1988.
9. This view is discussed in Poplawski N, Gillett G. Ethics and embryos. Journal of Medical Ethics. 1991; 17: 62-9. The form is that of a rational social being who has a longitudinal continuity (from potentiality to actuality of that form) through the process of bio-psycho-social development.
10. Tooley M. Abortion and infanticide. Philosophy and Public Affairs. 1972; 2: 37-65. Tooley states "[a]n organism possesses a serious right to life only if it possesses the concept of a self as a continuing subject of experiences and other mental states, and believes that it is itself such a continuing entity".
11. For example, in American law (Rowe v Wade, 410 US 113, at 164-165 (quoted in Gallagher J. Fetus as patient. In: Cohen S, Taub N, eds. Reproductive Laws for the 1990s. Clifton, New Jersey: Humana Press, 1989: 195).
12. Singer P. Embryo experimentation and the moral status of the embryo. In: Matthews E, Menlowe M, eds. Philosophy and health care. Hampshire: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 1992: 81-91. Singer states "[t]he minimal characteristic which is needed to give the embryo [or fetus] a claim to consideration is sentience, or the capacity to feel pain or pleasure".
13. Gillett G. Ought and well being. Inquiry 1993; 36: 287-306.
14. Johnsen D E. The creation of fetal rights: conflicts with women's constitutional rights to liberty, privacy, and equal protection. Yale Law Journal. 1986; 95: 600-2.
15. See reference 11: Gallagher J: 199.
16. See reference 15: 188.
17. Annas G J. Pregnant woman as fetal containers. Hastings Center Report. 1986; Dec: 13.
18. Annas G J. Forced caesarean sections: the most unkindest cut of all. Hastings Center Report 1982; Jun: 16-7.
19. Poplawski N, Gillett G. Ethics and embryos. Journal of Medical Ethics. 1991; 17: 62.
20. Strong C, Anderson G. Debate: The moral status of the near-term fetus. Journal of Medical Ethics. 1989; 15: 26.
21. See reference 12: Matthews E, Menlowe M, eds: Hayry M. Infanticide on request: the dark side of liberal abortion policies?: 105.
22. Warren MA. The moral significance of birth. In: Bequaert Holmes H, Purdy L M, eds. Feminist perspectives in medical ethics. Bloomington, Indianappolis: Indiana University Press, 1991: 207.
23. However, the born child's fate might be deeply relevant to the moral life of any mother.
24. Field MA. Controlling the woman to protect the fetus. Law, Medicine and Health Care. 1989; 17: 114.
25. Johnsen DE. The creation of fetal rights: conflicts with women's constitutional rights to liberty, privacy, and equal protection. Yale Law Journal. 1986; 95: 599-625.
26. Thomson JJ. A defense of abortion. In: Beauchamp T, Walters L, eds. Contemporary issues in bioethics. Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publishing Co, 1978: 199-209.
27. Gillett G. Reasonable care. Bristol: The Bristol Press, 1989: 75.
28. Gillon R. Philosophical medical ethics. Chichester: John Wiley & Sons for the British Medical Journal, 1985: 50.
29. See reference 3: 58.
30. This has been argued in Gillett G. Young human lives In: Laing J, Oderburg D, eds. Human lives. London: Macmillan, 1996.
31. See reference 2: 48-51.
32. An investigation of New Zealand law relating to abortion reveals, according to section 187 A of the Crimes Act 1961, that an abortion will not be unlawful 1) before 20 weeks, if "the continuance of the pregnancy would result in serious danger ⋯ to the life, or to the physical or mental health, of the woman or girl", there is substantial risk of severe abnormality of the fetus, the pregnancy was the result of incest or rape, or the woman is severely subnormal; 2) after 20 weeks, if the abortion is "necessary to save the life of the woman or girl or to prevent serious permanent injury to her physical or mental health". In practice this generally means that an abortion can be obtained fairly much on request early in gestation (the earlier the better) and becomes increasingly more difficult both to justify and to obtain later in gestation.
33. See reference 2: 20.
34. Rhoden B. The judge in the delivery room: the emergence of court-ordered caesareans. California Law Review 1986; 74: 1951, 1956.
35. Nelson M. Compelled medical treatment of pregnant women - life, liberty, and law in conflict. Journal of the American Medical Association. 1988; 259: 1061.
36. Noble-Allgire AM. Court ordered caesarean sections - a judicial standard for resolving the conflict between fetal interests and maternal rights. Journal of Legal Medicine. 1989; 10, 1: 211-249.
37. This is supported by the state of New Zealand and US law. Section 187 A of the New Zealand Crimes Act 1961 states that abortion may be performed where "there is a substantial risk that the child, if born, would be so physically or mentally abnormal as to be seriously handicapped" (albeit before 20 weeks). Indeed in the United States the negligent failure to prevent a child being born has been considered an actionable wrong. In one case (Carlender v Bio Science Laboratories) a judge indicated that a child would be able to sue its parents for not preventing its birth where they had prior knowledge of the probability of it being born defective.
38. Williams B. Ethics and the limits of philosophy. London: Fontana, 1985: 201.