Terry firma: Background democracy and constitutional foundations

Michigan Law Review

Volumn 99, Issue 8, 2001, Pages 1827-1852

  Michelman, Frank I ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0347236732     PISSN: 00262234     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/1290487     Document Type: Article

References (143)

1. FRANK I. MICHELMAN & TERRANCE SANDALOW, GOVERNMENT IN URBAN AREAS (1970).
2. Terrance Sandalow, The Limits of Municipal Power Under Home Rule: A Role for the Courts, 48 MINN. L. REV. 643 (1964) [hereinafter Sandalow, Limits of Municipal Power].
3. See Terrance Sandalow, Racial Preferences in Higher Education, 42 U. CHI. L. REV. 653 (1975) [hereinafter Sandalow, Racial Preferences], discussed infra Part IV.
4. See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, 62 TEXAS L. REV. 1363 (1984).
5. Terrance Sandalow, Constitutional Interpretation, 79 MICH. L. REV. 1033, 1049 (1981) [hereinafter Sandalow, Constitutional Interpretation].
6. But see infra text accompanying notes 104-105.
7. Sandalow, Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 5, at 1033; see also Terrance Sandalow, Abstract Democracy: A Review of Ackerman's We The People, 9 CONST. COMMENT. 309, 312 (1992) [hereinafter Sandalow, Abstract Democracy] (agreeing with Bruce Ackerman that "the absence of a satisfactory theory [of constitutional change] . . . has a corrosive effect on the commitment to constitutionalism"); Sandalow, Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 5, at 1049 (adding that "[t]he question whether legislation is within the authority of the federal government must . . . be decided within a framework which recognizes . . . that government . . . as one of enumerated powers. We do not consider ourselves at liberty to ignore the question or to answer it merely by demonstrating that the power can best be exercised by the federal government"); Terrance Sandalow, Social Justice and Fundamental Law: A Comment on Sager's Constitution, 88 Nw. U. L. REV. 461, 463 (1993) [hereinafter Sandalow, Social Justice] (referring sympathetically to the "common understanding" that constitutional law is not coextensive with speculative morality).
8. Sandalow, Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 5, at 1033; see also Terrance Sandalow, Abstract Democracy: A Review of Ackerman's We The People, 9 CONST. COMMENT. 309, 312 (1992) [hereinafter Sandalow, Abstract Democracy] (agreeing with Bruce Ackerman that "the absence of a satisfactory theory [of constitutional change] . . . has a corrosive effect on the commitment to constitutionalism"); Sandalow, Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 5, at 1049 (adding that "[t]he question whether legislation is within the authority of the federal government must . . . be decided within a framework which recognizes . . . that government . . . as one of enumerated powers. We do not consider ourselves at liberty to ignore the question or to answer it merely by demonstrating that the power can best be exercised by the federal government"); Terrance Sandalow, Social Justice and Fundamental Law: A Comment on Sager's Constitution, 88 Nw. U. L. REV. 461, 463 (1993) [hereinafter Sandalow, Social Justice] (referring sympathetically to the "common understanding" that constitutional law is not coextensive with speculative morality).
9. Sandalow, Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 5, at 1033; see also Terrance Sandalow, Abstract Democracy: A Review of Ackerman's We The People, 9 CONST. COMMENT. 309, 312 (1992) [hereinafter Sandalow, Abstract Democracy] (agreeing with Bruce Ackerman that "the absence of a satisfactory theory [of constitutional change] . . . has a corrosive effect on the commitment to constitutionalism"); Sandalow, Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 5, at 1049 (adding that "[t]he question whether legislation is within the authority of the federal government must . . . be decided within a framework which recognizes . . . that government . . . as one of enumerated powers. We do not consider ourselves at liberty to ignore the question or to answer it merely by demonstrating that the power can best be exercised by the federal government"); Terrance Sandalow, Social Justice and Fundamental Law: A Comment on Sager's Constitution, 88 Nw. U. L. REV. 461, 463 (1993) [hereinafter Sandalow, Social Justice] (referring sympathetically to the "common understanding" that constitutional law is not coextensive with speculative morality).
10. Sandalow, Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 5, at 1033; see also Terrance Sandalow, Abstract Democracy: A Review of Ackerman's We The People, 9 CONST. COMMENT. 309, 312 (1992) [hereinafter Sandalow, Abstract Democracy] (agreeing with Bruce Ackerman that "the absence of a satisfactory theory [of constitutional change] . . . has a corrosive effect on the commitment to constitutionalism"); Sandalow, Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 5, at 1049 (adding that "[t]he question whether legislation is within the authority of the federal government must . . . be decided within a framework which recognizes . . . that government . . . as one of enumerated powers. We do not consider ourselves at liberty to ignore the question or to answer it merely by demonstrating that the power can best be exercised by the federal government"); Terrance Sandalow, Social Justice and Fundamental Law: A Comment on Sager's Constitution, 88 Nw. U. L. REV. 461, 463 (1993) [hereinafter Sandalow, Social Justice] (referring sympathetically to the "common understanding" that constitutional law is not coextensive with speculative morality).
11. See HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1-9 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994).
12. See Sandalow, Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 5, at 1034 (suggesting that "the view that constitutional interpretation involves primarily an elucidation of the general intentions of the framers is . . . attractive . . . because it seems to support the institutional arrangements we have established for giving contemporary meaning to the Constitution").
13. Id. at 1068 (emphasis added).
14. See Sandalow, Social Justice, supra note 7, at 463 ("Because of the central role of the judiciary in interpreting and enforcing the Constitution, theories of constitutional interpretation have almost inevitably been influenced by theories about the appropriate distribution of power between the courts and other, more politically accountable institutions of government.").
15. Sandalow's ideas, while distinct from all of the following, also contain anticipations of them all: current common-law approaches to constitutional adjudication, see, e.g., David A. Strauss, The Irrelevance of Constitutional Amendments, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1457 (2001); Eugene Volokh, A Common-Law Model for Religious Exemptions, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1465 (1999), current democratic-experimentalist approaches, see, e.g., Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267 (1998), and current anti-judicial-supremacist approaches, see, e.g., MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999).
16. Sandalow's ideas, while distinct from all of the following, also contain anticipations of them all: current common-law approaches to constitutional adjudication, see, e.g., David A. Strauss, The Irrelevance of Constitutional Amendments, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1457 (2001); Eugene Volokh, A Common-Law Model for Religious Exemptions, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1465 (1999), current democratic-experimentalist approaches, see, e.g., Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267 (1998), and current anti-judicial-supremacist approaches, see, e.g., MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999).
17. Sandalow's ideas, while distinct from all of the following, also contain anticipations of them all: current common-law approaches to constitutional adjudication, see, e.g., David A. Strauss, The Irrelevance of Constitutional Amendments, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1457 (2001); Eugene Volokh, A Common-Law Model for Religious Exemptions, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1465 (1999), current democratic-experimentalist approaches, see, e.g., Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267 (1998), and current anti-judicial-supremacist approaches, see, e.g., MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999).
18. Sandalow's ideas, while distinct from all of the following, also contain anticipations of them all: current common-law approaches to constitutional adjudication, see, e.g., David A. Strauss, The Irrelevance of Constitutional Amendments, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1457 (2001); Eugene Volokh, A Common-Law Model for Religious Exemptions, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1465 (1999), current democratic-experimentalist approaches, see, e.g., Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267 (1998), and current anti-judicial-supremacist approaches, see, e.g., MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999).
19. See Sandalow, Limits of Municipal Power, supra note 2.
20. The matters summarized in this paragraph are described and discussed in detail in Sandalow, Limits of Municipal Power, supra note 2, at 645-71.
21. See id. at 692-707.
22. Terrance Sandalow, Judicial Protection of Minorities, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1162, 1165 (1977) [hereinafter Sandalow, Judicial Protection]; see also infra text accompanying notes 68, 100.
23. Cf. Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724 (1974) (upholding the constitutionality of a state statute of this kind).
24. See Sandalow, Limits of Municipal Power, supra note 2, at 708-09.
25. Id. at 710; cf. Sandalow, Judicial Protection, supra note 16, at 1191-93 (discussing pluralist safeguards in the operations of Congress).
26. Id. at 710; cf. Sandalow, Judicial Protection, supra note 16, at 1191-93 (discussing pluralist safeguards in the operations of Congress).
27. See Sandalow, Limits of Municipal Power, supra note 2, at 714.
28. Id. at 711, 715.
29. Id. at 712.
30. Id. at 716, 717.
31. Id. at 720.
32. Id. at 721.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 718 (offering this, along with the idea of local governments as sites of relatively safe "experimentation in the accommodation of competing values," as a reason for cautious use of any roving judicial commission to invalidate municipal legislation).
35. Sandalow, Racial Preferences, supra note 3.
36. Id. at 662-63.
37. Id. at 700. The point would become more emphatic in subsequent writings. See infra Parts VI-VIII.
38. Sandalow, Racial Preferences, supra note 3, at 662.
39. See id. at 700 (apparently acceding to judicial review as "the institutional mechanism that has developed for giving meaning to the Constitution").
40. See id. at 654-81.
41. Id. at 661.
42. Id. 36. Id. at 700.
43. Id.
44. See Sandalow, Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 5, at 1046 ("The amendment process . . . simply will not sustain the entire burden of adaptation that must be borne if the Constitution is to remain a vital instrument of government."); Terrance Sandalow, Equality and Freedom of Speech, 21 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 831, 833 (1995) [hereinafter Sandalow, Freedom of Speech] (warning that a result of tying constitutional adjudication to "principles formulated in response to issues very different from those we now confront" will be that the contemporary issues "will not be intelligently resolved").
45. See Sandalow, Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 5, at 1046 ("The amendment process . . . simply will not sustain the entire burden of adaptation that must be borne if the Constitution is to remain a vital instrument of government."); Terrance Sandalow, Equality and Freedom of Speech, 21 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 831, 833 (1995) [hereinafter Sandalow, Freedom of Speech] (warning that a result of tying constitutional adjudication to "principles formulated in response to issues very different from those we now confront" will be that the contemporary issues "will not be intelligently resolved").
46. See Sandalow, Racial Preferences, supra note 3, at 659 ("Unless a particular choice of values is prescribed by constitutional tradition, a judicial determination seems incompatible with the nation's commitment to democratic decisionmaking.").
47. See id. at 662, 680-81.
48. See, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 6-7 (1991).
49. See. e.g., Randy E. Barnett, Getting Normative: The Role of Natural Rights in Constitutional Adjudication, 12 CONST. COMMENT. 93, 111-12 (1995).
50. See infra Part VII.
51. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) (disclaiming jurisdiction by upholding the judicial duty to disregard a statute found to be in conflict with the Constitution).
52. See Sandalow, Racial Preferences, supra note 3, at 696, 698 ("Balancing the dangers of . . . preferences against their potential gains is a delicate, and ultimately legislative, task. There is no warrant for the courts to [with]draw the issue from the political forum.").
53. Id. at 695.
54. See id. at 699 ("A commitment to democratic values requires considerable judicial deference to deliberate [state] legislative judgments . . . .").
55. See supra text accompanying notes 19-21.
56. See Sandalow, Racial Preferences, supra note 3, at 696.
57. Id. at 699.
58. Id.
59. See supra text accompanying note 22.
60. See Sandalow, Racial Preferences, supra note 3, at 701-03.
61. Id. at 703; see also Terrance Sandalow, The Distrust of Politics, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 446, 447-50 (1981) [hereinafter Sandalow, Distrust of Politics] (compiling examples of issues "remov[ed] from politics [by decisions of the Supreme Court] that, in a democracy, one would expect to be resolved by a political process").
62. Id. at 703; see also Terrance Sandalow, The Distrust of Politics, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 446, 447-50 (1981) [hereinafter Sandalow, Distrust of Politics] (compiling examples of issues "remov[ed] from politics [by decisions of the Supreme Court] that, in a democracy, one would expect to be resolved by a political process").
63. Sandalow, Racial Preferences, supra note 3, at 695.
64. Id. at 700.
65. See, e.g., Sandalow, Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 5, at 1069.
66. See id. at 1055-60; Sandalow, Freedom of Speech, supra note 38, at 831-34; Sandalow, Social Justice, supra note 7, at 464-66; infra text accompanying notes 69-74, 79-80.
67. See id. at 1055-60; Sandalow, Freedom of Speech, supra note 38, at 831-34; Sandalow, Social Justice, supra note 7, at 464-66; infra text accompanying notes 69-74, 79-80.
68. See id. at 1055-60; Sandalow, Freedom of Speech, supra note 38, at 831-34; Sandalow, Social Justice, supra note 7, at 464-66; infra text accompanying notes 69-74, 79-80.
69. See supra text accompanying notes 40-41.
70. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW ch. 1 (1996); FRANK I. MICHELMAN, BRENNAN AND DEMOCRACY 11-25, 33-34, 40-51 (1999); Frank I. Michelman, Human Rights and the Limits of Constitutional Theory, 13 RATIO JURIS 63 (2000).
71. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW ch. 1 (1996); FRANK I. MICHELMAN, BRENNAN AND DEMOCRACY 11-25, 33-34, 40-51 (1999); Frank I. Michelman, Human Rights and the Limits of Constitutional Theory, 13 RATIO JURIS 63 (2000).
72. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW ch. 1 (1996); FRANK I. MICHELMAN, BRENNAN AND DEMOCRACY 11-25, 33-34, 40-51 (1999); Frank I. Michelman, Human Rights and the Limits of Constitutional Theory, 13 RATIO JURIS 63 (2000).
73. See Sandalow, Judicial Protection, supra note 16, at 1183.
74. See Sandalow, Abstract Democracy, supra note 7, at 311-12.
75. See id. at 310-12; Sandalow, Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 5, at 1038-45.
76. See id. at 310-12; Sandalow, Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 5, at 1038-45.
77. See Sandalow, Abstract Democracy, supra note 7, at 1046-49, 1064-68; Sandalow, Judicial Protection, supra note 16, at 1180-81.
78. See Sandalow, Abstract Democracy, supra note 7, at 1046-49, 1064-68; Sandalow, Judicial Protection, supra note 16, at 1180-81.
79. See Sandalow, Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 5, at 1036-37, 1045-46.
80. See Sandalow, Abstract Democracy, supra note 7, at 330.
81. Id.
82. Sandalow, Judicial Protection, supra note 16, at 1184.
83. Id. at 1186 (emphasis added).
84. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
85. Sandalow, Judicial Protection, supra note 16, at 1187.
86. Id. at 1186-87. Sandalow's rejection as "undemocratic" of the Court's decision in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1972), rests in part on his factual view that anti-abortion laws were not at the time contrary to any emergent state legislative consensus nor were they the product of state legislative heedlessness or inattention.
87. See Terrance Sandalow, Federalism and Social Change, 43 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 29, 35-36 (1980) [hereinafter Sandalow, Federalism].
88. See Sandalow, Judicial Protection, supra note 16, at 1188.
89. See id. at 1187; Sandalow, Racial Preferences, supra note 3, at 700-01.
90. See id. at 1187; Sandalow, Racial Preferences, supra note 3, at 700-01.
91. See supra text accompanying notes 55-56.
92. See Sandalow, Distrust of Politics, supra note 54, at 459 (emphasis added).
93. Id. at 468. Sandalow speaks in this sentence of "politics," not "representative government." But context makes clear that "politics" refers to conduct of the "political process" of representative government.
94. See Sandalow, Judicial Protection, supra note 16, at 1178.
95. See id. at 1186.
96. Sandalow, Distrust of Politics, supra note 54, at 447 n.4; see also Sandalow, Judicial Protection, supra note 16, at 1186, 1189.
97. Sandalow, Distrust of Politics, supra note 54, at 447 n.4; see also Sandalow, Judicial Protection, supra note 16, at 1186, 1189.
98. See Sandalow, Abstract Democracy, supra note 7.
99. See supra text accompanying notes 63-65.
100. See Sandalow, Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 5, at 1046-49.
101. Sandalow, Abstract Democracy, supra note 7, at 324-25; see also Sandalow, Federalism, supra note 72, at 29-30.
102. Sandalow, Abstract Democracy, supra note 7, at 324-25; see also Sandalow, Federalism, supra note 72, at 29-30.
103. Sandalow, Abstract Democracy, supra note 7, at 315 (emphasis added).
104. See generally EDMUND S. MORGAN, INVENTING THE PEOPLE (1988).
105. In regard to this statement and the balance of the paragraph, see Frank I. Michelman, Thirteen Easy Pieces, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1297, 1312-13, 1314 (1995), and sources cited.
106. See Frank I. Michelman. Constitutional Authorship by the People, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1605, 1624-25 (1999).
107. See Sandalow, Abstract Democracy, supra note 7, at 326-30.
108. See id. at 318-25, 330-36.
109. See id. at 325.
110. Id. at 331-32.
111. See ACKERMAN, supra note 41, at 10-16.
112. Sandalow, Judicial Protection, supra note 16, at 1166.
113. Id. at 1168.
114. Id. at 1166.
115. Id. at 1178.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 1178.
118. Id. at 1165.
119. Id. at 1165-66.
120. Id. at 1172 (emphasis added): see also id. at 1179-80 (extending the critique to the "suspect classification" branch of equal-protection review).
121. See id.
122. Id. at 1170, 1185.
123. See id. at 1171-72. But see supra text accompanying note 6.
124. See Sandalow, Judicial Protection, supra note 16, at 1182 ("If the court is to judge from within an evolving tradition . . . it lacks the fixed point of reference that is necessary for deciding whether [community] values were given their due.").
125. Id. at 1171.
126. See id. at 1168-70.
127. See Sandalow, Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 5, at 1054.
128. See Sandalow, Judicial Protection, supra note 16, at 1173 (asking why, "[i]f constitutional rules are a product of judicial choice," they should "be permitted to control" the acts of representative government).
129. See generally RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE (1986).
130. Sandalow, Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 5, at 1055.
131. See supra Parts VII-VIII.
132. See supra note 38.
133. See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
134. See Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L. J. 1 (1971).
135. See, e.g., Sandalow, Freedom of Speech, supra note 38.
136. See supra text accompanying notes 75-77.
137. As, for example, does TUSHNET, supra note 12.
138. See works cited supra note 60.
139. See Terrance Sandalow, A Skeptical Look at Contemporary Republicanism, 41 FLA. L. REV. 523, 525, 528-34 (1989); Sandalow, Distrust of Politics, supra note 54, at 453-55, 457, 468.
140. See Terrance Sandalow, A Skeptical Look at Contemporary Republicanism, 41 FLA. L. REV. 523, 525, 528-34 (1989); Sandalow, Distrust of Politics, supra note 54, at 453-55, 457, 468.
141. I doubt this is controversial. Consider, for example, the difference possibly made by what Abraham Lincoln thought and did about constitutional law. See Sanford Levinson, Was the Emancipation Proclamation Constitutional? Do We Care What the Answer Is? (David C. Baum Memorial Lecture Series on Civil Liberties and Civil Rights, Univ. of Ill. Law School, Apr. 5, 2001) (on file with author).
142. I do not mean he never writes with irony, wit, or a twinkle in the eye. See, e.g., Terrance Sandalow, The Supreme Court in Politics, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1300, 1300-03 (1990) (reviewing ETHAN BRONNER, BATTLE FOR JUSTICE: HOW THE BORK NOMINATION SHOOK AMERICA (1989)).
143. I do not mean he never writes with irony, wit, or a twinkle in the eye. See, e.g., Terrance Sandalow, The Supreme Court in Politics, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1300, 1300-03 (1990) (reviewing ETHAN BRONNER, BATTLE FOR JUSTICE: HOW THE BORK NOMINATION SHOOK AMERICA (1989)).