R&D Cooperation and Growth

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 86, Issue 1, 1999, Pages 17-49

  Cozzi, Guido ^a  

^a Department of Obstetrics Gynecology   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0347178829     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/jeth.1998.2502     Document Type: Article

References (45)

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