"Fortunate enough to obtain and keep the title of profession": Self-regulating organizations and the enforcement of professional monopolies

Canadian Public Administration

Volumn 41, Issue 4, 1998, Pages 587-621

  Brockman, Joan ^a,b  

^a SIMON FRASER UNIVERSITY   (Canada)

^b MEMORIAL UNIVERSITY OF NEWFOUNDLAND   (Canada)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 0347178646     PISSN: 00084840     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1754-7121.1998.tb00222.x     Document Type: Article

References (187)

1. Office des professions du Québec, The Evolution of Professionalism in Québec (Quebec City: Office, 1976), p. 29.
2. Harold Dick, legal counsel for the Manitoba Law Reform Commission, comments that of the 156 occupations examined by the commission, thirty-six were "self-governing and could be considered 'professions.'" Harold Dick, "Paradigm Lost: A Summary of the Manitoba Law Reform Commission's Regulating Professions and Occupations," Manitoba Law Journal 24, no. 2 (1996), p. 264. However, W. Wesley Pue, "Becoming 'Ethical': Lawyers' Professional Ethics in Early Twentieth Century Canada," in D. Gibson and W.W. Pue, eds., Glimpses of Canadian Legal History (Winnipeg: Legal Research Institute, University of Manitoba, 1991), pp. 246-8, shows that law societies functioned in Canada for some time before being given disciplinary powers by the provinces.
3. Harold Dick, legal counsel for the Manitoba Law Reform Commission, comments that of the 156 occupations examined by the commission, thirty-six were "self-governing and could be considered 'professions.'" Harold Dick, "Paradigm Lost: A Summary of the Manitoba Law Reform Commission's Regulating Professions and Occupations," Manitoba Law Journal 24, no. 2 (1996), p. 264. However, W. Wesley Pue, "Becoming 'Ethical': Lawyers' Professional Ethics in Early Twentieth Century Canada," in D. Gibson and W.W. Pue, eds., Glimpses of Canadian Legal History (Winnipeg: Legal Research Institute, University of Manitoba, 1991), pp. 246-8, shows that law societies functioned in Canada for some time before being given disciplinary powers by the provinces.
4. See, for example, Constance Backhouse, "Racial Segregation in Canadian Legal History: Viola Desmond's Challenge, Nova Scotia, 1946," Dalhousie Law Journal 17, no. 2 (Fall 1994), p. 299; Joan Brockman, "Exclusionary Tactics: The History of Women and Minorities in the Legal Profession in British Columbia," in Hamar Foster and John P.S. McLaren, eds., Essays in the History of Canadian Law, Volume VI, British Columbia and the Yukon (Toronto: Osgoode Society, 1995), p. 508; Dawna Tong, "A History of Exclusion: The Treatment of Racial and Ethnic Minorities by the Law Society of British Columbia in Admissions to the Legal Profession," Advocate 56, no. 2 (March 1998), pp. 197-208; Anne Witz, Professions and Patriarchy (London: Routledge, 1992).
5. See, for example, Constance Backhouse, "Racial Segregation in Canadian Legal History: Viola Desmond's Challenge, Nova Scotia, 1946," Dalhousie Law Journal 17, no. 2 (Fall 1994), p. 299; Joan Brockman, "Exclusionary Tactics: The History of Women and Minorities in the Legal Profession in British Columbia," in Hamar Foster and John P.S. McLaren, eds., Essays in the History of Canadian Law, Volume VI, British Columbia and the Yukon (Toronto: Osgoode Society, 1995), p. 508; Dawna Tong, "A History of Exclusion: The Treatment of Racial and Ethnic Minorities by the Law Society of British Columbia in Admissions to the Legal Profession," Advocate 56, no. 2 (March 1998), pp. 197-208; Anne Witz, Professions and Patriarchy (London: Routledge, 1992).
6. See, for example, Constance Backhouse, "Racial Segregation in Canadian Legal History: Viola Desmond's Challenge, Nova Scotia, 1946," Dalhousie Law Journal 17, no. 2 (Fall 1994), p. 299; Joan Brockman, "Exclusionary Tactics: The History of Women and Minorities in the Legal Profession in British Columbia," in Hamar Foster and John P.S. McLaren, eds., Essays in the History of Canadian Law, Volume VI, British Columbia and the Yukon (Toronto: Osgoode Society, 1995), p. 508; Dawna Tong, "A History of Exclusion: The Treatment of Racial and Ethnic Minorities by the Law Society of British Columbia in Admissions to the Legal Profession," Advocate 56, no. 2 (March 1998), pp. 197-208; Anne Witz, Professions and Patriarchy (London: Routledge, 1992).
7. See, for example, Constance Backhouse, "Racial Segregation in Canadian Legal History: Viola Desmond's Challenge, Nova Scotia, 1946," Dalhousie Law Journal 17, no. 2 (Fall 1994), p. 299; Joan Brockman, "Exclusionary Tactics: The History of Women and Minorities in the Legal Profession in British Columbia," in Hamar Foster and John P.S. McLaren, eds., Essays in the History of Canadian Law, Volume VI, British Columbia and the Yukon (Toronto: Osgoode Society, 1995), p. 508; Dawna Tong, "A History of Exclusion: The Treatment of Racial and Ethnic Minorities by the Law Society of British Columbia in Admissions to the Legal Profession," Advocate 56, no. 2 (March 1998), pp. 197-208; Anne Witz, Professions and Patriarchy (London: Routledge, 1992).
8. See, for example, Michael J. Trebilcock, "Regulating Service Quality in Professional Markets," in Donald N. Dewees, ed., The Regulation of Quality: Products, Services, Workplaces, and the Environment (Toronto: Butterworths, 1983), pp. 86-8.
9. Joan Brockman, "A Cold-Blooded Effort to Bolster Up the Legal Profession": The Battle Between Lawyers and Notaries in British Columbia, 1871-1930 (under review ); and Joan Brockman, "'Better to Enlist Their Support Than to Suffer Their Antagonism': The Game of Monopoly Between Lawyers and Notaries in British Columbia, 1930-1981," International Journal of the Legal Profession 4, no. 3 (November 1997), p. 197.
10. Joan Brockman, "A Cold-Blooded Effort to Bolster Up the Legal Profession": The Battle Between Lawyers and Notaries in British Columbia, 1871-1930 (under review ); and Joan Brockman, "'Better to Enlist Their Support Than to Suffer Their Antagonism': The Game of Monopoly Between Lawyers and Notaries in British Columbia, 1930-1981," International Journal of the Legal Profession 4, no. 3 (November 1997), p. 197.
11. Witz, Professions and Patriarchy, p. 56. Professions are also accused of creating needs. See, for example, Ivan Illich, The Right to Useful Unemployment and Its Professional Enemies (London: Marion Boyars, 1978), especially Chapter 2, "Disabling Professions."
12. Witz, Professions and Patriarchy, p. 56. Professions are also accused of creating needs. See, for example, Ivan Illich, The Right to Useful Unemployment and Its Professional Enemies (London: Marion Boyars, 1978), especially Chapter 2, "Disabling Professions."
13. Wes Pue writes, "[T]he purpose of creating a fully self-regulating profession is to secure an artificial monopoly in the provision of services and to back this monopoly with legislative sanctions." See W. Wesley Pue, "Foxes, Henhouses, Unfathomable Mysteries, and the Sufferance of the People: A Review of Regulating Professions and Occupations," Manitoba Law Journal 24, no. 2 (1996), p. 287. Pue questions whether occupations that are granted a state-backed monopoly should ever be given self-governing powers.
14. Law associations in Ontario in 1988 were investigated for enforcing suggested fee-schedules, and the federal court granted a prohibition against such activities. See Joan Brockman, "Controlling Crimes of the Professional Elite," Chapter 14 in Margaret A. Jackson and Curt Griffiths, eds., Canadian Criminology: Perspectives on Crime and Society, 2nd edition (Toronto: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Canada, 1995), p. 444. D.S. Lees, Economic Consequences of the Professions (London: The Institute of Economic Affairs, 1966), p. 3, writes, "[Professional groups normally operate so as to restrict competition, both by regulating the behaviour of members of the group with respect to fees, advertising, etc., and by seeking to limit the availability of substitutes for the services of the group as a whole."
15. Law associations in Ontario in 1988 were investigated for enforcing suggested fee-schedules, and the federal court granted a prohibition against such activities. See Joan Brockman, "Controlling Crimes of the Professional Elite," Chapter 14 in Margaret A. Jackson and Curt Griffiths, eds., Canadian Criminology: Perspectives on Crime and Society, 2nd edition (Toronto: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Canada, 1995), p. 444. D.S. Lees, Economic Consequences of the Professions (London: The Institute of Economic Affairs, 1966), p. 3, writes, "[Professional groups normally operate so as to restrict competition, both by regulating the behaviour of members of the group with respect to fees, advertising, etc., and by seeking to limit the availability of substitutes for the services of the group as a whole."
16. Keith M. Macdonald, The Sociology of the Professions (London: Sage Publications, 1995), pp. 10, 34 and 189. Macdonald borrowed the phrase "regulative bargain" from D. Cooper et al., "Regulating the U.K. Accountancy Profession: Episodes in the Relation between the Profession and the State." Paper presented at the Economic and Social Research Council Conference on Corporatism at the Policy Studies Institute, London, January, 1988. Christine Parker, "Competing Images of the Legal Profession: Competing Regulatory Strategies" International Journal of the Sociology of Law 25, no. 4 (December 1997), p. 385, uses the term "social bargain."
17. Keith M. Macdonald, The Sociology of the Professions (London: Sage Publications, 1995), pp. 10, 34 and 189. Macdonald borrowed the phrase "regulative bargain" from D. Cooper et al., "Regulating the U.K. Accountancy Profession: Episodes in the Relation between the Profession and the State." Paper presented at the Economic and Social Research Council Conference on Corporatism at the Policy Studies Institute, London, January, 1988. Christine Parker, "Competing Images of the Legal Profession: Competing Regulatory Strategies" International Journal of the Sociology of Law 25, no. 4 (December 1997), p. 385, uses the term "social bargain."
18. Keith M. Macdonald, The Sociology of the Professions (London: Sage Publications, 1995), pp. 10, 34 and 189. Macdonald borrowed the phrase "regulative bargain" from D. Cooper et al., "Regulating the U.K. Accountancy Profession: Episodes in the Relation between the Profession and the State." Paper presented at the Economic and Social Research Council Conference on Corporatism at the Policy Studies Institute, London, January, 1988. Christine Parker, "Competing Images of the Legal Profession: Competing Regulatory Strategies" International Journal of the Sociology of Law 25, no. 4 (December 1997), p. 385, uses the term "social bargain."
19. Carolyn J. Tuohy and Alan D. Wolfson, "Political Economy of Professionalism: A Perspective," in Consumer Research Council Canada, Four Aspects of Professionalism (Ottawa: Council, 1977), p. 62, wrote, "There must be provision for the regular review of professional regulatory decisions by the representative institutions of the state, and these institutions must be prepared to over-ride professional decisions where they judge the public interest has not been served."
20. Economic Council of Canada, Reforming Regulation (Ottawa: Council 1981), recommended that the federal government and each province establish an occupational regulation commission to "assess and advise the government on all existing and proposed legislation concerning regulated occupations; conduct and publish research assessing the performance of occupational regulation on a systematic basis; and hear appeals initiated by members of the public and of occupational groups, or by potential entrants" (p. 119).
21. Ibid., p. 120.
22. Manitoba, Law Reform Commission, Regulating Professions and Occupations (Winnipeg: Queen's Printer, 1994), p. 56. While most SROS were established to serve the interests of their members, some have evolved to a dual role (serving the public and their members), whereas others have been legislated to serve only the public interest.
23. Anil K. Gupta and Lawrence J. Lad, "Industry Self-Regulation: An Economic, Organizational and Political Analysis," Academy of Management Review 8, no. 3 (July 1983), p. 416.
24. Ian Ayres and John Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992); Canada, Treasury Board Secretariat, Responsive Regulation in Canada: The Government Reply to the Sub-Committee on Regulations and Competitiveness (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1993).
25. Ian Ayres and John Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992); Canada, Treasury Board Secretariat, Responsive Regulation in Canada: The Government Reply to the Sub-Committee on Regulations and Competitiveness (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1993).
26. Sam Scott Miller, "Self-regulation of the securities markets: A critical examination," Washington and Lee Law Review 42, no. 3 (Summer 1985), p. 859. However, this can be misleading, "unless tempered with the knowledge that industry and Government under self-regulation do not have the same regulatory perspective, responsibilities or powers" (p. 859). See, also Richard A. Booth, "Self-Regulation in a Democratic Society," Journal of Air Law and Commerce 50, nos. 3/4 (1985), p. 497.
27. Sam Scott Miller, "Self-regulation of the securities markets: A critical examination," Washington and Lee Law Review 42, no. 3 (Summer 1985), p. 859. However, this can be misleading, "unless tempered with the knowledge that industry and Government under self-regulation do not have the same regulatory perspective, responsibilities or powers" (p. 859). See, also Richard A. Booth, "Self-Regulation in a Democratic Society," Journal of Air Law and Commerce 50, nos. 3/4 (1985), p. 497.
28. John Braithwaite, "Enforced Self-Regulation: A New Strategy for Corporate Crime Control," Michigan Law Review 80, no. 7 (June 1982), p. 1466; Jurg Gerber, "Enforced Self-Regulation in the Infant Formula Industry: A Radical Extension of an 'Impractical' Proposal," Social Justice 17, no. 1 (1990), 98. Although used in the context of controlling corporate crime, it is equally applicable to occupational or professional regulation. Enforced self-regulation is sometimes used in the narrow sense of negotiated standards between the government and an individual firm or corporation, a form of subcontracting of regulatory functions.
29. John Braithwaite, "Enforced Self-Regulation: A New Strategy for Corporate Crime Control," Michigan Law Review 80, no. 7 (June 1982), p. 1466; Jurg Gerber, "Enforced Self-Regulation in the Infant Formula Industry: A Radical Extension of an 'Impractical' Proposal," Social Justice 17, no. 1 (1990), 98. Although used in the context of controlling corporate crime, it is equally applicable to occupational or professional regulation. Enforced self-regulation is sometimes used in the narrow sense of negotiated standards between the government and an individual firm or corporation, a form of subcontracting of regulatory functions.
30. Jay A. Sigler and Joseph E. Murphy, Interactive Corporate Compliance: An Alternative to Regulatory Compulsion (Westport, Conn.: Quorum, 1988).
31. Marianne Smythe, "Government Supervised Self-Regulation in the Securities Industry and the Antitrust Laws: Suggestions for Accommodation," Securities Law Review (1985), p. 459; David L. Ratner, "Self-Regulatory Organizations," Osgoode Hall Law Journal 19, no. 3 (September 1981), p. 369.
32. Marianne Smythe, "Government Supervised Self-Regulation in the Securities Industry and the Antitrust Laws: Suggestions for Accommodation," Securities Law Review (1985), p. 459; David L. Ratner, "Self-Regulatory Organizations," Osgoode Hall Law Journal 19, no. 3 (September 1981), p. 369.
33. Ayres and Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation, p. 16.
34. Douglas C. Michael, "Federal Agency Use of Audited Self-Regulation as Regulatory Technique," Administrative Law Review 47, no. 1 (Winter 1995), p. 171.
35. See, for example, Robert S Gilmour and Laura S. Jensen, "Reinventing Government Accountablity: Public Functions, Privatization, and the Meaning of 'State Action,'" Public Administration Review 58, no. 3 (May/June 1998), p. 247; Ronald C. Moe and Robert S. Gilmour, "Rediscovering Principles of Public Administration: The Neglected Foundation of Public Law," Public Administration Review 55, no. 2 (March/April 1995), p. 135.
36. See, for example, Robert S Gilmour and Laura S. Jensen, "Reinventing Government Accountablity: Public Functions, Privatization, and the Meaning of 'State Action,'" Public Administration Review 58, no. 3 (May/June 1998), p. 247; Ronald C. Moe and Robert S. Gilmour, "Rediscovering Principles of Public Administration: The Neglected Foundation of Public Law," Public Administration Review 55, no. 2 (March/April 1995), p. 135.
37. There are other models: Margot Priest, "The Privatization of Regulation: Five Models of Self-Regulation," Ottawa Law Review 29, no. 2 (1997/98), p. 233, examines five models: voluntary codes of conduct, statutory self-regulation, statutorily required self-regulation, supervised self-regulation, and regulatory self-management. See Paul Thomas and John Wilkins, "Special Operating Agencies: A Culture Change in the Manitoba Government," in Robin Ford and David Zussman, eds., Alternative Service Delivery: Sharing Governance in Canada (Toronto: KPMG and IPAC, 1997), p. 109, who elaborate on the use of SOAS in Manitoba; and Christopher Bruce and Don Woytowich, "Delegated Administrative Organizations: Alberta's Third Option,'" in Ford and Zussman, Alternative Service Delivery, p. 208.
38. There are other models: Margot Priest, "The Privatization of Regulation: Five Models of Self-Regulation," Ottawa Law Review 29, no. 2 (1997/98), p. 233, examines five models: voluntary codes of conduct, statutory self-regulation, statutorily required self-regulation, supervised self-regulation, and regulatory self-management. See Paul Thomas and John Wilkins, "Special Operating Agencies: A Culture Change in the Manitoba Government," in Robin Ford and David Zussman, eds., Alternative Service Delivery: Sharing Governance in Canada (Toronto: KPMG and IPAC, 1997), p. 109, who elaborate on the use of SOAS in Manitoba; and Christopher Bruce and Don Woytowich, "Delegated Administrative Organizations: Alberta's Third Option,'" in Ford and Zussman, Alternative Service Delivery, p. 208.
39. There are other models: Margot Priest, "The Privatization of Regulation: Five Models of Self-Regulation," Ottawa Law Review 29, no. 2 (1997/98), p. 233, examines five models: voluntary codes of conduct, statutory self-regulation, statutorily required self-regulation, supervised self-regulation, and regulatory self-management. See Paul Thomas and John Wilkins, "Special Operating Agencies: A Culture Change in the Manitoba Government," in Robin Ford and David Zussman, eds., Alternative Service Delivery: Sharing Governance in Canada (Toronto: KPMG and IPAC, 1997), p. 109, who elaborate on the use of SOAS in Manitoba; and Christopher Bruce and Don Woytowich, "Delegated Administrative Organizations: Alberta's Third Option,'" in Ford and Zussman, Alternative Service Delivery, p. 208.
40. Witz, Professions and Patriarchy, pp. 46,104 and 197.
41. Two other systems that impose minimum requirements, registration and permits are not discussed in this paper.
42. Economic Council of Canada, Reforming Regulation, p. 114.
43. See Tuohy and Wolfson, "Political Economy of Professionalism," Consumer Research Council of Canada, Four Aspects of Professionalism, p. 41; Carolyn J. Tuohy and Alan D. Wolfson, "Self-Regulation: Who Qualifies?" in Philip Slayton and Michael J. Trebilcock, eds., The Professions and Public Policy (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1976), p. 11; Trebilcock, "Regulating Service Quality," in Dewees, Regulation of Quality, p. 83.
44. See Tuohy and Wolfson, "Political Economy of Professionalism," Consumer Research Council of Canada, Four Aspects of Professionalism, p. 41; Carolyn J. Tuohy and Alan D. Wolfson, "Self-Regulation: Who Qualifies?" in Philip Slayton and Michael J. Trebilcock, eds., The Professions and Public Policy (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1976), p. 11; Trebilcock, "Regulating Service Quality," in Dewees, Regulation of Quality, p. 83.
45. See Tuohy and Wolfson, "Political Economy of Professionalism," Consumer Research Council of Canada, Four Aspects of Professionalism, p. 41; Carolyn J. Tuohy and Alan D. Wolfson, "Self-Regulation: Who Qualifies?" in Philip Slayton and Michael J. Trebilcock, eds., The Professions and Public Policy (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1976), p. 11; Trebilcock, "Regulating Service Quality," in Dewees, Regulation of Quality, p. 83.
46. Donald L. Flexner, "Occupational Licensing: Consumer Protection or Cartel Management," in Kentucky, Legislative Research Commission, A New Direction in Occupational Licensing. Edited by Michael Greer. Informational Bulletin no. 133 (Frankfort: Commission, 1979), p. 60.
47. Stanley J. Gross, Of Foxes and Hen Houses: Licensing and the Health Professions (Westport, Conn.: Quorum Books, 1984), p. 80.
48. Alan D. Wolfson, Michael J. Trebilcock and Carolyn J. Tuohy, "Regulating the Professions: A Theoretical Framework," in Simon Rottenberg, ed., Occupational Licensure (Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1980), p. 191. See also Hayne E. Leland, "Minimum-Quality Standards and Licensing in Markets with Asymmetric Information," in Ibid., p. 265, who comments that regulation is needed "because of the difficulties in assessing the hazard (information asymmetry) rather than the hazard itself" (p. 266).
49. Alan D. Wolfson, Michael J. Trebilcock and Carolyn J. Tuohy, "Regulating the Professions: A Theoretical Framework," in Simon Rottenberg, ed., Occupational Licensure (Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1980), p. 191. See also Hayne E. Leland, "Minimum-Quality Standards and Licensing in Markets with Asymmetric Information," in Ibid., p. 265, who comments that regulation is needed "because of the difficulties in assessing the hazard (information asymmetry) rather than the hazard itself" (p. 266).
50. Gross, Of Foxes and Hen Houses, p. 54.
51. Keith B. Leffler, "Commentary" in Rottenberg, Occupational Licensure, p. 292.
52. Gross, Of Foxes and Hen Houses, writes that "[i]n an anonymous urban society, information about a professional's reputation is not passed from neighbor to friend to relative as it might be in a more closely knit society" (p. 17).
53. Linda Bohnen, "The Sociology of the Professions in Canada," in Consumer Research Council Canada, Four Aspects of Professionalism, p. 36.
54. Gross, Of Foxes and Hen Houses, p. 79.
55. Lees, Economic Consequences of the Professions, p. 32.
56. Eliot Freidson has written extensively on the importance of formal bodies of knowledge (i.e., higher education) to achieve exclusive control over labour markets: See, for example, Eliot Freidson, Professional Powers: A Study of the Institutionalization of Formal Knowledge (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986). Also, see Magali Sarfatti Larson, The Rise of Professionalism: A Sociological Analysis (London: University of California Press, 1977); and Witz, Professions and Patriarchy.
57. Eliot Freidson has written extensively on the importance of formal bodies of knowledge (i.e., higher education) to achieve exclusive control over labour markets: See, for example, Eliot Freidson, Professional Powers: A Study of the Institutionalization of Formal Knowledge (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986). Also, see Magali Sarfatti Larson, The Rise of Professionalism: A Sociological Analysis (London: University of California Press, 1977); and Witz, Professions and Patriarchy.
58. Eliot Freidson has written extensively on the importance of formal bodies of knowledge (i.e., higher education) to achieve exclusive control over labour markets: See, for example, Eliot Freidson, Professional Powers: A Study of the Institutionalization of Formal Knowledge (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986). Also, see Magali Sarfatti Larson, The Rise of Professionalism: A Sociological Analysis (London: University of California Press, 1977); and Witz, Professions and Patriarchy.
59. Gross, Of Foxes and Hen Houses, p. 93.
60. Tuohy and Wolfson, "Political Economy of Professionalism," in Consumer Research Council Canada, Four Aspects of Professionalism, pp. 64-5.
61. Gross, Of Foxes and Hen Houses, p. 73.
62. Jean Ann Fox, "Occupational Licensing and the Consumer," in Kentucky, Legislative Research Commission, Occupational Licensing, p. 29.
63. See, for example, Nils Christie, "Conflicts as Property," British Journal of Criminology 17, no. 1 (January 1977), p. 1.
64. Lee Benham and Alexandra Benham, "Regulating Through the Profession: A Perspective on Information Control," Journal of Law and Economics 18, no. 2 (October 1975), p. 421.
65. Fox, "Occupational Licensing and the Consumer," in Kentucky, Legislative Research Commission, Occupational Licensing, p. 29.
66. R. Van Den Bergh and M. Faure, "Self-regulation of the professions in Belgium," International Review of Law and Economics 11, no. 2 (September 1991), p. 174. According to Benham and Benham, "Regulating Through the Profession," Journal of Law and Economics, p. 422, the control of information leads to less competition and higher prices. See also Kenneth W. Clarkson and Timothy J. Muris, "The Federal Trade Commission and Occupational Regulation," in Rottenberg, Occupational Licensure, p. 110; and Lee Benham, "The Effects of Advertising on the Price of Eyeglasses," Journal of Law and Economics 15, no. 2 (October 1972), p. 337.
67. R. Van Den Bergh and M. Faure, "Self-regulation of the professions in Belgium," International Review of Law and Economics 11, no. 2 (September 1991), p. 174. According to Benham and Benham, "Regulating Through the Profession," Journal of Law and Economics, p. 422, the control of information leads to less competition and higher prices. See also Kenneth W. Clarkson and Timothy J. Muris, "The Federal Trade Commission and Occupational Regulation," in Rottenberg, Occupational Licensure, p. 110; and Lee Benham, "The Effects of Advertising on the Price of Eyeglasses," Journal of Law and Economics 15, no. 2 (October 1972), p. 337.
68. R. Van Den Bergh and M. Faure, "Self-regulation of the professions in Belgium," International Review of Law and Economics 11, no. 2 (September 1991), p. 174. According to Benham and Benham, "Regulating Through the Profession," Journal of Law and Economics, p. 422, the control of information leads to less competition and higher prices. See also Kenneth W. Clarkson and Timothy J. Muris, "The Federal Trade Commission and Occupational Regulation," in Rottenberg, Occupational Licensure, p. 110; and Lee Benham, "The Effects of Advertising on the Price of Eyeglasses," Journal of Law and Economics 15, no. 2 (October 1972), p. 337.
69. R. Van Den Bergh and M. Faure, "Self-regulation of the professions in Belgium," International Review of Law and Economics 11, no. 2 (September 1991), p. 174. According to Benham and Benham, "Regulating Through the Profession," Journal of Law and Economics, p. 422, the control of information leads to less competition and higher prices. See also Kenneth W. Clarkson and Timothy J. Muris, "The Federal Trade Commission and Occupational Regulation," in Rottenberg, Occupational Licensure, p. 110; and Lee Benham, "The Effects of Advertising on the Price of Eyeglasses," Journal of Law and Economics 15, no. 2 (October 1972), p. 337.
70. The antitrust case Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar may have reduced lawyers fees as much as fifty per cent. Kenneth G. Elzinga, "The Compass of Competition for Professional Services," in Roger D. Blair and Stephen Rubin, eds., Regulating the Professions: A Public-Policy Symposium (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1980), p. 110; and William C. Wood, "Pricing Behavior of Attorneys in Northern Virginia after Goldfarb," The American Economist 22, no. 2 (Fall 1978), p. 56.
71. The antitrust case Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar may have reduced lawyers fees as much as fifty per cent. Kenneth G. Elzinga, "The Compass of Competition for Professional Services," in Roger D. Blair and Stephen Rubin, eds., Regulating the Professions: A Public-Policy Symposium (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1980), p. 110; and William C. Wood, "Pricing Behavior of Attorneys in Northern Virginia after Goldfarb," The American Economist 22, no. 2 (Fall 1978), p. 56.
72. Van Den Bergh and Faure, "Self-regulation of the professions in Belgium," International Review of Law and Economics, pp. 179 and 181.
73. Gross, Of Foxes and Hen Houses, pp. 92-3.
74. Stanley J. Gross, "Professional Disclosure: An Alternative Licensing," Personnel and Guidance Journal 55, no. 10 (June 1977), p. 586. This is also discussed in Gross, Of Foxes and Hen Houses, pp. 169-73.
75. Stanley J. Gross, "Professional Disclosure: An Alternative Licensing," Personnel and Guidance Journal 55, no. 10 (June 1977), p. 586. This is also discussed in Gross, Of Foxes and Hen Houses, pp. 169-73.
76. Van Den Bergh and Faure, "Self-regulation of the professions in Belgium," International Review of Law and Economics, p. 171.
77. Gross, Of Foxes and Hen Houses, p. 44.
78. Van Den Bergh and Faure, "Self-regulation of the professions in Belgium," International Review of Law and Economics, pp. 172-4.
79. See, for example, Leffler, "Commentary," in Rottenberg, Occupational Licensure, p. 292.
80. Gross, Of Foxes and Hen Houses, pp. 144-6.
81. Robert J. Gaston, "A Study of the Economic Impact of Occupational Licensing," in Kentucky, Legislative Research Commission, Occupational Licensing, pp. 45-7. Similar studies are discussed in Clarkson and Muris "The Federal Trade Commission," in Rottenberg, Occupational Licensure.
82. Robert J. Gaston, "A Study of the Economic Impact of Occupational Licensing," in Kentucky, Legislative Research Commission, Occupational Licensing, pp. 45-7. Similar studies are discussed in Clarkson and Muris "The Federal Trade Commission," in Rottenberg, Occupational Licensure.
83. Gross, Of Foxes and Hen Houses, pp. 22-3 and 146.
84. Ibid., pp. 157-9.
85. Robert G. Evans, "Professionals and the Production Function: Can Competition Policy Improve Efficiency in the Licensed Professions," in Rottenberg, Occupational Licensure, p. 252.
86. Wolfson, Trebilcock and Tuohy, "Regulating the Professions," in Ibid., p. 194.
87. Evans, "Professionals and the Production Function," in Ibid., p. 234.
88. Ibid., pp. 253-5.
89. Trebilcock, "Regulating Service Quality," in Dewees, Regulation of Quality, p. 97.
90. Gross, Of Foxes and Hen Houses, p. 29.
91. Trebilcock, "Regulating Service Quality," in Dewees, Regulation of Quality, p. 96.
92. Slyvia Ostry, "Competition Policy and the Self-Regulating Professions," in Slayton and Trebilcock, Professions and Public Policy, pp. 19-20.
93. Trebilcock, "Regulating Service Quality," in Dewees, Regulation of Quality, p. 97. Even if the quality of service offered was better under a licensure system, the average quality of service received by consumers would decline due to higher prices and reduced access to the services. See James W. Begun, "Economic and Sociological Approaches to Professionalism," Work and Occupations 13, no. 1 (February 1968), p. 123; and Gaston, "A Study of the Economic Impact," in Kentucky, Legislative Research Commission, Occupational Licensing, p. 44.
94. Trebilcock, "Regulating Service Quality," in Dewees, Regulation of Quality, p. 97. Even if the quality of service offered was better under a licensure system, the average quality of service received by consumers would decline due to higher prices and reduced access to the services. See James W. Begun, "Economic and Sociological Approaches to Professionalism," Work and Occupations 13, no. 1 (February 1968), p. 123; and Gaston, "A Study of the Economic Impact," in Kentucky, Legislative Research Commission, Occupational Licensing, p. 44.
95. Trebilcock, "Regulating Service Quality," in Dewees, Regulation of Quality, p. 97. Even if the quality of service offered was better under a licensure system, the average quality of service received by consumers would decline due to higher prices and reduced access to the services. See James W. Begun, "Economic and Sociological Approaches to Professionalism," Work and Occupations 13, no. 1 (February 1968), p. 123; and Gaston, "A Study of the Economic Impact," in Kentucky, Legislative Research Commission, Occupational Licensing, p. 44.
96. James W. Begun, Professionalism and the Public Interest: Price and Quality of Optometry (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1980), p. 1. C.O. Houle, Continuing Learning in the Professions (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1980), p. 27, observed an increasing public disillusionment with the professions since 1965 in terms of their failure to service the poor, their pursuit of self-interest, and demonstrated "incompetence, inattention, dogmatism, lack of feeling, or malevolence" (cited in Gross, Of Foxes and Hen Houses, pp. 68-9).
97. James W. Begun, Professionalism and the Public Interest: Price and Quality of Optometry (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1980), p. 1. C.O. Houle, Continuing Learning in the Professions (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1980), p. 27, observed an increasing public disillusionment with the professions since 1965 in terms of their failure to service the poor, their pursuit of self-interest, and demonstrated "incompetence, inattention, dogmatism, lack of feeling, or malevolence" (cited in Gross, Of Foxes and Hen Houses, pp. 68-9).
98. James W. Begun, Professionalism and the Public Interest: Price and Quality of Optometry (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1980), p. 1. C.O. Houle, Continuing Learning in the Professions (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1980), p. 27, observed an increasing public disillusionment with the professions since 1965 in terms of their failure to service the poor, their pursuit of self-interest, and demonstrated "incompetence, inattention, dogmatism, lack of feeling, or malevolence" (cited in Gross, Of Foxes and Hen Houses, pp. 68-9).
99. William J. Baroody, "Foreword," in Rottenberg, Occupational Licensure, p. xiv.
100. Trebilcock, "Regulating Service Quality," in Dewees, Regulation of Quality, p. 94.
101. Jack R. Bierig, "Whatever Happened to Professional Self-Regulation," American Bar Association Journal 69 (May 1983), p. 617. For example, the Waterloo Law Association in Ontario, in 1988, tried to enforce a minimum fee-schedule. See discussion in Brockman, "Controlling Crimes of the Professional Elite," in Jackson and Griffiths, Canadian Criminology, p. 444.
102. Jack R. Bierig, "Whatever Happened to Professional Self-Regulation," American Bar Association Journal 69 (May 1983), p. 617. For example, the Waterloo Law Association in Ontario, in 1988, tried to enforce a minimum fee-schedule. See discussion in Brockman, "Controlling Crimes of the Professional Elite," in Jackson and Griffiths, Canadian Criminology, p. 444.
103. Leonard Waverman, "The New Competition Policy and Regulated Industry in Canada," in J. Robert S. Prichard, W.T. Stanbury and Thomas A. Wilson, eds., Canadian Competition Policy: Essays in Law and Economics (Toronto: Butterworths, 1979), p. 382.
104. Ostry, "Competition Policy," in Slayton and Trebilcock, Professions and Public Policy, p. 19.
105. Flexner, "Occupational Licensing," in Kentucky, Legislative Research Commission, Occupational Licensing, p. 59.
106. Bruce Dunlop, David McQueen and Michael Trebilcock, Canadian Competition Policy: A Legal and Economic Analysis (Toronto: Canada Law Book, 1987), p. 152.
107. Various studies are discussed by Gross, Of Foxes and Hen Houses, pp. 24-6. Also, see Timothy R. Muzondo and Bohumir Pazderka, Professional Licensing and Competition Policy: Effects of Licensing on Earnings and Rates-of-Return Differentials (Ottawa: Consumer and Corporate Affairs Canada, 1979).
108. Various studies are discussed by Gross, Of Foxes and Hen Houses, pp. 24-6. Also, see Timothy R. Muzondo and Bohumir Pazderka, Professional Licensing and Competition Policy: Effects of Licensing on Earnings and Rates-of-Return Differentials (Ottawa: Consumer and Corporate Affairs Canada, 1979).
109. Economic Council of Canada, Interim Report on Competition Policy (Ottawa: Council, 1969), p. 148.
110. Ibid., p. 156.
111. W. T. Stanbury, "Provincial Regulation and Federal Competition Policy: The Jabour Case, Windsor Yearbook Access to Justice 3 (1983), pp. 294-5 and 322-7. See also Dunlop, McQueen and Trebilcock, Canadian Competition Policy, pp. 141-4.
112. W. T. Stanbury, "Provincial Regulation and Federal Competition Policy: The Jabour Case, Windsor Yearbook Access to Justice 3 (1983), pp. 294-5 and 322-7. See also Dunlop, McQueen and Trebilcock, Canadian Competition Policy, pp. 141-4.
113. Canada (Attorney General) v. Law Society (British Columbia), [1982] 2 S.C.R. 307.
114. Stanbury, "Provincial Regulation," Windsor Yearbook Access to Justice, p. 309.
115. Waterloo Law Association v. A.G. Canada, [1986] 31 C.C.C. (3d) 564 (Ont H.C.) at 571.
116. Stanbury, "Provincial Regulation," Windsor Yearbook Access to Justice, p. 306.
117. Evans, "Professionals and the Production Function," in Rottenberg, Occupational Licensure, p. 244
118. Leland, "Minimum-Quality Standards," in Ibid., p. 266.
119. Robert G. Evans and Malcolm F. Williamson, Extending Canadian Health Insurance: Policy Options for Pharmacare and Denticare. Ontario Economic Council Research Study No. 13 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1978), discussed in Evans, "Professionals and the Production Function," in Rottenberg, Occupational Licensure, pp. 241-3.
120. Robert G. Evans and Malcolm F. Williamson, Extending Canadian Health Insurance: Policy Options for Pharmacare and Denticare. Ontario Economic Council Research Study No. 13 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1978), discussed in Evans, "Professionals and the Production Function," in Rottenberg, Occupational Licensure, pp. 241-3.
121. Evans, "Professionals and the Production Function," in Ibid., p. 243.
122. The U.S. Supreme Court recognized this property right in 1889, commenting that the right to practice as physicians "is often of great value to the possessors, and cannot be arbitrarily taken from them" so long as they meet the prerequisites for entry. Cited in Gross, Of Foxes and Hen Houses, p. 8.
123. Ibid., pp. 19-29; L. Benham, "The Demand for Occupational Licensure," in Rottenberg, Occupational Licensure, p. 14.
124. Ibid., pp. 19-29; L. Benham, "The Demand for Occupational Licensure," in Rottenberg, Occupational Licensure, p. 14.
125. Lees, Economic Consequences of the Professions, p. 47.
126. Trebilcock, "Regulating Service Quality," in Dewees, Regulation of Quality, p. 101.
127. Ibid., p. 103.
128. Ibid., p. 99.
129. Cited in Gross, Of Foxes and Hen Houses, p. 27.
130. Parker, "Competing Images," International Journal of the Sociology of Law. She discusses lawyers' reactions to reform in Christine Parker, "Converting the Lawyers: The Dynamics of Competition and Accountability Reform," Australia and New Zealand Journal of Sociology 33, no. 1 (March 1997), p. 39.
131. Parker, "Competing Images," International Journal of the Sociology of Law. She discusses lawyers' reactions to reform in Christine Parker, "Converting the Lawyers: The Dynamics of Competition and Accountability Reform," Australia and New Zealand Journal of Sociology 33, no. 1 (March 1997), p. 39.
132. Bruce and Woytowich, "Delegated Administrative Organizations," in Ford and Zussman, Alternative Service Delivery, pp. 209-19.
133. Richard Steinecke, A Complete Guide to the Regulated Health Professions Act (Aurora, Ont.: Canada Law Book, 1997), pp. 11-13 to 11-14.
134. Architectural Institute of British Columbia, "TAKE 008: Act Enforcement: The Nature and Handling of Alleged Contraventions," Directors Chair (March 1990).
135. Pierre Issalys, "The Professional Tribunal and the Control of Ethical Conduct Among Professionals" McGill Law Journal 24, no. 4 (1978), p. 588.
136. Office des professions du Québec, Evolution of Professionalism in Québec, p. 9.
137. Issalys, "The Professional Tribunal," McGill Law Journal, pp. 592-3.
138. Claude Castonguay, "The Future of Self-regulation: A View from Québec," in Slayton and Trebilcock, Professions and Public Policy, p. 61. Castonguay resigned from the commission on 16 March 1970 and became minister of social affairs. Gérard Nepveu became chair of the commission on 1 April 1970, the year the report was released. Quebec, Commission of Inquiry on Health and Social Welfare, The Professions and Society. Report (Quebec City: Editeur officiel du Québec, 1970).
139. Claude Castonguay, "The Future of Self-regulation: A View from Québec," in Slayton and Trebilcock, Professions and Public Policy, p. 61. Castonguay resigned from the commission on 16 March 1970 and became minister of social affairs. Gérard Nepveu became chair of the commission on 1 April 1970, the year the report was released. Quebec, Commission of Inquiry on Health and Social Welfare, The Professions and Society. Report (Quebec City: Editeur officiel du Québec, 1970).
140. Castonguay, "The Future of Self-regulation," in Slayton and Trebilcock, Professions and Public Policy, p. 67.
141. René Dussault, "The Office des Professions du Québec in the Context of the Development of Professionalism," in Ibid., p. 101.
142. Professional Code, R.S.Q., updated to 18 January 1989, c.C-26, Sections 31 and 35 and Schedule I.
143. The Loi sur l'acupunture was added in 1994. Office des professions du Québec, Rapport annuel 1994-95 (Quebec City: Office, 1995), p. 12.
144. Pierre Doyle, Office des professions, telephone conversation, 6 February 1996.
145. This possibility is discussed in Joan Brockman, "Dismantling or Fortifying Professional Monopolies? A Comment on Regulating Professions and Occupations" Manitoba Law Journal 24, no. 2 (1996), p. 301; and Pue, "Foxes, Henhouses," Manitoba Law Journal.
146. This possibility is discussed in Joan Brockman, "Dismantling or Fortifying Professional Monopolies? A Comment on Regulating Professions and Occupations" Manitoba Law Journal 24, no. 2 (1996), p. 301; and Pue, "Foxes, Henhouses," Manitoba Law Journal.
147. British Columbia, Health Professions Council, Recommendations on the Designation of Dental Hygiene (Victoria: Council, 1993), pp. 6-7.
148. Law Society of British Columbia, "Benchers Back off Plan to Certify Legal Assistants," Benchers' Bulletin (January/February 1995), p. 9. No explanation was offered for this aboutface, other than that the "Benchers were not satisfied that they could support a legal assistance certification program." The Competency Department staff was asked to bring back "a series of such options as may be identified to educate the profession on the recognition and use of legal assistants."
149. st Session (9 November 1995) (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1995). However, the Law Society of Upper Canada has promised to "vigorously prosecute" paralegals who are involved in the unauthorized practice of law. See Monique Conrod, "Paralegals back prosecutions of colleagues who cross the line," Lawyers Weekly, 5 April 1996, p. 10.
150. st Session (9 November 1995) (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1995). However, the Law Society of Upper Canada has promised to "vigorously prosecute" paralegals who are involved in the unauthorized practice of law. See Monique Conrod, "Paralegals back prosecutions of colleagues who cross the line," Lawyers Weekly, 5 April 1996, p. 10.
151. st Session (18 May 1995) (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1995). In 1982, the Law Society of Upper Canada had recommended that all immigration consultants work under the supervision of lawyers. At that time, it acknowledged "that this might be a politically unacceptable proposal, however, it would be the least costly and the quickest to implement, and it was felt [it] would offer the best control."
152. st Session (31 May 1995) (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1995).
153. See, for example, Gilmour and Jensen, "Reinventing Government," Public Administration Review; and Moe and Gilmour, "Rediscovering Principles," Public Administration Review.
154. See, for example, Gilmour and Jensen, "Reinventing Government," Public Administration Review; and Moe and Gilmour, "Rediscovering Principles," Public Administration Review.
155. Jack T. McLeod, Consumer Participation, Regulation of the Professions and Decentralization in Health Security for British Columbians. Report of Richard G. Foulkes to the Minister of Health (Victoria: Health Security Programme Project, 1973), Part II, p. 19. This report is very similar to a report that McLeod wrote for the Saskatchewan government: Jack T. McLeod, "Consumer Participation: Regulation of the Professions; Decentralization of Health Services." Unpublished report submitted to the minister of public health (Regina, 1973.)
156. Jack T. McLeod, Consumer Participation, Regulation of the Professions and Decentralization in Health Security for British Columbians. Report of Richard G. Foulkes to the Minister of Health (Victoria: Health Security Programme Project, 1973), Part II, p. 19. This report is very similar to a report that McLeod wrote for the Saskatchewan government: Jack T. McLeod, "Consumer Participation: Regulation of the Professions; Decentralization of Health Services." Unpublished report submitted to the minister of public health (Regina, 1973.)
157. Office des Professions du Québec, Evolution of Professionalism, pp. 64-5.
158. The proposals are set out in a working document. Office des Professions du Québec, Approche à l'égard de la Réserve et du Partage d'Acts Professionnels: Vers un système professionnel plus souple et mieux adapté (Quebec City: Office, 1996). I am grateful to Mr. Pierre-Phillippe Doyle, direction des communications, Office des professions du Québec, for explaining the contents of this document to me.
159. Anthony Ogus, "Rethinking Self-Regulation," Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 15, no. 1 (Spring 1995), p. 105.
160. Canada, Department of Industry and Science, The British Bankruptcy System: Description and Assessment (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1994), pp. 12-13.
161. Information provided by telephone interview, 24 May 1996, from a source in England who prefers to remain anonymous.
162. For a discussion of how the Ontario Securities Commission will approach its rule and policy-making power, see "Rule-Making in Ontario - Staff Notice," Ontario Securities Commission Bulletin 18 (20 October 1995), p. 4838.
163. Saskatchewan Securities Commission, Discussion Paper: Regulation of Financial Planners (Regina: Commission, 1994), p. 8.
164. Saskatchewan Securities Commission, Second Discussion Paper: Regulation of Financial Planners (Regina: Commission, 1995).
165. Manitoba Law Reform Commission, Regulating Professions and Occupations, p. 7.
166. See, for example, Alberta Health Workforce Rebalancing Committee, Discussion Paper II (Edmonton: Committee, 1995); Alberta Health Workforce Rebalancing Committee, Principles and Recommendations for the Regulation of Health Professionals in Alberta: Final Report (Edmonton: Committee, 1995); and D.J. Philippon and S.A. Wasylyshyn, "Health-care reform in Alberta," CANADIAN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 39, no. 1 (Spring 1996), pp. 70-84.
167. See, for example, Alberta Health Workforce Rebalancing Committee, Discussion Paper II (Edmonton: Committee, 1995); Alberta Health Workforce Rebalancing Committee, Principles and Recommendations for the Regulation of Health Professionals in Alberta: Final Report (Edmonton: Committee, 1995); and D.J. Philippon and S.A. Wasylyshyn, "Health-care reform in Alberta," CANADIAN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 39, no. 1 (Spring 1996), pp. 70-84.
168. See, for example, Alberta Health Workforce Rebalancing Committee, Discussion Paper II (Edmonton: Committee, 1995); Alberta Health Workforce Rebalancing Committee, Principles and Recommendations for the Regulation of Health Professionals in Alberta: Final Report (Edmonton: Committee, 1995); and D.J. Philippon and S.A. Wasylyshyn, "Health-care reform in Alberta," CANADIAN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 39, no. 1 (Spring 1996), pp. 70-84.
169. Ontario Securities Commission, Annual Report, 1995 (Toronto: Commission, 1995), p. 33.
170. When the issue of lay benchers was put to the members of the Law Society in 1973, it was rejected. The benchers passed a motion, in 1980, to ask for amendments to the legislation to provide for three lay benchers. Bencher Mary Southin resigned over the defeat of a motion to put the issue of lay benchers to the members: n.a., "Entre Nous: The Lay Benchers Affair," Advocate 38, no. 6 (October/November 1980), p. 461.
171. See, for example, James T. Casey, The Regulation of Professions in Canada (Toronto: Carswell, 1994); and Keith Hamilton, Self-Governing Professions (Aurora, Ont.: Canada Law Book, 1996).
172. See, for example, James T. Casey, The Regulation of Professions in Canada (Toronto: Carswell, 1994); and Keith Hamilton, Self-Governing Professions (Aurora, Ont.: Canada Law Book, 1996).
173. Michael J. Trebilcock, "The Professions and Public Policy: The Nature of the Agenda," in Slayton and Trebilcock, Professions and Public Policy, p. 12.
174. Ontario, Ministry of Consumer and Commercial Relations, Approaches to Industry Self-Management (Toronto: Queen's Printer, 1995), p. 27.
175. Ayres and Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation, pp. 57-8.
176. Economic Council of Canada, Interim Report on Competition Policy, p. 152. The council was of the view that this could apply not only to licensing but to "other economically significant activities of professional bodies, including that of fee-setting."
177. Gross, Of Foxes and Hen Houses, p. 99.
178. Trebilcoclc, "Regulating Service Quality," in Dewees, Regulation of Quality, p. 104.
179. Stanbury, "Provincial Regulation," Windsor Yearbook, p. 334.
180. Mary Southin, cited in n.a., "Entre Nous: The Lay Benchers Affair," Advocate, p. 467.
181. Licensing boards in the United States are considered part of the executive branch of state government, but they also have legislative and judicial functions and operate quite independently of government. See Gross, Of Foxes and Hen Houses, Chapter 6.
182. Stanley J. Gross, "The Myth of Professional Licensing," American Psychologist 33, no. 11 (November 1978), p. 1009.
183. Gross, Of Foxes and Hen Houses, p. 98.
184. Fox, "Occupational Licensing," in Kentucky, Legislative Research Commission, Occupational Licensing, pp. 30-1.
185. Warren Rudman, "Rewriting Stock Market Rules: Nasdaq Eyes Regulatory Split-up," The Financial Post (Toronto) 26 September 1995, p. 20.
186. For a discussion of the implications of private law-making, see, for example, Harry W. Arthurs and Robert Kreklewich, "Law, Legal Institutions, and the Legal Profession in the New Economy," Osgoode Hall Law Journal 34, no. 1 (March 1996), p. 1. The trend to private laws for dispute resolution are discussed by Bryant Garth, "Public and private justice: issues in ideology, professional interest, information, and private governance," Studies in Law, Politics and Society 12, Part A (1992), p. 367.
187. For a discussion of the implications of private law-making, see, for example, Harry W. Arthurs and Robert Kreklewich, "Law, Legal Institutions, and the Legal Profession in the New Economy," Osgoode Hall Law Journal 34, no. 1 (March 1996), p. 1. The trend to private laws for dispute resolution are discussed by Bryant Garth, "Public and private justice: issues in ideology, professional interest, information, and private governance," Studies in Law, Politics and Society 12, Part A (1992), p. 367.