The reflexivity of evil

Social Philosophy and Policy

Volumn 15, Issue 1, 1998, Pages 216-227

  Kekes, John ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0347146011     PISSN: 02650525     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/s0265052500003137     Document Type: Article

References (27)

1. For more complete accounts, see Stanley I. Benn, "Wickedness," Ethics, vol. 95, no. 4 (July 1985), pp. 795-810; John Kekes, Facing Evil (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990); and Ronald D. Milo, Immorality (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984).
2. For more complete accounts, see Stanley I. Benn, "Wickedness," Ethics, vol. 95, no. 4 (July 1985), pp. 795-810; John Kekes, Facing Evil (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990); and Ronald D. Milo, Immorality (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984).
3. For more complete accounts, see Stanley I. Benn, "Wickedness," Ethics, vol. 95, no. 4 (July 1985), pp. 795-810; John Kekes, Facing Evil (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990); and Ronald D. Milo, Immorality (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984).
4. For an account of the difficult concept of autonomy and a bibliography of the large literature on this subject, see Gerald Dworkin, The Theory and Practice of Autonomy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988); and "Autonomy," in A Companion to Contemporary Political Philosophy, ed. Robert E. Goodin and Philip Pettit (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), pp. 359-65.
5. For an account of the difficult concept of autonomy and a bibliography of the large literature on this subject, see Gerald Dworkin, The Theory and Practice of Autonomy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988); and "Autonomy," in A Companion to Contemporary Political Philosophy, ed. Robert E. Goodin and Philip Pettit (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), pp. 359-65.
6. See Susan Wolf, Freedom within Reason (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), p. 43.
7. See Christopher Gowans, ed., Moral Dilemmas (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), for seminal articles and a bibliography; see also Christopher Gowans, Innocence Lost (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994); and Nicholas Rescher, Ethical Idealism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), ch. 2.
8. See Christopher Gowans, ed., Moral Dilemmas (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), for seminal articles and a bibliography; see also Christopher Gowans, Innocence Lost (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994); and Nicholas Rescher, Ethical Idealism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), ch. 2.
9. See Christopher Gowans, ed., Moral Dilemmas (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), for seminal articles and a bibliography; see also Christopher Gowans, Innocence Lost (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994); and Nicholas Rescher, Ethical Idealism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), ch. 2.
10. This is a minority view, but see James Brown, "Moral Theory and the Ought-Can Principle," Mind, vol. 89, no. 342 (April 1977), pp. 206-23; John Kekes, "'Ought Implies Can' and Two Kinds of Morality," Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 34, no. 137 (October 1984), pp. 459- 67; Charles E. Larmore, Patterns of Moral Complexity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), pp. 84-90; and Morton White, "Ought and Can," in The Idea of Freedom, ed. Alan Ryan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), pp. 211-19.
11. This is a minority view, but see James Brown, "Moral Theory and the Ought-Can Principle," Mind, vol. 89, no. 342 (April 1977), pp. 206-23; John Kekes, "'Ought Implies Can' and Two Kinds of Morality," Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 34, no. 137 (October 1984), pp. 459-67; Charles E. Larmore, Patterns of Moral Complexity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), pp. 84-90; and Morton White, "Ought and Can," in The Idea of Freedom, ed. Alan Ryan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), pp. 211-19.
12. This is a minority view, but see James Brown, "Moral Theory and the Ought-Can Principle," Mind, vol. 89, no. 342 (April 1977), pp. 206-23; John Kekes, "'Ought Implies Can' and Two Kinds of Morality," Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 34, no. 137 (October 1984), pp. 459- 67; Charles E. Larmore, Patterns of Moral Complexity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), pp. 84-90; and Morton White, "Ought and Can," in The Idea of Freedom, ed. Alan Ryan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), pp. 211-19.
13. This is a minority view, but see James Brown, "Moral Theory and the Ought-Can Principle," Mind, vol. 89, no. 342 (April 1977), pp. 206-23; John Kekes, "'Ought Implies Can' and Two Kinds of Morality," Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 34, no. 137 (October 1984), pp. 459- 67; Charles E. Larmore, Patterns of Moral Complexity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), pp. 84-90; and Morton White, "Ought and Can," in The Idea of Freedom, ed. Alan Ryan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), pp. 211-19.
14. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (London: Macmillan, 1953), A548.
15. Immanuel Kant, Religion mithin the Limits of Reason Alone, trans. Theodore M. Greene and Hoyt H. Hudson (New York: Harper and Row, 1960), pp. 43, 46, and 55.
16. See, for instance, Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, trans. Hazel E. Barnes (New York: Philosophical Library, 1954), esp. Part IV.
17. W. David Falk, "Morality, Self, and Others," in his Ought, Reasons, and Morality (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986), p. 219.
18. See Harry G. Frankfurt, "Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person," in his The Importance of What We Care About (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp. 11-25; Charles Taylor, "Responsibility for Self," in The Identities of Persons, ed. Amélie Rorty (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976), pp. 281-99; and Gary Watson, "Free Agency," Journal of Philosophy, vol. 72, no. 8 (April 1975), pp. 205-20.
19. See Harry G. Frankfurt, "Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person," in his The Importance of What We Care About (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp. 11-25; Charles Taylor, "Responsibility for Self," in The Identities of Persons, ed. Amélie Rorty (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976), pp. 281-99; and Gary Watson, "Free Agency," Journal of Philosophy, vol. 72, no. 8 (April 1975), pp. 205-20.
20. See Harry G. Frankfurt, "Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person," in his The Importance of What We Care About (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp. 11-25; Charles Taylor, "Responsibility for Self," in The Identities of Persons, ed. Amélie Rorty (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976), pp. 281-99; and Gary Watson, "Free Agency," Journal of Philosophy, vol. 72, no. 8 (April 1975), pp. 205-20.
21. Susan Wolf, "Sanity and the Metaphysics of Responsibility," in Responsibility, Character, and the Emotions, ed. Ferdinand Schoeman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), pp. 46-62.
22. Patricia Greenspan, "Unfreedom and Responsibility," in Schoeman, ed., Responsibility, Character, and the Emotions, pp. 63-80.
23. John Martin Fischer, "Responsiveness and Moral Responsibility," in Schoeman, ed., Responsibility, Character, and the Emotions, pp. 81-106.
24. Jonathan Bennett, "Accountability," in Philosophical Subjects, ed. Zak van Straaten (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), pp. 14-47; Thomas M. Scanlon, Jr., "The Significance of Choice," in The Tanner Lectures on Human Values, ed. Sterling M. McMurrin (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1988), pp. 151-216; and Peter F. Strawson, "Freedom and Resentment," in his Freedom and Resentment, and Other Essays (London: Methuen, 1974), pp. 1-25.
25. Jonathan Bennett, "Accountability," in Philosophical Subjects, ed. Zak van Straaten (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), pp. 14-47; Thomas M. Scanlon, Jr., "The Significance of Choice," in The Tanner Lectures on Human Values, ed. Sterling M. McMurrin (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1988), pp. 151-216; and Peter F. Strawson, "Freedom and Resentment," in his Freedom and Resentment, and Other Essays (London: Methuen, 1974), pp. 1-25.
26. Jonathan Bennett, "Accountability," in Philosophical Subjects, ed. Zak van Straaten (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), pp. 14-47; Thomas M. Scanlon, Jr., "The Significance of Choice," in The Tanner Lectures on Human Values, ed. Sterling M. McMurrin (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1988), pp. 151-216; and Peter F. Strawson, "Freedom and Resentment," in his Freedom and Resentment, and Other Essays (London: Methuen, 1974), pp. 1-25.
27. Susan Wolf, "Asymmetrical Freedom," Journal of Philosophy, vol. 77, no. 3 (March 1980), pp. 151-66.