The Gorbachev Interlude and International Relations Theory

Diplomatic History

Volumn 21, Issue 3, 1997, Pages 473-479

  Walt, Stephen M ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0347139940     PISSN: 01452096     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1467-7709.00083     Document Type: Review

References (22)

1. See Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, 1979).
2. For summaries of the various strands of realist thought see Stephen Van Evera, Causes of War, vol. I, The Structure of Power and the Roots of War (Ithaca, forthcoming), chap, I; Keith Shimko, "Realism, Neorealism, and American Liberalism," Review of Politics 54 (Spring 1991): 281-301; and Michael Smith, Realist Thought from Weber to Kissinger (Baton Rouge, 1986). A good survey of recent applications of realist theory is Michael Brown, Scan M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, eds., The Perils of Anarchy: Contemporary Realism and International Security (Cambridge, MA, 1995).
3. For summaries of the various strands of realist thought see Stephen Van Evera, Causes of War, vol. I, The Structure of Power and the Roots of War (Ithaca, forthcoming), chap, I; Keith Shimko, "Realism, Neorealism, and American Liberalism," Review of Politics 54 (Spring 1991): 281-301; and Michael Smith, Realist Thought from Weber to Kissinger (Baton Rouge, 1986). A good survey of recent applications of realist theory is Michael Brown, Scan M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, eds., The Perils of Anarchy: Contemporary Realism and International Security (Cambridge, MA, 1995).
4. For summaries of the various strands of realist thought see Stephen Van Evera, Causes of War, vol. I, The Structure of Power and the Roots of War (Ithaca, forthcoming), chap, I; Keith Shimko, "Realism, Neorealism, and American Liberalism," Review of Politics 54 (Spring 1991): 281-301; and Michael Smith, Realist Thought from Weber to Kissinger (Baton Rouge, 1986). A good survey of recent applications of realist theory is Michael Brown, Scan M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, eds., The Perils of Anarchy: Contemporary Realism and International Security (Cambridge, MA, 1995).
5. For summaries of the various strands of realist thought see Stephen Van Evera, Causes of War, vol. I, The Structure of Power and the Roots of War (Ithaca, forthcoming), chap, I; Keith Shimko, "Realism, Neorealism, and American Liberalism," Review of Politics 54 (Spring 1991): 281-301; and Michael Smith, Realist Thought from Weber to Kissinger (Baton Rouge, 1986). A good survey of recent applications of realist theory is Michael Brown, Scan M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, eds., The Perils of Anarchy: Contemporary Realism and International Security (Cambridge, MA, 1995).
6. In her own chapter, Janice Stein quotes Gorbachev as telling his colleagues that "only an intensive, fast developing economy can ensure the strengthening of the country's position in the international arena, enabling it to enter the new millennium appropriately, as a great and prosperous power" (p. 226, emphasis added). For all his rhetoric about "common security," in short, Gorbachev's reforms were at least partly inspired by the desire to compete as well.
7. Snyder's theory of domestic coalitions and international adventurism is presented in detail in Jack L. Snyder, Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition (Ithaca, 1991). For an extended analysis of the dangers of democratization see Edward D. Mansfield and Jack L. Snyder, "Democratization and the Danger of War," International Security 20 (Summer 1995): 5-38.
8. Snyder's theory of domestic coalitions and international adventurism is presented in detail in Jack L. Snyder, Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition (Ithaca, 1991). For an extended analysis of the dangers of democratization see Edward D. Mansfield and Jack L. Snyder, "Democratization and the Danger of War," International Security 20 (Summer 1995): 5-38.
9. Cooperation between historians and political scientists has enriched both fields in recent years, especially in the areas of diplomatic history and security studies. See John Lewis Gaddis, "Expanding the Data Base: Historians, Political Scientists, and the Enrichment of Security Studies," International Security 12 (Summer 1987): 3-21; Stephen M. Walt, "The Renaissance of Security Studies," International Studies Quarterly 35 (June 1991): 211-39; Marc Trachtenberg, History and Strategy (Princeton, 1991); and Michael J. Hogan and Thomas G. Paterson, eds., Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations (New York, 1991).
10. Cooperation between historians and political scientists has enriched both fields in recent years, especially in the areas of diplomatic history and security studies. See John Lewis Gaddis, "Expanding the Data Base: Historians, Political Scientists, and the Enrichment of Security Studies," International Security 12 (Summer 1987): 3-21; Stephen M. Walt, "The Renaissance of Security Studies," International Studies Quarterly 35 (June 1991): 211-39; Marc Trachtenberg, History and Strategy (Princeton, 1991); and Michael J. Hogan and Thomas G. Paterson, eds., Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations (New York, 1991).
11. Cooperation between historians and political scientists has enriched both fields in recent years, especially in the areas of diplomatic history and security studies. See John Lewis Gaddis, "Expanding the Data Base: Historians, Political Scientists, and the Enrichment of Security Studies," International Security 12 (Summer 1987): 3-21; Stephen M. Walt, "The Renaissance of Security Studies," International Studies Quarterly 35 (June 1991): 211-39; Marc Trachtenberg, History and Strategy (Princeton, 1991); and Michael J. Hogan and Thomas G. Paterson, eds., Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations (New York, 1991).
12. Cooperation between historians and political scientists has enriched both fields in recent years, especially in the areas of diplomatic history and security studies. See John Lewis Gaddis, "Expanding the Data Base: Historians, Political Scientists, and the Enrichment of Security Studies," International Security 12 (Summer 1987): 3-21; Stephen M. Walt, "The Renaissance of Security Studies," International Studies Quarterly 35 (June 1991): 211-39; Marc Trachtenberg, History and Strategy (Princeton, 1991); and Michael J. Hogan and Thomas G. Paterson, eds., Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations (New York, 1991).
13. Several participants (including the present author) made this point at the conference for which these papers were first prepared. Lebow and Risse-Kappen acknowledge it in their preface, but in a very one-sided way. They write: "[There are] two different ways of looking at recent events. The first maintains that one anomalous case is irrelevant to the testing and development of theory. The second contends that the reconciliation of two poles of a bipolar system is a remarkable development that is worth studying." This formulation implies that those who hold the first position believe that the end of the Cold War is not "worth studying," a claim that is neither correct nor relevant. The real issue is whether one can draw reliable conclusions about the relative merits of competing theories from a single case.
14. Similarly, one cannot properly revise a particular theory solely by modifying it to fit a single new case. Instead, one must first devise a new alternative and then test it against a new body of evidence.
15. See especially John Gerard Ruggie, "Continuity and Transformation in the World Polity: Toward a Neorealist Synthesis," World Politics 35 (January 1983): 261-85.
16. It is worth noting that Waltz did anticipate how the Cold War might end. Writing in 1979, he suggested that "With half our GNP, the [Soviet Union] has to run hard to stay in the race. . . . The question to ask is not whether a third or fourth country will enter the circle of the great powers . . . but whether the Soviet Union can keep up." See Theory of International Politics, 179-80.
17. As Waltz admits, a system's structure "never tells us all we want to know. Instead, [it] tells us a small number of big and important things." See Kenneth N. Waltz, "Reflections on Theory of International Politics: A Response to My Critics," in Neorealism and Its Critics, ed. Robert O. Keohane (New York, 1986), 529.
18. On this specific point, Risse-Kappen graciously acknowledges his debt to forthcoming works by Matthew Evangelista and Robert Herman.
19. Koslowski and Kratochwil also suggest that Gorbachev's diplomacy led to "new practices of superpower relations," including "the support of communist leaders by the American president," and thus constituted a transformation of the international system. But by this definition, American support to Marshal Tito in the 1905 and the Sino-American rapprochement in the early 1970s were equally momentous "transformations" as well.
20. On this point see John J. Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," International Security 19 (Winter 1995): 42-45.
21. As E. H. Carr observed decades ago, "the English-speaking peoples are past masters in the art of concealing their selfish national interests in the guise of the general good." See Edward Hallett Carr, The Twenty Years' Crisis: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations (New York, 1964), 79.
22. For a creative and original application of realist theory to the problems of ethnic conflict see Barry R. Posen, "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict," Survival 35 (Spring 1993): 27-47.