Conservatives' selective use of race in the law

Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy

Volumn 19, Issue 3, 1996, Pages

  Kennedy, Randall L ^a  

^a NONE

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[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0347138618     PISSN: 01934872     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (5)

1. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995) (O'Connor, J., majority opinion) (joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist) (holding that affirmative action programs are subject to strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause); id. at 2118 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (arguing that government can never have a 'compelling interest' in discriminating on the basis of race in order to 'make up' for past racial discrimination); id. at 2119 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (I believe that there is a 'moral [and] constitutional equivalence' . . . between laws designed to subjugate a race and those that distribute benefits on the basis of race in order to foster some current notion of equality.) (quoting id. at 2120 (Stevens, J., dissenting)); Richard v. J.A. Croson Co., 448 U.S. 469, 520 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing that strict scrutiny must be applied to all governmental classification by race).
2. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995) (O'Connor, J., majority opinion) (joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist) (holding that affirmative action programs are subject to strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause); id. at 2118 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (arguing that government can never have a 'compelling interest' in discriminating on the basis of race in order to 'make up' for past racial discrimination); id. at 2119 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (I believe that there is a 'moral [and] constitutional equivalence' . . . between laws designed to subjugate a race and those that distribute benefits on the basis of race in order to foster some current notion of equality.) (quoting id. at 2120 (Stevens, J., dissenting)); Richard v. J.A. Croson Co., 448 U.S. 469, 520 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing that strict scrutiny must be applied to all governmental classification by race).
3. See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965) (holding that a showing that blacks have not served on any petit jury during a specified period does not give rise to an inference of systematic discrimination through the use of peremptory challenges).
4. See, e.g., McCray v. New York, 461 U.S. 961, 963-70 (1983) (denying certiorari in three cases) (Marshall, J., dissenting); see also Randall Kennedy, Doing What You Can With What You Have: The Greatness of Justice Marshall, 80 GEO. L.J. 2081 (1992) (describing Justice Marshall's campaign to reverse Swain).
5. See, e.g., McCray v. New York, 461 U.S. 961, 963-70 (1983) (denying certiorari in three cases) (Marshall, J., dissenting); see also Randall Kennedy, Doing What You Can With What You Have: The Greatness of Justice Marshall, 80 GEO. L.J. 2081 (1992) (describing Justice Marshall's campaign to reverse Swain).