Incentive-Based Lending Capacity, Competition and Regulation in Banking

Journal of Financial Intermediation

Volumn 10, Issue 1, 2001, Pages 28-53

  Chiesa, Gabriella ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF BOLOGNA   (Italy)

Author keywords

Bank moral hazard; Capital requirements; Competition

Indexed keywords

EID: 0347137951     PISSN: 10429573     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/jfin.2000.0306     Document Type: Article

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