Are Legal Traditions Incommensurable?

American Journal of Comparative Law

Volumn 49, Issue 1, 2001, Pages 133-

  Glenn, H Patrick ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0347119054     PISSN: 0002919X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/840924     Document Type: Article

References (16)

1. The Pythagoreans determined that the proportional lengths of the diameter and side of a regular pentagon could not be expressed in terms of integers or whole numbers, and concluded as to the absence of a single scale of measure, or incommensurability. The idea overthrew older views that all could be expressed in integers or their ratios, but has itself been overtaken by the development of real numbers, expressed in decimals. See R. Chang (ed.), Incommensurability, Incomparability and Practical Reason (1997) at 1, 255; and for amplification V. J. Katz, A History of Mathematics [:] An Introduction (2nd ed. 1998) at 50, 51. This first example of incommensurability thus indicates that it will yield to further and more refined information.
2. The Pythagoreans determined that the proportional lengths of the diameter and side of a regular pentagon could not be expressed in terms of integers or whole numbers, and concluded as to the absence of a single scale of measure, or incommensurability. The idea overthrew older views that all could be expressed in integers or their ratios, but has itself been overtaken by the development of real numbers, expressed in decimals. See R. Chang (ed.), Incommensurability, Incomparability and Practical Reason (1997) at 1, 255; and for amplification V. J. Katz, A History of Mathematics [:] An Introduction (2nd ed. 1998) at 50, 51. This first example of incommensurability thus indicates that it will yield to further and more refined information.
3. T.S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (2nd ed. 1970).
4. See, for example, Chang, supra n. 1; D. Pearce, Roads to Commensurability (1987); H. Sankey, Rationality, Relativism and Incommensurability (1997); J. Griffin, Well Being [:] Its meaning, measurement, and importance (1986)(ch. 5, "Are There Incommensurable Values?"); R. Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (1979), notably pp. 264-365.
5. See, for example, Chang, supra n. 1; D. Pearce, Roads to Commensurability (1987); H. Sankey, Rationality, Relativism and Incommensurability (1997); J. Griffin, Well Being [:] Its meaning, measurement, and importance (1986)(ch. 5, "Are There Incommensurable Values?"); R. Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (1979), notably pp. 264-365.
6. See, for example, Chang, supra n. 1; D. Pearce, Roads to Commensurability (1987); H. Sankey, Rationality, Relativism and Incommensurability (1997); J. Griffin, Well Being [:] Its meaning, measurement, and importance (1986)(ch. 5, "Are There Incommensurable Values?"); R. Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (1979), notably pp. 264-365.
7. See, for example, Chang, supra n. 1; D. Pearce, Roads to Commensurability (1987); H. Sankey, Rationality, Relativism and Incommensurability (1997); J. Griffin, Well Being [:] Its meaning, measurement, and importance (1986)(ch. 5, "Are There Incommensurable Values?"); R. Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (1979), notably pp. 264-365.
8. See, for example, Chang, supra n. 1; D. Pearce, Roads to Commensurability (1987); H. Sankey, Rationality, Relativism and Incommensurability (1997); J. Griffin, Well Being [:] Its meaning, measurement, and importance (1986)(ch. 5, "Are There Incommensurable Values?"); R. Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (1979), notably pp. 264-365.
9. J. Raz, The Morality of Freedom (ch. 13, "Incommensurability") (1986); Sunstein, "Incommensurability and Valuation in Law," 92 Mich. L. Rev. 779 (1994); Smith, "Incommensurability and Alterity in Contemporary Jurisprudence," 45 Buff. L. Rev. 503 (1997); Pildes, "Conceptions of Value in Legal Thought," 90 Mich. L. Rev. 1520 (1992) (reviewing M. Nussbaum, Love's Knowledge).
10. J. Raz, The Morality of Freedom (ch. 13, "Incommensurability") (1986); Sunstein, "Incommensurability and Valuation in Law," 92 Mich. L. Rev. 779 (1994); Smith, "Incommensurability and Alterity in Contemporary Jurisprudence," 45 Buff. L. Rev. 503 (1997); Pildes, "Conceptions of Value in Legal Thought," 90 Mich. L. Rev. 1520 (1992) (reviewing M. Nussbaum, Love's Knowledge).
11. J. Raz, The Morality of Freedom (ch. 13, "Incommensurability") (1986); Sunstein, "Incommensurability and Valuation in Law," 92 Mich. L. Rev. 779 (1994); Smith, "Incommensurability and Alterity in Contemporary Jurisprudence," 45 Buff. L. Rev. 503 (1997); Pildes, "Conceptions of Value in Legal Thought," 90 Mich. L. Rev. 1520 (1992) (reviewing M. Nussbaum, Love's Knowledge).
12. J. Raz, The Morality of Freedom (ch. 13, "Incommensurability") (1986); Sunstein, "Incommensurability and Valuation in Law," 92 Mich. L. Rev. 779 (1994); Smith, "Incommensurability and Alterity in Contemporary Jurisprudence," 45 Buff. L. Rev. 503 (1997); Pildes, "Conceptions of Value in Legal Thought," 90 Mich. L. Rev. 1520 (1992) (reviewing M. Nussbaum, Love's Knowledge).
13. J. Raz, The Morality of Freedom (ch. 13, "Incommensurability") (1986); Sunstein, "Incommensurability and Valuation in Law," 92 Mich. L. Rev. 779 (1994); Smith, "Incommensurability and Alterity in Contemporary Jurisprudence," 45 Buff. L. Rev. 503 (1997); Pildes, "Conceptions of Value in Legal Thought," 90 Mich. L. Rev. 1520 (1992) (reviewing M. Nussbaum, Love's Knowledge).
14. See Riles, "Wigmore's Treasure Box: Comparative Law in the Era of Information," 40 Harv. Int. L. J. 221 at 244 (1999) ("Categories School" of comparative law seeing non-Western systems as "too different for meaningful comparison") and 245 (since "Context School" seeing context as all important, "meaningful comparison becomes increasingly problematic"); Legrand, "Sur l'analyse différentielle des juriscultures," Rev. int. dr. comp. (1999) 1053, at 1056 (incommensurablity of legal traditions would not prevent their comparison, though concepts of incommensurability, comparison not explained) 1067 (difference and altérité ultimately implying incommensurability of laws, particularly civil and common laws) and 1070 (laws which are product of different legal traditions irremediably different to the point of incommensurability). For earlier assertions of incomparability of laws, see infra n. 50 and accompanying text; and for a splendid polémique against nationalist historians and the idea of incommensurability, see M. Detienne, Comparer l'incomparable (2000), notably at 10
15. See Riles, "Wigmore's Treasure Box: Comparative Law in the Era of Information," 40 Harv. Int. L. J. 221 at 244 (1999) ("Categories School" of comparative law seeing non-Western systems as "too different for meaningful comparison") and 245 (since "Context School" seeing context as all important, "meaningful comparison becomes increasingly problematic"); Legrand, "Sur l'analyse différentielle des juriscultures," Rev. int. dr. comp. (1999) 1053, at 1056 (incommensurablity of legal traditions would not prevent their comparison, though concepts of incommensurability, comparison not explained) 1067 (difference and altérité ultimately implying incommensurability of laws, particularly civil and common laws) and 1070 (laws which are product of different legal traditions irremediably different to the point of incommensurability). For earlier assertions of incomparability of laws, see infra n. 50 and accompanying text; and for a splendid polémique against nationalist historians and the idea of incommensurability, see M. Detienne, Comparer l'incomparable (2000), notably at 10
16. See Riles, "Wigmore's Treasure Box: Comparative Law in the Era of Information," 40 Harv. Int. L. J. 221 at 244 (1999) ("Categories School" of comparative law seeing non-Western systems as "too different for meaningful comparison") and 245 (since "Context School" seeing context as all important, "meaningful comparison becomes increasingly problematic"); Legrand, "Sur l'analyse différentielle des juriscultures," Rev. int. dr. comp. (1999) 1053, at 1056 (incommensurablity of legal traditions would not prevent their comparison, though concepts of incommensurability, comparison not explained) 1067 (difference and altérité ultimately implying incommensurability of laws, particularly civil and common laws) and 1070 (laws which are product of different legal traditions irremediably different to the point of incommensurability). For earlier assertions of incomparability of laws, see infra n. 50 and accompanying text; and for a splendid polémique against nationalist historians and the idea of incommensurability, see M. Detienne, Comparer l'incomparable (2000), notably at 10