Blowback: China and the Afghan Arabs

Issues and Studies

Volumn 37, Issue 1, 2001, Pages 160-214

  Lutfi, Ahmad ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

Afghanistan; China; Human rights; Islam; Russia

Indexed keywords

EID: 0347116269     PISSN: 10132511     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (308)

1. This "central" belief is reflected even in contemporary China. In Mandarin, the words for "China" (Zhong guo), for instance, mean "The Middle Kingdom." There is a demonstrable distinction between a "Middle Kingdom person" (Zhong guo ren) and an "outer country person" (wai guo ren). World political maps produced in the PRC place China in the middle of the map as opposed to the left side as in maps produced elsewhere.
2. The 1990 census records a total of 1,042,482,187 Han population out of a grand total of 1,133,682,501.
3. June Teufel Dreyer, China's Forty Millions: Minority Nationalities and National Integration in the People's Republic of China (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1976), 8.
4. Ibid., 9. Other methods, such as those used by the Qing, included military force against at least two Muslim rebellions during the seventeenth and the nineteenth centuries. 5 These are declaring submission to Allah, the only God, and that Muhammad is his prophet (shahadah), turning to Mecca five times a day for prayer (salah), fasting during daytime for the whole month of Ramadan (sawm), paying alms to aid the poor (zakat), and making the journey to Mecca for pilgrimage at least once in a lifetime by each able-bodied, sane, solvent, adult Muslim (hajj).
5. A waqf is a religious endowment: revenue-generating properties, arable land, farm, or oasis administered by the donor or members of his family. Typically, waqf revenues finance mosques, religious schools, and other religious institutions. In the absence of official sponsorship, mosques and other religious institutions with economic problems were often out looking for new donors/waqfs. This enhanced the politico-economic weight of waqfs the revenues from which mosques, center of Muslim communities, were controlled.
6. Its most prominent ideologue is Ismail-bek Gasprinski (1851-1914) who called for modernization of Islamic education and unification of Muslims by "borrowing" from the West to revitalize intellectual and social life; emphasized rationalism, observation, personal experience, and common sense; and encouraged a liberal reading of the Quran and the Sunna. The movement had a profound impact on the thinking of educated Muslims in Russia and Central Asia. For a discussion of this, see Ludmila Polonskaya and Alexei Malashenko, Islam in Central Asia (Reading, Mass.: Ithaca Press, 1994), 59-62; and Abdujabbar A. Abduvakhitov, "The Jadid Movement and Its Impact on Contemporary Central Asia," in Central Asia: Its Strategic Importance and Future Prospects, ed. Hafeez Malik (New York: St. Martin's, 1994), 65-76.
7. Its most prominent ideologue is Ismail-bek Gasprinski (1851-1914) who called for modernization of Islamic education and unification of Muslims by "borrowing" from the West to revitalize intellectual and social life; emphasized rationalism, observation, personal experience, and common sense; and encouraged a liberal reading of the Quran and the Sunna. The movement had a profound impact on the thinking of educated Muslims in Russia and Central Asia. For a discussion of this, see Ludmila Polonskaya and Alexei Malashenko, Islam in Central Asia (Reading, Mass.: Ithaca Press, 1994), 59-62; and Abdujabbar A. Abduvakhitov, "The Jadid Movement and Its Impact on Contemporary Central Asia," in Central Asia: Its Strategic Importance and Future Prospects, ed. Hafeez Malik (New York: St. Martin's, 1994), 65-76.
8. Ira M. Lapidus, A History of Islamic Societies (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 789-90.
9. "Basmachi" was a rural bandit resistance in the name of Sharia and Jihad mostly active in rural areas. It was composed of former Khokand military units, landowners, merchants, village and clan notables, tribal chiefs, Sufis, unemployed tenant farmers, and workers. It was able to win minor political concessions from the Russians but was later crushed. See Lapidus, A History of Islamic Societies, 797-98; and John Obert Voll, "Soviet Central Asia and China: Integration or Isolation of Muslim Societies," in Islam in Asia: Religion, Politics, and Society, ed. John L. Esposito (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), 129.
10. "Basmachi" was a rural bandit resistance in the name of Sharia and Jihad mostly active in rural areas. It was composed of former Khokand military units, landowners, merchants, village and clan notables, tribal chiefs, Sufis, unemployed tenant farmers, and workers. It was able to win minor political concessions from the Russians but was later crushed. See Lapidus, A History of Islamic Societies, 797-98; and John Obert Voll, "Soviet Central Asia and China: Integration or Isolation of Muslim Societies," in Islam in Asia: Religion, Politics, and Society, ed. John L. Esposito (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), 129.
11. The term "jihad" signifies an effort directed toward a determined objective; it consists of military action with the object of expanding Islam and - if need be - of its defense in a just nonoppressive war.
12. Polonskaya and Malashenko, Islam in Central Asia, 85. The term "dar-al-harb," traceable to the Medina period of the Prophet's life, means the "land of war," being territories under perpetual threat of a missionary war, or those where (a) Islamic law is not in force; (b) Muslims and protected non-Muslim people-of-the-book (dhimmis) enjoy no protection; or (c) the territory in question directly adjoins a declared dar-al-harb territory.
13. Polonskaya and Malashenko, Islam in Central Asia, 41-81; Marie Bennigsen Broxup, "The Last Ghazawat: The 1920-1921 Uprising," in The North Caucasus Barrier: The Russian Advance towards the Muslim World, ed. Abdurahman Avtorkhanov et al. (London: Hurst, 1992), 112-45; and Stephen J. Blank, "Soviet Reconquest of Central Asia," in Malik, Central Asia, 40-64.
14. Polonskaya and Malashenko, Islam in Central Asia, 41-81; Marie Bennigsen Broxup, "The Last Ghazawat: The 1920-1921 Uprising," in The North Caucasus Barrier: The Russian Advance towards the Muslim World, ed. Abdurahman Avtorkhanov et al. (London: Hurst, 1992), 112-45; and Stephen J. Blank, "Soviet Reconquest of Central Asia," in Malik, Central Asia, 40-64.
15. Polonskaya and Malashenko, Islam in Central Asia, 41-81; Marie Bennigsen Broxup, "The Last Ghazawat: The 1920-1921 Uprising," in The North Caucasus Barrier: The Russian Advance towards the Muslim World, ed. Abdurahman Avtorkhanov et al. (London: Hurst, 1992), 112-45; and Stephen J. Blank, "Soviet Reconquest of Central Asia," in Malik, Central Asia, 40-64.
16. Polonskaya and Malashenko, Islam in Central Asia, 83-92.
17. Muhammad Ibrahim Qureshi, World Muslim Minorities (Islamabad: World Muslim Congress, 1993), 77; and Lapidus, A History of Islamic Societies, 818-19.
18. Muhammad Ibrahim Qureshi, World Muslim Minorities (Islamabad: World Muslim Congress, 1993), 77; and Lapidus, A History of Islamic Societies, 818-19.
19. This point was made as early as 1958 in Baymirza Hayit, ed., Documents: Soviet Russia's Anti-Islam Policy in Turkestan (Düsseldorf, Germany: Forschungsdienst Osteuropa, 1958), 7.
20. Organized into six USSR republics (Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzya, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan) and eight USSR autonomous republics including Bashkirya, Dagestan, Tataristan, and other Caucasian units. There are also four lesser-scale autonomous provinces in the Caucasus. See Lapidus, A History of Islamic Societies, 802.
21. Polonskaya and Malashenko, Islam in Central Asia, 92-95.
22. For a discussion of the practice of official Islam and its institutions in contrast to parallel "unofficial" Islam, see Alexandre Bennigsen and S. Enders Wimbush, Muslims of the Soviet Empire - A Guide (London: Hurst, 1985), 13-23; John O. Voll, "Muslim Minority Alternatives in China and the Soviet Union," Journal of the Institute of Muslim Minority Affairs 6, no. 2 (July 1985): 349-52; Abduvakhitov, "The Jadid Movement," 65-76; and United States Institute of Peace, "Afghanistan and Post-Soviet Central Asia: Prospects for Political Evolution and the Role of Islam" (1992), 14. For a discussion of the clergy's role in Central Asian Muslim republics as of 1989, see Sergei Petrovich Poliakov (Martha Brill Olcott, ed.), Everyday Islam: Religion and Tradition in Rural Central Asia, trans. Anthony Olcott (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1992), 105-12.
23. For a discussion of the practice of official Islam and its institutions in contrast to parallel "unofficial" Islam, see Alexandre Bennigsen and S. Enders Wimbush, Muslims of the Soviet Empire - A Guide (London: Hurst, 1985), 13-23; John O. Voll, "Muslim Minority Alternatives in China and the Soviet Union," Journal of the Institute of Muslim Minority Affairs 6, no. 2 (July 1985): 349-52; Abduvakhitov, "The Jadid Movement," 65-76; and United States Institute of Peace, "Afghanistan and Post-Soviet Central Asia: Prospects for Political Evolution and the Role of Islam" (1992), 14. For a discussion of the clergy's role in Central Asian Muslim republics as of 1989, see Sergei Petrovich Poliakov (Martha Brill Olcott, ed.), Everyday Islam: Religion and Tradition in Rural Central Asia, trans. Anthony Olcott (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1992), 105-12.
24. For a discussion of the practice of official Islam and its institutions in contrast to parallel "unofficial" Islam, see Alexandre Bennigsen and S. Enders Wimbush, Muslims of the Soviet Empire - A Guide (London: Hurst, 1985), 13-23; John O. Voll, "Muslim Minority Alternatives in China and the Soviet Union," Journal of the Institute of Muslim Minority Affairs 6, no. 2 (July 1985): 349-52; Abduvakhitov, "The Jadid Movement," 65-76; and United States Institute of Peace, "Afghanistan and Post-Soviet Central Asia: Prospects for Political Evolution and the Role of Islam" (1992), 14. For a discussion of the clergy's role in Central Asian Muslim republics as of 1989, see Sergei Petrovich Poliakov (Martha Brill Olcott, ed.), Everyday Islam: Religion and Tradition in Rural Central Asia, trans. Anthony Olcott (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1992), 105-12.
25. For a discussion of the practice of official Islam and its institutions in contrast to parallel "unofficial" Islam, see Alexandre Bennigsen and S. Enders Wimbush, Muslims of the Soviet Empire - A Guide (London: Hurst, 1985), 13-23; John O. Voll, "Muslim Minority Alternatives in China and the Soviet Union," Journal of the Institute of Muslim Minority Affairs 6, no. 2 (July 1985): 349-52; Abduvakhitov, "The Jadid Movement," 65-76; and United States Institute of Peace, "Afghanistan and Post-Soviet Central Asia: Prospects for Political Evolution and the Role of Islam" (1992), 14. For a discussion of the clergy's role in Central Asian Muslim republics as of 1989, see Sergei Petrovich Poliakov (Martha Brill Olcott, ed.), Everyday Islam: Religion and Tradition in Rural Central Asia, trans. Anthony Olcott (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1992), 105-12.
26. For a discussion of the practice of official Islam and its institutions in contrast to parallel "unofficial" Islam, see Alexandre Bennigsen and S. Enders Wimbush, Muslims of the Soviet Empire - A Guide (London: Hurst, 1985), 13-23; John O. Voll, "Muslim Minority Alternatives in China and the Soviet Union," Journal of the Institute of Muslim Minority Affairs 6, no. 2 (July 1985): 349-52; Abduvakhitov, "The Jadid Movement," 65-76; and United States Institute of Peace, "Afghanistan and Post-Soviet Central Asia: Prospects for Political Evolution and the Role of Islam" (1992), 14. For a discussion of the clergy's role in Central Asian Muslim republics as of 1989, see Sergei Petrovich Poliakov (Martha Brill Olcott, ed.), Everyday Islam: Religion and Tradition in Rural Central Asia, trans. Anthony Olcott (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1992), 105-12.
27. The preservation of the village form of Islamic life, the mahalla, in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan is a proof that Islam demonstrated creative potential despite long-term suppression. See Polonskaya and Malashenko, Islam in Central Asia, 94-98; Victor Spolinkov, "Impact of Afghanistan's War on the Former Soviet Republics of Central Asia," in Malik, Central Asia, 98-99; and Poliakov, Everyday Islam, 11-19, 76-80.
28. The preservation of the village form of Islamic life, the mahalla, in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan is a proof that Islam demonstrated creative potential despite long-term suppression. See Polonskaya and Malashenko, Islam in Central Asia, 94-98; Victor Spolinkov, "Impact of Afghanistan's War on the Former Soviet Republics of Central Asia," in Malik, Central Asia, 98-99; and Poliakov, Everyday Islam, 11-19, 76-80.
29. The preservation of the village form of Islamic life, the mahalla, in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan is a proof that Islam demonstrated creative potential despite long-term suppression. See Polonskaya and Malashenko, Islam in Central Asia, 94-98; Victor Spolinkov, "Impact of Afghanistan's War on the Former Soviet Republics of Central Asia," in Malik, Central Asia, 98-99; and Poliakov, Everyday Islam, 11-19, 76-80.
30. Yaacov Ro'i, "The Secularization of Islam and the USSR's Muslim Areas," in Muslim Eurasia: Conflicting Legacies, ed. Yaacov Ro'i (Essex, UK: Frank Cass, 1995), 13-14.
31. Reformism and modernism, the blend of which has inspired the Salafiyya movement in the Muslim Middle East, contributed to the psychological mobilization of Muslims in colonized Central Asia and aided the reconstruction of their Islamic political identity. See Lapidus, A History of Islamic Societies, 563-70, 634. The works of Qutb and al-Mawdudi were already entering the Soviet Union through contacts in the Middle East. See Martha Brill Olcott, "Islam and Fundamentalism in Independent Central Asia," in Ro'i, Muslim Eurasia, 34.
32. Reformism and modernism, the blend of which has inspired the Salafiyya movement in the Muslim Middle East, contributed to the psychological mobilization of Muslims in colonized Central Asia and aided the reconstruction of their Islamic political identity. See Lapidus, A History of Islamic Societies, 563-70, 634. The works of Qutb and al-Mawdudi were already entering the Soviet Union through contacts in the Middle East. See Martha Brill Olcott, "Islam and Fundamentalism in Independent Central Asia," in Ro'i, Muslim Eurasia, 34.
33. Mikhail Piotrovsky, quoted in Dale F. Eickelman, "Introduction: The Other 'Orientalist' Crisis," in Russia's Muslim Frontiers: New Directions in Cross-Cultural Analysis, ed. Dale F. Eickelman (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993), 3.
34. I-fan Yang, Islam in China (Hong Kong: Union, 1957), 2-4;
35. and Owen Lattimore, Studies in Frontier History - Collected Papers, 1928-1958 (London: Oxford University Press, 1962), 206.
36. Lapidus, A History of Islamic Societies, 817.
37. For a survey of the events leading to the establishment of the East Turkestan Republic, see Linda K. Benson, The Ili Rebellion: The Moslem Challenge to Chinese Authority in Xinjiang, 1944-1949 (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1990), 42-129.
38. Lapidus, A History of Islamic Societies, 819. For a survey of thought-reform programs, such as the Hundred Flowers Campaign, see Franklin W. Houn, A Short History of Chinese Communism (Englewood, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1973), 194-99.
39. Lapidus, A History of Islamic Societies, 819. For a survey of thought-reform programs, such as the Hundred Flowers Campaign, see Franklin W. Houn, A Short History of Chinese Communism (Englewood, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1973), 194-99.
40. Qureshi, World Muslim Minorities, 77-78.
41. The impact of Islam on China's policy is discussed in Yitzhak Shichor, "The Role of Islam in China's Middle-Eastern Policy," in Islam in Asia, ed. Raphael Israeli and Anthony Hearle Johns, vol. 2 (Jerusalem: Magnes, 1984), 305-17; and Lilian Craig Harris, China Considers the Middle East (London/ New York: I.B. Tauris, 1993), 95-124, 268-89.
42. The impact of Islam on China's policy is discussed in Yitzhak Shichor, "The Role of Islam in China's Middle-Eastern Policy," in Islam in Asia, ed. Raphael Israeli and Anthony Hearle Johns, vol. 2 (Jerusalem: Magnes, 1984), 305-17; and Lilian Craig Harris, China Considers the Middle East (London/ New York: I.B. Tauris, 1993), 95-124, 268-89.
43. Richard C. Bush, Jr., Religion in Communist China (Nashville/New York: Abingdon, 1970), 288-89.
44. Bennigsen and Wimbush, Muslims of the Soviet Empire, 38.
45. For a further discussion of China's policy toward Muslims then, see Clyde-Ahmad Winters, Mao or Muhammad: Islam in the People's Republic of China (Hong Kong: Asian Research Service, 1979), 27-41.
46. Colin Mackerras, China's Minorities: Integration and Modernization in the Twentieth Century (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 153-56.
47. The minister in charge of the State Ethnic Affairs Commission, for instance, was a Uyghur: Ismail Ahmat. Ibid., 159.
48. Ibid., 164.
49. These problems are evidenced elsewhere in China, such as the mass demonstrations associated with "Chinese Rushdi Affair." The "affair" refers to the Shanghai-published Sexual Customs book, which denigrated Islam and caused Muslim demonstrations in 1989 thus leading to recalling the book and punishing its authors. For details, see Dru C. Gladney, Muslim Chinese: Ethnic Nationalism in the People's Republic (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1996), 1-7; and Harris, China Considers the Middle East, 276.
50. These problems are evidenced elsewhere in China, such as the mass demonstrations associated with "Chinese Rushdi Affair." The "affair" refers to the Shanghai-published Sexual Customs book, which denigrated Islam and caused Muslim demonstrations in 1989 thus leading to recalling the book and punishing its authors. For details, see Dru C. Gladney, Muslim Chinese: Ethnic Nationalism in the People's Republic (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1996), 1-7; and Harris, China Considers the Middle East, 276.
51. These problems are evidenced elsewhere in China, such as the mass demonstrations associated with "Chinese Rushdi Affair." The "affair" refers to the Shanghai-published Sexual Customs book, which denigrated Islam and caused Muslim demonstrations in 1989 thus leading to recalling the book and punishing its authors. For details, see Dru C. Gladney, Muslim Chinese: Ethnic Nationalism in the People's Republic (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1996), 1-7; and Harris, China Considers the Middle East, 276.
52. Fred Halliday, Threat from the East? Soviet Policy from Afghanistan and Iran to the Horn of Africa (Middlesex, UK: Penguin, 1982), 111.
53. Mark Huband, Warriors of the Prophet: The Struggle for Islam (Boulder, Colo./Oxford: Westview, 1998), 1. A good example of how these young Muslims took part in the war and what was to become of them on returning home, and one that fits what is now common knowledge about their involvement, is that of the Mujahed turned parliamentarian Sheikh Tariq al-Fadhli of Yemen. For the complete story, see Katherine Roth, "Afghanistan and the Yemeni Jihad: A Surprising Visit to Post-war Aden - Part 1" (Institute of Current World Affairs, 1994).
54. Mark Huband, Warriors of the Prophet: The Struggle for Islam (Boulder, Colo./Oxford: Westview, 1998), 1. A good example of how these young Muslims took part in the war and what was to become of them on returning home, and one that fits what is now common knowledge about their involvement, is that of the Mujahed turned parliamentarian Sheikh Tariq al-Fadhli of Yemen. For the complete story, see Katherine Roth, "Afghanistan and the Yemeni Jihad: A Surprising Visit to Post-war Aden - Part 1" (Institute of Current World Affairs, 1994).
55. Usama Bin Laden had reportedly attracted 4,000 volunteers from Saudi Arabia alone: see Dilip Hiro, "The Cost of an Afghan 'Victory'," The Nation, February 15, 1999. The figure is claimed to have been 9,000 in Robert Fisk, "Talks with Osama Bin Laden: How an Afghan 'Freedom Fighter' Became 'America's Public Enemy Number One'," ibid., September 21, 1998. Bin Laden's exact whereabouts remain unknown and there have been speculations he might leave his current base in Afghanistan for Yemen. See "Yemen May Offer Sanctuary" and "Bin Laden 'To Move for Fear of U.S. Attack'," South China Morning Post, July 31, 1999; and "Taliban Claims U.S. to Hit at Bin Laden," The Financial Times, August 11, 1999.
56. Usama Bin Laden had reportedly attracted 4,000 volunteers from Saudi Arabia alone: see Dilip Hiro, "The Cost of an Afghan 'Victory'," The Nation, February 15, 1999. The figure is claimed to have been 9,000 in Robert Fisk, "Talks with Osama Bin Laden: How an Afghan 'Freedom Fighter' Became 'America's Public Enemy Number One'," ibid., September 21, 1998. Bin Laden's exact whereabouts remain unknown and there have been speculations he might leave his current base in Afghanistan for Yemen. See "Yemen May Offer Sanctuary" and "Bin Laden 'To Move for Fear of U.S. Attack'," South China Morning Post, July 31, 1999; and "Taliban Claims U.S. to Hit at Bin Laden," The Financial Times, August 11, 1999.
57. Usama Bin Laden had reportedly attracted 4,000 volunteers from Saudi Arabia alone: see Dilip Hiro, "The Cost of an Afghan 'Victory'," The Nation, February 15, 1999. The figure is claimed to have been 9,000 in Robert Fisk, "Talks with Osama Bin Laden: How an Afghan 'Freedom Fighter' Became 'America's Public Enemy Number One'," ibid., September 21, 1998. Bin Laden's exact whereabouts remain unknown and there have been speculations he might leave his current base in Afghanistan for Yemen. See "Yemen May Offer Sanctuary" and "Bin Laden 'To Move for Fear of U.S. Attack'," South China Morning Post, July 31, 1999; and "Taliban Claims U.S. to Hit at Bin Laden," The Financial Times, August 11, 1999.
58. Usama Bin Laden had reportedly attracted 4,000 volunteers from Saudi Arabia alone: see Dilip Hiro, "The Cost of an Afghan 'Victory'," The Nation, February 15, 1999. The figure is claimed to have been 9,000 in Robert Fisk, "Talks with Osama Bin Laden: How an Afghan 'Freedom Fighter' Became 'America's Public Enemy Number One'," ibid., September 21, 1998. Bin Laden's exact whereabouts remain unknown and there have been speculations he might leave his current base in Afghanistan for Yemen. See "Yemen May Offer Sanctuary" and "Bin Laden 'To Move for Fear of U.S. Attack'," South China Morning Post, July 31, 1999; and "Taliban Claims U.S. to Hit at Bin Laden," The Financial Times, August 11, 1999.
59. John K. Cooley, Unholy Wars: Afghanistan, America and International Terrorism (London: Pluto, 1999), 72-73; Huband, Warriors of the Prophet, 10-11; United States Institute of Peace, "Afghanistan and Post-Soviet Central Asia," 23; and Hiro, "The Cost of an Afghan 'Victory'."
60. John K. Cooley, Unholy Wars: Afghanistan, America and International Terrorism (London: Pluto, 1999), 72-73; Huband, Warriors of the Prophet, 10-11; United States Institute of Peace, "Afghanistan and Post-Soviet Central Asia," 23; and Hiro, "The Cost of an Afghan 'Victory'."
61. John K. Cooley, Unholy Wars: Afghanistan, America and International Terrorism (London: Pluto, 1999), 72-73; Huband, Warriors of the Prophet, 10-11; United States Institute of Peace, "Afghanistan and Post-Soviet Central Asia," 23; and Hiro, "The Cost of an Afghan 'Victory'."
62. John K. Cooley, Unholy Wars: Afghanistan, America and International Terrorism (London: Pluto, 1999), 72-73; Huband, Warriors of the Prophet, 10-11; United States Institute of Peace, "Afghanistan and Post-Soviet Central Asia," 23; and Hiro, "The Cost of an Afghan 'Victory'."
63. Cooley, Unholy Wars, 32; and Harris, China Considers the Middle East, 180-82.
64. Cooley, Unholy Wars, 32; and Harris, China Considers the Middle East, 180-82.
65. Hiro, "The Cost of an Afghan 'Victory'." For a discussion of the U.S. policy in the post-war Afghanistan, see Richard Mackenzie, "The United States and the Taliban," in Fundamentalism Reborn? Afghanistan and the Taliban, ed. William Maley (London: Hurst, 1998), 90-103.
66. Hiro, "The Cost of an Afghan 'Victory'." For a discussion of the U.S. policy in the post- war Afghanistan, see Richard Mackenzie, "The United States and the Taliban," in Fundamentalism Reborn? Afghanistan and the Taliban, ed. William Maley (London: Hurst, 1998), 90-103.
67. In China, there is concern over the possibility of Sufi orders forming any political aspirations, an assumption about which little appears to be known. See Lilian Craig Harris, "Xinjiang, Central Asia and the Implications for China's Policy in the Islamic World," The China Quarterly, no. 133 (March 1993): 126-27.
68. United States Institute of Peace, "Afghanistan and Post-Soviet Central Asia," 9.
69. Anoushiravan Ehteshami, "New Frontiers: Iran, the GCC and the CCARS," in From the Gulf to Central Asia: Players in the New Great Game, ed. Anoushiravan Ehteshami (Exeter, UK: University of Exeter Press, 1994), 110.
70. Hafeez Malik, "New Relationships Between Central Asia and Pakistan's Regional Politics," in Malik, Central Asia, 256.
71. "Shura Statements on the Web," BBC Online Network, August 10, 1999, at 〈http://news. bbc.co.uk〉. Noteworthy is that since the beginning of the 1999 Russian-Chechen rivalry, there have been several unconfirmed reports that the Russians are working toward "eliminating" the Chechen presence on the worldwide web.
72. "Islamists Declare Dagestan Independent," BBC Online Network, August 10, 1999, at 〈http://news.bbc.co.uk〉. A Chechen-Dagestani anti-Russian alliance, or unity, can be problematic due to the Dagestanis' rejection of Chechen presence in their territory and the difference in ethnic composition between the two groups. See "Analysis: Jihad or Russian Conspiracy?" BBC Online Network, August 11, 1999, at 〈http://news.bbc.co.uk〉; and Rida Mohammad Lari, "Dagestan: The Land of Conflict," ash-Sharq al-Awsat, August 18, 1999.
73. "Islamists Declare Dagestan Independent," BBC Online Network, August 10, 1999, at 〈http://news.bbc.co.uk〉. A Chechen-Dagestani anti-Russian alliance, or unity, can be problematic due to the Dagestanis' rejection of Chechen presence in their territory and the difference in ethnic composition between the two groups. See "Analysis: Jihad or Russian Conspiracy?" BBC Online Network, August 11, 1999, at 〈http://news.bbc.co.uk〉; and Rida Mohammad Lari, "Dagestan: The Land of Conflict," ash-Sharq al-Awsat, August 18, 1999.
74. "Islamists Declare Dagestan Independent," BBC Online Network, August 10, 1999, at 〈http://news.bbc.co.uk〉. A Chechen-Dagestani anti-Russian alliance, or unity, can be problematic due to the Dagestanis' rejection of Chechen presence in their territory and the difference in ethnic composition between the two groups. See "Analysis: Jihad or Russian Conspiracy?" BBC Online Network, August 11, 1999, at 〈http://news.bbc.co.uk〉; and Rida Mohammad Lari, "Dagestan: The Land of Conflict," ash-Sharq al-Awsat, August 18, 1999.
75. For a brief bibliography of Basayev, see "Basayev Seeks to Establish an Islamic State in the Caucasus," ash-Sharq al-Awsat, August 18, 1999. See also BBC Online Network, August 10, 1999, cited in notes 46 and 47 above; "Dagestan Rebels Call in Chechen Warlord," The Sunday Telegraph, August 11, 1999; and "Russia Faces Spreading Revolt: Dagestan Uprising Echoes Chechnya Rout," ibid., August 15, 1999.
76. For a brief bibliography of Basayev, see "Basayev Seeks to Establish an Islamic State in the Caucasus," ash-Sharq al-Awsat, August 18, 1999. See also BBC Online Network, August 10, 1999, cited in notes 46 and 47 above; "Dagestan Rebels Call in Chechen Warlord," The Sunday Telegraph, August 11, 1999; and "Russia Faces Spreading Revolt: Dagestan Uprising Echoes Chechnya Rout," ibid., August 15, 1999.
77. For a brief bibliography of Basayev, see "Basayev Seeks to Establish an Islamic State in the Caucasus," ash-Sharq al-Awsat, August 18, 1999. See also BBC Online Network, August 10, 1999, cited in notes 46 and 47 above; "Dagestan Rebels Call in Chechen Warlord," The Sunday Telegraph, August 11, 1999; and "Russia Faces Spreading Revolt: Dagestan Uprising Echoes Chechnya Rout," ibid., August 15, 1999.
78. For a brief bibliography of Basayev, see "Basayev Seeks to Establish an Islamic State in the Caucasus," ash-Sharq al-Awsat, August 18, 1999. See also BBC Online Network, August 10, 1999, cited in notes 46 and 47 above; "Dagestan Rebels Call in Chechen Warlord," The Sunday Telegraph, August 11, 1999; and "Russia Faces Spreading Revolt: Dagestan Uprising Echoes Chechnya Rout," ibid., August 15, 1999.
79. "Yeltsin Prepares Dagestan Offensive," The Times, August 13, 1999.
80. "Russian Tanks Entered Chechnya Then Left after a Few Hours - Moscow Accuses Western Intelligence Services of Helping the Dagestanis," ash-Sharq al-Awsat, August 18, 1999.
81. Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin stated that "Chechnya is Russian territory and we will strike at militants wherever they are." See "Russia Mounts Dagestan Offensive," BBC Online Network, August 13, 1999, at 〈http://news.bbc.co.uk〉. See comments on the Russian forces' insufficient training by military analyst Pavel Felgenhauer in The Times, August 13, 1999; and The Financial Times, August 16, 1999. For a background history of Russia's involvement in Chechnya and Dagestan, see Moshe Gammer, "Russian Strategies in the Conquest of Chechnya and Daghestan, 1825-1859," in Avtorkhanov et al., The North Caucasus Barrier, 45-61. On Russia's war in Chechnya, see Vanora Bennett, Crying Wolf: The Return of War to Chechnya (London: Picador, 1998), esp. 309-488.
82. Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin stated that "Chechnya is Russian territory and we will strike at militants wherever they are." See "Russia Mounts Dagestan Offensive," BBC Online Network, August 13, 1999, at 〈http://news.bbc.co.uk〉. See comments on the Russian forces' insufficient training by military analyst Pavel Felgenhauer in The Times, August 13, 1999; and The Financial Times, August 16, 1999. For a background history of Russia's involvement in Chechnya and Dagestan, see Moshe Gammer, "Russian Strategies in the Conquest of Chechnya and Daghestan, 1825-1859," in Avtorkhanov et al., The North Caucasus Barrier, 45-61. On Russia's war in Chechnya, see Vanora Bennett, Crying Wolf: The Return of War to Chechnya (London: Picador, 1998), esp. 309-488.
83. Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin stated that "Chechnya is Russian territory and we will strike at militants wherever they are." See "Russia Mounts Dagestan Offensive," BBC Online Network, August 13, 1999, at 〈http://news.bbc.co.uk〉. See comments on the Russian forces' insufficient training by military analyst Pavel Felgenhauer in The Times, August 13, 1999; and The Financial Times, August 16, 1999. For a background history of Russia's involvement in Chechnya and Dagestan, see Moshe Gammer, "Russian Strategies in the Conquest of Chechnya and Daghestan, 1825-1859," in Avtorkhanov et al., The North Caucasus Barrier, 45-61. On Russia's war in Chechnya, see Vanora Bennett, Crying Wolf: The Return of War to Chechnya (London: Picador, 1998), esp. 309-488.
84. Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin stated that "Chechnya is Russian territory and we will strike at militants wherever they are." See "Russia Mounts Dagestan Offensive," BBC Online Network, August 13, 1999, at 〈http://news.bbc.co.uk〉. See comments on the Russian forces' insufficient training by military analyst Pavel Felgenhauer in The Times, August 13, 1999; and The Financial Times, August 16, 1999. For a background history of Russia's involvement in Chechnya and Dagestan, see Moshe Gammer, "Russian Strategies in the Conquest of Chechnya and Daghestan, 1825-1859," in Avtorkhanov et al., The North Caucasus Barrier, 45-61. On Russia's war in Chechnya, see Vanora Bennett, Crying Wolf: The Return of War to Chechnya (London: Picador, 1998), esp. 309-488.
85. Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin stated that "Chechnya is Russian territory and we will strike at militants wherever they are." See "Russia Mounts Dagestan Offensive," BBC Online Network, August 13, 1999, at 〈http://news.bbc.co.uk〉. See comments on the Russian forces' insufficient training by military analyst Pavel Felgenhauer in The Times, August 13, 1999; and The Financial Times, August 16, 1999. For a background history of Russia's involvement in Chechnya and Dagestan, see Moshe Gammer, "Russian Strategies in the Conquest of Chechnya and Daghestan, 1825-1859," in Avtorkhanov et al., The North Caucasus Barrier, 45-61. On Russia's war in Chechnya, see Vanora Bennett, Crying Wolf: The Return of War to Chechnya (London: Picador, 1998), esp. 309-488.
86. Abduvakhitov, "The Jadid Movement," 75. For a further discussion of Jadidism in Central Asia, see M. Mobin Shorish, "Back to Jadidism: The Future of Education in Central Asia," Islamic Studies 33, no. 2-3 (Summer-Autumn 1994): 161-82.
87. Abduvakhitov, "The Jadid Movement," 75. For a further discussion of Jadidism in Central Asia, see M. Mobin Shorish, "Back to Jadidism: The Future of Education in Central Asia," Islamic Studies 33, no. 2-3 (Summer-Autumn 1994): 161-82.
88. Religion has come under attack especially during China's Cultural Revolution, and there has been religious revival in the 1980s following the adoption of a relatively conciliatory policy toward religions. See A. Doak Barnett, China's Far West: Four Decades of Change (Boulder, Colo./Oxford: Westview, 1993), 366.
89. Olcott, "Islam and Fundamentalism," 37.
90. See Hayit, Documents, 11.
91. Kulbhushan Warikoo, "Ethnic Religious Resurgence in Xinjiang," in Post-Soviet Central Asia, ed. Touraj Atabaki and John O'Kane (London/New York: I.B. Tauris and the International Institute for Asian Studies, 1998), 269-82. Cross-border migrations started on a large scale since 1917 and reoccurred during China's 1950s Great Leap Forward and 1960s Cultural Revolution. See Ahmed Rashid, The Resurgence of Central Asia: Islam or Nationalism? (London: Zed, 1995), 221.
92. Kulbhushan Warikoo, "Ethnic Religious Resurgence in Xinjiang," in Post-Soviet Central Asia, ed. Touraj Atabaki and John O'Kane (London/New York: I.B. Tauris and the International Institute for Asian Studies, 1998), 269-82. Cross-border migrations started on a large scale since 1917 and reoccurred during China's 1950s Great Leap Forward and 1960s Cultural Revolution. See Ahmed Rashid, The Resurgence of Central Asia: Islam or Nationalism? (London: Zed, 1995), 221.
93. Pakistani merchants have been visiting Kashgar since the opening of the Karakorum Highway in 1982. See Amar Grover, "Chinese Whispers," Geographical Magazine 71, no. 5 (May 19, 1999): 48.
94. Warikoo, "Ethnic Religious Resurgence in Xinjiang," 279. See also Cooley, Unholy Wars, 126-60; and U.S. General Accounting Office, "Drug Control: U.S. Heroin Control Efforts in Southwest Asia and the Former Soviet Union" (1997), 24-29, 32-35, 38-42.
95. Warikoo, "Ethnic Religious Resurgence in Xinjiang," 279. See also Cooley, Unholy Wars, 126-60; and U.S. General Accounting Office, "Drug Control: U.S. Heroin Control Efforts in Southwest Asia and the Former Soviet Union" (1997), 24-29, 32-35, 38-42.
96. Warikoo, "Ethnic Religious Resurgence in Xinjiang," 279. See also Cooley, Unholy Wars, 126-60; and U.S. General Accounting Office, "Drug Control: U.S. Heroin Control Efforts in Southwest Asia and the Former Soviet Union" (1997), 24-29, 32-35, 38-42.
97. Michael Dillon, "Xinjiang: Ethnicity, Separatism, and Control in Chinese Central Asia," Durham East Asian Papers, no. 1 (1995): 21. Mackerras argues that among the reasons that led to the April 1990 Baren uprising was the unrest in Dushanbe, Tajikistan in February 1990. See Mackerras, China's Minorities, 175.
98. Michael Dillon, "Xinjiang: Ethnicity, Separatism, and Control in Chinese Central Asia," Durham East Asian Papers, no. 1 (1995): 21. Mackerras argues that among the reasons that led to the April 1990 Baren uprising was the unrest in Dushanbe, Tajikistan in February 1990. See Mackerras, China's Minorities, 175.
99. Dillon, "Xinjiang," 21.
100. Raphael Israeli, "A New Wave of Muslim Revivalism in China," Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs 17, no. 2 (1997): 273-74. The same point is made in Dillon, "Xinjiang," 21.
101. Raphael Israeli, "A New Wave of Muslim Revivalism in China," Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs 17, no. 2 (1997): 273-74. The same point is made in Dillon, "Xinjiang," 21.
102. Rashid, The Resurgence of Central Asia, 222.
103. Ibid.
104. Distinction must be made between autonomous regions and autonomous areas where the first refers to provinces while the second refers to prefectures, municipalities, and counties. See Warikoo, "Ethnic Religious Resurgence in Xinjiang," 270; and Barnett, China's Far West, 364-65, 378-80.
105. Distinction must be made between autonomous regions and autonomous areas where the first refers to provinces while the second refers to prefectures, municipalities, and counties. See Warikoo, "Ethnic Religious Resurgence in Xinjiang," 270; and Barnett, China's Far West, 364-65, 378-80.
106. For a detailed description of Xinjiang, see Barnett, China's Far West, 343-407. See also Linda Benson and Ingvar Svanberg, China's Last Nomads: The History and Culture of China's Kazaks (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1998), 11-15; and Dillon, "Xinjiang," 1.
107. For a detailed description of Xinjiang, see Barnett, China's Far West, 343-407. See also Linda Benson and Ingvar Svanberg, China's Last Nomads: The History and Culture of China's Kazaks (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1998), 11-15; and Dillon, "Xinjiang," 1.
108. For a detailed description of Xinjiang, see Barnett, China's Far West, 343-407. See also Linda Benson and Ingvar Svanberg, China's Last Nomads: The History and Culture of China's Kazaks (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1998), 11-15; and Dillon, "Xinjiang," 1.
109. These subdivisions are referred to as Beijiang (North Xinjiang), Nanjiang (South Xinjiang), and Dongjiang (East Xinjiang).
110. For a discussion of the physiography of Xinjiang, see Justin Jon Rudelson, Oasis Identities: Uyghur Nationalism Along China's Silk Road (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), 17-20; and Songqiao Zhao, Geography of China: Environment, Resources, Population and Development (New York/Toronto: John Wiley, 1994), 274-96.
111. For a discussion of the physiography of Xinjiang, see Justin Jon Rudelson, Oasis Identities: Uyghur Nationalism Along China's Silk Road (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), 17-20; and Songqiao Zhao, Geography of China: Environment, Resources, Population and Development (New York/Toronto: John Wiley, 1994), 274-96.
112. Lattimore, Studies in Frontier History, 186.
113. "Crackdown in Western China," Time Daily, April 28, 1997.
114. Benson and Svanberg, China's Last Nomads, 13.
115. Rudelson, Oasis Identities, 21. Much of the literature agrees on the complexity of Xinjiang's multiethnic composition but appears to be in disagreement on how many ethnic groups coexist there today. The number of minority nationalities in Xinjiang is a source of ongoing debate; some sources set the number at forty-seven: see Zhao, Geography of China, 288. Of those, up to ten Muslim minority nationalities inhabit Xinjiang. See Harris, China Considers the Middle East, 289; and Qureshi, World Muslim Minorities, 82.
116. Rudelson, Oasis Identities, 21. Much of the literature agrees on the complexity of Xinjiang's multiethnic composition but appears to be in disagreement on how many ethnic groups coexist there today. The number of minority nationalities in Xinjiang is a source of ongoing debate; some sources set the number at forty-seven: see Zhao, Geography of China, 288. Of those, up to ten Muslim minority nationalities inhabit Xinjiang. See Harris, China Considers the Middle East, 289; and Qureshi, World Muslim Minorities, 82.
117. Rudelson, Oasis Identities, 21. Much of the literature agrees on the complexity of Xinjiang's multiethnic composition but appears to be in disagreement on how many ethnic groups coexist there today. The number of minority nationalities in Xinjiang is a source of ongoing debate; some sources set the number at forty-seven: see Zhao, Geography of China, 288. Of those, up to ten Muslim minority nationalities inhabit Xinjiang. See Harris, China Considers the Middle East, 289; and Qureshi, World Muslim Minorities, 82.
118. Rudelson, Oasis Identities, 21. Much of the literature agrees on the complexity of Xinjiang's multiethnic composition but appears to be in disagreement on how many ethnic groups coexist there today. The number of minority nationalities in Xinjiang is a source of ongoing debate; some sources set the number at forty-seven: see Zhao, Geography of China, 288. Of those, up to ten Muslim minority nationalities inhabit Xinjiang. See Harris, China Considers the Middle East, 289; and Qureshi, World Muslim Minorities, 82.
119. The Uyghurs include other subgroupings such as the Abdals, Dolans, Eastern Uyghurs, Kashgarliks, Keriyaliks, Kuldjaliks (also known as Taranchis), and Lopliks. Benson and Svanberg argue that under the Qing, the name "Uyghur" disappeared altogether and that the Uyghurs identified themselves by referring to their religion or native towns, thus names such as Kashgarlik (indicating nativity of Kashgar city) were used. For a discussion of Uyghur identity, see Benson and Svanberg, China's Last Nomads, 16-21;
120. Dru C. Gladney, Ethnic Identity in China: The Making of a Muslim Minority Nationality (Orlando, Fla.: Harcourt Brae College, 1998) 160-61;
121. and Dru C. Gladney, "Nations Transgressing NationStates: Constructing Dungan, [Uyghur] and Kazakh Identities Across China, Central Asia and Turkey," in Atabaki and O'Kane, Post-Soviet Central Asia, 301-23.
122. For a discussion of Xinjiang's demographic structure, see Barnett, China's Far West, 344-48; Benson, The Ili Rebellion, 29-34; and Rudelson, Oasis Identities, 20-24.
123. For a discussion of Xinjiang's demographic structure, see Barnett, China's Far West, 344- 48; Benson, The Ili Rebellion, 29-34; and Rudelson, Oasis Identities, 20-24.
124. For a discussion of Xinjiang's demographic structure, see Barnett, China's Far West, 344- 48; Benson, The Ili Rebellion, 29-34; and Rudelson, Oasis Identities, 20-24.
125. "The Perils of China's Wild West," World Press Review, August 1994.
126. "Xinjiang Cargo Transport Increases," Xinhua, July 21, 1999; Paul S. Triolo and Christopher Hegadorn, "China's Wild West," The China Business Review 23, no. 2 (March 13, 1996); and China Economic Information Centre, "Cargo Transport Up at China's Northern Border," July 22, 1999.
127. "Xinjiang Cargo Transport Increases," Xinhua, July 21, 1999; Paul S. Triolo and Christopher Hegadorn, "China's Wild West," The China Business Review 23, no. 2 (March 13, 1996); and China Economic Information Centre, "Cargo Transport Up at China's Northern Border," July 22, 1999.
128. "Xinjiang Cargo Transport Increases," Xinhua, July 21, 1999; Paul S. Triolo and Christopher Hegadorn, "China's Wild West," The China Business Review 23, no. 2 (March 13, 1996); and China Economic Information Centre, "Cargo Transport Up at China's Northern Border," July 22, 1999.
129. Linking nine former Silk Road posts/cities, the solar-energy-operated Kashgar-Turfan rail link was opened in May 1999 at a cost of six billion yuan (the Chinese official currency) and is expected to end the isolation of the region, which produces 70 percent of Xinjiang's cotton and is reportedly boasting some 20 billion tons of oil and gas reserves. See "Wild West Rail Link to Open Up Trade, Tourism to Muslim Outposts," South China Morning Post, May 15, 1999.
130. "China Silk Road City Seeks Old Glory," Reuters, August 19, 1999; Triolo and Hegadorn, "China's Wild West"; Bamett, China's Far West, 387-91; and "Xinjiang's First Expressway Under Construction," China Transportation News, July 24, 1999.
131. "China Silk Road City Seeks Old Glory," Reuters, August 19, 1999; Triolo and Hegadorn, "China's Wild West"; Bamett, China's Far West, 387-91; and "Xinjiang's First Expressway Under Construction," China Transportation News, July 24, 1999.
132. "China Silk Road City Seeks Old Glory," Reuters, August 19, 1999; Triolo and Hegadorn, "China's Wild West"; Bamett, China's Far West, 387-91; and "Xinjiang's First Expressway Under Construction," China Transportation News, July 24, 1999.
133. Triolo and Hegadorn, "China's Wild West"; Dillon, "Xinjiang," 11; and "Siemens and Xinjiang Telecom Building ATM Network," Asiainfo - Daily China News, July 28, 1999.
134. Triolo and Hegadorn, "China's Wild West"; Dillon, "Xinjiang," 11; and "Siemens and Xinjiang Telecom Building ATM Network," Asiainfo - Daily China News, July 28, 1999.
135. Triolo and Hegadorn, "China's Wild West"; Dillon, "Xinjiang," 11; and "Siemens and Xinjiang Telecom Building ATM Network," Asiainfo - Daily China News, July 28, 1999.
136. "Xinjiang to Invest 17.2 [Billion] Yuan in Highway Construction," Asia Pulse, July 9, 1999; and "Freight Forwarders Concerned over Delay in Opening of Karakorum Highway," Business Recorder, July 27, 1999.
137. "Xinjiang to Invest 17.2 [Billion] Yuan in Highway Construction," Asia Pulse, July 9, 1999; and "Freight Forwarders Concerned over Delay in Opening of Karakorum Highway," Business Recorder, July 27, 1999.
138. For further details on Xinjiang's agricultural prospects, see Zhao, Geography of China, 282-87.
139. See Dillon, "Xinjiang," 8, where he sets the number at 35 million livestock, mainly sheep. Advanced embryo transplant techniques are now used in Xinjiang to improve its livestock. See "Embryo Transplants Popularized in Xinjiang," Xinhua, July 22, 1999.
140. See Dillon, "Xinjiang," 8, where he sets the number at 35 million livestock, mainly sheep. Advanced embryo transplant techniques are now used in Xinjiang to improve its livestock. See "Embryo Transplants Popularized in Xinjiang," Xinhua, July 22, 1999.
141. Dillon, "Xinjiang," 8.
142. These include tomato paste for export to Europe and the United States, juice and wine factories, fruit industries, corn oil, and ethyl alcohol. See Triolo and Hegadorn, "China's Wild West"; Lattimore, Pivot of Asia, 152-81;
143. and Benson and Svanberg, China's Last Nomads, 13-15.
144. The Corps started as an offshoot of the Chinese military to farm Xinjiang and defend China's frontiers with Central Asia. For a discussion of the early years of the Corps and its role in Xinjiang's economic development, see Barnett, China's Far West, 386-87, 398-402. On its role within the punitive system, see James D. Seymour and Richard Anderson, New Ghosts, Old Ghosts: Prisons and Labor Reform Camps in China (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1998), 45-81; and James Hardings, "Xinjiang: Reaching Break-even Point," The Financial Times, August 3, 1999.
145. The Corps started as an offshoot of the Chinese military to farm Xinjiang and defend China's frontiers with Central Asia. For a discussion of the early years of the Corps and its role in Xinjiang's economic development, see Barnett, China's Far West, 386-87, 398-402. On its role within the punitive system, see James D. Seymour and Richard Anderson, New Ghosts, Old Ghosts: Prisons and Labor Reform Camps in China (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1998), 45-81; and James Hardings, "Xinjiang: Reaching Break-even Point," The Financial Times, August 3, 1999.
146. The Corps started as an offshoot of the Chinese military to farm Xinjiang and defend China's frontiers with Central Asia. For a discussion of the early years of the Corps and its role in Xinjiang's economic development, see Barnett, China's Far West, 386-87, 398-402. On its role within the punitive system, see James D. Seymour and Richard Anderson, New Ghosts, Old Ghosts: Prisons and Labor Reform Camps in China (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1998), 45-81; and James Hardings, "Xinjiang: Reaching Break-even Point," The Financial Times, August 3, 1999.
147. See "The New Pioneers," The Economist, June 19, 1999, 30;
148. Hardings, "Xinjiang: Reaching Break-even Point"; and "Xinjiang Corporation: A Stirring Giant," The Financial Times, August 3, 1999.
149. Zhao, Geography of China, 281-82.
150. Triolo and Hegadorn, "China's Wild West."
151. Ibid.
152. "China's Largest Desert Oil Field Begins Operation," Xinhua, May 20, 1999.
153. "Gains from Oil Field Help Fire CNPC Profits to $134m," South China Morning Post, May 13, 1999.
154. For a detailed survey of China's oil and gas industry, see "Profile - China's Oil Industry (August 1999)," Asia Pulse, August 12, 1999.
155. "China to Restructure Energy Industry in Short Term," ibid., July 9, 1999.
156. "China-Kazakhstan Pipeline to Be Built Early in 21st Century," BBC Monitoring Service, July 12, 1999; and Richard R. Dion, "Long View of Caspian Oil Export Options Tilts to Kazakhstan-China," The Oil and Gas
157. "China-Kazakhstan Pipeline to Be Built Early in 21st Century," BBC Monitoring Service, July 12, 1999; and Richard R. Dion, "Long View of Caspian Oil Export Options Tilts to Kazakhstan-China," The Oil and Gas Journal 97, no. 23 (June 19, 1999): 21. On Kazakhstan's oil potentials, see "Hoping for a Gusher" and "When the Oil Runs Out," The Economist, August 28, 1999, 24.
158. "China-Kazakhstan Pipeline to Be Built Early in 21st Century," BBC Monitoring Service, July 12, 1999; and Richard R. Dion, "Long View of Caspian Oil Export Options Tilts to Kazakhstan-China," The Oil and Gas Journal 97, no. 23 (June 19, 1999): 21. On Kazakhstan's oil potentials, see "Hoping for a Gusher" and "When the Oil Runs Out," The Economist, August 28, 1999, 24.
159. Benson, The Ili Rebellion, 20-22; "Stone Materials Beijing Highlight in Xinjiang," Asiainfo - Daily China News, July 14, 1999; China Economic Information Centre, "Resources: Jan- May Gold Output by Region," July 14, 1999; "China's Gold Output Up in June," Asia Pulse, August 5, 1999; and Zhao, Geography of China, 280-81.
160. Benson, The Ili Rebellion, 20-22; "Stone Materials Beijing Highlight in Xinjiang," Asiainfo - Daily China News, July 14, 1999; China Economic Information Centre, "Resources: Jan- May Gold Output by Region," July 14, 1999; "China's Gold Output Up in June," Asia Pulse, August 5, 1999; and Zhao, Geography of China, 280-81.
161. Benson, The Ili Rebellion, 20-22; "Stone Materials Beijing Highlight in Xinjiang," Asiainfo - Daily China News, July 14, 1999; China Economic Information Centre, "Resources: Jan-May Gold Output by Region," July 14, 1999; "China's Gold Output Up in June," Asia Pulse, August 5, 1999; and Zhao, Geography of China, 280-81.
162. Benson, The Ili Rebellion, 20-22; "Stone Materials Beijing Highlight in Xinjiang," Asiainfo - Daily China News, July 14, 1999; China Economic Information Centre, "Resources: Jan- May Gold Output by Region," July 14, 1999; "China's Gold Output Up in June," Asia Pulse, August 5, 1999; and Zhao, Geography of China, 280-81.
163. Benson, The Ili Rebellion, 20-22; "Stone Materials Beijing Highlight in Xinjiang," Asiainfo - Daily China News, July 14, 1999; China Economic Information Centre, "Resources: Jan- May Gold Output by Region," July 14, 1999; "China's Gold Output Up in June," Asia Pulse, August 5, 1999; and Zhao, Geography of China, 280-81.
164. China Economic Information Centre, "Xinjiang Protects 13 Kinds of Minerals," July 23, 1999.
165. "Chronology of China's Nuclear Weapons Technology Development," Agence France-Presse, July 15, 1999. China's latest nuclear test was conducted in Xinjiang according to: "China Tests New Ballistic Missile?" Hindustan Times, August 10, 1999; "AFP: PRC Missile Said Capable of Carrying Nuclear Warhead," The Daily Telegraph, August 2, 1999; and "China Tests New Long-Range Missile," Kyodo, August 2, 1999.
166. "Chronology of China's Nuclear Weapons Technology Development," Agence France- Presse, July 15, 1999. China's latest nuclear test was conducted in Xinjiang according to: "China Tests New Ballistic Missile?" Hindustan Times, August 10, 1999; "AFP: PRC Missile Said Capable of Carrying Nuclear Warhead," The Daily Telegraph, August 2, 1999; and "China Tests New Long-Range Missile," Kyodo, August 2, 1999.
167. "Chronology of China's Nuclear Weapons Technology Development," Agence France- Presse, July 15, 1999. China's latest nuclear test was conducted in Xinjiang according to: "China Tests New Ballistic Missile?" Hindustan Times, August 10, 1999; "AFP: PRC Missile Said Capable of Carrying Nuclear Warhead," The Daily Telegraph, August 2, 1999; and "China Tests New Long-Range Missile," Kyodo, August 2, 1999.
168. "Chronology of China's Nuclear Weapons Technology Development," Agence France- Presse, July 15, 1999. China's latest nuclear test was conducted in Xinjiang according to: "China Tests New Ballistic Missile?" Hindustan Times, August 10, 1999; "AFP: PRC Missile Said Capable of Carrying Nuclear Warhead," The Daily Telegraph, August 2, 1999; and "China Tests New Long-Range Missile," Kyodo, August 2, 1999.
169. Neighboring countries have growing concerns over the escalation of drug trafficking and arms smuggling, much of which seem to enter China via Xinjiang. See BBC Monitoring Service, "Xinjiang Uncovers Ammunition Trafficking Case in Ethnic Area," July 16, 1999 and "Death Sentences, Executions in China," July 17, 1999. Analysts have reasons to think that religious books and cassettes are smuggled across China's border from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. See "In the Northwest, Islam Raises its Head," Inter Press Service, May 14, 1996; and Agence France-Presse, April 22, 1996.
170. Neighboring countries have growing concerns over the escalation of drug trafficking and arms smuggling, much of which seem to enter China via Xinjiang. See BBC Monitoring Service, "Xinjiang Uncovers Ammunition Trafficking Case in Ethnic Area," July 16, 1999 and "Death Sentences, Executions in China," July 17, 1999. Analysts have reasons to think that religious books and cassettes are smuggled across China's border from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. See "In the Northwest, Islam Raises its Head," Inter Press Service, May 14, 1996; and Agence France-Presse, April 22, 1996.
171. Neighboring countries have growing concerns over the escalation of drug trafficking and arms smuggling, much of which seem to enter China via Xinjiang. See BBC Monitoring Service, "Xinjiang Uncovers Ammunition Trafficking Case in Ethnic Area," July 16, 1999 and "Death Sentences, Executions in China," July 17, 1999. Analysts have reasons to think that religious books and cassettes are smuggled across China's border from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. See "In the Northwest, Islam Raises its Head," Inter Press Service, May 14, 1996; and Agence France-Presse, April 22, 1996.
172. Triolo and Hegadorn, "'China's Wild West."
173. ibid. For a further discussion of China's economic policies in Xinjiang, see Gaye Christoffersen, "Xinjiang and the Great Islamic Circle: The Impact of Transnational Forces on Chinese Regional Economic Planning," The China Quarterly, no. 133 (March 1993): 130- 51.
174. ibid. For a further discussion of China's economic policies in Xinjiang, see Gaye Christoffersen, "Xinjiang and the Great Islamic Circle: The Impact of Transnational Forces on Chinese Regional Economic Planning," The China Quarterly, no. 133 (March 1993): 130-51.
175. Both quotations are from Lattimore, Pivot of Asia, 3.
176. Numerous reports uncover the size of China's crackdown on separatists in Xinjiang. See "Police Lift Campaign Against Terrorists," South China Morning Post, August 30, 1999; "Beijing Abuses Muslim Rights," The Australian, April 21, 1999;
177. Numerous reports uncover the size of China's crackdown on separatists in Xinjiang. See "Police Lift Campaign Against Terrorists," South China Morning Post, August 30, 1999; "Beijing Abuses Muslim Rights," The Australian, April 21, 1999;
178. "Beijing Sends in 1,000 Extra Troops in 'War against Separatists'"
179. and "Muslim Separatists are Put to Death by China," The Daily Telegraph (Australia), February 6, 1999;
180. "Muslim Separatists to Be Executed, Says Amnesty," South China Morning Post, January 17, 1999;
181. and "Chinese City's Crackdown on Separatists Coincides with Muslim Festivities," BBC Monitoring Service, January 8, 1999.
182. The 1997 official figures show over 180 million religious adherents and about 3,000 religious organizations. See U.S. Department of State, "Annual Report on International Religious Freedom for 1999: China" (September 9, 1999).
183. Quoted by Xinhua News Agency, March 29, 1996 and April 1, 1996. Historically, many faiths coexisted in China; Zoroastraism, Mithraism, and Nestorianism, among others, were brought into China from Iran. See A.H.H. Abidi, China, Iran and the Persian Gulf (New Delhi: Radiant, 1982), 11-12.
184. Beijing perceives religion as a potential threat to national unity: mosques and Quranic schools are closed down since they "are seen as a potential focus point for discontent." See Amnesty International, "Religious Repression in China," ASA 17/69/96 (July 1996): 23;
185. and U.S. Department of State, "Annual Report on International Religious Freedom for 1999: China."
186. 5U.S. Department of State, "Annual Report on International Religious Freedom for 1999: China."
187. Amnesty International, "Religious Repression in China," 25, 26.
188. "The Real Enemy Within," The Economist, May 1, 1999, 25-26. China's concerns with the decline of socialism appear to cause such moves as blaming the responsibility on foreign press. See "China Accuses BBC of Launching 'Invasion'," BBC Monitoring International Reports, August 5, 1999. See also "China: Mystics Protest at Police Crackdown," The Financial Times, July 22, 1999; "Chinese Official Says Falun Gong Most Serious Incident Since Tiananmen," BBC Monitoring International Reports, July 26, 1999; and "5,000 Arrested in China Cult Raids," The Times, July 26, 1999.
189. "The Real Enemy Within," The Economist, May 1, 1999, 25-26. China's concerns with the decline of socialism appear to cause such moves as blaming the responsibility on foreign press. See "China Accuses BBC of Launching 'Invasion'," BBC Monitoring International Reports, August 5, 1999. See also "China: Mystics Protest at Police Crackdown," The Financial Times, July 22, 1999; "Chinese Official Says Falun Gong Most Serious Incident Since Tiananmen," BBC Monitoring International Reports, July 26, 1999; and "5,000 Arrested in China Cult Raids," The Times, July 26, 1999.
190. "The Real Enemy Within," The Economist, May 1, 1999, 25-26. China's concerns with the decline of socialism appear to cause such moves as blaming the responsibility on foreign press. See "China Accuses BBC of Launching 'Invasion'," BBC Monitoring International Reports, August 5, 1999. See also "China: Mystics Protest at Police Crackdown," The Financial Times, July 22, 1999; "Chinese Official Says Falun Gong Most Serious Incident Since Tiananmen," BBC Monitoring International Reports, July 26, 1999; and "5,000 Arrested in China Cult Raids," The Times, July 26, 1999.
191. "The Real Enemy Within," The Economist, May 1, 1999, 25-26. China's concerns with the decline of socialism appear to cause such moves as blaming the responsibility on foreign press. See "China Accuses BBC of Launching 'Invasion'," BBC Monitoring International Reports, August 5, 1999. See also "China: Mystics Protest at Police Crackdown," The Financial Times, July 22, 1999; "Chinese Official Says Falun Gong Most Serious Incident Since Tiananmen," BBC Monitoring International Reports, July 26, 1999; and "5,000 Arrested in China Cult Raids," The Times, July 26, 1999.
192. "The Real Enemy Within," The Economist, May 1, 1999, 25-26. China's concerns with the decline of socialism appear to cause such moves as blaming the responsibility on foreign press. See "China Accuses BBC of Launching 'Invasion'," BBC Monitoring International Reports, August 5, 1999. See also "China: Mystics Protest at Police Crackdown," The Financial Times, July 22, 1999; "Chinese Official Says Falun Gong Most Serious Incident Since Tiananmen," BBC Monitoring International Reports, July 26, 1999; and "5,000 Arrested in China Cult Raids," The Times, July 26, 1999.
193. "Xinjiang Area Said Seriously Affected by Falun Gong Fallacies," BBC Monitoring Service, August 9, 1999.
194. "China Religious Leaders Support Falun Gong Ban," BBC Monitoring Service, August 2, 1999.
195. "Glimpse of a Troubled Land," The Economist, May 1, 1999, 25.
196. Ibid.; "Xinjiang Separatists Jailed," The Financial Times, August 17, 1999; "Magazine Says Separatists Killed After China Military Base Attack," BBC Monitoring Service, August 3, 1999; "Huge China Army Parade Held," Associated Press, July 14, 1999; "China Puts to Death 16 After Wave of Separatist Violence," The Guardian, January 13, 1998; "China-Xinjiang: 'Great Wall of Steel' to Quell Ethnic Unrest," Inter Press Service, March 11, 1997; "Resurgence of Separatism in West Puts Beijing on Guard," ibid., June 6, 1996; and "China Tightens Control over Moslems in Xinjiang," Agence France-Presse, April 22, 1996.
197. Ibid.; "Xinjiang Separatists Jailed," The Financial Times, August 17, 1999; "Magazine Says Separatists Killed After China Military Base Attack," BBC Monitoring Service, August 3, 1999; "Huge China Army Parade Held," Associated Press, July 14, 1999; "China Puts to Death 16 After Wave of Separatist Violence," The Guardian, January 13, 1998; "China-Xinjiang: 'Great Wall of Steel' to Quell Ethnic Unrest," Inter Press Service, March 11, 1997; "Resurgence of Separatism in West Puts Beijing on Guard," ibid., June 6, 1996; and "China Tightens Control over Moslems in Xinjiang," Agence France-Presse, April 22, 1996.
198. Ibid.; "Xinjiang Separatists Jailed," The Financial Times, August 17, 1999; "Magazine Says Separatists Killed After China Military Base Attack," BBC Monitoring Service, August 3, 1999; "Huge China Army Parade Held," Associated Press, July 14, 1999; "China Puts to Death 16 After Wave of Separatist Violence," The Guardian, January 13, 1998; "China-Xinjiang: 'Great Wall of Steel' to Quell Ethnic Unrest," Inter Press Service, March 11, 1997; "Resurgence of Separatism in West Puts Beijing on Guard," ibid., June 6, 1996; and "China Tightens Control over Moslems in Xinjiang," Agence France-Presse, April 22, 1996.
199. Ibid.; "Xinjiang Separatists Jailed," The Financial Times, August 17, 1999; "Magazine Says Separatists Killed After China Military Base Attack," BBC Monitoring Service, August 3, 1999; "Huge China Army Parade Held," Associated Press, July 14, 1999; "China Puts to Death 16 After Wave of Separatist Violence," The Guardian, January 13, 1998; "China-Xinjiang: 'Great Wall of Steel' to Quell Ethnic Unrest," Inter Press Service, March 11, 1997; "Resurgence of Separatism in West Puts Beijing on Guard," ibid., June 6, 1996; and "China Tightens Control over Moslems in Xinjiang," Agence France-Presse, April 22, 1996.
200. Ibid.; "Xinjiang Separatists Jailed," The Financial Times, August 17, 1999; "Magazine Says Separatists Killed After China Military Base Attack," BBC Monitoring Service, August 3, 1999; "Huge China Army Parade Held," Associated Press, July 14, 1999; "China Puts to Death 16 After Wave of Separatist Violence," The Guardian, January 13, 1998; "China-Xinjiang: 'Great Wall of Steel' to Quell Ethnic Unrest," Inter Press Service, March 11, 1997; "Resurgence of Separatism in West Puts Beijing on Guard," ibid., June 6, 1996; and "China Tightens Control over Moslems in Xinjiang," Agence France-Presse, April 22, 1996.
201. Ibid.; "Xinjiang Separatists Jailed," The Financial Times, August 17, 1999; "Magazine Says Separatists Killed After China Military Base Attack," BBC Monitoring Service, August 3, 1999; "Huge China Army Parade Held," Associated Press, July 14, 1999; "China Puts to Death 16 After Wave of Separatist Violence," The Guardian, January 13, 1998; "China-Xinjiang: 'Great Wall of Steel' to Quell Ethnic Unrest," Inter Press Service, March 11, 1997; "Resurgence of Separatism in West Puts Beijing on Guard," ibid., June 6, 1996; and "China Tightens Control over Moslems in Xinjiang," Agence France-Presse, April 22, 1996.
202. Ibid.; "Xinjiang Separatists Jailed," The Financial Times, August 17, 1999; "Magazine Says Separatists Killed After China Military Base Attack," BBC Monitoring Service, August 3, 1999; "Huge China Army Parade Held," Associated Press, July 14, 1999; "China Puts to Death 16 After Wave of Separatist Violence," The Guardian, January 13, 1998; "China-Xinjiang: 'Great Wall of Steel' to Quell Ethnic Unrest," Inter Press Service, March 11, 1997; "Resurgence of Separatism in West Puts Beijing on Guard," ibid., June 6, 1996; and "China Tightens Control over Moslems in Xinjiang," Agence France-Presse, April 22, 1996.
203. Ibid.; "Xinjiang Separatists Jailed," The Financial Times, August 17, 1999; "Magazine Says Separatists Killed After China Military Base Attack," BBC Monitoring Service, August 3, 1999; "Huge China Army Parade Held," Associated Press, July 14, 1999; "China Puts to Death 16 After Wave of Separatist Violence," The Guardian, January 13, 1998; "China-Xinjiang: 'Great Wall of Steel' to Quell Ethnic Unrest," Inter Press Service, March 11, 1997; "Resurgence of Separatism in West Puts Beijing on Guard," ibid., June 6, 1996; and "China Tightens Control over Moslems in Xinjiang," Agence France-Presse, April 22, 1996.
204. "Muslim Rebels 'Raided Xinjiang Arms Depot and Police Station'," South China Morning Post, August 16, 1999; and "Separatists, Police Clash in China's Xinjiang," Kyodo, February 17, 1999.
205. "Muslim Rebels 'Raided Xinjiang Arms Depot and Police Station'," South China Morning Post, August 16, 1999; and "Separatists, Police Clash in China's Xinjiang," Kyodo, February 17, 1999.
206. "China Sets Up Quick Reaction Forces to Counter Xinjiang Terrorists," Agence France-Presse, May 29, 1996. On the role of the People's Armed Police, see Seymour and Anderson, New Ghosts, Old Ghosts, 81-84.
207. "China Sets Up Quick Reaction Forces to Counter Xinjiang Terrorists," Agence France- Presse, May 29, 1996. On the role of the People's Armed Police, see Seymour and Anderson, New Ghosts, Old Ghosts, 81-84.
208. This highly controversial book, published on May 19, 1999, has attracted wide criticism in China. See, for instance, "Lee's Splittism Theory Widely Condemned," China Daily, August 9, 1999; "Ebb and Flow," Asiaweek, July 30, 1999, 17; and "ASEAN Meeting: China Scores Points on Taiwan," The Financial Times, July 26, 1999.
209. This highly controversial book, published on May 19, 1999, has attracted wide criticism in China. See, for instance, "Lee's Splittism Theory Widely Condemned," China Daily, August 9, 1999; "Ebb and Flow," Asiaweek, July 30, 1999, 17; and "ASEAN Meeting: China Scores Points on Taiwan," The Financial Times, July 26, 1999.
210. This highly controversial book, published on May 19, 1999, has attracted wide criticism in China. See, for instance, "Lee's Splittism Theory Widely Condemned," China Daily, August 9, 1999; "Ebb and Flow," Asiaweek, July 30, 1999, 17; and "ASEAN Meeting: China Scores Points on Taiwan," The Financial Times, July 26, 1999.
211. There is a growing body of literature on China's systematic violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms of its Muslims in Xinjiang. Two of the most relevant and up-to-date sources are: Amnesty International, "Gross Violations of Human Rights in the Xinjiang [Uyghur] Autonomous Region," ASA 17/18/99 (April 21, 1999) and Seymour and Anderson, New Ghosts, Old Ghosts, esp. 44-127.
212. There is a growing body of literature on China's systematic violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms of its Muslims in Xinjiang. Two of the most relevant and up-to- date sources are: Amnesty International, "Gross Violations of Human Rights in the Xinjiang [Uyghur] Autonomous Region," ASA 17/18/99 (April 21, 1999) and Seymour and Anderson, New Ghosts, Old Ghosts, esp. 44-127.
213. See Amnesty International, "Gross Violations of Human Rights," 45. The report records 210 death sentences and 190 executions - since January 1997, mostly of Uyghurs convicted of subversive activities after unfair summary trials. Chinese Criminal Procedure Law is considered short of international standards for fair trial. See Amnesty International, "Law Reform and Human Rights," ASA 17/14/97 (March 1997). See also "China Torture Ordeal Claim," The Independent, April 24, 1999; "Chinese 'Brutality' Used to Crush Ethnic Dissent," The Guardian, April 21, 1999; and "Uyghur Youths Arrested During Drunken Brawl Clash After Chants for Independence," South China Morning Post, February 18, 1999.
214. See Amnesty International, "Gross Violations of Human Rights," 45. The report records 210 death sentences and 190 executions - since January 1997, mostly of Uyghurs convicted of subversive activities after unfair summary trials. Chinese Criminal Procedure Law is considered short of international standards for fair trial. See Amnesty International, "Law Reform and Human Rights," ASA 17/14/97 (March 1997). See also "China Torture Ordeal Claim," The Independent, April 24, 1999; "Chinese 'Brutality' Used to Crush Ethnic Dissent," The Guardian, April 21, 1999; and "Uyghur Youths Arrested During Drunken Brawl Clash After Chants for Independence," South China Morning Post, February 18, 1999.
215. See Amnesty International, "Gross Violations of Human Rights," 45. The report records 210 death sentences and 190 executions - since January 1997, mostly of Uyghurs convicted of subversive activities after unfair summary trials. Chinese Criminal Procedure Law is considered short of international standards for fair trial. See Amnesty International, "Law Reform and Human Rights," ASA 17/14/97 (March 1997). See also "China Torture Ordeal Claim," The Independent, April 24, 1999; "Chinese 'Brutality' Used to Crush Ethnic Dissent," The Guardian, April 21, 1999; and "Uyghur Youths Arrested During Drunken Brawl Clash After Chants for Independence," South China Morning Post, February 18, 1999.
216. See Amnesty International, "Gross Violations of Human Rights," 45. The report records 210 death sentences and 190 executions - since January 1997, mostly of Uyghurs convicted of subversive activities after unfair summary trials. Chinese Criminal Procedure Law is considered short of international standards for fair trial. See Amnesty International, "Law Reform and Human Rights," ASA 17/14/97 (March 1997). See also "China Torture Ordeal Claim," The Independent, April 24, 1999; "Chinese 'Brutality' Used to Crush Ethnic Dissent," The Guardian, April 21, 1999; and "Uyghur Youths Arrested During Drunken Brawl Clash After Chants for Independence," South China Morning Post, February 18, 1999.
217. See Amnesty International, "Gross Violations of Human Rights," 45. The report records 210 death sentences and 190 executions - since January 1997, mostly of Uyghurs convicted of subversive activities after unfair summary trials. Chinese Criminal Procedure Law is considered short of international standards for fair trial. See Amnesty International, "Law Reform and Human Rights," ASA 17/14/97 (March 1997). See also "China Torture Ordeal Claim," The Independent, April 24, 1999; "Chinese 'Brutality' Used to Crush Ethnic Dissent," The Guardian, April 21, 1999; and "Uyghur Youths Arrested During Drunken Brawl Clash After Chants for Independence," South China Morning Post, February 18, 1999.
218. Amnesty International, "No One is Safe: Political Repression and Abuse of Power in the 1990s," ASA 17/01/96 (March 1996): 49-53. For details of the April 1990 Baren incident, see Amnesty International, "Secret Violence: Human Rights Violations in Xinjiang," ASA 17/50/92 (November 13, 1992): 3-6. The latest figures show that out of sixty-four death sentences in Xinjiang, sixty-two were carried out; twenty-five of those executed were Uyghur political prisoners. See Amnesty International, "The Death Penalty Worldwide: Developments in 1998," ACT 50/04/99 (May 1999): 28.
219. Amnesty International, "No One is Safe: Political Repression and Abuse of Power in the 1990s," ASA 17/01/96 (March 1996): 49-53. For details of the April 1990 Baren incident, see Amnesty International, "Secret Violence: Human Rights Violations in Xinjiang," ASA 17/50/92 (November 13, 1992): 3-6. The latest figures show that out of sixty-four death sentences in Xinjiang, sixty-two were carried out; twenty-five of those executed were Uyghur political prisoners. See Amnesty International, "The Death Penalty Worldwide: Developments in 1998," ACT 50/04/99 (May 1999): 28.
220. Amnesty International, "No One is Safe: Political Repression and Abuse of Power in the 1990s," ASA 17/01/96 (March 1996): 49-53. For details of the April 1990 Baren incident, see Amnesty International, "Secret Violence: Human Rights Violations in Xinjiang," ASA 17/50/92 (November 13, 1992): 3-6. The latest figures show that out of sixty-four death sentences in Xinjiang, sixty-two were carried out; twenty-five of those executed were Uyghur political prisoners. See Amnesty International, "The Death Penalty Worldwide: Developments in 1998," ACT 50/04/99 (May 1999): 28.
221. Michael Dillon, "Ethnic, Religious, and Political Conflict on China's Northwestern Borders: The Background to the Violence in Xinjiang," Boundary and Security Bulletin 5, no. 1 (1997): 83.
222. Many are classified as "prisoners of conscience" by international human rights organizations. See Amnesty International, "Appeal for Uyghurs Arbitrarily Detained," ASA 17/02/99 (January 1999): 4; "Gross Violations of Human Rights," 13-17; and "Summary of Amnesty International Concerns," ASA 17/06/98 (February 1998): 3-5. It has been reported that four men and four children, all Muslim Uyghurs from Xinjiang, were forcibly returned to China from Kazakhstan in late August or early September 1998; the children were released after eighteen days, but the men were believed to remain in detention in Kashgar as of January 1999. See U.S. Department of State, "Annual Report on International Religious Freedom for 1999: China."
223. Many are classified as "prisoners of conscience" by international human rights organizations. See Amnesty International, "Appeal for Uyghurs Arbitrarily Detained," ASA 17/02/99 (January 1999): 4; "Gross Violations of Human Rights," 13-17; and "Summary of Amnesty International Concerns," ASA 17/06/98 (February 1998): 3-5. It has been reported that four men and four children, all Muslim Uyghurs from Xinjiang, were forcibly returned to China from Kazakhstan in late August or early September 1998; the children were released after eighteen days, but the men were believed to remain in detention in Kashgar as of January 1999. See U.S. Department of State, "Annual Report on International Religious Freedom for 1999: China."
224. Many are classified as "prisoners of conscience" by international human rights organizations. See Amnesty International, "Appeal for Uyghurs Arbitrarily Detained," ASA 17/02/99 (January 1999): 4; "Gross Violations of Human Rights," 13-17; and "Summary of Amnesty International Concerns," ASA 17/06/98 (February 1998): 3-5. It has been reported that four men and four children, all Muslim Uyghurs from Xinjiang, were forcibly returned to China from Kazakhstan in late August or early September 1998; the children were released after eighteen days, but the men were believed to remain in detention in Kashgar as of January 1999. See U.S. Department of State, "Annual Report on International Religious Freedom for 1999: China."
225. Many are classified as "prisoners of conscience" by international human rights organizations. See Amnesty International, "Appeal for Uyghurs Arbitrarily Detained," ASA 17/02/99 (January 1999): 4; "Gross Violations of Human Rights," 13-17; and "Summary of Amnesty International Concerns," ASA 17/06/98 (February 1998): 3-5. It has been reported that four men and four children, all Muslim Uyghurs from Xinjiang, were forcibly returned to China from Kazakhstan in late August or early September 1998; the children were released after eighteen days, but the men were believed to remain in detention in Kashgar as of January 1999. See U.S. Department of State, "Annual Report on International Religious Freedom for 1999: China."
226. "Prominent [Uyghur] Businesswoman Detained," M2 Presswire, August 17, 1999.
227. Amnesty International, "State Secrets - A Pretext for Repression," ASA 17/42/96 (May 1996): 2.
228. "Pledging 'Firm Resolve,' China Signs Human Rights Pact," International Herald Tribune, October 6, 1998.
229. Amnesty International, "Gross Human Rights Violations in the Xinjiang [Uyghur] Autonomous Region Must Stop," ASA 17/25/99 (April 20, 1999).
230. Quoted in Amnesty International, "Open Letter from Amnesty International to EU Governments on the Eve of EU-China Human Rights Dialogue," TG ASA 17/99.01 (February 4, 1999): 2-3. China, nevertheless, calls for help against terrorism in trouble-ridden Xinjiang. See "Plea for Global Pact on Terror," South China Morning Post, October 11, 1998.
231. Quoted in Amnesty International, "Open Letter from Amnesty International to EU Governments on the Eve of EU-China Human Rights Dialogue," TG ASA 17/99.01 (February 4, 1999): 2-3. China, nevertheless, calls for help against terrorism in trouble-ridden Xinjiang. See "Plea for Global Pact on Terror," South China Morning Post, October 11, 1998.
232. "Blair Quietly Brings Up Rights as UK and China Seek Smoother Course," International Herald Tribune, October 7, 1998; "Human Rights: Robin Cook's Tour of the Global Badlands," The Guardian, April 22, 1998; and "Chinese Rights and Wrongs," ibid., June 23, 1998.
233. "Blair Quietly Brings Up Rights as UK and China Seek Smoother Course," International Herald Tribune, October 7, 1998; "Human Rights: Robin Cook's Tour of the Global Badlands," The Guardian, April 22, 1998; and "Chinese Rights and Wrongs," ibid., June 23, 1998.
234. "Blair Quietly Brings Up Rights as UK and China Seek Smoother Course," International Herald Tribune, October 7, 1998; "Human Rights: Robin Cook's Tour of the Global Badlands," The Guardian, April 22, 1998; and "Chinese Rights and Wrongs," ibid., June 23, 1998.
235. "A British-Chinese Partnership," People's Daily (Beijing) October 6, 1998. Noteworthy is that the World Bank has lent China approximately US$23 billion of which US$90 million went to Xinjiang's Production-Construction Corps, which runs most of Xinjiang's prisons and reform-through-labor camps. See Seymour and Anderson, New Ghosts, Old Ghosts, 228-30. China's "firm" stance does not mean it is altogether unworried about Western attitudes. See "China Accuses BBC of Launching 'Invasion'" (cited in note 107 above).
236. "A British-Chinese Partnership," People's Daily (Beijing) October 6, 1998. Noteworthy is that the World Bank has lent China approximately US$23 billion of which US$90 million went to Xinjiang's Production-Construction Corps, which runs most of Xinjiang's prisons and reform-through-labor camps. See Seymour and Anderson, New Ghosts, Old Ghosts, 228-30. China's "firm" stance does not mean it is altogether unworried about Western attitudes. See "China Accuses BBC of Launching 'Invasion'" (cited in note 107 above).
237. "A British-Chinese Partnership," People's Daily (Beijing) October 6, 1998. Noteworthy is that the World Bank has lent China approximately US$23 billion of which US$90 million went to Xinjiang's Production-Construction Corps, which runs most of Xinjiang's prisons and reform-through-labor camps. See Seymour and Anderson, New Ghosts, Old Ghosts, 228-30. China's "firm" stance does not mean it is altogether unworried about Western attitudes. See "China Accuses BBC of Launching 'Invasion'" (cited in note 107 above).
238. Fred Halliday, Islam and the Myth of Confrontation: Religion and Politics in the Middle East (London/New York: I.B. Tauris, 1996), 131.
239. Dillon, "Ethnic, Religious, and Political Conflict," 82.
240. Ibid., 80.
241. Ibid., 82. For a discussion of the Uyghur connection to Turkey, see Gladney, "Nations Transgressing Nation-States"; and "Extremist Groups in Turkey Analyzed," The Pesticides Register (CBNB, USA) August 23, 1998.
242. Ibid., 82. For a discussion of the Uyghur connection to Turkey, see Gladney, "Nations Transgressing Nation-States"; and "Extremist Groups in Turkey Analyzed," The Pesticides Register (CBNB, USA) August 23, 1998.
243. In Israeli's words, based on al-Shawkani's Nayl al-Awtar, "The Hanafi madhahab [School of Law], which prevailed in China, laid down three conditions under any of which a Muslim territory reverts to dar-al-harb: (1) if the law of the unbelievers is enforced; (2) if it becomes separated from dar-al-Islam by non-Muslim territory; or (3) if no believer or dhimmi (protégé of Islam) could safely reside in the territory." See Israeli, "Muslims in China," 292. Most Muslims in Xinjiang are Sunnis, but there are two Shiite groups: Tajiks in Kashgar (Ismailis) and a small community of Uyghurs in Yarkand (Twelvers). See Michael Dillon, "Muslims in Post-Mao China," Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs 16, no. 1 (1996): 42.
244. In Israeli's words, based on al-Shawkani's Nayl al-Awtar, "The Hanafi madhahab [School of Law], which prevailed in China, laid down three conditions under any of which a Muslim territory reverts to dar-al-harb: (1) if the law of the unbelievers is enforced; (2) if it becomes separated from dar-al-Islam by non-Muslim territory; or (3) if no believer or dhimmi (protégé of Islam) could safely reside in the territory." See Israeli, "Muslims in China," 292. Most Muslims in Xinjiang are Sunnis, but there are two Shiite groups: Tajiks in Kashgar (Ismailis) and a small community of Uyghurs in Yarkand (Twelvers). See Michael Dillon, "Muslims in Post-Mao China," Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs 16, no. 1 (1996): 42.
245. Bennigsen and Wimbush, Muslims of the Soviet Empire, 115-20.
246. Benson and Svanberg, China's Last Nomads, 16-18. For further reading on the Uyghur history, from a Uyghur viewpoint, see Eastern Turkestan Union in Europe, "Brief History of the Uyghurs," at 〈http://www.geocities.com/CapitolHill/1730/buh.htm〉 (September 16, 1999); and Erkin Alptekin, "The Uighurs," at 〈http://www.taklamakan.org/erkin/aliptekin.htm〉 (September 16, 1999).
247. Benson and Svanberg, China's Last Nomads, 16-18. For further reading on the Uyghur history, from a Uyghur viewpoint, see Eastern Turkestan Union in Europe, "Brief History of the Uyghurs," at 〈http://www.geocities.com/CapitolHill/1730/buh.htm〉 (September 16, 1999); and Erkin Alptekin, "The Uighurs," at 〈http://www.taklamakan.org/erkin/aliptekin.htm〉 (September 16, 1999).
248. Benson and Svanberg, China's Last Nomads, 16-18. For further reading on the Uyghur history, from a Uyghur viewpoint, see Eastern Turkestan Union in Europe, "Brief History of the Uyghurs," at 〈http://www.geocities.com/CapitolHill/1730/buh.htm〉 (September 16, 1999); and Erkin Alptekin, "The Uighurs," at 〈http://www.taklamakan.org/erkin/aliptekin.htm〉 (September 16, 1999).
249. Dillon, "Ethnic, Religious, and Political Conflict," 80.
250. Andrew D.W. Forbes, Warlords and Muslims in Chinese Central Asia: A Political History of Republican Sinkiang, 1911-1949 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 229-34.
251. Ibid.
252. Ibid., 233.
253. Dillon, "Ethnic, Religious, and Political Conflict," 81.
254. Forbes, Warlords and Muslims, 229-34; and Warikoo, "Ethnic Religious Resurgence in Xinjiang," 272-73.
255. Forbes, Warlords and Muslims, 229-34; and Warikoo, "Ethnic Religious Resurgence in Xinjiang," 272-73.
256. Dillon, "Ethnic, Religious, and Political Conflict," 82.
257. Benson and Svanberg, China's Last Nomads, 23. In this context, noteworthy is that - as of June 1999 - there have been discussions between the Chinese government and the World Bank for a loan of US$160 million for financing the "China Western Poverty Reduction Project." The project involves the immigration of tens of thousands of Chinese peasants to Tibet. See "China: Beijing Awaits Crucial World Bank Decision on Loan," Inter Press Service, June 24, 1999.
258. Benson and Svanberg, China's Last Nomads, 23. In this context, noteworthy is that - as of June 1999 - there have been discussions between the Chinese government and the World Bank for a loan of US$160 million for financing the "China Western Poverty Reduction Project." The project involves the immigration of tens of thousands of Chinese peasants to Tibet. See "China: Beijing Awaits Crucial World Bank Decision on Loan," Inter Press Service, June 24, 1999.
259. Dillon, "Ethnic, Religious, and Political Conflict," 82.
260. Barnett, China's Far West, 375.
261. Israeli, "Muslims in China," 295.
262. Ibid., 296.
263. "In the Northwest, Islam Raises its Head," Inter Press Service, May 14, 1996.
264. "Resurgence of Separatism in West Puts Beijing on Guard," ibid., June 6, 1996.
265. "Taliban Trains Muslim Separatists for Terrorism in China," The Sunday Telegraph, October 4, 1998.
266. South China Morning Post, August 16, 1998.
267. "Separatists, Policy Clash in China's Xinjiang," Kyodo, February 17, 1999.
268. Hiro, "The Cost of an Afghan 'Victory'."
269. U.S. aid to the Mujahedin was "matched dollar for dollar by that from Saudi Arabia." See Huband, Warriors of the Prophet, 10. For a discussion of Saudi Arabia's involvement in Afghanistan, see Anwar-ul-Haq Ahady, "Saudi Arabia, Iran and the Conflict in Afghanistan," in Maley, Fundamentalism Reborn? 117-34.
270. U.S. aid to the Mujahedin was "matched dollar for dollar by that from Saudi Arabia." See Huband, Warriors of the Prophet, 10. For a discussion of Saudi Arabia's involvement in Afghanistan, see Anwar-ul-Haq Ahady, "Saudi Arabia, Iran and the Conflict in Afghanistan," in Maley, Fundamentalism Reborn? 117-34.
271. The author is grateful to Dr. Eric Watkins for pointing out possibly the earliest mention of China's involvement in the Afghanistan war: "Pravda Says U.S. and China Financing Rebels," The Times, December 31, 1979.
272. Cooley, Unholy Wars, 68.
273. Ibid., 69.
274. China's military supplies to the Afghan resistance are estimated to be of an annual value of US$200 million. See Fazal-ur-Rahman, "Pakistan's Relations with China," Strategic Studies 19, no. 4/20, no. 1 (Winter & Spring 1998): 72.
275. Harold Brown, the U.S. secretary of defense in the Carter administration, in a Beijing news conference in January 1980 following talks with Chinese top officials; transcript of the conference released by the Pentagon on January 9, 1980, cited in Cooley, Unholy Wars, 65.
276. Brigadier Mohammad Youssef of the Pakistani Intelligence, quoted in ibid., 74.
277. Under its veteran U.S.-trained PLA intelligence officer, Major General Xiong Guangkai, and former Chinese military attaché in London, Colonel Li Ning. Ibid., 73. Extremely important to note is that Cooley's point about China's PLA involvement in the war is based on reports that are extremely difficult to substantiate. Such reports, nevertheless, cannot be disregarded altogether in the light of the various ways, suggested in the literature, in which China has been involved in aiding the Mujahedin.
278. Based on his interview with Brigadier Youssef, Cooley is convinced this was the case. See Cooley, Unholy Wars, 75. Beijing, however, has rejected "allegations" to this effect by Kabul, which accused China of allowing its territory to be used as "the main center for organization of Afghan resistance." See Lilian Craig Harris, "China's Support for People's War in the 1980s," in China and the Third World: Champion or Challenger? ed. Lilian Craig Harris and Robert L. Worden (Mass.: Auburn House, 1986), 133.
279. Based on his interview with Brigadier Youssef, Cooley is convinced this was the case. See Cooley, Unholy Wars, 75. Beijing, however, has rejected "allegations" to this effect by Kabul, which accused China of allowing its territory to be used as "the main center for organization of Afghan resistance." See Lilian Craig Harris, "China's Support for People's War in the 1980s," in China and the Third World: Champion or Challenger? ed. Lilian Craig Harris and Robert L. Worden (Mass.: Auburn House, 1986), 133.
280. Harris, "China's Support for People's War," 132.
281. The author acknowledges gratefully the point made here by Dr. Michael Dillon during conversations in Durham in September 1999.
282. Huband described the situation in Warriors of the Prophet, 4.
283. Rashid, The Resurgence of Central Asia, 219. See also U.S. General Accounting Office, "Drug Control."
284. Rashid, The Resurgence of Central Asia, 219. See also U.S. General Accounting Office, "Drug Control."
285. Rashid, The Resurgence of Central Asia, 221.
286. Malik, "New Relationships," 254.
287. It has been argued that "the main form of development of civil society has been the tremendous religious revival throughout the area." See United States Institute of Peace, "Afghanistan and Post-Soviet Central Asia," 9. For a discussion of the post-USSR state of affairs in Central Asia, see V.F. Piacentini, "The Disintegration of the Soviet Empire: Problems of National and Collective Security in Central Asia," Islamic Studies 33, no. 2-3 (Summer-Autumn 1994): 281-316.
288. It has been argued that "the main form of development of civil society has been the tremendous religious revival throughout the area." See United States Institute of Peace, "Afghanistan and Post-Soviet Central Asia," 9. For a discussion of the post-USSR state of affairs in Central Asia, see V.F. Piacentini, "The Disintegration of the Soviet Empire: Problems of National and Collective Security in Central Asia," Islamic Studies 33, no. 2-3 (Summer-Autumn 1994): 281-316.
289. Mikhail Konarovsky, "Russia and the Muslim States of Central Asia and Afghanistan," in Islam, Muslims and the Modern State: Case-Studies of Muslims in Thirteen Countries, ed. Hussin Mutalib and Taj ul-Islam Hashmi (London: Macmillan, 1996), 236.
290. "Russia, China, [Central] Asian States Eye Closer Links," Reuters, August 25, 1999.
291. "The Lack of Democracy Breeds Rebellion in Central Asia," The Times, July 20, 1998.
292. See note 168 above.
293. "Kyrgyzstan Declares State of Emergency, Mobilisation" and "Kyrgyzstan Launches Operation to Rescue Japanese Hostages: Diplomat," Agence France-Presse, August 26, 1999.
294. Hosted by Kazakhstan, the conference also included Russia, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Azerbaijan, China, Mongolia, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, Iran, Israel, Egypt, Turkey, and the Palestinian Authority. See Eric Watkins, "U.S. Must Not Ignore Rights of Russia's Minorities as Washington, Moscow Join Forces Against Terrorists," Bridge News, at 〈http://www.bridge.com/〉 (September 16, 1999).
295. Ibid.
296. THe author acknowledges gratefully the suggestion offered here by Dr. Eric Watkins during long conversations in London and Durham in August 1999.
297. Bennigsen and Wimbush, Muslims of the Soviet Empire, 38.
298. This is evident from recent Sino-Central Asian talks, which centered on China's feelings of Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, and Tajikistan containing bases for groups supporting the Uyghurs' separatist movement in Xinjiang. See "Jiang Set to Meet with Russian, Central Asian Leaders," Kyodo, July 26, 1999.
299. Victoria Conner, "Summitry Can't Pacify Xinjiang," The Wall Street Journal Europe, August 25, 1999.
300. Cooley, Unholy Wars, 241.
301. See note 177 above. According to Warikoo, "The use of arms and ammunition and the involvement of foreign subversives from Turkey, Afghanistan (Mujahedin), Pakistan and [Uyghur] groups in Central Asian states, whose activists have been working in Xinjiang to propagate pan-Turkic and pan-Islamic views, has lent an extraneous dimension to the renascent domestic Muslim resentment against the Han Chinese." See Warikoo, "Ethnic Religious Resurgence in Xinjiang," 279.
302. For a discussion of Islamism in Algeria, see Huband, Warriors of the Prophet, 46-72; for a discussion of Islamism in Egypt, see ibid., 73-93.
303. For a discussion of Islamism in Algeria, see Huband, Warriors of the Prophet, 46-72; for a discussion of Islamism in Egypt, see ibid., 73-93.
304. "Beijing Rattled by Separatists," The Times, March 13, 1998.
305. Harris, "Xinjiang," 112.
306. "China's Wild West: Muslim [Uyghurs] Demand Independence," World Press Review 44, no. 8 (August 1997): 12.
307. Ibid.
308. A Chinese political analyst, quoted in Harris, China Considers the Middle East, 269.