And Justice for all - Including the Unrepresented poor: Revisiting the roles of the judges, mediators, and clerks

Fordham Law Review

Volumn 67, Issue 5, 1999, Pages 1987-2069

  Engler, Russell ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0347092089     PISSN: 0015704X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (401)

1. See Jona Goldschmidt et al., Meeting the Challenge of Pro Se Litigation: A Report and Guidebook for Judges and Court Managers 49 (1998) [hereinafter Meeting the Challenge] ("Court managers believe that the volume of cases involving self-represented litigants has increased substantially in recent years."); infra Part III.
2. See, e.g., William P. Quigley, The Unmet Civil Legal Needs of the Poor in Louisiana, 19 S.U. L. Rev. 273, 273 (1992) ("Between 85% and 92% of the low income people in Louisiana who had civil legal needs in 1991 were not represented by an attorney."); Janet Reno, Address Delivered at the Celebration of the Seventy-Fifth Anniversary of Women at Fordham Law School, 63 Fordham L. Rev. 5, 8 (1994) ("Ladies and gentlemen, at least eighty percent of the poor and the working poor in the United States do not have access to legal services." (citing Talbot D'Alemberte, Racial Injustice and American Justice, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1992, at 58, 59)). See generally Roy W. Reese & Carolyn A. Eldred, Legal Needs Among Low-Income and Moderate-Income Households: Summary of Findings from the Comprehensive Legal Needs Study 42 (1994) (finding that 71% of low income people who face legal problems do not have access to the legal and judicial system).
3. See, e.g., William P. Quigley, The Unmet Civil Legal Needs of the Poor in Louisiana, 19 S.U. L. Rev. 273, 273 (1992) ("Between 85% and 92% of the low income people in Louisiana who had civil legal needs in 1991 were not represented by an attorney."); Janet Reno, Address Delivered at the Celebration of the Seventy-Fifth Anniversary of Women at Fordham Law School, 63 Fordham L. Rev. 5, 8 (1994) ("Ladies and gentlemen, at least eighty percent of the poor and the working poor in the United States do not have access to legal services." (citing Talbot D'Alemberte, Racial Injustice and American Justice, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1992, at 58, 59)). See generally Roy W. Reese & Carolyn A. Eldred, Legal Needs Among Low-Income and Moderate-Income Households: Summary of Findings from the Comprehensive Legal Needs Study 42 (1994) (finding that 71% of low income people who face legal problems do not have access to the legal and judicial system).
4. See, e.g., William P. Quigley, The Unmet Civil Legal Needs of the Poor in Louisiana, 19 S.U. L. Rev. 273, 273 (1992) ("Between 85% and 92% of the low income people in Louisiana who had civil legal needs in 1991 were not represented by an attorney."); Janet Reno, Address Delivered at the Celebration of the Seventy-Fifth Anniversary of Women at Fordham Law School, 63 Fordham L. Rev. 5, 8 (1994) ("Ladies and gentlemen, at least eighty percent of the poor and the working poor in the United States do not have access to legal services." (citing Talbot D'Alemberte, Racial Injustice and American Justice, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1992, at 58, 59)). See generally Roy W. Reese & Carolyn A. Eldred, Legal Needs Among Low-Income and Moderate-Income Households: Summary of Findings from the Comprehensive Legal Needs Study 42 (1994) (finding that 71% of low income people who face legal problems do not have access to the legal and judicial system).
5. See, e.g., William P. Quigley, The Unmet Civil Legal Needs of the Poor in Louisiana, 19 S.U. L. Rev. 273, 273 (1992) ("Between 85% and 92% of the low income people in Louisiana who had civil legal needs in 1991 were not represented by an attorney."); Janet Reno, Address Delivered at the Celebration of the Seventy-Fifth Anniversary of Women at Fordham Law School, 63 Fordham L. Rev. 5, 8 (1994) ("Ladies and gentlemen, at least eighty percent of the poor and the working poor in the United States do not have access to legal services." (citing Talbot D'Alemberte, Racial Injustice and American Justice, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1992, at 58, 59)). See generally Roy W. Reese & Carolyn A. Eldred, Legal Needs Among Low-Income and Moderate-Income Households: Summary of Findings from the Comprehensive Legal Needs Study 42 (1994) (finding that 71% of low income people who face legal problems do not have access to the legal and judicial system).
6. See infra Parts I.A, I.D, II.B.1, II.B.3. See generally Meeting the Challenge, supra note 1, passim (discussing how self representation has increased greatly in recent years); Jona Goldschmidt, How Are Judges and Courts Coping with Pro Se Litigants?: Results from a Survey of Judges and Court Managers passim (May 1997) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author) (considering the policy issues raised by the increase in pro se litigants).
7. See infra Part I.B.
8. See infra Parts I.A, I.D.
9. See infra notes 132, 134 and accompanying text.
10. See infra Part II.A.1.
11. See infra Part I.A.
12. See infra note 160 and accompanying text.
13. See infra Part I.B.3.
14. See infra note 158 and accompanying text.
15. See infra Part I.D.
16. See infra note 134 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 151-57 and accompanying text.
18. See infra Part I.C. As described in part I.C, court-connected mediation is mandatory in some settings. In most settings, the court-connected mediation is labeled voluntary. To many unrepresented litigants, however, pressure from the court to mediate makes the mediation feel mandatory.
19. See infra Part I.D.
20. See infra Part II.A. It is unnecessary and foolhardy to attempt to provide a comprehensive definition of "fairness and justice." It is unnecessary because the profession repeatedly invokes the goals of "fairness and justice" without having provided a universal definition of the terms. Achieving "fairness and justice" nonetheless remains a fundamental goal of our legal system. See infra note 169. It is foolhardy because an attempt to define these terms would distract from the urgent and immediate task of assisting the unrepresented poor. Fairness and justice as used in this Article mean more than procedural fairness. The terms must require examination of the underlying rights of the unrepresented litigants. A system in which litigants forfeit important rights through ignorance or powerlessness cannot be viewed as fair; nor can a system in which the outcomes of cases are determined not according to their merits, but according to the status of a party's representation. If the concepts mean less than this, judges, mediators, and lawyers must - at a minimum - educate the public accordingly. For articles discussing the debate between substantive and procedural fairness in the context of mediation, see infra note 97.
21. See infra Part II.A.6.
22. See infra Part III.A.
23. See infra Part III.B.
24. Proposals to create "pro se divisions" or courts are therefore at most only partial responses. See, e.g., Robert Gottsfield, Let's Talk About It - A Superior Court Pro Se Division, Ariz. Att'y, May 1992, at 49, 49 (describing a model of a pro se court in which the decision would not be binding unless both parties consent to it); William W Schwarzer, Let's Try a Pro Se and Small-Stakes Civil Calendar in the Federal Courts, FJC Directions, June 1996, at 14 (suggesting an expedited calendar for "fair and efficient disposition" of pro se litigation). The issue of the roles of the players remains critical regardless of whether the cases are segregated.
25. Proposals to create "pro se divisions" or courts are therefore at most only partial responses. See, e.g., Robert Gottsfield, Let's Talk About It - A Superior Court Pro Se Division, Ariz. Att'y, May 1992, at 49, 49 (describing a model of a pro se court in which the decision would not be binding unless both parties consent to it); William W Schwarzer, Let's Try a Pro Se and Small-Stakes Civil Calendar in the Federal Courts, FJC Directions, June 1996, at 14 (suggesting an expedited calendar for "fair and efficient disposition" of pro se litigation). The issue of the roles of the players remains critical regardless of whether the cases are segregated.
26. See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 16 (outlining federal pretrial conference scheduling and management rules). The contrast unwittingly speaks volumes about the notion of justice in the courts: justice apparently is measured by case dispositions, not case outcomes.
27. Throughout this Article, I consciously choose the term "unrepresented litigants" in most cases instead of "self-represented," "pro se," or "pro per." The prefix "un-" means "not," the "opposite of." Webster's Third International Dictionary of the English Language 2481 (1986). The literal definition therefore is "not represented," indicating a "lack of" representation. Because the focus of this Article is the unrepresented poor, the concept of "not represented" best captures the plight of indigent litigants who appear without lawyers and who, essentially, are not heard by the court. See, e.g., Barbara Bezdek, Silence in the Court: Participation and Subordination of Poor Tenants' Voices in Legal Process, 20 Hofstra L. Rev. 533, 562-63 (1992) (stating that only 3.7% of tenants in observed cases were represented, mostly by non-attorneys); Erica L. Fox, Alone In the Hallway: Challenges to Effective Self-Representation in Negotiation, 1 Harv. Negotiation L. Rev. 85 (1996) (discussing the disadvantages of hallway settlements between the parties themselves). The concept of "self-representation" connotes the choice to forego counsel and probably some perceived ability to carry out the representation of oneself. See, e.g., Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 816-18 (1975) (discussing criminal cases in which courts allowed defendants to waive the right to counsel). This does not describe the predicament of most of the unrepresented poor and should not form our operating assumptions in attempting to fashion solutions. See generally infra Part II.A.5 (discussing the notion that most unrepresented litigants are not voluntarily unrepresented). For similar reasons, and because I prefer English to Latin, I prefer the term "unrepresented litigants" to "pro se" ("for himself") and "pro per" (the abbreviation for "in propria persona," California's version of "pro se," meaning "in one's own proper person").
28. Throughout this Article, I consciously choose the term "unrepresented litigants" in most cases instead of "self-represented," "pro se," or "pro per." The prefix "un-" means "not," the "opposite of." Webster's Third International Dictionary of the English Language 2481 (1986). The literal definition therefore is "not represented," indicating a "lack of" representation. Because the focus of this Article is the unrepresented poor, the concept of "not represented" best captures the plight of indigent litigants who appear without lawyers and who, essentially, are not heard by the court. See, e.g., Barbara Bezdek, Silence in the Court: Participation and Subordination of Poor Tenants' Voices in Legal Process, 20 Hofstra L. Rev. 533, 562-63 (1992) (stating that only 3.7% of tenants in observed cases were represented, mostly by non-attorneys); Erica L. Fox, Alone In the Hallway: Challenges to Effective Self-Representation in Negotiation, 1 Harv. Negotiation L. Rev. 85 (1996) (discussing the disadvantages of hallway settlements between the parties themselves). The concept of "self-representation" connotes the choice to forego counsel and probably some perceived ability to carry out the representation of oneself. See, e.g., Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 816-18 (1975) (discussing criminal cases in which courts allowed defendants to waive the right to counsel). This does not describe the predicament of most of the unrepresented poor and should not form our operating assumptions in attempting to fashion solutions. See generally infra Part II.A.5 (discussing the notion that most unrepresented litigants are not voluntarily unrepresented). For similar reasons, and because I prefer English to Latin, I prefer the term "unrepresented litigants" to "pro se" ("for himself") and "pro per" (the abbreviation for "in propria persona," California's version of "pro se," meaning "in one's own proper person").
29. Throughout this Article, I consciously choose the term "unrepresented litigants" in most cases instead of "self-represented," "pro se," or "pro per." The prefix "un-" means "not," the "opposite of." Webster's Third International Dictionary of the English Language 2481 (1986). The literal definition therefore is "not represented," indicating a "lack of" representation. Because the focus of this Article is the unrepresented poor, the concept of "not represented" best captures the plight of indigent litigants who appear without lawyers and who, essentially, are not heard by the court. See, e.g., Barbara Bezdek, Silence in the Court: Participation and Subordination of Poor Tenants' Voices in Legal Process, 20 Hofstra L. Rev. 533, 562-63 (1992) (stating that only 3.7% of tenants in observed cases were represented, mostly by non-attorneys); Erica L. Fox, Alone In the Hallway: Challenges to Effective Self-Representation in Negotiation, 1 Harv. Negotiation L. Rev. 85 (1996) (discussing the disadvantages of hallway settlements between the parties themselves). The concept of "self-representation" connotes the choice to forego counsel and probably some perceived ability to carry out the representation of oneself. See, e.g., Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 816-18 (1975) (discussing criminal cases in which courts allowed defendants to waive the right to counsel). This does not describe the predicament of most of the unrepresented poor and should not form our operating assumptions in attempting to fashion solutions. See generally infra Part II.A.5 (discussing the notion that most unrepresented litigants are not voluntarily unrepresented). For similar reasons, and because I prefer English to Latin, I prefer the term "unrepresented litigants" to "pro se" ("for himself") and "pro per" (the abbreviation for "in propria persona," California's version of "pro se," meaning "in one's own proper person").
30. As the proceeding progresses, unrepresented litigants may seek additional help from the clerks and may also encounter other court personnel, such as court officers and clerks, in the courtrooms. Although the focus of this section is on the clerks, the restrictions apply to the range of nonjudicial court personnel. See, e.g., John M. Greacen, "No Legal Advice from Court Personnel" What Does that Mean?, Judges' J., Winter 1995, at 10, 10 (discussing the types of advice court staff may and may not give).
31. See, e.g., In re Amendments to the Fla. Small Claims Rules, 601 So. 2d 1201, 1216 (Fla. 1992) ("The clerk is not authorized to practice law and therefore cannot give you legal advice on how to prove your case."); State v. Walters, 411 S.E.2d 688, 691 (W. Va. 1991) (stating that no magistrate clerk may act as an attorney for any party); Standing Comm. on the Delivery of Legal Servs., American Bar Ass'n, Responding to the Needs of the Self-Represented Divorce Litigant 24-25 (1994) [hereinafter Responding to the Needs] ("[I]t is important that court clerks not practice law by giving substantive legal advice . . . ."); Graecen, supra note 24, at 10 ("Members shall not give legal advice unless specifically required to do so as part of their office position." (quoting The National Association for Court Management, Model Code of Conduct art. II(B))). One survey of court administrators, administered non-randmonly, revealed that 59% of courts with policies guiding court staff assistance to the public included the explicit prohibition against giving legal advice. See Goldschmidt, supra note 3, at 21. Forty-eight percent of the administrators reported that their courts had no policies at all. See id.; see also Meeting the Challenge, supra note 1, at 50, 123 (reporting that about half the responding courts had a policy concerning the giving of legal advice to unrepresented litigants).
32. See, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 11-403 (West 1990) (concerning the "practice of law prohibited to certain officers"); In re Amendments, 601 So. 2d at 1216 (stating that a clerk cannot practice law).
33. See, e.g., Fed. R. App. P. 45(a) ("Neither the clerk nor any deputy clerk shall practice as an attorney or counselor in any court while continuing in office."); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. Rule 3:02(2) (West 1997) ("All clerks of court . . . and their assistants and employees in their offices are prohibited from engaging in the practice of law . . . ."); Greacen, supra note 24, at 11-12 (providing examples of various state rules prohibiting clerks from giving legal advice); Letter from Julia M. Freit, Assistant Attorney General, Office of the Maryland Attorney General, to the Honorable Mary Boergers, Senator 1 (October 22, 1991) (on file with the author) [hereinafter Freit Letter] ("The Annotated Code of Maryland, Business Occupations and Professions Article . . . § 10-603(b) provides that a clerk, deputy clerk, or employee of the clerk's office may not practice law . . . .").
34. See, e.g., Greacen, supra note 24, at 14 ("Court staff must always remember the absolute duty of impartiality"); Open Letter from the Supreme Judicial Court of the Massachusetts Advisory Committee on Ethical Opinions for Clerks of the Courts 4 (November 8, 1995) (on file with the author) ("[T]he Canons [of the Code of Professional Responsibility for Clerks of Court], in particular Canons 4 and 5, require clerks to remain impartial . . . .").
35. See, e.g., Committee on Prof'l Ethics and Conduct of the Iowa State Bar Ass'n v. Baker, 492 N.W.2d 695, 701 (Iowa 1992) ("It is neither necessary nor desirable to attempt the formulation of a single, specific definition of what constitutes the practice of law." (citation omitted)); State Bar v. Guardian Abstract & Title Co., 575 P.2d 943, 948 (N.M. 1978) ("There is no comprehensive definition of what constitutes the practice of law in our basic law or the cases. The Court has specifically declined to take on the onerous task."); Oregon State Bar v. Security Escrows, Inc., 377 P.2d 334, 337 (Or. 1992) (in banc) (citing State Bar v. Arizona Land Title & Trust Co., 366 P.2d 1, 8-9 (Ariz. 1961), for the proposition that an exhaustive definition is impossible); Utah State Bar v. Summerhayes & Hayden, 905 P.2d 867, 869 (Utah 1995) ("The practice of law, although difficult to define precisely, is generally acknowleged to involve the rendering of legal services that requires the knowledge and application of legal principles to serve the interests of another with his consent."). An examination of cases discussing the unauthorized practice of law is beyond the scope of this Article.
36. See, e.g., Florida Bar v. Schramek, 616 So. 2d 979, 984 (Fla. 1993) (stating that the giving of legal advice constitutes the unauthorized practice of law); People ex rel. Ill. State Bar Ass'n v. People's Stock Yards State Bank, 176 N.E. 901, 907-08 (Ill. 1931) (same); Baker, 492 N.W.2d at 701-2 (same); In re Opinion of the Justices, 194 N.E. 313, 317 (Mass. 1935) (same); Guardian Abstract, 575 P.2d at 948 (same); R.J. Edwards, Inc. v. Hert, 504 P.2d 407, 417 (Okla. 1972) (same); Security Escrows, 377 P.2d at 339 (same); Summerhayes & Hayden, 905 P.2d at 869 (same); see also Wis. Stat. Ann. § 757.30(2) (West 1981 & Supp. 1997) (stating that every person who gives legal advice is practicing law).
37. See, e.g., Walters, 411 S.E.2d at 691 (distinguishing between the giving of information and the giving of legal advice by a magistrate); see also Freit Letter, supra note 27, at 1 (discussing the prohibition against lay persons practicing law).
38. See, e.g., Massachusetts Advisory Comm. on Ethical Opinions for the Clerks of the Courts, Op. 95-6 (November 8, 1995) (identifying several scenarios in which a court clerk may assist a litigant without engaging in the practice of law).
39. See Freit Letter, supra note 27, at 2. According to one reading of the opinion put forth in this letter, "[t]he circuit clerk's office cannot provide information, forms, or sample pleadings to [unrepresented] clients." Advisory Council on Family Legal Needs of Low Income Persons, Increasing Access to Justice for Maryland's Families: A Joint Project of the Maryland Legal Services Corporation and the University of Baltimore School of Law 10 (1992) [hereinafter Increasing Access to Justice].
40. See Judicial Ethics Advisory Comm. of the Arizona Supreme Court, Op. 88-5 (1988).
41. Pro Se Issues & Answers: An On-Line Forum, FJC Directions, June 1996, at 33, 34 (quoting eletronic message from Pamela Mitchel, CJRA Staff Attorney, W.D. La., dated Oct. 20, 1995).
42. Greacen, supra note 24, at 10. A slightly different version of the article ap-pears under the title "Clerk's Office Staff Cannot Give Legal Advice" What Does that Mean?, in Court Manager, Winter 1995, at 35, 35. When he wrote the articles, Greacen was the Clerk of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court in the District of New Mexico, Albuquerque, New Mexico.
43. Greacen, supra note 24, at 10. Greacen illustrates the difficulty by providing nine common scenarios that clerks face and suggesting that the prohibition against giving legal advice provides no insight as to how to answer the questions: (1) "Has a complaint . . . been filed?"; (2) "I just got this here summons and complaint. . . . What is an answer? What does one look like? What does it say?"; (3) "When is my answer due?"; (4) "What does 'interrogatory' mean?"; (5) "I got this summons for jury service . . . . What happens if I don't show up?"; (6) "When will the court decide my case?"; (7) "Do I have to do anything else?"; (8) "Here is the situation I am in . . . how should I bring this issue before the court for resolution?"; (9) "Hi. . . . I'm a new attorney . . . I need to file a motion . . . . Does the court have a local rule I should be aware of? . . . How is the judge likely to react . . . ." Id. at 10.
44. Id. at 11; see also supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text (discussing courts' attempts to explain what is meant by "legal advice" in the context of what is meant by "the practice of law" and the further attempts to provide guidance to clerks by distinguishing between "advice" and "information" and "law" and "procedure").
45. Greacen, supra note 24, at 12. As Greacen explains, "[c]ases are often won and lost on procedural issues. It is hard to know what is information, when an inquiring citizen is clearly going to rely and act on what you say." Id.
46. Id. at 15. Greacen articulates five such principles, which have begun to attract attention. See id. at 14-15; see also Committee on the Treatment of Litigants and Pro Se Litig., Report of the Minn. Conference of Chief Judges 14 (1996) [hereinafter Minn. Conference Report]; Jona Goldschmidt, Cases and Materials on Pro Se Litigation and Related Issues 11 (May 1997) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author) (prepared for the ABA Lawyer's Conference Annual Meeting in Tuscon, Arizona). For an analysis of the principles, see infra Part II.B.3.
47. See, e.g., Franko v. Mitchell, 762 P.2d 1345, 1351 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988) (holding that an attorney is held to the same standard of care in proffering legal advice whether or not such advice is gratuitous); Togstad v. Vesey, Otto, Miller & Keefe, 291 N.W.2d 686, 693 (Minn. 1980) (holding that plaintiff was injured when defendant attorney advised her that she had no medical malpractice claim).
48. See, e.g., Crane v. Crane, 614 A.2d 935, 940-42 (D.C. 1992) (Terry, J., concurring) (discussing the attorney-client privilege and the crime-fraud exception regarding communications involving an attorney).
49. See generally Russell Engler, Out of Sight and Out of Line: The Need for Regulation of Lawyers' Negotiations with Unrepresented Poor Persons, 85 Cal. L. Rev. 79 (1997) (commenting on lawyers' abuses of ethical rules regarding the giving of advice to unrepresented parties). The ethical rules governing a lawyers' interactions with an unrepresented party prohibit not only the giving of "legal advice," but also of "advice." Depending on the context of the interaction, the terms may have little, if any, difference in meaning. See id. at 97-98.
50. It would not be surprising to find courts relying on a narrow definition of what constitutes "legal advice" where the "expected" or "routine" interactions between unrepresented litigants and clerks or opposing lawyers are at issue. A somewhat broader definition of the term is needed to protect clients or potential clients from the actions of attorneys on whose advice they have relied. See generally supra notes 31-43 and accompanying text (discussing the ambiguity of the meaning of "legal advice"). I have described elsewhere the importance of resisting the tendency to employ narrow definitions of the terms "advice" and "legal advice" in understanding and regulating a lawyer's interactions with unrepresented adversaries. See Engler, supra note 43, at 97-98. In understanding and enforcing the prohibition against advice-giving, I argued that context - in particular, the identity of the unrepresented party and the setting of the attorney's statement - is critical in determining whether a particular statement or action constitutes advice-giving. See id. at 98. Because the key to the inquiry is the effect or potential effect on the unrepresented party, I urged that for the prohibition on advice-giving to have any meaning, it needs to include "prohibiting a lawyer from both giving an opinion or counsel and proposing or recommending a course of action." Id.
51. See, e.g., Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.4(b) (1998) ("A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions."). Leading texts on the skill of client counseling make clear that this process includes a discussion of options for the client. See, e.g., Robert M. Bastress & Joseph D. Harbaugh, Interviewing, Counseling, and Negotiating: Skills for Effective Representation 256 (1990) (describing the attorney-client encounter to include: "work[ing] together to identify priorities, alternatives, consequences, and action steps[,] . . . predicting] consequences, reflecting] and clarifying] clients' concerns and ensure that all consequences for each alternative are considered[, and] . . . guid[ing] the clients through discussion and analysis of the alternatives and their consequences"); see also David Binder et al., Lawyers As Counselors: A Client-Centered Approach (1991) (describing how lawyers can better serve their clients). Binder and his co-authors define "Counseling" as follows: Counseling is the process by which lawyers help clients decide what course of action to adopt in order to resolve a problem. The process begins with identifying a problem and clarifying a client's objectives. Thereafter, the process entails identifying and evaluating the probable positive and negative consequences of potential solutions in order to decide which alternative is most likely to achieve a client's aims. Id. at 259-60 (footnote omitted). Their definition of advice-giving includes advising clients about the likely legal and/or nonlegal consequences of their decisions, as well as giving the lawyer's opinion "about which alternative a client should adopt." Id. at 260. Throughout their text, Binder and his co-authors underscore the importance of proposing solutions or options, and advising clients of the potential consequences of their choices. See id. at 28, 273-74.
52. See, e.g., Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.4(b) (1998) ("A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions."). Leading texts on the skill of client counseling make clear that this process includes a discussion of options for the client. See, e.g., Robert M. Bastress & Joseph D. Harbaugh, Interviewing, Counseling, and Negotiating: Skills for Effective Representation 256 (1990) (describing the attorney-client encounter to include: "work[ing] together to identify priorities, alternatives, consequences, and action steps[,] . . . predicting] consequences, reflecting] and clarifying] clients' concerns and ensure that all consequences for each alternative are considered[, and] . . . guid[ing] the clients through discussion and analysis of the alternatives and their consequences"); see also David Binder et al., Lawyers As Counselors: A Client-Centered Approach (1991) (describing how lawyers can better serve their clients). Binder and his co-authors define "Counseling" as follows: Counseling is the process by which lawyers help clients decide what course of action to adopt in order to resolve a problem. The process begins with identifying a problem and clarifying a client's objectives. Thereafter, the process entails identifying and evaluating the probable positive and negative consequences of potential solutions in order to decide which alternative is most likely to achieve a client's aims. Id. at 259-60 (footnote omitted). Their definition of advice-giving includes advising clients about the likely legal and/or nonlegal consequences of their decisions, as well as giving the lawyer's opinion "about which alternative a client should adopt." Id. at 260. Throughout their text, Binder and his co-authors underscore the importance of proposing solutions or options, and advising clients of the potential consequences of their choices. See id. at 28, 273-74.
53. The purpose of the illustration in the preceding paragraph is not to suggest that clerks should be giving advice to the full extent one's lawyer might. Rather, it is to demonstrate that prohibiting clerks from giving "legal advice" is an unworkable and ill-advised prohibition. For a discussion of suggested guidelines for clerks, see infra part II.B.3.
54. Steven R. Elias, Bias Against Pro Per Litigants 1 (n.d.) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author). Elias suggests that posted signs stating "We don't provide legal advice!" most often mean that the clerks want the self-represented litigant to get a lawyer. See id. As Elias explains, "[i]f a lawyer's office calls the clerk and asks about a particular scheduling procedure, the clerk will provide all sorts of information without thinking twice. But let a self-represented person ask for the same (or even much less) information, and it suddenly becomes legal advice." Id. at 5. Elias urges that clerks provide the same information to the self-represented as they would to lawyers and their staffs, that the boundary as to what is considered legal advice be pushed back, and that a requirement of being a clerk be a genuine desire to facilitate equal access regardless of whether a party is represented by counsel. See id.
55. Steven R. Cox & Mark Dwyer, A Report on Self-Help Law: Its Many Perspectives 50 (n.d.) (unpublished report, on file with the author) (sponsored by the ABA Special Committee on the Delivery of Legal Services but not formally endorsed by the ABA); see also Forrest S. Mosten, Unbundling of Legal Services and the Family Lawyer, 28 Fam. L.Q. 421, 435 (1994) (discussing lawyer and judicial prejudice toward pro se litigants).
56. Steven R. Cox & Mark Dwyer, A Report on Self-Help Law: Its Many Perspectives 50 (n.d.) (unpublished report, on file with the author) (sponsored by the ABA Special Committee on the Delivery of Legal Services but not formally endorsed by the ABA); see also Forrest S. Mosten, Unbundling of Legal Services and the Family Lawyer, 28 Fam. L.Q. 421, 435 (1994) (discussing lawyer and judicial prejudice toward pro se litigants).
57. See Gender Bias Study Comm., Supreme Judicial Court of Mass., Report of the Gender Bias Study of the Supreme Judicial Court 20 (1989) [hereinafter Mass. Gender Bias Study].
58. Greacen, supra note 24, at 12. Outside one clerk's office hangs the sign: "The District Court Clerk's Office Cannot Answer Any Questions Regarding Pro Se Cases." Goldschmidt, supra note 3, at 34. "While court clerks have traditionally assisted attorneys and their staff by providing instructions as to the appropriate rule to follow or form to file, they are hesitant to provide the same information and forms to self-represented litigants." Meeting the Challenge, supra note 1, at 3 (footnote omitted); see also Patricia Nealon, Electronic Equality Is Tested in Court, Boston Globe, August 5, 1997, at B1 (describing litigation by a non-lawyer denied access to a computer service in the Massachusetts Superior Courts, called Superior Court Remote Inquiry for the Bar, that allows lawyers to view court dockets from computers in their homes).
59. See, e.g., N.Y. City Civ. Ct. Act § 110(o) (McKinney 1989) (requiring a "sufficient" number of pro se clerks to assist persons not represented by counsel in housing court). The federal courts have made extensive use of pro se law clerks in the context of prisoner litigation. See Federal Judicial Qr., Resource Guide for Managing Prisoner Civil Rights Litigation 35 (1996) (describing the role of the federal pro se law clerk).
60. The New York City Housing Courts have a "pro se attorney" on staff in each borough to assist litigants. See, e.g., infra note 346 (discussing the lack of sufficient pro se attorneys to assist unrepresented litigants). Staff attorneys in the Pro Se Legal Services Unit in Family Court in Fort Lauderdale, Florida, provide assistance and advice to unrepresented parties. See Meeting the Challenge, supra note 1, at 69, 86.
61. See Bruce D. Sales et al., Is Self-Representation a Reasonable Alternative to Attorney Representation in Divorce Cases?, 37 St. Louis U. L.J. 553, 560 (1992) ("The Domestic Relations Division of the Maricopa County (Phoenix, Arizona) Superior Court hired a full time paralegal to provide procedural assistance to self-represented litigants."). One Florida Court has established a full-time assistant for family law cases, who reviews required documentation submitted by pro se litigants, schedules, and dockets hearings once the paperwork is in order. See First Circuit's Pro Se Litigant System Delivers Results, Full Court Press (Office of the Courts Administrator, Tallahassee, Fla.), July-Aug. 1994, at 2, 2.
62. See Harvey Halberstadter, Help for the Pro Se Litigant, State Ct. J., Winter 1982, at 9, 11.
63. See, e.g., Erin St. John Kelly, Yourself Esq.: When You're Up Litigation Creek Without a Lawyer, N.Y. Times, Nov. 16, 1997, § 14, at CY3 (describing the Office for the Self-Represented in New York Supreme Court). Most federal courts have had a pro se division of the clerk's office since the early 1980s. See id.
64. See, e.g., Responding to the Needs, supra note 25, at 20-23 (describing models for courthouse-based assistance to pro se family law litigants in the District of Columbia, King County, Seattle, Washington, and Maricopa County, Phoenix, Arizona). The City-Wide Task Force on Housing staffs information tables in many of New York City's Housing Courts. See Miller v. Silbermann, 832 F. Supp. 663, 667 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (describing allegations of landlords' groups that the systemic operation of the Housing Court, including the presence of the information tables, deprives landlords of their due process and equal protection rights).
65. See Michael Millemann et al., Rethinking the Full-Service Legal Representational Model: A Maryland Experiment, 31 Clearinghouse Rev. 1178, 1178 (1997) (describing "an experimental project in which law students provide legal information and advice to otherwise unrepresented parties in family law cases").
66. See Daniel Golden, Probate Plaintiffs at Risk Without Lawyers, Boston Globe, Nov. 27,1995, at 1 ("[M]any lawyers who regularly practice in family court have begun volunteering one day each year to help impoverished pro se litigants. Most fam-ily courts now offer 'lawyer for the day' [('LFD')]services."); see also Family Law Section Comm. on the Probate and Family Court, Massachusetts Bar Ass'n, Changing the Culture of the Probate and Family Court 34-37 (1997) [hereinafter Changing the Culture] (describing such programs in the Probate and Family Court in Massachusetts in seven different counties).
67. See Meeting the Challenge, supra note 1, at 72-104 (describing fourteen "Illustrative Pro Se Assistance Programs and Services").
68. See, e.g., Howard M. Rubin, The Civil Pro Se Litigant v. The Legal System, 20 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 999, 1010 (1989) ("Some of the circuit courts in Illinois and several bar associations have written materials to assist the pro se litigant.").
69. See, e.g., Supreme Court of Fla., Florida Supreme Court: Self Help Center, (visited Oct. 22, 1998) (providing links to summaries, written by the Florida Bar for the layman, on various aspects of Florida law); HALT, HALT - An Organization for Legal Reform, (visited Oct. 22, 1998) (providing an online "Everyday Law Series" with answers to common legal questions); New York Law Journal & NYS Unified Court System, New York Courts' Law Guide, (visited Oct. 22, 1998) (including "more than 100 documents, written in plain English, that explain the courts and laws of New York to non-lawyers"); Nolo Press, Nolo Home Page, (visited Oct. 22, 1998) (providing "Nolo's Legal Encyclopedia" for information on law relating to small businesses, wills and estate planning, employment, etc.).
70. Meeting the Challenge, supra note 1, at 69. Various reports around the country include descriptions of the Arizona kiosk, as other states prepare to implement a similar approach. As one such report describes the kiosk: [t]hese kiosks, called QuickCourt, permit persons to obtain information on how to bring or respond to certain family law actions and to fill out court forms. The kiosk prompts users with questions that are answered by utilizing a touch screen and keyboard. For example, in a divorce proceeding, the litigant is prompted to enter information such as gross income, household expenses, community assets, etc. The computer calculates child support and prints out documents with directions concerning notarization, filing and service. Memorandum from David Long and Susan Lee to the Board Committee on Courts and Legislation, State Bar of California, regarding the Pro Per Crisis in Family Law 36 (Aug. 15, 1998) (on file with the author).
71. See Meeting the Challenge, supra note 1, at 71; Long & Lee, supra note 62, at 37-38.
72. See Long & Lee, supra note 62, at 37. The Self-Service Center in Maricopa County includes not only screening and referral services, but also user-friendly court forms and instructions, a list of professionals including lawyers prepared to provide representation at a reduced fee and alternative dispute resolution ("ADR") neutrals, and general education and information. The court has dedicated a floor in the court-house, which includes videotapes, forms and instructions for filling them out, computers and printers for completing forms, serve advisors to answer questions about materials and court forms, a law library and access to an information specialist, and services from other agencies such as a volunteer lawyer program and the state division of child support enforcement. See Meeting the Challenge, supra note 1, at 73-75; Long & Lee, supra note 62, at 37.
73. Legal scholars have vigorously debated whether more formal or informal procedures might better protect the rights of the disempowered. See, e.g., William H. Simon, Legal Informality and Redistributive Politics, 19 Clearinghouse Rev. 384, 384 (1985) ("Until recently . . . [t]he left critique [of the legal system] portrayed formality as facilitating the manipulation of the legal system by the privileged to the disadvantage of others.").
74. See, e.g., Responding to the Needs, supra note 25, at 20-24 (describing models for courthouse-based assistance to pro se family law litigants in the District of Columbia, King County, Seattle, Washington, and Maricopa County, Phoenix, Arizona). In each model the assistance provided by the personnel does not include legal advice. See id. at 22. Maricopa County has since added a lawyer referral service component, which includes brief legal advice. See id. at 23; see also Kelly, supra note 55, at 3 (stating that in New York State Supreme Court, litigants should not expect legal advice from the Office of the Self Represented, but rather prepare to fill out all the forms themselves).
75. See Changing the Culture, supra note 58, at 35 (describing how participants in the Bristol County LFD program "are not allowed to give legal advice or provide actual representation" but merely "assist with the paper work, which relieves the clerks from the task"); see also Millemann et al., supra note 57, at 1187 ("The students gave legal information to any person who requested it but gave additional legal advice (pursuant to the state's student practice rule) only to indigent clients."). While cautioning that the clinic was located in Montgomery County, an affluent jurisdiction, Millemann and his co-authors reported that "80 percent of the pro se litigants who asked for legal information and advice were employed." Id. at 1187 n.28. Presumably, many of those seeking help from the clinic students were ineligible to receive legal advice.
76. See Changing the Culture, supra note 58, at 30 (concluding, with respect to Massachusetts LFD programs, "[w]e must develop the ability to provide education to potential litigants not only on procedural requirements, but also on their rights"); Responding to the Needs, supra note 25, app. H at 38 (describing program in Los Angeles in which local legal services organization staffs a part-time program to provide assistance to pro se litigants; the one to two lawyers see about 50 persons a day); Golden, supra note 58, at 1 ("Pro se litigants take a number and stand in line. Some wait as long as two hours . . . . With so much paperwork, [the LFD] can help only a dozen people in eight hours - just a small fraction of all the pro se litigants . . . ."); Millemann et al., supra note 57, at 1181 ("During a 17-month period in 1995-96, 34 law students conducted diagnostic interviews and gave basic legal information and advice (generally 30-60 minute sessions) to approximately 4,400 people . . . .").
77. See, e.g., Responding to the Needs, supra note 25, at 23 (describing the court-house lawyer referral service component of the Maricopa County program, which does not arrange for overall representation but provides on-the-spot legal advice for up to 30 minutes for a $20 fee); Mark Thompson, Help Wanted: Few Programs Aid Pro Pers in Maneuvering Though Legal System, L.A. Daily J., Feb. 1, 1995, at 1 (describing pro per counseling projects in some California county courts as so busy that they do not advertise, since they are barely able to help walk-ins).
78. The more typical scenario is the description of the Massachusetts LFD program: "Most court personnel see the LFD role as only assistance for the day, not as representation." Changing the Culture, supra note 58, at 37.
79. Indeed, attempts to provide representation led to the demise of the LFD program in Barnstable County, Massachusetts. "Previously, the person performing [LFD] services provided actual representation where appropriate. A disgruntled litigant in a custody battle sued the [LFD] who assisted the opposing party. Since then the bar has been understandably wary of involvement." Changing the Culture, supra note 58, at 34-35. Where representation arises from contact with the LFD, the representation typically is for a fee or reduced fee. See, e.g., id. at 36 (describing Plymouth County Massachusetts LFD program).
80. In reality, the litigants may be receiving what should properly be defined as limited or partial legal advice. See supra Part I.A. That reality does not eliminate the propriety of viewing the litigants as uninformed actors, or the need to revisit the restrictions on those who provide assistance.
81. The technological and procedural innovations are a critical component of any effort to increase the accessibility to the court of unrepresented litigants. For some litigants, the ability to overcome traditional barriers of mystifying and complicated procedures may be the primary form of assistance needed. It is hard to imagine that the developers of the information kiosks would contend that the kiosks are providing legal advice.
82. See, e.g., Responding to the Needs, supra note 25, at 34 ("[A]ny program to provide direction to pro se litigants should include resources for giving substantive advice."); Changing the Culture, supra note 58, at 42 ("[O]ur committee was inclined to agree that court appointments for indigent persons or restoration of funded legal services are necessary long-term solutions."); Millemann et al., supra note 57, at 1190 ("The qualified success of limited representation does not suggest that the nation needs fewer, rather than significantly more, legal services attorneys and pro bono lawyers."); id. at 1191 ("Some people would need no more than onetime-only legal information and advice such as that given by the project students. More would need follow-up legal assistance, however."); Thompson, supra note 69, at 9 ("Those who helped set up [the California pro bono] counseling programs have no illusions that they are solving the problems stemming from the flood of pro pers into family courts."); Robert B. Yegge, Divorce Litigants Without Lawyers, Judges' J., Spring 1994, at 8, 10 ("Yet, in certain circumstances, pro se litigants must be warned about the need for the advice-if not actual representation - of a lawyer.").
83. As one scholar recently noted in the context of client counseling: "Lawyers often represent clients who are uninformed or misinformed about the law. The clients may have only received information from the media, from well-meaning, but inaccurate friends or relatives, or from the street." Kimberlee K. Kovach, The Lawyer as Teacher: The Role of Education in Lawyering, 4 Clinical L. Rev. 359, 367 (1998).
84. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 5.5 (1998).
85. See generally Deborah L. Rhode, The Delivery of Legal Services by Non-Lawyers, 4 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 209, 216-21 (1990) (discussing the extent to which enforcement of the prohibition against the unauthorized practice of law has diminished). For an excellent overview of the history and current trends in lay advocacy, see Commission on Nonlawyer Practice, American Bar Ass'n, Nonlawyer Activity in Law-Related Situations 13-72 (1995) [hereinafter Nonlawyer Practice].
86. See Rhode, supra note 77, at 213-14.
87. See supra notes 24-27. One commentator describes the practical restriction: "Since paralegals may not provide fact-specific advice in light of unauthorized practice of law regulations, paralegals conducting classes may either refuse to respond [to fact-specific questions] or choose to explain the law in only general terms." Helen B. Kim, Legal Education for the Pro Se Litigant: A Step Towards a Meaningful Right to Be Heard, 96 Yale L.J. 1641, 1654 (1987) (footnote omitted).
88. See, e.g., Elizabeth McCulloch, Let Me Show You How: Pro Se Divorce Courses and Client Power, 48 Fla. L. Rev. 481, 481-83 (1996) (discussing problems with legal services designed to aid pro se litigants); Jane C. Murphy, Access to Legal Remedies: The Crisis in Family Law, 8 B.Y.U. J. Pub. L. 123, 137 n.66 (1993) (describing pro se programs run by the Legal Aid Bureau in Maryland).
89. See, e.g., Elizabeth McCulloch, Let Me Show You How: Pro Se Divorce Courses and Client Power, 48 Fla. L. Rev. 481, 481-83 (1996) (discussing problems with legal services designed to aid pro se litigants); Jane C. Murphy,
90. Compare Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 4.2 (1984) (prohibiting lawyers from communicating with represented parties), with id. Rule 4.3 (providing guidelines for communications between lawyers and unrepresented parties).
91. See, e.g., Ricotta v. California, 4 F. Supp. 2d 961, 987 (S.D. Cal. 1998) (condemning attorneys who help pro se litigants with materials they know will be used in court); Somerset Pharm., Inc. v. Kimball, 168 F.R.D. 69, 72 (M.D. Fla. 1996) (finding that "ghost-writing" taints the legal process); Johnson v. Board of County Comm'rs, 868 F. Supp. 1226, 1232 (D. Colo, 1994) (holding that "ghost-writing" may subject lawyers to contempt charges), aff'd on other grounds, 85 F.3d 489 (10th Cir. 1996); Klein v. H.N. Whitney, Goadby & Co., 341 F. Supp. 699, 702-03 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (condemning a pro se litigant's surreptitious enjoyment of the benefits of an attorney); Klein v. Spear, Leeds & Kellogg, 309 F. Supp. 341, 342-43 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (stating that ghost-writing "smacks of . . . gross unfairness"); ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1414 (1978) [hereinafter ABA Informal Op. 1414] (discussing the appropriate conduct for lawyers assisting pro se litigants).
92. Johnson, 868 F. Supp. at 1231. The Johnson court relied on a variety of cases and ethics opinions to support the proposition that ghost-writing without disclosure of the lawyer's identity amounted to "a deliberate evasion of the responsibilities imposed on counsel" by Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 and misrepresentation in violation of Model Code of Professional Responsibility DR 1-102(A)(4). Id. at 1231-32 (citing Ellis v. Maine, 448 F.2d 1325, 1328 (1st Cir. 1971)). Other courts have condemned such practices by attorneys. See H.N. Whitney, 341 F. Supp. at 702-03; Spear, Leeds & Kellogg, 309 F. Supp. at 342-43. Ethics opinions, therefore, typically require disclosure of the fact of the lawyer's participation, and often the lawyer's identity as well. See, e.g., ABA Informal Op. 1414, supra note 82 ("Extensive undisclosed participation by a lawyer . . . that permits the litigant falsely to appear as being without substantial professional assistance is improper . . . .") (emphasis added); Committee on Prof'l Ethics. Massachusetts Bar Ass'n, Op. 98-1 (1998), reprinted in 26 Mass. Law. Wkly. 2350. 2350 (1998) (noting "concerns about substantial and undisclosed involvement by at- torneys in cases where the client is acting pro se"); Committee on Prof'l Ethics, New York State Bar Ass'n, Op. 613 (1990), reprinted in N.Y. L.J., Oct. 15, 1990, at 4 (requiring disclosure both of the fact that the pleading was prepared by a lawyer and the lawyer's name).
93. See Mosten, supra note 48, at 422. The full package may, implicitly or explicitly, involve: "(1) gathering facts, (2) advising the client, (3) discovering facts of the opposing party, (4) researching the law, (5) drafting correspondence and documents, (6) negotiating, and (7) representing the client in court." Id. at 423.
94. Id. at 423. Mosten continues: Further, the client may, in some cases specify the depth or extent of each service. For example, a client may want representation at trial, but may want to handle court filings, discovery, and negotiations without the lawyer. Conversely, a client may seek the advice and support of a family lawyer in negotiating a settlement, but may choose to self-represent or retain another attorney for actual court representation. Id. With respect to "service depth" the client may desire research in the form of a five-minute check, or an exhaustive memorandum. See id.
95. See, e.g., Minn. Conference Report, supra note 40, at 16 (recommending support for unbundled legal services); Mary Helen McNeal, Redefining Attorney-Client Roles: Unbundling and Moderate-Income Elderly Clients, 32 Wake Forest L. Rev. 295, 335-39 (1997) (cautioning attorneys who may provide unbundled legal services to the elderly); Millemann, supra note 57, at 1178 (encouraging increased use of limited lawyer representation); Ilene Mitchell, Unbundling Legal Services and Access to Justice, Mass. B. Ass'n Access to Justice Sec. News (Massachussetts Bar Inst., Boston, Mass.), April 1998, at 1, 3 (noting the benefits of unbundling whiled encouraging careful consideration of possible ethical conflicts); Lonnie A. Powers, Pro Bono and Pro Se: Letting Clients Order Off the Menu Without Giving Yourself Indigestion, Boston B.J., May/June 1998, at 10, 10-11 (discussing ethical concerns in providing unbundled legal services); Long & Lee, supra note 62, at 40-41 (recommending support for unbundled legal services).
96. See, e.g., Minn. Conference Report, supra note 40, at 16 (recommending support for unbundled legal services); Mary Helen McNeal, Redefining Attorney-Client Roles: Unbundling and Moderate-Income Elderly Clients, 32 Wake Forest L. Rev. 295, 335-39 (1997) (cautioning attorneys who may provide unbundled legal services to the elderly); Millemann, supra note 57, at 1178 (encouraging increased use of limited lawyer representation); Ilene Mitchell, Unbundling Legal Services and Access to Justice, Mass. B. Ass'n Access to Justice Sec. News (Massachussetts Bar Inst., Boston, Mass.), April 1998, at 1, 3 (noting the benefits of unbundling whiled encouraging careful consideration of possible ethical conflicts); Lonnie A. Powers, Pro Bono and Pro Se: Letting Clients Order Off the Menu Without Giving Yourself Indigestion, Boston B.J., May/June 1998, at 10, 10-11 (discussing ethical concerns in providing unbundled legal services); Long & Lee, supra note 62, at 40-41 (recommending support for unbundled legal services).
97. See, e.g., Minn. Conference Report, supra note 40, at 16 (recommending support for unbundled legal services); Mary Helen McNeal, Redefining Attorney-Client Roles: Unbundling and Moderate-Income Elderly Clients, 32 Wake Forest L. Rev. 295, 335-39 (1997) (cautioning attorneys who may provide unbundled legal services to the elderly); Millemann, supra note 57, at 1178 (encouraging increased use of limited lawyer representation); Ilene Mitchell, Unbundling Legal Services and Access to Justice, Mass. B. Ass'n Access to Justice Sec. News (Massachussetts Bar Inst., Boston, Mass.), April 1998, at 1, 3 (noting the benefits of unbundling whiled encouraging careful consideration of possible ethical conflicts); Lonnie A. Powers, Pro Bono and Pro Se: Letting Clients Order Off the Menu Without Giving Yourself Indigestion, Boston B.J., May/June 1998, at 10, 10-11 (discussing ethical concerns in providing unbundled legal services); Long & Lee, supra note 62, at 40-41 (recommending support for unbundled legal services).
98. See generally Engler, supra note 43, at 104-22 (discussing the prohibition of advice giving in housing and consumer cases).
99. See id. at 122-30.
100. See generally id. at 130-57 (discussing steps for addressing attorney misconduct with unrepresented litigants).
101. See id.
102. See id. at 103. The broader issue of the profession's need to regulate and eliminate lawyer misconduct in interactions with unrepresented parties is beyond the scope of this Article. See id. at 83-84 (discussing alternative responses to attorney misconduct with unrepresented litigants).
103. For articles generally referring to the increased use of mediation, in part as a means of docket control, see Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 Yale L.J. 1073, 1075 (1984); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Pursuing Settlement in an Adversary Culture: A Tale of Innovation Co-opted or "The Law of ADR," 19 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 1, 3 (1991); Jacqueline M. Nolan-Haley, Court Mediation and the Search for Justice Through Law, 74 Wash. U. L.Q. 47, 57-63 (1996); and Edward F. Sherman, Court-Mandated Alternative Dispute Resolution: What Form of Participation Should Be Required?, 46 SMU L. Rev. 2079, 2081-84 (1993). For references to courts with significant numbers of unrepresented litigants using court-connected mediation, see infra parts III.A, III.C (discussing courts' handling of family law and housing cases). For the purposes of this Article, I define the concept of mediation broadly enough to include all forms of court-connected ADR. Absent explicit rules to the contrary, the constraints on the person conducting the court-connected ADR session will be similar to the rules governing mediators discussed in this section.
104. For articles generally referring to the increased use of mediation, in part as a means of docket control, see Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 Yale L.J. 1073, 1075 (1984); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Pursuing Settlement in an Adversary Culture: A Tale of Innovation Co-opted or "The Law of ADR," 19 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 1, 3 (1991); Jacqueline M. Nolan-Haley, Court Mediation and the Search for Justice Through Law, 74 Wash. U. L.Q. 47, 57-63 (1996); and Edward F. Sherman, Court-Mandated Alternative Dispute Resolution: What Form of Participation Should Be Required?, 46 SMU L. Rev. 2079, 2081-84 (1993). For references to courts with significant numbers of unrepresented litigants using court-connected mediation, see infra parts III.A, III.C (discussing courts' handling of family law and housing cases). For the purposes of this Article, I define the concept of mediation broadly enough to include all forms of court-connected ADR. Absent explicit rules to the contrary, the constraints on the person conducting the court-connected ADR session will be similar to the rules governing mediators discussed in this section.
105. For articles generally referring to the increased use of mediation, in part as a means of docket control, see Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 Yale L.J. 1073, 1075 (1984); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Pursuing Settlement in an Adversary Culture: A Tale of Innovation Co-opted or "The Law of ADR," 19 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 1, 3 (1991); Jacqueline M. Nolan-Haley, Court Mediation and the Search for Justice Through Law, 74 Wash. U. L.Q. 47, 57-63 (1996); and Edward F. Sherman, Court-Mandated Alternative Dispute Resolution: What Form of Participation Should Be Required?, 46 SMU L. Rev. 2079, 2081-84 (1993). For references to courts with significant numbers of unrepresented litigants using court-connected mediation, see infra parts III.A, III.C (discussing courts' handling of family law and housing cases). For the purposes of this Article, I define the concept of mediation broadly enough to include all forms of court-connected ADR. Absent explicit rules to the contrary, the constraints on the person conducting the court-connected ADR session will be similar to the rules governing mediators discussed in this section.
106. For articles generally referring to the increased use of mediation, in part as a means of docket control, see Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 Yale L.J. 1073, 1075 (1984); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Pursuing Settlement in an Adversary Culture: A Tale of Innovation Co-opted or "The Law of ADR," 19 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 1, 3 (1991); Jacqueline M. Nolan-Haley, Court Mediation and the Search for Justice Through Law, 74 Wash. U. L.Q. 47, 57-63 (1996); and Edward F. Sherman, Court-Mandated Alternative Dispute Resolution: What Form of Participation Should Be Required?, 46 SMU L. Rev. 2079, 2081-84 (1993). For references to courts with significant numbers of unrepresented litigants using court-connected mediation, see infra parts III.A, III.C (discussing courts' handling of family law and housing cases). For the purposes of this Article, I define the concept of mediation broadly enough to include all forms of court-connected ADR. Absent explicit rules to the contrary, the constraints on the person conducting the court-connected ADR session will be similar to the rules governing mediators discussed in this section.
107. See, e.g., Karla Fisher et al., Procedural Justice Implications of ADR in Specialized Contexts: The Culture of Battering and the Role of Mediation in Domestic Violence Cases, 46 SMU L. Rev. 2117, 2150 (1993) (discussing the use of mediation in divorce and child custody cases as well as criminal assault and battery cases); Craig A. McEwen et al., Bring in the Lawyers: Challenging the Dominant Approaches to Ensuring Fairness in Divorce Mediation, 79 Minn. L. Rev. 1317, 1357 (1995) (discussing mediation in family law cases in Maine). California's mandatory mediation includes the feature of excluding lawyers from the mediation. See Cal. Fam. Code § 3182(a) (West 1994).
108. See, e.g., Karla Fisher et al., Procedural Justice Implications of ADR in Specialized Contexts: The Culture of Battering and the Role of Mediation in Domestic Violence Cases, 46 SMU L. Rev. 2117, 2150 (1993) (discussing the use of mediation in divorce and child custody cases as well as criminal assault and battery cases); Craig A. McEwen et al., Bring in the Lawyers: Challenging the Dominant Approaches to Ensuring Fairness in Divorce Mediation, 79 Minn. L. Rev. 1317, 1357 (1995) (discussing mediation in family law cases in Maine). California's mandatory mediation includes the feature of excluding lawyers from the mediation. See Cal. Fam. Code § 3182(a) (West 1994).
109. See, e.g., Access to Justice Project, American Civil Liberties Union, Justice Evicted: An Inquiry into Housing Court Problems 15 (1987) ("This inquiry [of the New York City Housing Courts] observed . . . the frequent lack of consistently clear explanations regarding the mediation process . . . ."); Fox, supra note 23, at 91-92 (describing how unrepresented tenants in the Boston Housing Court are simply referred by court officials "upstairs to mediation" with little or no explanation as to what mediation is, that mediation is voluntary, and that there might be advantages or disadvantages to mediation).
110. See, e.g., Mass. Unif. R. on Dispute Resolution 9(c)(iv), reprinted in 26 Mass. Law. Wkly. 2129, 2131 (1998) ("A neutral . . . shall not provide legal advice . . . ."); Florida Mediator Qualifications Advisory Panel, MQAP 96-003 (1997) (answering questions posed by an attorney regarding a mediator's duty not to give legal advice); Jamie Henikoff & Michael Moffitt, Remodeling the Model Standards of Conduct for Mediators, 2 Harv. Negotiation L. Rev. 87, 90 n.14 (1997) ("Neither attorney-mediators nor non-attorney-mediators may provide parties with legal advice."); Robert B. Moberly, Mediator Gag Rules: Is It Ethical for Mediators to Evaluate or Advise?, 38 S. Tex. L. Rev. 669, 675 (1997) ("Many bar ethics committees have distinguished between giving 'legal advice,' which is often prohibited, and giving 'legal information,' which generally is permitted." (citations omitted)); James H. Stark, The Ethics of Mediation Evaluation: Some Troublesome Questions and Tentative Proposals, from an Evaluative Lawyer Mediator, 38 S. Tex. L. Rev. 769, 770 n.2 (1997) ("In addition to the Joint Standards [of Conduct for Mediators], the ABA Standards of Practice for Lawyer Mediators in Family Disputes (1984) and mediator codes in Colorado and Texas either limit or prohibit legal advice by a mediator."). As with court personnel generally, the prohibition against giving legal advice often flows from the fact that mediators often are not lawyers, and therefore are prohibited from "practicing law." See, e.g., Henikoff & Moffitt, supra, at 90 n.14 ("Non-attorney mediators, like all non-attorneys, would likely be prohibited from dispensing legal advice because such actions would probably constitute the unauthorized practice of law."). In the mediation context as well, however, commentators have recognized the difficulty in identifying what constitutes information and what constitutes legal advice. See Joel Kurtzberg & Jamie Henikoff, Freeing the Parties from the Law: Designing an Interest and Rights Focused Model of Landlord/Tenant Mediation, 1997 J. Disp. Resol. 53, 83, 90 (1997); Moberly, supra, at 677; Stark, supra, at 784-86.
111. See, e.g., Mass. Unif. R. on Dispute Resolution 9(c)(iv), reprinted in 26 Mass. Law. Wkly. 2129, 2131 (1998) ("A neutral . . . shall not provide legal advice . . . ."); Florida Mediator Qualifications Advisory Panel, MQAP 96-003 (1997) (answering questions posed by an attorney regarding a mediator's duty not to give legal advice); Jamie Henikoff & Michael Moffitt, Remodeling the Model Standards of Conduct for Mediators, 2 Harv. Negotiation L. Rev. 87, 90 n.14 (1997) ("Neither attorney- mediators nor non-attorney-mediators may provide parties with legal advice."); Robert B. Moberly, Mediator Gag Rules: Is It Ethical for Mediators to Evaluate or Advise?, 38 S. Tex. L. Rev. 669, 675 (1997) ("Many bar ethics committees have distinguished between giving 'legal advice,' which is often prohibited, and giving 'legal information,' which generally is permitted." (citations omitted)); James H. Stark, The Ethics of Mediation Evaluation: Some Troublesome Questions and Tentative Proposals, from an Evaluative Lawyer Mediator, 38 S. Tex. L. Rev. 769, 770 n.2 (1997) ("In addition to the Joint Standards [of Conduct for Mediators], the ABA Standards of Practice for Lawyer Mediators in Family Disputes (1984) and mediator codes in Colorado and Texas either limit or prohibit legal advice by a mediator."). As with court personnel generally, the prohibition against giving legal advice often flows from the fact that mediators often are not lawyers, and therefore are prohibited from "practicing law." See, e.g., Henikoff & Moffitt, supra, at 90 n.14 ("Non-attorney mediators, like all non-attorneys, would likely be prohibited from dispensing legal advice because such actions would probably constitute the unauthorized practice of law."). In the mediation context as well, however, commentators have recognized the difficulty in identifying what constitutes information and what constitutes legal advice. See Joel Kurtzberg & Jamie Henikoff, Freeing the Parties from the Law: Designing an Interest and Rights Focused Model of Landlord/Tenant Mediation, 1997 J. Disp. Resol. 53, 83, 90 (1997); Moberly, supra, at 677; Stark, supra, at 784-86.
112. See, e.g., Mass. Unif. R. on Dispute Resolution 9(c)(iv), reprinted in 26 Mass. Law. Wkly. 2129, 2131 (1998) ("A neutral . . . shall not provide legal advice . . . ."); Florida Mediator Qualifications Advisory Panel, MQAP 96-003 (1997) (answering questions posed by an attorney regarding a mediator's duty not to give legal advice); Jamie Henikoff & Michael Moffitt, Remodeling the Model Standards of Conduct for Mediators, 2 Harv. Negotiation L. Rev. 87, 90 n.14 (1997) ("Neither attorney- mediators nor non-attorney-mediators may provide parties with legal advice."); Robert B. Moberly, Mediator Gag Rules: Is It Ethical for Mediators to Evaluate or Advise?, 38 S. Tex. L. Rev. 669, 675 (1997) ("Many bar ethics committees have distinguished between giving 'legal advice,' which is often prohibited, and giving 'legal information,' which generally is permitted." (citations omitted)); James H. Stark, The Ethics of Mediation Evaluation: Some Troublesome Questions and Tentative Proposals, from an Evaluative Lawyer Mediator, 38 S. Tex. L. Rev. 769, 770 n.2 (1997) ("In addition to the Joint Standards [of Conduct for Mediators], the ABA Standards of Practice for Lawyer Mediators in Family Disputes (1984) and mediator codes in Colorado and Texas either limit or prohibit legal advice by a mediator."). As with court personnel generally, the prohibition against giving legal advice often flows from the fact that mediators often are not lawyers, and therefore are prohibited from "practicing law." See, e.g., Henikoff & Moffitt, supra, at 90 n.14 ("Non-attorney mediators, like all non-attorneys, would likely be prohibited from dispensing legal advice because such actions would probably constitute the unauthorized practice of law."). In the mediation context as well, however, commentators have recognized the difficulty in identifying what constitutes information and what constitutes legal advice. See Joel Kurtzberg & Jamie Henikoff, Freeing the Parties from the Law: Designing an Interest and Rights Focused Model of Landlord/Tenant Mediation, 1997 J. Disp. Resol. 53, 83, 90 (1997); Moberly, supra, at 677; Stark, supra, at 784-86.
113. See, e.g., Mass. Unif. R. on Dispute Resolution 9(c)(iv), reprinted in 26 Mass. Law. Wkly. 2129, 2131 (1998) ("A neutral . . . shall not provide legal advice . . . ."); Florida Mediator Qualifications Advisory Panel, MQAP 96-003 (1997) (answering questions posed by an attorney regarding a mediator's duty not to give legal advice); Jamie Henikoff & Michael Moffitt, Remodeling the Model Standards of Conduct for Mediators, 2 Harv. Negotiation L. Rev. 87, 90 n.14 (1997) ("Neither attorney- mediators nor non-attorney-mediators may provide parties with legal advice."); Robert B. Moberly, Mediator Gag Rules: Is It Ethical for Mediators to Evaluate or Advise?, 38 S. Tex. L. Rev. 669, 675 (1997) ("Many bar ethics committees have distinguished between giving 'legal advice,' which is often prohibited, and giving 'legal information,' which generally is permitted." (citations omitted)); James H. Stark, The Ethics of Mediation Evaluation: Some Troublesome Questions and Tentative Proposals, from an Evaluative Lawyer Mediator, 38 S. Tex. L. Rev. 769, 770 n.2 (1997) ("In addition to the Joint Standards [of Conduct for Mediators], the ABA Standards of Practice for Lawyer Mediators in Family Disputes (1984) and mediator codes in Colorado and Texas either limit or prohibit legal advice by a mediator."). As with court personnel generally, the prohibition against giving legal advice often flows from the fact that mediators often are not lawyers, and therefore are prohibited from "practicing law." See, e.g., Henikoff & Moffitt, supra, at 90 n.14 ("Non-attorney mediators, like all non-attorneys, would likely be prohibited from dispensing legal advice because such actions would probably constitute the unauthorized practice of law."). In the mediation context as well, however, commentators have recognized the difficulty in identifying what constitutes information and what constitutes legal advice. See Joel Kurtzberg & Jamie Henikoff, Freeing the Parties from the Law: Designing an Interest and Rights Focused Model of Landlord/Tenant Mediation, 1997 J. Disp. Resol. 53, 83, 90 (1997); Moberly, supra, at 677; Stark, supra, at 784-86.
114. See Mass. Unif. R. on Dispute Resolution 9(b), reprinted in 26 Mass. Law. Wkly. 2129, 2131 (1998) ("A neutral shall provide dispute resolution services in an impartial manner."); John D. Feerick et al., American Arbitration Assoc. et al., Model Standards of Conduct for Mediators Standard II (n.d.) (developed jointly by the American Arbitration Association, the American Bar Association, and the Society of Professionals in Dispute Resolution) ("The concept of mediator impartiality is central to the mediation process."), available in ; Henikoff & Moffitt, supra note 95, at 101 ("Virtually every proposed code of mediator ethics mentions the importance of neutrality . . . ." (citations omitted)); Kurtzberg & Henikoff, supra note 95, at 81-84. This requirement provides a further source of the prohibition against giving legal advice. See, e.g., Florida Mediator Qualifications Advisory Panel, MQAP 96-003 (1997) (explaining mediators' obligation to refer participants to independent legal counsel in certain situations); Moberly, supra note 95, at 677 (discussing the interrelationship between impartiality and providing legal advice).
115. The general proposition that mediators must conduct the mediation fairly is widely accepted. See, e.g., John D. Feerick et al., American Arbitration Assoc. et al., Model Standards of Conduct for Mediators Standard VI (n.d.) ("A Mediator shall Conduct the Mediation Fairly"), available in . The "fairness" debate focuses around the issue of whether mediators must simply provide "procedural" fairness, or must provide for "substantive" fairness and a fair outcome as well. For an overview of the "fairness" debate, see McEwen et al., supra note 93, at 1323-29. For an exploration of the complexities in defining fairness, see Carol Bohmer & Marilyn L. Ray, Notions of Equity and Fairness in the Context of Divorce: The Role of Mediation, 14 Mediation Q. 37 (1996). For an example of this debate in the context of the rules for court-connected mediation in Massachusetts, compare Lawrence D. Shubow, Neutrals Should Have Ethical Responsibility, 25 Mass. Law. Wkly. 1921, 1921 (1997) (contending that the Uniform Rules on Dispute Resolution mistakenly define the responsibility of neutrals in aiding disputants to reach agreements out of a "loyalty to a rigid and utopian shibboleth about mediation"), with Peter W. Agnes, Jr., Mediator's Duty to Ensure Fairness Limited, 25 Mass. Law. Wkly. 1921, 1921 (1997) (arguing that a neutral's observance of all the responsibilities set forth in the Uniform Rules is the best assurance that justice will be achieved in the adjudication).
116. The general proposition that mediators must conduct the mediation fairly is widely accepted. See, e.g., John D. Feerick et al., American Arbitration Assoc. et al., Model Standards of Conduct for Mediators Standard VI (n.d.) ("A Mediator shall Conduct the Mediation Fairly"), available in . The "fairness" debate focuses around the issue of whether mediators must simply provide "procedural" fairness, or must provide for "substantive" fairness and a fair outcome as well. For an overview of the "fairness" debate, see McEwen et al., supra note 93, at 1323-29. For an exploration of the complexities in defining fairness, see Carol Bohmer & Marilyn L. Ray, Notions of Equity and Fairness in the Context of Divorce: The Role of Mediation, 14 Mediation Q. 37 (1996). For an example of this debate in the context of the rules for court-connected mediation in Massachusetts, compare Lawrence D. Shubow, Neutrals Should Have Ethical Responsibility, 25 Mass. Law. Wkly. 1921, 1921 (1997) (contending that the Uniform Rules on Dispute Resolution mistakenly define the responsibility of neutrals in aiding disputants to reach agreements out of a "loyalty to a rigid and utopian shibboleth about mediation"), with Peter W. Agnes, Jr., Mediator's Duty to Ensure Fairness Limited, 25 Mass. Law. Wkly. 1921, 1921 (1997) (arguing that a neutral's observance of all the responsibilities set forth in the Uniform Rules is the best assurance that justice will be achieved in the adjudication).
117. The general proposition that mediators must conduct the mediation fairly is widely accepted. See, e.g., John D. Feerick et al., American Arbitration Assoc. et al., Model Standards of Conduct for Mediators Standard VI (n.d.) ("A Mediator shall Conduct the Mediation Fairly"), available in . The "fairness" debate focuses around the issue of whether mediators must simply provide "procedural" fairness, or must provide for "substantive" fairness and a fair outcome as well. For an overview of the "fairness" debate, see McEwen et al., supra note 93, at 1323-29. For an exploration of the complexities in defining fairness, see Carol Bohmer & Marilyn L. Ray, Notions of Equity and Fairness in the Context of Divorce: The Role of Mediation, 14 Mediation Q. 37 (1996). For an example of this debate in the context of the rules for court-connected mediation in Massachusetts, compare Lawrence D. Shubow, Neutrals Should Have Ethical Responsibility, 25 Mass. Law. Wkly. 1921, 1921 (1997) (contending that the Uniform Rules on Dispute Resolution mistakenly define the responsibility of neutrals in aiding disputants to reach agreements out of a "loyalty to a rigid and utopian shibboleth about mediation"), with Peter W. Agnes, Jr., Mediator's Duty to Ensure Fairness Limited, 25 Mass. Law. Wkly. 1921, 1921 (1997) (arguing that a neutral's observance of all the responsibilities set forth in the Uniform Rules is the best assurance that justice will be achieved in the adjudication).
118. The general proposition that mediators must conduct the mediation fairly is widely accepted. See, e.g., John D. Feerick et al., American Arbitration Assoc. et al., Model Standards of Conduct for Mediators Standard VI (n.d.) ("A Mediator shall Conduct the Mediation Fairly"), available in . The "fairness" debate focuses around the issue of whether mediators must simply provide "procedural" fairness, or must provide for "substantive" fairness and a fair outcome as well. For an overview of the "fairness" debate, see McEwen et al., supra note 93, at 1323-29. For an exploration of the complexities in defining fairness, see Carol Bohmer & Marilyn L. Ray, Notions of Equity and Fairness in the Context of Divorce: The Role of Mediation, 14 Mediation Q. 37 (1996). For an example of this debate in the context of the rules for court-connected mediation in Massachusetts, compare Lawrence D. Shubow, Neutrals Should Have Ethical Responsibility, 25 Mass. Law. Wkly. 1921, 1921 (1997) (contending that the Uniform Rules on Dispute Resolution mistakenly define the responsibility of neutrals in aiding disputants to reach agreements out of a "loyalty to a rigid and utopian shibboleth about mediation"), with Peter W. Agnes, Jr., Mediator's Duty to Ensure Fairness Limited, 25 Mass. Law. Wkly. 1921, 1921 (1997) (arguing that a neutral's observance of all the responsibilities set forth in the Uniform Rules is the best assurance that justice will be achieved in the adjudication).
119. See Florida Mediator Qualifications Advisory Panel, MQAP 96-003 (1997).
120. Id. at 1 (quoting Florida Mediator Qualifications Advisory Panel, MQAP 95-005C).
121. Id. (quoting Florida Mediator Qualifications Advisory Panel, MQAP 95-005C).
122. See id. Rule 10.090(a) of the Florida Rules for Certified and Court-Appointed Mediators permits a mediator to "provide information" that the mediator is "qualified by training or experience to provide." Id.
123. Id. Rule 10.060(a) of the Florida Rules for Certified and Court-Appointed Mediators provides that the mediator "shall assist the parties in reaching an informed . . . settlement." Id. The mediator asked for answers first assuming that plaintiff was represented by counsel, and then assuming that the plaintiff was pro se. See id. Noting that Rule 10.020(b) of the Florida Rules for Certified and Court-Appointed Mediators declares that mediation is a "nonadversarial process," the mediator ended the inquiry as follows: How much deference must be given by mediators to the idea (clearly drawn from the adversarial trial model) that legal issues (such as defenses and claims) may only be raised by the parties, and never by the third party? If mediation is intended to be truly not adversarial, then the role of the third party should be markedly different than that of a judge in an adversarial trial system. Id. at 2.
124. See id. at 2-3. The mediator in this case was a qualified mediator and a member of the Florida Bar. See id.
125. Id. at 3 (citing Rule 10.090(b) of the Florida Rules for Certified and Court-Appointed Mediators).
126. Id.
127. The panel also answered that it is improper for the mediator to intervene with respect to represented parties. See id. ("If the party is represented, the mediator must assume that counsel is competent and has considered all relevant issues and causes of action. It is improper for a mediator to substitute his or her judgment for that of counsel.").
128. The Florida opinion should be viewed as representative of how similar bodies in different jurisdictions would answer the queries. The decision flows from basic rules such as the prohibition against giving legal advice and the need for impartiality. See supra notes 95-96 and accompanying text. Individual mediators, of course, may vary greatly in the manner in which they conduct mediation. The practices of some mediators may diverge from the general rules described in this section. That some mediators may choose to ignore or bend the rules, however, does not eliminate the need to assess the rules as written and change them as necessary to require the desired practices. For an additional case study illustrating similar harm to an unrepresented litigant, see Nolan-Haley, supra note 92, at 67-71.
129. Yet, voluntariness is a cornerstone of successful mediation. See, e.g., John D. Feerick et al., American Arbitration Assoc. et al., Model Standards of Conduct for Mediators Standard I (n.d.) ("Self-determination is the fundamental principle of mediation. It requires that the mediation process rely upon the ability of the parties to reach a voluntary, uncoerced agreement."), available in ; Henikoff & Moffitt, supra note 95, at 103 ("Voluntariness in the mediation context means both that a party must be free to accept or reject possible settlement options and that a party must be free to accept or reject continued participation in the mediation process.").
130. See, e.g., Andree G. Gagnon, Ending Mandatory Divorce Mediation for Battered Women, 15 Harv. Women's L.J. 272, 281 (1992) (discussing how mediators handling family law matters in the Massachusetts Probate and Family Courts - called "family service offices" - report pressure from judges to settle cases, and indicate that they believe their job effectiveness is evaluated based on how many cases they settle).
131. Precisely this scenario occurs in Boston Housing Court, where mediation is often a more favorable forum for landlords than resolution before the judges. See infra Part III.C.I. Similarly, observers in the New York City Housing Courts have commented that the landlords' attorneys control the mediation process. See Monitoring Subcomm., City Wide Task Force on Housing Ct., 5 Minute Justice or "Aint [sic] Nothing Going on But the Rent!" 42-43 (1986) [hereinafter 5 Minute Justice].
132. Where settlement is not reached, the cases are sent to a judge for resolution as well.
133. See McEwen et al., supra note 93, at 1345-46; infra Part I.D.
134. The sequence may be different. The unrepresented litigant may appear before the judge earlier in the sequence, resulting in a recommendation that the unrepresented litigant try to settle the case with the attorney, go to mediation, go to the clerk's office for assistance, or seek assistance from some other court-connected or outside source. The analysis discussed in this section applies regardless of the actual sequence.
135. See infra notes 116-32.
136. See, e.g., Julie M. Bradlow, Procedural Due Process Rights of Pro Se Civil Litigants, 55 U. Chi. L. Rev. 659, 660 (1988) (advocating the use of a "sliding scale" test which will result in more leniency for pro se civil litigants); Kim, supra note 79, at 1643 (proposing an alternative to attorney representation); Rubin, supra note 60, at 1000-01 (discussing judges' dilemma of balancing fairness and order in pro se proceedings); Joseph M. McLaughlin, Note, An Extension of the Right of Access: The Pro Se Litigant's Right to Notification of the Requirements of the Summary Judgment Rule, 55 Fordham L. Rev. 1109, 1112 (1987) (arguing that judicial notification of the requirements of the summary judgement rule is a necessary element of the right of access to the courts).
137. See, e.g., Julie M. Bradlow, Procedural Due Process Rights of Pro Se Civil Litigants, 55 U. Chi. L. Rev. 659, 660 (1988) (advocating the use of a "sliding scale" test which will result in more leniency for pro se civil litigants); Kim, supra note 79, at 1643 (proposing an alternative to attorney representation); Rubin, supra note 60, at 1000-01 (discussing judges' dilemma of balancing fairness and order in pro se proceedings); Joseph M. McLaughlin, Note, An Extension of the Right of Access: The Pro Se Litigant's Right to Notification of the Requirements of the Summary Judgment Rule, 55 Fordham L. Rev. 1109, 1112 (1987) (arguing that judicial notification of the requirements of the summary judgement rule is a necessary element of the right of access to the courts).
138. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972) (per curiam); Mazur v. Pennsylvania, 507 F. Supp. 3, 4 (E.D. Pa. 1980), aff'd, 649 F.2d 860 (3d Cir. 1981); Solimine v. Davidian, 661 N.E.2d 934, 934 (Mass. 1996); Mmoe v. Commonwealth, 473 N.E.2d 169, 171-72 (Mass. 1985); Rubin, supra note 60, at 1004-05; McLaughlin, supra note 115, at 1115.
139. See United States v. Pinkey, 548 F.2d 305, 308-09 (10th Cir. 1977); Homecraft Corp. v. Fimbres, 580 P.2d 760, 762-63 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1978); Connecticut Light and Power Co. v. Kluczinsky, 370 A.2d 1306, 1308-09 (Conn. 1976); Commonwealth v. Jackson, 647 N.E.2d 401, 405 (Mass. 1995); Commonwealth v. Barnes, 504 N.E.2d 624, 628-29 (Mass. 1987); International Fidelity Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 443 N.E.2d 1308, 1312 (Mass. 1983); Austin v. Ellis, 408 A.2d 784, 785 (N.H. 1979); Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207, 1213-14 (Utah 1983); Standards Relating to Trial Courts § 2.23 (1992); Rubin, supra note 60, at 1001-07.
140. See, e.g., In re Inquiry Concerning a Judge, 357 So. 2d 172, 179 (Fla. 1978) (stating that a judge "may not withhold justice from one litigant in favor of another"); Austin, 408 A.2d at 785 (stating that the courts' essential function is "to serve as an impartial referee"); Indiana Comm'n on Judicial Qualifications, Op. No. 1-97 (stating that the judge must ensure that pro se litigants are not denied relief only of the basis of minor deficiencies in their case); Model Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 3 (1990) ("A Judge Shall Perform the Duties of Judicial Office Impartially and Diligently").
141. See, e.g., Kluczinsky, 370 A.2d at 1308 (stating that courts should "endeavor to see that . . . a [pro se] litigant shall have the opportunity to have his case fully and fairly heard" (alteration in original) (citation omitted)); Rodriguez v. Owaynat, 485 N.E.2d 438, 441 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985) (holding that fundamental fairness and justice required vacatur of the judgment entered after a trial involving a pro se litigant who failed to understand the nature of court proceedings); Blair v. Maynard, 324 S.E.2d 391, 396 (W. Va. 1984) ("The fundamental tenet [is] that the rules of procedure should work to do substantial justice . . . . The court should strive . . . to ensure that the diligent pro se party does not forfeit any substantial rights by inadvertent omission or mistake." (footnote omitted)); Indiana Comm'n on Judicial Qualifications, Op. No. 1-97 (1997) ("Fairness, courtesy, and efficiency also are hallmarks of an honorable judicial system."); Standards Relating to Trial Courts § 2.23 (1992) ("When litigants undertake to represent themselves, the court should take whatever measures may be reasonable and necessary to ensure a fair trial.").
142. Austin, 408 A.2d at 785 (quoting Standards of Judicial Administration, Trial Courts § 2.23) (alteration in original).
143. Goldschmidt, supra note 3, at 16.
144. See, e.g., Pinkey, 548 F.2d at 311 (stating that pro se litigants have no greater rights than those represented by lawyers); Oko v. Rogers, 466 N.E.2d 658, 662 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984) (Barry, J., dissenting) ("Defendant was entitled to a fair opportunity to present his evidence, but nothing more."); Solimine v. Davidian, 661 N.E.2d 934, 934 (Mass. 1996) (stating that a pro se litigant "is held to the same standards to which litigants with counsel are held"); Jackson, 647 N.E.2d at 405 (holding that no lenience is required on the part of the judge toward a pro se defendant); Barnes, 504 N.E.2d at 629 (observing that the same rules of procedure apply to a pro se litigant as to those represented by an attorney); Mmoe v. Commonwealth, 473 N.E.2d 169, 172 (Mass. 1984) ("[T]he rules bind a pro se litigant as they bind other litigants."); Wilson, 443 N.E.2d at 1312 ("[A] pro se litigant is bound by the same rules of procedure as litigants with counsel."); Newsome v. Farer, 708 P.2d 327, 331 (N.M. 1985) (stating that a pro se litigant "enjoy[s] no greater rights than those who employ counsel"); Sunpower, Inc. v. Hawley, 296 N.W.2d 532, 533 (S.D. 1980) (per curiam) (holding that a judgment should not be set aside because a pro se litigant was unfamiliar with the rules of pleading or trial practice); Nelson, 669 P.2d at 1213 ("[A] party who represents himself will be held to the same standard of knowledge and practice as any qualified member of the bar."); Osborn v. Manning, 685 P.2d 1121, 1125 (Wyo. 1984) ("[A] pro se litigant has no greater right that other litigants.").
145. See, e.g., Mazur v. Pennsylvania, 507 F. Supp. 3, 4 (E.D. Pa. 1980) ("[A] judge may not become the surrogate attorney for a party, even one who is proceeding pro se."), affd 649 F.2d 860 (3d Cir. 1981); In re Inquiry Concerning a Judge, 357 So. 2d at 182 (stating that judges must not act as advocates for one side or the other); Sunpower, 296 N.W.2d at 533 (stating that the trial court "has no duty to practice law for the pro se litigant"); Nelson, 669 P.2d at 1213 (stating that a court should not attempt "to redress the ongoing consequences of the party's decision" to represent himself); Kim, supra note 79, at 1646 ("Courts cannot be expected to assume the awkward position . . . of serving as both adjudicator and counsel for the pro se litigant."); Long & Lee, supra note 62, at 7 ("Judges are not supposed to practice law on behalf of pro pers."). Some judges have been informed that they cannot provide legal advice and that they impermissibly practice law in providing various forms of assistance. See Meeting the Challenge, supra note 1, at 27-30.
146. See, e.g., Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972) (per curiam) (holding that the trial court erred in refusing to allow pro se complainant to present evidence supporting his allegations); Mazur, 507 F. Supp. at 4 (noting that courts "must proceed painstakingly" to discern the nature of a pro se plaintiff's claim); Oko, 466 N.E.2d at 660 (noting that the trial judge ensured the pro se litigant received a fair trial); Standards Relating to Trial Courts § 2.23 (1992) ("When litigants undertake to represent themselves, the court should take whatever measures may be reasonable and necessary to insure a fair trial."); Indiana Comm'n on Judicial Qualifications, Op. No. 1-97 (1997) (stating that a judge should "ensure that a pro se litigant in a non-adversarial setting is not denied relief sought only on the basis of a minor or easily established defense").
147. Oko, 446 N.E.2d at 661.
148. See Rubin, supra note 60, at 1001-02; see also Kim, supra note 79, at 1644-46 (discussing the strict versus the liberal approach to pro se litigants); Goldschmidt, supra note 40, at 12-16 (discussing judges' views regarding pro se litigants); Long & Lee, supra note 62, at 7-8 (discussing the "compromise position" of family law judges in cases with unrepresented litigants); Maureen McKnight, Dealing with the Unrepresented Opponent 6-8 (1996) (unpublished manuscript prepared for the Oregon Family Law Conference 1996, on file with author) (discussing the court's need to assist pro se litigants without compromising the adversarial process).
149. See, e.g., United States v. Pinkey, 548 F.2d 305, 310 (7th Cir. 1977) (affirming the trial judge's refusal to allow a pro se defendant to engage in irregular conduct); Commonwealth v. Jackson, 647 N.E.2d 401, 405 (Mass. 1995) (same); see also In re Tuntland, 390 N.E.2d 11, 14-16 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979) (upholding a petition for hospitalization alleging the respondent was in need of mental treatment where the respondent represented himself despite the right to appointed counsel).
150. See, e.g., Connecticut Light and Power Company v. Kluczinsky, 370 A.2d 1306, 1310 (Conn. 1976); International Fidelity Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 443 N.E.2d 1308, 1312 (Mass. 1983) (noting that the litigant appeared pro se after the trial judge ordered the original counsel to withdraw); Blair v. Maynard, 324 S.E.2d 391, 396 (W. Va. 1984).
151. See Mmoe v. Commonwealth, 473 N.E.2d 169, 171-72 (Mass. 1985).
152. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Owaynat, 485 N.E.2d 438, 441 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985) (holding that a pro se defendant who failed to understand the nature of court proceedings was improperly denied his motion to vacate); Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207, 1213- 14 (Utah 1983) (discussing a judge's help and consideration for a pro se litigant harmed by unfamiliarity with court processes and the "factual compelexities of the case").
153. See Oko v. Rogers, 466 N.E.2d 658, 661 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984).
154. See, e.g., Kluczinsky, 370 A.2d at 1308-09 (refusing to make allowances for a pro se litigant's lack of education); Oko, 466 N.E.2d at 662 (Barry, J., dissenting) (warning that leniency toward pro se litigants invites pro se representation and difficulties at trial). One survey of judges asked to describe the ideal pro se assistance program provoked responses revealing a fear that such programs "would open the floodgates and attorneys would revolt." Goldschmidt, supra note 3, at 18 ("I would not adopt such a program. Soon virtually every litigant would seek to be included in it. I think if too much attention is given to it, there will be a tremendous increase in pro se litigation, much of which will be by non-indigent parties.").
155. See Homecraft Corp. v. Fimbres, 580 P.2d 760, 762 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1978); Sunpower, Inc. v. Hawley, 296 N.W.2d 532, 533 (S.D. 1980) (per curiam).
156. See Jacobsen v. Filler, 790 F.2d 1362,1365 n.7 (9th Cir. 1986); United States v. Pinkey, 548 F.2d 305, 310-11 (7th Cir. 1977); Austin v. Ellis, 408 A.2d 784, 785 (N.H. 1979); Kluczinsky, 370 A.2d at 1310.
157. See Robert W. Schachner et al., How and When to Be Your Own Lawyer 159 (1993) ("The majority of judges I have interviewed would just as soon not deal with a pro se situation if they had a choice . . . ."); Goldschmidt, supra note 3, at 13 ("Many judges make an effort to deter litigants from proceeding pro se."). At a minimum, judges frequently mention the "difficulties" involved in dealing with cases involving unrepresented litigants. See id. at 11-19. One judge phrases the negative ramifications differently: One of the sad things is that we are driving attorneys out of the practice [of law] because they can't afford to sit there all day as pro se people go on and on. Lawyers just can't afford that. The more that happens, the more you have the self-fulfilling prophecy of turning the court into a pro se system, which is not good. The responsibility of the court is to resolve disputes. It is not an emergency room of a hospital. It is not a therapy session. Bench Conference: Judge Edward M. Ginsburg, Probate & Family Court, 25 Mass. Law. Wkly. 252, 252 (1996).
158. See Bezdek, supra note 23, at 566-75. The unrepresented tenants typically are poor, black women. See id. at 534 n.4.
159. See, e.g., 5 Minute Justice, supra note 110, at 65-68 (observing New York City Housing Court judges in interactions with unrepresented tenants); Frank S. Bloch, Framing the Clinical Experience: Lessons on Turning Points and the Dynamics of Lawyering, 64 Tenn. L. Rev. 989, 999 (1997) (describing the silencing of an unrepresented tenant in an eviction case in Tennessee);
160. Mark H. Lazerson, In the Halls of Justice, the Only Justice Is in the Halls, in 1 The Politics of Informal Justice 119, 119-21 (Richard L. Abel ed., 1982) (describing the bias of judges in New York City Housing Courts against tenants, most of whom were unrepresented);
161. Beatrice A. Moulton Note, The Persecution and Intimidation of the Low-Income Litigant as Performed by the Small Claims Court in California, 21 Stan. L. Rev. 1657, 1664-65 (1969) (discussing judicial intimidation of pro se litigants).
162. See Elias, supra note 47, passim; Goldschmidt, supra note 3, at 18 (observing "negative judicial philosophies about and attitudes toward pro se litigants": "some judges went beyond stating their fear of 'opening the floodgates' of pro se litigants they evidenced a general anti-pro se litigant sentiment").
163. See infra Part III. For self-representation to comprise more than a hollow right, litigants should not be punished for exercising that right.
164. Unif. Small Claims R. of the Mass. Trial Cts. 7(c).
165. In re Amendments to the Florida Small Claims Rules, 601 So. 2d 1201, 1209 (Fla. 1992).
166. Ill. S. Ct. R. Ch. 110A, Rule 286(b).
167. Lashley v. Secretary of Health and Human Servs., 708 F.2d 1048, 1051 (6th Cir. 1983) (citation omitted); Clark v. Schweiker, 652 F.2d 399, 404 (5th Cir. 1981).
168. Lashley, 708 F.2d at 1052 (citations omitted).
169. See, e.g., Mass. Regs. Code tit. 106, § 343.450(A)(2) (1995) (describing the Powers and Duties of Hearing Officials in Massachusetts welfare benefits as including the duty "[t]o assist all those present in making a full and free statement of the facts in order to bring out all the information necessary to decide the issues involved and to ascertain the rights of the parties").
170. In Massachusetts unemployment hearings, for example, the hearing officer, called a "Review Examiner," has obligations set forth in Massachusetts Regulations Code title 801, section 1.02(10)(g). The specific obligations include: 2. [to] assist all those present in making a full and free statement of the facts in order to bring out all the information necessary to decide the issues involved and to ascertain the rights of the Petitioner; 3. [to] ensure that all Parties have a full opportunity to present their claims orally, or in writing; [and to] . . . 10. examine witnesses and ensure that relevant evidence is secured and introduced . . . . Mass. Regs. Code tit. 801, § 1.02(10)(g) (1993).
171. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
172. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 556(b) (1994) ("The functions of presiding employees and of employees participating in decisions . . . shall be conducted in an impartial manner.").
173. In Massachusetts, for example, welfare hearings are "conducted by an impartial referee." Mass. Regs. Code tit. 106, § 343.110 (1997); see also Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 271 (1970) ("And, of course, an impartial decision maker is essential").
174. For example, Article 29 of the Massachusetts Declaration Of Rights, guaranteeing the right to have cases heard by impartial judges, applies to administrative agency officials as well. See, e.g., Police Comm'r v. Municipal
175. The paucity of guidance regarding the judge's role in settlement is understandable, since, where cases settle, the conflicts ostensibly have been resolved. Contested trials and pleadings require judicial action. A notable exception to the general lack of guidance for judges in settlement is Jona Goldschmidt & Lisa Milord, Judicial Settlement Ethics: Judge's Guide (1996). The driving force for the project was "the lack of adequate guidelines for judges and others who host settlement conferences." Id. at 1. Despite its impressive breadth, the project does not distinguish between cases involving unrepresented parties and cases involving represented ones; few of the cited cases appear to involve unrepresented litigants at all. The project is therefore at best a partial response to issues raised in this Article.
176. Moore v. Moore, 448 N.E.2d 1255, 1257 (Mass. 1983).
177. Penelope Eileen Bryan, The Coercion of Women in Divorce Settlement Negotiations, 74 Denv. U. L. Rev. 931, 937 (1997) (footnote omitted).
178. See, e.g., Amsterdam Co. v. Levy, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 9, 1987, at 14 (App. Term. Mar. 9, 1987) (vacating a "one-sided stipulation"); McEvoy v. Chaplin, N.Y. L.J., July 15, 1983, at 13 (App. Term. July 15, 1983) (holding that "it would be inequitable to hold the pro se [litigant] to the terms of the stipulation"); Solack Estates, Inc. v. Goodman, 425 N.Y.S.2d 906, 907 (App. Term. 1979) (holding that a stipulation of settlement may be vacated when "the stipulation is unduly harsh or unjust"), aff'd, 432 N.Y.S.2d 3 (App. Div. 1980).
179. See, e.g., Benchmark Apartment Management Corp. v. Mercer, No. 96-00949, at 8-9 n.8 (Mass. Housing Ct. Jan. 3, 1997) (unpublished opinion, on file with the Fordham Law Review) (listing several determinations that a judge should make when approving a landlord-tenant settlement); In re Marriage of Foran, 834 P.2d 1081, 1090 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992) (affirming decision that a prenuptial agreement was unenforceable because it was patently unfair and wife did not have a full understanding of the legal consequences of the contract and could not voluntarily and intelligently waive her rights). For further discussion of mediation, see infra notes 311, 322 and accompanying text.
180. See, e.g., Table Run Estate, Inc. v. Perez, N.Y. L.J., Feb. 23, 1994, at 21 (App. Term. Feb. 23, 1994) ("In the colloquy attending execution of the stipulation, these allegations were not examined. . . . It is clear that the unrepresented tenant did not appreciate the available alternatives to signing the stipulation . . . .").
181. See supra notes 118-20 and accompanying text. For a general discussion of the need for impartiality in settlement, see Goldschmidt & Milord, supra note 151, at 19-29. The author's primary recommendation for judges in the context of guiding or influencing settlement is: "The judge should guide and supervise the settlement process to ensure its fundamental fairness. In seeking to resolve disputes, a judge in settlement discussions should not sacrifice justice for expediency." Id. at 51.
182. See 144 Woodruff Corp. v. Lacrete, 585 N.Y.S.2d 956, 960 (Civ. Ct. 1992) (discussing crushing volume in New York City Housing Courts); David Caplovitz, Consumers in Trouble: A Study of Debtors in Default 218-24 (1974) (discussing how debtors who do not default in debt collection cases are pressured into settling their cases without a trial); Bryan, supra note 153, at 937 ("Currently, however, for many reasons, judges pay only cursory attention to the actual provisions of divorce agreements." (footnotes omitted)); Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 Yale L.J. 950, 951, 956 (1979) (describing how most family cases settle, with minimal intervention of the court); Hillard M. Sterling & Philip G. Schrag, Default Judgments Against Consumers: Has the System Failed?, 67 Denv. U. L. Rev. 357, 386-87 (1990) (similarly describing how most small claims debt collection cases in the District of Columbia do not make it to trial).
183. See 144 Woodruff Corp. v. Lacrete, 585 N.Y.S.2d 956, 960 (Civ. Ct. 1992) (discussing crushing volume in New York City Housing Courts); David Caplovitz, Consumers in Trouble: A Study of Debtors in Default 218-24 (1974) (discussing how debtors who do not default in debt collection cases are pressured into settling their cases without a trial); Bryan, supra note 153, at 937 ("Currently, however, for many reasons, judges pay only cursory attention to the actual provisions of divorce agreements." (footnotes omitted)); Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 Yale L.J. 950, 951, 956 (1979) (describing how most family cases settle, with minimal intervention of the court); Hillard M. Sterling & Philip G. Schrag, Default Judgments Against Consumers: Has the System Failed?, 67 Denv. U. L. Rev. 357, 386-87 (1990) (similarly describing how most small claims debt collection cases in the District of Columbia do not make it to trial).
184. See Lacrete, 585 N.Y.S.2d at 960 (describing how most cases in New York City's Housing Courts are "disposed of at an average rate of five to fourteen minutes per case, with many settlements in the range of five minutes or less"); Bohmer & Ray, supra note 97, at 40 ("[J]udicial scrutiny [of settlements] is in fact pro forma."); McCulloch, supra note 80, at 504 (describing how judges in divorce cases "expect each case to take three minutes or less"); McEwen et al., supra note 93, at 1345-46 ("Court review [of mediated agreements] has traditionally been viewed as a check on only the most egregious and obvious unfairness, because the judge receives only the written result of negotiations and has no advocate for non-signature . . . . [T]he 'sheer quantity of cases . . . [prevents] a judge [from] attending] to cases prone to injustice." (citations omitted)); Richard Neely, The Primary Caretaker Parent Rule: Child Custody and the Dynamics of Greed, 3 Yale L. & Pol'y Rev. 168, 177 (1984) ("Divorce decrees are typically drafted for the parties after compromises reached through private negotiation. These compromises are then approved by a judge, who generally gives them only the most perfunctory sort of review.").
185. See, e.g., Bryan, supra note 153, at 938 ("In support of the state's policy of favoring settlement of divorce disputes, the Illinois courts have created a presumption in favor of the validity of settlement agreements."); Engler, supra note 43, at 142-43 ("[T]o expect courts facing crushing volume to raise the [vacatur] challenge sua sponte or regularly to undo [the parties' settlement] work only to create more work is unrealistic.").
186. See Caplovitz, supra note 158, at 218-19; Gagnon, supra note 109, at 281. For a general picture of the situation faced by poor people in the court system and pressure placed upon them to settle, see infra Part III.
187. See Fiss, supra note 92, at 1073-75; Carrie Menkel-Meadow, For and Against Settlement: Uses and Abuses of the Mandatory Settlement Conference, 33 UCLA L. Rev. 485, 491-93 (1985) (discussing effect of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16).
188. See Goldschmidt & Milord, supra note 151, at 41-56.
189. "The survey of judges makes it clear that many judges experience great difficulty when dealing with pro se litigants in the courtroom." Meeting the Challenge, supra note 1, at 68 (referring to a non-randomly administered study).
190. For a description of varying judicial attitudes and strategies in dealing with unrepresented litigants, see id. at 52-61.
191. See, e.g., Model Code of Professional Responsibility EC 7-18 (1982) (stating that lawyers should not undertake to give advice to a person who is attempting to represent himself except to advise him to obtain a lawyer). The ethical rules give little direct attention to cases involving unrepresented litigants. In the Model Rules, only Rule 4.3 speaks directly to a lawyer's dealings with an unrepresented party. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 4.3 (1998). In the Model Code, only a single subsection of one disciplinary rule focuses on this scenario. See Model Code of Professional Responsibility DR 7-104(A)(2) (1982).
192. In many contexts, particularly the "poor people's courts" that handle civil cases, it is the case involving two represented parties that is more likely to be the exception. See infra Part III.
193. See, e.g., Sales, et al., supra note 53, at 559-60 ("Self-representation may place the litigant at a disadvantage when facing the expertise and skills of an attorney."); McLaughlin, supra note 115, at 1124 ("The effective operation of the adversary system relies on the assumption that the parties to a lawsuit are approximately equal in their legal representation. This rough balance, however, is entirely upset when one side appears pro se." (footnotes omitted)).
194. Embedded in the ethical rules governing lawyers and judges is the underlying goal of providing fairness and justice. See, e.g., Model Code of Judicial Conduct pmbl., at 3 (1990) ("Our legal system is based on the principle that an independent, fair and competent judiciary will interpret and apply the laws that govern us." (emphasis added)); Model Code of Professional Responsibility EC 7-19 to -39 (1982) (grouped under the title "Duty of the Lawyer to the Adversary System of Justice" (emphasis added)); id. EC 7-23 ("A tribunal that is fully informed on the applicable law is better able to make a fair and accurate determination . . . ." (emphasis added)); id. EC 7-24 ("In order to bring about just and informed decisions . . . ." (emphasis added)); id. EC 7-39 ("[P]roper functioning of the adversary system depends upon cooperation be-tween lawyers and tribunals in utilizing procedures which will . . . make their decisional processes prompt and just . . . ." (emphasis added)); Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 3.6 cmt. 1 (1984) ("It is difficult to strike a balance between protecting the right to a fair trial. . . ." (emphasis added)); id. Rule 3.3 cmt. 15 ("The object of an ex parte proceeding is nevertheless to yield a substantially just result."). The Preamble to the ABA Canons of Professional Ethics, which preceded the Model Code of Professional Responsibility, similarly referred to "the system for establishing and dispensing Justice." Canons of Professional Ethics pmbl. (1908).
195. For the purposes of this discussion, the word "court" applies not only to the judge but to the overall court system, including any of the individual actors in that system who must maintain impartiality.
196. See, e.g., Ellen E. Sward, Values, Ideology, and the Evolution of the Adversary System, 64 Ind. L.J. 301, 321 n.96 (1989) ("A judge can be impartial but very active in developing the case . . . . Impartiality is a requirement for fair adjudication, but judicial passivity is not.").
197. See infra Part III.
198. Cf. Sherrilyn A. Ifill, Judging the Judges: Racial Diversity, Impartiality and Representation on State Trial Courts, 39 B.C. L. Rev. 95, 98-99 (1997) (distinguishing between structural and individual impartiality in arguing "that the Fourteenth Amendment's judicial impartiality mandate is violated by the persistent presence of an all-white bench in jurisdictions with significant minority populations" (footnote omitted)).
199. See, e.g., Black's Law Dictionary 752 (6th ed. 1990) (listing, as the first three definitions of "impartial": "Favoring neither; disinterested; treating all alike . . . ."). This is not to minimize the problems created in terms of the appearance of impartiality where the court provides more help to one side than the other. Nor does it minimize the dangers that an arbiter might be moved by a "sympathetic identification" with a party that the arbiter begins to assist. See Lon L. Fuller & John D. Randall, Professional Responsibility: Report of the Joint Conference, 44 A.B.A. J. 1159, 1160- 61 (1958). Given the difficulties facing unrepresented litigants in the courts, a failure to assist unrepresented litigants is a greater threat to the impartiality of the court system than the dangers flowing from the provision of assistance.
200. See, e.g., Black's Law Dictionary 752 (6th ed. 1990) (listing, as the first three definitions of "impartial": "Favoring neither; disinterested; treating all alike . . . ."). This is not to minimize the problems created in terms of the appearance of impartiality where the court provides more help to one side than the other. Nor does it minimize the dangers that an arbiter might be moved by a "sympathetic identification" with a party that the arbiter begins to assist. See Lon L. Fuller & John D. Randall, Professional Responsibility: Report of the Joint Conference, 44 A.B.A. J. 1159, 1160-61 (1958). Given the difficulties facing unrepresented litigants in the courts, a failure to assist unrepresented litigants is a greater threat to the impartiality of the court system than the dangers flowing from the provision of assistance.
201. See, e.g., Boston Bar Ass'n, BBA Task Force on Unrepresented Litigants Report 26 (1998) [hereinafter BBA Report] ("[T]he judges . . . worry over potential unfairness to both sides in a case where one of the litigants is unrepresented."); Meeting the Challenge, supra note 1, at 52-53 (stating that judges found it difficult to maintain their impartiality where one litigant was unrepresented); Goldschmidt, supra note 3, at 13-14 ("Some judges indicate they [sic] under some agonizing moments during the course of trials where one party is represented and one is pro se . . . . Some of the judges' comments concerned problems arising from attorneys' actions in these situation [sic] of one party appearing pro se.").
202. As noted, courts expect most cases to settle, provide minimal supervision to the settlement, and rarely overturn the settlement agreement. See supra notes 158-62 and accompanying text. The agreements routinely involve the waiver of significant rights by the unrepresented litigants. See id. Some commentators therefore prefer the concept of "informed waiver" to that of "informed consent." See, e.g., Nina W. Tarr, Clients' and Students' Stories: Avoiding Exploitation and Complying with the Law to Produce Scholarship with Integrity, 5 Clinical L. Rev. 271, 298-99 (1998).
203. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 780 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (footnote omitted). Other formulations of the doctrine, developed in the medical context, consistently include the elements of evaluating options based on an understanding of the risks and alternatives. See, e.g., Harnish v. Children's Hosp. Med. Ctr., 439 N.E.2d 240, 242 (Mass. 1982) ("Knowing exercise of this right requires knowledge of the available options and the risks attendant on each."); Wilkinson v. Vesey, 295 A.2d 676, 685 (R.I. 1972) (describing the informed consent doctrine as standing for the proposition that "a patient's consent to a proposed course of treatment was valid only to the extent he had been informed by the physician as to what was to be done, the risk involved and the alternatives to the contemplated treatment"). For a listing of many of the landmark cases discussing informed consent, see Harnish, 439 N.E.2d at 242 n.3, 243 n.4.
204. Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 780 (footnote omitted).
205. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
206. For example, the cases split over the issue of whether disclosure should be measured from the patient's point of view, see Harnish, 439 N.E.2d at 242 n.3, or in light of the standards of the medical profession, measured by the information as is customarily disclosed by physicians in similar circumstances. See id. at 243 n.4. Even when measured by the custom of the profession, the concept of putting the patient in a position to make informed choices about alternatives remains central. See, e.g., Woolley v. Henderson, 418 A.2d 1123, 1128 (Me. 1980) (explaining the general principles behind the doctrine of informed consent).
207. Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 780 (footnote omitted). Black's Law Dictionary defines "informed consent" as: "A person's agreement to allow something to happen . . . that is based on a full disclosure of facts needed to make the decision intelligently; i.e., knowledge of risks involved, alternatives, etc." Black's Law Dictionary 779 (6th ed. 1990) (describing the concept of informed consent as the necessary disclosures so that a patient "faced with a choice of undergoing the proposed treatment, or alternative treatment, or none at all, may intelligently exercise his judgment by reasonably balancing the probable risks against the probable benefits").
208. The doctrine of "informed consent" already appears in the mediation literature both as a standard for measuring a litigant's decision to mediate and as a standard for measuring a decision to accept an agreement. See, e.g., Mass. Unif. R. on Dispute Resolution 9(c) (describing rules for informed consent to ADR), reprinted in 26 Mass. Law. Wkly. 2129, 2131 (1998); Henikoff & Moffitt, supra note 95, at 103 (noting that "[i]nformed consent includes both the parties' agreement to participate in the mediation process and their acceptance of any ultimate substantive agreement"); Kurtzberg & Henikoff, supra note 95, at 86-87 (describing different views of the role of informed consent in the mediation process); see also infra Part II.B.2 (describing the mediator's role). For a discussion of the concept of "informed consent" in the context of the lawyer-client relationship, see Mark Spiegel, Lawyering and Client Decisionmaking: Informed Consent and the Legal Profession, 128 U. Pa. L. Rev. 41 (1979). For recent examples of efforts to impart concepts and practices from the medical world to the legal world, see Gay Gellhorn, Law and Language: An Empirically- Based Model for the Opening Moments of Client Interviews, 4 Clinical L. Rev. 321 (1998); and Linda F. Smith, Medical Paradigms for Counseling: Giving Clients Bad News, 4 Clinical L. Rev. 391 (1998).
209. The doctrine of "informed consent" already appears in the mediation literature both as a standard for measuring a litigant's decision to mediate and as a standard for measuring a decision to accept an agreement. See, e.g., Mass. Unif. R. on Dispute Resolution 9(c) (describing rules for informed consent to ADR), reprinted in 26 Mass. Law. Wkly. 2129, 2131 (1998); Henikoff & Moffitt, supra note 95, at 103 (noting that "[i]nformed consent includes both the parties' agreement to participate in the mediation process and their acceptance of any ultimate substantive agreement"); Kurtzberg & Henikoff, supra note 95, at 86-87 (describing different views of the role of informed consent in the mediation process); see also infra Part II.B.2 (describing the mediator's role). For a discussion of the concept of "informed consent" in the context of the lawyer-client relationship, see Mark Spiegel, Lawyering and Client Decisionmaking: Informed Consent and the Legal Profession, 128 U. Pa. L. Rev. 41 (1979). For recent examples of efforts to impart concepts and practices from the medical world to the legal world, see Gay Gellhorn, Law and Language: An Empirically-Based Model for the Opening Moments of Client Interviews, 4 Clinical L. Rev. 321 (1998); and Linda F. Smith, Medical Paradigms for Counseling: Giving Clients Bad News, 4 Clinical L. Rev. 391 (1998).
210. The doctrine of "informed consent" already appears in the mediation literature both as a standard for measuring a litigant's decision to mediate and as a standard for measuring a decision to accept an agreement. See, e.g., Mass. Unif. R. on Dispute Resolution 9(c) (describing rules for informed consent to ADR), reprinted in 26 Mass. Law. Wkly. 2129, 2131 (1998); Henikoff & Moffitt, supra note 95, at 103 (noting that "[i]nformed consent includes both the parties' agreement to participate in the mediation process and their acceptance of any ultimate substantive agreement"); Kurtzberg & Henikoff, supra note 95, at 86-87 (describing different views of the role of informed consent in the mediation process); see also infra Part II.B.2 (describing the mediator's role). For a discussion of the concept of "informed consent" in the context of the lawyer-client relationship, see Mark Spiegel, Lawyering and Client Decisionmaking: Informed Consent and the Legal Profession, 128 U. Pa. L. Rev. 41 (1979). For recent examples of efforts to impart concepts and practices from the medical world to the legal world, see Gay Gellhorn, Law and Language: An Empirically- Based Model for the Opening Moments of Client Interviews, 4 Clinical L. Rev. 321 (1998); and Linda F. Smith, Medical Paradigms for Counseling: Giving Clients Bad News, 4 Clinical L. Rev. 391 (1998).
211. Rather than assuming that the unrepresented litigant has had access to help, the unrepresented litigant must be viewed at best as having received no legal advice at all. In reality, the unrepresented litigant has probably received some combination of information and misinformation, that may or may not be accurate or helpful, and that the litigant may or may not have understood. Particularly in the "poor people's courts," the litigant's appearance without counsel cannot be viewed as one of choice, but one forced on the litigant by necessity. See infra Part II.A.5.
212. See supra Part I.A.
213. This point necessarily follows from the need for a broad definition of what constitutes legal advice. Moreover, it is consistent with the view that far more interactions between lawyers and unrepresented adversaries involve impermissible advice-giving than generally is recognized. See generally Engler, supra note 43, passim (examining the issues surrounding lawyers' interactions with lay adversaries). That more actors should provide more help does not imply that opposing lawyers should be unleashed on their unrepresented adversaries. The increased assistance from the court and advocates and relaxation of the prohibition against giving legal advice in that context should be combined with enforcing the limitations on the interactions with opposing counsel. The lawyer has a vested interest in influencing the unrepresented party to adopt a course of action serving the goals not of the unrepresented party, but of her client.
214. See BBA Report, supra note 175, at 20 ("Most of the unrepresented litigants [in the Boston Housing Court] reported that they wanted an attorney but felt they could not afford one."); infra Part III.
215. See supra notes 127-29 and accompanying text; see also Meeting the Challenge, supra note 1, at 60 (noting that pro se litigants who pursue a political agenda in court are seen as pests by judges); Robert M. Daniszewski, Coping with the Pro Se Litigant, N.H. B.J., March 1995, at 46 (discussing the trend toward pro se litigation); Paul B. Zuydhoek, Litigation Against a Pro Se Plaintiff, Litigation, Summer 1989, at 13 (discussing the difficulties of litigating against pro se plaintiffs).
216. See supra notes 127-29 and accompanying text; see also Meeting the Challenge, supra note 1, at 60 (noting that pro se litigants who pursue a political agenda in court are seen as pests by judges); Robert M. Daniszewski, Coping with the Pro Se Litigant, N.H. B.J., March 1995, at 46 (discussing the trend toward pro se litigation); Paul B. Zuydhoek, Litigation Against a Pro Se Plaintiff, Litigation, Summer 1989, at 13 (discussing the difficulties of litigating against pro se plaintiffs).
217. See infra Part III.
218. For a description of courts handling family law and bankruptcy cases involving unrepresented litigants, see infra part III.A-B.
219. Litigants exercising the right to self-representation should not face a bias favoring represented parties. The right to self-representation is well established. See, e.g., Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 816-32 (1975) (discussing a litigant's right to self-representation). Many observers nonetheless perceive a pattern of bias against the unrepresented litigant. See, e.g., Mosten, supra note 48, at 435 (commenting on negative perceptions of the pro se litigant); Elias, supra note 47, passim (discussing the bias in the court system against unrepresented litigants and proposing solutions). 191. 466 N.E.2d 658 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984).
220. Id. at 661.
221. See id.
222. Indeed, the same holds true for defaults as well. Judicial duties are not limited to ministerial acts. Compare, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(1) (discussing when a default judgment may be entered by the clerk), with Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2) (discussing when a default judgement must be entered by the clerk). Where a party fails to appear, the court still must take appropriate steps to ensure that the appearing party is entitled to any relief it is seeking against the defaulting party. The high incidence of default among debtors in debt collection cases, for example, is a poignant reminder of the need for judicial oversight even where litigants default. See, e.g., Caplovitz, supra note 158, at 221 (finding default judgement rate of three city cross-section at over ninety percent).
223. Mass. Unif. Sm. Cl. R. 7(c).
224. Fla. Ct. Sm. Cl. R. 7.140(e).
225. See Ill. Sup. Ct. R. 286(b).
226. Lashley v. Secretary of Health and Human Servs., 708 F.2d 1048, 1051 (6th Cir. 1983) (quoting McConnell v. Schweiker, 655 F.2d 604, 606 (5th Cir. 1981)).
227. See supra notes 147-50 and accompanying text.
228. Where the opposing party is represented by counsel, the judicial inquiry could be aided by imposing a duty on the opposing counsel to "inform the tribunal of all material facts known to the lawyer which will enable the tribunal to make an informed decision, whether or not the facts are adverse[,]" a requirement currently imposed by the Model Rules in ex parte proceedings. Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 3.3(d) (1998). Such a duty may be imposed by ethical rule or court rule. See generally Engler, supra note 43, at 139-40, 143 (discussing the need for courts to enact rules regulating unrepresented adversaries).
229. See supra Part II.A.3-5.
230. Judicial oversight, including inquiries into the substance of the negotiations between lawyers and unrepresented parties, is one of the most important steps for the legal system to take in its effort to curb attorney misconduct in such negotiations and to protect unrepresented litigants from the misconduct. See Engler, supra note 43, at 142-47.
231. For a discussion of ethical issues raised by the participation of trial judges in the settlement process, see Goldschmidt & Milord, supra note 151, at 9-18. Note, however, that the discussion does not focus on cases involving unrepresented litigants or courts with a large number of unrepresented litigants.
232. See, e.g., Changing the Culture, supra note 58, at 27 (reporting that lawyers find it unfair when judges assisted an unrepresented opponent); Meeting the Challenge, supra note 1, at 29 ("The data collected in this study show that the most serious concern of trial judges is their perceived inability to assist a pro se litigant due to their duty to maintain impartiality."); Daniszewski, supra note 187, at 48 ("When the court deviates from its neutral course to lend assistance to otherwise overmatched pre se litigants the adversarial system itself can suffer."); Sales et al., supra note 53, at 558 ("Courts cannot be expected to assume the awkward position, not to mention the imposition, of serving as both adjudicator and counsel for the pro se litigant.").
233. See supra Part II.A.2.
234. In one survey, "[s]everal judges pointed to the need for rules permitting judges to actively assist self-represented litigants." Meeting the Challenge, supra note 1, at 59.
235. For a description of one judge's extensive use of law clerks as part of a "Pro Se Assistance Program" see Halberstadter, supra note 54.
236. As stated previously, for purposes of this Article, I am using the term "mediation" broadly enough to include all forms of court-connected ADR. See supra note 92.
237. See, e.g., John C. Cratsley, Mediation: A Device That Is "Here To Stay", 26 Mass. Law. Wkly. 2055, 2077 (1998) (reporting results of key findings of ADR Studies, including findings that "ADR produces high user satisfaction" and in "high settlement rates"). "When users of District Court programs - usually pro se litigants - are asked about the fairness of the mediation process, their satisfaction is overwhelming." Id. at 2055. These findings mainly relate to small claims cases, which may or may not apply to other contexts. Moreover, the perception of fairness is only one measure of fairness. See, e.g., Cecilia Albin, The Role of Fairness in Negotiation, 9 Negotiation J. 223 passim (1993) (analyzing four classes of fairness issues affecting negotiators); Bohmer & Ray, supra note 97, at 39 (same). If the unrepresented poor, routinely and without their informed consent, are waiving significant rights in court-connected mediation, high settlement rates and high litigant satisfaction should not compel a conclusion that the procedures are appropriate or fair.
238. See, e.g., John C. Cratsley, Mediation: A Device That Is "Here To Stay", 26 Mass. Law. Wkly. 2055, 2077 (1998) (reporting results of key findings of ADR Studies, including findings that "ADR produces high user satisfaction" and in "high settlement rates"). "When users of District Court programs - usually pro se litigants - are asked about the fairness of the mediation process, their satisfaction is overwhelming." Id. at 2055. These findings mainly relate to small claims cases, which may or may not apply to other contexts. Moreover, the perception of fairness is only one measure of fairness. See, e.g., Cecilia Albin, The Role of Fairness in Negotiation, 9 Negotiation J. 223 passim (1993) (analyzing four classes of fairness issues affecting negotiators); Bohmer & Ray, supra note 97, at 39 (same). If the unrepresented poor, routinely and without their informed consent, are waiving significant rights in court-connected mediation, high settlement rates and high litigant satisfaction should not compel a conclusion that the procedures are appropriate or fair.
239. See supra Part I.C.
240. See supra Part II.B.1.
241. This efficiency is illustrated by Wright v. Brockett, 571 N.Y.S.2d 660 (Sup. Ct. 1991). The Wright court declined to enforce a court mediated agreement because it was not "a provident decision by the [unrepresented] tenant, free of coercion . . . ." Id. at 665. For a discussion of the Wright decision, see Nolan-Haley, supra note 92, at 87-88. Moreover, to ensure that litigants are making informed choices to mediate, mediators should be advising all litigants that it is not their job to ensure that agreements are fair, and that they cannot provide assistance at all. Otherwise, the unrepresented litigant might be choosing mediation based on a misunderstanding of the mediation process.
242. As discussed above, the term mediation as used here is intended to cover all forms of court-connected ADR in which the unrepresented poor participate. See supra note 92. The focus must become the role played by the person conducting the settlement session, not the person's title.
243. See, e.g., Harry T. Edwards, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panacea or Anathema?, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 668, 671-72 (1986) (expressing concern that ADR may "result in an abandonment of our constitutional system in which the 'rule of law' is created and principally enforced by . . . government"); Fischer et al., supra note 93, at 2156 ("[O]ne can infer that a primary motivation in sending [domestic disputes] . . . to mediation is that it helps clear court dockets of troublesome cases . . . ."); Fiss, supra note 92, at 1075 (arguing that ADR "should be treated instead as a highly problematic technique for streamlining dockets"); Menkel-Meadow, supra note 92, at 13 ("As ADR becomes institutionalized within the court system, one can ask . . . what are the implications for justice?").
244. Cf. Stark, supra note 95, at 794 ("[Mediators who undertake case evaluation ought to be obliged to provide the parties sufficient information about the law and its application to their case to enable them to make reasonably informed decisions." (citation omitted)).
245. See id. at 794-95. [I]ncluded within this duty [to inform] should be a responsibility to provide information fairly, objectively, and in good faith, without regard for its effect on the prospects for settlement . . . . Helping parties resolve their disputes and assisting in unclogging crowded court dockets are positive goals. But I am unaware of any mediator ethics code that considers them ethical goals. Id. (citation omitted) (emphasis in original).
246. Mediators might be assisted in this immense undertaking by development of a checklist tailored to a particular context. The checklist might include important introductory statements to clarify the role of the mediator and the mediation process. The checklist might also include inquiries to elicit information related to claims that typically arise in the context; to provide the unrepresented party with an opportunity to raise concerns other than those related to the typical claims; and to uncover improper advice, pressure, or misperceptions that might hinder the unrepresented litigants from giving informed consent or that might result in an unfair agreement.
247. Scholars even debate whether it is proper for mediators to engage in evaluative mediation. See, e.g., Moberly, supra note 95, at 670-75 (discussing differing approaches to mediator evaluation).
248. See supra Part II.A.1. To the extent that the impartiality requirement bars such a role, the revised notion of "impartiality" should overcome those objections for the same reason it did with the role of the judges. See supra Part II.A.2. For a suggestion that impartiality may not be essential for effective mediation, see Saadia Touval, Multilateral Negotiation: An Analytic Approach, 5 Negotiation J. 159, 167-69 (1989) (describing the effectiveness of Britain as a mediator in the dispute between China and France over Indochina at the 1954 Geneva Conference, despite the fact that Britain was not an impartial third party, but instead possessed leverage over the parties to perform an effective mediation). An exploration of that concept is beyond the scope of this Article, and unnecessary, since the revised notion of impartiality discussed in this Article should permit the mediator to maintain impartiality and protect unrepresented litigants.
249. See, e.g., Henikoff & Moffitt, supra note 95, at 89 ("For most mediators, however, questions of when and how to inform ignorant parties of the law present an unusually difficult dilemma."); Gary LaFree & Christine Rack, The Effects of Participants' Ethnicity and Gender on Monetary Outcomes in Mediated and Adjudicated Civil Cases, 30 L. & Soc'y Rev. 767, 794 (1996) ("In the name of neutrality, mediators may fail to deal with power imbalances in negotiations.").
250. See Stark, supra note 95, at 792 ("What should be done about the dangers of materially incomplete, misleading, and manipulative advice by evaluative mediators? The dangers are clearly most pronounced in cases . . . in which the parties are pro se."); see also Florida Mediator Qualifications Advisory Panel, MQAP 96-003 (1997) (stating that mediators should take additional steps to ensure fairness to unrepresented parties); Nolan-Haley, supra note 92, at 92-99 (discussing mediator's role with unrepresented parties in court).
251. See, e.g., John D. Feerick et al., American Arbitration Assoc. et al., Model Standards of Conduct for Mediators Standard I (n.d.) ("Self-determination is the fundamental principle of mediation. It requires that the mediation process rely upon the ability of the parties to reach a voluntary, uncoerced agreement. Any party may withdraw from mediation at any time."), available in ; Henikoff & Moffitt, supra note 95, at 102-03 ("[T]he parties must fully understand that the process is voluntary and that they have the right to create, propose, evaluate, accept, or reject any possible solutions."); Nolan-Haley, supra note 92, at 90 ("The controlling principle of mediation is self-determination."); Stark, supra note 95, at 792 ("[A]n agreement is not truly voluntary if it is based on a factual misunderstanding (including a misunderstanding about governing law) that the mediator had an opportunity to correct but did not." (quoting James B. Boskey, The Proper Role of the Mediator: Rational Assessment, Not Pressure, 10 Negotiation J. 367, 370 (1994))).
252. See, e.g., John D. Feerick et al., American Arbitration Assoc. et al., Model Standards of Conduct for Mediators Standard I (n.d.) ("Self-determination is the fundamental principle of mediation. It requires that the mediation process rely upon the ability of the parties to reach a voluntary, uncoerced agreement. Any party may withdraw from mediation at any time."), available in ; Henikoff & Moffitt, supra note 95, at 102-03 ("[T]he parties must fully understand that the process is voluntary and that they have the right to create, propose, evaluate, accept, or reject any possible solutions."); Nolan-Haley, supra note 92, at 90 ("The controlling principle of mediation is self-determination."); Stark, supra note 95, at 792 ("[A]n agreement is not truly voluntary if it is based on a factual misunderstanding (including a misunderstanding about governing law) that the mediator had an opportunity to correct but did not." (quoting James B. Boskey, The Proper Role of the Mediator: Rational Assessment, Not Pressure, 10 Negotiation J. 367, 370 (1994))).
253. Henikoff & Moffitt, supra note 95, at 103. Kurtzberg and Henikoff illustrate the tension by discussing competing visions of the meaning of the term "informed consent." See Kurtzberg & Henikoff, supra note 95, at 86. The issue of whether the "informed consent" should be informed simply with respect to the nature of the mediation process, or with respect to the terms of any agreement, parallels the procedural versus substantive fairness debate. See supra note 97.
254. See, e.g., Henikoff & Moffitt, supra note 95, at 102-04 (considering principles of self-determination and informed consent); Kurtzberg & Henikoff, supra note 95, at 84-87 (same); Stark, supra note 95, at 775-79 (discussing arguments and counter-arguments regarding mediator evaluation and informed consent); Nolan-Haley, supra note 92, at 79-83 (discussing the debate over the propriety of mediators giving legal assistance).
255. Some scholars already argue that mediation is inappropriate in certain contexts - such as cases involving domestic violence - where a power imbalance exists and the mediation process may be utilized by the stronger party to further the domination of the weaker party. See, e.g., Penelope E. Bryan, Killing Us Softly: Divorce Mediation and the Politics of Power, 40 Buff. L. Rev. 441, 522 (1992) ("The insidious nature of mediation for divorcing women, though, remains hidden beneath its carefully crafted marketing rhetoric."); Trina Grillo, The Mediation Alternative: Process Dangers for Women, 100 Yale L.J. 1545, 1605-07 (1991) ("Women who have been through mandatory mediation often describe it as an experience of sexual domination, comparing mandatory mediation to rape." (citation omitted)); Henikoff & Moffitt, supra note 95, at 92-93 (criticizing mediations involving power imbalances between the sexes); Kurtzberg & Henikoff, supra note 95, at 55-60 (considering why critics find mediation to be harmful to the poor and disempowered). Similar arguments led to the exemption of unrepresented litigants from mediation in the Family Division in the Maryland Circuit Court. See, e.g., Letter from Judith Moran, Esq., Family Division Case Coordinator, Circuit Court of Baltimore City, to Sandra F. Haines, Esq. (Aug. 8, 1997) (on file with author) (critiquing the rule, labeled as Rule 9-205(b)(1)(A)).
256. Some scholars already argue that mediation is inappropriate in certain contexts - such as cases involving domestic violence - where a power imbalance exists and the mediation process may be utilized by the stronger party to further the domination of the weaker party. See, e.g., Penelope E. Bryan, Killing Us Softly: Divorce Mediation and the Politics of Power, 40 Buff. L. Rev. 441, 522 (1992) ("The insidious nature of mediation for divorcing women, though, remains hidden beneath its carefully crafted marketing rhetoric."); Trina Grillo, The Mediation Alternative: Process Dangers for Women, 100 Yale L.J. 1545, 1605-07 (1991) ("Women who have been through mandatory mediation often describe it as an experience of sexual domination, comparing mandatory mediation to rape." (citation omitted)); Henikoff & Moffitt, supra note 95, at 92-93 (criticizing mediations involving power imbalances between the sexes); Kurtzberg & Henikoff, supra note 95, at 55-60 (considering why critics find mediation to be harmful to the poor and disempowered). Similar arguments led to the exemption of unrepresented litigants from mediation in the Family Division in the Maryland Circuit Court. See, e.g., Letter from Judith Moran, Esq., Family Division Case Coordinator, Circuit Court of Baltimore City, to Sandra F. Haines, Esq. (Aug. 8, 1997) (on file with author) (critiquing the rule, labeled as Rule 9-205(b)(1)(A)).
257. See supra Part I.A. The discussion in this section focuses on the role of clerks in the clerk's offices. A discussion of the possible role of law clerks in the settlement process is included in the discussion of the role of the judge. See supra Part II.B.1.
258. See Greacen, supra note 24, passim. While Greacen recognizes that simplified procedures, easy-to-understand-and use forms, guidebooks, and volunteer bar efforts all are helpful, "even these efforts will not succeed unless court staff are capable of providing extensive information to litigants without lawyers, and [are] willing to do so." Id. at 12.
259. Elias, supra note 47, at 5. Elias argues that "[c]lerks should be able to provide the same information to the self-represented as they do to lawyers and their staffs," that the boundary be pushed back as to what is considered legal advice, and that court clerks should be required "to facilitate equal access regardless of whether a party is represented by counsel." Id.; see also Goldschmidt, supra note 3, at 25 ("Assistance to the pro se litigant should also be proactively provided by court staff.").
260. See, e.g., Minn. Conference Report, supra note 40, at 14; Greacen, supra note 24, at 12 (citing The Task Force on the Future of California's Courts, Justice in the Balance 2020 (1993)). Modifying the rules regarding the unauthorized practice of law might be necessary to provide comfort to clerks providing expanded assistance. See, e.g., Meeting the Challenge, supra note 1, at 41-45 (discussing recent proposals to guide court staff).
261. Greacen, supra note 24, at 14. Graecen also develops a description of the "Sample Staff Guidelines for Providing Information." See id. at 15. For a critique of the guidelines, see Meeting the Challenge, supra note 1, at 42-43. In Michigan, a group of court managers and support staff announced a description of guidelines. See id. at 43-44.
262. See supra Part II.A.2.
263. According to Mr. Greacen, this is the reading he intended. See Letter from John M. Greacen, Director of the Administrative Office of the Courts, Supreme Court of New Mexico, to Russell Engler, Clinical Director & Professor of Law, New England School of Law 4 (July 29, 1998) (on file with the author).
264. As with my reservations about the fourth Greacen principle, my discomfort with the third principle may be one of semantics, rather than substance. As proponents of a "client-centered" approach to counseling might contend, even lawyers arguably should not be telling litigants whether to bring their claims to court; the lawyers should be helping clients choose by advising clients of their options and the advantages and disadvantages of the options. See generally Binder et al., supra note 45, at 258-86 (discussing the proper and desirable ways lawyers can offer advice and guidance). To the extent the third Greacen principle only prohibits the telling, it is less objectionable, but it also provides clerks with less guidance. To the extent it is intended to bar clerks in all contexts from providing the type of information that might help unrepresented litigants make informed choices, my objections remain.
265. See supra notes 123-28 and accompanying text.
266. See supra Parts I.D, II.B.1.
267. See supra Part I.B.
268. See Increasing Access to Justice, supra note 33, at 10; Meeting the Challenge, supra note 1, at 109 ("State Court Systems and Local Courts Should Train Court Staff on How to Assist Self-Represented Litigants."). Clerks may need to preface their assistance with clear disclosures about their role, including their status as non-lawyers, where appropriate, and the fact that they might be called upon to help the other side. Given the realities facing the unrepresented poor, it is hard to imagine that the disclosures will deter many litigants from accepting whatever assistance the clerks can provide. A discussion of the court's role where clerks give poor advice to a represented party is beyond the scope of this Article.
269. See Poulakis v. Amtrak, 139 F.R.D. 107 (N.D. Ill. 1991); Patterson v. Brady, 131 F.R.D. 679 (S.D. Ind. 1990) (holding that where a pro se litigant's failure to comply with service requirements was attributed in part to the clerk's office, the pro se plaintiff satisfied the good cause requirement under Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(J)), aff'd mem. sub nom. Patterson v. Rubin, 89 F.3d 838 (7th Cir. 1996); see also Patterson, 131 F.R.D. at 684 n.7 (citing cases where courts found good cause in a pro se litigant's reliance on the clerk's advice).
270. See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b); Mass. R. Civ. P. 60(b).
271. See, e.g., supra notes 152-55 and accompanying text. Greacen refers to the consequences of misunderstood advice as an "extraneous" issue of "estoppel." Greacen, supra note 24, at 12. Greacen cites a series of cases that he contends stand for the proposition that reliance on erroneous advice from clerks does not "absolve[]" procedural responsibilities, constitute "excusable neglect" or permit "rel[iance] thereon for the purpose of estoppel." Id. at 12-14 (citing Brown v. Quinn, 550 N.E.2d 134, 136, 137 (Mass. 1990); Krupp v. Gulf Oil Corp., 557 N.E.2d 769, 771 (Mass. 1990); and Wyoming ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Compensation Div. v. Halstead, 795 P.2d 760, 775 (Wyo. 1990), superseded by statute as stated in Neal v. Caballo Rojo, Inc., 899 P.2d 56 (Wyo. 1995)). The cases cited by Greacen do not stand for the proposition that when an unrepresented litigant relies on incorrect advice from a clerk, such reliance does not constitute estoppel. The two Massachusetts cases, as well as the cases cited in those two cases, do not involve unrepresented litigants. See Brown, 550 N.E.2d at 135; Krupp, 557 N.E.2d at 770-71. In the third case, which does appear to involve an unrepresented litigant, the Supreme Court of Wyoming granted relief on other grounds, "negat[ing] the need to discuss the issue of estoppel." Halstead, 795 P.2d at 762.
272. See, e.g., Wis. Stat. Ann. § 757.30(2) (West 1981) ("Every person who . . . for compensation or pecuniary reward gives professional legal advice not incidental to his or her usual or ordinary business . . . shall be
273. See, e.g., Changing the Culture, supra note 58, at 34-35 (describing how a law-suit against a volunteer attorney jeopardized future LFD programs).
274. See, e.g., Mosten, supra note 48, at 430-35 (discussing malpractice exposure and civil immunity in the context of limited representation). With court-sponsored limited assistance programs, it is difficult to envision sound policy reasons to permit litigation. The appropriate focus should be court oversight and training. Litigants receiving harmful advice should have their remedy in the litigation itself in the form of relief from adverse decisions. The closer the assistance provided comes to full representation, the weaker the argument for civil immunity will be. For a similar recommendation relating to court staff, see Meeting the Challenge, supra note 1, at 113.
275. See Nonlawyer Practice, supra note 77, at 1-12, 73-157; Derek A. Denckla, Nonlawyers and the Unauthorized Practice of Law: An Overview of the Legal and Ethical Parameters, 67 Fordham L. Rev. 2581, passim (1999); Alex J. Hurder, Nonlawyer Legal Assistance and Access to Justice, 67 Fordham L. Rev. 2241, passim (1999); Rhode, supra note 77, passim (surveying developments in the unauthorized practice of law). As Gary Bellow and Jeanne Kettleson observed twenty years ago, "[m]uch more effective lay . . . representation would be a necessary component of any significant expansion of access . . . ." Gary Bellow & Jeanne Kettleson, From Ethics to Politics: Confronting Scarcity and Fairness in Public Interest Practice, 58 B.U. L. Rev. 337, 386 n.193 (1978). The increased use of lay advocates, however, would not necessarily benefit indigent litigants. As Barbara Bezdek's study of Baltimore's Rent Court revealed, the lion's share of non-attorney assistance is used against, rather than for, the indigent litigant. See Bezdek, supra note 23, at 562-63. Professor Bezdek's study confirmed the earlier predictions of Professor Abel: if advantaged parties were prohibited from using lawyers, they "could retain representatives who were not formally qualified as lawyers but possessed all of the lawyer's competence." Richard L. Abel, Socializing the Legal Profession: Can Redistributing Lawyers' Services Achieve Social Justice?, 1 L. & Pol'y Q., 5, 20 (1979).
276. See Nonlawyer Practice, supra note 77, at 1-12, 73-157; Derek A. Denckla, Nonlawyers and the Unauthorized Practice of Law: An Overview of the Legal and Ethical Parameters, 67 Fordham L. Rev. 2581, passim (1999); Alex J. Hurder, Nonlawyer Legal Assistance and Access to Justice, 67 Fordham L. Rev. 2241, passim (1999); Rhode, supra note 77, passim (surveying developments in the unauthorized practice of law). As Gary Bellow and Jeanne Kettleson observed twenty years ago, "[m]uch more effective lay . . . representation would be a necessary component of any significant expansion of access . . . ." Gary Bellow & Jeanne Kettleson, From Ethics to Politics: Confronting Scarcity and Fairness in Public Interest Practice, 58 B.U. L. Rev. 337, 386 n.193 (1978). The increased use of lay advocates, however, would not necessarily benefit indigent litigants. As Barbara Bezdek's study of Baltimore's Rent Court revealed, the lion's share of non-attorney assistance is used against, rather than for, the indigent litigant. See Bezdek, supra note 23, at 562-63. Professor Bezdek's study confirmed the earlier predictions of Professor Abel: if advantaged parties were prohibited from using lawyers, they "could retain representatives who were not formally qualified as lawyers but possessed all of the lawyer's competence." Richard L. Abel, Socializing the Legal Profession: Can Redistributing Lawyers' Services Achieve Social Justice?, 1 L. & Pol'y Q., 5, 20 (1979).
277. See Nonlawyer Practice, supra note 77, at 1-12, 73-157; Derek A. Denckla, Nonlawyers and the Unauthorized Practice of Law: An Overview of the Legal and Ethical Parameters, 67 Fordham L. Rev. 2581, passim (1999); Alex J. Hurder, Nonlawyer Legal Assistance and Access to Justice, 67 Fordham L. Rev. 2241, passim (1999); Rhode, supra note 77, passim (surveying developments in the unauthorized practice of law). As Gary Bellow and Jeanne Kettleson observed twenty years ago, "[m]uch more effective lay . . . representation would be a necessary component of any significant expansion of access . . . ." Gary Bellow & Jeanne Kettleson, From Ethics to Politics: Confronting Scarcity and Fairness in Public Interest Practice, 58 B.U. L. Rev. 337, 386 n.193 (1978). The increased use of lay advocates, however, would not necessarily benefit indigent litigants. As Barbara Bezdek's study of Baltimore's Rent Court revealed, the lion's share of non-attorney assistance is used against, rather than for, the indigent litigant. See Bezdek, supra note 23, at 562-63. Professor Bezdek's study confirmed the earlier predictions of Professor Abel: if advantaged parties were prohibited from using lawyers, they "could retain representatives who were not formally qualified as lawyers but possessed all of the lawyer's competence." Richard L. Abel, Socializing the Legal Profession: Can Redistributing Lawyers' Services Achieve Social Justice?, 1 L. & Pol'y Q., 5, 20 (1979).
278. See Nonlawyer Practice, supra note 77, at 1-12, 73-157; Derek A. Denckla, Nonlawyers and the Unauthorized Practice of Law: An Overview of the Legal and Ethical Parameters, 67 Fordham L. Rev. 2581, passim (1999); Alex J. Hurder, Nonlawyer Legal Assistance and Access to Justice, 67 Fordham L. Rev. 2241, passim (1999); Rhode, supra note 77, passim (surveying developments in the unauthorized practice of law). As Gary Bellow and Jeanne Kettleson observed twenty years ago, "[m]uch more effective lay . . . representation would be a necessary component of any significant expansion of access . . . ." Gary Bellow & Jeanne Kettleson, From Ethics to Politics: Confronting Scarcity and Fairness in Public Interest Practice, 58 B.U. L. Rev. 337, 386 n.193 (1978). The increased use of lay advocates, however, would not necessarily benefit indigent litigants. As Barbara Bezdek's study of Baltimore's Rent Court revealed, the lion's share of non-attorney assistance is used against, rather than for, the indigent litigant. See Bezdek, supra note 23, at 562-63. Professor Bezdek's study confirmed the earlier predictions of Professor Abel: if advantaged parties were prohibited from using lawyers, they "could retain representatives who were not formally qualified as lawyers but possessed all of the lawyer's competence." Richard L. Abel, Socializing the Legal Profession: Can Redistributing Lawyers' Services Achieve Social Justice?, 1 L. & Pol'y Q., 5, 20 (1979).
279. See Murphy, supra note 80, at 138-39; Rhode, supra note 77, at 221.
280. See, e.g., Responding to the Needs, supra note 25, at 37-38 (discussing the problems the non-traditional attorney-client relationship raises for malpractice insurance coverage); Millemann et al., supra note 57, at 1188-89 (discussing the need for reform in order to provide better legal services for unrepresented litigants); Mosten, supra note 48, at 430-34 (purporting that clear communication and a positive personal relationship between lawyer and client is mandatory until immunity or limitation on malpractice exposure are enacted for discrete task representation); Long & Lee, supra note 62, at 40-41 (exploring the possibility of providing incentives for the private bar to service those now unrepresented in family law matters); see also Meeting the Challenge, supra note 1, at 112 (recommending enhancement of unbundled legal services in pro bono cases). Recognizing a standard of care consistent with the limited representation, rather than measuring the provider of discrete task representation by the standards of full representation, and embedding the sliding standing into analysis under the ethics and malpractice rules, seems to be the most sensible approach. Requiring the attorney to set clear limits, particularly through a retainer, as to the scope of the representation is consistent with this approach. Mosten's call for civil immunity, however, seems unnecessary and goes too far. See Mosten, supra note 48, at 433-34. Even Mosten seems to recognize this: "I do not suggest complete immunity for unbundled lawyering malfeasance. Rather, I propose that liability should attach according to the contracted scope of lawyer engagement." Id. at 434. For a thoughtful set of recommendations designed to balance the need to protect vulnerable clients while expanding the use of discrete-task representation see McNeal, supra note 86, at 335-38.
281. See supra Part II.B.1-3.
282. See, e.g., infra Part III.B (discussing lay advocates in the context of bankruptcy cases).
283. See part I.B.2 for a discussion of the judiciary's and the profession's reaction to the provision of limited assistance by attorneys. Appropriate inquiries by judges and mediators would help identify the advice received by the unrepresented litigant and provide a measure of oversight. See supra Part II.B.1-2. Once attorneys are persuaded that the provision of limited assistance is welcomed, they may become more willing to provide the assistance. Rules requiring disclosure in pleadings might then become appropriate safeguards, rather than a device for chilling the practice.
284. See supra Part I.D.
285. Ninety-one percent of judges in one recent survey reported "that their courts had no general policy addressing the manner in which pro se litigants should be handled in the courtroom or in the litigation process generally." Goldschmidt, supra note 3, at 16; see Meeting the Challenge, supra note 1, at 54, 117. Forty-eight percent of court administrators in the same study reported that their court had no established rules, policies, or instructions to guide court staff in responding to pro se-related questions; of those responding that their courts had such policies, only 38% said the policies were in writing. See Meeting the Challenge, supra note 1, at 50, 123; Goldschmidt, supra note 3, at 21. For a discussion of the lack of guidance for mediators, see supra notes 217-25 and accompanying text. See also BBA Report, supra note 175, at 18 ("there is no systemic approach to unrepresented litigants in the [Massachusetts] District Court[s]"); id. at 3, 66 (recommending the adoption of guidelines to assist judges).
286. As Professor Galanter warned 25 years ago in his classic study explaining why the "haves" come out ahead of the "have nots": Rule change is in itself likely to have little effect because the system is so constructed that changes in the rules can be filtered out unless accompanied by changes at other levels. . . . The system has the capacity to change a great deal at the level of rules without corresponding changes in everyday patterns of practice or distribution of tangible advantages. Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 L. & Soc'y Rev. 95, 149 (1974) (footnote omitted) (describing relative success of repeat players versus one-shot players in court).
287. In promulgating rules, it will be important to ensure that rules or guidelines protect unrepresented litigants, rather than self-interested lawyers and judges. As a number of commentators observed, the process of adopting the Model Rules of Professional Conduct produced rules favoring lawyers at every turn, providing a basis for the concern that self-interest might prevail in rule-making. See, e.g., Stephen Gillers, What We Talked About When We Talked About Ethics: A Critical View of the Model Rules, 46 Ohio St. L.J. 243, 245, 268 (1985) (noting the tendency of the American legal profession to adopt self-serving rules); Deborah L. Rhode, Why the ABA Bothers: A Functional Perspective on Professional Codes, 59 Tex. L. Rev. 689, 691 (1981) (discussing potential conflicts of interest among members of the bar in adopting rules).
288. In promulgating rules, it will be important to ensure that rules or guidelines protect unrepresented litigants, rather than self-interested lawyers and judges. As a number of commentators observed, the process of adopting the Model Rules of Professional Conduct produced rules favoring lawyers at every turn, providing a basis for the concern that self-interest might prevail in rule-making. See, e.g., Stephen Gillers, What We Talked About When We Talked About Ethics: A Critical View of the Model Rules, 46 Ohio St. L.J. 243, 245, 268 (1985) (noting the tendency of the American legal profession to adopt self-serving rules); Deborah L. Rhode, Why the ABA Bothers: A Functional Perspective on Professional Codes, 59 Tex. L. Rev. 689, 691 (1981) (discussing potential conflicts of interest among members of the bar in adopting rules).
289. This is not to suggest that simplifying the procedures will inevitably benefit indigent litigants, the most common unrepresented litigants. Scholars have vigorously debated advantages of formal versus informal procedures in considering changes that might benefit poor people. See, e.g., Richard Abel, Informalism: A Tactical Equivalent to Law?, 19 Clearinghouse Rev. 375, 379-83 (1985) (arguing that formal procedures protect the pro se litigant); Galanter, supra note 253, at 149 (suggesting that substantive rule change alone is not likely to "be determinative of . . . outcomes"); William H. Simon, Legal Informality and Redistributive Politics, 19 Clearinghouse Rev. 384, 385-88 (1985) (analyzing the strategic advantages of the anti-informalist argument). Viewed only from the perspective of simplicity, difficulties facing unrepresented litigants in prosecuting breach of warranty of habitability might be equally met by making the proof of the defense easier for the tenant on the one hand, or eliminating the defense on the other. Both changes would "simplify" the procedure, but with very different substantive results.
290. This is not to suggest that simplifying the procedures will inevitably benefit indigent litigants, the most common unrepresented litigants. Scholars have vigorously debated advantages of formal versus informal procedures in considering changes that might benefit poor people. See, e.g., Richard Abel, Informalism: A Tactical Equivalent to Law?, 19 Clearinghouse Rev. 375, 379-83 (1985) (arguing that formal procedures protect the pro se litigant); Galanter, supra note 253, at 149 (suggesting that substantive rule change alone is not likely to "be determinative of . . . outcomes"); William H. Simon, Legal Informality and Redistributive Politics, 19 Clearinghouse Rev. 384, 385-88 (1985) (analyzing the strategic advantages of the anti-informalist argument). Viewed only from the perspective of simplicity, difficulties facing unrepresented litigants in prosecuting breach of warranty of habitability might be equally met by making the proof of the defense easier for the tenant on the one hand, or eliminating the defense on the other. Both changes would "simplify" the procedure, but with very different substantive results.
291. Notwithstanding the importance of a generalized assessment of complexity by subject matter, assistance models must also plan for varying degrees of complexity in individual cases. See, e.g., Cox & Dwyer, supra note 48, at 19 ("[J]ust as legal fields vary in complexity, so do individual cases. Some cases present simple fact situations, and others present complex situations. An otherwise simple divorce case, for example, may be made complex by the presence of marital children or substantial marital property.").
292. In making this assessment it is critical that the inquiry not turn on settlement rate of the cases; as has been seen, the pressure on unrepresented litigants to settle is immense, and the fact of their capitulating with great regularity is more a comment on the difficulties they encounter in court than on the contested nature of the action. A more instructive test might be to measure the contested nature of the action where both parties have lawyers. If the type of case is one that typically may be easily resolved, the case may be viewed as one that is not tremendously adversarial. One's view as to whether the presence of lawyers exacerbates or facilitates the dispute resolution process will affect one's view as to the appropriateness of such a test.
293. See, e.g., Caplovitz, supra note 158, passim (considering the serious problem of debt disentanglement); Sterling & Schrag, supra note 158, at 360 (suggesting that procedural reforms to protect unrepresented debtors may be warranted).
294. See infra Part III.C.
295. Notwithstanding imperfections in any effort to place programs along such a scale, the exercise nonetheless may provide assistance to those choosing among programs.
296. While no jurisdiction has recognized a right to counsel in most civil cases, judges in civil cases retain the discretion to appoint counsel where appropriate. See, e.g., UBO Realty Corp. v. Fulton, No. 98761/91 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. Dec. 9, 1991) (unpublished opinion, on file with the Fordham Law Review) (assigning counsel to indigent defendant where complex legal issues were at stake); Gardenia Realty v. McMillan, No. 77216/87 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. Aug. 3, 1987) (unpublished opinion, on file with the Fordham Law Review) (assigning counsel to indigent defendant where risk of grave harm existed). "Many states have poor persons statutes that authorize the appointment of counsel in civil matters for people who cannot afford the costs of prosecuting or defending a proceeding." Andrew Scherer, Gideon's Shelter: The Need to Recognize a Right to Counsel for Indigent Defendants in Eviction Proceedings, 23 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 557, 585 (1988); see also Rubin, supra note 60, at 1008-09 (discussing court appointed representation for indigent litigants).
297. As discussed above, the goal remains one of providing fairness and justice for those without lawyers as well as those with lawyers. See supra Part II.A.I. As urged throughout this Article, for that goal to have meaning, at a minimum, litigants should not forfeit important rights due to the absence of counsel. Outcomes of cases should relate to the merits of the claims, rather than the presence or absence of counsel. See supra note 17. While similar questions of fairness arise when both parties have counsel of differing levels of skill or the parties have unequal resources, those questions are beyond the scope of this Article. The profession could choose to place the burden on the court personnel to correct imbalances, increase its regulation of lawyers, or allow the imbalance to operate unchecked. None of the choices obviates the need to solve the problem of assisting the unrepresented poor.
298. See, e.g., Changing the Culture, supra note 58, at 26 (reporting the impressions of court personnel that "in approximately 80% of cases in the [Massachusetts] Probate and Family Court, at least one party is not represented by counsel"); Erin M. Moore, The Cost of Divorce: Pro Se Litigants Flood Family Law Courts, De Novo, May 1995, at 1 (reporting that 77% of all family cases in Washington State involve at least one unrepresented litigant); Sales et al., supra note 53, at 571 n.82 (noting that "in 88.2% of the divorce cases filed in Maricopa County [Arizona] in 1990, at least one of the litigants was self-represented"); McKnight, supra note 126, at 1 (revealing that 89% of the family law cases in Oregon involve at least one pro se party). The numbers have been surging at least since the 1980s. See, e.g., Rhode, supra note 77, at 214-15 (noting that the proportion of pro se filings in surveyed California counties grew from 39% to 62% of family law cases during the 1980s); Cox & Dwyer, supra note 48, at 2 (reporting that pro se filings for a sample of divorce cases in Arizona increased from 24% to 47% between 1980 and 1985); see also BBA Report, supra note 175, at 5 ("Although some growth in pro se litigation is reported in all categories of civil litigation, the most drastic and consistent increase appears to be in domestic litigation."); Meeting the Challenge, supra note 1, at 49 ("The area of law and court operations that is feeling the brunt of the increase in the volume of pro se cases is domestic relations.").
299. See, e.g., Cox & Dwyer, supra note 48, at 30 (concluding that after testing theories as to why more litigants self-represent in divorce cases than in bankruptcy cases, "[o]ur empirical findings are consistent with our hypothesis that consumers' use of self-help varies inversely with legal and factual complexity").
300. See, e.g., Sales et al., supra note 53, at 561-66 (identifying factors such as the income of the parties, the presence of any children, the amount of property, and the length of the marriage as affecting the complexity of the proceeding).
301. See, e.g., Sales et al., supra note 53, at 571 n.82 (reporting that in over 35% of the divorce cases filed in Maricopa County, Arizona, in 1990, one side was pro se, while the other was represented by an attorney); McKnight, supra note 263, at 1 (reporting that 44% of the family law filings in Oregon involved only one represented party).
302. See Jana B. Singer & William L. Reynolds, A Dissent on Joint Custody, 47 Md. L. Rev. 497, 503 (1988) (describing "custody blackmail," in which "divorcing husbands routinely and successfully use the threat of a custody fight to reduce or eliminate alimony and child support obligations"). But cf. Eleanor E. MacCoby & Robert H. Mnookin, Dividing the Child 154-59 (1992) (questioning the extent of the practice of "custody blackmail" based on a California study).
303. See Jana B. Singer & William L. Reynolds, A Dissent on Joint Custody, 47 Md. L. Rev. 497, 503 (1988) (describing "custody blackmail," in which "divorcing husbands routinely and successfully use the threat of a custody fight to reduce or eliminate alimony and child support obligations"). But cf. Eleanor E. MacCoby & Robert H. Mnookin, Dividing the Child 154-59 (1992) (questioning the extent of the practice of "custody blackmail" based on a California study).
304. Jan Hoffman, New York's Chief Judge Imposes Strict Rules for Divorce Lawyers, N.Y. Times, Aug. 17, 1993, at A1 (quoting Chief Judge Judith S. Kaye of the New York Court of Appeals); see Grillo, supra note 225, at 1572 ("[F]amily conflicts . . . often involve a combination of emotional and legal complaints . . . .").
305. See, e.g., Richard E. Crouch, The Matter of Bombers: Unfair Tactics and the Problem of Defining Unethical Behavior in Divorce Litigation, 20 Fam. L.Q. 413, 415-34 (1986) (describing unethical tactics used in divorce litigation). But cf. McEwen et al., supra note 93, at 1364-65 (describing the results of a study in Maine, including reports from lawyers that they typically try to reduce, rather than exacerbate, conflict).
306. See, e.g., District of Columbia Bar Task Force on Family Law Representation, Access to Family Law Representation in the District of Columbia: A Report of the D.C. Bar Public Service Activities Corporation 12 (1992) (demonstrating that the majority of low income families and children in the District of Columbia are not receiving the legal assistance they need in family law matters); Changing the Culture, supra note 58, at 26 (discussing the large number of unrepresented litigants appearing in family courts); Minn. Conference Report, supra note 40, at 14 (recommending measures to address the needs of pro se litigants); Long & Lee, supra note 62, at 1-2 (discussing the pro per problem in California family law cases).
307. See generally Millemann et al., supra note 57, passim (describing an experimental project in which law students provided legal information and advice to otherwise unrepresented parties in family law cases); Murphy, supra note 80, at 123-24 (discussing the lack of access to the courts to resolve family law disputes and recommending alternatives to adversarial proceedings); Sales et al., supra note 53, at 560 (discussing self representation as an alternative to attorney representation in divorce cases).
308. See Responding to the Needs, supra note 25, at 12-13; Changing the Culture, supra note 58, at 29-34; Murphy, supra note 80, at 142; Yegge, supra note 74, at 10-12; Long & Lee, supra note 62, at 13-42. Some include reference to the concept of "unbundled legal services." See Responding to the Needs, supra note 25, at 37-38; Minn. Conference Report, supra note 40, at 16; Wisconsin Comm. on the Delivery of Legal Services, State Bar of Wise., Final Report and Recommendations 29 (1996); Changing the Culture, supra note 58, at 33; Millemann et al., supra note 57, at 1188-89; Long & Lee, supra note 62, at 40-42.
309. See, e.g., Caroline Kearney, Pedagogy in a Poor People's Court: The First Year of a Child Support Clinic, 19 N.M. L. Rev. 175, 176 (1989) ("One of the frequently cited barriers to the establishment and collection of support orders is the inability of large numbers of women to afford counsel." (citations omitted)); Golden, supra note 58, at 1 (reporting that, according to judges and other legal observers of the Massachusetts Probate and Family Courts, "[w]ithout attorneys, [unrepresented female litigants] run more risk of losing their children, paying excessive support, being pressured into an unfair settlement - or even making themselves vulnerable to batter-ers . . . ."); Yegge, supra note 74, at 10 ("Research indicates that pro se litigants frequently proceed without the benefit of critical information such as pretrial relief, allocation of insurance, pension benefits, and tax consequences."); Long & Lee, supra note 62, at 9 ("Pro pers appear to have a greater probability of experiencing an unjust result"). See generally Bryan, supra note 153, at 931 (discussing the different background conditions that women face in divorce proceedings).
310. See Changing the Culture, supra note 58, at 29 (arguing that judges' practice of using "valuable court time to explain rules and procedures or to ask questions of witnesses in an attempt to be fair or to further discovery of critical information" may be unfair to represented adversaries "since it creates the appearance that the court favors the unrepresented party"); Cox & Dwyer, supra note 48, at 51 (noting a potential problem in divorce cases, where "courts are forced to take an active role in their cases in order to protect [unrepresented] individuals' rights, thus jeopardizing judicial impartiality"); Long & Lee, supra note 62, at 7-8.
311. See Bohmer & Ray, supra note 97, at 40; Bryan, supra note 153, at 937; McEwen et al., supra note 93, at 1345-46; Mnookin & Kernhauser, supra note 158, at 956; Richard Neely, The Primary Caretaker Parent Rule: Child Custody and the Dynamics of Greed, 3 Yale L. & Pol'y Rev. 168, 173 n.11 (1984).
312. See supra notes 274-76; see also Memorandum from Judith C. Nord, Staff Attorney, Minnesota Judicial Center, to All Pro Se Subcommittee Members app. G (May 2, 1997) [hereinafter Nord Memorandum] (on file with author) (recommending a protocol to be used by the court during proceedings with pro se litigants); Long & Lee, supra note 62, at 5-7 ("Pro pers demand . . . more attention from judges. . . . [Some] judges feel that unrepresented parties place them in a compromising position.").
313. See Daniszewski, supra note 187, at 49 ("According to one superior court clerk's informal estimate, 75 percent of the staff time at the clerk's office counter is spent dealing with inquiries by pro se litigants. Pro se litigants also consume 60 to 70 percent of staff telephone time."); Cox & Dwyer, supra note 48, at 54 ("[T]he majority of court personnel indicated that self-help cases require more court time and resources on a per case basis than do attorney-handled cases."); Long & Lee, supra note 62, at 5.
314. See Responding to the Needs, supra note 25, at 24-26; Changing the Culture, supra note 58, at 29 ("Significant numbers of pro se litigants seek to use court personnel as a source of legal advice."); Yegge, supra note 74, at 11 ("While court clerks may not practice law, they must not hide behind that prohibition. Clerks must be trained to give clear and correct procedural directions . . . ." (emphasis added)); Long & Lee, supra note 62, at 5. While observing that court staff are "appropriately reluctant to give information that could be construed as legal advice," the Minnesota Conference of Judges has proposed following the advice of John Greacen. Minn. Conference Report, supra note 40, at 14; see Nord Memorandum, supra note 276, app. F; see also supra Part II.B.3 (stating that the role of court personnel should be expanded beyond the barrier of "no legal advice").
315. See, e.g., Committee for Gender Equality of the Mass. Supreme Jud. Ct., Achieving Equity: Recommendations for Dispute Intervention Practice in the Probate & Family Court 10-11 (1995) [hereinafter Achieving Equity] (redefining mediation as "dispute intervention" in the family setting); Mass. Gender Bias Study, supra note 49, at 23-27 (arguing that mediation, as it is currently practiced in the probate court, disadvantages women because if their generally unequal bargaining power); Grillo, supra note 225, at 1548-50 (challenging the view that mediation is preferred over the adversarial system for women in custody disputes).
316. See, e.g., Changing the Culture, supra note 58, at 28-29 ("Pro se litigants often raise frivolous claims or legally meritorious claims in frivolous ways . . . . Pro se litigants are rarely penalized for failure to follow the rules."); Sales et al., supra note 53, at 558 ("An issue . . . is whether judicial assistance to self-represented litigants in any way biases the outcome in their favor when the opposing parties are represented by attorneys."); Daniszewski, supra note 187, at 47 (describing one school of thought that proposes that "judges [may be] more prone to relax the enforcement of the rules when they are dealing with pro se litigants.").
317. See Daniszewski, supra note 187, at 46; Charles P. Kindregan et al., Emerging Changes in Domestic Relations Procedure, 26 Mass. Law. Wkly. 1241, 1262 (1998).
318. See generally Engler, supra note 43, at 122-30 (providing examples suggesting that such misconduct is commonplace). Even where ethical issues are mentioned, they are mentioned in terms of problems created for the lawyer by the unrepresented litigant, rather than as lawyer misconduct that must be curbed. See, e.g., Changing the Culture, supra note 58, at 28 ("Lawyers who represent a party against a pro se opponent are often placed in an ethical bind because the lawyer must deal directly with the unrepresented opponent."); Long & Lee, supra note 62, at 5 (noting that one party's lack of representation creates difficulties for the adversary).
319. Even the source of the proposals underscores current limitations. The proposals come from individual lawyers and groups of lawyers, and remain as proposals. Until and unless the proposals gain the backing of court administrators, the effectiveness of the proposals will be limited. Rather than simply providing courthouse space and cooperation, court administrators need to promulgate rules redefining the proper role of the judges, lawyers, mediators and clerks consistent with the principals discussed in this Article. See supra Part U.C.
320. See Cox & Dwyer, supra note 48, at 2.
321. See Gary Klein & Maggie Spade, National Consumer Law Ctr., Self Representation in the Bankruptcy Court: The Massachusetts Experience 1 (1996) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author). The total number of pro se cases filed in Massachusetts increased from 580 to 813 between 1990 and 1991. See id. Data from New Hampshire, Rhode Island and Vermont reflected a similar pattern. See id. at 1 n.4. Pro se filings in bankruptcies varied from 10% to 34% in certain California counties by the late 1980s. See Rhode, supra note 77, at 214-215. "The Administrative Offices of the United States Courts estimate that 12.7 percent of Chapter 7 cases were filed pro se in 1992, or approximately 84,000 pro se petitions." Susan Block-Lieb, A Comparison of Pro Bono Representation Programs for Consumer Debtors, 2 Am. Bankr. Inst. L. Rev. 37, 55 (1994).
322. See Gary Klein & Maggie Spade, National Consumer Law Ctr., Self Representation in the Bankruptcy Court: The Massachusetts Experience 1 (1996) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author). The total number of pro se cases filed in Massachusetts increased from 580 to 813 between 1990 and 1991. See id. Data from New Hampshire, Rhode Island and Vermont reflected a similar pattern. See id. at 1 n.4. Pro se filings in bankruptcies varied from 10% to 34% in certain California counties by the late 1980s. See Rhode, supra note 77, at 214-215. "The Administrative Offices of the United States Courts estimate that 12.7 percent of Chapter 7 cases were filed pro se in 1992, or approximately 84,000 pro se petitions." Susan Block-Lieb, A Comparison of Pro Bono Representation Programs for Consumer Debtors, 2 Am. Bankr. Inst. L. Rev. 37, 55 (1994).
323. See Block-Lieb, supra note 285, at 41.
324. "In addition to those who file pro se because they can't afford an attorney, there is also undoubtedly a pool of people who would like to file bankruptcy but can't afford the legal fees and don't feel confident to file pro se." Klein & Spade, supra note 285, at 36 (citing Jason DeParle, Poor Find Going Broke is Too Costly, N.Y. Times, Dec. 11, 1991, at A24). Bankruptcy court, of course, provided the context for the famous due process challenge of the debtor too poor to afford the filing fee for bankruptcy. See United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 450 (1973) (upholding a state filing fee requirement conditioning access to judicial discharge in bankruptcy).
325. See Klein & Spade, supra note 285, at 29 ("Most lawyers advise [judgment proof] debtors not to bother with the bankruptcy process, because they have little to gain from filing which they cannot achieve by ignoring their creditors.").
326. "[P]etition preparation services and their advertising as well as 'self help' bankruptcy kits, played a significant but unquantifiable role in the pro se filings we studied. The data in this study strongly suggests that a high percentage of debtors obtained assistance in some way, large or small, from non-attorneys." Klein & Spade, supra note 285, at 34-35; see also Rhode, supra note 77, at 227 (noting that in response to a recommendation by the California State Bar Commission on Legal Technicians for limited reforms in the area of unauthorized practice of law, "[a]dvisory groups in bankruptcy, family law, and landlord-tenant stressed the significant risk of injuries from lay practice . . . ."). For cases involving the alleged unauthorized practice of law in the bankruptcy context, see, for example, In re Bachmann, 113 B.R. 769 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1990); In re Anderson, 79 B.R. 482 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1987); O'Connell v. David, 35 B.R. 141 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1983).
327. See Klein & Spade, supra note 285, at 2. Nonetheless, the prevalence of unrepresented litigants and volume of cases might vary significantly from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, calling for different responses. See id. at 40 ("Pro se filing rates appear to have substantial local impetus. For example, in California there are huge and unmanageable numbers of pro se cases. In other jurisdictions, such as Vermont, there are almost none."). Klein and Spade identify the additional strains on clerks in terms of dealing with paperwork that is improperly prepared and the need to address frequent requests for significant information. See id. at 2. Judges and other courtroom personnel similarly "devote significant court time to explaining the intricacies of the bankruptcy system to confused pro se debtors," and hearings "in pro se cases frequently fray the nerves of not just the participants," but others in the courtroom as well. Id.
328. Id. at 5. Due primarily to this factor, the Bar Association in Minneapolis provides pro bono counsel for "adversary proceedings." Id. at 39.
329. "Nearly half the pro se debtors were low-income, while only 19% of the control group fell in this bracket. By comparison, nearly 40% of the represented debtors had incomes recorded at the highest range, above $24,000 annually, while only 17% of pro se debtors had similar income." Id. at 12. "The majority of the telephone interviewees, 66% . . . indicated their reason[ ] for filing pro se was that they were unable to afford an attorney for the case." Id. at 17. Cox and Dwyer similarly found that income for pro se debtors was generally lower than for represented debtors. See Cox & Dwyer, supra note 48, at 44. "Payment of attorneys fees is . . . out of the reach of many individuals in bankruptcy." Block-Lieb, supra note 285, at 39.
330. Klein & Spade, supra note 285, at 4. Cox and Dwyer previously identified the complexity of bankruptcy cases as a major reason consumers' use of self-help was greater in divorce ("the less complex field") than bankruptcy. Cox & Dwyer, supra note 48, at 2. Cox and Dwyer assumed that legal complexity was important to consumers' choice of legal representation, and therefore compared "consumers' use of self-help divorce (a relatively simple legal procedure) to that of self-help bankruptcy (a more complex legal action)." Id. "Our empirical findings are consistent with our hypothesis that consumers' use of self-help varies inversely with legal and factual complexity." Id. at 30.
331. Klein & Spade, supra note 285, at 20. While both Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 bankruptcies are options for an individual debtor, Chapter 7 involves a simpler process, often resulting in discharge of debts but typically involving liquidations of the debtor's assets. See id. at 27-28. Chapter 13 "has substantial procedural and substantive complications," including a reorganization plan and the need for ongoing payments; the stakes are higher, since the successful debtor can "protect and keep non-exempt property, take advantage of the broader discharge, and . . . make installment payments on the arrears of a secured debt after default." Id. at 28. Klein and Spade measured success primarily by the extent to which the debtors' debts were discharged, the goal of most bankruptcy cases. Since a discharge releases the debtor from the legal obligation to repay discharged debts, "[discharge is . . . a good outcome." Id. at 18. In contrast, case dismissal is "generally a bad outcome," since the debtor is turned away without relief. Id. "In Chapter 7 [cases], 97.5% of represented debtors and 93.5% of unrepresented debtors obtained discharges." Id. at 19. In contrast, in only 2% of the Chapter 13 bankruptcies (possibly rising at most to 12%, since not all cases were completed at the time of the study) were the debts of the unrepresented debtors discharged. See id. at 19-20. Comparatively, 27.3% of the represented debtors already had received a discharge by the end of the data collection (possibly rising as high as 82%, given the pendency of additional cases). See id. Cox and Dwyer earlier had found that self-helpers tended to reaffirm too many debts. See Cox & Dwyer, supra note 48, at 49. Klein and Spade, however, found that this concern, which requires the debtor to remain legally bound to pay a debt which would otherwise be eliminated, was not born out by their study. See Klein & Spade, supra note 285, at 21.
332. See Klein & Spade, supra note 285, at 20.
333. See id. "Pro se debtors had more problems filling out the bankruptcy forms than debtors represented by an attorney." Id. at 24.
334. See id. at 28-29. Pro se "debtors are priced out of [Chapter 13] bankruptcy unless they can afford the $800-1500 attorney fee for such cases - in addition to the amounts necessary to cure their defaults and propose a feasible plan." Id. (footnotes omitted).
335. See id. at 12 ("Represented debtors . . . tended to have more assets than pro se debtors."). For Cox and Dwyer, however, the clearer correlation was with debt: Through experimentation with various debt and asset measures of relative case complexity, we found that consumers' use of self-help bankruptcy was best explained by the dollar amount of total debt involved in each bankruptcy case . . . . As total debt increases, use of self-help declines. The relationship between consumer income and the incidence of self-help bankruptcy, on the other hand, is a quadratic one. As income increases from very low levels to lower middle income levels, the incidence of self-help bankruptcy falls; but, between $20,000 and $50,000 of annual income, the incidence of self-help bankruptcy increases slightly. Cox & Dwyer, supra note 48, at 27 (footnote omitted).
336. Block-Lieb, supra note 285, at 37; see Klein & Spade, supra note 285, at 18-27. Bankruptcy judges in Massachusetts have expressed concerns about unrepresented litigants, including "the loss of valuable rights by litigants who do not understand the process." BBA Report, supra note 175, at 38. 300. See, e.g., Block-Lieb, supra note 285, at 42-45 (describing existing programs for pro bono representation of individual debtors); Pro Se Debtors & Creditors in Bankruptcy Cases: An Excerpt from the Case Management Manual for U.S. Bankruptcy Judges, FJC Directions, June 1996, at 37, 39 [hereinafter Bankruptcy Excerpt] (offering suggestions regarding development of district-wide programs to address the needs of pro se parties); Klein & Spade, supra note 285, at 37 (proposing a "pro se clinic" model for unrepresented Chapter 7 debtors).
337. Klein & Spade, supra note 285, at 37. Klein and Spade caution that the clinic would be designed to provide "advice to those who feel comfortable proceeding without an attorney, as long as pro bono help is provided to qualified debtors who need it." Id. (emphasis added). Klein and Spade envision that the help would be available on an ongoing basis, "for example, if a motion for relief or adversary proceeding is filed." Id.
338. Id.
339. Id.
340. This proposal involves "[a]ggressive enforcement work" under 11 U.S.C. § 110 to put "the bad actors out of business" and the elimination of publications known to be out of date. Id. at 38. Elsewhere, the authors assert that "[t]he bar should encourage rather than discourage responsible non-attorney participation in that process, through bankruptcy kits and petition preparation services." Id. at 36; see also Bankruptcy Excerpt, supra note 300, at 39 (identifying the need to control "improper filings by 'bankruptcy mills'" as a key component to a strategy to assist pro se parties in bankruptcy court).
341. See Bankruptcy Excerpt, supra note 300, at 37 (describing the possible use of clerks to provide early review of pro se filings to allow for prompt curing of technical defects); Klein & Spade, supra note 285, at 38 ("The number of pro se cases has increased to the point in many jurisdictions where it makes sense to designate clerk's office personnel for special training and assistance to pro se debtors.").
342. Examples include regulation of reaffirmation agreements and uniform protections for motions and other litigation filed against pro se debtors. See Klein & Spade, supra note 285, at 39 (footnote omitted); see also Bankruptcy Excerpt, supra note 300, at 37-39 (discussing generally management techniques for individual cases and proceedings involving pro se litigants).
343. See Bankruptcy Excerpt, supra note 300, at 39 (discussing sample forms and instructional materials as components to a districtwide program to assist pro se parties); Klein & Spade, supra note 285, at 39.
344. Klein & Spade state that: [J]udges . . . frequently devote significant court time to explaining the intricacies of the bankruptcy system to confused pro se debtors, providing information about bankruptcy which is normally conveyed by an attorney in the course of paid representation. Judicial proceedings involving pro se debtors may be time consuming and frustrating for all concerned. Klein & Spade, supra note 285, at 2. The authors attribute the relative scarcity of motions for stays by creditors in cases involving unrepresented debtors in part to "creditor awareness of judicial protectiveness of pro se debtors." Id. at 23 (footnote omitted).
345. "Since judges regularly engage in substantial efforts to assist pro se debtors because of a perception that they are at a disadvantage, it is not uncommon for parties opposing pro se litigants to feel unjustly treated." Id. at 2. "Taking such precautions [of sample instruction sheets] can alleviate the need for judges to serve as ad hoc protectors of the interests of pro se debtors together with the appearance of partiality which that creates." Id. at 39. "Discussions with other members of the bar about this study suggest that many perceive the judges in Massachusetts to bend over backward to protect the rights of unrepresented debtors. There was little objection to this practice." Id. at 23 n.48; see also Cox & Dwyer, supra note 48, at 51 (noting that one problem created by self-helpers in both bankruptcy and divorce cases is that "courts are forced to take an active role in their cases in order to protect individuals' rights, thus jeopardizing judicial impartiality").
346. See Greacen, supra note 24, at 12 (observing that the phrase "I am not allowed to give legal advice" is an easy way to "get rid of" an unrepresented litigant seeking assistance); Cox & Dwyer, supra note 48, at 50 ("Some judicial personnel even display a marked degree of antagonism for the self-helper."); Klein & Spade, supra note 285, at 32 ("The clerk's office in Massachusetts will almost always accept filings unless they are so deficient as to be incomprehensible . . . . Although personnel seek to avoid providing legal advice, it is not completely clear where the line lies."). See generally Greacen, supra note 24 (arguing that the phrase "no legal advice from court personnel" has no inherent meaning and has negative consequences in the courts' ability to serve the public).
347. See, e.g., Bankruptcy Excerpt, supra note 300, at 38 (noting the equalizing effect of mediation in litigation between pro se parties and represented parties); Barry Russell, U.S. Bankruptcy Court Initiates Innovative Mediation Program with Success, Resolutions, Winter 1997, at 4, 4 (measuring "success" of mediation program by a settlement rate of 62%).
348. As one commentator has noted: Judges disagree as to the level and type of assistance they or other members of the court staff can provide to pro se parties without creating a perception of, or actually, favoring unrepresented parties, engaging in the inappropriate "practice of law" in the cases before the court, and compromising the court's impartiality. These materials are not intended to provide support for any position on these issues, but rather to provide suggestions for consideration by judges in light of their individual views. Bankruptcy Excerpt, supra note 300, at 37 (emphasis added). Moreover, the recommendations remain such until and unless they are adopted by the courts themselves, or the proposals receive the full support of the courts. See id. ("[T]he Case Management Manual for United States Bankruptcy Judges['] . . . suggestions reflect the varied experiences of both bankruptcy and district court judges, but not any official position or recommendation of the Judicial Conference, the Administrative Office [of the U.S. Courts], or the [Federal Judicial] Center."(emphasis added)).
349. Wisdom v. Brunache, No. 96-05297, at 2-3 (Boston Housing Ct. Mar. 6, 1997) (unpublished opinion, on file with the Fordham Law Review). The other justice, Chief Justice E. George Daher, stated that the court's decision "accurately reflects my own views." Letter from E. George Daher, Chief Justice, Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Housing Court Department, City of Boston, to Barbara Sard, Senior Managing Attorney, Greater Boston Legal Services 1 (Mar. 13, 1997) [hereinafter Daher Mar. 13, 1997 Letter] (on file with the author). In Wisdom, the defendant received assistance from Greater Boston Legal Services in completing her answer and filing discovery. Wisdom, No. 96-05297, at 2 n.2. Despite the presence of claims relating to a violation of Massachusetts' Security Deposit Statute and a breach of the implied warranty of habitability, no evidence relating to these claims was elicited at trial. See id. at 2. As the court further explained: There are hundreds of cases on the summary process docket on any given Thursday. The answer form filed by the defendant was apparently provided to the her [sic] by Legal Services. The defendant checked off boxes, filled in a few blanks and signed her name. These form pleadings are filled out and filed by tenants in thousands of summary process actions. Sometimes the tenant presents evidence in support of a claim check off on the form. Often they do not. The parties (both represented and pro se) file numerous papers with the Court prior to trial (including discovery) that are never introduced in evidence. The defendant now points to information about a security deposit in the plaintiff's answer to an interrogatory which was not mentioned during the trial. . . . I am obligated to decide cases based upon the evidence and testimony presented at trial. Id. at 2-3.
350. Benchmark Apartment Management Corp. v. Mercer, No. 96-00949, at 8-9 n.8 (Boston Housing Ct. Jan. 3, 1997) (unpublished opinion, on file with the Fordham Law Review). The Mercer decision arose in the limited context of a motion to vacate a consent judgment involving a federal subsidized tenancy. At issue was a proceeding brought under Massachusetts General Laws chapter 139, section 19 to annul and void the tenancy based on alleged illegal acts, in this instance involving an altercation between the tenant and her neighbor. See id. at 1. Despite the fact that the tenancy was a section 8 tenancy, the landlord did not provide termination notice, as required by federal law, believing that the federal law did not apply in a Massachusetts General Laws chapter 139, section 19 proceeding. See id. at 9. On the court date, the case was referred to mediation where the tenant entered into an agreement to vacate her apartment. See id. at 4. The tenant thereafter retained counsel, who filed a motion to vacate the consent judgment on a variety of grounds, including a lack of subject matter jurisdiction based on the failure to serve a termination notice. See id. at 1. Finding that federal law did not conflict with state law; that federal law required service of the termination notice; that the failure to serve the termination notice deprived the court of jurisdiction; and that the lack of jurisdiction could not be waived by the tenant by entering into a consent judgment, the court allowed Defendant's Motion to Vacate the Agreement and dismissed plaintiff's complaint. See id. at 12. The court's proposed colloquy included the following additional questions specifically relating to the federal subsidy reached in a case brought under Massachusetts General Laws chapter 139, section 19. At a minimum the judge should determine: "(1) whether a federally subsidized tenancy is involved; (2) if yes, whether the landlord has served the tenant with a legally sufficient termination notice prior to the commencement of the legal action." Id. at 8 n.8.
351. Various studies have indicated that landlords are represented in approximately 75% of the cases in Boston Housing Court, while tenants are represented in approximately 10% of the cases. See Letter from Paul R. Collier, Esq., Senior Clinical Instructor, Greater Boston Legal Services, et al., to the Honorable Paul J. Liacos, Chief Justice, Supreme Judicial Court of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts 2 (May 23, 1996) [hereinafter Collier May 23, 1996 Letter] (on file with author); Russell Engler & Craig S. Bloomgarden, Summary Process Actions in Boston Housing Court: An Empirical Study and Recommendations for Reform 5 (May 20, 1983) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author); Neil Steiner, An Analysis of the Effectiveness of a Limited Assistance Outreach Project to Low-Income Tenants Facing Eviction 2 (Oct. 14, 1997) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author); see also Fox, supra note 23, passim (exploring the role of "self-agency" in negotiations between landlords and tenants); Kurtzberg & Henikoff, supra note 95, at 60-61 (arguing that poorer, unfamiliar tenants are at a legal disadvantage against wealthier, knowledgeable landlords).
352. See, e.g., Bezdek, supra note 23, at 557 (noting that rent court "is a theater of class conflict in which businesses and their hirelings constitute a class of professional claimants exercising significant advantages over the individual defendants whom they bring before the court, who are poor and poorly situated with respect to the attributes that garner respectful hearing in court rooms"); Fox, supra note 23, at 92-93 ("Groups in the hallway [of the Boston Housing Court] are stratified by socio-economic class and authority with the court. In addition to visible discrepancies such as style of dress and color of skin, other palpable distinctions exist between those with more and less privilege.").
353. See Fox, supra note 23, at 91-92; Steiner, supra note 315, at 2.
354. See, e.g., Kurtzberg & Henikoff, supra note 95, at 63-70 (noting that the complexities of Massachusetts housing law present obstacles to tenants in defending their rights). In the words of a Boston Housing Court Judge, "[t]he laws regulating landlords and tenants in Massachusetts are technical and complex and often traps for the unwary." Engler, supra note 43, at 117 n.166 (quoting Associate Justice Jeffrey Winik, Remarks from the Bench (Nov. 30, 1995)). With respect to the adversarial nature, the frequent battles in the legislature and the courts between landlords' interests and tenants' interests are one indicator of the conflict. The court cases reflect conflicting policies of protecting a tenant's home and a landlord's property (and home as well, in the owner-occupied context).
355. See, e.g., Fox, supra note 23, at 92 ("No information was available regarding the rights and responsibilities of landlords or tenants. Similarly, no one was available to answer questions."); see also BBA Report, supra note 175, at 20 ("There are not sufficient signs to direct people to the correct floor and no information desk or other means for litigants to know where to go or what to do.").
356. BBA Report, supra note 175, at 20.
357. See, e.g., Fox, supra note 23, at 92-93, 98 (citing examples of tenants' unwillingness to assert valid defenses); Kurtzberg & Henikoff, supra note 95, at 71 ("Without the benefit of legal counsel, tenants frequently forfeited their formal legal protections . . . ."); Collier May 23, 1996 Letter, supra note 315, at 2-3 ("The tenant families were evicted in approximately 80% of these cases.") (citing Massachusetts Law Reform Inst., Survey of 1993 and 1994 Summary Process Cases in the Housing Courts and District Courts in Massachusetts (1995)).
358. See, e.g., Fox, supra note 23, at 85 (stating that the majority of housing court cases in Boston are sent to mediation).
359. Id. at 91-92. The mediation office is called the office of the housing specialists, and the mediators are referred to as "housing specialists." Id. at 91.
360. See, e.g., id. ("In an effort to manage the hundreds of cases docketed for a single day, the housing court instituted mediation with housing specialists.").
361. See, e.g., Kurtzberg & Henikoff, supra note 95, at 90 (referring to the Harvard Mediation Program's "policy which prohibits mediators from providing parties with 'the law' during mediation"). Not surprisingly, unrepresented tenants fare worse when they settle cases in mediation than when they appear before a judge. See BBA Report, supra note 175, at 21; Engler & Bloomgarden, supra note 315, at 5-6; Steiner, supra note 315, at 28.
362. See generally Engler, supra note 43 (arguing for the regulation of lawyers' negotiations with the unrepresented poor). Whether unrepresented tenants fare worse in the hallways or before the mediators is a matter of dispute. Compare Steiner, supra note 315, at 28 (stating that tenants who choose mediation fare worse), with Kurtzberg & Henikoff, supra note 95, at 73-74, 108 (stating that tenants who negotiate in the hallways fare worse). The disparity may be due in part to the fact that Kurtzberg & Henikoff did not limit their study of mediation in housing cases to mediation conducted by the specialists in Boston Housing Court; they examined other jurisdictions in Massachusetts and other mediation mechanisms. See Kurtzberg & Henikoff, supra note 95, at 73-74. Neither report, however, questions the fundamental conclusion that unrepresented tenants generally fare poorly both in the hallway and in mediation.
363. See supra Part H.A. Nor is it even clear that the Housing Court judges apply their limited colloquy to all cases. Mercer, the Boston Housing Court decision discussing the judge's role in settlement, involved an injunction proceeding brought pursuant to chapter 139, section 19 of the General Laws of Massachusetts. See Benchmark Apartment Management Corp. v. Mercer, No. 96-00949, at 8 n.8 (Boston Housing Ct. Jan. 3, 1997) (unpublished opinion, on file with the Fordham Law Review). Most cases on the summary process docket are nonpayment cases, with the balance of the remaining cases involving termination of tenancy proceedings, rather than cases seeking an injunction pursuant to chapter 139, section 19.
364. See Daher Mar. 13, 1997 Letter, supra note 311, at 1-2. In routinely approving the agreements, the Clerk/Magistrate asks even fewer questions than the court articulated in Mercer. The clerk asks the parties only "whether they entered into the Agreement voluntarily, and whether in the circumstances of the case, they are satisfied with the Agreement." Id. at 2. These questions provide even less of a basis to explore the fairness of the agreement by identifying the applicable facts, law, and waivers of rights than the minimal judicial inquiry discussed by the judge.
365. Mass. Unif. Sm. Cl. R. 7(c). The typical decision of the Chief Justice after trial involving unrepresented tenants begins as follows: "The parties stipulate to tenancy, occupancy, notice to quit, monthly rent of [dollar figure] and arrearage of [dollar figure]." Lawton v. Garwood, No. 98-01215, at 1 (Mass. Housing Ct. Apr. 6, 1998) (unpublished opinion, on file with the Fordham Law Review)', Bromley Heath Tenant Management Corp. v. Day, No. 98-01188, at 1 (Mass. Housing Ct. Apr. 1, 1998) (unpublished opinion, on file with the Fordham Law Review). Both cases involved a represented landlord against an unrepresented tenant. The trials typically lasted a matter of minutes. The tenants in essence "waived" any defenses they may have had to the landlord's prima facie case, thereby stipulating to the landlord's entire case. Under these circumstances, serious doubts should exist as to whether the waivers are knowing, intelligent, and voluntary ones and are the product of anything resembling informed consent. See supra Part II.A.3.
366. See, e.g., Wisdom v. Brunache, No. 96-05297 (Boston Housing Ct. Mar. 6, 1997) (unpublished opinion, on file with the Fordham Law Review) (refusing to reconsider a pro se litigant's inability to communicate in English when the argument was not raised at trial). The standard legal services clinic, providing assistance in completing pro se pleadings and motions, is of limited efficacy if judges fail to read the papers.
367. For example, if unrepresented parties were told the mediator would not help or protect them, fewer cases might settle at mediation, again causing more work for the judges. Similarly, if the court limited or monitored hallway settlements, either fewer cases would settle or more resources would be dedicated to settlement. If judges provided a detailed inquiry truly designed to assess the fairness of the agreements, more judicial resources would be required and many of the proposed settlements might be rejected. If judges actually had to assist unrepresented litigants at trial, by developing facts and claims, the trials would take longer. Indeed, the judge in Wisdom explicitly referred to docket control pressures in explaining his decision: "There are hundreds of cases on the summary process docket on any given Thursday." Id. at 2.
368. Advocates proposed not only to speak with litigants in court, as in a traditional LFD program, but to assist families in mediation as well. For cases that did not settle, advocates proposed to conduct an intake the following day and refer the case for full representation to lawyers from a panel of pro bono attorneys. The advocates asked the court's cooperation in allowing the families access to the advisors in court, allowing the litigants to file amended answers with discovery, and re-scheduling the cases that did not settle to a "date certain," to accommodate the schedules of the volunteer lawyers and enable them to develop the case. Letter from Barbara Sard, Senior Managing Attorney, Greater Boston Legal Services, & Paul R. Collier, Esq., Hale & Dorr Legal Services Center, to E. George Daher, Chief Justice, Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Housing Court Department, City of Boston 2 (Mar. 22, 1996) (on file with the author).
369. Letter from E. George Daher, Chief Justice, Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Housing Court Department, Housing Unit, City of Boston, to Barbara Sard, Esq., Senior Managing Attorney, Greater Boston Legal Services, & Paul R. Collier, Esq., Senior Clinical Instructor, Hale and Dorr Legal Services Center 1 (May 6, 1996) [hereinafter Daher May 6, 1996 Letter] (on file with the author). The proponents of the plan subsequently responded to this concern by explaining that no tenant would be "solicit(ed) for a fee" in violation of D.R. 2-103(C) and (D) and noting that the disciplinary rules governing solicitation "do not limit the offering of legal services in any manner where the representation is 'not for a fee.' D.R. 2-103(B)(1)." Collier May 23, 1996 Letter, supra note 315, at 5-6. Although the Code of Professional Responsibility has since been superseded in Massachusetts by the Rules of Professional Conduct, the analysis would remain unchanged. See Massachusetts Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 7.3 & cmt. 1 (1998).
370. Daher May 6, 1996 Letter, supra note 333, at 2. Advocates responded that "the provision and use of courthouse areas to permit counsel to meet with and consult clients is a fairly traditional one." Collier May 23, 1996 Letter, supra note 315, at 6.
371. See Letter of E. George Daher, Chief Justice, Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Housing Court Department, City of Boston, to Paul R. Collier, Esq., Senior Clinical Instructor, Hale and Dorr Legal Services Center 1 (June 19, 1996) (on file with the author). "[T]he Supreme Judicial Court would have to amend the rules by which a lawyer could advise and represent a pro se litigants [sic] at mediation, without being compelled to file an appearance, should the case proceed to trial." Id. at 1. Chief Justice Daher did not identify the rules to which he was referring. The court sought a response to its concerns "to protect the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary." Id. at 2.
372. Letter from E. George Daher, Chief Justice, Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Housing Court Department, City of Boston, to Jeanne Charn, Esq., Legal Services Center 2 (Apr. 9, 1997) (on file with author). "The Supreme Court has given me a broad grant as to when and whether I want to initiate such a program - at this time I have not done so." Id. Along the way, the Chief Justice of the Housing Court had (1) accused legal services lawyers of a variety of unethical behavior, including soliciting clients and interfering with the mediation process, see id.; (2) vigorously defended the court's current practices in terms of the extent to which mediation was utilized, the level of explanation of mediation provided and the extent of court oversight of resulting agreements by the Clerk/Magistrate, see Daher Mar. 13, 1997 Letter, supra note 313, at 1-3; and (3) even made gratuitous comments critical of legal services in his decisions. See, e.g., Arcadian Management v. King, No. 97-00257 (Mass. Housing Ct. Mar. 14,1997) (unpublished opinion, on file with the Fordham Law Review) (blaming Legal Services for making receivership impossible, thereby jeopardizing tenancies in affordable housing). In response to a motion by the Legal Services Center to permit a tenant to raise a section 8A defense in an eviction proceeding brought by a receiver, the court sua sponte terminated the receivership, ending its order as follows: "Greater Boston Legal Services has constantly argued to the Court that they wish to protect affordable housing for the poor - now they have an opportunity to come up with a solution." Id. at 2. The Legal Services Center - not Greater Boston Legal Services - was involved in the case. Both offices were involved in the effort to implement the program in court.
373. See Daher Mar. 13 1997 Letter, supra note 313, at 4.
374. Nearly 400,000 eviction cases are filed each year. See 144 Woodruff Corp. v. Lacrete, 585 N.Y.S.2d 956, 960 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1992). "Overcrowded, dirty, poorly ventilated, inadequate seating" are among the physical problems cited by one report. 5 Minute Justice, supra note 110, at 20.
375. While landlords are represented in approximately 90% of the cases, tenants are unrepresented in over 90% of the cases. See Lacrete, 585 N.Y.S.2d at 958; 5 Minute Justice, supra note 110, at 28 (quoting a housing court judge outraged that "95 percent of the landlords [were] represented by attorneys, and only 5 percent of the tenants [were]" (alteration in original)). "About 90 percent of the 321,000 cases filed in Housing Court [in 1992] concerned overdue rent." Anthony M. DeStefano, In Housing Court, Justice in a Jam, N.Y. Newsday, June 1, 1993, at 7 (quoting Ernesto Belzaguy, chief clerk of the court).
376. See, e.g., Community Training and Resource Ctr. & City-Wide Task Force on Housing Court, Inc., Housing Court, Evictions and Homelessness: The Costs and Benefits of Establishing a Right to Counsel at iii (1993) [hereinafter Housing Court, Evictions and Homelessness] (providing statistical profile of housing court litigants); Jan Hoffman, New York's Court Interpreters: Overworked Link, N.Y. Times, Dec. 24, 1993, at A1 (describing high demand for interpreters in New York housing court).
377. New York's housing laws are so complex that the New York Court of Appeals has referred to them as an "impenetrable thicket, confusing not only to laymen but to lawyers." 89 Christopher Inc. v. Joy, 318 N.E.2d 776, 780 (N.Y. 1974).
378. See, e.g., Lacrete, 585 N.Y.S.2d at 960 ("[Stipulations are generally signed [by tenants] without knowledge of possible defenses and out of fear of eviction or the sense that there is no alternative."); Catherine T. Brody, In Housing Court: Not a Clue, N.Y. Times, Sept. 25, 1994, at B21 (noting that settlements occur "away from the courtroom in the hurly-burly of the hallway").
379. See Engler, supra note 43, at 108-15.
380. See N.Y. City Civ. Ct. Act § 110(o) (McKinney 1989) ("There shall be a sufficient number of pro se clerks of the housing part to assist persons without counsel. Such assistance shall include, but need not be limited to providing information concerning court procedure, helping to file court papers, and, where appropriate, advising persons to seek administrative relief."). "Housing Court" is the common name for the "Housing Part of the New York City Civil Court."
381. See Judith S. Kaye & Jonathan Lippman, Breaking New Ground 2 (1997).
382. See id. The inadequacy of the staffing is underscored by the Housing Court Program's planned expansion of the number of pro se attorneys "to ensure that self-represented litigants have access . . . ." Id. at 16.
383. See Miller v. Silbermann, 832 F. Supp. 663, 667 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (describing allegations of landlords' groups that the systemic operation of the Housing Court deprives landlords of their due process and equal protection rights).
384. 5 Minute Justice, supra note 110, at 43.
385. See, e.g., Engler, supra note 43, at 104-15 nn.104-55 (citing criticism of New York housing courts); see also Matthew Goldstein, State Legislator Urges Abolition of Housing Court, N.Y. L.J., May 20, 1997, at 1 (reporting Manhattan Assemblyman Scott M. Stringer's proposal to phase out current housing court judges and redistribute their case loads to an expanded New York City Civil Court).
386. See Kaye & Lippman, supra note 345, at 3. The judges asserted that "[t]he Housing Court Program will immediately and dramatically change the Housing Court-replacing a system of triage with orderly procedures, modern technology and services to ensure fulfillment of the Court's stated mission while simultaneously providing for proceedings that are . . . quick, simple and inexpensive." Id.
387. See id. at 8 ("Settlements in the hallway . . . will be eliminated and judges, aided by trained staff, will maintain control over all aspects of the calendar. Moreover, an effective alternative dispute resolution program will be available to those who seek settlement outside the traditional court process.").
388. See id. at 14-17. The simplified pleadings are to be accompanied by supplemental instruction sheets available in six languages. See id. at 15.
389. See id. at 15.
390. See id. at 16-17. The increase in the number of Housing Court Counselors is "to ensure that self-represented litigants have access to attorneys who can provide assistance regarding court procedures during the course of their housing matter." Id. at 16. A Housing Court Counselor also will staff each Resource Center to answer questions and provide information. See id. at 15. The non-lawyer volunteers, who will include law or paralegal students, will be called "Housing Court Associates." Id. at 17.
391. Id. at 16. The attorneys will be organized into a new Citywide Volunteer Lawyers Project. See id. Beyond caseflow and access changes, the Program announced the submission of a constitutional amendment to restructure the New York State trial courts, see id. at 6-7; an intent to explore the concept of decentralizing the courts and create Community Housing Courts, see id. at 17; technological innovations to provide an integrated, sophisticated computer technology into daily operations, see id. at 18; and enhanced court resources through budget requests supporting additional judgeships, new and improved facilities, resource assistants, an expanded Interpreter Staff, and additional training seminars for Housing Court judges, see id. at 22-24.
392. The report frankly acknowledged that the court's primary function had been to process the large volume of eviction proceedings in a manner consistent with the picture described by the numerous reports and articles. See id. at 2. The combination of massive caseloads, litigants largely unfamiliar with the legal process and limited judicial resources has resulted in an environment that more closely resembles a hospital emergency room than a court. Courthouse decorum is noticeably lacking, with facilities ill equipped to accommodate the large number of litigants that appear daily. Landlords and tenants come to the courthouse either to commence a proceeding or to respond to a petition, forming long lines in the Clerks' Offices and seeking out the pro se attorneys for assistance. . . . Throughout the process, settlement negotiations take place in every corner of the courthouse - resulting in stipulated agree-ments . . . . Id. at 2. The report anticipated that the problems would only get worse in light of changes in Federal and State law. "[I]mplementation of the Federal welfare reform bill is expected to increase the number of nonpayment proceedings, as public entitlements are reduced or terminated." Id. The report also referred to changes in the State Rent Regulation Reform Act of 1997, requiring "rent deposits in all summary proceedings upon a tenant's request for a second adjournment unless, at an immediate hearing, the tenant can establish one of several enumerated defenses." Id. at 3.
393. See Engler, supra note 43, at 142-47.
394. As with the overall changes to the Housing Court, changes in the roles of the judges and other personnel should be recognized and endorsed at the top levels of the State's judicial administration.
395. See Kaye & Lippman, supra note 345, at 8.
396. The Program's premise with respect to the mediators, while undoubtedly true, does not resolve the concern. "In many instances, non-legal issues underlie Housing Court proceedings and hinder resolution of housing disputes, adding cases to the Court's calendar that can be resolved outside the courtroom." Id. at 11. Even assuming that many issues exist which most observers would agree are "non-legal," the distinction between a "legal" and "non-legal" issue is unlikely to be evident through a bright-line test. Moreover, even to the extent a clearly "non-legal" issue is present, there may be legal issues impeding resolution of the case as well. Unless the mediators are responsible for the fairness of the result, either the unrepresented litigants typically will be harmed in settlement or inefficiencies will be the result as judges are forced to correct for the shortcomings of mediation.
397. See supra notes 65, 255.
398. See supra Part II.B.4.
399. See supra Parts I.B, II.B.4. Although New York ethics opinions have approved the practice of providing limited assistance, they typically have done so with limitations and against the backdrop of concern about the practice. For example, in 1990 the Committee on Professional Ethics of the New York Bar Association addressed the question as to whether a lawyer, "without entering an appearance as attorney of record, [could] agree to counsel and advise an indigent pro se litigant to the extent of preparing pleadings for the litigant to sign and file with the court pro se." Committee on Prof'l Ethics, New York State Bar Ass'n., Op. 613, reprinted in N.Y. L.J., Oct. 15, 1990, at 4. The opinion ultimately approved the practice as long as the attorney disclosed in the pleadings that the papers were prepared by a lawyer, along with the name of the lawyer. See id. reprinted in N.Y. L.J., Oct. 15, 1990, at 4. The opinion first recounted the long history of decisions condemning the practice, includ-ing Ellis v. Maine, 448 F.2d 1325, 1328 (1st Cir. 1971); Klein v. H.N. Whitney, Goadby & Co., 341 F. Supp. 699, 702-03 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); and Klein v. Spear, Leeds & Kellogg, 309 F. Supp. 341, 342-43 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). The decision observed that available ethics opinions were more lenient. See id. (citing ethics opinions from New York City, Maine, Virginia, and the ABA). The Committee was "not unmindful of the substantial abuses that may arise from sanctioning the conduct proposed" by the inquirer, but concluded that the courts and lawyers "subjected to such abuses will be vigilant to root them out." Id. The Committee "firmly believe[d] that the creation of barriers to the procurement of legal advice by those in need and who are unable to pay in the name of legal ethics ill serves the profession." Id. The opinion approved the conduct, with disclosure, along with the cautionary words that lawyers needed to provide "full and adequate disclosures" to the litigant; that "[t]he prohibition against limiting liability for malpractice was fully applicable . . . [and] no pleading should be drafted for a pro se litigant unless it is adequately investigated and can be prepared in good faith." Id.
400. See generally Galanter, supra note 253, at 149-51 (describing the level of change necessary to produce "tangible redistribution of benefits").
401. In light of all of the features of courts such as the New York City Housing Court, dramatic changes in the forum and roles of the players will provide insight into whether unrepresented litigants can achieve a fair result absent a civil right to counsel in certain contexts. See, e.g., Scherer, supra note 261, at 562-87 (discussing federal and state constitutional due process arguments for recognizing a right to counsel for tenants faced with eviction).