Switching Costs and Implicit Contracts

Journal of Economics/ Zeitschrift fur Nationalokonomie

Volumn 69, Issue 2, 1999, Pages 159-171

  Eber, Nicolas ^a  

^a UNIVERSITÉ DE STRASBOURG   (France)

Author keywords

Implicit contracts; Reputation; Switching costs

Indexed keywords

EID: 0347035378     PISSN: 09318658     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/BF01232419     Document Type: Article

References (11)

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