Body and mind

History of Psychiatry

Volumn 11, Issue 43, 2000, Pages 311-338

  Clifford, C K ^b   Berrios, G E ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE   (United Kingdom)

^b NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ART; ARTICLE; HISTORY; PSYCHOSOMATICS; UNITED KINGDOM;

ENGLAND; HISTORY, 19TH CENTURY; PORTRAITS; PSYCHOSOMATIC MEDICINE;

EID: 0346986284     PISSN: 0957154X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0957154x0001104305     Document Type: Review

References (43)

1. On biographical details see: Critchley, M. and Critchley, E. A., John Hughlings Jackson, father of British Neurology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998). On an analysis of his ideas in relation to neurology and psychiatry, respectively, see: López Piñero, J. M., John Hughlings Jackson. Evolutionismo y Neurology (Madrid: Moneda, 1973); Dewhurst, K., Hughlings Jackson on Psychiatry (Oxford: Sanford Publications, 1982).
2. On biographical details see: Critchley, M. and Critchley, E. A., John Hughlings Jackson, father of British Neurology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998). On an analysis of his ideas in relation to neurology and psychiatry, respectively, see: López Piñero, J. M., John Hughlings Jackson. Evolutionismo y Neurology (Madrid: Moneda, 1973); Dewhurst, K., Hughlings Jackson on Psychiatry (Oxford: Sanford Publications, 1982).
3. On biographical details see: Critchley, M. and Critchley, E. A., John Hughlings Jackson, father of British Neurology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998). On an analysis of his ideas in relation to neurology and psychiatry, respectively, see: López Piñero, J. M., John Hughlings Jackson. Evolutionismo y Neurology (Madrid: Moneda, 1973); Dewhurst, K., Hughlings Jackson on Psychiatry (Oxford: Sanford Publications, 1982).
4. The issue is described as 'obscure' for there is not always agreement between (a) what Jackson officially declared as his sources, (b) what close textual reading of his work suggests to the historian, and (c) what is known of indirect influences, i.e. assumptions which came to him hidden in the views of the physicians and neurologists he admired (on the latter see the useful: Greenblatt, S. H., 'The major influences on the early life and work of John Hughlings Jackson', Bulletin of the History of Medicine, xxxix (1965), 346-76).
5. Jackson's views on consciousness (see Riese, W., 'Hughlings Jackson's doctrine of consciousness', Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease, cxx (1954), 330-7), 'the mind' (Levin, M., 'Hughlings Jackson's views on mentation', Archives of Psychiatry, xxx (1933), 848-74) and 'the mental' (see Balan, B., 'Les Fondements psychologiques de la notion d'automatisme mental chez John Hughlings Jackson', L'Information psychiatrique, lxix (1989), 610-19), and 'mental disorders' (see Savage, G., 'Dr Hughlings Jackson on mental disorders') The Journal of Mental Science, xliii (1917), 315-28) have not been yet fully disentangled. As with other abstruse (or careless) writers, the historian may choose to take Jackson's claims ad verbum or dig in for subterranean meanings. Because in the case of Jackson the former approach often leads to blind alleys (i.e. contradictory and/or meaningless claims are soon met with), and because of the reputation of the man, historians turn exegetes with some ease.
6. Jackson's views on consciousness (see Riese, W., 'Hughlings Jackson's doctrine of consciousness', Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease, cxx (1954), 330-7), 'the mind' (Levin, M., 'Hughlings Jackson's views on mentation', Archives of Psychiatry, xxx (1933), 848-74) and 'the mental' (see Balan, B., 'Les Fondements psychologiques de la notion d'automatisme mental chez John Hughlings Jackson', L'Information psychiatrique, lxix (1989), 610-19), and 'mental disorders' (see Savage, G., 'Dr Hughlings Jackson on mental disorders') The Journal of Mental Science, xliii (1917), 315-28) have not been yet fully disentangled. As with other abstruse (or careless) writers, the historian may choose to take Jackson's claims ad verbum or dig in for subterranean meanings. Because in the case of Jackson the former approach often leads to blind alleys (i.e. contradictory and/or meaningless claims are soon met with), and because of the reputation of the man, historians turn exegetes with some ease.
7. Jackson's views on consciousness (see Riese, W., 'Hughlings Jackson's doctrine of consciousness', Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease, cxx (1954), 330-7), 'the mind' (Levin, M., 'Hughlings Jackson's views on mentation', Archives of Psychiatry, xxx (1933), 848-74) and 'the mental' (see Balan, B., 'Les Fondements psychologiques de la notion d'automatisme mental chez John Hughlings Jackson', L'Information psychiatrique, lxix (1989), 610-19), and 'mental disorders' (see Savage, G., 'Dr Hughlings Jackson on mental disorders') The Journal of Mental Science, xliii (1917), 315-28) have not been yet fully disentangled. As with other abstruse (or careless) writers, the historian may choose to take Jackson's claims ad verbum or dig in for subterranean meanings. Because in the case of Jackson the former approach often leads to blind alleys (i.e. contradictory and/or meaningless claims are soon met with), and because of the reputation of the man, historians turn exegetes with some ease.
8. Jackson's views on consciousness (see Riese, W., 'Hughlings Jackson's doctrine of consciousness', Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease, cxx (1954), 330-7), 'the mind' (Levin, M., 'Hughlings Jackson's views on mentation', Archives of Psychiatry, xxx (1933), 848-74) and 'the mental' (see Balan, B., 'Les Fondements psychologiques de la notion d'automatisme mental chez John Hughlings Jackson', L'Information psychiatrique, lxix (1989), 610-19), and 'mental disorders' (see Savage, G., 'Dr Hughlings Jackson on mental disorders') The Journal of Mental Science, xliii (1917), 315-28) have not been yet fully disentangled. As with other abstruse (or careless) writers, the historian may choose to take Jackson's claims ad verbum or dig in for subterranean meanings. Because in the case of Jackson the former approach often leads to blind alleys (i.e. contradictory and/or meaningless claims are soon met with), and because of the reputation of the man, historians turn exegetes with some ease.
9. Levin, M., The mind-body problem and Hughlings Jacksons doctrine of concomitance', American Journal of Psychiatry, cxvi (1959-60), 718-22.
10. The literature on psychophysical parallelism or concomitance is enormous (see Eisler, M. R., 'Der psychophysische Parallelismus' (Leipzig: Enke, 1894); Bain, A., Mind and Body (London: King, 1874) and concerns the solutions offered in Western culture to the issue of how physical and psychological phenomena exchange information (see Rieber, R. W. (ed.), Body and Mind. Past Present and Future (New York: Academic Press, 1980). The problem remains extant (see: Feigl, H., 'The "mental" and the "physical", in Feigl, H. et al. (eds), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. II. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press), 370-497; Moravia, S., The Enigma of the Mind. The Mind-Body Problem in Contemporary Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995)). Versions of Parallelism have been grouped into metaphysical (or ontological) and psychological, although it is generally believed that the latter can be subsumed under the former. For example, the versions put forward by Spinoza, Descartes or Leibniz are considered as 'ontological'. Psychological versions of psychophysical parallelism appeared during the nineteenth century in the work of writers such as Fechner and Helmholtz and ranged from the belief in 'correspondence' simpliciter to broader conceptions where even forms of interaction (between the physical and psychological) were allowed (see Boring, E. G., Sensation and Perception in the History of Experimental Psychology (New York: Irvington Publishers, 1942)).
11. The literature on psychophysical parallelism or concomitance is enormous (see Eisler, M. R., 'Der psychophysische Parallelismus' (Leipzig: Enke, 1894); Bain, A., Mind and Body (London: King, 1874) and concerns the solutions offered in Western culture to the issue of how physical and psychological phenomena exchange information (see Rieber, R. W. (ed.), Body and Mind. Past Present and Future (New York: Academic Press, 1980). The problem remains extant (see: Feigl, H., 'The "mental" and the "physical", in Feigl, H. et al. (eds), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. II. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press), 370-497; Moravia, S., The Enigma of the Mind. The Mind-Body Problem in Contemporary Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995)). Versions of Parallelism have been grouped into metaphysical (or ontological) and psychological, although it is generally believed that the latter can be subsumed under the former. For example, the versions put forward by Spinoza, Descartes or Leibniz are considered as 'ontological'. Psychological versions of psychophysical parallelism appeared during the nineteenth century in the work of writers such as Fechner and Helmholtz and ranged from the belief in 'correspondence' simpliciter to broader conceptions where even forms of interaction (between the physical and psychological) were allowed (see Boring, E. G., Sensation and Perception in the History of Experimental Psychology (New York: Irvington Publishers, 1942)).
12. The literature on psychophysical parallelism or concomitance is enormous (see Eisler, M. R., 'Der psychophysische Parallelismus' (Leipzig: Enke, 1894); Bain, A., Mind and Body (London: King, 1874) and concerns the solutions offered in Western culture to the issue of how physical and psychological phenomena exchange information (see Rieber, R. W. (ed.), Body and Mind. Past Present and Future (New York: Academic Press, 1980). The problem remains extant (see: Feigl, H., 'The "mental" and the "physical", in Feigl, H. et al. (eds), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. II. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press), 370-497; Moravia, S., The Enigma of the Mind. The Mind-Body Problem in Contemporary Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995)). Versions of Parallelism have been grouped into metaphysical (or ontological) and psychological, although it is generally believed that the latter can be subsumed under the former. For example, the versions put forward by Spinoza, Descartes or Leibniz are considered as 'ontological'. Psychological versions of psychophysical parallelism appeared during the nineteenth century in the work of writers such as Fechner and Helmholtz and ranged from the belief in 'correspondence' simpliciter to broader conceptions where even forms of interaction (between the physical and psychological) were allowed (see Boring, E. G., Sensation and Perception in the History of Experimental Psychology (New York: Irvington Publishers, 1942)).
13. The literature on psychophysical parallelism or concomitance is enormous (see Eisler, M. R., 'Der psychophysische Parallelismus' (Leipzig: Enke, 1894); Bain, A., Mind and Body (London: King, 1874) and concerns the solutions offered in Western culture to the issue of how physical and psychological phenomena exchange information (see Rieber, R. W. (ed.), Body and Mind. Past Present and Future (New York: Academic Press, 1980). The problem remains extant (see: Feigl, H., 'The "mental" and the "physical", in Feigl, H. et al. (eds), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. II. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press), 370-497; Moravia, S., The Enigma of the Mind. The Mind-Body Problem in Contemporary Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995)). Versions of Parallelism have been grouped into metaphysical (or ontological) and psychological, although it is generally believed that the latter can be subsumed under the former. For example, the versions put forward by Spinoza, Descartes or Leibniz are considered as 'ontological'. Psychological versions of psychophysical parallelism appeared during the nineteenth century in the work of writers such as Fechner and Helmholtz and ranged from the belief in 'correspondence' simpliciter to broader conceptions where even forms of interaction (between the physical and psychological) were allowed (see Boring, E. G., Sensation and Perception in the History of Experimental Psychology (New York: Irvington Publishers, 1942)).
14. The literature on psychophysical parallelism or concomitance is enormous (see Eisler, M. R., 'Der psychophysische Parallelismus' (Leipzig: Enke, 1894); Bain, A., Mind and Body (London: King, 1874) and concerns the solutions offered in Western culture to the issue of how physical and psychological phenomena exchange information (see Rieber, R. W. (ed.), Body and Mind. Past Present and Future (New York: Academic Press, 1980). The problem remains extant (see: Feigl, H., 'The "mental" and the "physical", in Feigl, H. et al. (eds), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. II. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press), 370-497; Moravia, S., The Enigma of the Mind. The Mind-Body Problem in Contemporary Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995)). Versions of Parallelism have been grouped into metaphysical (or ontological) and psychological, although it is generally believed that the latter can be subsumed under the former. For example, the versions put forward by Spinoza, Descartes or Leibniz are considered as 'ontological'. Psychological versions of psychophysical parallelism appeared during the nineteenth century in the work of writers such as Fechner and Helmholtz and ranged from the belief in 'correspondence' simpliciter to broader conceptions where even forms of interaction (between the physical and psychological) were allowed (see Boring, E. G., Sensation and Perception in the History of Experimental Psychology (New York: Irvington Publishers, 1942)).
15. The literature on psychophysical parallelism or concomitance is enormous (see Eisler, M. R., 'Der psychophysische Parallelismus' (Leipzig: Enke, 1894); Bain, A., Mind and Body (London: King, 1874) and concerns the solutions offered in Western culture to the issue of how physical and psychological phenomena exchange information (see Rieber, R. W. (ed.), Body and Mind. Past Present and Future (New York: Academic Press, 1980). The problem remains extant (see: Feigl, H., 'The "mental" and the "physical", in Feigl, H. et al. (eds), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. II. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press), 370-497; Moravia, S., The Enigma of the Mind. The Mind-Body Problem in Contemporary Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995)). Versions of Parallelism have been grouped into metaphysical (or ontological) and psychological, although it is generally believed that the latter can be subsumed under the former. For example, the versions put forward by Spinoza, Descartes or Leibniz are considered as 'ontological'. Psychological versions of psychophysical parallelism appeared during the nineteenth century in the work of writers such as Fechner and Helmholtz and ranged from the belief in 'correspondence' simpliciter to broader conceptions where even forms of interaction (between the physical and psychological) were allowed (see Boring, E. G., Sensation and Perception in the History of Experimental Psychology (New York: Irvington Publishers, 1942)).
16. The best analysis of this issue remains Engelhardt, H. T., 'John Hughlings Jackson and the mind-body relation', Bulletin of the History of Medicine, xlix (1975), 137-51.
17. Mercier, Ch., 'Recollections', in Jackson, J. H., Neurological Fragments (London: Oxford University Press), 44.
18. Fortnightly Review, December 1874, 728.
19. Jackson, J. H., 'On the comparative study of diseases of the nervous system'. Originally published in British Medical Journal, ii (1889), 355. Quoted here from Selected Writings of John Hughlings Jackson, Vol. II. Edited by James Taylor (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1932), 393-410.
20. Jackson, J. H., 'On the comparative study of diseases of the nervous system'. Originally published in British Medical Journal, ii (1889), 355. Quoted here from Selected Writings of John Hughlings Jackson, Vol. II. Edited by James Taylor (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1932), 393-410.
21. p.72, 'Evolution and dissolution of the nervous system'. Croonian Lectures delivered at the Royal College of Physicians. In Selected Writings of John Hughlings Jackson, Vol. I. Edited by James Taylor (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1932), 45-75.
22. p.252, Prince, M., 'Hughlings Jackson on the connection between the mind and the brain', Brain, xiv (1891), 250-69.
23. It is unclear whether his rejection of pre-ordainment resulted from a religious reason or a rejection or ignorance of Leibniz's views.
24. The locus classicus for the discussion of the issue of the parallelism between two 'self contained substances' is Leibniz's 'New system and explanation of the new system' where he writes: 'I was insensibly led to adopt a view which surprised me, but which seems inevitable, and which does in fact possess very great advantages and considerable beauties. This view is that we must say that God first created the soul, and every other real unity, in such a way that everything in it must spring from within itself, by a perfect spontaneity with regard to itself, and yet in a perfect conformity with things outside ... it follows from this that ... there will be a perfect agreement between all these substances, producing the same effect as would occur if these communicated with one another by means of a transmission of species or qualities...' (pp.122-3, in Leibniz: Philosophical Writings. Edited and Translated by G. H. R. Parkinson (London: Everyman's Library)).
25. In his excellent book on the influence of Leibniz's ideas on psychiatry, Jacques Chazaud calls Jackson a 'Leibnizian' (p.84, Chazaud, J., Leibniz pour les psy (Paris: Collection Les Empêcheurs de Penser en Rond, 1997).
26. p.616, Bradley, F. H., Appearance and Reality (London, 1899).
27. In Clifford, W. K., Lectures and Essays, Vol. II. Edited by Leslie Stephen and Frederick Pollock (London: Macmillan, 1879), 88. This quotation was used by Mach to support his own views (see Prologue to Third edition, Mach, E., Análisis de las Sensaciones (Barcelona, 1987)).
28. In Clifford, W. K., Lectures and Essays, Vol. II. Edited by Leslie Stephen and Frederick Pollock (London: Macmillan, 1879), 88. This quotation was used by Mach to support his own views (see Prologue to Third edition, Mach, E., Análisis de las Sensaciones (Barcelona, 1987)).
29. Tucker, R. (ed.). Mathematical Papers by William Kingdon Clifford (New York: American Mathematical Society Chelsea Publishing, 1968).
30. For biographical information see Leslie Stephen's entry in the Dictionary of National Biography (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975).
31. pp.411-14, Vol. II, in Robertson, J. M., A History of Free Thought in the Nineteenth Century, 2 Vols (London: Watts, 1929).
32. p.274, in Muirhead, J. H. (ed.), Contemporary British Philosophers. Personal Statements (First Series) (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1929).
33. Sully, J., My Life and Friends (London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1918).
34. Pearson, K., The Grammar of Science (London: Dent, 1892).
35. pp.121-7, in Metz, R., A Hundred Years of British Philosophy, translated by J. W. Harvey et al. (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1938).
36. For a serious criticism of Clifford's views see Lecture XI (Theory of Psychophysical parallelism) in Ward, J., Naturalism and Gnosticism. The Gifford Lectures 1896-1898, Vol. II (London; Adam & Charles Black, 1899), 13-17; and McIntyre, J. L., 'Body and mind". In Vol. II of Hastings, J., Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1909), 774-8.
37. For a serious criticism of Clifford's views see Lecture XI (Theory of Psychophysical parallelism) in Ward, J., Naturalism and Gnosticism. The Gifford Lectures 1896-1898, Vol. II (London; Adam & Charles Black, 1899), 13-17; and McIntyre, J. L., 'Body and mind". In Vol. II of Hastings, J., Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1909), 774-8.
38. See Stengel, E., 'Hughlings Jackson's influence in psychiatry', British Journal of Psychiatry, cix (1963), 348-55.
39. Berrios, G. E., 'Positive and negative symptoms and Jackson: a conceptual history", Archives General Psychiatry, xlii (1985), 95-7.
40. Chapter III in Ladd, G. T., Elements of Physiological Psychology (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1892).
41. pp.xv-xvi, Bergson, H., Matter and Memory (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1911).
42. On this concept see: Riese, W., 'The principle of evolution of nervous function', Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease, xcviii (1943), 255-66.
43. p.413, in Selected Writings of John Hughlings Jackson, Vol. I. Edited by James Taylor (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1932).