Judicial Uses of Subterfuge: Affirmative Action Reconsidered

Political Science Quarterly

Volumn 118, Issue 3, 2003, Pages 411-436

  Sabbagh, Daniel ^a  

^a Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique   (France)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0346962571     PISSN: 00323195     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1002/j.1538-165X.2003.tb00400.x     Document Type: Review

References (164)

1. That those should qualify as genuine principles, however, remains a point of contention. On colorblindness, see Andrew Kull, The Color-Blind Constitution (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992); Anthony K. Appiah and Amy Gutmann, Color-Conscious: The Political Morality of Race (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996); David Strauss, "The Myth of Colorblindness" in Philip Kurland, Gerhard Casper, and Dennis Hutchinson, eds., 1986: The Supreme Court Review (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1986), 99-134; on meritocracy, see John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971), 134; Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 19-24, 69-72, 77-87; Joel Feinberg, Doing and Deserving (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970); David Miller, "Two Cheers for Meritocracy," The Journal of Political Philosophy 4 (December 1996): 277-301; Michael Selmi, "Testing for Equality: Merit, Efficiency, and the Affirmative Action Debate," UCLA Law Review 42 (June 1995): 1251-1314.
2. That those should qualify as genuine principles, however, remains a point of contention. On colorblindness, see Andrew Kull, The Color-Blind Constitution (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992); Anthony K. Appiah and Amy Gutmann, Color-Conscious: The Political Morality of Race (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996); David Strauss, "The Myth of Colorblindness" in Philip Kurland, Gerhard Casper, and Dennis Hutchinson, eds., 1986: The Supreme Court Review (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1986), 99-134; on meritocracy, see John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971), 134; Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 19-24, 69-72, 77-87; Joel Feinberg, Doing and Deserving (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970); David Miller, "Two Cheers for Meritocracy," The Journal of Political Philosophy 4 (December 1996): 277-301; Michael Selmi, "Testing for Equality: Merit, Efficiency, and the Affirmative Action Debate," UCLA Law Review 42 (June 1995): 1251-1314.
3. That those should qualify as genuine principles, however, remains a point of contention. On colorblindness, see Andrew Kull, The Color-Blind Constitution (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992); Anthony K. Appiah and Amy Gutmann, Color-Conscious: The Political Morality of Race (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996); David Strauss, "The Myth of Colorblindness" in Philip Kurland, Gerhard Casper, and Dennis Hutchinson, eds., 1986: The Supreme Court Review (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1986), 99-134; on meritocracy, see John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971), 134; Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 19-24, 69-72, 77-87; Joel Feinberg, Doing and Deserving (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970); David Miller, "Two Cheers for Meritocracy," The Journal of Political Philosophy 4 (December 1996): 277-301; Michael Selmi, "Testing for Equality: Merit, Efficiency, and the Affirmative Action Debate," UCLA Law Review 42 (June 1995): 1251-1314.
4. That those should qualify as genuine principles, however, remains a point of contention. On colorblindness, see Andrew Kull, The Color-Blind Constitution (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992); Anthony K. Appiah and Amy Gutmann, Color-Conscious: The Political Morality of Race (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996); David Strauss, "The Myth of Colorblindness" in Philip Kurland, Gerhard Casper, and Dennis Hutchinson, eds., 1986: The Supreme Court Review (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1986), 99-134; on meritocracy, see John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971), 134; Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 19-24, 69-72, 77-87; Joel Feinberg, Doing and Deserving (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970); David Miller, "Two Cheers for Meritocracy," The Journal of Political Philosophy 4 (December 1996): 277-301; Michael Selmi, "Testing for Equality: Merit, Efficiency, and the Affirmative Action Debate," UCLA Law Review 42 (June 1995): 1251-1314.
5. That those should qualify as genuine principles, however, remains a point of contention. On colorblindness, see Andrew Kull, The Color-Blind Constitution (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992); Anthony K. Appiah and Amy Gutmann, Color-Conscious: The Political Morality of Race (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996); David Strauss, "The Myth of Colorblindness" in Philip Kurland, Gerhard Casper, and Dennis Hutchinson, eds., 1986: The Supreme Court Review (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1986), 99-134; on meritocracy, see John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971), 134; Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 19-24, 69-72, 77-87; Joel Feinberg, Doing and Deserving (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970); David Miller, "Two Cheers for Meritocracy," The Journal of Political Philosophy 4 (December 1996): 277-301; Michael Selmi, "Testing for Equality: Merit, Efficiency, and the Affirmative Action Debate," UCLA Law Review 42 (June 1995): 1251-1314.
6. That those should qualify as genuine principles, however, remains a point of contention. On colorblindness, see Andrew Kull, The Color-Blind Constitution (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992); Anthony K. Appiah and Amy Gutmann, Color-Conscious: The Political Morality of Race (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996); David Strauss, "The Myth of Colorblindness" in Philip Kurland, Gerhard Casper, and Dennis Hutchinson, eds., 1986: The Supreme Court Review (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1986), 99-134; on meritocracy, see John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971), 134; Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 19-24, 69-72, 77-87; Joel Feinberg, Doing and Deserving (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970); David Miller, "Two Cheers for Meritocracy," The Journal of Political Philosophy 4 (December 1996): 277-301; Michael Selmi, "Testing for Equality: Merit, Efficiency, and the Affirmative Action Debate," UCLA Law Review 42 (June 1995): 1251-1314.
7. That those should qualify as genuine principles, however, remains a point of contention. On colorblindness, see Andrew Kull, The Color-Blind Constitution (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992); Anthony K. Appiah and Amy Gutmann, Color-Conscious: The Political Morality of Race (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996); David Strauss, "The Myth of Colorblindness" in Philip Kurland, Gerhard Casper, and Dennis Hutchinson, eds., 1986: The Supreme Court Review (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1986), 99-134; on meritocracy, see John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971), 134; Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 19-24, 69-72, 77-87; Joel Feinberg, Doing and Deserving (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970); David Miller, "Two Cheers for Meritocracy," The Journal of Political Philosophy 4 (December 1996): 277-301; Michael Selmi, "Testing for Equality: Merit, Efficiency, and the Affirmative Action Debate," UCLA Law Review 42 (June 1995): 1251-1314.
8. That those should qualify as genuine principles, however, remains a point of contention. On colorblindness, see Andrew Kull, The Color-Blind Constitution (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992); Anthony K. Appiah and Amy Gutmann, Color-Conscious: The Political Morality of Race (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996); David Strauss, "The Myth of Colorblindness" in Philip Kurland, Gerhard Casper, and Dennis Hutchinson, eds., 1986: The Supreme Court Review (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1986), 99-134; on meritocracy, see John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971), 134; Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 19-24, 69-72, 77-87; Joel Feinberg, Doing and Deserving (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970); David Miller, "Two Cheers for Meritocracy," The Journal of Political Philosophy 4 (December 1996): 277-301; Michael Selmi, "Testing for Equality: Merit, Efficiency, and the Affirmative Action Debate," UCLA Law Review 42 (June 1995): 1251-1314.
9. See David Miller, "Distributive Justice: What the People Think," Ethics 102 (April 1992): 558-564; Paul Sniderman and Edward Carmines, Reaching Beyond Race (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997), 99-139 and 22-27.
10. See David Miller, "Distributive Justice: What the People Think," Ethics 102 (April 1992): 558-564; Paul Sniderman and Edward Carmines, Reaching Beyond Race (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997), 99-139 and 22-27.
11. See Hugh Davis Graham, Collision Course: The Strange Convergence of Affirmative Action and Immigration Policy in America (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 139-140; Jed Rubenfeld, "Affirmative Action, " Yale Law Journal 107 (1997): 471-472; Keith Bybee, "The Political Significance of Legal Ambiguity: The Case of Affirmative Action," Law and Society Review 34 (no. 2, 2000): 267; Guido Calabresi and Philip Bobbitt, Tragic Choices: The Conflict Society Confronts in the Allocation of Tragically Scarce Resources (New York: Norton, 1978), 222; Gwénaële Calvès, L'Affirmative action dans la jurisprudence de la Cour suprême: le problème de la discrimination "positive" (Paris: LGDJ, 1998), 136-137; Nathan Glazer, "The End of Meritocracy, " The New Republic, 27 September 1999, 28; Harvey Mansfield, Jr., "The Underhandedness of Affirmative Action" in Russell Nieli, ed., Racial Preference and Racial Justice: The New Affirmative Action Controversy (Washington, DC: Ethics and Public Policy Center, 1991), 130; Paul Mishkin, "The Uses of Ambivalence: Reflections on the Supreme Court and the Constitutionality of Affirmative Action," University of Pennsylvania Law Review 131 (March 1983): 928; Ronald Dworkin, "The Court and the University," New York Review of Books, 15 May 2003, 10; Jeffrey Rosen, "How I Learned to Love Quotas," New York Times Magazine, 1 June 2003. For a broader analysis of other less specific kinds of dissimulation in the Supreme Court case law, see Rogers Smith, "The Inherent Deceptiveness of Constitutional Discourse: A Diagnosis and Prescription" in Ian Shapiro and Robert Adams, eds., NOMOS: Integrity and Conscience (New York: New York University Press, 1998), 218-254.
12. See Hugh Davis Graham, Collision Course: The Strange Convergence of Affirmative Action and Immigration Policy in America (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 139-140; Jed Rubenfeld, "Affirmative Action, " Yale Law Journal 107 (1997): 471-472; Keith Bybee, "The Political Significance of Legal Ambiguity: The Case of Affirmative Action," Law and Society Review 34 (no. 2, 2000): 267; Guido Calabresi and Philip Bobbitt, Tragic Choices: The Conflict Society Confronts in the Allocation of Tragically Scarce Resources (New York: Norton, 1978), 222; Gwénaële Calvès, L'Affirmative action dans la jurisprudence de la Cour suprême: le problème de la discrimination "positive" (Paris: LGDJ, 1998), 136-137; Nathan Glazer, "The End of Meritocracy, " The New Republic, 27 September 1999, 28; Harvey Mansfield, Jr., "The Underhandedness of Affirmative Action" in Russell Nieli, ed., Racial Preference and Racial Justice: The New Affirmative Action Controversy (Washington, DC: Ethics and Public Policy Center, 1991), 130; Paul Mishkin, "The Uses of Ambivalence: Reflections on the Supreme Court and the Constitutionality of Affirmative Action," University of Pennsylvania Law Review 131 (March 1983): 928; Ronald Dworkin, "The Court and the University," New York Review of Books, 15 May 2003, 10; Jeffrey Rosen, "How I Learned to Love Quotas," New York Times Magazine, 1 June 2003. For a broader analysis of other less specific kinds of dissimulation in the Supreme Court case law, see Rogers Smith, "The Inherent Deceptiveness of Constitutional Discourse: A Diagnosis and Prescription" in Ian Shapiro and Robert Adams, eds., NOMOS: Integrity and Conscience (New York: New York University Press, 1998), 218-254.
13. See Hugh Davis Graham, Collision Course: The Strange Convergence of Affirmative Action and Immigration Policy in America (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 139-140; Jed Rubenfeld, "Affirmative Action, " Yale Law Journal 107 (1997): 471-472; Keith Bybee, "The Political Significance of Legal Ambiguity: The Case of Affirmative Action," Law and Society Review 34 (no. 2, 2000): 267; Guido Calabresi and Philip Bobbitt, Tragic Choices: The Conflict Society Confronts in the Allocation of Tragically Scarce Resources (New York: Norton, 1978), 222; Gwénaële Calvès, L'Affirmative action dans la jurisprudence de la Cour suprême: le problème de la discrimination "positive" (Paris: LGDJ, 1998), 136-137; Nathan Glazer, "The End of Meritocracy, " The New Republic, 27 September 1999, 28; Harvey Mansfield, Jr., "The Underhandedness of Affirmative Action" in Russell Nieli, ed., Racial Preference and Racial Justice: The New Affirmative Action Controversy (Washington, DC: Ethics and Public Policy Center, 1991), 130; Paul Mishkin, "The Uses of Ambivalence: Reflections on the Supreme Court and the Constitutionality of Affirmative Action," University of Pennsylvania Law Review 131 (March 1983): 928; Ronald Dworkin, "The Court and the University," New York Review of Books, 15 May 2003, 10; Jeffrey Rosen, "How I Learned to Love Quotas," New York Times Magazine, 1 June 2003. For a broader analysis of other less specific kinds of dissimulation in the Supreme Court case law, see Rogers Smith, "The Inherent Deceptiveness of Constitutional Discourse: A Diagnosis and Prescription" in Ian Shapiro and Robert Adams, eds., NOMOS: Integrity and Conscience (New York: New York University Press, 1998), 218-254.
14. See Hugh Davis Graham, Collision Course: The Strange Convergence of Affirmative Action and Immigration Policy in America (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 139-140; Jed Rubenfeld, "Affirmative Action, " Yale Law Journal 107 (1997): 471-472; Keith Bybee, "The Political Significance of Legal Ambiguity: The Case of Affirmative Action," Law and Society Review 34 (no. 2, 2000): 267; Guido Calabresi and Philip Bobbitt, Tragic Choices: The Conflict Society Confronts in the Allocation of Tragically Scarce Resources (New York: Norton, 1978), 222; Gwénaële Calvès, L'Affirmative action dans la jurisprudence de la Cour suprême: le problème de la discrimination "positive" (Paris: LGDJ, 1998), 136-137; Nathan Glazer, "The End of Meritocracy, " The New Republic, 27 September 1999, 28; Harvey Mansfield, Jr., "The Underhandedness of Affirmative Action" in Russell Nieli, ed., Racial Preference and Racial Justice: The New Affirmative Action Controversy (Washington, DC: Ethics and Public Policy Center, 1991), 130; Paul Mishkin, "The Uses of Ambivalence: Reflections on the Supreme Court and the Constitutionality of Affirmative Action," University of Pennsylvania Law Review 131 (March 1983): 928; Ronald Dworkin, "The Court and the University," New York Review of Books, 15 May 2003, 10; Jeffrey Rosen, "How I Learned to Love Quotas," New York Times Magazine, 1 June 2003. For a broader analysis of other less specific kinds of dissimulation in the Supreme Court case law, see Rogers Smith, "The Inherent Deceptiveness of Constitutional Discourse: A Diagnosis and Prescription" in Ian Shapiro and Robert Adams, eds., NOMOS: Integrity and Conscience (New York: New York University Press, 1998), 218-254.
15. See Hugh Davis Graham, Collision Course: The Strange Convergence of Affirmative Action and Immigration Policy in America (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 139-140; Jed Rubenfeld, "Affirmative Action, " Yale Law Journal 107 (1997): 471-472; Keith Bybee, "The Political Significance of Legal Ambiguity: The Case of Affirmative Action," Law and Society Review 34 (no. 2, 2000): 267; Guido Calabresi and Philip Bobbitt, Tragic Choices: The Conflict Society Confronts in the Allocation of Tragically Scarce Resources (New York: Norton, 1978), 222; Gwénaële Calvès, L'Affirmative action dans la jurisprudence de la Cour suprême: le problème de la discrimination "positive" (Paris: LGDJ, 1998), 136-137; Nathan Glazer, "The End of Meritocracy, " The New Republic, 27 September 1999, 28; Harvey Mansfield, Jr., "The Underhandedness of Affirmative Action" in Russell Nieli, ed., Racial Preference and Racial Justice: The New Affirmative Action Controversy (Washington, DC: Ethics and Public Policy Center, 1991), 130; Paul Mishkin, "The Uses of Ambivalence: Reflections on the Supreme Court and the Constitutionality of Affirmative Action," University of Pennsylvania Law Review 131 (March 1983): 928; Ronald Dworkin, "The Court and the University," New York Review of Books, 15 May 2003, 10; Jeffrey Rosen, "How I Learned to Love Quotas," New York Times Magazine, 1 June 2003. For a broader analysis of other less specific kinds of dissimulation in the Supreme Court case law, see Rogers Smith, "The Inherent Deceptiveness of Constitutional Discourse: A Diagnosis and Prescription" in Ian Shapiro and Robert Adams, eds., NOMOS: Integrity and Conscience (New York: New York University Press, 1998), 218-254.
16. See Hugh Davis Graham, Collision Course: The Strange Convergence of Affirmative Action and Immigration Policy in America (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 139-140; Jed Rubenfeld, "Affirmative Action, " Yale Law Journal 107 (1997): 471-472; Keith Bybee, "The Political Significance of Legal Ambiguity: The Case of Affirmative Action," Law and Society Review 34 (no. 2, 2000): 267; Guido Calabresi and Philip Bobbitt, Tragic Choices: The Conflict Society Confronts in the Allocation of Tragically Scarce Resources (New York: Norton, 1978), 222; Gwénaële Calvès, L'Affirmative action dans la jurisprudence de la Cour suprême: le problème de la discrimination "positive" (Paris: LGDJ, 1998), 136-137; Nathan Glazer, "The End of Meritocracy, " The New Republic, 27 September 1999, 28; Harvey Mansfield, Jr., "The Underhandedness of Affirmative Action" in Russell Nieli, ed., Racial Preference and Racial Justice: The New Affirmative Action Controversy (Washington, DC: Ethics and Public Policy Center, 1991), 130; Paul Mishkin, "The Uses of Ambivalence: Reflections on the Supreme Court and the Constitutionality of Affirmative Action," University of Pennsylvania Law Review 131 (March 1983): 928; Ronald Dworkin, "The Court and the University," New York Review of Books, 15 May 2003, 10; Jeffrey Rosen, "How I Learned to Love Quotas," New York Times Magazine, 1 June 2003. For a broader analysis of other less specific kinds of dissimulation in the Supreme Court case law, see Rogers Smith, "The Inherent Deceptiveness of Constitutional Discourse: A Diagnosis and Prescription" in Ian Shapiro and Robert Adams, eds., NOMOS: Integrity and Conscience (New York: New York University Press, 1998), 218-254.
17. See Hugh Davis Graham, Collision Course: The Strange Convergence of Affirmative Action and Immigration Policy in America (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 139-140; Jed Rubenfeld, "Affirmative Action, " Yale Law Journal 107 (1997): 471-472; Keith Bybee, "The Political Significance of Legal Ambiguity: The Case of Affirmative Action," Law and Society Review 34 (no. 2, 2000): 267; Guido Calabresi and Philip Bobbitt, Tragic Choices: The Conflict Society Confronts in the Allocation of Tragically Scarce Resources (New York: Norton, 1978), 222; Gwénaële Calvès, L'Affirmative action dans la jurisprudence de la Cour suprême: le problème de la discrimination "positive" (Paris: LGDJ, 1998), 136-137; Nathan Glazer, "The End of Meritocracy, " The New Republic, 27 September 1999, 28; Harvey Mansfield, Jr., "The Underhandedness of Affirmative Action" in Russell Nieli, ed., Racial Preference and Racial Justice: The New Affirmative Action Controversy (Washington, DC: Ethics and Public Policy Center, 1991), 130; Paul Mishkin, "The Uses of Ambivalence: Reflections on the Supreme Court and the Constitutionality of Affirmative Action," University of Pennsylvania Law Review 131 (March 1983): 928; Ronald Dworkin, "The Court and the University," New York Review of Books, 15 May 2003, 10; Jeffrey Rosen, "How I Learned to Love Quotas," New York Times Magazine, 1 June 2003. For a broader analysis of other less specific kinds of dissimulation in the Supreme Court case law, see Rogers Smith, "The Inherent Deceptiveness of Constitutional Discourse: A Diagnosis and Prescription" in Ian Shapiro and Robert Adams, eds., NOMOS: Integrity and Conscience (New York: New York University Press, 1998), 218-254.
18. See Hugh Davis Graham, Collision Course: The Strange Convergence of Affirmative Action and Immigration Policy in America (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 139-140; Jed Rubenfeld, "Affirmative Action, " Yale Law Journal 107 (1997): 471-472; Keith Bybee, "The Political Significance of Legal Ambiguity: The Case of Affirmative Action," Law and Society Review 34 (no. 2, 2000): 267; Guido Calabresi and Philip Bobbitt, Tragic Choices: The Conflict Society Confronts in the Allocation of Tragically Scarce Resources (New York: Norton, 1978), 222; Gwénaële Calvès, L'Affirmative action dans la jurisprudence de la Cour suprême: le problème de la discrimination "positive" (Paris: LGDJ, 1998), 136-137; Nathan Glazer, "The End of Meritocracy, " The New Republic, 27 September 1999, 28; Harvey Mansfield, Jr., "The Underhandedness of Affirmative Action" in Russell Nieli, ed., Racial Preference and Racial Justice: The New Affirmative Action Controversy (Washington, DC: Ethics and Public Policy Center, 1991), 130; Paul Mishkin, "The Uses of Ambivalence: Reflections on the Supreme Court and the Constitutionality of Affirmative Action," University of Pennsylvania Law Review 131 (March 1983): 928; Ronald Dworkin, "The Court and the University," New York Review of Books, 15 May 2003, 10; Jeffrey Rosen, "How I Learned to Love Quotas," New York Times Magazine, 1 June 2003. For a broader analysis of other less specific kinds of dissimulation in the Supreme Court case law, see Rogers Smith, "The Inherent Deceptiveness of Constitutional Discourse: A Diagnosis and Prescription" in Ian Shapiro and Robert Adams, eds., NOMOS: Integrity and Conscience (New York: New York University Press, 1998), 218-254.
19. See Hugh Davis Graham, Collision Course: The Strange Convergence of Affirmative Action and Immigration Policy in America (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 139-140; Jed Rubenfeld, "Affirmative Action, " Yale Law Journal 107 (1997): 471-472; Keith Bybee, "The Political Significance of Legal Ambiguity: The Case of Affirmative Action," Law and Society Review 34 (no. 2, 2000): 267; Guido Calabresi and Philip Bobbitt, Tragic Choices: The Conflict Society Confronts in the Allocation of Tragically Scarce Resources (New York: Norton, 1978), 222; Gwénaële Calvès, L'Affirmative action dans la jurisprudence de la Cour suprême: le problème de la discrimination "positive" (Paris: LGDJ, 1998), 136-137; Nathan Glazer, "The End of Meritocracy, " The New Republic, 27 September 1999, 28; Harvey Mansfield, Jr., "The Underhandedness of Affirmative Action" in Russell Nieli, ed., Racial Preference and Racial Justice: The New Affirmative Action Controversy (Washington, DC: Ethics and Public Policy Center, 1991), 130; Paul Mishkin, "The Uses of Ambivalence: Reflections on the Supreme Court and the Constitutionality of Affirmative Action," University of Pennsylvania Law Review 131 (March 1983): 928; Ronald Dworkin, "The Court and the University," New York Review of Books, 15 May 2003, 10; Jeffrey Rosen, "How I Learned to Love Quotas," New York Times Magazine, 1 June 2003. For a broader analysis of other less specific kinds of dissimulation in the Supreme Court case law, see Rogers Smith, "The Inherent Deceptiveness of Constitutional Discourse: A Diagnosis and Prescription" in Ian Shapiro and Robert Adams, eds., NOMOS: Integrity and Conscience (New York: New York University Press, 1998), 218-254.
20. See Hugh Davis Graham, Collision Course: The Strange Convergence of Affirmative Action and Immigration Policy in America (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 139-140; Jed Rubenfeld, "Affirmative Action, " Yale Law Journal 107 (1997): 471-472; Keith Bybee, "The Political Significance of Legal Ambiguity: The Case of Affirmative Action," Law and Society Review 34 (no. 2, 2000): 267; Guido Calabresi and Philip Bobbitt, Tragic Choices: The Conflict Society Confronts in the Allocation of Tragically Scarce Resources (New York: Norton, 1978), 222; Gwénaële Calvès, L'Affirmative action dans la jurisprudence de la Cour suprême: le problème de la discrimination "positive" (Paris: LGDJ, 1998), 136-137; Nathan Glazer, "The End of Meritocracy, " The New Republic, 27 September 1999, 28; Harvey Mansfield, Jr., "The Underhandedness of Affirmative Action" in Russell Nieli, ed., Racial Preference and Racial Justice: The New Affirmative Action Controversy (Washington, DC: Ethics and Public Policy Center, 1991), 130; Paul Mishkin, "The Uses of Ambivalence: Reflections on the Supreme Court and the Constitutionality of Affirmative Action," University of Pennsylvania Law Review 131 (March 1983): 928; Ronald Dworkin, "The Court and the University," New York Review of Books, 15 May 2003, 10; Jeffrey Rosen, "How I Learned to Love Quotas," New York Times Magazine, 1 June 2003. For a broader analysis of other less specific kinds of dissimulation in the Supreme Court case law, see Rogers Smith, "The Inherent Deceptiveness of Constitutional Discourse: A Diagnosis and Prescription" in Ian Shapiro and Robert Adams, eds., NOMOS: Integrity and Conscience (New York: New York University Press, 1998), 218-254.
21. See Hugh Davis Graham, Collision Course: The Strange Convergence of Affirmative Action and Immigration Policy in America (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 139-140; Jed Rubenfeld, "Affirmative Action, " Yale Law Journal 107 (1997): 471-472; Keith Bybee, "The Political Significance of Legal Ambiguity: The Case of Affirmative Action," Law and Society Review 34 (no. 2, 2000): 267; Guido Calabresi and Philip Bobbitt, Tragic Choices: The Conflict Society Confronts in the Allocation of Tragically Scarce Resources (New York: Norton, 1978), 222; Gwénaële Calvès, L'Affirmative action dans la jurisprudence de la Cour suprême: le problème de la discrimination "positive" (Paris: LGDJ, 1998), 136-137; Nathan Glazer, "The End of Meritocracy, " The New Republic, 27 September 1999, 28; Harvey Mansfield, Jr., "The Underhandedness of Affirmative Action" in Russell Nieli, ed., Racial Preference and Racial Justice: The New Affirmative Action Controversy (Washington, DC: Ethics and Public Policy Center, 1991), 130; Paul Mishkin, "The Uses of Ambivalence: Reflections on the Supreme Court and the Constitutionality of Affirmative Action," University of Pennsylvania Law Review 131 (March 1983): 928; Ronald Dworkin, "The Court and the University," New York Review of Books, 15 May 2003, 10; Jeffrey Rosen, "How I Learned to Love Quotas," New York Times Magazine, 1 June 2003. For a broader analysis of other less specific kinds of dissimulation in the Supreme Court case law, see Rogers Smith, "The Inherent Deceptiveness of Constitutional Discourse: A Diagnosis and Prescription" in Ian Shapiro and Robert Adams, eds., NOMOS: Integrity and Conscience (New York: New York University Press, 1998), 218-254.
22. U.S. Congress, National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 1935, section 151-158.
23. U.S. Congress, Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII, section 706 (g). Words in italics are those that Congress added in 1972, mostly in order to legalize some of the first "affirmative action" programs in the more specific sense of that phrase.
24. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act provides that "It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer. . . to fail or refuse to hire or discharge any individual, or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin" (Civil Rights Act (1964). 42 U.S. Section 2003, section 703 section (a)).
25. On the origins of contemporary affirmative action, see Hugh Davis Graham, The Civil Rights Era: Origins and Development of National Policy, 1960-1972 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 233-254, 278-297; John David Skrentny, The Ironies of Affirmative Action: Politics, Culture, and Justice in America (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1996), 67-144. Executive Order 10925 is reprinted in United States Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Education and Labor. Subcommittee on Employment Opportunities, Report on Affirmative Action and the Federal Enforcement of Equal Opportunity Laws (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Public Office, 1982), 5.
26. On the origins of contemporary affirmative action, see Hugh Davis Graham, The Civil Rights Era: Origins and Development of National Policy, 1960-1972 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 233-254, 278-297; John David Skrentny, The Ironies of Affirmative Action: Politics, Culture, and Justice in America (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1996), 67-144. Executive Order 10925 is reprinted in United States Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Education and Labor. Subcommittee on Employment Opportunities, Report on Affirmative Action and the Federal Enforcement of Equal Opportunity Laws (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Public Office, 1982), 5.
27. On the origins of contemporary affirmative action, see Hugh Davis Graham, The Civil Rights Era: Origins and Development of National Policy, 1960-1972 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 233-254, 278-297; John David Skrentny, The Ironies of Affirmative Action: Politics, Culture, and Justice in America (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1996), 67-144. Executive Order 10925 is reprinted in United States Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Education and Labor. Subcommittee on Employment Opportunities, Report on Affirmative Action and the Federal Enforcement of Equal Opportunity Laws (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Public Office, 1982), 5.
28. 30 Federal Register. 12319 (1965). 3 C.F.R. 339, 340.
29. See Nathan Glazer, Affirmative Discrimination: Ethnic Inequality and Public Policy (New York: Basic Books, 1975), 196-197.
30. See Local 28, Sheet Metal Workers International Association v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 478 US 421 (1986), 445, 476; see also United States v. Paradise, 480 US 149 (1987), 186, 193-194 (holding that a judicially-imposed minority quota might count as an appropriate remedy for persistent racial discrimination by state actors under the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause).
31. See Local 28, Sheet Metal Workers International Association v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 478 US 421 (1986), 445, 476; see also United States v. Paradise, 480 US 149 (1987), 186, 193-194 (holding that a judicially-imposed minority quota might count as an appropriate remedy for persistent racial discrimination by state actors under the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause).
32. See Thomas Nagel, "Equal Treatment and Compensatory Discrimination" in Marshall Cohen, Thomas Nagel, and Thomas Scanlon, eds., Equality and Preferential Treatment (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977), 3.
33. For other similar definitions of affirmative action by scholars whose research agendas are otherwise clearly different from mine, see Michel Rosenfeld, Affirmative Action and Justice: A Philosophical and Constitutional Inquiry (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991), 47; Calvès, L'Affirmative action dans ta jurisprudence de ta Cour suprême, 3.
34. For other similar definitions of affirmative action by scholars whose research agendas are otherwise clearly different from mine, see Michel Rosenfeld, Affirmative Action and Justice: A Philosophical and Constitutional Inquiry (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991), 47; Calvès, L'Affirmative action dans ta jurisprudence de ta Cour suprême, 3.
35. Insightful developments of a similar kind may be found in Owen Fiss, "Groups and the Equal Protection Clause," Philosophy and Public Affairs 5 (Winter 1976): 107-177; Cass Sunstein, "The Anti-Caste Principle," Michigan Law Review 92 (August 1994): 2410-2455. For an overview of these and other related arguments, see Andrew Koppelman, Antidiscrimination Law and Social Equality (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996), 76-92. Other conceivable justifications for affirmative action policies include the notion that they offer a measure of compensation to the victims of past injustice and the idea that they help promote an intrinsically beneficial kind of diversity of a mostly cultural nature. Yet, both arguments raise insuperable difficulties: on the corrective justice argument, see Robert Fullinwider, "Preferential Hiring and Compensation" in Steven Cahn. ed., The Affirmative Action Debate (New York: Routledge, 1995), 81-90; Robert Simon, "Preferential Hiring: A Reply to Judith Jarvis Thompson" in Cohen, Nagel, and Scanlon, Equality and Preferential Treatment, 40-48; on the diversity argument, see E. John Gregory, "Diversity is a Value in American Higher Education, But It is Not a Legal Justification for Affirmative Action," Florida Law Review 52 (2000): 930-955; Eugene Lowe, ed., Promise and Dilemma: Racial Diversity and Higher Education (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999). Whether the Dworkinian argument - which, I believe, stands on much firmer ground - would fare well with the members of the groups that benefit from affirmative action is an interesting question; but I shall not explore it here.
36. Insightful developments of a similar kind may be found in Owen Fiss, "Groups and the Equal Protection Clause," Philosophy and Public Affairs 5 (Winter 1976): 107-177; Cass Sunstein, "The Anti-Caste Principle," Michigan Law Review 92 (August 1994): 2410-2455. For an overview of these and other related arguments, see Andrew Koppelman, Antidiscrimination Law and Social Equality (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996), 76-92. Other conceivable justifications for affirmative action policies include the notion that they offer a measure of compensation to the victims of past injustice and the idea that they help promote an intrinsically beneficial kind of diversity of a mostly cultural nature. Yet, both arguments raise insuperable difficulties: on the corrective justice argument, see Robert Fullinwider, "Preferential Hiring and Compensation" in Steven Cahn. ed., The Affirmative Action Debate (New York: Routledge, 1995), 81-90; Robert Simon, "Preferential Hiring: A Reply to Judith Jarvis Thompson" in Cohen, Nagel, and Scanlon, Equality and Preferential Treatment, 40-48; on the diversity argument, see E. John Gregory, "Diversity is a Value in American Higher Education, But It is Not a Legal Justification for Affirmative Action," Florida Law Review 52 (2000): 930-955; Eugene Lowe, ed., Promise and Dilemma: Racial Diversity and Higher Education (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999). Whether the Dworkinian argument - which, I believe, stands on much firmer ground - would fare well with the members of the groups that benefit from affirmative action is an interesting question; but I shall not explore it here.
37. Insightful developments of a similar kind may be found in Owen Fiss, "Groups and the Equal Protection Clause," Philosophy and Public Affairs 5 (Winter 1976): 107-177; Cass Sunstein, "The Anti-Caste Principle," Michigan Law Review 92 (August 1994): 2410-2455. For an overview of these and other related arguments, see Andrew Koppelman, Antidiscrimination Law and Social Equality (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996), 76-92. Other conceivable justifications for affirmative action policies include the notion that they offer a measure of compensation to the victims of past injustice and the idea that they help promote an intrinsically beneficial kind of diversity of a mostly cultural nature. Yet, both arguments raise insuperable difficulties: on the corrective justice argument, see Robert Fullinwider, "Preferential Hiring and Compensation" in Steven Cahn. ed., The Affirmative Action Debate (New York: Routledge, 1995), 81-90; Robert Simon, "Preferential Hiring: A Reply to Judith Jarvis Thompson" in Cohen, Nagel, and Scanlon, Equality and Preferential Treatment, 40-48; on the diversity argument, see E. John Gregory, "Diversity is a Value in American Higher Education, But It is Not a Legal Justification for Affirmative Action," Florida Law Review 52 (2000): 930-955; Eugene Lowe, ed., Promise and Dilemma: Racial Diversity and Higher Education (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999). Whether the Dworkinian argument - which, I believe, stands on much firmer ground - would fare well with the members of the groups that benefit from affirmative action is an interesting question; but I shall not explore it here.
38. Insightful developments of a similar kind may be found in Owen Fiss, "Groups and the Equal Protection Clause," Philosophy and Public Affairs 5 (Winter 1976): 107-177; Cass Sunstein, "The Anti-Caste Principle," Michigan Law Review 92 (August 1994): 2410-2455. For an overview of these and other related arguments, see Andrew Koppelman, Antidiscrimination Law and Social Equality (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996), 76-92. Other conceivable justifications for affirmative action policies include the notion that they offer a measure of compensation to the victims of past injustice and the idea that they help promote an intrinsically beneficial kind of diversity of a mostly cultural nature. Yet, both arguments raise insuperable difficulties: on the corrective justice argument, see Robert Fullinwider, "Preferential Hiring and Compensation" in Steven Cahn. ed., The Affirmative Action Debate (New York: Routledge, 1995), 81-90; Robert Simon, "Preferential Hiring: A Reply to Judith Jarvis Thompson" in Cohen, Nagel, and Scanlon, Equality and Preferential Treatment, 40-48; on the diversity argument, see E. John Gregory, "Diversity is a Value in American Higher Education, But It is Not a Legal Justification for Affirmative Action," Florida Law Review 52 (2000): 930-955; Eugene Lowe, ed., Promise and Dilemma: Racial Diversity and Higher Education (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999). Whether the Dworkinian argument - which, I believe, stands on much firmer ground - would fare well with the members of the groups that benefit from affirmative action is an interesting question; but I shall not explore it here.
39. Insightful developments of a similar kind may be found in Owen Fiss, "Groups and the Equal Protection Clause," Philosophy and Public Affairs 5 (Winter 1976): 107-177; Cass Sunstein, "The Anti-Caste Principle," Michigan Law Review 92 (August 1994): 2410-2455. For an overview of these and other related arguments, see Andrew Koppelman, Antidiscrimination Law and Social Equality (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996), 76-92. Other conceivable justifications for affirmative action policies include the notion that they offer a measure of compensation to the victims of past injustice and the idea that they help promote an intrinsically beneficial kind of diversity of a mostly cultural nature. Yet, both arguments raise insuperable difficulties: on the corrective justice argument, see Robert Fullinwider, "Preferential Hiring and Compensation" in Steven Cahn. ed., The Affirmative Action Debate (New York: Routledge, 1995), 81-90; Robert Simon, "Preferential Hiring: A Reply to Judith Jarvis Thompson" in Cohen, Nagel, and Scanlon, Equality and Preferential Treatment, 40-48; on the diversity argument, see E. John Gregory, "Diversity is a Value in American Higher Education, But It is Not a Legal Justification for Affirmative Action," Florida Law Review 52 (2000): 930-955; Eugene Lowe, ed., Promise and Dilemma: Racial Diversity and Higher Education (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999). Whether the Dworkinian argument - which, I believe, stands on much firmer ground - would fare well with the members of the groups that benefit from affirmative action is an interesting question; but I shall not explore it here.
40. Insightful developments of a similar kind may be found in Owen Fiss, "Groups and the Equal Protection Clause," Philosophy and Public Affairs 5 (Winter 1976): 107-177; Cass Sunstein, "The Anti-Caste Principle," Michigan Law Review 92 (August 1994): 2410-2455. For an overview of these and other related arguments, see Andrew Koppelman, Antidiscrimination Law and Social Equality (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996), 76-92. Other conceivable justifications for affirmative action policies include the notion that they offer a measure of compensation to the victims of past injustice and the idea that they help promote an intrinsically beneficial kind of diversity of a mostly cultural nature. Yet, both arguments raise insuperable difficulties: on the corrective justice argument, see Robert Fullinwider, "Preferential Hiring and Compensation" in Steven Cahn. ed., The Affirmative Action Debate (New York: Routledge, 1995), 81-90; Robert Simon, "Preferential Hiring: A Reply to Judith Jarvis Thompson" in Cohen, Nagel, and Scanlon, Equality and Preferential Treatment, 40-48; on the diversity argument, see E. John Gregory, "Diversity is a Value in American Higher Education, But It is Not a Legal Justification for Affirmative Action," Florida Law Review 52 (2000): 930-955; Eugene Lowe, ed., Promise and Dilemma: Racial Diversity and Higher Education (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999). Whether the Dworkinian argument - which, I believe, stands on much firmer ground - would fare well with the members of the groups that benefit from affirmative action is an interesting question; but I shall not explore it here.
41. Insightful developments of a similar kind may be found in Owen Fiss, "Groups and the Equal Protection Clause," Philosophy and Public Affairs 5 (Winter 1976): 107-177; Cass Sunstein, "The Anti-Caste Principle," Michigan Law Review 92 (August 1994): 2410-2455. For an overview of these and other related arguments, see Andrew Koppelman, Antidiscrimination Law and Social Equality (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996), 76-92. Other conceivable justifications for affirmative action policies include the notion that they offer a measure of compensation to the victims of past injustice and the idea that they help promote an intrinsically beneficial kind of diversity of a mostly cultural nature. Yet, both arguments raise insuperable difficulties: on the corrective justice argument, see Robert Fullinwider, "Preferential Hiring and Compensation" in Steven Cahn. ed., The Affirmative Action Debate (New York: Routledge, 1995), 81-90; Robert Simon, "Preferential Hiring: A Reply to Judith Jarvis Thompson" in Cohen, Nagel, and Scanlon, Equality and Preferential Treatment, 40-48; on the diversity argument, see E. John Gregory, "Diversity is a Value in American Higher Education, But It is Not a Legal Justification for Affirmative Action," Florida Law Review 52 (2000): 930-955; Eugene Lowe, ed., Promise and Dilemma: Racial Diversity and Higher Education (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999). Whether the Dworkinian argument - which, I believe, stands on much firmer ground - would fare well with the members of the groups that benefit from affirmative action is an interesting question; but I shall not explore it here.
42. For some empirical data, see Abigail Thernstrom and Stephan Thernstrom, America in Black and White: One Nation, Indivisible (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1997), 183-202. But see also Dalton Conley, "Getting Into the Black: Race, Wealth, and Public Policy," Political Science Quarterly 114 (Winter 1999-2000): 595-612; Being Black, Living in the Red (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999); Melvin Oliver and Thomas M. Shapiro, Black Wealth/White Wealth: A New Perspective on Racial Inequality (New York: Routledge, 1995).
43. For some empirical data, see Abigail Thernstrom and Stephan Thernstrom, America in Black and White: One Nation, Indivisible (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1997), 183-202. But see also Dalton Conley, "Getting Into the Black: Race, Wealth, and Public Policy," Political Science Quarterly 114 (Winter 1999-2000): 595-612; Being Black, Living in the Red (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999); Melvin Oliver and Thomas M. Shapiro, Black Wealth/White Wealth: A New Perspective on Racial Inequality (New York: Routledge, 1995).
44. For some empirical data, see Abigail Thernstrom and Stephan Thernstrom, America in Black and White: One Nation, Indivisible (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1997), 183-202. But see also Dalton Conley, "Getting Into the Black: Race, Wealth, and Public Policy," Political Science Quarterly 114 (Winter 1999-2000): 595-612; Being Black, Living in the Red (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999); Melvin Oliver and Thomas M. Shapiro, Black Wealth/White Wealth: A New Perspective on Racial Inequality (New York: Routledge, 1995).
45. For some empirical data, see Abigail Thernstrom and Stephan Thernstrom, America in Black and White: One Nation, Indivisible (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1997), 183-202. But see also Dalton Conley, "Getting Into the Black: Race, Wealth, and Public Policy," Political Science Quarterly 114 (Winter 1999-2000): 595-612; Being Black, Living in the Red (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999); Melvin Oliver and Thomas M. Shapiro, Black Wealth/White Wealth: A New Perspective on Racial Inequality (New York: Routledge, 1995).
46. Ronald Dworkin, A Matter of Principle (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985), 294.
47. Ronald Dworkin, A Matter of Principle (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985), 294.
48. Dworkin, A Matter of Principle, 294, 295. Hardly anyone would argue that the "future point" mentioned by Dworkin has already been reached. On the increase in race-consciousness initially experienced by many members of the black middle and upper-middle class, which may well testify simply to the yet incomplete character of their integration into a professional environment where the presence of nonwhites is still perceived as an anomaly of some kind, see Jennifer Hochschild, Facing Up to the American Dream: Race, Class, and the Soul of the Nation (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), 73-78.
49. Dworkin, A Matter of Principle, 294, 295. Hardly anyone would argue that the "future point" mentioned by Dworkin has already been reached. On the increase in race-consciousness initially experienced by many members of the black middle and upper-middle class, which may well testify simply to the yet incomplete character of their integration into a professional environment where the presence of nonwhites is still perceived as an anomaly of some kind, see Jennifer Hochschild, Facing Up to the American Dream: Race, Class, and the Soul of the Nation (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), 73-78.
50. Gunnar Myrdal, An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and Modern Democracy (New York: Harper & Row, 1944), vol. 1, 75, 76.
51. Ibid., 75-76.
52. Ibid., 77.
53. Jon Elster, Sour Grapes: Studies in the Subversion of Rationality (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 43.
54. Ibid., 43; Jon Elster, Psychologie politique (Veyne, Zinoviev, Tocqueville) (Paris: éd. de Minuit, 1990), 51; Jon Elster, "Is There (or Should There Be) a Right to Work?" in Amy Gutmann, ed., Democracy and the Welfare State (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), 74.
55. Ibid., 43; Jon Elster, Psychologie politique (Veyne, Zinoviev, Tocqueville) (Paris: éd. de Minuit, 1990), 51; Jon Elster, "Is There (or Should There Be) a Right to Work?" in Amy Gutmann, ed., Democracy and the Welfare State (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), 74.
56. Ibid., 43; Jon Elster, Psychologie politique (Veyne, Zinoviev, Tocqueville) (Paris: éd. de Minuit, 1990), 51; Jon Elster, "Is There (or Should There Be) a Right to Work?" in Amy Gutmann, ed., Democracy and the Welfare State (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), 74.
57. Elster, Sour Grapes, 46.
58. Ibid., 45.
59. Elster, Psychologie politique, 76, 92.
60. Elster, Sour Grapes, 43.
61. Ibid., 44; Elster, Psychologie politique, 50.
62. Ibid., 44; Elster, Psychologie politique, 50.
63. Elster, Sour Grapes, 60; Elster, Psychologie politique, 51.
64. Elster, Sour Grapes, 60; Elster, Psychologie politique, 51.
65. Elster, Sour Grapes, 56.
66. Ibid., 60, 84.
67. On the meaning and usefulness of this term, see David Hollinger, Postethnic America: Beyond Multiculturalism (New York: Basic Books, 1995), 19-50.
68. That the mere mention of the existence of affirmative action programs actually tends to reinforce such stereotypes is suggested in Paul Sniderman and Thomas Piazza, The Scar of Race (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993), 97-104; Sniderman and Carmines, Reaching Beyond Race, 37-40.
69. That the mere mention of the existence of affirmative action programs actually tends to reinforce such stereotypes is suggested in Paul Sniderman and Thomas Piazza, The Scar of Race (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993), 97-104; Sniderman and Carmines, Reaching Beyond Race, 37-40.
70. See Marylin Brewer and Norman Miller, "Contact and Cooperation: When Do They Work?" in Phyllis Katz and Dalmas Taylor, eds., Eliminating Racism: Profiles in Controversy (New York: Plenum Press, 1988), 320, 324; Myron Rothbart and Oliver P. John, "Social Categorization and Behavioral Episodes: A Cognitive Analysis of the Effects of Intergroup Contact," Journal of Social Issues 41 (no. 3, 1985): 95-96; Thomas Krull and Robert Wyer, "Category Accessibility and Social Perception: Some Implications for the Study of Person Memory and Interpersonal Judgments," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 38 (June 1980): 841-856.
71. See Marylin Brewer and Norman Miller, "Contact and Cooperation: When Do They Work?" in Phyllis Katz and Dalmas Taylor, eds., Eliminating Racism: Profiles in Controversy (New York: Plenum Press, 1988), 320, 324; Myron Rothbart and Oliver P. John, "Social Categorization and Behavioral Episodes: A Cognitive Analysis of the Effects of Intergroup Contact," Journal of Social Issues 41 (no. 3, 1985): 95-96; Thomas Krull and Robert Wyer, "Category Accessibility and Social Perception: Some Implications for the Study of Person Memory and Interpersonal Judgments," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 38 (June 1980): 841-856.
72. See Marylin Brewer and Norman Miller, "Contact and Cooperation: When Do They Work?" in Phyllis Katz and Dalmas Taylor, eds., Eliminating Racism: Profiles in Controversy (New York: Plenum Press, 1988), 320, 324; Myron Rothbart and Oliver P. John, "Social Categorization and Behavioral Episodes: A Cognitive Analysis of the Effects of Intergroup Contact," Journal of Social Issues 41 (no. 3, 1985): 95-96; Thomas Krull and Robert Wyer, "Category Accessibility and Social Perception: Some Implications for the Study of Person Memory and Interpersonal Judgments," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 38 (June 1980): 841-856.
73. Elster, Sour Grapes, 58.
74. Of course, one may fail in trying to do so. Thus, legal scholar Cass Sunstein has made the plausible, though empirically unsubstantiated, suggestion that part of the current hostility toward affirmative action may well stem from a widespread perception and resentment of that policy's lack of transparency. See Cass Sunstein, One Case at a Time: Judicial Minimalism on the Supreme Court (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), 130.
75. This point has been raised in several Supreme Court decisions. See Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 US 265 (1978), 398 (opinion of Justice Powell), 360 (opinion of Justice Brennan); United Jewish Organizations v. Carey, 430 US 144 (1977), 173-174 (opinion of Justice Brennan) ; Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 US 448 (1980), 545 (dissenting opinion of Justice Stevens); City of Richmond v. Croson, 488 US 469 (1989), 493 (opinion of Justice O'Connor).
76. This point has been raised in several Supreme Court decisions. See Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 US 265 (1978), 398 (opinion of Justice Powell), 360 (opinion of Justice Brennan); United Jewish Organizations v. Carey, 430 US 144 (1977), 173-174 (opinion of Justice Brennan) ; Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 US 448 (1980), 545 (dissenting opinion of Justice Stevens); City of Richmond v. Croson, 488 US 469 (1989), 493 (opinion of Justice O'Connor).
77. This point has been raised in several Supreme Court decisions. See Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 US 265 (1978), 398 (opinion of Justice Powell), 360 (opinion of Justice Brennan); United Jewish Organizations v. Carey, 430 US 144 (1977), 173-174 (opinion of Justice Brennan) ; Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 US 448 (1980), 545 (dissenting opinion of Justice Stevens); City of Richmond v. Croson, 488 US 469 (1989), 493 (opinion of Justice O'Connor).
78. This point has been raised in several Supreme Court decisions. See Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 US 265 (1978), 398 (opinion of Justice Powell), 360 (opinion of Justice Brennan); United Jewish Organizations v. Carey, 430 US 144 (1977), 173-174 (opinion of Justice Brennan) ; Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 US 448 (1980), 545 (dissenting opinion of Justice Stevens); City of Richmond v. Croson, 488 US 469 (1989), 493 (opinion of Justice O'Connor).
79. See Linda Hamilton Krieger, "The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach on Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity," Stanford Law Review 47 (July 1995): 1161-1248 (reviewing a substantial portion of the relevant literature); Linda Hamilton Krieger, "Civil Rights Perestroika: Intergroup Relations After Affirmative Action," California Law Review 86 (December 1998): 1264-1270; John W. Howard and Myron Rothbart, "Social Categorization and Memory for In-Group and Out-Group Behavior," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 38 (February 1980): 303-306; Madeleine Heilman, Caryn Block, and Jonathan Lucas, "Presumed Incompetent: Stigmatization and Affirmative Action Efforts, " Journal of Applied Psychology 77 (August 1992): 536-545; Rupert Nascoste, "Sources of Stigma: Analysing the Psychology of Affirmative Action," Law and Policy 12 (April 1990): 175-195; Rupert Nascoste, "Social Psychology and Affirmative Action: The Importance of Process in Policy Analysis," Journal of Social Issues 43 (no. 1 1987): 127-132.
80. See Linda Hamilton Krieger, "The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach on Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity," Stanford Law Review 47 (July 1995): 1161-1248 (reviewing a substantial portion of the relevant literature); Linda Hamilton Krieger, "Civil Rights Perestroika: Intergroup Relations After Affirmative Action," California Law Review 86 (December 1998): 1264-1270; John W. Howard and Myron Rothbart, "Social Categorization and Memory for In-Group and Out-Group Behavior," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 38 (February 1980): 303-306; Madeleine Heilman, Caryn Block, and Jonathan Lucas, "Presumed Incompetent: Stigmatization and Affirmative Action Efforts, " Journal of Applied Psychology 77 (August 1992): 536-545; Rupert Nascoste, "Sources of Stigma: Analysing the Psychology of Affirmative Action," Law and Policy 12 (April 1990): 175-195; Rupert Nascoste, "Social Psychology and Affirmative Action: The Importance of Process in Policy Analysis," Journal of Social Issues 43 (no. 1 1987): 127-132.
81. See Linda Hamilton Krieger, "The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach on Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity," Stanford Law Review 47 (July 1995): 1161-1248 (reviewing a substantial portion of the relevant literature); Linda Hamilton Krieger, "Civil Rights Perestroika: Intergroup Relations After Affirmative Action," California Law Review 86 (December 1998): 1264-1270; John W. Howard and Myron Rothbart, "Social Categorization and Memory for In-Group and Out-Group Behavior," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 38 (February 1980): 303-306; Madeleine Heilman, Caryn Block, and Jonathan Lucas, "Presumed Incompetent: Stigmatization and Affirmative Action Efforts, " Journal of Applied Psychology 77 (August 1992): 536-545; Rupert Nascoste, "Sources of Stigma: Analysing the Psychology of Affirmative Action," Law and Policy 12 (April 1990): 175-195; Rupert Nascoste, "Social Psychology and Affirmative Action: The Importance of Process in Policy Analysis," Journal of Social Issues 43 (no. 1 1987): 127-132.
82. See Linda Hamilton Krieger, "The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach on Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity," Stanford Law Review 47 (July 1995): 1161-1248 (reviewing a substantial portion of the relevant literature); Linda Hamilton Krieger, "Civil Rights Perestroika: Intergroup Relations After Affirmative Action," California Law Review 86 (December 1998): 1264-1270; John W. Howard and Myron Rothbart, "Social Categorization and Memory for In-Group and Out-Group Behavior," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 38 (February 1980): 303-306; Madeleine Heilman, Caryn Block, and Jonathan Lucas, "Presumed Incompetent: Stigmatization and Affirmative Action Efforts, " Journal of Applied Psychology 77 (August 1992): 536-545; Rupert Nascoste, "Sources of Stigma: Analysing the Psychology of Affirmative Action," Law and Policy 12 (April 1990): 175-195; Rupert Nascoste, "Social Psychology and Affirmative Action: The Importance of Process in Policy Analysis," Journal of Social Issues 43 (no. 1 1987): 127-132.
83. See Linda Hamilton Krieger, "The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach on Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity," Stanford Law Review 47 (July 1995): 1161-1248 (reviewing a substantial portion of the relevant literature); Linda Hamilton Krieger, "Civil Rights Perestroika: Intergroup Relations After Affirmative Action," California Law Review 86 (December 1998): 1264-1270; John W. Howard and Myron Rothbart, "Social Categorization and Memory for In-Group and Out-Group Behavior," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 38 (February 1980): 303-306; Madeleine Heilman, Caryn Block, and Jonathan Lucas, "Presumed Incompetent: Stigmatization and Affirmative Action Efforts, " Journal of Applied Psychology 77 (August 1992): 536-545; Rupert Nascoste, "Sources of Stigma: Analysing the Psychology of Affirmative Action," Law and Policy 12 (April 1990): 175-195; Rupert Nascoste, "Social Psychology and Affirmative Action: The Importance of Process in Policy Analysis," Journal of Social Issues 43 (no. 1 1987): 127-132.
84. See Linda Hamilton Krieger, "The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach on Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity," Stanford Law Review 47 (July 1995): 1161-1248 (reviewing a substantial portion of the relevant literature); Linda Hamilton Krieger, "Civil Rights Perestroika: Intergroup Relations After Affirmative Action," California Law Review 86 (December 1998): 1264-1270; John W. Howard and Myron Rothbart, "Social Categorization and Memory for In-Group and Out-Group Behavior," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 38 (February 1980): 303-306; Madeleine Heilman, Caryn Block, and Jonathan Lucas, "Presumed Incompetent: Stigmatization and Affirmative Action Efforts, " Journal of Applied Psychology 77 (August 1992): 536-545; Rupert Nascoste, "Sources of Stigma: Analysing the Psychology of Affirmative Action," Law and Policy 12 (April 1990): 175-195; Rupert Nascoste, "Social Psychology and Affirmative Action: The Importance of Process in Policy Analysis," Journal of Social Issues 43 (no. 1 1987): 127-132.
85. Michel Dobry, Sociologie des crises politiques (Paris: Presses de la FNSP, 1986), 198.
86. See Rothbart and John, "Social Categorization," 96.
87. In this respect, see the dissenting opinion by Justice Stevens in Fullilove v. Klutznick, 545. See also Luis Garcia, Nancy Erskine, Cathy Hawn, and Susan Casmey, "The Effects of Affirmative Action on Attributions about Minority Group Members," Journal of Personality 49 (December 1981): 427-437; Russell Summers, "The Influence of Affirmative Action on Perceptions of a Beneficiary's Qualifications," Journal of Applied Social Psychology 21 (August 1991): 1265-1277.
88. In this respect, see the dissenting opinion by Justice Stevens in Fullilove v. Klutznick, 545. See also Luis Garcia, Nancy Erskine, Cathy Hawn, and Susan Casmey, "The Effects of Affirmative Action on Attributions about Minority Group Members," Journal of Personality 49 (December 1981): 427-437; Russell Summers, "The Influence of Affirmative Action on Perceptions of a Beneficiary's Qualifications," Journal of Applied Social Psychology 21 (August 1991): 1265-1277.
89. In this respect, see the dissenting opinion by Justice Stevens in Fullilove v. Klutznick, 545. See also Luis Garcia, Nancy Erskine, Cathy Hawn, and Susan Casmey, "The Effects of Affirmative Action on Attributions about Minority Group Members," Journal of Personality 49 (December 1981): 427-437; Russell Summers, "The Influence of Affirmative Action on Perceptions of a Beneficiary's Qualifications," Journal of Applied Social Psychology 21 (August 1991): 1265-1277.
90. Antonin Scalia, "The Disease as Cure: 'In Order to Get Beyond Racism, We Must First Take Account of Race'" in Nieli, Racial Preference and Racial Justice, 279.
91. Griggs v. Duke Power Company, 401 US 424 (1971), 431, 430.
92. Alfred Blumrosen, Black Employment and the Law (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1973), viii.
93. See Kull, The Color-Blind Constitution, 204-206.
94. United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 US 193 (1979); Johnson v. Santa Clara Transportation Agency, 480 US 616 (1987). On Weber, see Bernard Meltzer, "The Weber Case: The Judicial Abrogation of the Antidiscrimination Standard in Employment," University of Chicago Law Review 47 (Spring 1980): 423-466; William Eskridge, Jr., Dynamics of Statutory Interpretation (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994), 14-31, 33-44; on Johnson, see Daniel Sabbagh, L'Affirmative Action aux États-Unis: Construction juridique et enjeux politiques des dispositifs de lutte contre l'inégalité et la discrimination raciales (Ph.D. dissertation, Institut d'études politiques de Paris, 2000) 123-125, 222.
95. United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 US 193 (1979); Johnson v. Santa Clara Transportation Agency, 480 US 616 (1987). On Weber, see Bernard Meltzer, "The Weber Case: The Judicial Abrogation of the Antidiscrimination Standard in Employment," University of Chicago Law Review 47 (Spring 1980): 423-466; William Eskridge, Jr., Dynamics of Statutory Interpretation (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994), 14-31, 33-44; on Johnson, see Daniel Sabbagh, L'Affirmative Action aux États-Unis: Construction juridique et enjeux politiques des dispositifs de lutte contre l'inégalité et la discrimination raciales (Ph.D. dissertation, Institut d'études politiques de Paris, 2000) 123-125, 222.
96. United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 US 193 (1979); Johnson v. Santa Clara Transportation Agency, 480 US 616 (1987). On Weber, see Bernard Meltzer, "The Weber Case: The Judicial Abrogation of the Antidiscrimination Standard in Employment," University of Chicago Law Review 47 (Spring 1980): 423-466; William Eskridge, Jr., Dynamics of Statutory Interpretation (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994), 14-31, 33-44; on Johnson, see Daniel Sabbagh, L'Affirmative Action aux États-Unis: Construction juridique et enjeux politiques des dispositifs de lutte contre l'inégalité et la discrimination raciales (Ph.D. dissertation, Institut d'études politiques de Paris, 2000) 123-125, 222.
97. United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 US 193 (1979); Johnson v. Santa Clara Transportation Agency, 480 US 616 (1987). On Weber, see Bernard Meltzer, "The Weber Case: The Judicial Abrogation of the Antidiscrimination Standard in Employment," University of Chicago Law Review 47 (Spring 1980): 423-466; William Eskridge, Jr., Dynamics of Statutory Interpretation (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994), 14-31, 33-44; on Johnson, see Daniel Sabbagh, L'Affirmative Action aux États-Unis: Construction juridique et enjeux politiques des dispositifs de lutte contre l'inégalité et la discrimination raciales (Ph.D. dissertation, Institut d'études politiques de Paris, 2000) 123-125, 222.
98. United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 US 193 (1979); Johnson v. Santa Clara Transportation Agency, 480 US 616 (1987). On Weber, see Bernard Meltzer, "The Weber Case: The Judicial Abrogation of the Antidiscrimination Standard in Employment," University of Chicago Law Review 47 (Spring 1980): 423-466; William Eskridge, Jr., Dynamics of Statutory Interpretation (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994), 14-31, 33-44; on Johnson, see Daniel Sabbagh, L'Affirmative Action aux États-Unis: Construction juridique et enjeux politiques des dispositifs de lutte contre l'inégalité et la discrimination raciales (Ph.D. dissertation, Institut d'études politiques de Paris, 2000) 123-125, 222.
99. See Griggs v. Duke Power Company, 431.
100. On the decrease in the Asian-American admission rate registered at several elite universities during the first half of the 1980s, see Grace Tsuang, "Assuring Equal Access of Asian Americans to Highly Selective Universities," Yale Law Journal 98 (January 1989): 660-661; also see Selena Dong, "Too Many Asians: The Challenge of Fighting Discrimination Against Asian Americans and Preserving Affirmative Action," Stanford Law Review 47 (May 1995): 1027-1057; Dana Takagi, The Retreat from Race: Asian-American Admissions and Racial Politics (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1992).
101. On the decrease in the Asian-American admission rate registered at several elite universities during the first half of the 1980s, see Grace Tsuang, "Assuring Equal Access of Asian Americans to Highly Selective Universities," Yale Law Journal 98 (January 1989): 660-661; also see Selena Dong, "Too Many Asians: The Challenge of Fighting Discrimination Against Asian Americans and Preserving Affirmative Action," Stanford Law Review 47 (May 1995): 1027-1057; Dana Takagi, The Retreat from Race: Asian-American Admissions and Racial Politics (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1992).
102. On the decrease in the Asian-American admission rate registered at several elite universities during the first half of the 1980s, see Grace Tsuang, "Assuring Equal Access of Asian Americans to Highly Selective Universities," Yale Law Journal 98 (January 1989): 660-661; also see Selena Dong, "Too Many Asians: The Challenge of Fighting Discrimination Against Asian Americans and Preserving Affirmative Action," Stanford Law Review 47 (May 1995): 1027-1057; Dana Takagi, The Retreat from Race: Asian-American Admissions and Racial Politics (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1992).
103. See also Desmond King, Separate and Unequal: Black Americans and the US Federal Government (Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 1995), 209.
104. Griggs v. Duke Power Company, 431.
105. On Griggs v. Duke Power Company, see also Richard Epstein, Forbidden Grounds: The Case Against Employment Discrimination Laws (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992), 193-200, 212-216.
106. On Griggs v. Duke Power Company, see also Richard Epstein, Forbidden Grounds: The Case Against Employment Discrimination Laws (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992), 193-200, 212-216.
107. Regents of the University of California v. Bakke (1978). There are other such examples: On City of Richmond v. Croson (488 US 469, (1989)) see Ian Ayres, "Narrow Tailoring," UCLA Law Review 43 (August 1996): 1786-1799. On Shaw v. Reno 509 US 630 (1993) see Morgan Kousser, Color-Blind Injustice: Minority Voting Rights and the Undoing of the Second Reconstruction (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1999), 366-396.
108. Regents of the University of California v. Bakke (1978). There are other such examples: On City of Richmond v. Croson (488 US 469, (1989)) see Ian Ayres, "Narrow Tailoring," UCLA Law Review 43 (August 1996): 1786-1799. On Shaw v. Reno 509 US 630 (1993) see Morgan Kousser, Color-Blind Injustice: Minority Voting Rights and the Undoing of the Second Reconstruction (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1999), 366-396.
109. Regents of the University of California v. Bakke (1978). There are other such examples: On City of Richmond v. Croson (488 US 469, (1989)) see Ian Ayres, "Narrow Tailoring," UCLA Law Review 43 (August 1996): 1786-1799. On Shaw v. Reno 509 US 630 (1993) see Morgan Kousser, Color-Blind Injustice: Minority Voting Rights and the Undoing of the Second Reconstruction (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1999), 366-396.
110. Regents of the University of California v. Bakke (1978). There are other such examples: On City of Richmond v. Croson (488 US 469, (1989)) see Ian Ayres, "Narrow Tailoring," UCLA Law Review 43 (August 1996): 1786-1799. On Shaw v. Reno 509 US 630 (1993) see Morgan Kousser, Color-Blind Injustice: Minority Voting Rights and the Undoing of the Second Reconstruction (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1999), 366-396.
111. Regents of the University of California v. Bakke (1978). There are other such examples: On City of Richmond v. Croson (488 US 469, (1989)) see Ian Ayres, "Narrow Tailoring," UCLA Law Review 43 (August 1996): 1786-1799. On Shaw v. Reno 509 US 630 (1993) see Morgan Kousser, Color-Blind Injustice: Minority Voting Rights and the Undoing of the Second Reconstruction (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1999), 366-396.
112. Powell's opinion determined this case because the other eight justices were evenly divided between defenders (William Brennan, Harry Blackmun, Thurgood Marshall, and Byron White) and opponents (Warren Burger, William Rehnquist, Potter Stewart, and John Paul Stevens) of race-based affirmative action programs in university admissions; see Bernard Schwartz, Behind Bakke: Affirmative Action and the Supreme Court (New York: New York University Press, 1988), 143-146.
113. See, for instance, Dworkin, A Matter of Principle, 313-314; Richard Posner, "The Bakke Case and the Future of 'Affirmative Action,'" California Law Review 67 (January 1979): 171-189.
114. See, for instance, Dworkin, A Matter of Principle, 313-314; Richard Posner, "The Bakke Case and the Future of 'Affirmative Action,'" California Law Review 67 (January 1979): 171-189.
115. Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 US 265 (1978), 315.
116. Ibid., 316. That quote is taken from what was then the Harvard undergraduate affirmative action plan, a program Powell found constitutionally admissible and presented as a model for public universities.
117. Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 317 (footnote omitted).
118. Ibid., 318.
119. Ibid., 317-318.
120. "Brief of President and Fellows of Harvard College," Amicus Curiae, DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 US 312 (1974), 15 (quoted in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 322).
121. At least as much can be gathered from most empirical studies currently available. For an example, see Patricia Conley, "The Allocation of College Admission" in Jon Elster, ed., Local Justice in America (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1995), 59-60. In particular, there are reasons to believe that the advantage enjoyed by blacks and Hispanics in university admissions is usually larger than the one often awarded to athletes and children of alumni. See Richard Kahlenberg, The Remedy: Class, Race, and Affirmative Action (New York: New Republic Books/Basic Books, 1996), 241.
122. At least as much can be gathered from most empirical studies currently available. For an example, see Patricia Conley, "The Allocation of College Admission" in Jon Elster, ed., Local Justice in America (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1995), 59-60. In particular, there are reasons to believe that the advantage enjoyed by blacks and Hispanics in university admissions is usually larger than the one often awarded to athletes and children of alumni. See Richard Kahlenberg, The Remedy: Class, Race, and Affirmative Action (New York: New Republic Books/Basic Books, 1996), 241.
123. Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 314.
124. However, a public university seeking to promote religious diversity in the selection of its student body would be prevented from doing so by the First Amendment. See Eugene Volokh, "Diversity, Race as Proxy, and Religion as Proxy," UCLA Law Review 43 (August 1996): 2070-2072.
125. See Rodolfo de la Garza, et. al., Latino Voices: Mexican, Puerto Rican, and Cuban Perspectives on American Politics (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1992), 40; Ronald Takaki, Strangers from a Different Shore: A History of Asian Americans (Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin Books, 1990), 421, 432; Miranda Oshige McGowan, "Diversity of What?" Representations 57 (Summer 1996): 133.
126. See Rodolfo de la Garza, et. al., Latino Voices: Mexican, Puerto Rican, and Cuban Perspectives on American Politics (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1992), 40; Ronald Takaki, Strangers from a Different Shore: A History of Asian Americans (Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin Books, 1990), 421, 432; Miranda Oshige McGowan, "Diversity of What?" Representations 57 (Summer 1996): 133.
127. See Rodolfo de la Garza, et. al., Latino Voices: Mexican, Puerto Rican, and Cuban Perspectives on American Politics (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1992), 40; Ronald Takaki, Strangers from a Different Shore: A History of Asian Americans (Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin Books, 1990), 421, 432; Miranda Oshige McGowan, "Diversity of What?" Representations 57 (Summer 1996): 133.
128. For another case in point, Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission et. al. 497 US 547 (1990), see Sabbagh, L'Affirmative Action aux États-Unis, 554-555.
129. For another case in point, Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission et. al. 497 US 547 (1990), see Sabbagh, L'Affirmative Action aux États-Unis, 554-555.
130. United States v. Virginia, 522 US 116 (1996) in Donald P. Kommers and John E. Finn, eds., American Constitutional Law, vol. 2 (Belmont, CA: West/Wadsworth, 1998), 838.
131. United States v. Virginia, 522 US 116 (1996) in Donald P. Kommers and John E. Finn, eds., American Constitutional Law, vol. 2 (Belmont, CA: West/Wadsworth, 1998), 838.
132. Ibid., 838-839.
133. See Christopher Jencks and Meredith Phillips, eds., The Black-White Test Score Gap (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1998); Jeffrey Rosen, "Is Affirmative Action Doomed?" The New Republic, 17 October 1994.
134. See Christopher Jencks and Meredith Phillips, eds., The Black-White Test Score Gap (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1998); Jeffrey Rosen, "Is Affirmative Action Doomed?" The New Republic, 17 October 1994.
135. Dworkin, A Matter of Principle, 311.
136. Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 379.
137. See Brian Barry, Culture and Equality: An Egalitarian Critique of Multiculturalism (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2001), 343, n. 3.
138. See Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 321-324.
139. Ibid., 316.
140. Ibid., 323.
141. See Alan Dershowitz and Laura Hanft, "Affirmative Action and the Harvard College Diversity-Discretion Model: Paradigm or Pretext?" Cardozo Law Review 1 (Fall 1979): 383.
142. Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 318.
143. Ibid., 318-319.
144. Dworkin, A Matter of Principle, 309.
145. Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 319, n. 53. The quote is from the decision Offutt v. United States, 348 US 11 (1954), 14.
146. Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 319, n. 53. The quote is from the decision Offutt v. United States, 348 US 11 (1954), 14.
147. See Paul Peterson, "A Politically Correct Solution" in Paul Peterson, ed., Classifying by Race (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), 3-21.
148. See John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 235-237; Owen Fiss, "The Supreme Court, 1978 Term. Foreword: The Forms of Justice," Harvard Law Review 93 (November 1979): 51-52.
149. See John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 235-237; Owen Fiss, "The Supreme Court, 1978 Term. Foreword: The Forms of Justice," Harvard Law Review 93 (November 1979): 51-52.
150. As decided by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Hopwood v. State of Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Circuit 1996).
151. On the legislative history of the "ten-percent plan," see David Montejano, "Maintaining Diversity at the University of Texas" in Robert Post and Michael Rogin, eds., Race and Representation: Affirmative Action (New York: Zone Books, 1998): 362-366.
152. See Erica Frankenburg, Chungmei Lee, and Gary Orfield, A Multiracial Society with Segregated Schools: Are We Losing the Dream? (January 2003), http://www.civilrightsproject.harvard.edu/research/reseg03/AreWeLosingtheDream. pdf (as visited June 14, 2003).
153. This is certainly not the first time in American history that university officials use seemingly neutral criteria that are actually chosen because of their positive or negative disparate impact on some specific ethnic or racial minority. See Dan Oren, Joining the Club: A History of Jews at Yale (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985), 48-56; for a more general analysis, see Jon Elster, Local Justice: How Institutions Allocate Goods and Necessary Burdens (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 116-120. Aside from their nontransferability to graduate and professional schools, whose applicants come from more integrated undergraduate institutions, and from the perverse incentives that they may set up in the minority parents' mind to keep their child in a low-performing, segregated school, these percentage plans can also be criticized on meritocratic grounds. Since they do not make any qualitative distinction between high schools, they usually involve a less stringent qualification standard for admission than do the former, openly-acknowledged affirmative action programs. Thus they may well end up yielding a less well-prepared population of black and Hispanic matriculants. See Lawrence Blum, I'm not a Racist But. . .: The Moral Quandary of Race (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002), 91.
154. This is certainly not the first time in American history that university officials use seemingly neutral criteria that are actually chosen because of their positive or negative disparate impact on some specific ethnic or racial minority. See Dan Oren, Joining the Club: A History of Jews at Yale (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985), 48-56; for a more general analysis, see Jon Elster, Local Justice: How Institutions Allocate Goods and Necessary Burdens (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 116-120. Aside from their nontransferability to graduate and professional schools, whose applicants come from more integrated undergraduate institutions, and from the perverse incentives that they may set up in the minority parents' mind to keep their child in a low-performing, segregated school, these percentage plans can also be criticized on meritocratic grounds. Since they do not make any qualitative distinction between high schools, they usually involve a less stringent qualification standard for admission than do the former, openly-acknowledged affirmative action programs. Thus they may well end up yielding a less well-prepared population of black and Hispanic matriculants. See Lawrence Blum, I'm not a Racist But. . .: The Moral Quandary of Race (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002), 91.
155. This is certainly not the first time in American history that university officials use seemingly neutral criteria that are actually chosen because of their positive or negative disparate impact on some specific ethnic or racial minority. See Dan Oren, Joining the Club: A History of Jews at Yale (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985), 48-56; for a more general analysis, see Jon Elster, Local Justice: How Institutions Allocate Goods and Necessary Burdens (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 116-120. Aside from their nontransferability to graduate and professional schools, whose applicants come from more integrated undergraduate institutions, and from the perverse incentives that they may set up in the minority parents' mind to keep their child in a low-performing, segregated school, these percentage plans can also be criticized on meritocratic grounds. Since they do not make any qualitative distinction between high schools, they usually involve a less stringent qualification standard for admission than do the former, openly-acknowledged affirmative action programs. Thus they may well end up yielding a less well-prepared population of black and Hispanic matriculants. See Lawrence Blum, I'm not a Racist But. . .: The Moral Quandary of Race (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002), 91.
156. Glenn Loury, The Anatomy of Racial Inequality (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002), 134.
157. See William Bowen and Derek Bok, The Shape of the River: Long-Term Consequences of Considering Race in College and University Admissions (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), 31-39.
158. Grutter v. Bollinger, No.02-241, 2003 WL 21433492 (U.S. June 23, 2003). Justice Sandra O'Connor wrote the majority opinion. She was joined by Justices John Paul Stevens, David Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Stephen Breyer.
159. Gratz v. Bollinger, No. 02-516, 2003 WL 21434002 (U.S. June 23, 2003). Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote the majority opinion. He was joined by Justices Sandra O'Connor, Antonin Scalia, Anthony Kennedy, Clarence Thomas, and Stephen Breyer.
160. See also A Joint Statement of Constitutional Law Scholars, Reaffirming Diversity: A Legal Analysis of the University of Michigan Affirmative Action Cases, http://www.civilrightsproject.harvard.edu/policy/legal_docs/ Diversity_%20Reaffirmed.pdf (as visited 14 July 2003).
161. Gratz v. Bollinger (dissenting opinion of Justice Souter).
162. Gratz v. Bollinger (dissenting opinion of Justice Ginsburg).
163. Gratz v. Bollinger (dissenting opinion of Justice Souter).
164. The author thanks Rogers M. Smith, Nathan Glazer, Desmond King, and Sarah Song for their helpful comments on a preliminary version of this article.