The Marble Cake: Introducing Federalism to the Government Growth Equation

Publius: The Journal of Federalism

Volumn 30, Issue 3, 2000, Pages 35-45

  Bohte, John ^a   Meier, Kenneth J ^b  

^a OAKLAND UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b TEXAS A AND M UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0346909285     PISSN: 00485950     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/oxfordjournals.pubjof.a030094     Document Type: Article

References (51)

1. See William D. Berry and David Lowery, "The Measurement of Government Size: Implication for the Study of Government Growth," Journal of Politics 46 (November 1984): 1193-1206; William D. Berry and David Lowery, "Explaining the Size of the Public Sector: Responsive and Excessive Government Interpretations," Journal of Politics 49 (May 1987): 401-440; Michael S. Lewis-Beck and Tom Rice, "Government Growth in the United Sates," Journal of Politics 47 (February 1985): 2-30; David Lowery and William D. Berry, "The Growth of Government in the United States: An Empirical Assessment of Competing Explanations," American Journal of Political Science 27 (November 1983): 665-694. Aside from the many political science studies on government growth, economists have devoted substantial attention to the topic as well. Representative works include Geoffrey Brennan and James M Buchanan, The Power of Tax (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980); Philip J. Grossman, "Federalism and the Size of Government," Southern Economic Journal 55 (January 1989): 580-593; David Joulfaian and Michael L. Marlow, "Government Size and Decentralization: Evidence From Disaggregated Data," Southern Economic Journal 56 (April 1989): 1094-1102. For a comprehensive overview of the economics literature on government growth, see Ronald Shadbegian, "Fiscal Federalism, Collusion, and Government Size: Evidence From the States," Public Finance Review 27 (May 1999): 262-281.
2. See William D. Berry and David Lowery, "The Measurement of Government Size: Implication for the Study of Government Growth," Journal of Politics 46 (November 1984): 1193-1206; William D. Berry and David Lowery, "Explaining the Size of the Public Sector: Responsive and Excessive Government Interpretations," Journal of Politics 49 (May 1987): 401-440; Michael S. Lewis-Beck and Tom Rice, "Government Growth in the United Sates," Journal of Politics 47 (February 1985): 2-30; David Lowery and William D. Berry, "The Growth of Government in the United States: An Empirical Assessment of Competing Explanations," American Journal of Political Science 27 (November 1983): 665-694. Aside from the many political science studies on government growth, economists have devoted substantial attention to the topic as well. Representative works include Geoffrey Brennan and James M Buchanan, The Power of Tax (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980); Philip J. Grossman, "Federalism and the Size of Government," Southern Economic Journal 55 (January 1989): 580-593; David Joulfaian and Michael L. Marlow, "Government Size and Decentralization: Evidence From Disaggregated Data," Southern Economic Journal 56 (April 1989): 1094-1102. For a comprehensive overview of the economics literature on government growth, see Ronald Shadbegian, "Fiscal Federalism, Collusion, and Government Size: Evidence From the States," Public Finance Review 27 (May 1999): 262-281.
3. See William D. Berry and David Lowery, "The Measurement of Government Size: Implication for the Study of Government Growth," Journal of Politics 46 (November 1984): 1193-1206; William D. Berry and David Lowery, "Explaining the Size of the Public Sector: Responsive and Excessive Government Interpretations," Journal of Politics 49 (May 1987): 401-440; Michael S. Lewis-Beck and Tom Rice, "Government Growth in the United Sates," Journal of Politics 47 (February 1985): 2-30; David Lowery and William D. Berry, "The Growth of Government in the United States: An Empirical Assessment of Competing Explanations," American Journal of Political Science 27 (November 1983): 665-694. Aside from the many political science studies on government growth, economists have devoted substantial attention to the topic as well. Representative works include Geoffrey Brennan and James M Buchanan, The Power of Tax (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980); Philip J. Grossman, "Federalism and the Size of Government," Southern Economic Journal 55 (January 1989): 580-593; David Joulfaian and Michael L. Marlow, "Government Size and Decentralization: Evidence From Disaggregated Data," Southern Economic Journal 56 (April 1989): 1094-1102. For a comprehensive overview of the economics literature on government growth, see Ronald Shadbegian, "Fiscal Federalism, Collusion, and Government Size: Evidence From the States," Public Finance Review 27 (May 1999): 262-281.
4. See William D. Berry and David Lowery, "The Measurement of Government Size: Implication for the Study of Government Growth," Journal of Politics 46 (November 1984): 1193-1206; William D. Berry and David Lowery, "Explaining the Size of the Public Sector: Responsive and Excessive Government Interpretations," Journal of Politics 49 (May 1987): 401-440; Michael S. Lewis-Beck and Tom Rice, "Government Growth in the United Sates," Journal of Politics 47 (February 1985): 2-30; David Lowery and William D. Berry, "The Growth of Government in the United States: An Empirical Assessment of Competing Explanations," American Journal of Political Science 27 (November 1983): 665-694. Aside from the many political science studies on government growth, economists have devoted substantial attention to the topic as well. Representative works include Geoffrey Brennan and James M Buchanan, The Power of Tax (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980); Philip J. Grossman, "Federalism and the Size of Government," Southern Economic Journal 55 (January 1989): 580-593; David Joulfaian and Michael L. Marlow, "Government Size and Decentralization: Evidence From Disaggregated Data," Southern Economic Journal 56 (April 1989): 1094-1102. For a comprehensive overview of the economics literature on government growth, see Ronald Shadbegian, "Fiscal Federalism, Collusion, and Government Size: Evidence From the States," Public Finance Review 27 (May 1999): 262-281.
5. See William D. Berry and David Lowery, "The Measurement of Government Size: Implication for the Study of Government Growth," Journal of Politics 46 (November 1984): 1193-1206; William D. Berry and David Lowery, "Explaining the Size of the Public Sector: Responsive and Excessive Government Interpretations," Journal of Politics 49 (May 1987): 401-440; Michael S. Lewis-Beck and Tom Rice, "Government Growth in the United Sates," Journal of Politics 47 (February 1985): 2-30; David Lowery and William D. Berry, "The Growth of Government in the United States: An Empirical Assessment of Competing Explanations," American Journal of Political Science 27 (November 1983): 665-694. Aside from the many political science studies on government growth, economists have devoted substantial attention to the topic as well. Representative works include Geoffrey Brennan and James M Buchanan, The Power of Tax (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980); Philip J. Grossman, "Federalism and the Size of Government," Southern Economic Journal 55 (January 1989): 580-593; David Joulfaian and Michael L. Marlow, "Government Size and Decentralization: Evidence From Disaggregated Data," Southern Economic Journal 56 (April 1989): 1094-1102. For a comprehensive overview of the economics literature on government growth, see Ronald Shadbegian, "Fiscal Federalism, Collusion, and Government Size: Evidence From the States," Public Finance Review 27 (May 1999): 262-281.
6. See William D. Berry and David Lowery, "The Measurement of Government Size: Implication for the Study of Government Growth," Journal of Politics 46 (November 1984): 1193-1206; William D. Berry and David Lowery, "Explaining the Size of the Public Sector: Responsive and Excessive Government Interpretations," Journal of Politics 49 (May 1987): 401-440; Michael S. Lewis-Beck and Tom Rice, "Government Growth in the United Sates," Journal of Politics 47 (February 1985): 2-30; David Lowery and William D. Berry, "The Growth of Government in the United States: An Empirical Assessment of Competing Explanations," American Journal of Political Science 27 (November 1983): 665-694. Aside from the many political science studies on government growth, economists have devoted substantial attention to the topic as well. Representative works include Geoffrey Brennan and James M Buchanan, The Power of Tax (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980); Philip J. Grossman, "Federalism and the Size of Government," Southern Economic Journal 55 (January 1989): 580-593; David Joulfaian and Michael L. Marlow, "Government Size and Decentralization: Evidence From Disaggregated Data," Southern Economic Journal 56 (April 1989): 1094-1102. For a comprehensive overview of the economics literature on government growth, see Ronald Shadbegian, "Fiscal Federalism, Collusion, and Government Size: Evidence From the States," Public Finance Review 27 (May 1999): 262-281.
7. See William D. Berry and David Lowery, "The Measurement of Government Size: Implication for the Study of Government Growth," Journal of Politics 46 (November 1984): 1193-1206; William D. Berry and David Lowery, "Explaining the Size of the Public Sector: Responsive and Excessive Government Interpretations," Journal of Politics 49 (May 1987): 401-440; Michael S. Lewis-Beck and Tom Rice, "Government Growth in the United Sates," Journal of Politics 47 (February 1985): 2-30; David Lowery and William D. Berry, "The Growth of Government in the United States: An Empirical Assessment of Competing Explanations," American Journal of Political Science 27 (November 1983): 665-694. Aside from the many political science studies on government growth, economists have devoted substantial attention to the topic as well. Representative works include Geoffrey Brennan and James M Buchanan, The Power of Tax (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980); Philip J. Grossman, "Federalism and the Size of Government," Southern Economic Journal 55 (January 1989): 580-593; David Joulfaian and Michael L. Marlow, "Government Size and Decentralization: Evidence From Disaggregated Data," Southern Economic Journal 56 (April 1989): 1094-1102. For a comprehensive overview of the economics literature on government growth, see Ronald Shadbegian, "Fiscal Federalism, Collusion, and Government Size: Evidence From the States," Public Finance Review 27 (May 1999): 262-281.
8. See William D. Berry and David Lowery, "The Measurement of Government Size: Implication for the Study of Government Growth," Journal of Politics 46 (November 1984): 1193-1206; William D. Berry and David Lowery, "Explaining the Size of the Public Sector: Responsive and Excessive Government Interpretations," Journal of Politics 49 (May 1987): 401-440; Michael S. Lewis-Beck and Tom Rice, "Government Growth in the United Sates," Journal of Politics 47 (February 1985): 2-30; David Lowery and William D. Berry, "The Growth of Government in the United States: An Empirical Assessment of Competing Explanations," American Journal of Political Science 27 (November 1983): 665-694. Aside from the many political science studies on government growth, economists have devoted substantial attention to the topic as well. Representative works include Geoffrey Brennan and James M Buchanan, The Power of Tax (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980); Philip J. Grossman, "Federalism and the Size of Government," Southern Economic Journal 55 (January 1989): 580-593; David Joulfaian and Michael L. Marlow, "Government Size and Decentralization: Evidence From Disaggregated Data," Southern Economic Journal 56 (April 1989): 1094-1102. For a comprehensive overview of the economics literature on government growth, see Ronald Shadbegian, "Fiscal Federalism, Collusion, and Government Size: Evidence From the States," Public Finance Review 27 (May 1999): 262-281.
9. Berry and Lowery, "Explaining the Size of the Public Sector, Responsive and Excessive Government Interpretations."
10. James C. Garand, "Explaining Government Growth in the U.S. States," American Political Science Review 82 (September 1988): 837-849.
11. Lowery and Berry, "The Growth of Government in the United States," 674.
12. For examples of the literature on comparative government growth, see David R. Cameron, "The Expansion of the Public Economy: A Comparative Analysis," American Political Science Review 72 (December 1978): 1243-1262; Richard B. McKenzie and Robert J. Staff, "Revenue Sharing and Monopoly Government," Public Choice 33 (no. 3, 1978): 93-98: and William M. Chandler and Herman Bakvis, "Federalism and the Strong-State/Weak-State Conundrum: Canadian Economic Policymaking in Comparative Perspective," Publius: The Journal of Federalism 19 (Winter 1989): 59-77.
13. For examples of the literature on comparative government growth, see David R. Cameron, "The Expansion of the Public Economy: A Comparative Analysis," American Political Science Review 72 (December 1978): 1243-1262; Richard B. McKenzie and Robert J. Staff, "Revenue Sharing and Monopoly Government," Public Choice 33 (no. 3, 1978): 93-98: and William M. Chandler and Herman Bakvis, "Federalism and the Strong-State/Weak-State Conundrum: Canadian Economic Policymaking in Comparative Perspective," Publius: The Journal of Federalism 19 (Winter 1989): 59-77.
14. For examples of the literature on comparative government growth, see David R. Cameron, "The Expansion of the Public Economy: A Comparative Analysis," American Political Science Review 72 (December 1978): 1243-1262; Richard B. McKenzie and Robert J. Staff, "Revenue Sharing and Monopoly Government," Public Choice 33 (no. 3, 1978): 93-98: and William M. Chandler and Herman Bakvis, "Federalism and the Strong-State/Weak-State Conundrum: Canadian Economic Policymaking in Comparative Perspective," Publius: The Journal of Federalism 19 (Winter 1989): 59-77.
15. Garand, "Explaining Government Growth in the U. S. States," 842.
16. Thomas R. Dye, Politics in States and Communities, 9th ed. (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1997), p. 57.
17. For overviews of the evolution in the administrative capacities of the national government, see Stephen Skowronek, Building a New American State (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982) and Thomas K. McCraw, Prophets of Regulation (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1984).
18. For overviews of the evolution in the administrative capacities of the national government, see Stephen Skowronek, Building a New American State (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982) and Thomas K. McCraw, Prophets of Regulation (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1984).
19. Morton Grodzins is widely recognized as the originator of the marble-cake metaphor. See Morton Grodzins, The American System: A New View of Government in the United States (Chicago, IL: Rand McNally, 1966).
20. See James W. Fesler and Donald F. Kettl, The Politics of the Administrative Process (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House Publishers, 1991), pp. 105-108; and Kenneth J. Meier, Politics and the Bureaucracy: Policymaking in the Fourth Branch of Government, 3rd ed. (Pacific Grove, CA: Brooks Cole Publishing, 1993), pp. 30-42, for analyses of trends in public sector employment at different orders of government.
21. See James W. Fesler and Donald F. Kettl, The Politics of the Administrative Process (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House Publishers, 1991), pp. 105-108; and Kenneth J. Meier, Politics and the Bureaucracy: Policymaking in the Fourth Branch of Government, 3rd ed. (Pacific Grove, CA: Brooks Cole Publishing, 1993), pp. 30-42, for analyses of trends in public sector employment at different orders of government.
22. Dwight Waldo, The Administrative State. Second Edition with New Observations and Reflections (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1984), p. xlii.
23. Skowronek, Building a New American State, pp. 85-120.
24. McCraw, Prophets of Regulation, p. 57.
25. J. Clarence Davies and Barbara S. Davies, The Politics of Pollution, 2nd ed. (Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1975), p.152.
26. Davies and Davies, The Politics of Pollution, p. 159.
27. See Charles O. Jones, Clean Air: The Politics of Pollution Control (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1975), p. 68.
28. State pressures to increase the stringency of environmental protection played a major role in the Clean Air Act amendments of 1991. California and several other states had adopted more stringent standards than the federal government and were able to generate pressures for stronger national standards also.
29. Marc A. Eisner, Regulatory Politics in Transition (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), p. 14.
30. Brennan and Buchanan, The Power to Tax, p. 182.
31. On this point, see Albert Breton, "A Theory of Government Grants," Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science 31 (May 1965): 175-187; Gordon Tullock, "Federalism: Problems of Scale," Public Choice 6 (1969): 19-29; Philip J. Grossman and E. G. West, "Federalism and the Growth of Government Revisited," Public Choice 79 (vol. 1, 1994): 19-32; and Matthias Wrede, "Tragedy of the Fiscal Common?: Fiscal Stock Externalities in a Leviathan Model of Federalism," Public Choice 101 (December 1999): 177-193. Most of the economic federalism literature deals with whether or not decentralization leads to larger or smaller overall government expenditures. It does not address directly whether states or the national government are the driving force in the relationship.
32. On this point, see Albert Breton, "A Theory of Government Grants," Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science 31 (May 1965): 175-187; Gordon Tullock, "Federalism: Problems of Scale," Public Choice 6 (1969): 19-29; Philip J. Grossman and E. G. West, "Federalism and the Growth of Government Revisited," Public Choice 79 (vol. 1, 1994): 19-32; and Matthias Wrede, "Tragedy of the Fiscal Common?: Fiscal Stock Externalities in a Leviathan Model of Federalism," Public Choice 101 (December 1999): 177-193. Most of the economic federalism literature deals with whether or not decentralization leads to larger or smaller overall government expenditures. It does not address directly whether states or the national government are the driving force in the relationship.
33. On this point, see Albert Breton, "A Theory of Government Grants," Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science 31 (May 1965): 175-187; Gordon Tullock, "Federalism: Problems of Scale," Public Choice 6 (1969): 19-29; Philip J. Grossman and E. G. West, "Federalism and the Growth of Government Revisited," Public Choice 79 (vol. 1, 1994): 19-32; and Matthias Wrede, "Tragedy of the Fiscal Common?: Fiscal Stock Externalities in a Leviathan Model of Federalism," Public Choice 101 (December 1999): 177-193. Most of the economic federalism literature deals with whether or not decentralization leads to larger or smaller overall government expenditures. It does not address directly whether states or the national government are the driving force in the relationship.
34. On this point, see Albert Breton, "A Theory of Government Grants," Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science 31 (May 1965): 175-187; Gordon Tullock, "Federalism: Problems of Scale," Public Choice 6 (1969): 19-29; Philip J. Grossman and E. G. West, "Federalism and the Growth of Government Revisited," Public Choice 79 (vol. 1, 1994): 19-32; and Matthias Wrede, "Tragedy of the Fiscal Common?: Fiscal Stock Externalities in a Leviathan Model of Federalism," Public Choice 101 (December 1999): 177-193. Most of the economic federalism literature deals with whether or not decentralization leads to larger or smaller overall government expenditures. It does not address directly whether states or the national government are the driving force in the relationship.
35. Donald F. Kettl, Government by Proxy: (Mis?) Managing Federal Programs (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1988), p. 8.
36. Peter M. Benda and Charles H. Levine, "Reagan and the Bureaucracy: The Bequest, the Promise, and the Legacy," The Reagan Legacy: Promise and Performance, ed. Charles O. Jones (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House, 1988), p. 121.
37. Ann O'M. Bowman and Richard C. Kearney, State and Local Government, 3rd ed. (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1996), p. 44.
38. General Revenue Sharing for state governments was eliminated in 1980 under President Jimmy Carter.
39. On the rise of federal mandates, see John Kincaid, "From Cooperation to Coercion in American Federalism: Housing, Fragmentation, and Preemption. 1780-1992," Journal of Law and Politics 9 (Winter 1993): 333-433.
40. We excluded education employees because the federal Fiscal role in education is relatively modest. Including education employees did not change the results of the analysis.
41. Berry and Lowery, "The Measurement of Government Size," 1194.
42. On the symbolic importance of political institutions, see James G. March and Johan P. Olson, "The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life," American Political Science Review 78 (September 1984): 734-749.
43. See John R. Freeman, "Granger Causality and the Times Series Analysis of Political Relationships," American Journal of Political Science 27 (May 1983): 327-358. Freeman argues that Granger methods are useful for assessing endogenous relationships among variables.
44. Walter N. Thurman, Mark E. Fisher, "Chickens, Eggs, and Causality, or Which Came First," American Journal of Agricultural Economics 70 (May 1988): 237-238.
45. See C. W. Granger, "Investigation of Causal Relationships by Econometric Methods," Econometrica 37 (August 1969): 424-438.
46. Although the use of Granger causal methods in political science research is not widespread, these methods have been widely used in economics research. Granger causal methods have been used extensively in examining long-term economic relationships such as those between stock prices and interest rates and various other economic indicators. Examples of works utilizing economic variables include Craig Hiemstra and Jonathan D. Jones, "Testing for Linear and Nonlinear Granger Causality in the Stock Price-Volume Relation," The Journal of Finance 69 (December 1994): 1639-1664 and Christopher Sims, "Money, Income, and Causality," American Economic Review 62 (September 1972): 540-552. For a technical discussion of Granger methods, see Terence C. Mills, Time Series Techniques for Economists (New Yort: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 291-303.
47. Although the use of Granger causal methods in political science research is not widespread, these methods have been widely used in economics research. Granger causal methods have been used extensively in examining long-term economic relationships such as those between stock prices and interest rates and various other economic indicators. Examples of works utilizing economic variables include Craig Hiemstra and Jonathan D. Jones, "Testing for Linear and Nonlinear Granger Causality in the Stock Price-Volume Relation," The Journal of Finance 69 (December 1994): 1639-1664 and Christopher Sims, "Money, Income, and Causality," American Economic Review 62 (September 1972): 540-552. For a technical discussion of Granger methods, see Terence C. Mills, Time Series Techniques for Economists (New Yort: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 291-303.
48. Although the use of Granger causal methods in political science research is not widespread, these methods have been widely used in economics research. Granger causal methods have been used extensively in examining long-term economic relationships such as those between stock prices and interest rates and various other economic indicators. Examples of works utilizing economic variables include Craig Hiemstra and Jonathan D. Jones, "Testing for Linear and Nonlinear Granger Causality in the Stock Price-Volume Relation," The Journal of Finance 69 (December 1994): 1639-1664 and Christopher Sims, "Money, Income, and Causality," American Economic Review 62 (September 1972): 540-552. For a technical discussion of Granger methods, see Terence C. Mills, Time Series Techniques for Economists (New Yort: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 291-303.
49. White-noise residuals indicate that there is no correlation among the residuals. Some time-series analysts take the presence of serial correlation among residuals as an indicator of under speculation or, in this case, the need to add additional lags of the variable to the equation. On this point, see Russell Davidson and James D. MacKinnon, Estimation and Inference in Econometrics, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 359.
50. Garand, "Explaining Government Growth in the U.S. States," 838.
51. Garand, "Explaining Government Growth in the U.S. States," 840-841.