Syria: The politics of economic liberalisation

Third World Quarterly

Volumn 18, Issue 2, 1997, Pages 249-266

  Hinnebusch, Raymond A ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ST ANDREWS   (United Kingdom)

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 0346693823     PISSN: 01436597     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/01436599714939     Document Type: Article

References (43)

1. A sophisticated analysis which links economic crisis and policy changes is Huda Hawwa, 'Linkages and constraints of the Syrian economy', in Youssef Choueiri, State and Society in Syria and Lebanon, Exeter: University of Exeter Press, 1993, pp 84-102. An excellent variant of the political approach is Jean Leca, 'Social structure and political stability: comparative evidence from the Algerian, Syrian, and Iraqi cases', in Adeed Dawisha & I William Zartman, (eds), Beyond Coercion: The Durability of the Arab State. London: Croom Helm, 1988, pp 164-202.
2. A sophisticated analysis which links economic crisis and policy changes is Huda Hawwa, 'Linkages and constraints of the Syrian economy', in Youssef Choueiri, State and Society in Syria and Lebanon, Exeter: University of Exeter Press, 1993, pp 84-102. An excellent variant of the political approach is Jean Leca, 'Social structure and political stability: comparative evidence from the Algerian, Syrian, and Iraqi cases', in Adeed Dawisha & I William Zartman, (eds), Beyond Coercion: The Durability of the Arab State. London: Croom Helm, 1988, pp 164-202.
3. See Stephen Heydemann, 'The political logic of economic rationality: selective stabilization in Syria', in H J Barkey (ed), The Politics of Economic Reform in the Middle East, New York: St Martin's Press, 1992, pp 11-37.
4. See the analysis of the state in Raymond A Hinnebusch, Authoritarian Power and State Formation in Ba'thist Syria: Army, Party and Peasant, Boulder CO: Westview Press, 1990, pp 120-155. For a complementary analysis of the regime, see Yahya Sadowski, Cadres, Guns and Money: The Eighth Regional Congress of the Syrian Ba'th, MERIP Reports 134, July-August 1995.
5. See the analysis of the state in Raymond A Hinnebusch, Authoritarian Power and State Formation in Ba'thist Syria: Army, Party and Peasant, Boulder CO: Westview Press, 1990, pp 120-155. For a complementary analysis of the regime, see Yahya Sadowski, Cadres, Guns and Money: The Eighth Regional Congress of the Syrian Ba'th, MERIP Reports 134, July-August 1995.
6. Thus, GDP grew at an annual rate of 8.2% in 1970-75 and 6.8% in 1977-80. However, savings covered only about one half of the investment fuelling this growth; the balance was financed by external aid or borrowing or deficit financing. This imbalance was reflected in public finance. For example, in 1976 domestic resources financed only about 62% of public expenditures on government and development, while deficit financing (22.5%), external borrowing (8.9%) and Arab transfers (6.6%) covered the balance. Clawson estimates Syria received $20 billion in civilian aid between 1977 and 1988. These data have been collated from World Bank, Syrian Arab Republic Development Prospects and Policies, Washington DC, 1980, Vol 2, p 18, Vol 4, p 48; and Patrick Clawson, Unaffordable Ambitions: Syria's Military Buildup and Economic Crisis, Washington, DC: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1989, pp, 14-17, appendixes 4 and 5.
7. Thus, GDP grew at an annual rate of 8.2% in 1970-75 and 6.8% in 1977-80. However, savings covered only about one half of the investment fuelling this growth; the balance was financed by external aid or borrowing or deficit financing. This imbalance was reflected in public finance. For example, in 1976 domestic resources financed only about 62% of public expenditures on government and development, while deficit financing (22.5%), external borrowing (8.9%) and Arab transfers (6.6%) covered the balance. Clawson estimates Syria received $20 billion in civilian aid between 1977 and 1988. These data have been collated from World Bank, Syrian Arab Republic Development Prospects and Policies, Washington DC, 1980, Vol 2, p 18, Vol 4, p 48; and Patrick Clawson, Unaffordable Ambitions: Syria's Military Buildup and Economic Crisis, Washington, DC: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1989, pp, 14-17, appendixes 4 and 5.
8. At the end of 1986 the mere $144 million in the treasury was enough for only two weeks of imports. GDP yearly growth dropped to 1.5% from 1980 to 1986 and from 1983 to 1987 was at a negative 2.9% yearly. Debt as a percentage of GNP rose from 10.8% in 1980 to 25% in 1988. Data on the economic crisis were compiled from the following sources: World Bank, Syrian Arab Republic, Vol 1; ix; World Bank, World Development Report 1990, pp 224-25; Clawson, Unaffordable Ambitions, ch 7-8, Table 1; Syrian Arab Republic Central Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Abstract, 1989, pp 490-491, 1991, pp 424, 485; The Middle East, December 1988, p 27, January 1990, p 24. For data on Syria's austerity programme, see Heydemann, 'The political logic of economic rationality', pp 17, 25-31. For a comprehensive analysis of the economic crisis, see Volker Perthes, 'The Syrian economy in the 1980s', Middle East Journal, Vol 46, No 1, 1992, pp 37-58.
9. At the end of 1986 the mere $144 million in the treasury was enough for only two weeks of imports. GDP yearly growth dropped to 1.5% from 1980 to 1986 and from 1983 to 1987 was at a negative 2.9% yearly. Debt as a percentage of GNP rose from 10.8% in 1980 to 25% in 1988. Data on the economic crisis were compiled from the following sources: World Bank, Syrian Arab Republic, Vol 1; ix; World Bank, World Development Report 1990, pp 224-25; Clawson, Unaffordable Ambitions, ch 7-8, Table 1; Syrian Arab Republic Central Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Abstract, 1989, pp 490-491, 1991, pp 424, 485; The Middle East, December 1988, p 27, January 1990, p 24. For data on Syria's austerity programme, see Heydemann, 'The political logic of economic rationality', pp 17, 25-31. For a comprehensive analysis of the economic crisis, see Volker Perthes, 'The Syrian economy in the 1980s', Middle East Journal, Vol 46, No 1, 1992, pp 37-58.
10. At the end of 1986 the mere $144 million in the treasury was enough for only two weeks of imports. GDP yearly growth dropped to 1.5% from 1980 to 1986 and from 1983 to 1987 was at a negative 2.9% yearly. Debt as a percentage of GNP rose from 10.8% in 1980 to 25% in 1988. Data on the economic crisis were compiled from the following sources: World Bank, Syrian Arab Republic, Vol 1; ix; World Bank, World Development Report 1990, pp 224-25; Clawson, Unaffordable Ambitions, ch 7-8, Table 1; Syrian Arab Republic Central Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Abstract, 1989, pp 490-491, 1991, pp 424, 485; The Middle East, December 1988, p 27, January 1990, p 24. For data on Syria's austerity programme, see Heydemann, 'The political logic of economic rationality', pp 17, 25-31. For a comprehensive analysis of the economic crisis, see Volker Perthes, 'The Syrian economy in the 1980s', Middle East Journal, Vol 46, No 1, 1992, pp 37-58.
11. At the end of 1986 the mere $144 million in the treasury was enough for only two weeks of imports. GDP yearly growth dropped to 1.5% from 1980 to 1986 and from 1983 to 1987 was at a negative 2.9% yearly. Debt as a percentage of GNP rose from 10.8% in 1980 to 25% in 1988. Data on the economic crisis were compiled from the following sources: World Bank, Syrian Arab Republic, Vol 1; ix; World Bank, World Development Report 1990, pp 224-25; Clawson, Unaffordable Ambitions, ch 7-8, Table 1; Syrian Arab Republic Central Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Abstract, 1989, pp 490-491, 1991, pp 424, 485; The Middle East, December 1988, p 27, January 1990, p 24. For data on Syria's austerity programme, see Heydemann, 'The political logic of economic rationality', pp 17, 25-31. For a comprehensive analysis of the economic crisis, see Volker Perthes, 'The Syrian economy in the 1980s', Middle East Journal, Vol 46, No 1, 1992, pp 37-58.
12. At the end of 1986 the mere $144 million in the treasury was enough for only two weeks of imports. GDP yearly growth dropped to 1.5% from 1980 to 1986 and from 1983 to 1987 was at a negative 2.9% yearly. Debt as a percentage of GNP rose from 10.8% in 1980 to 25% in 1988. Data on the economic crisis were compiled from the following sources: World Bank, Syrian Arab Republic, Vol 1; ix; World Bank, World Development Report 1990, pp 224-25; Clawson, Unaffordable Ambitions, ch 7-8, Table 1; Syrian Arab Republic Central Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Abstract, 1989, pp 490-491, 1991, pp 424, 485; The Middle East, December 1988, p 27, January 1990, p 24. For data on Syria's austerity programme, see Heydemann, 'The political logic of economic rationality', pp 17, 25-31. For a comprehensive analysis of the economic crisis, see Volker Perthes, 'The Syrian economy in the 1980s', Middle East Journal, Vol 46, No 1, 1992, pp 37-58.
13. At the end of 1986 the mere $144 million in the treasury was enough for only two weeks of imports. GDP yearly growth dropped to 1.5% from 1980 to 1986 and from 1983 to 1987 was at a negative 2.9% yearly. Debt as a percentage of GNP rose from 10.8% in 1980 to 25% in 1988. Data on the economic crisis were compiled from the following sources: World Bank, Syrian Arab Republic, Vol 1; ix; World Bank, World Development Report 1990, pp 224-25; Clawson, Unaffordable Ambitions, ch 7-8, Table 1; Syrian Arab Republic Central Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Abstract, 1989, pp 490-491, 1991, pp 424, 485; The Middle East, December 1988, p 27, January 1990, p 24. For data on Syria's austerity programme, see Heydemann, 'The political logic of economic rationality', pp 17, 25-31. For a comprehensive analysis of the economic crisis, see Volker Perthes, 'The Syrian economy in the 1980s', Middle East Journal, Vol 46, No 1, 1992, pp 37-58.
14. At the end of 1986 the mere $144 million in the treasury was enough for only two weeks of imports. GDP yearly growth dropped to 1.5% from 1980 to 1986 and from 1983 to 1987 was at a negative 2.9% yearly. Debt as a percentage of GNP rose from 10.8% in 1980 to 25% in 1988. Data on the economic crisis were compiled from the following sources: World Bank, Syrian Arab Republic, Vol 1; ix; World Bank, World Development Report 1990, pp 224-25; Clawson, Unaffordable Ambitions, ch 7-8, Table 1; Syrian Arab Republic Central Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Abstract, 1989, pp 490-491, 1991, pp 424, 485; The Middle East, December 1988, p 27, January 1990, p 24. For data on Syria's austerity programme, see Heydemann, 'The political logic of economic rationality', pp 17, 25-31. For a comprehensive analysis of the economic crisis, see Volker Perthes, 'The Syrian economy in the 1980s', Middle East Journal, Vol 46, No 1, 1992, pp 37-58.
15. Volker Perthes, 'The Syrian private industrial and commercial sectors and the state', International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol 24, No 2, 1992, pp 207-230.
16. Patrick Scale, Asad: The Struggle for the Middle East, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988, p 457. For other analyses of the relation between state and class see Eberhard Kienle, Entre jama'a et classe: Le pouvoir politique en Syrie, Ethnizität und Gesellschaft, Occasional Papers, Nr 31, Berlin: Verlag Das Arabische Buch, 1992, and Syed Aziz al-Ahsan, 'Economic policy and class structure in Syria, 1958-80', International Journal of Middle East Studies, 16, 1984. For an interpretation of the class base of the regime which emphasises the increasing weight of the bourgeoisie in the regime coalition in the 1980s, see Fred Lawson, 'From neo-Ba'th to Ba'th nouveau: Hafiz al-Asad's second decade', Journal of South Asian and Middle East Studies, Vol xiv, No 2, 1990, pp 1-21.
17. Patrick Scale, Asad: The Struggle for the Middle East, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988, p 457. For other analyses of the relation between state and class see Eberhard Kienle, Entre jama'a et classe: Le pouvoir politique en Syrie, Ethnizität und Gesellschaft, Occasional Papers, Nr 31, Berlin: Verlag Das Arabische Buch, 1992, and Syed Aziz al-Ahsan, 'Economic policy and class structure in Syria, 1958-80', International Journal of Middle East Studies, 16, 1984. For an interpretation of the class base of the regime which emphasises the increasing weight of the bourgeoisie in the regime coalition in the 1980s, see Fred Lawson, 'From neo-Ba'th to Ba'th nouveau: Hafiz al-Asad's second decade', Journal of South Asian and Middle East Studies, Vol xiv, No 2, 1990, pp 1-21.
18. Patrick Scale, Asad: The Struggle for the Middle East, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988, p 457. For other analyses of the relation between state and class see Eberhard Kienle, Entre jama'a et classe: Le pouvoir politique en Syrie, Ethnizität und Gesellschaft, Occasional Papers, Nr 31, Berlin: Verlag Das Arabische Buch, 1992, and Syed Aziz al-Ahsan, 'Economic policy and class structure in Syria, 1958-80', International Journal of Middle East Studies, 16, 1984. For an interpretation of the class base of the regime which emphasises the increasing weight of the bourgeoisie in the regime coalition in the 1980s, see Fred Lawson, 'From neo-Ba'th to Ba'th nouveau: Hafiz al-Asad's second decade', Journal of South Asian and Middle East Studies, Vol xiv, No 2, 1990, pp 1-21.
19. Patrick Scale, Asad: The Struggle for the Middle East, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988, p 457. For other analyses of the relation between state and class see Eberhard Kienle, Entre jama'a et classe: Le pouvoir politique en Syrie, Ethnizität und Gesellschaft, Occasional Papers, Nr 31, Berlin: Verlag Das Arabische Buch, 1992, and Syed Aziz al-Ahsan, 'Economic policy and class structure in Syria, 1958-80', International Journal of Middle East Studies, 16, 1984. For an interpretation of the class base of the regime which emphasises the increasing weight of the bourgeoisie in the regime coalition in the 1980s, see Fred Lawson, 'From neo-Ba'th to Ba'th nouveau: Hafiz al-Asad's second decade', Journal of South Asian and Middle East Studies, Vol xiv, No 2, 1990, pp 1-21.
20. Nabil Sukkar, 'The crisis of 1986 and Syria's plan for reform', in Eberhard Kienle (ed), Contemporary Syria: Liberalization Between Cold War and Cold Peace, London: Academic Press, 1994, pp 26-43.
21. Austerity measures in the late 1980s produced a current account surplus of $1.222 million in 1988. Growth rates of 7-8% GNP per year in 1990-93 were fuelled in part by an increase in oil revenues from $500 million in 1988 to $2.15 billion in 1992 and by a resumption of aid - some $2 billion was promised - by Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states as a reward for joining the Gulf coalition against Iraq, Economic Intelligence Unit, Syria: Country Report, 2nd quarter, 1994.
22. The use of economic liberalisation to serve political autonomy is emphasised in Neil Quilliam, 'Syria: adjusting to the new world order', Working Paper, University of Durham Centre for Middle East and Islamic Studies, 1994; and Isabelle Daneels, 'Syrian foreign policy: between rational actor and regime legitimacy', MA dissertation, University of Durham Centre for Middle East and Islamic Studies, 1994.
23. The use of economic liberalisation to serve political autonomy is emphasised in Neil Quilliam, 'Syria: adjusting to the new world order', Working Paper, University of Durham Centre for Middle East and Islamic Studies, 1994; and Isabelle Daneels, 'Syrian foreign policy: between rational actor and regime legitimacy', MA dissertation, University of Durham Centre for Middle East and Islamic Studies, 1994.
24. Discussions, Nabil Sukkar, Damascus, 1994.
25. Dr Mohammed al-Imady, Syria's Experience in Trade Liberalization and Policies of Economic Reform, Damascus: The Ministry of Economy and Foreign Trade, 1994, p 3.
26. Economist Intelligence Unit, Syria: Country Report, 1st quarter, 1994, pp 27-28.
27. Imadi, Syria's Experience in Trade Liberalization, p 14.
28. Interviews, Dr Imadi, Damascus, January 1992, July 1994; also, Dr Muhammed al-Imadi, dawr al-qita' al-kass wa al-mushtarak fi amaliya al-tanmiya (The roles of the private and joint sectors in the process of development), Damascus: Ministry of Economy and Foreign Trade, 1986.
29. Tishrin, 4-5 December, 1989.
30. Interview, Ala ad-Din Abdin, Damascus party secretary, January 1992.
31. Interview, Sabah Baqjahji, Minister of State for Planning, January 1992.
32. Unpublished confidential interviews with public sector managers, 1990.
33. Imadi, Syria's Experience in Trade Liberalization, p 18.
34. Sylvia Polling, 'Investment Law #10: which future for the private sector?', in Kienle, Contemporary Syria, p 20.
35. Ibid., p 22.
36. The Middle East, September 1991, pp 20-22.
37. Unpublished confidential interviews with public sector managers, 1990.
38. Economic Intelligence Unit, Syria: Country Report, 2nd quarter, 1994, p 3; Syrian Arab Republic Central Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Abstract, 1993, p 503; Polling, 'Investment Law #10', p 14; Eberhard Kienle, 'The return of politics? Scenarios for Syria's second Infitah', in Kienle, Contemporary Syria, pp 120-128; unpublished economic analyses, US Embassy, Damascus, 1994; Belgian Embassy, Damascus, 1994; and United Nations, World Economic and Social Survey 1996, New York, 1996.
39. Economic Intelligence Unit, Syria: Country Report, 2nd quarter, 1994, p 3; Syrian Arab Republic Central Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Abstract, 1993, p 503; Polling, 'Investment Law #10', p 14; Eberhard Kienle, 'The return of politics? Scenarios for Syria's second Infitah', in Kienle, Contemporary Syria, pp 120-128; unpublished economic analyses, US Embassy, Damascus, 1994; Belgian Embassy, Damascus, 1994; and United Nations, World Economic and Social Survey 1996, New York, 1996.
40. Economic Intelligence Unit, Syria: Country Report, 2nd quarter, 1994, p 3; Syrian Arab Republic Central Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Abstract, 1993, p 503; Polling, 'Investment Law #10', p 14; Eberhard Kienle, 'The return of politics? Scenarios for Syria's second Infitah', in Kienle, Contemporary Syria, pp 120-128; unpublished economic analyses, US Embassy, Damascus, 1994; Belgian Embassy, Damascus, 1994; and United Nations, World Economic and Social Survey 1996, New York, 1996.
41. Economic Intelligence Unit, Syria: Country Report, 2nd quarter, 1994, p 3; Syrian Arab Republic Central Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Abstract, 1993, p 503; Polling, 'Investment Law #10', p 14; Eberhard Kienle, 'The return of politics? Scenarios for Syria's second Infitah', in Kienle, Contemporary Syria, pp 120-128; unpublished economic analyses, US Embassy, Damascus, 1994; Belgian Embassy, Damascus, 1994; and United Nations, World Economic and Social Survey 1996, New York, 1996.
42. Economic Intelligence Unit, Syria: Country Report, 2nd quarter, 1994, p 3; Syrian Arab Republic Central Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Abstract, 1993, p 503; Polling, 'Investment Law #10', p 14; Eberhard Kienle, 'The return of politics? Scenarios for Syria's second Infitah', in Kienle, Contemporary Syria, pp 120-128; unpublished economic analyses, US Embassy, Damascus, 1994; Belgian Embassy, Damascus, 1994; and United Nations, World Economic and Social Survey 1996, New York, 1996.
43. The current account surplus of $1762 million in 1990 had become a deficit of about $360 million in 1993 and was projected to double in 1994. Economic Intelligence Unit, Syria: Country Report, 2nd quarter, 1994, pp 3, 6.