Reconciliation - A Rhetorical Concept/ion

Quarterly Journal of Speech

Volumn 89, Issue 4, 2003, Pages 267-292

  Doxtader, Erik ^a,b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN MADISON   (United States)

^b Inst for Justice and Reconciliation   (South Africa)

Author keywords

Definition; Identity; Opposition; Reconciliation; Rhetorical concept

Indexed keywords

EID: 0346671104     PISSN: 00335630     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/0033563032000160954     Document Type: Review

References (117)

1. G.W.F. Hegel, The Philosophy of Right, trans. T.M. Knox (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), 12.
2. Hannah Arendt's account of forgiveness is instructive in this matter. See The Human Condition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958), 233-47. Also see Kenneth Burke's connection between substance and what he describes as the "'is' of 'being.'" In A Grammar of Motives (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969), 21-38, 505.
3. Hannah Arendt's account of forgiveness is instructive in this matter. See The Human Condition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958), 233-47. Also see Kenneth Burke's connection between substance and what he describes as the "'is' of 'being.'" In A Grammar of Motives (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969), 21-38, 505.
4. An advocate long before he was charged to lead the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Desmond Tutu holds that the "Christian Gospel is summed in the work of reconciliation" as the latter strives toward "at-one-ment" and helps to "restore friendship and fellowship between God and man, [and] man and man." Others, including Nelson Mandela's former Director General, Jakes Gerwel, set the term more firmly within a socio-political milieu, arguing that South Africa's transition from apartheid leaned heavily on a mode of reconciliation that grew from the African National Congress's commitment to non-racialism and a form of struggle predicated on the value of negotiation, consensus-seeking, and hard compromise. See Desmond Tutu, "Christianity and Apartheid," in Apartheid is Heresy, ed. John de Gruchy (Cape Town: David Philip, 1983), 44; Jakes Gerwel, "National Reconciliation: Holy Grail or Secular Pact?" in Looking Back, Reaching Forward: Reflections on the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa, ed. C. Villa-Vicencio and W. Verwoerd (Cape Town: UCT Press, 2000), 277-86. Elsewhere, I have traced several key moments of reconciliation's history in South Africa. See Erik Doxtader, "Making Rhetorical History in a Time of Transition: The Occasion, Constitution, and Representation of South African Reconciliation," Rhetoric and Public Affairs 4 (2001): 233-60.
5. An advocate long before he was charged to lead the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Desmond Tutu holds that the "Christian Gospel is summed in the work of reconciliation" as the latter strives toward "at-one-ment" and helps to "restore friendship and fellowship between God and man, [and] man and man." Others, including Nelson Mandela's former Director General, Jakes Gerwel, set the term more firmly within a socio-political milieu, arguing that South Africa's transition from apartheid leaned heavily on a mode of reconciliation that grew from the African National Congress's commitment to non-racialism and a form of struggle predicated on the value of negotiation, consensus-seeking, and hard compromise. See Desmond Tutu, "Christianity and Apartheid," in Apartheid is Heresy, ed. John de Gruchy (Cape Town: David Philip, 1983), 44; Jakes Gerwel, "National Reconciliation: Holy Grail or Secular Pact?" in Looking Back, Reaching Forward: Reflections on the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa, ed. C. Villa-Vicencio and W. Verwoerd (Cape Town: UCT Press, 2000), 277-86. Elsewhere, I have traced several key moments of reconciliation's history in South Africa. See Erik Doxtader, "Making Rhetorical History in a Time of Transition: The Occasion, Constitution, and Representation of South African Reconciliation," Rhetoric and Public Affairs 4 (2001): 233-60.
6. An advocate long before he was charged to lead the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Desmond Tutu holds that the "Christian Gospel is summed in the work of reconciliation" as the latter strives toward "at-one-ment" and helps to "restore friendship and fellowship between God and man, [and] man and man." Others, including Nelson Mandela's former Director General, Jakes Gerwel, set the term more firmly within a socio-political milieu, arguing that South Africa's transition from apartheid leaned heavily on a mode of reconciliation that grew from the African National Congress's commitment to non-racialism and a form of struggle predicated on the value of negotiation, consensus-seeking, and hard compromise. See Desmond Tutu, "Christianity and Apartheid," in Apartheid is Heresy, ed. John de Gruchy (Cape Town: David Philip, 1983), 44; Jakes Gerwel, "National Reconciliation: Holy Grail or Secular Pact?" in Looking Back, Reaching Forward: Reflections on the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa, ed. C. Villa-Vicencio and W. Verwoerd (Cape Town: UCT Press, 2000), 277-86. Elsewhere, I have traced several key moments of reconciliation's history in South Africa. See Erik Doxtader, "Making Rhetorical History in a Time of Transition: The Occasion, Constitution, and Representation of South African Reconciliation," Rhetoric and Public Affairs 4 (2001): 233-60.
7. MP Johnny de Lange, interview with author, Cape Town, South Africa, 21 June 2000.
8. See Through Fire with Water. The Roots of Division and the Potential for Reconciliation in Africa, ed. Erik Doxtader and Charles Villa-Vicencio (Cape Town: David Philip, 2003).
9. The debate over whether and how reconciliation is best linked to reparation is a contentious one and lies outside the scope of this essay. For a groundbreaking treatment of the matter, see Wole Soyinka, The Burden of Memory, the Muse of Forgiveness (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999). With a number of others, I have addressed the issue elsewhere. See Erik Doxtader, "The Matter of Words in the Midst of Beginnings: Unraveling the 'Relationship' between Reparations and Reconciliation," in Repairing the Irreparable: Reparations and Reconstruction in South Africa, ed. Erik Doxtader and Charles Villa-Vicencio (Cape Town: David Philip, forthcoming 2004). For a nuanced view of this issue in the context of U.S. slavery, see Robert Meister, "Forgiving and Forgetting: Lincoln and the Politics of Recovery," in Human Rights in Political Transitions: Gettysburg to Bosnia, ed. Carla Hess and Robert Post (Boston: Zone Books, 199), 135-75. For a review of the debate on reparations and its relation to memory and history, see Jacqueline Bacon, "Reading the Reparations Debate," Quarterly Journal of Speech 89 (2003): 171-95.
10. The debate over whether and how reconciliation is best linked to reparation is a contentious one and lies outside the scope of this essay. For a groundbreaking treatment of the matter, see Wole Soyinka, The Burden of Memory, the Muse of Forgiveness (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999). With a number of others, I have addressed the issue elsewhere. See Erik Doxtader, "The Matter of Words in the Midst of Beginnings: Unraveling the 'Relationship' between Reparations and Reconciliation," in Repairing the Irreparable: Reparations and Reconstruction in South Africa, ed. Erik Doxtader and Charles Villa-Vicencio (Cape Town: David Philip, forthcoming 2004). For a nuanced view of this issue in the context of U.S. slavery, see Robert Meister, "Forgiving and Forgetting: Lincoln and the Politics of Recovery," in Human Rights in Political Transitions: Gettysburg to Bosnia, ed. Carla Hess and Robert Post (Boston: Zone Books, 199), 135-75. For a review of the debate on reparations and its relation to memory and history, see Jacqueline Bacon, "Reading the Reparations Debate," Quarterly Journal of Speech 89 (2003): 171-95.
11. The debate over whether and how reconciliation is best linked to reparation is a contentious one and lies outside the scope of this essay. For a groundbreaking treatment of the matter, see Wole Soyinka, The Burden of Memory, the Muse of Forgiveness (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999). With a number of others, I have addressed the issue elsewhere. See Erik Doxtader, "The Matter of Words in the Midst of Beginnings: Unraveling the 'Relationship' between Reparations and Reconciliation," in Repairing the Irreparable: Reparations and Reconstruction in South Africa, ed. Erik Doxtader and Charles Villa-Vicencio (Cape Town: David Philip, forthcoming 2004). For a nuanced view of this issue in the context of U.S. slavery, see Robert Meister, "Forgiving and Forgetting: Lincoln and the Politics of Recovery," in Human Rights in Political Transitions: Gettysburg to Bosnia, ed. Carla Hess and Robert Post (Boston: Zone Books, 199), 135-75. For a review of the debate on reparations and its relation to memory and history, see Jacqueline Bacon, "Reading the Reparations Debate," Quarterly Journal of Speech 89 (2003): 171-95.
12. The debate over whether and how reconciliation is best linked to reparation is a contentious one and lies outside the scope of this essay. For a groundbreaking treatment of the matter, see Wole Soyinka, The Burden of Memory, the Muse of Forgiveness (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999). With a number of others, I have addressed the issue elsewhere. See Erik Doxtader, "The Matter of Words in the Midst of Beginnings: Unraveling the 'Relationship' between Reparations and Reconciliation," in Repairing the Irreparable: Reparations and Reconstruction in South Africa, ed. Erik Doxtader and Charles Villa-Vicencio (Cape Town: David Philip, forthcoming 2004). For a nuanced view of this issue in the context of U.S. slavery, see Robert Meister, "Forgiving and Forgetting: Lincoln and the Politics of Recovery," in Human Rights in Political Transitions: Gettysburg to Bosnia, ed. Carla Hess and Robert Post (Boston: Zone Books, 199), 135-75. For a review of the debate on reparations and its relation to memory and history, see Jacqueline Bacon, "Reading the Reparations Debate," Quarterly Journal of Speech 89 (2003): 171-95.
13. Krog has made this point elegantly, wondering if the continued imprecision of the term is cause to "get rid of the word 'reconciliation'"; Antjie Krog, "Anticipating a Different Kind of Future," in Transcending a Century of Injustice, ed. Charles Villa-Vicencio (Cape Town: Institute for Justice and Reconciliation, 2000), 128.
14. Charles Villa-Vicencio, Learning to Live Together: Where the Subjective and the Material Meet (Institute for Justice and Reconciliation, Cape Town, 2001, working paper). For work that highlights the tension between reconciliation and justice, see Kader Asmal, Louise Asmal, and Ronald Roberts, Reconciliation Through Truth (Cape Town: David Philip Publishing, 1996); Mahmood Mamdani, "Reconciliation without Justice," Southern African Review of Books 10 (1997): 22-5.
15. Charles Villa-Vicencio, Learning to Live Together: Where the Subjective and the Material Meet (Institute for Justice and Reconciliation, Cape Town, 2001, working paper). For work that highlights the tension between reconciliation and justice, see Kader Asmal, Louise Asmal, and Ronald Roberts, Reconciliation Through Truth (Cape Town: David Philip Publishing, 1996); Mahmood Mamdani, "Reconciliation without Justice," Southern African Review of Books 10 (1997): 22-5.
16. Charles Villa-Vicencio, Learning to Live Together: Where the Subjective and the Material Meet (Institute for Justice and Reconciliation, Cape Town, 2001, working paper). For work that highlights the tension between reconciliation and justice, see Kader Asmal, Louise Asmal, and Ronald Roberts, Reconciliation Through Truth (Cape Town: David Philip Publishing, 1996); Mahmood Mamdani, "Reconciliation without Justice," Southern African Review of Books 10 (1997): 22-5.
17. J.L Austin, "The Meaning of a Word," in Philosophical Papers, 2nd ed. (London: Oxford University Press, 1970), 58.
18. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, trans. G.E. Anscombe (London: Blackwell, 2003), 14-43; Ludwig Wittgenstein, The Blue and the Brown Books (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1960), 25-30.
19. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, trans. G.E. Anscombe (London: Blackwell, 2003), 14-43; Ludwig Wittgenstein, The Blue and the Brown Books (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1960), 25-30.
20. For the original position, see W.B. Gallie, "Essentially Contested Concepts," Proceedings of the Meeting of the Aristotelian Society 56 (1956): 167-98. There are several important commentaries on Gallie's argument. For two that are relevant to the matter at hand, see Eugene Garver, "Rhetoric and Essentially Contested Arguments," Philosophy and Rhetoric 11 (1978): 156-72; Andrew Mason, "On Explaining Political Disagreement: The Notion of an Essentially Contested Concept," Inquiry 33 (1990): 81-98. In brief, I would point to four difficulties that may attend the attachment of Gallie's essential contestation thesis to reconciliation. First, reconciliation may be a platform for choosing or making the values of political life more than an expression of dispute about different value accreditations that can be attached to particular political-moral concepts. In other words, the practice of reconciliation may be a kind of placeholder in which to invent meta-norms about how to define and implement shared values. Second, reconciliation may appear in situations in which rational dialogue or disagreement about particular contested terms cannot be presupposed, particularly in situations of transition or radical inequality in which public discourse is not open to all corners. In other words, there may be vast disagreement about how to disagree and whether it is valuable. Third, the focus on the need to rationally disagree over the meaning of key terms may miss the centrality and power of reconciliation's faith. Finally, the conclusion that a term is essentially contested may be a tacit warrant for inaction or endless discussion; both of these calls for reconciliation tend to oppose in very direct ways.
21. For the original position, see W.B. Gallie, "Essentially Contested Concepts," Proceedings of the Meeting of the Aristotelian Society 56 (1956): 167-98. There are several important commentaries on Gallie's argument. For two that are relevant to the matter at hand, see Eugene Garver, "Rhetoric and Essentially Contested Arguments," Philosophy and Rhetoric 11 (1978): 156-72; Andrew Mason, "On Explaining Political Disagreement: The Notion of an Essentially Contested Concept," Inquiry 33 (1990): 81-98. In brief, I would point to four difficulties that may attend the attachment of Gallie's essential contestation thesis to reconciliation. First, reconciliation may be a platform for choosing or making the values of political life more than an expression of dispute about different value accreditations that can be attached to particular political-moral concepts. In other words, the practice of reconciliation may be a kind of placeholder in which to invent meta-norms about how to define and implement shared values. Second, reconciliation may appear in situations in which rational dialogue or disagreement about particular contested terms cannot be presupposed, particularly in situations of transition or radical inequality in which public discourse is not open to all corners. In other words, there may be vast disagreement about how to disagree and whether it is valuable. Third, the focus on the need to rationally disagree over the meaning of key terms may miss the centrality and power of reconciliation's faith. Finally, the conclusion that a term is essentially contested may be a tacit warrant for inaction or endless discussion; both of these calls for reconciliation tend to oppose in very direct ways.
22. For the original position, see W.B. Gallie, "Essentially Contested Concepts," Proceedings of the Meeting of the Aristotelian Society 56 (1956): 167-98. There are several important commentaries on Gallie's argument. For two that are relevant to the matter at hand, see Eugene Garver, "Rhetoric and Essentially Contested Arguments," Philosophy and Rhetoric 11 (1978): 156-72; Andrew Mason, "On Explaining Political Disagreement: The Notion of an Essentially Contested Concept," Inquiry 33 (1990): 81-98. In brief, I would point to four difficulties that may attend the attachment of Gallie's essential contestation thesis to reconciliation. First, reconciliation may be a platform for choosing or making the values of political life more than an expression of dispute about different value accreditations that can be attached to particular political-moral concepts. In other words, the practice of reconciliation may be a kind of placeholder in which to invent meta-norms about how to define and implement shared values. Second, reconciliation may appear in situations in which rational dialogue or disagreement about particular contested terms cannot be presupposed, particularly in situations of transition or radical inequality in which public discourse is not open to all corners. In other words, there may be vast disagreement about how to disagree and whether it is valuable. Third, the focus on the need to rationally disagree over the meaning of key terms may miss the centrality and power of reconciliation's faith. Finally, the conclusion that a term is essentially contested may be a tacit warrant for inaction or endless discussion; both of these calls for reconciliation tend to oppose in very direct ways.
23. For instance, consult the Liddell-Scott-Jones Lexicon of Classical Greek. Reprinted at the Perseus Digital Library, available from http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/(May 2002).
24. Aristophanes, Lysistrata, ed. Jeffrey Henderson, 11113-15; Aristophanes, Acharnians, ed. Jeffrey Henderson, 997. Reprinted at the Perseus Digital Library (January 2001).
25. Aristophanes, Lysistrata, ed. Jeffrey Henderson, 11113-15; Aristophanes, Acharnians, ed. Jeffrey Henderson, 997. Reprinted at the Perseus Digital Library (January 2001).
26. Xenophon, Hellenica, 6.3.4. Reprinted at the Perseus Digital Library (January 2001).
27. Lysias, "Against Eratosthenes," Speeches, 12.52. Reprinted at the Perseus Digital Library (January 2001).
28. Aristophanes, Wasps, 471-2. Reprinted at the Perseus Digital Library (January 2001).
29. Isocrates, Against Callimachus, Speech 18, 30-32. Reprinted at the Perseus Digital Library (January 2001).
30. This interpretation of stasis is developed in Barbara Cassin, "Politics of Memory: On Treatments of Hate," The Public-Javnost: Journal of the European Institute for Communication and Culture VIII (2001): 9-22. The first known amnesty occurred in 403 BCE, occasioned by the need for reconciliation in the wake of the civil war that followed the close of the Peloponnesian War. Illustrating both its temporal complexity and relationship to the (re)formation of the city, the terms of the amnesty are described fully by Aristotle in the Constitution of Athens. Also see David Cohen, "The Rhetoric of Justice: Strategies of Reconciliation and Revenge in the Restoration of the Athenian Democracy in 403 BC," Annales European de Sociologie 62 (2001).
31. This interpretation of stasis is developed in Barbara Cassin, "Politics of Memory: On Treatments of Hate," The Public-Javnost: Journal of the European Institute for Communication and Culture VIII (2001): 9-22. The first known amnesty occurred in 403 BCE, occasioned by the need for reconciliation in the wake of the civil war that followed the close of the Peloponnesian War. Illustrating both its temporal complexity and relationship to the (re)formation of the city, the terms of the amnesty are described fully by Aristotle in the Constitution of Athens. Also see David Cohen, "The Rhetoric of Justice: Strategies of Reconciliation and Revenge in the Restoration of the Athenian Democracy in 403 BC," Annales European de Sociologie 62 (2001).
32. This interpretation of stasis is developed in Barbara Cassin, "Politics of Memory: On Treatments of Hate," The Public-Javnost: Journal of the European Institute for Communication and Culture VIII (2001): 9-22. The first known amnesty occurred in 403 BCE, occasioned by the need for reconciliation in the wake of the civil war that followed the close of the Peloponnesian War. Illustrating both its temporal complexity and relationship to the (re)formation of the city, the terms of the amnesty are described fully by Aristotle in the Constitution of Athens. Also see David Cohen, "The Rhetoric of Justice: Strategies of Reconciliation and Revenge in the Restoration of the Athenian Democracy in 403 BC," Annales European de Sociologie 62 (2001).
33. Isocrates, Against Callimachus, Speech 18, 34.
34. This rendering of kairos draws from Giorgio Agamben's interpretation of the term. I am grateful for his assistance in this matter.
35. A synecdoche of the discussion in the Epistle to the Romans, Paul announces in 2 Corinthians that "the letter kills but the spirit makes alive" (3:6). The claim has provoked substantial and important commentary. In part, it seems to mean that the law's promise of salvation leads to human subjugation and defers (endlessly) man's relationship with God. A cause of pride (hybris], Martin's interpretation is that Paul viewed the law as a source of discord and an embodiment of the temptation to wrest the power of creation from its divine source. See Ralph Martin, Reconciliation: A Study of Paul's Theology (Atlanta: John Knox Press, 1981), 62. In important recent work, Giorgio Agamben has extended Hegel's claim that the external force of law marks a moment when the task of becoming is supplanted by the juridical fate of being. Following Paul's description of how it was handed from behind a veil, Agamben explores whether law covets a power of mediation that can neither be seen nor questioned. Able to structure the form of history and impute the identity of its subjects, he argues that the word of law can cut against the words of identification that energize human interaction. Paul seems to underscore this point when he claims that without the contingency of faith, the work of law beckons condemnation and death. Further, he claims that the problem has much to do with the status and relation of divine and human words: "But we have renounced the hidden things of shame, not walking in craftiness, nor adulterating the Word of God, but by the revelation of the truth commending ourselves to every conscience of men before God" (4:2). Elsewhere, I have offered a fuller reading of Paul's letter, analysis that focuses on the way that the precise terms of his situation shape his rhetorical appeal to the Word and word of reconciliation. See Erik Doxtader, "Reconciliation in a State of Emergency: The Middle Voice of 2 Corinthians," The Journal for the Study of Religion 14 (2001): 47-66.
36. A synecdoche of the discussion in the Epistle to the Romans, Paul announces in 2 Corinthians that "the letter kills but the spirit makes alive" (3:6). The claim has provoked substantial and important commentary. In part, it seems to mean that the law's promise of salvation leads to human subjugation and defers (endlessly) man's relationship with God. A cause of pride (hybris], Martin's interpretation is that Paul viewed the law as a source of discord and an embodiment of the temptation to wrest the power of creation from its divine source. See Ralph Martin, Reconciliation: A Study of Paul's Theology (Atlanta: John Knox Press, 1981), 62. In important recent work, Giorgio Agamben has extended Hegel's claim that the external force of law marks a moment when the task of becoming is supplanted by the juridical fate of being. Following Paul's description of how it was handed from behind a veil, Agamben explores whether law covets a power of mediation that can neither be seen nor questioned. Able to structure the form of history and impute the identity of its subjects, he argues that the word of law can cut against the words of identification that energize human interaction. Paul seems to underscore this point when he claims that without the contingency of faith, the work of law beckons condemnation and death. Further, he claims that the problem has much to do with the status and relation of divine and human words: "But we have renounced the hidden things of shame, not walking in craftiness, nor adulterating the Word of God, but by the revelation of the truth commending ourselves to every conscience of men before God" (4:2). Elsewhere, I have offered a fuller reading of Paul's letter, analysis that focuses on the way that the precise terms of his situation shape his rhetorical appeal to the Word and word of reconciliation. See Erik Doxtader, "Reconciliation in a State of Emergency: The Middle Voice of 2 Corinthians," The Journal for the Study of Religion 14 (2001): 47-66.
37. The Second Epistle of Paul to the Corinthians, 5.19. All citations are from the Interlinear Greek-English New Testament, 3rd ed., ed. Jay Green (Grand Rapids: Baker Books, 1996). In the Christian tradition, there is longstanding controversy over whether this removal into presence is best understood as a divine imputation, amnesty, transference, or identification. Martin's commentary contains a detailed review of this debate.
38. The idea of the state of emergency is a central feature of Walter Benjamin's concern for the reconciling communication that can perform a meaningful critique of violence. See "The Critique of Violence," in Walter Benjamin: Selected Writings, Volume 1, 1913-1926, ed. Marcus Bullock (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996), 236-52. Also see Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 1990), 28-9.
39. The idea of the state of emergency is a central feature of Walter Benjamin's concern for the reconciling communication that can perform a meaningful critique of violence. See "The Critique of Violence," in Walter Benjamin: Selected Writings, Volume 1, 1913-1926, ed. Marcus Bullock (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996), 236-52. Also see Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 1990), 28-9.
40. This is the literal translation of 2 Corinthians, 5:17, according to Green. The King James Version of the text inserts "are," an addition that works to resolve the ambiguous sense of agency that appears in the operation of reconciliation. This solution is a source of debate about whether reconciliation is a process or singular (timeless) event.
41. Corinthians, 5:19. At 5:18, Paul writes, "And all things (are) of God, the (One) having reconciled us to Himself through Jesus Christ, and having given us the ministry of reconciliation." Thus, it is unclear whether the former act implies or culminates in the latter or if the actions are somehow distinct. The passage at 5:19 seems clearer in this respect but the matter is still debatable.
42. Very much a philosopher of reconciliation, the preliminary difficulty in considering Hegel's view is one of sheer volume; he approached reconciliation from a number of perspectives and tied it variously to the designs of spirit. Less well known, the philosopher's early theological writings on the matter are highly relevant, particularly as they offer an explanation of reconciliation's constitutive action. See G.W.F. Hegel, "The Spirit of Christianity and Its Fate," in On Christianity: Early Theological Writings, trans. T.M. Knox (New York: Harper, 1948). For a broad, synthetic view of Hegel's notion of reconciliation see Michael O. Hardimon, Hegel's Social Philosophy: The Project of Reconciliation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994).
43. Very much a philosopher of reconciliation, the preliminary difficulty in considering Hegel's view is one of sheer volume; he approached reconciliation from a number of perspectives and tied it variously to the designs of spirit. Less well known, the philosopher's early theological writings on the matter are highly relevant, particularly as they offer an explanation of reconciliation's constitutive action. See G.W.F. Hegel, "The Spirit of Christianity and Its Fate," in On Christianity: Early Theological Writings, trans. T.M. Knox (New York: Harper, 1948). For a broad, synthetic view of Hegel's notion of reconciliation see Michael O. Hardimon, Hegel's Social Philosophy: The Project of Reconciliation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994).
44. Hegel, "Spirit of Christianity," 233-5.
45. Thus, the occasion of fate takes shape at the nexus both of "another's deed" and the "manner of receiving and reacting" against this deed. In other words, fate does not pass over the "guilt of innocence" to the degree that the innocent reacts to transgression by clinging to the imperatives or judgments of "right" ("Spirit," 233). Regarding judgment in this moment, Hegel writes, "We envy the man as he is, and we judge him by a concept, a thought, by our conception of what he ought to be, or by our conception of the laws by which he ought to abide. In this we get the better of him, not in reality, but in thought, because the standard of judgment lies on our thinking. But this process recoils on us. We must be judged by the same standard" ("Spirit," 223).
46. Hegel, "The Spirit of Christianity," 232.
47. Hegel, "The Spirit of Christianity," 236.
48. Hegel, "The Spirit of Christianity," 266.
49. Hegel, "The Spirit of Christianity," 279.
50. That desire precedes interest is significant with respect to how Hegel's understanding of reconciliation bears on Habermas's claim that the telos of communication is understanding. In fact, there is a strong case to be made that Habermas underappreciates the constitutive dimensions of opposition, the ways in which desire first creates the grounds for the achievement of intersubjective understanding. Evident in Theory and Practice, this problem is central to understanding the limits of Habermas' theory of communicative action. See Jurgen Habermas, Theory and Practice, trans. John Viertel (Boston: Beacon Press, 1973), 142-69.
51. Of central importance in this history is the 1950 Population Registration Act, legislation that defined, classified and explicitly regulated the racial identity of each South African citizen. In post-apartheid South Africa, however, the problem of identity is not limited to the matter of race. It has much to do with how apartheid used law and religion to establish a definitive power, a capacity to define and ban relationships through an identitarian logic. For a crucial study, see Aletta Norval, Deconstructing Apartheid Discourse (London: Verso, 1996).
52. The debate arises because key aspects of apartheid were theorized and developed through the lens of Dutch Reformed Theology. For some, apartheid was intended to fulfill a divin: calling and rested on the idea that each race ought to be left to its own devices in order to realize its (divine) potential. In contrast, the call for reconciliation by opponents of the regime was one for the present, a moment in which to stand against the future promised by law. For one history of this development, see J.A. Loubser, The Apartheid Bible: A Critical Review of Racial Theology in South Africa (Cape Town: Maskew Miller Longman, 1987). With respect 1:0 the church opposition to apartheid, see The Kairos Document; Challenge to the Church, 2nd ed. (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1986).
53. The debate arises because key aspects of apartheid were theorized and developed through the lens of Dutch Reformed Theology. For some, apartheid was intended to fulfill a divin: calling and rested on the idea that each race ought to be left to its own devices in order to realize its (divine) potential. In contrast, the call for reconciliation by opponents of the regime was one for the present, a moment in which to stand against the future promised by law. For one history of this development, see J.A. Loubser, The Apartheid Bible: A Critical Review of Racial Theology in South Africa (Cape Town: Maskew Miller Longman, 1987). With respect 1:0 the church opposition to apartheid, see The Kairos Document; Challenge to the Church, 2nd ed. (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1986).
54. Asmal, Reconciliation through Truth is a detailed analysis of the role of reconciliation in transition.
55. For a candid consideration of this debate see Piet Miering, "The Baruti versus the Lawyers: The Role of Religion in the TRC Process," in Looking Back, Reaching Forward, 123-131. Work remains to be done on how the Commission's Final Report defined and defended its interpretation of reconciliation. The chapter given to reconciliation is a pastiche of claims, composed mainly from testimony provided by victims and perpetrators to the Commission. The chapter illustrates the heavy emphasis placed on the restoration of dignity and the ways in which this recovery fosters the grounds for interaction between transgressed and transgressor. This claim sits next to discussions of reconciliation as a national good, a means of creating the body politic.
56. For a significant view on the matter, see Itumeleng Mosala, "The Meaning of Reconciliation: A Black Perspective," Journal of Theology for Southern Africa 59 (1987): 19-25.
57. Laurie Nathan, the Director of the South African Centre for Conflict Resolution, has argued quite correctly that reconciliation involves a vast range of activity; work that includes interaction between belligerent parties, perpetrators and victims, old and new political institutions, communities, and publics. In fact, a recent national conference hosted by the Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation was devoted just to the problem of defining reconciliation. Answers were plentiful even as delegates from some of the organizations most involved in the reconciliation process struggled to delineate the implications of their different interpretations. There was little agreement about how to distinguish reconciliation's process and product. Repeatedly, reconciliation was defined through distinct if not competing accounts of how it is performed and radically divergent accounts of what ought to count as the end of reconciliation. Broad-based appeals to transformation and peace were deemed inadequate, particularly as they were held to confound judgment about the experiential, ethical, and material commitments needed to reconcile and how well the process has worked. There was heated debate about whether the faith of reconciliation amounts to raw sacrifice and thus whether it covers a matter of secular justice with a Christian or neocolonial ideology.
58. South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Final Report, Volume 5 (Republic of South Africa, Cape Town, 1998), 291.
59. Theodor Adorno, Negative Dialectics, trans. E.B. Ashton (Continuum: New York, 1973), 142.
60. Adorno, Negative Dialectics, 145. In the South African context, Aletta Norval has offered something of a congruent argument regarding the relationship between reconciliation and identity in "Memory, Identity, and the (Impossibility of Reconciliation: The Work of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa," Constellations 5 (1998): 250-65.
61. Adorno, Negative Dialectics, 145. In the South African context, Aletta Norval has offered something of a congruent argument regarding the relationship between reconciliation and identity in "Memory, Identity, and the (Impossibility of Reconciliation: The Work of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa," Constellations 5 (1998): 250-65.
62. Aside from Hegel, perhaps Walter Benjamin most clearly senses the connection between philosophical, religious, and political interpretations of reconciliation. Evident in his writings on the creation of language and juridical violence, Benjamin sees that the problem of how reconciliation exceeds the law of non-contradiction has practical implications for the question of how to create the standing for human interaction. Compare Walter Benjamin, "Critique of Violence," with "On Language as Such and on the Language of Man," in Walter Benjamin: Selected Writings, Volume 1, 1913-1926, ed. Marcus Bullock (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996), 244, 62-74.
63. Paul Lederach, quoted in Noel Chicuecue, "Reconciliation; The Role of Truth Commissions and Alternative Ways of Healing," Development in Practice 7 (1997): 484.
64. See Alex Boraine, "A Language of Potential," in After the TRC: Reflections on Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa, ed. Wilmot James and Linda van der Vijver (Cape Town: David Philips, 2000), 73-81.
65. The point is decidedly not that there was a moral equivalence between the state and the struggle. Rather, the call for reconciliation represented a moment in which each side had to reflect on the limits of and relax their commitment to the respective histories that were justifying the continuation of violence. In this regard, it is instructive to note that both de Klerk and Mandela were accused by their own constituencies of selling out.
66. This is a crucial point. The South African debate over the value of liberal public deliberation and political opposition has been fierce, having much to do with charges and counter charges of racism stemming from the issue of whether the liberal subject and its capacity to argue can simply be assumed and, if so, at what point in time. If apartheid distorted the experience, language, and material standing of millions, which it did, then reconciliation implies a need to recover these goods, in part as a way to set the stage for open public deliberation. The argument is not about the sheer incapacity for public debate but whether the capacity must take shape over time and in light of history. I have explored the specific terms of the debate and its relation to the work of reconciliation elsewhere. See Erik Doxtader, "Reconciling the Form of Public Speech in Post-TRC South Africa," Javnost - The Public, Journal of the European Institute of Communication and Culture VIII (2001): 23-34.
67. Nelson Mandela, Long Walk to Freedom (London: Abacus, 1994); Patti Waldmeir, Anatomy of a Miracle: The End of Apartheid and the Birth of a New South African Constitution (New York: W.W. Norton, 1997), 87, 101.
68. Nelson Mandela, Long Walk to Freedom (London: Abacus, 1994); Patti Waldmeir, Anatomy of a Miracle: The End of Apartheid and the Birth of a New South African Constitution (New York: W.W. Norton, 1997), 87, 101.
69. Antjie Krog, Country of My Skull: Guilt, Sorrow and the Limits of Forgiveness in the New South Africa (New York: Times Books, 1998), 39. Indeed, extensive interviews with South African political leaders from across the political spectrum reveal a shared sense of the intrinsic connection between reconciliation and communication.
70. Krog, Country, 62.
71. The sentiment is documented in the 1999 film Long Night's Journey into Day.
72. More fully, it argued: "The evil forces we speak of in baptism must be named. We know that these evil forces are in South Africa today. The unity and sharing we profess in our communion services or masses must be named. It is the solidarity of the people inviting all to join in the struggle for God's peace in South Africa. The repentance we preach must be named. It is repentance for our share of the guilt for the suffering and oppression in our country." See The Kairos Document, 17-29. For background on the premises of The Kairos Document see Robert McAfee Brown, ed., Kairos: Three Prophetic Challenges to the Church (Grand Rapids: William Eerdmans, 1990); Klaus Nurnberger, ed., The Cost of Reconciliation in South Africa: NIR Reader Number One (Cape Town: Methodist Publishing, 1988).
73. More fully, it argued: "The evil forces we speak of in baptism must be named. We know that these evil forces are in South Africa today. The unity and sharing we profess in our communion services or masses must be named. It is the solidarity of the people inviting all to join in the struggle for God's peace in South Africa. The repentance we preach must be named. It is repentance for our share of the guilt for the suffering and oppression in our country." See The Kairos Document, 17-29. For background on the premises of The Kairos Document see Robert McAfee Brown, ed., Kairos: Three Prophetic Challenges to the Church (Grand Rapids: William Eerdmans, 1990); Klaus Nurnberger, ed., The Cost of Reconciliation in South Africa: NIR Reader Number One (Cape Town: Methodist Publishing, 1988).
74. More fully, it argued: "The evil forces we speak of in baptism must be named. We know that these evil forces are in South Africa today. The unity and sharing we profess in our communion services or masses must be named. It is the solidarity of the people inviting all to join in the struggle for God's peace in South Africa. The repentance we preach must be named. It is repentance for our share of the guilt for the suffering and oppression in our country." See The Kairos Document, 17-29. For background on the premises of The Kairos Document see Robert McAfee Brown, ed., Kairos: Three Prophetic Challenges to the Church (Grand Rapids: William Eerdmans, 1990); Klaus Nurnberger, ed., The Cost of Reconciliation in South Africa: NIR Reader Number One (Cape Town: Methodist Publishing, 1988).
75. F.W. de Klerk, "Inaugural Address," Cape Argus, 20 September 1989, p. 1; Nelson Mandela, "Document Forwarded to F.W. de Klerk," 12 December 1989. Available from http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/mandela/nm891212.html (August 1998).
76. F.W. de Klerk, "Inaugural Address," Cape Argus, 20 September 1989, p. 1; Nelson Mandela, "Document Forwarded to F.W. de Klerk," 12 December 1989. Available from http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/mandela/nm891212.html (August 1998).
77. This reference to forgiveness is drawn from Jacques Derrida's reflections on the South African transition in On Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness (London: Routledge, 2001).
78. Hegel, "Spirit of Christianity," 236-7, 290.
79. There is an expansive literature on this matter. For one, the TRC developed this theme at length in its final report. For other views on the relationship between narrative and reconciliation, see Njabulo Ndebele, "Memory, Metaphor and the Triumph of Narrative," in Negotiating the Past: The Making of Memory in South Africa, ed. Sarah Nuttall (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 19-28. In the same volume, see Andre Brink, "Stories of History: Reimagining the Past in Post-Apartheid Narrative", 29-42. In a theological vein, see Dirkie Smit, "Confession-Guilt-Truth and Forgiveness in the Christian Tradition," in To Remember and To Heal: Theological and Psychological Reflections on Truth and Reconciliation, ed. Russel Botman (Cape Town: Human and Rousseau, 1996), 96-117.
80. There is an expansive literature on this matter. For one, the TRC developed this theme at length in its final report. For other views on the relationship between narrative and reconciliation, see Njabulo Ndebele, "Memory, Metaphor and the Triumph of Narrative," in Negotiating the Past: The Making of Memory in South Africa, ed. Sarah Nuttall (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 19-28. In the same volume, see Andre Brink, "Stories of History: Reimagining the Past in Post-Apartheid Narrative", 29-42. In a theological vein, see Dirkie Smit, "Confession-Guilt-Truth and Forgiveness in the Christian Tradition," in To Remember and To Heal: Theological and Psychological Reflections on Truth and Reconciliation, ed. Russel Botman (Cape Town: Human and Rousseau, 1996), 96-117.
81. There is an expansive literature on this matter. For one, the TRC developed this theme at length in its final report. For other views on the relationship between narrative and reconciliation, see Njabulo Ndebele, "Memory, Metaphor and the Triumph of Narrative," in Negotiating the Past: The Making of Memory in South Africa, ed. Sarah Nuttall (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 19-28. In the same volume, see Andre Brink, "Stories of History: Reimagining the Past in Post-Apartheid Narrative", 29-42. In a theological vein, see Dirkie Smit, "Confession-Guilt-Truth and Forgiveness in the Christian Tradition," in To Remember and To Heal: Theological and Psychological Reflections on Truth and Reconciliation, ed. Russel Botman (Cape Town: Human and Rousseau, 1996), 96-117.
82. TRC, Final Report, Vol. 1, 104-20.
83. In an interview, Archbishop Emeritus Desmond Tutu put it to me that reconciliation in South Africa, and in the larger context of Africa, departs from Western philosophical views about identity, particularly as they work in political contexts to delineate the substance of the individual subject. On Tutu's reading, evident in a large number of his writings, the matter is more complicated, turning on how a person is an independent being and one who is made through others. The latter is central to the notion of ubuntu, the idea that people are people through other people.
84. Jacques Lacan, The Seminar of Jacques Lacan: Book I, Freud's Papers on Technique, 1953-1954, trans. John Forrester, ed. Jacques-Alain Miller (New York: Norton, 1991, original French publication in 1975). Also see Jane Gallop, Reading Lacan (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985), 74-92.
85. Jacques Lacan, The Seminar of Jacques Lacan: Book I, Freud's Papers on Technique, 1953-1954, trans. John Forrester, ed. Jacques-Alain Miller (New York: Norton, 1991, original French publication in 1975). Also see Jane Gallop, Reading Lacan (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985), 74-92.
86. Two excellent studies have approached this issue in the South African context. See Philippe Salazar, An African Athens: Rhetoric and the Shaping of Democracy in South Africa (London: Lawrence Erlbaum, 2002); and Fiona Ross, Bearing Witness (Cape Town: Pluto Press, 2003).
87. Two excellent studies have approached this issue in the South African context. See Philippe Salazar, An African Athens: Rhetoric and the Shaping of Democracy in South Africa (London: Lawrence Erlbaum, 2002); and Fiona Ross, Bearing Witness (Cape Town: Pluto Press, 2003).
88. At the broadest level, these invitations are institutional-political acts of constitution. For instance, the TRC set the stage for narrative, asking and sometimes pressuring individuals to testify about the harms and evil of apartheid. In order to call citizens to speech and encourage their participation in the formation of a "new moral order," the Commission undertook what Wilmot James has described as a "campaign of persuasion." See "Co-existence and Community," in The Healing of a Nation, ed. Alex Boraine (Cape Town: Justice In Transition, 1995), 83-6. This institutional argumentation about reconciliation addressed the public, and opened space for its formation and deliberations. It is an illustration of how reconciliation involves "moral persuasion" and discourses of "en-lightenment," both of which attempt to create the conditions for "bridging historical division and animosity." This view appears to be an important part of Desmond Tutu's theology of reconciliation. See Michael Battle, Reconciliation: The Ubuntu Theology of Desmond Tutu (Cleveland: Pilgrim Press, 1997).
89. At the broadest level, these invitations are institutional-political acts of constitution. For instance, the TRC set the stage for narrative, asking and sometimes pressuring individuals to testify about the harms and evil of apartheid. In order to call citizens to speech and encourage their participation in the formation of a "new moral order," the Commission undertook what Wilmot James has described as a "campaign of persuasion." See "Co-existence and Community," in The Healing of a Nation, ed. Alex Boraine (Cape Town: Justice In Transition, 1995), 83-6. This institutional argumentation about reconciliation addressed the public, and opened space for its formation and deliberations. It is an illustration of how reconciliation involves "moral persuasion" and discourses of "en-lightenment," both of which attempt to create the conditions for "bridging historical division and animosity." This view appears to be an important part of Desmond Tutu's theology of reconciliation. See Michael Battle, Reconciliation: The Ubuntu Theology of Desmond Tutu (Cleveland: Pilgrim Press, 1997).
90. Luce Irigaray's account of love "to" is suggestive in this respect. See I Love to You: Sketch of a Possible Felicity in History, trans. Alison Martin (New York: Routledge, 1996).
91. Much of the discussion turns on questions about the dynamics of human experience, the motivations of the novel - a form that appears in close temporal proximity to the rise of the bourgeois public sphere - and the fate of speech when it is no longer held to be a conduit of knowledge. See Hayden White, "Writing in the Middle Voice," Stanford Literature Review 9 (1992): 179-87.
92. White, "Writing," 187.
93. White quotes Barthes in this matter: "In the case of the middle voice ... the subject affects himself in acting; he always remains inside the action, even if an object is involved. The middle voice does not therefore, exclude transitivity," 181.
94. White uses the example of "I deliver a speech" to illustrate this point.
95. Martin Jay, "Experience without a Subject: Walter Benjamin and the Novel," New Formations 20 (1993): 145-55.
96. White, "Writing," 184.
97. Between 1994 and 1999, Gerwel served as Mandela's Director General. See Jakes Gerwel, "The Leader who Held it All Together," Madiba at 85: A Celebration (Insert to the Cape Times), 18 July 2003, p. 10. An important example of Mandela's middle voice can be found in the address that he delivered to Parliament at the beginning of the debate over legislation that authorized the formation of the TRC. Here, Mandela engages the question of how parties ought to speak with one another and argues that the "majority party [ANC] must have the understanding and humility" not only to hear the "fears and concerns of minorities" but to acknowledge the "sacrifices" that they made in the name of ending apartheid. In this respect, the speech is both a performance and advocacy of reconciliation. See Nelson Mandela, Debates of the National Assembly (Second Session, First Parliament), 17 May 1995, 1349-50. For an excellent assessment of the Mandela presidency, see Salazar, African Athens, 18-31. Krog also discusses the issue, comparing President Thabo Mbeki and Desmond Tutu's public performances and interpretations of reconciliation; in, Country of My Skull, 143-6.
98. Between 1994 and 1999, Gerwel served as Mandela's Director General. See Jakes Gerwel, "The Leader who Held it All Together," Madiba at 85: A Celebration (Insert to the Cape Times), 18 July 2003, p. 10. An important example of Mandela's middle voice can be found in the address that he delivered to Parliament at the beginning of the debate over legislation that authorized the formation of the TRC. Here, Mandela engages the question of how parties ought to speak with one another and argues that the "majority party [ANC] must have the understanding and humility" not only to hear the "fears and concerns of minorities" but to acknowledge the "sacrifices" that they made in the name of ending apartheid. In this respect, the speech is both a performance and advocacy of reconciliation. See Nelson Mandela, Debates of the National Assembly (Second Session, First Parliament), 17 May 1995, 1349-50. For an excellent assessment of the Mandela presidency, see Salazar, African Athens, 18-31. Krog also discusses the issue, comparing President Thabo Mbeki and Desmond Tutu's public performances and interpretations of reconciliation; in, Country of My Skull, 143-6.
99. Between 1994 and 1999, Gerwel served as Mandela's Director General. See Jakes Gerwel, "The Leader who Held it All Together," Madiba at 85: A Celebration (Insert to the Cape Times), 18 July 2003, p. 10. An important example of Mandela's middle voice can be found in the address that he delivered to Parliament at the beginning of the debate over legislation that authorized the formation of the TRC. Here, Mandela engages the question of how parties ought to speak with one another and argues that the "majority party [ANC] must have the understanding and humility" not only to hear the "fears and concerns of minorities" but to acknowledge the "sacrifices" that they made in the name of ending apartheid. In this respect, the speech is both a performance and advocacy of reconciliation. See Nelson Mandela, Debates of the National Assembly (Second Session, First Parliament), 17 May 1995, 1349-50. For an excellent assessment of the Mandela presidency, see Salazar, African Athens, 18-31. Krog also discusses the issue, comparing President Thabo Mbeki and Desmond Tutu's public performances and interpretations of reconciliation; in, Country of My Skull, 143-6.
100. Between 1994 and 1999, Gerwel served as Mandela's Director General. See Jakes Gerwel, "The Leader who Held it All Together," Madiba at 85: A Celebration (Insert to the Cape Times), 18 July 2003, p. 10. An important example of Mandela's middle voice can be found in the address that he delivered to Parliament at the beginning of the debate over legislation that authorized the formation of the TRC. Here, Mandela engages the question of how parties ought to speak with one another and argues that the "majority party [ANC] must have the understanding and humility" not only to hear the "fears
101. Elsewhere, I have offered a detailed reading of the post-amble. See Doxtader, "Making Rhetorical History," 246-9. The post-amble reads: "This constitution provides a historic bridge between the past of a deeply divided society, characterized by strife, conflict, untold suffering and injustice, and a future grounded on the recognition of human rights, democracy, and peaceful coexistence and development opportunities for all South Africans, irrespective of colour, race, class, belief or sex. The pursuit of national unity, the well-being of all South African citizens and peace require reconciliation between the people of South Africa and the reconstruction of society. The adoption of this constitution lays the secure foundation for the people of South Africa to transcend the divisions and strife of the past, which generated gross violations of human rights, the transgression of humanitarian principles in violent conflicts and a legacy of hatred, fear, guilt and revenge. These can now be addressed on the basis that there is a need for understanding not for vengeance, a need for reparation but not retaliation, a need for ubuntu but not victimization. In order to advance such reconciliation and reconstruction, amnesty shall be granted in all respect of acts, omissions and offences associated with political objectives and committed in the course of the conflicts of the past. To this end, Parliament under this constitution shall adopt a law determining a firm cut-off date, which shall be a date after 8 October 1990 and before 6 December 1993, and providing for the mechanisms, criteria and procedures, including tribunals, if any, through which such amnesty shall be dealt with at any time after the law has been passed. With this constitution and these commitments we, the people of South Africa, open a new chapter in the history of our country. Nkosi sikelel' iAfrika. God seen Suid-Afrika. Moreana boloka sechaba sa heso. May God bless our country. Mudzimu fhatutshedza Afrika. Hosi katekisa Afrika."
102. Mac Maharaj, interview with author, Johannesburg, South Africa, 16 January 2001.
103. A significant literature addresses the relationship between recognition and reconciliation in South Africa. See, for example, Andre du Toit, "The Moral Foundations of the South African TRC: Truth as Acknowledgement and Justice as Recognition," in Truth v. Justice: The Morality of Truth Commissions, ed. Robert Rotberg and Dennis Thompson (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), 122-40. More generally, see Axel Honneth, The Struggle for Recognition: The Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts, trans. Joel Anderson (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1997); Nancy Fraser, "From Redistribution to Recognition? Dilemmas of Justice in a Post-Socialist Age," New Left Review 21 (1995): 68-93.
104. A significant literature addresses the relationship between recognition and reconciliation in South Africa. See, for example, Andre du Toit, "The Moral Foundations of the South African TRC: Truth as Acknowledgement and Justice as Recognition," in Truth v. Justice: The Morality of Truth Commissions, ed. Robert Rotberg and Dennis Thompson (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), 122-40. More generally, see Axel Honneth, The Struggle for Recognition: The Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts, trans. Joel Anderson (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1997); Nancy Fraser, "From Redistribution to Recognition? Dilemmas of Justice in a Post-Socialist Age," New Left Review 21 (1995): 68-93.
105. A significant literature addresses the relationship between recognition and reconciliation in South Africa. See, for example, Andre du Toit, "The Moral Foundations of the South African TRC: Truth as Acknowledgement and Justice as Recognition," in Truth v. Justice: The Morality of Truth Commissions, ed. Robert Rotberg and Dennis Thompson (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), 122-40. More generally, see Axel Honneth, The Struggle for Recognition: The Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts, trans. Joel Anderson (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1997); Nancy Fraser, "From Redistribution to Recognition? Dilemmas of Justice in a Post-Socialist Age," New Left Review 21 (1995): 68-93.
106. Asmal, Reconciliation through Truth, 9, 47.
107. There have been several attempts to gather and plot the terms of these debates. See Robert Rotberg and Dennis Thompson, Truth v. Justice; After the TRC: Reflections on Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa, ed. Wilmot James and Linda van de Vijver (Cape Town: David Philip, 2000); The Provocations of Amnesty: Memory, Justice and Impunity, ed. Charles Villa-Vicencio and Erik Doxtader (Cape Town: David Phillip, 2003).
108. There have been several attempts to gather and plot the terms of these debates. See Robert Rotberg and Dennis Thompson, Truth v. Justice; After the TRC: Reflections on Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa, ed. Wilmot James and Linda van de Vijver (Cape Town: David Philip, 2000); The Provocations of Amnesty: Memory, Justice and Impunity, ed. Charles Villa-Vicencio and Erik Doxtader (Cape Town: David Phillip, 2003).
109. For a vital essay on the matter of judgment in moments of transition, see J.B. Bernstein, "Confession and Forgiveness: Hegel's Poetics of Action," Beyond Representation: Philosophy and Poetic Imagination, ed. R. Eldridge (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 34-65.
110. Martin Coetzee, interview with author, Cape Town, October 2001.
111. Respectively, see Hannah Arendt, On Revolution (New York: Viking Press, 1965), 207-13; Adorno, Negative Dialectics, 71.
112. Respectively, see Hannah Arendt, On Revolution (New York: Viking Press, 1965), 207-13; Adorno, Negative Dialectics, 71.
113. The phrase is Heidegger's, one that is developed richly in George Steiner, Grammars of Creation (New Haven, Yale University Press, 2002).
114. Although we have downgraded it to popular reading, Robert Pirsig's fictionalized struggle with McKeon remains one of the very best attempts to think through this problem of quality.
115. Friedrich Nietzsche, "On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense," in The Rhetorical Tradition: Readings from Classical Times to the Present, ed. Patricia Bizzell and Bruce Herzberg (Boston: St. Martin's Press, 1990), 891.
116. From a slim but important volume that abides in the question of how to recover expression from identity, these words are Agamben's. They are set out in the midst of his concern for "whatever being," a form (ethos) that holds within it the "potentiality to not be," a calling to the ethical experience of "one's own amorphousness and in every act one's inactuality." For Agamben, this turn from a world that supplants freedom with the irreparable is not the negation of but an occasion for community. Speculatively, if it affords a capacity to bring "language itself to language," a rhetorical concept may sound the echo of "whatever being." See Giorgio Agamben, The Coming Community, trans. Michael Hardt (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2001), 19.
117. Adorno, Negative Dialectics, 145, 160.