Of stranded costs and stranded hopes: The difficulties of deregulation

Independent Review

Volumn 3, Issue 4, 1999, Pages 485-509

  Mcchesney, Fred S ^a  

^a MIT Sloan School of Management   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0346589430     PISSN: 10861653     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

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