Just desert

Journal of Value Inquiry

Volumn 31, Issue 2, 1997, Pages 221-230

  Nuyen, A T ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF QUEENSLAND   (Australia)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0346442733     PISSN: 00225363     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1004244623913     Document Type: Article

References (29)

1. Joel Feinberg, "Justice and personal desert," in his Doing and Deserving (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1970), pp. 55-87.
2. Ibid., p. 86.
3. This task has been taken by many writers, notably George Sher in Desert (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1987).
4. For a useful discussion of the Presocratic conception of justice, see Gregory Vlastos, "Equality and justice in early Greek cosmologies," in David J. Furley and R.E. Allen (eds.), Studies in Presocratic Philosophy, Vol. I (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1970).
5. Ibid., p. 71.
6. John Hospers, Human Conduct: An Introduction to the Problems of Ethics (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1961), p. 433.
7. Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, trans. David Ross (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980), p. 108 (1129b).
8. Ibid., p. 108 (1129b) and p. 109 (1130a).
9. Ibid., p. 109 (1130a).
10. Ibid., p. 133 (1137b).
11. Feinberg, op. cit., p. 86.
12. Aristotle, op. cit., p. 133 (1137b).
13. For a discussion of the Oedipus case, see my "Straining the quality of mercy," Philosophical Papers, 23 (1994), pp. 61-74. See also Martha Nussbaum, "Equity and mercy," Philosophy and Public Affairs, 22 (1993), pp. 83-125.
14. For a discussion of the Oedipus case, see my "Straining the quality of mercy," Philosophical Papers, 23 (1994), pp. 61-74. See also Martha Nussbaum, "Equity and mercy," Philosophy and Public Affairs, 22 (1993), pp. 83-125.
15. Aristotle, op. cit., p. 133 (1137b).
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid., p. 134 (1138a).
18. See Note 13.
19. Feinberg, op. cit., p. 74.
20. Ibid., p. 86.
21. Ibid., p. 61.
22. Among these philosophers, Jorge Garcia comes closest to the account given here. See his "The rights interpretation of desert," Dialogos, 25.56 (1990), pp. 143-156. Garcia argues that a desert claim is a prima facie right claim: For 5 to deserve T is for 5 to have acquired & prima facie right to T. Thus, if S deserves T then S is entitled to it. However, Garcia admits that he has not tried to prove his view, but only to explain our own intuition about a desert claim.
23. Steven Sverdlik, "The nature of desert," Southern Journal of Philosophy, 21 (1983), pp. 585-594. For James Sterba's conditions, see his "Justice as desert," Social Theory and Practice, 3 (Spring 1974) pp. 101-117.
24. Steven Sverdlik, "The nature of desert," Southern Journal of Philosophy, 21 (1983), pp. 585-594. For James Sterba's conditions, see his "Justice as desert," Social Theory and Practice, 3 (Spring 1974) pp. 101-117.
25. Sverdlik, op. cit., p. 591.
26. Ibid.
27. Feinberg, op. cit., p. 86.
28. See Bruce N. Waller, "Just and nonjust deserts," Southern Journal of Philosophy, 25 (1987), pp. 229-238.
29. Ironically, these are Feinberg's own words. See Joel Feinberg, Harmless Wrongdoing (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), p. 202.