The public hazard of lawyer self-regulation: Learning from Ohio's struggle to reform its disciplinary system

University of Cincinnati Law Review

Volumn 68, Issue 1, 1999, Pages 65-116

  Sahl, John P ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0346408864     PISSN: 00096881     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (424)

1. See ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 268 (J.P. Mayer & Max Lerner eds., George Lawrence trans., Harper & Row 1966) (1838) (positing that lawyers pose the greatest risk to the nation's democracy); ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER 1 (1993) (noting that "there have always been those who questioned the honesty and trustworthiness of lawyers"); see also Nancy Marshall, Jurors and Lawyer Defendants: What Do Jurors Ratify Think About Lawyers, in LAWYERS' PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY UPDATE ch. 4, 3 (ABA ed. 1997) (writing "[i]t is axiomatic that lawyers are unpopular"); Harvey Berkman, Feds, states battle over law on U.S. prosecutors' ethics rules, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 5, 1999, at A5 (describing national controversy and ten-year battle concerning ethical rules for federal prosecutors).
2. See ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 268 (J.P. Mayer & Max Lerner eds., George Lawrence trans., Harper & Row 1966) (1838) (positing that lawyers pose the greatest risk to the nation's democracy); ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER 1 (1993) (noting that "there have always been those who questioned the honesty and trustworthiness of lawyers"); see also Nancy Marshall, Jurors and Lawyer Defendants: What Do Jurors Ratify Think About Lawyers, in LAWYERS' PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY UPDATE ch. 4, 3 (ABA ed. 1997) (writing "[i]t is axiomatic that lawyers are unpopular"); Harvey Berkman, Feds, states battle over law on U.S. prosecutors' ethics rules, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 5, 1999, at A5 (describing national controversy and ten-year battle concerning ethical rules for federal prosecutors).
3. See ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 268 (J.P. Mayer & Max Lerner eds., George Lawrence trans., Harper & Row 1966) (1838) (positing that lawyers pose the greatest risk to the nation's democracy); ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER 1 (1993) (noting that "there have always been those who questioned the honesty and trustworthiness of lawyers"); see also Nancy Marshall, Jurors and Lawyer Defendants: What Do Jurors Ratify Think About Lawyers, in LAWYERS' PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY UPDATE ch. 4, 3 (ABA ed. 1997) (writing "[i]t is axiomatic that lawyers are unpopular"); Harvey Berkman, Feds, states battle over law on U.S. prosecutors' ethics rules, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 5, 1999, at A5 (describing national controversy and ten-year battle concerning ethical rules for federal prosecutors).
4. See ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 268 (J.P. Mayer & Max Lerner eds., George Lawrence trans., Harper & Row 1966) (1838) (positing that lawyers pose the greatest risk to the nation's democracy); ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER 1 (1993) (noting that "there have always been those who questioned the honesty and trustworthiness of lawyers"); see also Nancy Marshall, Jurors and Lawyer Defendants: What Do Jurors Ratify Think About Lawyers, in LAWYERS' PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY UPDATE ch. 4, 3 (ABA ed. 1997) (writing "[i]t is axiomatic that lawyers are unpopular"); Harvey Berkman, Feds, states battle over law on U.S. prosecutors' ethics rules, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 5, 1999, at A5 (describing national controversy and ten-year battle concerning ethical rules for federal prosecutors).
5. See SOL M. LINOWITZ, THE BETRAYED PROFESSION 9 (1994) (observing that in the United States, many of "[o]ur icons" and leaders have been lawyers); KRONMAN, supra note 1 (suggesting that since Watergate, the issue of lawyers' honesty and trustworthiness has "been very conspicuously in the public eye"). See also Vincent R. Johnson, American's Preoccupation with Ethics in Government, 30 ST. MARY'S L.J. 717, 728 (1999) (recognizing that "[l]awyers in American play a key role in influencing the conduct of public affairs.")
6. See SOL M. LINOWITZ, THE BETRAYED PROFESSION 9 (1994) (observing that in the United States, many of "[o]ur icons" and leaders have been lawyers); KRONMAN, supra note 1 (suggesting that since Watergate, the issue of lawyers' honesty and trustworthiness has "been very conspicuously in the public eye"). See also Vincent R. Johnson, American's Preoccupation with Ethics in Government, 30 ST. MARY'S L.J. 717, 728 (1999) (recognizing that "[l]awyers in American play a key role in influencing the conduct of public affairs.")
7. See MARY ANN GLENDON, A NATION UNDER LAWYERS 12 (1994) (reporting that twenty-three of the forty-one United States presidents, a majority of the United States Senate and almost one-half of the United States House of Representatives, as well as thirteen of the eighteen members of President William Jefferson Clinton's first cabinet, have been lawyers). National leaders include President William Jefferson Clinton and Senators Trent Lott and Edward M. Kennedy. As in other states, many of Ohio's leaders are lawyers. They include: Senator Michael DeWine, Senator and former Governor George V. Voinovich, Governor Robert Taft, Lieutenant Governor Maureen O'Connor, many state legislators (such as Senator Eric Fingerhut), and many other public officials. In addition, many of Ohio's corporate and university leaders are legally trained. They include, for example: Joseph Kanfer, Chief Executive Officer of GOJO Industries; Earl Mackey, Vice-Chancellor, External Relations, Ohio Board of Regents; and John W. Garland, President, Central State University.
8. See KRONMAN, supra note 1.
9. See PAUL G. HASKELL, WHY LAWYERS BEHAVE AS THEY DO 85 (1998) (blaming the lack of civility among lawyers on increased competition); LINOWITZ, supra note 2, at 9 (suggesting that "[w]hat has diminished the law in recent decades is not the wider variety of humanity among the practitioners but the loss of humanity in the practice itself"); ROBERT V. WILLS, LAWYERS ARE KILLING AMERICA 9-33 (1999) (criticizing lawyers for the rise in volume and cost of litigation); see also Michael Asimow, Lawyers as Fallen Idols: Whatever Happened to Our Golden Image?, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 8, 1999, at A22 (positing that in the last twenty years lawyers have been "portrayed [in movies] as miserable human beings and either unethical or incompetent at their jobs"); Mike Jones, Lawyer indicted for alleged mishandled funds, TOLEDO BLADE, Oct. 27, 1998, at 16 (detailing lawyer's misappropriation of money from client's estate); Wes Hills, Rob Modic & Jim Bebbington, States Can Get Tough, DAYTON DAILY NEWS, Aug. 13, 1997, at 1B (reporting allegations of judicial misconduct by judges in Ohio and noting that between 500 and 750 complaints are filed annually against Ohio judges); George McGovern, It's high time we reformed America's runaway lawsuit industry, DENVER POST, Mar. 5, 1995, at E-04 [hereinafter McGovern] (declaring that "[i]t's high time we reformed America's runaway lawsuit industry, . . . [because an] increasing minority of [lawyers] are pursuing frivolous, costly and damaging litigation that serves no interest other than their own greed . . . which weakens our economy and lowers the decency level of our society"). For articles illustrating the level of the public's criticism and frustration with lawyer misconduct, see Bruce Cadwallader, Victims of Thieving Lawyers Get Help From Fund, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Jan. 29, 1998, at 10C (revealing that in 1997 the Ohio Supreme Court's Clients' Security Fund paid $187,000 to clients of thirty-six lawyers and that overall there have been disbursements from the fund for the misdeeds of 232 lawyers). See also Thomas Scheffey, Price, Principle and Professionalism, CONN. L. TRIB., June 22, 1998, at 1 (divulging that claims against Connecticut's Client Security Fund are on the increase and that of the outstanding claims, "$10 million stems from 132 claimants who were clients of John A. Carrozzella, the former . . . lawyer and state representative who once co-chaired the Legislature's Judiciary Committee"). But see Diane Solov, Justice Varies by Location: Bar Associations' Discipline Systems Rely on Volunteers, Yield Mixed Results, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, Apr. 12, 1993, at 1A [hereinafter Mixed Results] (disagreeing with much of the criticism about the lawyer discipline process, Ohio Chief Justice Thomas J. Moyer commented: "[w]e believe it [the disciplinary system] is still functioning well").
10. See PAUL G. HASKELL, WHY LAWYERS BEHAVE AS THEY DO 85 (1998) (blaming the lack of civility among lawyers on increased competition); LINOWITZ, supra note 2, at 9 (suggesting that "[w]hat has diminished the law in recent decades is not the wider variety of humanity among the practitioners but the loss of humanity in the practice itself"); ROBERT V. WILLS, LAWYERS ARE KILLING AMERICA 9-33 (1999) (criticizing lawyers for the rise in volume and cost of litigation); see also Michael Asimow, Lawyers as Fallen Idols: Whatever Happened to Our Golden Image?, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 8, 1999, at A22 (positing that in the last twenty years lawyers have been "portrayed [in movies] as miserable human beings and either unethical or incompetent at their jobs"); Mike Jones, Lawyer indicted for alleged mishandled funds, TOLEDO BLADE, Oct. 27, 1998, at 16 (detailing lawyer's misappropriation of money from client's estate); Wes Hills, Rob Modic & Jim Bebbington, States Can Get Tough, DAYTON DAILY NEWS, Aug. 13, 1997, at 1B (reporting allegations of judicial misconduct by judges in Ohio and noting that between 500 and 750 complaints are filed annually against Ohio judges); George McGovern, It's high time we reformed America's runaway lawsuit industry, DENVER POST, Mar. 5, 1995, at E-04 [hereinafter McGovern] (declaring that "[i]t's high time we reformed America's runaway lawsuit industry, . . . [because an] increasing minority of [lawyers] are pursuing frivolous, costly and damaging litigation that serves no interest other than their own greed . . . which weakens our economy and lowers the decency level of our society"). For articles illustrating the level of the public's criticism and frustration with lawyer misconduct, see Bruce Cadwallader, Victims of Thieving Lawyers Get Help From Fund, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Jan. 29, 1998, at 10C (revealing that in 1997 the Ohio Supreme Court's Clients' Security Fund paid $187,000 to clients of thirty-six lawyers and that overall there have been disbursements from the fund for the misdeeds of 232 lawyers). See also Thomas Scheffey, Price, Principle and Professionalism, CONN. L. TRIB., June 22, 1998, at 1 (divulging that claims against Connecticut's Client Security Fund are on the increase and that of the outstanding claims, "$10 million stems from 132 claimants who were clients of John A. Carrozzella, the former . . . lawyer and state representative who once co-chaired the Legislature's Judiciary Committee"). But see Diane Solov, Justice Varies by Location: Bar Associations' Discipline Systems Rely on Volunteers, Yield Mixed Results, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, Apr. 12, 1993, at 1A [hereinafter Mixed Results] (disagreeing with much of the criticism about the lawyer discipline process, Ohio Chief Justice Thomas J. Moyer commented: "[w]e believe it [the disciplinary system] is still functioning well").
11. See PAUL G. HASKELL, WHY LAWYERS BEHAVE AS THEY DO 85 (1998) (blaming the lack of civility among lawyers on increased competition); LINOWITZ, supra note 2, at 9 (suggesting that "[w]hat has diminished the law in recent decades is not the wider variety of humanity among the practitioners but the loss of humanity in the practice itself"); ROBERT V. WILLS, LAWYERS ARE KILLING AMERICA 9-33 (1999) (criticizing lawyers for the rise in volume and cost of litigation); see also Michael Asimow, Lawyers as Fallen Idols: Whatever Happened to Our Golden Image?, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 8, 1999, at A22 (positing that in the last twenty years lawyers have been "portrayed [in movies] as miserable human beings and either unethical or incompetent at their jobs"); Mike Jones, Lawyer indicted for alleged mishandled funds, TOLEDO BLADE, Oct. 27, 1998, at 16 (detailing lawyer's misappropriation of money from client's estate); Wes Hills, Rob Modic & Jim Bebbington, States Can Get Tough, DAYTON DAILY NEWS, Aug. 13, 1997, at 1B (reporting allegations of judicial misconduct by judges in Ohio and noting that between 500 and 750 complaints are filed annually against Ohio judges); George McGovern, It's high time we reformed America's runaway lawsuit industry, DENVER POST, Mar. 5, 1995, at E-04 [hereinafter McGovern] (declaring that "[i]t's high time we reformed America's runaway lawsuit industry, . . . [because an] increasing minority of [lawyers] are pursuing frivolous, costly and damaging litigation that serves no interest other than their own greed . . . which weakens our economy and lowers the decency level of our society"). For articles illustrating the level of the public's criticism and frustration with lawyer misconduct, see Bruce Cadwallader, Victims of Thieving Lawyers Get Help From Fund, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Jan. 29, 1998, at 10C (revealing that in 1997 the Ohio Supreme Court's Clients' Security Fund paid $187,000 to clients of thirty-six lawyers and that overall there have been disbursements from the fund for the misdeeds of 232 lawyers). See also Thomas Scheffey, Price, Principle and Professionalism, CONN. L. TRIB., June 22, 1998, at 1 (divulging that claims against Connecticut's Client Security Fund are on the increase and that of the outstanding claims, "$10 million stems from 132 claimants who were clients of John A. Carrozzella, the former . . . lawyer and state representative who once co-chaired the Legislature's Judiciary Committee"). But see Diane Solov, Justice Varies by Location: Bar Associations' Discipline Systems Rely on Volunteers, Yield Mixed Results, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, Apr. 12, 1993, at 1A [hereinafter Mixed Results] (disagreeing with much of the criticism about the lawyer discipline process, Ohio Chief Justice Thomas J. Moyer commented: "[w]e believe it [the disciplinary system] is still functioning well").
12. See PAUL G. HASKELL, WHY LAWYERS BEHAVE AS THEY DO 85 (1998) (blaming the lack of civility among lawyers on increased competition); LINOWITZ, supra note 2, at 9 (suggesting that "[w]hat has diminished the law in recent decades is not the wider variety of humanity among the practitioners but the loss of humanity in the practice itself"); ROBERT V. WILLS, LAWYERS ARE KILLING AMERICA 9-33 (1999) (criticizing lawyers for the rise in volume and cost of litigation); see also Michael Asimow, Lawyers as Fallen Idols: Whatever Happened to Our Golden Image?, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 8, 1999, at A22 (positing that in the last twenty years lawyers have been "portrayed [in movies] as miserable human beings and either unethical or incompetent at their jobs"); Mike Jones, Lawyer indicted for alleged mishandled funds, TOLEDO BLADE, Oct. 27, 1998, at 16 (detailing lawyer's misappropriation of money from client's estate); Wes Hills, Rob Modic & Jim Bebbington, States Can Get Tough, DAYTON DAILY NEWS, Aug. 13, 1997, at 1B (reporting allegations of judicial misconduct by judges in Ohio and noting that between 500 and 750 complaints are filed annually against Ohio judges); George McGovern, It's high time we reformed America's runaway lawsuit industry, DENVER POST, Mar. 5, 1995, at E-04 [hereinafter McGovern] (declaring that "[i]t's high time we reformed America's runaway lawsuit industry, . . . [because an] increasing minority of [lawyers] are pursuing frivolous, costly and damaging litigation that serves no interest other than their own greed . . . which weakens our economy and lowers the decency level of our society"). For articles illustrating the level of the public's criticism and frustration with lawyer misconduct, see Bruce Cadwallader, Victims of Thieving Lawyers Get Help From Fund, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Jan. 29, 1998, at 10C (revealing that in 1997 the Ohio Supreme Court's Clients' Security Fund paid $187,000 to clients of thirty-six lawyers and that overall there have been disbursements from the fund for the misdeeds of 232 lawyers). See also Thomas Scheffey, Price, Principle and Professionalism, CONN. L. TRIB., June 22, 1998, at 1 (divulging that claims against Connecticut's Client Security Fund are on the increase and that of the outstanding claims, "$10 million stems from 132 claimants who were clients of John A. Carrozzella, the former . . . lawyer and state representative who once co-chaired the Legislature's Judiciary Committee"). But see Diane Solov, Justice Varies by Location: Bar Associations' Discipline Systems Rely on Volunteers, Yield Mixed Results, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, Apr. 12, 1993, at 1A [hereinafter Mixed Results] (disagreeing with much of the criticism about the lawyer discipline process, Ohio Chief Justice Thomas J. Moyer commented: "[w]e believe it [the disciplinary system] is still functioning well").
13. See PAUL G. HASKELL, WHY LAWYERS BEHAVE AS THEY DO 85 (1998) (blaming the lack of civility among lawyers on increased competition); LINOWITZ, supra note 2, at 9 (suggesting that "[w]hat has diminished the law in recent decades is not the wider variety of humanity among the practitioners but the loss of humanity in the practice itself"); ROBERT V. WILLS, LAWYERS ARE KILLING AMERICA 9-33 (1999) (criticizing lawyers for the rise in volume and cost of litigation); see also Michael Asimow, Lawyers as Fallen Idols: Whatever Happened to Our Golden Image?, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 8, 1999, at A22 (positing that in the last twenty years lawyers have been "portrayed [in movies] as miserable human beings and either unethical or incompetent at their jobs"); Mike Jones, Lawyer indicted for alleged mishandled funds, TOLEDO BLADE, Oct. 27, 1998, at 16 (detailing lawyer's misappropriation of money from client's estate); Wes Hills, Rob Modic & Jim Bebbington, States Can Get Tough, DAYTON DAILY NEWS, Aug. 13, 1997, at 1B (reporting allegations of judicial misconduct by judges in Ohio and noting that between 500 and 750 complaints are filed annually against Ohio judges); George McGovern, It's high time we reformed America's runaway lawsuit industry, DENVER POST, Mar. 5, 1995, at E-04 [hereinafter McGovern] (declaring that "[i]t's high time we reformed America's runaway lawsuit industry, . . . [because an] increasing minority of [lawyers] are pursuing frivolous, costly and damaging litigation that serves no interest other than their own greed . . . which weakens our economy and lowers the decency level of our society"). For articles illustrating the level of the public's criticism and frustration with lawyer misconduct, see Bruce Cadwallader, Victims of Thieving Lawyers Get Help From Fund, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Jan. 29, 1998, at 10C (revealing that in 1997 the Ohio Supreme Court's Clients' Security Fund paid $187,000 to clients of thirty-six lawyers and that overall there have been disbursements from the fund for the misdeeds of 232 lawyers). See also Thomas Scheffey, Price, Principle and Professionalism, CONN. L. TRIB., June 22, 1998, at 1 (divulging that claims against Connecticut's Client Security Fund are on the increase and that of the outstanding claims, "$10 million stems from 132 claimants who were clients of John A. Carrozzella, the former . . . lawyer and state representative who once co-chaired the Legislature's Judiciary Committee"). But see Diane Solov, Justice Varies by Location: Bar Associations' Discipline Systems Rely on Volunteers, Yield Mixed Results, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, Apr. 12, 1993, at 1A [hereinafter Mixed Results] (disagreeing with much of the criticism about the lawyer discipline process, Ohio Chief Justice Thomas J. Moyer commented: "[w]e believe it [the disciplinary system] is still functioning well").
14. See PAUL G. HASKELL, WHY LAWYERS BEHAVE AS THEY DO 85 (1998) (blaming the lack of civility among lawyers on increased competition); LINOWITZ, supra note 2, at 9 (suggesting that "[w]hat has diminished the law in recent decades is not the wider variety of humanity among the practitioners but the loss of humanity in the practice itself"); ROBERT V. WILLS, LAWYERS ARE KILLING AMERICA 9-33 (1999) (criticizing lawyers for the rise in volume and cost of litigation); see also Michael Asimow, Lawyers as Fallen Idols: Whatever Happened to Our Golden Image?, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 8, 1999, at A22 (positing that in the last twenty years lawyers have been "portrayed [in movies] as miserable human beings and either unethical or incompetent at their jobs"); Mike Jones, Lawyer indicted for alleged mishandled funds, TOLEDO BLADE, Oct. 27, 1998, at 16 (detailing lawyer's misappropriation of money from client's estate); Wes Hills, Rob Modic & Jim Bebbington, States Can Get Tough, DAYTON DAILY NEWS, Aug. 13, 1997, at 1B (reporting allegations of judicial misconduct by judges in Ohio and noting that between 500 and 750 complaints are filed annually against Ohio judges); George McGovern, It's high time we reformed America's runaway lawsuit industry, DENVER POST, Mar. 5, 1995, at E-04 [hereinafter McGovern] (declaring that "[i]t's high time we reformed America's runaway lawsuit industry, . . . [because an] increasing minority of [lawyers] are pursuing frivolous, costly and damaging litigation that serves no interest other than their own greed . . . which weakens our economy and lowers the decency level of our society"). For articles illustrating the level of the public's criticism and frustration with lawyer misconduct, see Bruce Cadwallader, Victims of Thieving Lawyers Get Help From Fund, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Jan. 29, 1998, at 10C (revealing that in 1997 the Ohio Supreme Court's Clients' Security Fund paid $187,000 to clients of thirty-six lawyers and that overall there have been disbursements from the fund for the misdeeds of 232 lawyers). See also Thomas Scheffey, Price, Principle and Professionalism, CONN. L. TRIB., June 22, 1998, at 1 (divulging that claims against Connecticut's Client Security Fund are on the increase and that of the outstanding claims, "$10 million stems from 132 claimants who were clients of John A. Carrozzella, the former . . . lawyer and state representative who once co-chaired the Legislature's Judiciary Committee"). But see Diane Solov, Justice Varies by Location: Bar Associations' Discipline Systems Rely on Volunteers, Yield Mixed Results, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, Apr. 12, 1993, at 1A [hereinafter Mixed Results] (disagreeing with much of the criticism about the lawyer discipline process, Ohio Chief Justice Thomas J. Moyer commented: "[w]e believe it [the disciplinary system] is still functioning well").
15. See PAUL G. HASKELL, WHY LAWYERS BEHAVE AS THEY DO 85 (1998) (blaming the lack of civility among lawyers on increased competition); LINOWITZ, supra note 2, at 9 (suggesting that "[w]hat has diminished the law in recent decades is not the wider variety of humanity among the practitioners but the loss of humanity in the practice itself"); ROBERT V. WILLS, LAWYERS ARE KILLING AMERICA 9-33 (1999) (criticizing lawyers for the rise in volume and cost of litigation); see also Michael Asimow, Lawyers as Fallen Idols: Whatever Happened to Our Golden Image?, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 8, 1999, at A22 (positing that in the last twenty years lawyers have been "portrayed [in movies] as miserable human beings and either unethical or incompetent at their jobs"); Mike Jones, Lawyer indicted for alleged mishandled funds, TOLEDO BLADE, Oct. 27, 1998, at 16 (detailing lawyer's misappropriation of money from client's estate); Wes Hills, Rob Modic & Jim Bebbington, States Can Get Tough, DAYTON DAILY NEWS, Aug. 13, 1997, at 1B (reporting allegations of judicial misconduct by judges in Ohio and noting that between 500 and 750 complaints are filed annually against Ohio judges); George McGovern, It's high time we reformed America's runaway lawsuit industry, DENVER POST, Mar. 5, 1995, at E-04 [hereinafter McGovern] (declaring that "[i]t's high time we reformed America's runaway lawsuit industry, . . . [because an] increasing minority of [lawyers] are pursuing frivolous, costly and damaging litigation that serves no interest other than their own greed . . . which weakens our economy and lowers the decency level of our society"). For articles illustrating the level of the public's criticism and frustration with lawyer misconduct, see Bruce Cadwallader, Victims of Thieving Lawyers Get Help From Fund, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Jan. 29, 1998, at 10C (revealing that in 1997 the Ohio Supreme Court's Clients' Security Fund paid $187,000 to clients of thirty-six lawyers and that overall there have been disbursements from the fund for the misdeeds of 232 lawyers). See also Thomas Scheffey, Price, Principle and Professionalism, CONN. L. TRIB., June 22, 1998, at 1 (divulging that claims against Connecticut's Client Security Fund are on the increase and that of the outstanding claims, "$10 million stems from 132 claimants who were clients of John A. Carrozzella, the former . . . lawyer and state representative who once co-chaired the Legislature's Judiciary Committee"). But see Diane Solov, Justice Varies by Location: Bar Associations' Discipline Systems Rely on Volunteers, Yield Mixed Results, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, Apr. 12, 1993, at 1A [hereinafter Mixed Results] (disagreeing with much of the criticism about the lawyer discipline process, Ohio Chief Justice Thomas J. Moyer commented: "[w]e believe it [the disciplinary system] is still functioning well").
16. See PAUL G. HASKELL, WHY LAWYERS BEHAVE AS THEY DO 85 (1998) (blaming the lack of civility among lawyers on increased competition); LINOWITZ, supra note 2, at 9 (suggesting that "[w]hat has diminished the law in recent decades is not the wider variety of humanity among the practitioners but the loss of humanity in the practice itself"); ROBERT V. WILLS, LAWYERS ARE KILLING AMERICA 9-33 (1999) (criticizing lawyers for the rise in volume and cost of litigation); see also Michael Asimow, Lawyers as Fallen Idols: Whatever Happened to Our Golden Image?, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 8, 1999, at A22 (positing that in the last twenty years lawyers have been "portrayed [in movies] as miserable human beings and either unethical or incompetent at their jobs"); Mike Jones, Lawyer indicted for alleged mishandled funds, TOLEDO BLADE, Oct. 27, 1998, at 16 (detailing lawyer's misappropriation of money from client's estate); Wes Hills, Rob Modic & Jim Bebbington, States Can Get Tough, DAYTON DAILY NEWS, Aug. 13, 1997, at 1B (reporting allegations of judicial misconduct by judges in Ohio and noting that between 500 and 750 complaints are filed annually against Ohio judges); George McGovern, It's high time we reformed America's runaway lawsuit industry, DENVER POST, Mar. 5, 1995, at E-04 [hereinafter McGovern] (declaring that "[i]t's high time we reformed America's runaway lawsuit industry, . . . [because an] increasing minority of [lawyers] are pursuing frivolous, costly and damaging litigation that serves no interest other than their own greed . . . which weakens our economy and lowers the decency level of our society"). For articles illustrating the level of the public's criticism and frustration with lawyer misconduct, see Bruce Cadwallader, Victims of Thieving Lawyers Get Help From Fund, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Jan. 29, 1998, at 10C (revealing that in 1997 the Ohio Supreme Court's Clients' Security Fund paid $187,000 to clients of thirty-six lawyers and that overall there have been disbursements from the fund for the misdeeds of 232 lawyers). See also Thomas Scheffey, Price, Principle and Professionalism, CONN. L. TRIB., June 22, 1998, at 1 (divulging that claims against Connecticut's Client Security Fund are on the increase and that of the outstanding claims, "$10 million stems from 132 claimants who were clients of John A. Carrozzella, the former . . . lawyer and state representative who once co-chaired the Legislature's Judiciary Committee"). But see Diane Solov, Justice Varies by Location: Bar Associations' Discipline Systems Rely on Volunteers, Yield Mixed Results, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, Apr. 12, 1993, at 1A [hereinafter Mixed Results] (disagreeing with much of the criticism about the lawyer discipline process, Ohio Chief Justice Thomas J. Moyer commented: "[w]e believe it [the disciplinary system] is still functioning well").
17. See PAUL G. HASKELL, WHY LAWYERS BEHAVE AS THEY DO 85 (1998) (blaming the lack of civility among lawyers on increased competition); LINOWITZ, supra note 2, at 9 (suggesting that "[w]hat has diminished the law in recent decades is not the wider variety of humanity among the practitioners but the loss of humanity in the practice itself"); ROBERT V. WILLS, LAWYERS ARE KILLING AMERICA 9-33 (1999) (criticizing lawyers for the rise in volume and cost of litigation); see also Michael Asimow, Lawyers as Fallen Idols: Whatever Happened to Our Golden Image?, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 8, 1999, at A22 (positing that in the last twenty years lawyers have been "portrayed [in movies] as miserable human beings and either unethical or incompetent at their jobs"); Mike Jones, Lawyer indicted for alleged mishandled funds, TOLEDO BLADE, Oct. 27, 1998, at 16 (detailing lawyer's misappropriation of money from client's estate); Wes Hills, Rob Modic & Jim Bebbington, States Can Get Tough, DAYTON DAILY NEWS, Aug. 13, 1997, at 1B (reporting allegations of judicial misconduct by judges in Ohio and noting that between 500 and 750 complaints are filed annually against Ohio judges); George McGovern, It's high time we reformed America's runaway lawsuit industry, DENVER POST, Mar. 5, 1995, at E-04 [hereinafter McGovern] (declaring that "[i]t's high time we reformed America's runaway lawsuit industry, . . . [because an] increasing minority of [lawyers] are pursuing frivolous, costly and damaging litigation that serves no interest other than their own greed . . . which weakens our economy and lowers the decency level of our society"). For articles illustrating the level of the public's criticism and frustration with lawyer misconduct, see Bruce Cadwallader, Victims of Thieving Lawyers Get Help From Fund, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Jan. 29, 1998, at 10C (revealing that in 1997 the Ohio Supreme Court's Clients' Security Fund paid $187,000 to clients of thirty-six lawyers and that overall there have been disbursements from the fund for the misdeeds of 232 lawyers). See also Thomas Scheffey, Price, Principle and Professionalism, CONN. L. TRIB., June 22, 1998, at 1 (divulging that claims against Connecticut's Client Security Fund are on the increase and that of the outstanding claims, "$10 million stems from 132 claimants who were clients of John A. Carrozzella, the former . . . lawyer and state representative who once co-chaired the Legislature's Judiciary Committee"). But see Diane Solov, Justice Varies by Location: Bar Associations' Discipline Systems Rely on Volunteers, Yield Mixed Results, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, Apr. 12, 1993, at 1A [hereinafter Mixed Results] (disagreeing with much of the criticism about the lawyer discipline process, Ohio Chief Justice Thomas J. Moyer commented: "[w]e believe it [the disciplinary system] is still functioning well").
18. See 6 Metro. Corp. Couns. 37 (Jan. 1998) ("[d]isciplinary cases are on the rise and, . . . more respondents need representation"); Ted Gest, A Move to Ethics: More Emphasis on Teaching Right from Wrong, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Mar. 18, 1996, at 79; see also Ronald J. Hansen, Sanctions Against Lawyers Increase, WASH. TIMES, Feb. 8, 1998, at A1 (reporting that disbarments and other sanctions in the District of Columbia and Maryland have more than tripled in last decade); Asimow, supra note 5 (reporting that the high or very high honesty and ethics rating given to lawyers in the 1970s and early 80s fell to sixteen percent in 1993-95). See generally William Glaberson, A Law School Where Jesus Is the Ultimate Case Study, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25, 1998, at A1 (disclosing that public opinion polls traditionally rank the legal profession low on the integrity scale and revealing the "Christian approach" to the study of law used by Pepperdine University School of Law to combat amorality in the American legal system). Ohio has also experienced an increase in grievances against lawyers. Telephone Interview with Jonathan Coughlan, Ohio Disciplinary Counsel (Nov. 17, 1998) [hereinafter Coughlan Interview] (reporting an annual increase in grievances against lawyers in Ohio as of the second week in November 1998). See also Mike Jones, Increases In Lawyer Grievances Alarming, TOLEDO BLADE, Oct. 25, 1998, at 13-14 (Board Secretary, Jonathan Marshall, reporting that "grievances . . . have risen to between 7,500 and 8,000 annually"); ABA Center for Professional Responsibility Standing Comm. on Professional Discipline, Survey on Lawyer Discipline Systems: 1996 Data, Chart I (1996) (3,400 Ohio complaints received); ABA Center for Professional Responsibility Standing Comm. on Professional Discipline, Survey on Lawyer Discipline Systems: 1995 Data, Chart I (1995) (3,244 Ohio complaints received); ABA Center for Professional Responsibility Standing Comm. on Professional Discipline, Survey on Lawyer Discipline Systems: 1993-94 Data, Chart I (1993-1994) (3,054 Ohio complaints received in 1994 and 2,597 Ohio complaints received in 1993). See generally Jack A. Guttenberg, The Ohio Attorney Disciplinary Process-1982 to 1991: An Empirical Study, Critique, and Recommendations for Change, 62 U. CIN. L. REV. 947, 988 (1994) (positing that the large "number of grievances in Ohio reflects considerable dissatisfaction with the delivery of legal services").
19. See 6 Metro. Corp. Couns. 37 (Jan. 1998) ("[d]isciplinary cases are on the rise and, . . . more respondents need representation"); Ted Gest, A Move to Ethics: More Emphasis on Teaching Right from Wrong, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Mar. 18, 1996, at 79; see also Ronald J. Hansen, Sanctions Against Lawyers Increase, WASH. TIMES, Feb. 8, 1998, at A1 (reporting that disbarments and other sanctions in the District of Columbia and Maryland have more than tripled in last decade); Asimow, supra note 5 (reporting that the high or very high honesty and ethics rating given to lawyers in the 1970s and early 80s fell to sixteen percent in 1993-95). See generally William Glaberson, A Law School Where Jesus Is the Ultimate Case Study, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25, 1998, at A1 (disclosing that public opinion polls traditionally rank the legal profession low on the integrity scale and revealing the "Christian approach" to the study of law used by Pepperdine University School of Law to combat amorality in the American legal system). Ohio has also experienced an increase in grievances against lawyers. Telephone Interview with Jonathan Coughlan, Ohio Disciplinary Counsel (Nov. 17, 1998) [hereinafter Coughlan Interview] (reporting an annual increase in grievances against lawyers in Ohio as of the second week in November 1998). See also Mike Jones, Increases In Lawyer Grievances Alarming, TOLEDO BLADE, Oct. 25, 1998, at 13-14 (Board Secretary, Jonathan Marshall, reporting that "grievances . . . have risen to between 7,500 and 8,000 annually"); ABA Center for Professional Responsibility Standing Comm. on Professional Discipline, Survey on Lawyer Discipline Systems: 1996 Data, Chart I (1996) (3,400 Ohio complaints received); ABA Center for Professional Responsibility Standing Comm. on Professional Discipline, Survey on Lawyer Discipline Systems: 1995 Data, Chart I (1995) (3,244 Ohio complaints received); ABA Center for Professional Responsibility Standing Comm. on Professional Discipline, Survey on Lawyer Discipline Systems: 1993-94 Data, Chart I (1993-1994) (3,054 Ohio complaints received in 1994 and 2,597 Ohio complaints received in 1993). See generally Jack A. Guttenberg, The Ohio Attorney Disciplinary Process-1982 to 1991: An Empirical Study, Critique, and Recommendations for Change, 62 U. CIN. L. REV. 947, 988 (1994) (positing that the large "number of grievances in Ohio reflects considerable dissatisfaction with the delivery of legal services").
20. See 6 Metro. Corp. Couns. 37 (Jan. 1998) ("[d]isciplinary cases are on the rise and, . . . more respondents need representation"); Ted Gest, A Move to Ethics: More Emphasis on Teaching Right from Wrong, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Mar. 18, 1996, at 79; see also Ronald J. Hansen, Sanctions Against Lawyers Increase, WASH. TIMES, Feb. 8, 1998, at A1 (reporting that disbarments and other sanctions in the District of Columbia and Maryland have more than tripled in last decade); Asimow, supra note 5 (reporting that the high or very high honesty and ethics rating given to lawyers in the 1970s and early 80s fell to sixteen percent in 1993-95). See generally William Glaberson, A Law School Where Jesus Is the Ultimate Case Study, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25, 1998, at A1 (disclosing that public opinion polls traditionally rank the legal profession low on the integrity scale and revealing the "Christian approach" to the study of law used by Pepperdine University School of Law to combat amorality in the American legal system). Ohio has also experienced an increase in grievances against lawyers. Telephone Interview with Jonathan Coughlan, Ohio Disciplinary Counsel (Nov. 17, 1998) [hereinafter Coughlan Interview] (reporting an annual increase in grievances against lawyers in Ohio as of the second week in November 1998). See also Mike Jones, Increases In Lawyer Grievances Alarming, TOLEDO BLADE, Oct. 25, 1998, at 13-14 (Board Secretary, Jonathan Marshall, reporting that "grievances . . . have risen to between 7,500 and 8,000 annually"); ABA Center for Professional Responsibility Standing Comm. on Professional Discipline, Survey on Lawyer Discipline Systems: 1996 Data, Chart I (1996) (3,400 Ohio complaints received); ABA Center for Professional Responsibility Standing Comm. on Professional Discipline, Survey on Lawyer Discipline Systems: 1995 Data, Chart I (1995) (3,244 Ohio complaints received); ABA Center for Professional Responsibility Standing Comm. on Professional Discipline, Survey on Lawyer Discipline Systems: 1993-94 Data, Chart I (1993-1994) (3,054 Ohio complaints received in 1994 and 2,597 Ohio complaints received in 1993). See generally Jack A. Guttenberg, The Ohio Attorney Disciplinary Process-1982 to 1991: An Empirical Study, Critique, and Recommendations for Change, 62 U. CIN. L. REV. 947, 988 (1994) (positing that the large "number of grievances in Ohio reflects considerable dissatisfaction with the delivery of legal services").
21. See 6 Metro. Corp. Couns. 37 (Jan. 1998) ("[d]isciplinary cases are on the rise and, . . . more respondents need representation"); Ted Gest, A Move to Ethics: More Emphasis on Teaching Right from Wrong, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Mar. 18, 1996, at 79; see also Ronald J. Hansen, Sanctions Against Lawyers Increase, WASH. TIMES, Feb. 8, 1998, at A1 (reporting that disbarments and other sanctions in the District of Columbia and Maryland have more than tripled in last decade); Asimow, supra note 5 (reporting that the high or very high honesty and ethics rating given to lawyers in the 1970s and early 80s fell to sixteen percent in 1993-95). See generally William Glaberson, A Law School Where Jesus Is the Ultimate Case Study, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25, 1998, at A1 (disclosing that public opinion polls traditionally rank the legal profession low on the integrity scale and revealing the "Christian approach" to the study of law used by Pepperdine University School of Law to combat amorality in the American legal system). Ohio has also experienced an increase in grievances against lawyers. Telephone Interview with Jonathan Coughlan, Ohio Disciplinary Counsel (Nov. 17, 1998) [hereinafter Coughlan Interview] (reporting an annual increase in grievances against lawyers in Ohio as of the second week in November 1998). See also Mike Jones, Increases In Lawyer Grievances Alarming, TOLEDO BLADE, Oct. 25, 1998, at 13-14 (Board Secretary, Jonathan Marshall, reporting that "grievances . . . have risen to between 7,500 and 8,000 annually"); ABA Center for Professional Responsibility Standing Comm. on Professional Discipline, Survey on Lawyer Discipline Systems: 1996 Data, Chart I (1996) (3,400 Ohio complaints received); ABA Center for Professional Responsibility Standing Comm. on Professional Discipline, Survey on Lawyer Discipline Systems: 1995 Data, Chart I (1995) (3,244 Ohio complaints received); ABA Center for Professional Responsibility Standing Comm. on Professional Discipline, Survey on Lawyer Discipline Systems: 1993-94 Data, Chart I (1993-1994) (3,054 Ohio complaints received in 1994 and 2,597 Ohio complaints received in 1993). See generally Jack A. Guttenberg, The Ohio Attorney Disciplinary Process-1982 to 1991: An Empirical Study, Critique, and Recommendations for Change, 62 U. CIN. L. REV. 947, 988 (1994) (positing that the large "number of grievances in Ohio reflects considerable dissatisfaction with the delivery of legal services").
22. See 6 Metro. Corp. Couns. 37 (Jan. 1998) ("[d]isciplinary cases are on the rise and, . . . more respondents need representation"); Ted Gest, A Move to Ethics: More Emphasis on Teaching Right from Wrong, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Mar. 18, 1996, at 79; see also Ronald J. Hansen, Sanctions Against Lawyers Increase, WASH. TIMES, Feb. 8, 1998, at A1 (reporting that disbarments and other sanctions in the District of Columbia and Maryland have more than tripled in last decade); Asimow, supra note 5 (reporting that the high or very high honesty and ethics rating given to lawyers in the 1970s and early 80s fell to sixteen percent in 1993-95). See generally William Glaberson, A Law School Where Jesus Is the Ultimate Case Study, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25, 1998, at A1 (disclosing that public opinion polls traditionally rank the legal profession low on the integrity scale and revealing the "Christian approach" to the study of law used by Pepperdine University School of Law to combat amorality in the American legal system). Ohio has also experienced an increase in grievances against lawyers. Telephone Interview with Jonathan Coughlan, Ohio Disciplinary Counsel (Nov. 17, 1998) [hereinafter Coughlan Interview] (reporting an annual increase in grievances against lawyers in Ohio as of the second week in November 1998). See also Mike Jones, Increases In Lawyer Grievances Alarming, TOLEDO BLADE, Oct. 25, 1998, at 13-14 (Board Secretary, Jonathan Marshall, reporting that "grievances . . . have risen to between 7,500 and 8,000 annually"); ABA Center for Professional Responsibility Standing Comm. on Professional Discipline, Survey on Lawyer Discipline Systems: 1996 Data, Chart I (1996) (3,400 Ohio complaints received); ABA Center for Professional Responsibility Standing Comm. on Professional Discipline, Survey on Lawyer Discipline Systems: 1995 Data, Chart I (1995) (3,244 Ohio complaints received); ABA Center for Professional Responsibility Standing Comm. on Professional Discipline, Survey on Lawyer Discipline Systems: 1993-94 Data, Chart I (1993-1994) (3,054 Ohio complaints received in 1994 and 2,597 Ohio complaints received in 1993). See generally Jack A. Guttenberg, The Ohio Attorney Disciplinary Process-1982 to 1991: An Empirical Study, Critique, and Recommendations for Change, 62 U. CIN. L. REV. 947, 988 (1994) (positing that the large "number of grievances in Ohio reflects considerable dissatisfaction with the delivery of legal services").
23. President Clinton settled the sexual harassment suit by Paula Corbin Jones on November 13, 1998 for $850,000. See David Stout, from A Modest Start to a Threat to the Presidency, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 1998, at 34. Other lawyers associated with President Clinton, including Hilary Rodham Clinton and Webster L. Hubbell, have been accused of or convicted of misconduct and the office of independent counsel was examined in response to complaints of misconduct. See Don Van Natta, Jr., Starr Rehearsing Speech That Goes Beyond Lewinsky, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 1998, at A1 (listing some of the investigations). Independent Counsel Kenneth Strr laid out eleven possible grounds for impeachment in a 445-page report to the United States House of Representatives. Associated Press, Reluctance reigns as impeachment hearings kick off, NEW HAVEN REGISTER, Nov. 5, 1998, at A17. The House Judiciary Committee increased the number of grounds to fifteen, adding the offenses of perjury, obstruction of justice, witness tampering, and abuse of authority. President Clinton admitted to having "inappropriate sexual contact" with a White House intern. See id. He denied giving false testimony, counseling the intern to misrepresent their relationship, helping her obtain a job to insure her silence, and trying to influence the grand jury testimony of his secretary. See id. Although the United States Senate rejected impeaching and removing the president, many senators thought the president had acted wrongly. See Alison Mitchell, In Search of a Rebuke, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 1999, at A1 (reporting that many Democrats do not want their votes against an impeachment conviction to signal that they condone President Clinton's lies to the nation about his relationship with an intern); see also Two Words, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 8, 1999, at A20; Joseph I. Lieberman, Editorial, The One Reasonable Solution, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 1998, § 4, at 9 (Democratic leader in U.S. Senate proclaiming that the President's "deliberative efforts to deceive the American people and our judicial system have had a serious and adverse impact on the nation"). See generally George J. Mitchell, Editorial, In Danger of Discrediting the House, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 1998, at A35 (noting "President Clinton behaved wrongly, irresponsibly and foolishly").
24. President Clinton settled the sexual harassment suit by Paula Corbin Jones on November 13, 1998 for $850,000. See David Stout, from A Modest Start to a Threat to the Presidency, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 1998, at 34. Other lawyers associated with President Clinton, including Hilary Rodham Clinton and Webster L. Hubbell, have been accused of or convicted of misconduct and the office of independent counsel was examined in response to complaints of misconduct. See Don Van Natta, Jr., Starr Rehearsing Speech That Goes Beyond Lewinsky, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 1998, at A1 (listing some of the investigations). Independent Counsel Kenneth Strr laid out eleven possible grounds for impeachment in a 445-page report to the United States House of Representatives. Associated Press, Reluctance reigns as impeachment hearings kick off, NEW HAVEN REGISTER, Nov. 5, 1998, at A17. The House Judiciary Committee increased the number of grounds to fifteen, adding the offenses of perjury, obstruction of justice, witness tampering, and abuse of authority. President Clinton admitted to having "inappropriate sexual contact" with a White House intern. See id. He denied giving false testimony, counseling the intern to misrepresent their relationship, helping her obtain a job to insure her silence, and trying to influence the grand jury testimony of his secretary. See id. Although the United States Senate rejected impeaching and removing the president, many senators thought the president had acted wrongly. See Alison Mitchell, In Search of a Rebuke, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 1999, at A1 (reporting that many Democrats do not want their votes against an impeachment conviction to signal that they condone President Clinton's lies to the nation about his relationship with an intern); see also Two Words, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 8, 1999, at A20; Joseph I. Lieberman, Editorial, The One Reasonable Solution, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 1998, § 4, at 9 (Democratic leader in U.S. Senate proclaiming that the President's "deliberative efforts to deceive the American people and our judicial system have had a serious and adverse impact on the nation"). See generally George J. Mitchell, Editorial, In Danger of Discrediting the House, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 1998, at A35 (noting "President Clinton behaved wrongly, irresponsibly and foolishly").
25. President Clinton settled the sexual harassment suit by Paula Corbin Jones on November 13, 1998 for $850,000. See David Stout, from A Modest Start to a Threat to the Presidency, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 1998, at 34. Other lawyers associated with President Clinton, including Hilary Rodham Clinton and Webster L. Hubbell, have been accused of or convicted of misconduct and the office of independent counsel was examined in response to complaints of misconduct. See Don Van Natta, Jr., Starr Rehearsing Speech That Goes Beyond Lewinsky, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 1998, at A1 (listing some of the investigations). Independent Counsel Kenneth Strr laid out eleven possible grounds for impeachment in a 445-page report to the United States House of Representatives. Associated Press, Reluctance reigns as impeachment hearings kick off, NEW HAVEN REGISTER, Nov. 5, 1998, at A17. The House Judiciary Committee increased the number of grounds to fifteen, adding the offenses of perjury, obstruction of justice, witness tampering, and abuse of authority. President Clinton admitted to having "inappropriate sexual contact" with a White House intern. See id. He denied giving false testimony, counseling the intern to misrepresent their relationship, helping her obtain a job to insure her silence, and trying to influence the grand jury testimony of his secretary. See id. Although the United States Senate rejected impeaching and removing the president, many senators thought the president had acted wrongly. See Alison Mitchell, In Search of a Rebuke, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 1999, at A1 (reporting that many Democrats do not want their votes against an impeachment conviction to signal that they condone President Clinton's lies to the nation about his relationship with an intern); see also Two Words, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 8, 1999, at A20; Joseph I. Lieberman, Editorial, The One Reasonable Solution, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 1998, § 4, at 9 (Democratic leader in U.S. Senate proclaiming that the President's "deliberative efforts to deceive the American people and our judicial system have had a serious and adverse impact on the nation"). See generally George J. Mitchell, Editorial, In Danger of Discrediting the House, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 1998, at A35 (noting "President Clinton behaved wrongly, irresponsibly and foolishly").
26. President Clinton settled the sexual harassment suit by Paula Corbin Jones on November 13, 1998 for $850,000. See David Stout, from A Modest Start to a Threat to the Presidency, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 1998, at 34. Other lawyers associated with President Clinton, including Hilary Rodham Clinton and Webster L. Hubbell, have been accused of or convicted of misconduct and the office of independent counsel was examined in response to complaints of misconduct. See Don Van Natta, Jr., Starr Rehearsing Speech That Goes Beyond Lewinsky, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 1998, at A1 (listing some of the investigations). Independent Counsel Kenneth Strr laid out eleven possible grounds for impeachment in a 445-page report to the United States House of Representatives. Associated Press, Reluctance reigns as impeachment hearings kick off, NEW HAVEN REGISTER, Nov. 5, 1998, at A17. The House Judiciary Committee increased the number of grounds to fifteen, adding the offenses of perjury, obstruction of justice, witness tampering, and abuse of authority. President Clinton admitted to having "inappropriate sexual contact" with a White House intern. See id. He denied giving false testimony, counseling the intern to misrepresent their relationship, helping her obtain a job to insure her silence, and trying to influence the grand jury testimony of his secretary. See id. Although the United States Senate rejected impeaching and removing the president, many senators thought the president had acted wrongly. See Alison Mitchell, In Search of a Rebuke, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 1999, at A1 (reporting that many Democrats do not want their votes against an impeachment conviction to signal that they condone President Clinton's lies to the nation about his relationship with an intern); see also Two Words, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 8, 1999, at A20; Joseph I. Lieberman, Editorial, The One Reasonable Solution, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 1998, § 4, at 9 (Democratic leader in U.S. Senate proclaiming that the President's "deliberative efforts to deceive the American people and our judicial system have had a serious and adverse impact on the nation"). See generally George J. Mitchell, Editorial, In Danger of Discrediting the House, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 1998, at A35 (noting "President Clinton behaved wrongly, irresponsibly and foolishly").
27. President Clinton settled the sexual harassment suit by Paula Corbin Jones on November 13, 1998 for $850,000. See David Stout, from A Modest Start to a Threat to the Presidency, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 1998, at 34. Other lawyers associated with President Clinton, including Hilary Rodham Clinton and Webster L. Hubbell, have been accused of or convicted of misconduct and the office of independent counsel was examined in response to complaints of misconduct. See Don Van Natta, Jr., Starr Rehearsing Speech That Goes Beyond Lewinsky, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 1998, at A1 (listing some of the investigations). Independent Counsel Kenneth Strr laid out eleven possible grounds for impeachment in a 445-page report to the United States House of Representatives. Associated Press, Reluctance reigns as impeachment hearings kick off, NEW HAVEN REGISTER, Nov. 5, 1998, at A17. The House Judiciary Committee increased the number of grounds to fifteen, adding the offenses of perjury, obstruction of justice, witness tampering, and abuse of authority. President Clinton admitted to having "inappropriate sexual contact" with a White House intern. See id. He denied giving false testimony, counseling the intern to misrepresent their relationship, helping her obtain a job to insure her silence, and trying to influence the grand jury testimony of his secretary. See id. Although the United States Senate rejected impeaching and removing the president, many senators thought the president had acted wrongly. See Alison Mitchell, In Search of a Rebuke, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 1999, at A1 (reporting that many Democrats do not want their votes against an impeachment conviction to signal that they condone President Clinton's lies to the nation about his relationship with an intern); see also Two Words, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 8, 1999, at A20; Joseph I. Lieberman, Editorial, The One Reasonable Solution, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 1998, § 4, at 9 (Democratic leader in U.S. Senate proclaiming that the President's "deliberative efforts to deceive the American people and our judicial system have had a serious and adverse impact on the nation"). See generally George J. Mitchell, Editorial, In Danger of Discrediting the House, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 1998, at A35 (noting "President Clinton behaved wrongly, irresponsibly and foolishly").
28. President Clinton settled the sexual harassment suit by Paula Corbin
29. President Clinton settled the sexual harassment suit by Paula Corbin Jones on November 13, 1998 for $850,000. See David Stout, from A Modest Start to a Threat to the Presidency, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 1998, at 34. Other lawyers associated with President Clinton, including Hilary Rodham Clinton and Webster L. Hubbell, have been accused of or convicted of misconduct and the office of independent counsel was examined in response to complaints of misconduct. See Don Van Natta, Jr., Starr Rehearsing Speech That Goes Beyond Lewinsky, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 1998, at A1 (listing some of the investigations). Independent Counsel Kenneth Strr laid out eleven possible grounds for impeachment in a 445-page report to the United States House of Representatives. Associated Press, Reluctance reigns as impeachment hearings kick off, NEW HAVEN REGISTER, Nov. 5, 1998, at A17. The House Judiciary Committee increased the number of grounds to fifteen, adding the offenses of perjury, obstruction of justice, witness tampering, and abuse of authority. President Clinton admitted to having "inappropriate sexual contact" with a White House intern. See id. He denied giving false testimony, counseling the intern to misrepresent their relationship, helping her obtain a job to insure her silence, and trying to influence the grand jury testimony of his secretary. See id. Although the United States Senate rejected impeaching and removing the president, many senators thought the president had acted wrongly. See Alison Mitchell, In Search of a Rebuke, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 1999, at A1 (reporting that many Democrats do not want their votes against an impeachment conviction to signal that they condone President Clinton's lies to the nation about his relationship with an intern); see also Two Words, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 8, 1999, at A20; Joseph I. Lieberman, Editorial, The One Reasonable Solution, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 1998, § 4, at 9 (Democratic leader in U.S. Senate proclaiming that the President's "deliberative efforts to deceive the American people and our judicial system have had a serious and adverse impact on the nation"). See generally George J. Mitchell, Editorial, In Danger of Discrediting the House, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 1998, at A35 (noting "President Clinton behaved wrongly, irresponsibly and foolishly").
30. The ABA Special Committee on Evaluation of Disciplinary Enforcement, chaired by former United States Supreme Court Justice Tom C. Clark, published the first nationwide assessment of lawyer disciplinary procedures in the United States in 1970; ABA SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON EVALUATION OF DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT, PROBLEMS AND RECOMMENDATIONS IN DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT (1970) [hereinafter CLARK REPORT]. "The Clark Committee warned of a 'scandalous situation' in professional discipline and called for 'the immediate attention of the profession.'" MCKAY REPORT, infra note 9, at xiv. See also, e.g., Joseph B. Treaster, Trying to Stem Auto Accident fraud, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24, 1998, at D2 (exposing corrupt lawyers and fraud in the auto insurance industry and mentioning that the nation's largest auto insurer, Allstate, filed a $107 million suit, the largest ever in connection with falsified auto accidents, against forty-five doctors, lawyers, and false-accident organizers in Los Angeles); Jef Feeley, Jury Ponders Cafiano, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 1, 1999, at A4 (predicting that prominent lawyer, Thomas Capano, has little hope of avoiding execution for murdering his secretary). See also MCKAY REPORT, infra note 9, at 11 (concluding that "existing regulation . . . does not adequately protect the public from lawyer incompetence and neglect"); LINOWITZ, supra note 2, at 145 (writing that "[t]he feeling that lawyers are not trustworthy is the most debilitating aspect of public (and client) attitudes today").
31. The ABA Special Committee on Evaluation of Disciplinary Enforcement, chaired by former United States Supreme Court Justice Tom C. Clark, published the first nationwide assessment of lawyer disciplinary procedures in the United States in 1970; ABA SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON EVALUATION OF DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT, PROBLEMS AND RECOMMENDATIONS IN DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT (1970) [hereinafter CLARK REPORT]. "The Clark Committee warned of a 'scandalous situation' in professional discipline and called for 'the immediate attention of the profession.'" MCKAY REPORT, infra note 9, at xiv. See also, e.g., Joseph B. Treaster, Trying to Stem Auto Accident fraud, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24, 1998, at D2 (exposing corrupt lawyers and fraud in the auto insurance industry and mentioning that the nation's largest auto insurer, Allstate, filed a $107 million suit, the largest ever in connection with falsified auto accidents, against forty-five doctors, lawyers, and false-accident organizers in Los Angeles); Jef Feeley, Jury Ponders Cafiano, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 1, 1999, at A4 (predicting that prominent lawyer, Thomas Capano, has little hope of avoiding execution for murdering his secretary). See also MCKAY REPORT, infra note 9, at 11 (concluding that "existing regulation . . . does not adequately protect the public from lawyer incompetence and neglect"); LINOWITZ, supra note 2, at 145 (writing that "[t]he feeling that lawyers are not trustworthy is the most debilitating aspect of public (and client) attitudes today").
32. The ABA Special Committee on Evaluation of Disciplinary Enforcement, chaired by former United States Supreme Court Justice Tom C. Clark, published the first nationwide assessment of lawyer disciplinary procedures in the United States in 1970; ABA SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON EVALUATION OF DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT, PROBLEMS AND RECOMMENDATIONS IN DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT (1970) [hereinafter CLARK REPORT]. "The Clark Committee warned of a 'scandalous situation' in professional discipline and called for 'the immediate attention of the profession.'" MCKAY REPORT, infra note 9, at xiv. See also, e.g., Joseph B. Treaster, Trying to Stem Auto Accident fraud, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24, 1998, at D2 (exposing corrupt lawyers and fraud in the auto insurance industry and mentioning that the nation's largest auto insurer, Allstate, filed a $107 million suit, the largest ever in connection with falsified auto accidents, against forty-five doctors, lawyers, and false-accident organizers in Los Angeles); Jef Feeley, Jury Ponders Cafiano, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 1, 1999, at A4 (predicting that prominent lawyer, Thomas Capano, has little hope of avoiding execution for murdering his secretary). See also MCKAY REPORT, infra note 9, at 11 (concluding that "existing regulation . . . does not adequately protect the public from lawyer incompetence and neglect"); LINOWITZ, supra note 2, at 145 (writing that "[t]he feeling that lawyers are not trustworthy is the most debilitating aspect of public (and client) attitudes today").
33. ABA CENTER FOR PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, LAWYER REGULATION FOR A NEW CENTURY xiv (1992) (hereinafter MCKAY REPORT] (quoting the CLARK REPORT, supra note 8). In February, 1989, the ABA created a second group, the Commission on the Evaluation of Disciplinary Enforcement to examine the lawyer disciplinary process - often referred to as the McKay Commission or McKay Report for its chairman, Professor Robert B. McKay. See id. at xi. In December 1991, the McKay Commission submitted to the ABA House of Delegates the second nationwide assessment of the lawyer discipline process - the McKay Report. See id. at xii. The House of Delegates adopted most of the McKay Report's 22 recommendations. See id. See generally Gest, supra note 6 (reporting one sociologist's opinion that the profession will not be transformed overnight by new emphasis on ethics in law schools).
34. See LINOWITZ, supra note 2, at 140 (emphasizing that bar associations should be "urgently concerned about what . . . the general public think[s] of lawyers"); see also McGovern, supra note 5 (noting that New York City's total payout for personal injury actions jumped from $24 million in 1977 to $260 million in 1994 and exhorting immediate reform of the civil justice system lest "we . . . undercut the civil basis of society itself").
35. Even lawyers, judges, and law professors criticize the profession. See Patrick A. Reardon, Solo, Teach Thyself, CONN. L. TRIB., June 22, 1998, at 17 (lawyer lamenting that many lawyers do a poor job of dealing with people and their problems, in part, because they have weak interpersonal skills); WARREN E. BURGER, DELIVERY OF JUSTICE 157 (1990) (former United States Supreme Court Chief Justice declares that "in some jurisdictions up to half of the lawyers who appear in court are so poorly trained that they are not properly performing their job . . . and their professional ethics offend a great many people . . . [receiving] on-the-job training at the expense of their clients' interests and the public") (1967 address to American College of Trial Lawyers); PrimeTime: Interview with Professor Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. (CBS television broadcast, Feb. 10, 1994) (suggesting that "probably 25%" of lawyers should not be practicing law); see also Lawyer Regulation for a New Century, Report of the Commission on Evaluation of Disciplinary Enforcement xiii (1992) (noting that as many as one-third of all lawyers are not suited to be practicing law).
36. Even lawyers, judges, and law professors criticize the profession. See Patrick A. Reardon, Solo, Teach Thyself, CONN. L. TRIB., June 22, 1998, at 17 (lawyer lamenting that many lawyers do a poor job of dealing with people and their problems, in part, because they have weak interpersonal skills); WARREN E. BURGER, DELIVERY OF JUSTICE 157 (1990) (former United States Supreme Court Chief Justice declares that "in some jurisdictions up to half of the lawyers who appear in court are so poorly trained that they are not properly performing their job . . . and their professional ethics offend a great many people . . . [receiving] on-the-job training at the expense of their clients' interests and the public") (1967 address to American College of Trial Lawyers); PrimeTime: Interview with Professor Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. (CBS television broadcast, Feb. 10, 1994) (suggesting that "probably 25%" of lawyers should not be practicing law); see also Lawyer Regulation for a New Century, Report of the Commission on Evaluation of Disciplinary Enforcement xiii (1992) (noting that as many as one-third of all lawyers are not suited to be practicing law).
37. Even lawyers, judges, and law professors criticize the profession. See Patrick A. Reardon, Solo, Teach Thyself, CONN. L. TRIB., June 22, 1998, at 17 (lawyer lamenting that many lawyers do a poor job of dealing with people and their problems, in part, because they have weak interpersonal skills); WARREN E. BURGER, DELIVERY OF JUSTICE 157 (1990) (former United States Supreme Court Chief Justice declares that "in some jurisdictions up to half of the lawyers who appear in court are so poorly trained that they are not properly performing their job . . . and their professional ethics offend a great many people . . . [receiving] on-the-job training at the expense of their clients' interests and the public") (1967 address to American College of Trial Lawyers); PrimeTime: Interview with Professor Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. (CBS television broadcast, Feb. 10, 1994) (suggesting that "probably 25%" of lawyers should not be practicing law); see also Lawyer Regulation for a New Century, Report of the Commission on Evaluation of Disciplinary Enforcement xiii (1992) (noting that as many as one-third of all lawyers are not suited to be practicing law).
38. Even lawyers, judges, and law professors criticize the profession. See Patrick A. Reardon, Solo, Teach Thyself, CONN. L. TRIB., June 22, 1998, at 17 (lawyer lamenting that many lawyers do a poor job of dealing with people and their problems, in part, because they have weak interpersonal skills); WARREN E. BURGER, DELIVERY OF JUSTICE 157 (1990) (former United States Supreme Court Chief Justice declares that "in some jurisdictions up to half of the lawyers who appear in court are so poorly trained that they are not properly performing their job . . . and their professional ethics offend a great many people . . . [receiving] on-the-job training at the expense of their clients' interests and the public") (1967 address to American College of Trial Lawyers); PrimeTime: Interview with Professor Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. (CBS television broadcast, Feb. 10, 1994) (suggesting that "probably 25%" of lawyers should not be practicing law); see also Lawyer Regulation for a New Century, Report of the Commission on Evaluation of Disciplinary Enforcement xiii (1992) (noting that as many as one-third of all lawyers are not suited to be practicing law).
39. Lawyers have an ethical obligation to promote justice. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. EC 9-1 (Baldwin 1995) ("A lawyer should promote public confidence in our [legal] system and in the legal profession."); see also ARTHUR F. GREENBAUM, LAWYER'S GUIDE TO THE OHIO CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 52, 611 (1996) (providing a comprehensive and scholarly discussion of the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility, advisory ethics opinions, related cases, and the disciplinary process); ROBERT L. NELSON, PARTNERS WITH POWER, 27 (1988). "The hallmark of the professions is the privilege of enclosing a set of activities through a licensed monopoly from the state in exchange for the observance of high standards and a commitment to public service." Id. "A leading practitioner . . . described such public 'service as a means of 'repaying the public for the privilege to practice law.'" Id. at 11. See generally THOMAS D. MORGAN & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 409-14 (6th ed. 1995) (analyzing a lawyer's duty to see justice done in light of various philosophical schools of thought, such as rule utilitarianism). When attorneys violate their clients' trust they inevitably diminish the public's trust in the profession. The degree of diminishment depends on the gravity of the violation and the publicity surrounding it. A recent, egregious case of violating client trust involved Ohio lawyer, Karen Bond, who allegedly stole $879,000 from two elderly sisters, one of whom has Alzheimer's disease. Both sisters are now living penniless in a nursing home. A new lawyer for one of the sisters stated: "She [the client] doesn't understand how Karen could have done this to her when she's placed so much trust in her." See Ann Fisher, Attorney Accused of Stealing, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Oct. 24, 1998, at 1A.
40. Lawyers have an ethical obligation to promote justice. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. EC 9-1 (Baldwin 1995) ("A lawyer should promote public confidence in our [legal] system and in the legal profession."); see also ARTHUR F. GREENBAUM, LAWYER'S GUIDE TO THE OHIO CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 52, 611 (1996) (providing a comprehensive and scholarly discussion of the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility, advisory ethics opinions, related cases, and the disciplinary process); ROBERT L. NELSON, PARTNERS WITH POWER, 27 (1988). "The hallmark of the professions is the privilege of enclosing a set of activities through a licensed monopoly from the state in exchange for the observance of high standards and a commitment to public service." Id. "A leading practitioner . . . described such public 'service as a means of 'repaying the public for the privilege to practice law.'" Id. at 11. See generally THOMAS D. MORGAN & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 409-14 (6th ed. 1995) (analyzing a lawyer's duty to see justice done in light of various philosophical schools of thought, such as rule utilitarianism). When attorneys violate their clients' trust they inevitably diminish the public's trust in the profession. The degree of diminishment depends on the gravity of the violation and the publicity surrounding it. A recent, egregious case of violating client trust involved Ohio lawyer, Karen Bond, who allegedly stole $879,000 from two elderly sisters, one of whom has Alzheimer's disease. Both sisters are now living penniless in a nursing home. A new lawyer for one of the sisters stated: "She [the client] doesn't understand how Karen could have done this to her when she's placed so much trust in her." See Ann Fisher, Attorney Accused of Stealing, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Oct. 24, 1998, at 1A.
41. Lawyers have an ethical obligation to promote justice. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. EC 9-1 (Baldwin 1995) ("A lawyer should promote public confidence in our [legal] system and in the legal profession."); see also ARTHUR F. GREENBAUM, LAWYER'S GUIDE TO THE OHIO CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 52, 611 (1996) (providing a comprehensive and scholarly discussion of the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility, advisory ethics opinions, related cases, and the disciplinary process); ROBERT L. NELSON, PARTNERS WITH POWER, 27 (1988). "The hallmark of the professions is the privilege of enclosing a set of activities through a licensed monopoly from the state in exchange for the observance of high standards and a commitment to public service." Id. "A leading practitioner . . . described such public 'service as a means of 'repaying the public for the privilege to practice law.'" Id. at 11. See generally THOMAS D. MORGAN & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 409-14 (6th ed. 1995) (analyzing a lawyer's duty to see justice done in light of various philosophical schools of thought, such as rule utilitarianism). When attorneys violate their clients' trust they inevitably diminish the public's trust in the profession. The degree of diminishment depends on the gravity of the violation and the publicity surrounding it. A recent, egregious case of violating client trust involved Ohio lawyer, Karen Bond, who allegedly stole $879,000 from two elderly sisters, one of whom has Alzheimer's disease. Both sisters are now living penniless in a nursing home. A new lawyer for one of the sisters stated: "She [the client] doesn't understand how Karen could have done this to her when she's placed so much trust in her." See Ann Fisher, Attorney Accused of Stealing, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Oct. 24, 1998, at 1A.
42. Lawyers have an ethical obligation to promote justice. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. EC 9-1 (Baldwin 1995) ("A lawyer should promote public confidence in our [legal] system and in the legal profession."); see also ARTHUR F. GREENBAUM, LAWYER'S GUIDE TO THE OHIO CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 52, 611 (1996) (providing a comprehensive and scholarly discussion of the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility, advisory ethics opinions, related cases, and the disciplinary process); ROBERT L. NELSON, PARTNERS WITH POWER, 27 (1988). "The hallmark of the professions is the privilege of enclosing a set of activities through a licensed monopoly from the state in exchange for the observance of high standards and a commitment to public service." Id. "A leading practitioner . . . described such public 'service as a means of 'repaying the public for the privilege to practice law.'" Id. at 11. See generally THOMAS D. MORGAN & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 409-14 (6th ed. 1995) (analyzing a lawyer's duty to see justice done in light of various philosophical schools of thought, such as rule utilitarianism). When attorneys violate their clients' trust they inevitably diminish the public's trust in the profession. The degree of diminishment depends on the gravity of the violation and the publicity surrounding it. A recent, egregious case of violating client trust involved Ohio lawyer, Karen Bond, who allegedly stole $879,000 from two elderly sisters, one of whom has Alzheimer's disease. Both sisters are now living penniless in a nursing home. A new lawyer for one of the sisters stated: "She [the client] doesn't understand how Karen could have done this to her when she's placed so much trust in her." See Ann Fisher, Attorney Accused of Stealing, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Oct. 24, 1998, at 1A.
43. Lawyers have an ethical obligation to promote justice. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. EC 9-1 (Baldwin 1995) ("A lawyer should promote public confidence in our [legal] system and in the legal profession."); see also ARTHUR F. GREENBAUM, LAWYER'S GUIDE TO THE OHIO CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 52, 611 (1996) (providing a comprehensive and scholarly discussion of the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility, advisory ethics opinions, related cases, and the disciplinary process); ROBERT L. NELSON, PARTNERS WITH POWER, 27 (1988). "The hallmark of the professions is the privilege of enclosing a set of activities through a licensed monopoly from the state in exchange for the observance of high standards and a commitment to public service." Id. "A leading practitioner . . . described such public 'service as a means of 'repaying the public for the privilege to practice law.'" Id. at 11. See generally THOMAS D. MORGAN & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 409-14 (6th ed. 1995) (analyzing a lawyer's duty to see justice done in light of various philosophical schools of thought, such as rule utilitarianism). When attorneys violate their clients' trust they inevitably diminish the public's trust in the profession. The degree of diminishment depends on the gravity of the violation and the publicity surrounding it. A recent, egregious case of violating client trust involved Ohio lawyer, Karen Bond, who allegedly stole $879,000 from two elderly sisters, one of whom has Alzheimer's disease. Both sisters are now living penniless in a nursing home. A new lawyer for one of the sisters stated: "She [the client] doesn't understand how Karen could have done this to her when she's placed so much trust in her." See Ann Fisher, Attorney Accused of Stealing, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Oct. 24, 1998, at 1A.
44. Lawyers have an ethical obligation to promote justice. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. EC 9-1 (Baldwin 1995) ("A lawyer should promote public confidence in our [legal] system and in the legal profession."); see also ARTHUR F. GREENBAUM, LAWYER'S GUIDE TO THE OHIO CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 52, 611 (1996) (providing a comprehensive and scholarly discussion of the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility, advisory ethics opinions, related cases, and the disciplinary process); ROBERT L. NELSON, PARTNERS WITH POWER, 27 (1988). "The hallmark of the professions is the privilege of enclosing a set of activities through a licensed monopoly from the state in exchange for the observance of high standards and a commitment to public service." Id. "A leading practitioner . . . described such public 'service as a means of 'repaying the public for the privilege to practice law.'" Id. at 11. See generally THOMAS D. MORGAN & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 409-14 (6th ed. 1995) (analyzing a lawyer's duty to see justice done in light of various philosophical schools of thought, such as rule utilitarianism). When attorneys violate their clients' trust they inevitably diminish the public's trust in the profession. The degree of diminishment depends on the gravity of the violation and the publicity surrounding it. A recent, egregious case of violating client trust involved Ohio lawyer, Karen Bond, who allegedly stole $879,000 from two elderly sisters, one of whom has Alzheimer's disease. Both sisters are now living penniless in a nursing home. A new lawyer for one of the sisters stated: "She [the client] doesn't understand how Karen could have done this to her when she's placed so much trust in her." See Ann Fisher, Attorney Accused of Stealing, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Oct. 24, 1998, at 1A.
45. Lawyers have an ethical obligation to promote justice. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. EC 9-1 (Baldwin 1995) ("A lawyer should promote public confidence in our [legal] system and in the legal profession."); see also ARTHUR F. GREENBAUM, LAWYER'S GUIDE TO THE OHIO CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 52, 611 (1996) (providing a comprehensive and scholarly discussion of the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility, advisory ethics opinions, related cases, and the disciplinary process); ROBERT L. NELSON, PARTNERS WITH POWER, 27 (1988). "The hallmark of the professions is the privilege of enclosing a set of activities through a licensed monopoly from the state in exchange for the observance of high standards and a commitment to public service." Id. "A leading practitioner . . . described such public 'service as a means of 'repaying the public for the privilege to practice law.'" Id. at 11. See generally THOMAS D. MORGAN & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 409-14 (6th ed. 1995) (analyzing a lawyer's duty to see justice done in light of various philosophical schools of thought, such as rule utilitarianism). When attorneys violate their clients' trust they inevitably diminish the public's trust in the profession. The degree of diminishment depends on the gravity of the violation and the publicity surrounding it. A recent, egregious case of violating client trust involved Ohio lawyer, Karen Bond, who allegedly stole $879,000 from two elderly sisters, one of whom has Alzheimer's disease. Both sisters are now living penniless in a nursing home. A new lawyer for one of the sisters stated: "She [the client] doesn't understand how Karen could have done this to her when she's placed so much trust in her." See Ann Fisher, Attorney Accused of Stealing, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Oct. 24, 1998, at 1A.
46. The Ohio Supreme Court regulates the Ohio legal services market. See OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 2(B)(1)(g). It controls the entry, continuation, and departure from law practice and "all other matters related to [it]," including the lawyer disciplinary process. Id. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. Gov Bar R I, §§ 1-15; V, § 6(L) (Baldwin 1995 & Supp. 1999); see also Berger v. Cuyahoga County Bar Ass'n, 983 F.2d 718, 723 (6th Cir. 1993) (bar disciplinary procedure within Supreme Court's "constitutionally prescribed jurisdiction"); Paula A. Monopoli, Legal Ethics and Practical Politics: Musings an the Public Perception of Lawyer Distyline, 10 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 423, 423-25 (1997) (noting that judicial regulation, the predominant model for lawyer discipline in the United States, relies on judges, who themselves are lawyers, to judge lawyers). But see Susan R. Martyn, Lawyer Competence and Lawyer Discipline: Beyond the Bar?, 69 GEO. L.J. 705, 734-36, 743 (1981) (citing the Federal Trade Commission as an example of the increasing and "subtle" outside regulation of lawyers and predicting "legislative . . . alternatives far less solicitous of lawyer involvement" if the profession fails to address public concerns about lawyer competency). See generally Larry E. Ribstein, Ethical Rules, Agency Costs, and Law Firm Structure, 84 VA. L. REV. 1707, 1751-52 (1998) (predicting that the current system of professional self-regulation is likely to break down from competitive pressure within and outside the profession). Throughout this article, unless the context indicates otherwise, Ohio Supreme Court Justices and other judges are included in the term "bar" or "profession" when discussing the self-regulatory nature of the legal profession. Ohio's justices and judges are lawyers - sharing a common culture. Judges and lawyers share common educational and training experiences, and interact on a regular basis. Judges are active and key players in state and local bar associations. Their close interrelationship is especially underscored when judges run for office every four years. Judges depend on lawyer donations and other assistance for waging their political campaigns. There is little reason to believe that Ohio's judiciary will deviate far from the bar's self-interest in self-regulation. See Sharon Naragon, Resnick urges strengthening of legal profession, BEAVERCREEK NEWS CURRENT, Sept. 25, 1998, at 1 (asserting that Supreme Court justices should be elected to one term of fourteen years to be free from the compromising pressures of reelection and to have a "truly independent high court.") ; set also Melvin Belli, REMARKS (Wash. D.C. Nov. 1966) (remarking "[b]less those men in black robes. They're in the same union with us.") (quoted in Murray Teigh Bloom, THE TROUBLE WITH LAWYERS 184 (1968)). But see Arnold R. Rosenfeld, The Bar Disciplinary Process in Massachusetts: Bar Counsel's Perspective, 79 MASS. L. REV. 180 n.5 (1994) (asserting that the "distinction between self-regulation by the bar and judicial regulation of the bar is not just one of semantics").
47. The Ohio Supreme Court regulates the Ohio legal services market. See OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 2(B)(1)(g). It controls the entry, continuation, and departure from law practice and "all other matters related to [it]," including the lawyer disciplinary process. Id. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. Gov Bar R I, §§ 1-15; V, § 6(L) (Baldwin 1995 & Supp. 1999); see also Berger v. Cuyahoga County Bar Ass'n, 983 F.2d 718, 723 (6th Cir. 1993) (bar disciplinary procedure within Supreme Court's "constitutionally prescribed jurisdiction"); Paula A. Monopoli, Legal Ethics and Practical Politics: Musings an the Public Perception of Lawyer Distyline, 10 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 423, 423-25 (1997) (noting that judicial regulation, the predominant model for lawyer discipline in the United States, relies on judges, who themselves are lawyers, to judge lawyers). But see Susan R. Martyn, Lawyer Competence and Lawyer Discipline: Beyond the Bar?, 69 GEO. L.J. 705, 734-36, 743 (1981) (citing the Federal Trade Commission as an example of the increasing and "subtle" outside regulation of lawyers and predicting "legislative . . . alternatives far less solicitous of lawyer involvement" if the profession fails to address public concerns about lawyer competency). See generally Larry E. Ribstein, Ethical Rules, Agency Costs, and Law Firm Structure, 84 VA. L. REV. 1707, 1751-52 (1998) (predicting that the current system of professional self-regulation is likely to break down from competitive pressure within and outside the profession). Throughout this article, unless the context indicates otherwise, Ohio Supreme Court Justices and other judges are included in the term "bar" or "profession" when discussing the self-regulatory nature of the legal profession. Ohio's justices and judges are lawyers - sharing a common culture. Judges and lawyers share common educational and training experiences, and interact on a regular basis. Judges are active and key players in state and local bar associations. Their close interrelationship is especially underscored when judges run for office every four years. Judges depend on lawyer donations and other assistance for waging their political campaigns. There is little reason to believe that Ohio's judiciary will deviate far from the bar's self-interest in self-regulation. See Sharon Naragon, Resnick urges strengthening of legal profession, BEAVERCREEK NEWS CURRENT, Sept. 25, 1998, at 1 (asserting that Supreme Court justices should be elected to one term of fourteen years to be free from the compromising pressures of reelection and to have a "truly independent high court.") ; set also Melvin Belli, REMARKS (Wash. D.C. Nov. 1966) (remarking "[b]less those men in black robes. They're in the same union with us.") (quoted in Murray Teigh Bloom, THE TROUBLE WITH LAWYERS 184 (1968)). But see Arnold R. Rosenfeld, The Bar Disciplinary Process in Massachusetts: Bar Counsel's Perspective, 79 MASS. L. REV. 180 n.5 (1994) (asserting that the "distinction between self-regulation by the bar and judicial regulation of the bar is not just one of semantics").
48. The Ohio Supreme Court regulates the Ohio legal services market. See OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 2(B)(1)(g). It controls the entry, continuation, and departure from law practice and "all other matters related to [it]," including the lawyer disciplinary process. Id. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. Gov Bar R I, §§ 1-15; V, § 6(L) (Baldwin 1995 & Supp. 1999); see also Berger v. Cuyahoga County Bar Ass'n, 983 F.2d 718, 723 (6th Cir. 1993) (bar disciplinary procedure within Supreme Court's "constitutionally prescribed jurisdiction"); Paula A. Monopoli, Legal Ethics and Practical Politics: Musings an the Public Perception of Lawyer Distyline, 10 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 423, 423-25 (1997) (noting that judicial regulation, the predominant model for lawyer discipline in the United States, relies on judges, who themselves are lawyers, to judge lawyers). But see Susan R. Martyn, Lawyer Competence and Lawyer Discipline: Beyond the Bar?, 69 GEO. L.J. 705, 734-36, 743 (1981) (citing the Federal Trade Commission as an example of the increasing and "subtle" outside regulation of lawyers and predicting "legislative . . . alternatives far less solicitous of lawyer involvement" if the profession fails to address public concerns about lawyer competency). See generally Larry E. Ribstein, Ethical Rules, Agency Costs, and Law Firm Structure, 84 VA. L. REV. 1707, 1751-52 (1998) (predicting that the current system of professional self-regulation is likely to break down from competitive pressure within and outside the profession). Throughout this article, unless the context indicates otherwise, Ohio Supreme Court Justices and other judges are included in the term "bar" or "profession" when discussing the self-regulatory nature of the legal profession. Ohio's justices and judges are lawyers - sharing a common culture. Judges and lawyers share common educational and training experiences, and interact on a regular basis. Judges are active and key players in state and local bar associations. Their close interrelationship is especially underscored when judges run for office every four years. Judges depend on lawyer donations and other assistance for waging their political campaigns. There is little reason to believe that Ohio's judiciary will deviate far from the bar's self-interest in self-regulation. See Sharon Naragon, Resnick urges strengthening of legal profession, BEAVERCREEK NEWS CURRENT, Sept. 25, 1998, at 1 (asserting that Supreme Court justices should be elected to one term of fourteen years to be free from the compromising pressures of reelection and to have a "truly independent high court.") ; set also Melvin Belli, REMARKS (Wash. D.C. Nov. 1966) (remarking "[b]less those men in black robes. They're in the same union with us.") (quoted in Murray Teigh Bloom, THE TROUBLE WITH LAWYERS 184 (1968)). But see Arnold R. Rosenfeld, The Bar Disciplinary Process in Massachusetts: Bar Counsel's Perspective, 79 MASS. L. REV. 180 n.5 (1994) (asserting that the "distinction between self-regulation by the bar and judicial regulation of the bar is not just one of semantics").
49. The Ohio Supreme Court regulates the Ohio legal services market. See OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 2(B)(1)(g). It controls the entry, continuation, and departure from law practice and "all other matters related to [it]," including the lawyer disciplinary process. Id. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. Gov Bar R I, §§ 1-15; V, § 6(L) (Baldwin 1995 & Supp. 1999); see also Berger v. Cuyahoga County Bar Ass'n, 983 F.2d 718, 723 (6th Cir. 1993) (bar disciplinary procedure within Supreme Court's "constitutionally prescribed jurisdiction"); Paula A. Monopoli, Legal Ethics and Practical Politics: Musings an the Public Perception of Lawyer Distyline, 10 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 423, 423-25 (1997) (noting that judicial regulation, the predominant model for lawyer discipline in the United States, relies on judges, who themselves are lawyers, to judge lawyers). But see Susan R. Martyn, Lawyer Competence and Lawyer Discipline: Beyond the Bar?, 69 GEO. L.J. 705, 734-36, 743 (1981) (citing the Federal Trade Commission as an example of the increasing and "subtle" outside regulation of lawyers and predicting "legislative . . . alternatives far less solicitous of lawyer involvement" if the profession fails to address public concerns about lawyer competency). See generally Larry E. Ribstein, Ethical Rules, Agency Costs, and Law Firm Structure, 84 VA. L. REV. 1707, 1751-52 (1998) (predicting that the current system of professional self-regulation is likely to break down from competitive pressure within and outside the profession). Throughout this article, unless the context indicates otherwise, Ohio Supreme Court Justices and other judges are included in the term "bar" or "profession" when discussing the self-regulatory nature of the legal profession. Ohio's justices and judges are lawyers - sharing a common culture. Judges and lawyers share common educational and training experiences, and interact on a regular basis. Judges are active and key players in state and local bar associations. Their close interrelationship is especially underscored when judges run for office every four years. Judges depend on lawyer donations and other assistance for waging their political campaigns. There is little reason to believe that Ohio's judiciary will deviate far from the bar's self-interest in self-regulation. See Sharon Naragon, Resnick urges strengthening of legal profession, BEAVERCREEK NEWS CURRENT, Sept. 25, 1998, at 1 (asserting that Supreme Court justices should be elected to one term of fourteen years to be free from the compromising pressures of reelection and to have a "truly independent high court.") ; set also Melvin Belli, REMARKS (Wash. D.C. Nov. 1966) (remarking "[b]less those men in black robes. They're in the same union with us.") (quoted in Murray Teigh Bloom, THE TROUBLE WITH LAWYERS 184 (1968)). But see Arnold R. Rosenfeld, The Bar Disciplinary Process in Massachusetts: Bar Counsel's Perspective, 79 MASS. L. REV. 180 n.5 (1994) (asserting that the "distinction between self-regulation by the bar and judicial regulation of the bar is not just one of semantics").
50. The Ohio Supreme Court regulates the Ohio legal services market. See OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 2(B)(1)(g). It controls the entry, continuation, and departure from law practice and "all other matters related to [it]," including the lawyer disciplinary process. Id. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. Gov Bar R I, §§ 1-15; V, § 6(L) (Baldwin 1995 & Supp. 1999); see also Berger v. Cuyahoga County Bar Ass'n, 983 F.2d 718, 723 (6th Cir. 1993) (bar disciplinary procedure within Supreme Court's "constitutionally prescribed jurisdiction"); Paula A. Monopoli, Legal Ethics and Practical Politics: Musings an the Public Perception of Lawyer Distyline, 10 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 423, 423-25 (1997) (noting that judicial regulation, the predominant model for lawyer discipline in the United States, relies on judges, who themselves are lawyers, to judge lawyers). But see Susan R. Martyn, Lawyer Competence and Lawyer Discipline: Beyond the Bar?, 69 GEO. L.J. 705, 734-36, 743 (1981) (citing the Federal Trade Commission as an example of the increasing and "subtle" outside regulation of lawyers and predicting "legislative . . . alternatives far less solicitous of lawyer involvement" if the profession fails to address public concerns about lawyer competency). See generally Larry E. Ribstein, Ethical Rules, Agency Costs, and Law Firm Structure, 84 VA. L. REV. 1707, 1751-52 (1998) (predicting that the current system of professional self-regulation is likely to break down from competitive pressure within and outside the profession). Throughout this article, unless the context indicates otherwise, Ohio Supreme Court Justices and other judges are included in the term "bar" or "profession" when discussing the self-regulatory nature of the legal profession. Ohio's justices and judges are lawyers - sharing a common culture. Judges and lawyers share common educational and training experiences, and interact on a regular basis. Judges are active and key players in state and local bar associations. Their close interrelationship is especially underscored when judges run for office every four years. Judges depend on lawyer donations and other assistance for waging their political campaigns. There is little reason to believe that Ohio's judiciary will deviate far from the bar's self-interest in self-regulation. See Sharon Naragon, Resnick urges strengthening of legal profession, BEAVERCREEK NEWS CURRENT, Sept. 25, 1998, at 1 (asserting that Supreme Court justices should be elected to one term of fourteen years to be free from the compromising pressures of reelection and to have a "truly independent high court.") ; set also Melvin Belli, REMARKS (Wash. D.C. Nov. 1966) (remarking "[b]less those men in black robes. They're in the same union with us.") (quoted in Murray Teigh Bloom, THE TROUBLE WITH LAWYERS 184 (1968)). But see Arnold R. Rosenfeld, The Bar Disciplinary Process in Massachusetts: Bar Counsel's Perspective, 79 MASS. L. REV. 180 n.5 (1994) (asserting that the "distinction between self-regulation by the bar and judicial regulation of the bar is not just one of semantics").
51. The Ohio Supreme Court regulates the Ohio legal services market. See OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 2(B)(1)(g). It controls the entry, continuation, and departure from law practice and "all other matters related to [it]," including the lawyer disciplinary process. Id. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. Gov Bar R I, §§ 1-15; V, § 6(L) (Baldwin 1995 & Supp. 1999); see also Berger v. Cuyahoga County Bar Ass'n, 983 F.2d 718, 723 (6th Cir. 1993) (bar disciplinary procedure within Supreme Court's "constitutionally prescribed jurisdiction"); Paula A. Monopoli, Legal Ethics and Practical Politics: Musings an the Public Perception of Lawyer Distyline, 10 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 423, 423-25 (1997) (noting that judicial regulation, the predominant model for lawyer discipline in the United States, relies on judges, who themselves are lawyers, to judge lawyers). But see Susan R. Martyn, Lawyer Competence and Lawyer Discipline: Beyond the Bar?, 69 GEO. L.J. 705, 734-36, 743 (1981) (citing the Federal Trade Commission as an example of the increasing and "subtle" outside regulation of lawyers and predicting "legislative . . . alternatives far less solicitous of lawyer involvement" if the profession fails to address public concerns about lawyer competency). See generally Larry E. Ribstein, Ethical Rules, Agency Costs, and Law Firm Structure, 84 VA. L. REV. 1707, 1751-52 (1998) (predicting that the current system of professional self-regulation is likely to break down from competitive pressure within and outside the profession). Throughout this article, unless the context indicates otherwise, Ohio Supreme Court Justices and other judges are included in the term "bar" or "profession" when discussing the self-regulatory nature of the legal profession. Ohio's justices and judges are lawyers - sharing a common culture. Judges and lawyers share common educational and training experiences, and interact on a regular basis. Judges are active and key players in state and local bar associations. Their close interrelationship is especially underscored when judges run for office every four years. Judges depend on lawyer donations and other assistance for waging their political campaigns. There is little reason to believe that Ohio's judiciary will deviate far from the bar's self-interest in self-regulation. See Sharon Naragon, Resnick urges strengthening of legal profession, BEAVERCREEK NEWS CURRENT, Sept. 25, 1998, at 1 (asserting that Supreme Court justices should be elected to one term of fourteen years to be free from the compromising pressures of reelection and to have a "truly independent high court.") ; set also Melvin Belli, REMARKS (Wash. D.C. Nov. 1966) (remarking "[b]less those men in black robes. They're in the same union with us.") (quoted in Murray Teigh Bloom, THE TROUBLE WITH LAWYERS 184 (1968)). But see Arnold R. Rosenfeld, The Bar Disciplinary Process in Massachusetts: Bar Counsel's Perspective, 79 MASS. L. REV. 180 n.5 (1994) (asserting that the "distinction between self-regulation by the bar and judicial regulation of the bar is not just one of semantics").
52. The Ohio Supreme Court regulates the Ohio legal services market. See OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 2(B)(1)(g). It controls the entry, continuation, and departure from law practice and "all other matters related to [it]," including the lawyer disciplinary process. Id. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. Gov Bar R I, §§ 1-15; V, § 6(L) (Baldwin 1995 & Supp. 1999); see also Berger v. Cuyahoga County Bar Ass'n, 983 F.2d 718, 723 (6th Cir. 1993) (bar disciplinary procedure within Supreme Court's "constitutionally prescribed jurisdiction"); Paula A. Monopoli, Legal Ethics and Practical Politics: Musings an the Public Perception of Lawyer Distyline, 10 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 423, 423-25 (1997) (noting that judicial regulation, the predominant model for lawyer discipline in the United States, relies on judges, who themselves are lawyers, to judge lawyers). But see Susan R. Martyn, Lawyer Competence and Lawyer Discipline: Beyond the Bar?, 69 GEO. L.J. 705, 734-36, 743 (1981) (citing the Federal Trade Commission as an example of the increasing and "subtle" outside regulation of lawyers and predicting "legislative . . . alternatives far less solicitous of lawyer involvement" if the profession fails to address public concerns about lawyer competency). See generally Larry E. Ribstein, Ethical Rules, Agency Costs, and Law Firm Structure, 84 VA. L. REV. 1707, 1751-52 (1998) (predicting that the current system of professional self-regulation is likely to break down from competitive pressure within and outside the profession). Throughout this article, unless the context indicates otherwise, Ohio Supreme Court Justices and other judges are included in the term "bar" or "profession" when discussing the self-regulatory nature of the legal profession. Ohio's justices and judges are lawyers - sharing a common culture. Judges and lawyers share common educational and training experiences, and interact on a regular basis. Judges are active and key players in state and local bar associations. Their close interrelationship is especially underscored when judges run for office every four years. Judges depend on lawyer donations and other assistance for waging their political campaigns. There is little reason to believe that Ohio's judiciary will deviate far from the bar's self-interest in self-regulation. See Sharon Naragon, Resnick urges strengthening of legal profession, BEAVERCREEK NEWS CURRENT, Sept. 25, 1998, at 1 (asserting that Supreme Court justices should be elected to one term of fourteen years to be free from the compromising pressures of reelection and to have a "truly independent high court.") ; set also Melvin Belli, REMARKS (Wash. D.C. Nov. 1966) (remarking "[b]less those men in black robes. They're in the same union with us.") (quoted in Murray Teigh Bloom, THE TROUBLE WITH LAWYERS 184 (1968)). But see Arnold R. Rosenfeld, The Bar Disciplinary Process in Massachusetts: Bar Counsel's Perspective, 79 MASS. L. REV. 180 n.5 (1994) (asserting that the "distinction between self-regulation by the bar and judicial regulation of the bar is not just one of semantics").
53. The Ohio Supreme Court regulates the Ohio legal services market. See OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 2(B)(1)(g). It controls the entry, continuation, and departure from law practice and "all other matters related to [it]," including the lawyer disciplinary process. Id. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. Gov Bar R I, §§ 1-15; V, § 6(L) (Baldwin 1995 & Supp. 1999); see also Berger v. Cuyahoga County Bar Ass'n, 983 F.2d 718, 723 (6th Cir. 1993) (bar disciplinary procedure within Supreme Court's "constitutionally prescribed jurisdiction"); Paula A. Monopoli, Legal Ethics and Practical Politics: Musings an the Public Perception of Lawyer Distyline, 10 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 423, 423-25 (1997) (noting that judicial regulation, the predominant model for lawyer discipline in the United States, relies on judges, who themselves are lawyers, to judge lawyers). But see Susan R. Martyn, Lawyer Competence and Lawyer Discipline: Beyond the Bar?, 69 GEO. L.J. 705, 734-36, 743 (1981) (citing the Federal Trade Commission as an example of the increasing and "subtle" outside regulation of lawyers and predicting "legislative . . . alternatives far less solicitous of lawyer involvement" if the profession fails to address public concerns about lawyer competency). See generally Larry E. Ribstein, Ethical Rules, Agency Costs, and Law Firm Structure, 84 VA. L. REV. 1707, 1751-52 (1998) (predicting that the current system of professional self-regulation is likely to break down from competitive pressure within and outside the profession). Throughout this article, unless the context indicates otherwise, Ohio Supreme Court Justices and other judges are included in the term "bar" or "profession" when discussing the self-regulatory nature of the legal profession. Ohio's justices and judges are lawyers - sharing a common culture. Judges and lawyers share common educational and training experiences, and interact on a regular basis. Judges are active and key players in state and local bar associations. Their close interrelationship is especially underscored when judges run for office every four years. Judges depend on lawyer donations and other assistance for waging their political campaigns. There is little reason to believe that Ohio's judiciary will deviate far from the bar's self-interest in self-regulation. See Sharon Naragon, Resnick urges strengthening of legal profession, BEAVERCREEK NEWS CURRENT, Sept. 25, 1998, at 1 (asserting that Supreme Court justices should be elected to one term of fourteen years to be free from the compromising pressures of reelection and to have a "truly independent high court.") ; set also Melvin Belli, REMARKS (Wash. D.C. Nov. 1966) (remarking "[b]less those men in black robes. They're in the same union with us.") (quoted in Murray Teigh Bloom, THE TROUBLE WITH LAWYERS 184 (1968)). But see Arnold R. Rosenfeld, The Bar Disciplinary Process in Massachusetts: Bar Counsel's Perspective, 79 MASS. L. REV. 180 n.5 (1994) (asserting that the "distinction between self-regulation by the bar and judicial regulation of the bar is not just one of semantics").
54. The President of the ABA recently asserted that professional associations, like the ABA, "can be instrumental in" such self-evaluative and reform efforts by "setting standards of conduct and encouraging adherence to them . . . through education programs or old-fashioned peer pressure." N. Lee Cooper, Opening Remarks: Looking Inside and Outside the Profession, PROF. LAW. 1, 4 (1997). The bar should also educate the public about any improvements in the administration of justice and publicize the bar's role in heralding such progress. See Bloom, supra note 12, at 156 (warning that if "reforms come without the bar's help" lawyers will suffer a serious "loss of public confidence"). See generally Michael J. Kelly, LIVES OF LAWYERS: JOURNEYS IN THE ORGANIZATIONS OF PRACTICE 208 (1994) (examining lawyers in various organizational settings and predicting that "the concepts of profession and professional . . . will be set less by the organized bar than by the practice organization").
55. The President of the ABA recently asserted that professional associations, like the ABA, "can be instrumental in" such self-evaluative and reform efforts by "setting standards of conduct and encouraging adherence to them . . . through education programs or old-fashioned peer pressure." N. Lee Cooper, Opening Remarks: Looking Inside and Outside the Profession, PROF. LAW. 1, 4 (1997). The bar should also educate the public about any improvements in the administration of justice and publicize the bar's role in heralding such progress. See Bloom, supra note 12, at 156 (warning that if "reforms come without the bar's help" lawyers will suffer a serious "loss of public confidence"). See generally Michael J. Kelly, LIVES OF LAWYERS: JOURNEYS IN THE ORGANIZATIONS OF PRACTICE 208 (1994) (examining lawyers in various organizational settings and predicting that "the concepts of profession and professional . . . will be set less by the organized bar than by the practice organization").
56. See David Luban, The Social Responsibilities of Lawyers: A Green Perspective, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 955, 961 (noting that Ohio was a bellwether state for the savings and loan debacle); Janet Frankston, Some Are Willing To Forgive President, Report Doesn't Convince Area Voters That Clinton Should Find A New Job, AKRON BEACON J., Sept. 12, 1998, at B1; see also Michael Winerip, Bellwether's Rank and File Strongly Support Clinton, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 1998, at A1 (designating Ohio as a "political bellwether"). See generally Dan Balz & Ruth Marcus, In Year Since Webster, Abortion Debate Defies Predictions, WASH. POST., July 3, 1990, at A1 (public's view on abortion
57. See David Luban, The Social Responsibilities of Lawyers: A Green Perspective, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 955, 961 (noting that Ohio was a bellwether state for the savings and loan debacle); Janet Frankston, Some Are Willing To Forgive President, Report Doesn't Convince Area Voters That Clinton Should Find A New Job, AKRON BEACON J., Sept. 12, 1998, at B1; see also Michael Winerip, Bellwether's Rank and File Strongly Support Clinton, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 1998, at A1 (designating Ohio as a "political bellwether"). See generally Dan Balz & Ruth Marcus, In Year Since Webster, Abortion Debate Defies Predictions, WASH. POST., July 3, 1990, at A1 (public's view on abortion reflected in bellwether states like Ohio). In 1999, there are 38,300 registered lawyers on active status for the practice of law in Ohio and there are perhaps another 10,000 unregistered lawyers licensed to practice in the state. See Telephone Interview with Cindy Farrenkopf, Attorney Registration Clerk, Ohio Supreme Court (Feb. 25, 1999). Active status designates lawyers who are registered and in good standing with the Ohio Supreme Court to practice law. See id. As of January 22, 1999, there was a total of 47,991 attorneys registered in Ohio and subject to discipline. The total is misleading, however, because many attorneys included in this number are not on "active status" and presumably not practicing law. See id. For example, many of the attorneys who represent the difference between 47,991 and 38,300 are retired. See id. In 1990, Ohio's attorney population ranked tenth largest in the nation. See ABA Ctr. for Professional Responsibility Standing Comm. on Professional Discipline, Survey of Lawyer Discipline Systems: 1996 Data, Chart I at 1-4. According to the Secretary of the Ohio Board of Commissioners, there has been a steady increase in the number of registered practitioners in Ohio. See Telephone Interview with Jonathan Marshall, Secretary to the Board of Commissioners On Grievances and Discipline (Feb. 25, 1999) [hereinafter Marshall Interview]; see also Jack P. Sahl, From Grievance and Complaint to Sanction: Attorney Misconduct in Ohio, 23 U. DAYTON L. REV. 303, 304 (1998) (reporting that in 1997 there was a total of 45,156 lawyers registered in Ohio). The Secretary is a full-time attorney who has overall scheduling, fiscal, and administrative responsibility for the Board. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. Gov Bar R V, §3(A) (Baldwin 1995). The Board is composed of seventeen volunteer lawyers, seven judges, and four non-attorneys. See id. § 1(A). The Board reviews evidence, preserves the record, makes findings of misconduct against lawyers and judges and recommends sanctions to the Ohio Supreme Court. See id. § 2(A),(B)(1)-(4).
58. See David Luban, The Social Responsibilities of Lawyers: A Green Perspective, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 955, 961 (noting that Ohio was a bellwether state for the savings and loan debacle); Janet Frankston, Some Are Willing To Forgive President, Report Doesn't Convince Area Voters That Clinton Should Find A New Job, AKRON BEACON J., Sept. 12, 1998, at B1; see also Michael Winerip, Bellwether's Rank and File Strongly Support Clinton, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 1998, at A1 (designating Ohio as a "political bellwether"). See generally Dan Balz & Ruth Marcus, In Year Since Webster, Abortion Debate Defies Predictions, WASH. POST., July 3, 1990, at A1 (public's view on abortion reflected in bellwether states like Ohio). In 1999, there are 38,300 registered lawyers on active status for the practice of law in Ohio and there are perhaps another 10,000 unregistered lawyers licensed to practice in the state. See Telephone Interview with Cindy Farrenkopf, Attorney Registration Clerk, Ohio Supreme Court (Feb. 25, 1999). Active status designates lawyers who are registered and in good standing with the Ohio Supreme Court to practice law. See id. As of January 22, 1999, there was a total of 47,991 attorneys registered in Ohio and subject to discipline. The total is misleading, however, because many attorneys included in this number are not on "active status" and presumably not practicing law. See id. For example, many of the attorneys who represent the difference between 47,991 and 38,300 are retired. See id. In 1990, Ohio's attorney population ranked tenth largest in the nation. See ABA Ctr. for Professional Responsibility Standing Comm. on Professional Discipline, Survey of Lawyer Discipline Systems: 1996 Data, Chart I at 1-4. According to the Secretary of the Ohio Board of Commissioners, there has been a steady increase in the number of registered practitioners in Ohio. See Telephone Interview with Jonathan Marshall, Secretary to the Board of Commissioners On Grievances and Discipline (Feb. 25, 1999) [hereinafter Marshall Interview]; see also Jack P. Sahl, From Grievance and Complaint to Sanction: Attorney Misconduct in Ohio, 23 U. DAYTON L. REV. 303, 304 (1998) (reporting that in 1997 there was a total of 45,156 lawyers registered in Ohio). The Secretary is a full-time attorney who has overall scheduling, fiscal, and administrative responsibility for the Board. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. Gov Bar R V, §3(A) (Baldwin 1995). The Board is composed of seventeen volunteer lawyers, seven judges, and four non-attorneys. See id. § 1(A). The Board reviews evidence, preserves the record, makes findings of misconduct against lawyers and judges and recommends sanctions to the Ohio Supreme Court. See id. § 2(A),(B)(1)-(4).
59. See David Luban, The Social Responsibilities of Lawyers: A Green Perspective, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 955, 961 (noting that Ohio was a bellwether state for the savings and loan debacle); Janet Frankston, Some Are Willing To Forgive President, Report Doesn't Convince Area Voters That Clinton Should Find A New Job, AKRON BEACON J., Sept. 12, 1998, at B1; see also Michael Winerip, Bellwether's Rank and File Strongly Support Clinton, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 1998, at A1 (designating Ohio as a "political bellwether"). See generally Dan Balz & Ruth Marcus, In Year Since Webster, Abortion Debate Defies Predictions, WASH. POST., July 3, 1990, at A1 (public's view on abortion reflected in bellwether states like Ohio). In 1999, there are 38,300 registered lawyers on active status for the practice of law in Ohio and there are perhaps another 10,000 unregistered lawyers licensed to practice in the state. See Telephone Interview with Cindy Farrenkopf, Attorney Registration Clerk, Ohio Supreme Court (Feb. 25, 1999). Active status designates lawyers who are registered and in good standing with the Ohio Supreme Court to practice law. See id. As of January 22, 1999, there was a total of 47,991 attorneys registered in Ohio and subject to discipline. The total is misleading, however, because many attorneys included in this number are not on "active status" and presumably not practicing law. See id. For example, many of the attorneys who represent the difference between 47,991 and 38,300 are retired. See id. In 1990, Ohio's attorney population ranked tenth largest in the nation. See ABA Ctr. for Professional Responsibility Standing Comm. on Professional Discipline, Survey of Lawyer Discipline Systems: 1996 Data, Chart I at 1-4. According to the Secretary of the Ohio Board of Commissioners, there has been a steady increase in the number of registered practitioners in Ohio. See Telephone Interview with Jonathan Marshall, Secretary to the Board of Commissioners On Grievances and Discipline (Feb. 25, 1999) [hereinafter Marshall Interview]; see also Jack P. Sahl, From Grievance and Complaint to Sanction: Attorney Misconduct in Ohio, 23 U. DAYTON L. REV. 303, 304 (1998) (reporting that in 1997 there was a total of 45,156 lawyers registered in Ohio). The Secretary is a full-time attorney who has overall scheduling, fiscal, and administrative responsibility for the Board. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. Gov Bar R V, §3(A) (Baldwin 1995). The Board is composed of seventeen volunteer lawyers, seven judges, and four non-attorneys. See id. § 1(A). The Board reviews evidence, preserves the record, makes findings of misconduct against lawyers and judges and recommends sanctions to the Ohio Supreme Court. See id. § 2(A),(B)(1)-(4).
60. See David Luban, The Social Responsibilities of Lawyers: A Green Perspective, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 955, 961 (noting that Ohio was a bellwether state for the savings and loan debacle); Janet Frankston, Some Are Willing To Forgive President, Report Doesn't Convince Area Voters That Clinton Should Find A New Job, AKRON BEACON J., Sept. 12, 1998, at B1; see also Michael Winerip, Bellwether's Rank and File Strongly Support Clinton, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 1998, at A1 (designating Ohio as a "political bellwether"). See generally Dan Balz & Ruth Marcus, In Year Since Webster, Abortion Debate Defies Predictions, WASH. POST., July 3, 1990, at A1 (public's view on abortion reflected in bellwether states like Ohio). In 1999, there are 38,300 registered lawyers on active status for the practice of law in Ohio and there are perhaps another 10,000 unregistered lawyers licensed to practice in the state. See Telephone Interview with Cindy Farrenkopf, Attorney Registration Clerk, Ohio Supreme Court (Feb. 25, 1999). Active status designates lawyers who are registered and in good standing with the Ohio Supreme Court to practice law. See id. As of January 22, 1999, there was a total of 47,991 attorneys registered in Ohio and subject to discipline. The total is misleading, however, because many attorneys included in this number are not on "active status" and presumably not practicing law. See id. For example, many of the attorneys who represent the difference between 47,991 and 38,300 are retired. See id. In 1990, Ohio's attorney population ranked tenth largest in the nation. See ABA Ctr. for Professional Responsibility Standing Comm. on Professional Discipline, Survey of Lawyer Discipline Systems: 1996 Data, Chart I at 1-4. According to the Secretary of the Ohio Board of Commissioners, there has been a steady increase in the number of registered practitioners in Ohio. See Telephone Interview with Jonathan Marshall, Secretary to the Board of Commissioners On Grievances and Discipline (Feb. 25, 1999) [hereinafter Marshall Interview]; see also Jack P. Sahl, From Grievance and Complaint to Sanction: Attorney Misconduct in Ohio, 23 U. DAYTON L. REV. 303, 304 (1998) (reporting that in 1997 there was a total of 45,156 lawyers registered in Ohio). The Secretary is a full-time attorney who has overall scheduling, fiscal, and administrative responsibility for the Board. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. Gov Bar R V, §3(A) (Baldwin 1995). The Board is composed of seventeen volunteer lawyers, seven judges, and four non-attorneys. See id. § 1(A). The Board reviews evidence, preserves the record, makes findings of misconduct against lawyers and judges and recommends sanctions to the Ohio Supreme Court. See id. § 2(A),(B)(1)-(4).
61. See David Luban, The Social Responsibilities of Lawyers: A Green Perspective, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 955, 961 (noting that Ohio was a bellwether state for the savings and loan debacle); Janet Frankston, Some Are Willing To Forgive President, Report Doesn't Convince Area Voters That Clinton Should Find A New Job, AKRON BEACON J., Sept. 12, 1998, at B1; see also Michael Winerip, Bellwether's Rank and File Strongly Support Clinton, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 1998, at A1 (designating Ohio as a "political bellwether"). See generally Dan Balz & Ruth Marcus, In Year Since Webster, Abortion Debate Defies Predictions, WASH. POST., July 3, 1990, at A1 (public's view on abortion reflected in bellwether states like Ohio). In 1999, there are 38,300 registered lawyers on active status for the practice of law in Ohio and there are perhaps another 10,000 unregistered lawyers licensed to practice in the state. See Telephone Interview with Cindy Farrenkopf, Attorney Registration Clerk, Ohio Supreme Court (Feb. 25, 1999). Active status designates lawyers who are registered and in good standing with the Ohio Supreme Court to practice law. See id. As of January 22, 1999, there was a total of 47,991 attorneys registered in Ohio and subject to discipline. The total is misleading, however, because many attorneys included in this number are not on "active status" and presumably not practicing law. See id. For example, many of the attorneys who represent the difference between 47,991 and 38,300 are retired. See id. In 1990, Ohio's attorney population ranked tenth largest in the nation. See ABA Ctr. for Professional Responsibility Standing Comm. on Professional Discipline, Survey of Lawyer Discipline Systems: 1996 Data, Chart I at 1-4. According to the Secretary of the Ohio Board of Commissioners, there has been a steady increase in the number of registered practitioners in Ohio. See Telephone Interview with Jonathan Marshall, Secretary to the Board of Commissioners On Grievances and Discipline (Feb. 25, 1999) [hereinafter Marshall Interview]; see also Jack P. Sahl, From Grievance and Complaint to Sanction: Attorney Misconduct in Ohio, 23 U. DAYTON L. REV. 303, 304 (1998) (reporting that in 1997 there was a total of 45,156 lawyers registered in Ohio). The Secretary is a full-time attorney who has overall scheduling, fiscal, and administrative responsibility for the Board. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. Gov Bar R V, §3(A) (Baldwin 1995). The Board is composed of seventeen volunteer lawyers, seven judges, and four non-attorneys. See id. § 1(A). The Board reviews evidence, preserves the record, makes findings of misconduct against lawyers and judges and recommends sanctions to the Ohio Supreme Court. See id. § 2(A),(B)(1)-(4).
62. See F. Raymond Marks & Darlene Cathcart, Discipline Within the Legal Profession, in ETHICS AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION 62, 73 (Michael Davis & Frederick A. Elliston eds. 1986) (noting that "[t]he legal profession has zealously resisted lay or even legislative intervention in the disciplinary process").
63. See ABA CENTER FOR PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, CHART ON ACCESS TO DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS (1999) (on reserve with the author).
64. See Guttenberg, supra note 6.
65. See Guttenberg, supra note 6.
66. The Bell Committee submitted the recommendations to the OSBA Council of Delegates in November 1996. See Letter from Albert L. Bell, Chair of the Committee to Review Ohio's Disciplinary Process, to the Council of Delegates for its Nov. 1996 Meeting [hereinafter Bell Letter] (containing the original Bell Committee Recommendations) (on file with author); see also BELL REPORT, infra note 41 (discussing Attorney Bell and the Bell Committee's creation) (on file with author); 69 OSBA REP. 820-25 (Oct. 7, 1996) (containing the recommendations without the introduction and commentary). The Council adopted most of the Bell Committee Recommendations at its annual meeting. See OSBA COUNCIL OF DELEGATES MEETING REPORT, 70 OSBA REP. 528 (June 27, 1997) [hereinafter OSBA DELEGATES COUNCIL REPORT] (listing adoptions of and modifications to the Bell Recommendations); infra notes 53-63 and accompanying text (discussing the Council's significant modifications to the Bell Committee Recommendations).
67. The Bell Committee submitted the recommendations to the OSBA Council of Delegates in November 1996. See Letter from Albert L. Bell, Chair of the Committee to Review Ohio's Disciplinary Process, to the Council of Delegates for its Nov. 1996 Meeting [hereinafter Bell Letter] (containing the original Bell Committee Recommendations) (on file with author); see also BELL REPORT, infra note 41 (discussing Attorney Bell and the Bell Committee's creation) (on file with author); 69 OSBA REP. 820-25 (Oct. 7, 1996) (containing the recommendations without the introduction and commentary). The Council adopted most of the Bell Committee Recommendations at its annual meeting. See OSBA COUNCIL OF DELEGATES MEETING REPORT, 70 OSBA REP. 528 (June 27, 1997) [hereinafter OSBA DELEGATES COUNCIL REPORT] (listing adoptions of and modifications to the Bell Recommendations); infra notes 53-63 and accompanying text (discussing the Council's significant modifications to the Bell Committee Recommendations).
68. The Bell Committee submitted the recommendations to the OSBA Council of Delegates in November 1996. See Letter from Albert L. Bell, Chair of the Committee to Review Ohio's Disciplinary Process, to the Council of Delegates for its Nov. 1996 Meeting [hereinafter Bell Letter] (containing the original Bell Committee Recommendations) (on file with author); see also BELL REPORT, infra note 41 (discussing Attorney Bell and the Bell Committee's creation) (on file with author); 69 OSBA REP. 820-25 (Oct. 7, 1996) (containing the recommendations without the introduction and commentary). The Council adopted most of the Bell Committee Recommendations at its annual meeting. See OSBA COUNCIL OF DELEGATES MEETING REPORT, 70 OSBA REP. 528 (June 27, 1997) [hereinafter OSBA DELEGATES COUNCIL REPORT] (listing adoptions of and modifications to the Bell Recommendations); infra notes 53-63 and accompanying text (discussing the Council's significant modifications to the Bell Committee Recommendations).
69. Experts recently questioned lawyer accountability in Ohio after reviewing its disciplinary process - a process premised on self-regulation. They noted a risk to public confidence in the integrity of the process when "probably in excess of 90%, of grievances [against lawyers were] dismissed without any formal sanction." BELL REPORT, infra note 41, at 4-5. See also Guttenberg, supra note 6, at 988. The belief that lawyers are not held sufficiently accountable for their actions is longstanding. As the ABA President in 1965; United States Supreme Court Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. stated: "I have found, far and wide, a growing dissatisfaction with the adequacy of the discipline maintained by our profession . . . . [T]his dissatisfaction is justified. It is found among thoughtful lawyers . . . and it is widely prevalent among laymen." Bloom, supra note 12, at 157. See also Diane Solov, Finding Sympathetic Ears: Supreme Court Sanctions Take Into Account Variety of Situations, Excuses of Lawyers, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, Apr. 11, 1993, at A13 (criticizing that "[f]ew complaints about lawyers result in sanctions, but even fewer result in sanctions that cause lawyers to miss a beat in their practice" and noting that "[m]ore than 37% of the 389 lawyers sanctioned between 1982 and 1991 continued to practice" and that "consumers are unlikely to learn of misconduct"); Diane Solov, Their Own Brand of Justice; Critics Say Ohio Fails to Protect Consumers Against Bad Lawyers; System of Discipline Questioned, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, Apr. 11, 1993, at 1A (recounting that one percent of 20,770 complaints filed against lawyers from 1987 to 1991 resulted in sanctions - less than a third of the national rate; "most complaints . . . never get out of the starting gate" and that the '"process doesn't serve its stated purpose, which is to protect the public and the administration of justice"' (quoting law professor Jack A. Guttenberg)); Solov, Mixed Results, supra note 5 (emphasizing that lawyers in Ohio "miss the mark" when it comes to "sweeping scoundrels out of their profession"). See generally EDWARD LAZARUS, CLOSED CHAMBERS 9 (1998) (indicating that the public "accept[s] . . . the certainty that" even Supreme Court "judges will sometimes err or overstep their bounds").
70. Experts recently questioned lawyer accountability in Ohio after reviewing its disciplinary process - a process premised on self-regulation. They noted a risk to public confidence in the integrity of the process when "probably in excess of 90%, of grievances [against lawyers were] dismissed without any formal sanction." BELL REPORT, infra note 41, at 4-5. See also Guttenberg, supra note 6, at 988. The belief that lawyers are not held sufficiently accountable for their actions is longstanding. As the ABA President in 1965; United States Supreme Court Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. stated: "I have found, far and wide, a growing dissatisfaction with the adequacy of the discipline maintained by our profession . . . . [T]his dissatisfaction is justified. It is found among thoughtful lawyers . . . and it is widely prevalent among laymen." Bloom, supra note 12, at 157. See also Diane Solov, Finding Sympathetic Ears: Supreme Court Sanctions Take Into Account Variety of Situations, Excuses of Lawyers, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, Apr. 11, 1993, at A13 (criticizing that "[f]ew complaints about lawyers result in sanctions, but even fewer result in sanctions that cause lawyers to miss a beat in their practice" and noting that "[m]ore than 37% of the 389 lawyers sanctioned between 1982 and 1991 continued to practice" and that "consumers are unlikely to learn of misconduct"); Diane Solov, Their Own Brand of Justice; Critics Say Ohio Fails to Protect Consumers Against Bad Lawyers; System of Discipline Questioned, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, Apr. 11, 1993, at 1A (recounting that one percent of 20,770 complaints filed against lawyers from 1987 to 1991 resulted in sanctions - less than a third of the national rate; "most complaints . . . never get out of the starting gate" and that the '"process doesn't serve its stated purpose, which is to protect the public and the administration of justice"' (quoting law professor Jack A. Guttenberg)); Solov, Mixed Results, supra note 5 (emphasizing that lawyers in Ohio "miss the mark" when it comes to "sweeping scoundrels out of their profession"). See generally EDWARD LAZARUS, CLOSED CHAMBERS 9 (1998) (indicating that the public "accept[s] . . . the certainty that" even Supreme Court "judges will sometimes err or overstep their bounds").
71. Experts recently questioned lawyer accountability in Ohio after reviewing its disciplinary process - a process premised on self-regulation. They noted a risk to public confidence in the integrity of the process when "probably in excess of 90%, of grievances [against lawyers were] dismissed without any formal sanction." BELL REPORT, infra note 41, at 4-5. See also Guttenberg, supra note 6, at 988. The belief that lawyers are not held sufficiently accountable for their actions is longstanding. As the ABA President in 1965; United States Supreme Court Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. stated: "I have found, far and wide, a growing dissatisfaction with the adequacy of the discipline maintained by our profession . . . . [T]his dissatisfaction is justified. It is found among thoughtful lawyers . . . and it is widely prevalent among laymen." Bloom, supra note 12, at 157. See also Diane Solov, Finding Sympathetic Ears: Supreme Court Sanctions Take Into Account Variety of Situations, Excuses of Lawyers, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, Apr. 11, 1993, at A13 (criticizing that "[f]ew complaints about lawyers result in sanctions, but even fewer result in sanctions that cause lawyers to miss a beat in their practice" and noting that "[m]ore than 37% of the 389 lawyers sanctioned between 1982 and 1991 continued to practice" and that "consumers are unlikely to learn of misconduct"); Diane Solov, Their Own Brand of Justice; Critics Say Ohio Fails to Protect Consumers Against Bad Lawyers; System of Discipline Questioned, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, Apr. 11, 1993, at 1A (recounting that one percent of 20,770 complaints filed against lawyers from 1987 to 1991 resulted in sanctions - less than a third of the national rate; "most complaints . . . never get out of the starting gate" and that the '"process doesn't serve its stated purpose, which is to protect the public and the administration of justice"' (quoting law professor Jack A. Guttenberg)); Solov, Mixed Results, supra note 5 (emphasizing that lawyers in Ohio "miss the mark" when it comes to "sweeping scoundrels out of their profession"). See generally EDWARD LAZARUS, CLOSED CHAMBERS 9 (1998) (indicating that the public "accept[s] . . . the certainty that" even Supreme Court "judges will sometimes err or overstep their bounds").
72. Experts recently questioned lawyer accountability in Ohio after reviewing its disciplinary process - a process premised on self-regulation. They noted a risk to public confidence in the integrity of the process when "probably in excess of 90%, of grievances [against lawyers were] dismissed without any formal sanction." BELL REPORT, infra note 41, at 4-5. See also Guttenberg, supra note 6, at 988. The belief that lawyers are not held sufficiently accountable for their actions is longstanding. As the ABA President in 1965; United States Supreme Court Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. stated: "I have found, far and wide, a growing dissatisfaction with the adequacy of the discipline maintained by our profession . . . . [T]his dissatisfaction is justified. It is found among thoughtful lawyers . . . and it is widely prevalent among laymen." Bloom, supra note 12, at 157. See also Diane Solov, Finding Sympathetic Ears: Supreme Court Sanctions Take Into Account Variety of Situations, Excuses of Lawyers, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, Apr. 11, 1993, at A13 (criticizing that "[f]ew complaints about lawyers result in sanctions, but even fewer result in sanctions that cause lawyers to miss a beat in their practice" and noting that "[m]ore than 37% of the 389 lawyers sanctioned between 1982 and 1991 continued to practice" and that "consumers are unlikely to learn of misconduct"); Diane Solov, Their Own Brand of Justice; Critics Say Ohio Fails to Protect Consumers Against Bad Lawyers; System of Discipline Questioned, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, Apr. 11, 1993, at 1A (recounting that one percent of 20,770 complaints filed against lawyers from 1987 to 1991 resulted in sanctions - less than a third of the national rate; "most complaints . . . never get out of the starting gate" and that the '"process doesn't serve its stated purpose, which is to protect the public and the administration of justice"' (quoting law professor Jack A. Guttenberg)); Solov, Mixed Results, supra note 5 (emphasizing that lawyers in Ohio "miss the mark" when it comes to "sweeping scoundrels out of their profession"). See generally EDWARD LAZARUS, CLOSED CHAMBERS 9 (1998) (indicating that the public "accept[s] . . . the certainty that" even Supreme Court "judges will sometimes err or overstep their bounds").
73. For a scholarly discussion by a non-lawyer of the problems of lawyer self-regulation, see JETHRO K. LIEBERMAN, CRISIS AT THE BAR (1978). "The failure of grievance committees to stalk incompetence is mirrored by the abysmal record of the courts." Id. at 203. Judges do not forward "the names of . . . incompetent attorneys to disciplinary committees for appropriate action, nor have they imposed sanctions on their own motion." Id. at 203-04. Professor Lieberman asserts that the bar is "incapable of rooting out improper behavior" and recommends, in part, that bar-appointed and bar-operated disciplinary committees be replaced by a system "operated by and for the public." Id. at 218-20. Even when attorneys are held accountable for inappropriate conduct, they sometimes appear to receive kid-gloves disciplinary treatment from their peers. For example, two attorneys who engaged in a fight in the Cuyahoga County Juvenile Court were merely required to pass through metal detectors after threatening to harm each other in the future. See Christopher Quinn, Lawyers Ordered to Use Detector, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, Oct. 28, 1998, at IB.
74. For a scholarly discussion by a non-lawyer of the problems of lawyer self-regulation, see JETHRO K. LIEBERMAN, CRISIS AT THE BAR (1978). "The failure of grievance committees to stalk incompetence is mirrored by the abysmal record of the courts." Id. at 203. Judges do not forward "the names of . . . incompetent attorneys to disciplinary committees for appropriate action, nor have they imposed sanctions on their own motion." Id. at 203-04. Professor Lieberman asserts that the bar is "incapable of rooting out improper behavior" and recommends, in part, that bar-appointed and bar-operated disciplinary committees be replaced by a system "operated by and for the public." Id. at 218-20. Even when attorneys are held accountable for inappropriate conduct, they sometimes appear to receive kid-gloves disciplinary treatment from their peers. For example, two attorneys who engaged in a fight in the Cuyahoga County Juvenile Court were merely required to pass through metal detectors after threatening to harm each other in the future. See Christopher Quinn, Lawyers Ordered to Use Detector, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, Oct. 28, 1998, at IB.
75. For a scholarly discussion by a non-lawyer of the problems of lawyer self-regulation, see JETHRO K. LIEBERMAN, CRISIS AT THE BAR (1978). "The failure of grievance committees to stalk incompetence is mirrored by the abysmal record of the courts." Id. at 203. Judges do not forward "the names of . . . incompetent attorneys to disciplinary committees for appropriate action, nor have they imposed sanctions on their own motion." Id. at 203-04. Professor Lieberman asserts that the bar is "incapable of rooting out improper behavior" and recommends, in part, that bar-appointed and bar-operated disciplinary committees be replaced by a system "operated by and for the public." Id. at 218-20. Even when attorneys are held accountable for inappropriate conduct, they sometimes appear to receive kid-gloves disciplinary treatment from their peers. For example, two attorneys who engaged in a fight in the Cuyahoga County Juvenile Court were merely required to pass through metal detectors after threatening to harm each other in the future. See Christopher Quinn, Lawyers Ordered to Use Detector, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, Oct. 28, 1998, at IB.
76. For a scholarly discussion by a non-lawyer of the problems of lawyer self-regulation, see JETHRO K. LIEBERMAN, CRISIS AT THE BAR (1978). "The failure of grievance committees to stalk incompetence is mirrored by the abysmal record of the courts." Id. at 203. Judges do not forward "the names of . . . incompetent attorneys to disciplinary committees for appropriate action, nor have they imposed sanctions on their own motion." Id. at 203-04. Professor Lieberman asserts that the bar is "incapable of rooting out improper behavior" and recommends, in part, that bar-appointed and bar-operated disciplinary committees be replaced by a system "operated by and for the public." Id. at 218-20. Even when attorneys are held accountable for inappropriate conduct, they sometimes appear to receive kid-gloves disciplinary treatment from their peers. For example, two attorneys who engaged in a fight in the Cuyahoga County Juvenile Court were merely required to pass through metal detectors after threatening to harm each other in the future. See Christopher Quinn, Lawyers Ordered to Use Detector, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, Oct. 28, 1998, at IB.
77. For a scholarly discussion by a non-lawyer of the problems of lawyer self-regulation, see JETHRO K. LIEBERMAN, CRISIS AT THE BAR (1978). "The failure of grievance committees to stalk incompetence is mirrored by the abysmal record of the courts." Id. at 203. Judges do not forward "the names of . . . incompetent attorneys to disciplinary committees for appropriate action, nor have they imposed sanctions on their own motion." Id. at 203-04. Professor Lieberman asserts that the bar is "incapable of rooting out improper behavior" and recommends, in part, that bar-appointed and bar-operated disciplinary committees be replaced by a system "operated by and for the public." Id. at 218-20. Even when attorneys are held accountable for inappropriate conduct, they sometimes appear to receive kid-gloves disciplinary treatment from their peers. For example, two attorneys who engaged in a fight in the Cuyahoga County Juvenile Court were merely required to pass through metal detectors after threatening to harm each other in the future. See Christopher Quinn, Lawyers Ordered to Use Detector, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, Oct. 28, 1998, at IB.
78. See KRONMAN, supra note 1, at 12-13 (noting that the "lawyer-statesman" ideal, the possession of "great practical wisdom" and "exceptional persuasive powers . . . devoted to the public good . . . has reached an all-time low . . . and can stir feelings of suspicion or contempt"); LAZARUS, supra note 20, at 34 (reporting that "much of the advocacy before the [United States Supreme] Court is mediocre, some downright contemptible" and that "[t]he client rarely present, pays the price"); Gene G. James, Whistle Blowing: Its Moral Justification, in CASES AND READINGS IN MARKETS, ETHICS, AND LAW 249 (Bruce S. Buchanan et al., eds., 5th ed. 1998) (recommending that whistle blowers consult lawyers but cautioning that "lawyers frequently view problems within a narrow legal framework, and decisions to blow the whistle are moral decisions, so in the final analysis" one can not assume lawyers will act morally and therefore one must "rely on [his or her] own judgment"); Joseph C. Sommer, Editorial, Shielding Judges Won't Help, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Jan. 31, 1998, at 11A (suggesting "that much of the criticism [against judges] is justified and signals a need for substantial improvement in the performance of our court system" and that lawyers who defend judges from valid criticism are doing a disservice to the public). Attorney Sommer also quotes Lewis M. Isaacs, Jr., a "prominent New York housing lawyer," who described a judge as often a person "whose ignorance, intolerance and impatience are such as to sicken anyone who stops to think about them . . . the judiciary is overloaded with bias, intolerance, cowardice, impatience, and sometimes graft." Id. See also VINCENT BUGLIOSI, OUTRAGE: THE FIVE REASONS WHY O.J. SIMPSON GOT AWAY WITH MURDER 88 (1996) (criticizing most judges as having "little or no trial experience as a lawyer, or is pompous and dictatorial on the bench, or worst of all, is clearly partial to one side or the other in a lawsuit . . . and [s]ometimes the judge displays all three"). See generally LAZARUS, supra note 20. "[T]he Justices knew, there were hundreds of cases like Tompkins', in which prosecutors, state courts, or both abused or avoided Batson's command" to ban race-biased jury selection. BUGLIOSI, supra, at 71. Yet four justices, even with the "egregious facts" in Tompkins, broke the Court's command in Batson. See id. "The corrosiveness of this fact . . . foster[s] precisely the kind of legitimate mistrust of the judicial system that pervades the black community and destroys the possibility of a shared vision of justice." Id.
79. See KRONMAN, supra note 1, at 12-13 (noting that the "lawyer-statesman" ideal, the possession of "great practical wisdom" and "exceptional persuasive powers . . . devoted to the public good . . . has reached an all-time low . . . and can stir feelings of suspicion or contempt"); LAZARUS, supra note 20, at 34 (reporting that "much of the advocacy before the [United States Supreme] Court is mediocre, some downright contemptible" and that "[t]he client rarely present, pays the price"); Gene G. James, Whistle Blowing: Its Moral Justification, in CASES AND READINGS IN MARKETS, ETHICS, AND LAW 249 (Bruce S. Buchanan et al., eds., 5th ed. 1998) (recommending that whistle blowers consult lawyers but cautioning that "lawyers frequently view problems within a narrow legal framework, and decisions to blow the whistle are moral decisions, so in the final analysis" one can not assume lawyers will act morally and therefore one must "rely on [his or her] own judgment"); Joseph C. Sommer, Editorial, Shielding Judges Won't Help, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Jan. 31, 1998, at 11A (suggesting "that much of the criticism [against judges] is justified and signals a need for substantial improvement in the performance of our court system" and that lawyers who defend judges from valid criticism are doing a disservice to the public). Attorney Sommer also quotes Lewis M. Isaacs, Jr., a "prominent New York housing lawyer," who described a judge as often a person "whose ignorance, intolerance and impatience are such as to sicken anyone who stops to think about them . . . the judiciary is overloaded with bias, intolerance, cowardice, impatience, and sometimes graft." Id. See also VINCENT BUGLIOSI, OUTRAGE: THE FIVE REASONS WHY O.J. SIMPSON GOT AWAY WITH MURDER 88 (1996) (criticizing most judges as having "little or no trial experience as a lawyer, or is pompous and dictatorial on the bench, or worst of all, is clearly partial to one side or the other in a lawsuit . . . and [s]ometimes the judge displays all three"). See generally LAZARUS, supra note 20. "[T]he Justices knew, there were hundreds of cases like Tompkins', in which prosecutors, state courts, or both abused or avoided Batson's command" to ban race-biased jury selection. BUGLIOSI, supra, at 71. Yet four justices, even with the "egregious facts" in Tompkins, broke the Court's command in Batson. See id. "The corrosiveness of this fact . . . foster[s] precisely the kind of legitimate mistrust of the judicial system that pervades the black community and destroys the possibility of a shared vision of justice." Id.
80. See KRONMAN, supra note 1, at 12-13 (noting that the "lawyer-statesman" ideal, the possession of "great practical wisdom" and "exceptional persuasive powers . . . devoted to the public good . . . has reached an all-time low . . . and can stir feelings of suspicion or contempt"); LAZARUS, supra note 20, at 34 (reporting that "much of the advocacy before the [United States Supreme] Court is mediocre, some downright contemptible" and that "[t]he client rarely present, pays the price"); Gene G. James, Whistle Blowing: Its Moral Justification, in CASES AND READINGS IN MARKETS, ETHICS, AND LAW 249 (Bruce S. Buchanan et al., eds., 5th ed. 1998) (recommending that whistle blowers consult lawyers but cautioning that "lawyers frequently view problems within a narrow legal framework, and decisions to blow the whistle are moral decisions, so in the final analysis" one can not assume lawyers will act morally and therefore one must "rely on [his or her] own judgment"); Joseph C. Sommer, Editorial, Shielding Judges Won't Help, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Jan. 31, 1998, at 11A (suggesting "that much of the criticism [against judges] is justified and signals a need for substantial improvement in the performance of our court system" and that lawyers who defend judges from valid criticism are doing a disservice to the public). Attorney Sommer also quotes Lewis M. Isaacs, Jr., a "prominent New York housing lawyer," who described a judge as often a person "whose ignorance, intolerance and impatience are such as to sicken anyone who stops to think about them . . . the judiciary is overloaded with bias, intolerance, cowardice, impatience, and sometimes graft." Id. See also VINCENT BUGLIOSI, OUTRAGE: THE FIVE REASONS WHY O.J. SIMPSON GOT AWAY WITH MURDER 88 (1996) (criticizing most judges as having "little or no trial experience as a lawyer, or is pompous and dictatorial on the bench, or worst of all, is clearly partial to one side or the other in a lawsuit . . . and [s]ometimes the judge displays all three"). See generally LAZARUS, supra note 20. "[T]he Justices knew, there were hundreds of cases like Tompkins', in which prosecutors, state courts, or both abused or avoided Batson's command" to ban race-biased jury selection. BUGLIOSI, supra, at 71. Yet four justices, even with the "egregious facts" in Tompkins, broke the Court's command in Batson. See id. "The corrosiveness of this fact . . . foster[s] precisely the kind of legitimate mistrust of the judicial system that pervades the black community and destroys the possibility of a shared vision of justice." Id.
81. See KRONMAN, supra note 1, at 12-13 (noting that the "lawyer-statesman" ideal, the possession of "great practical wisdom" and "exceptional persuasive powers . . . devoted to the public good . . . has reached an all-time low . . . and can stir feelings of suspicion or contempt"); LAZARUS, supra note 20, at 34 (reporting that "much of the advocacy before the [United States Supreme] Court is mediocre, some downright contemptible" and that "[t]he client rarely present, pays the price"); Gene G. James, Whistle Blowing: Its Moral Justification, in CASES AND READINGS IN MARKETS, ETHICS, AND LAW 249 (Bruce S. Buchanan et al., eds., 5th ed. 1998) (recommending that whistle blowers consult lawyers but cautioning that "lawyers frequently view problems within a narrow legal framework, and decisions to blow the whistle are moral decisions, so in the final analysis" one can not assume lawyers will act morally and therefore one must "rely on [his or her] own judgment"); Joseph C. Sommer, Editorial, Shielding Judges Won't Help, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Jan. 31, 1998, at 11A (suggesting "that much of the criticism [against judges] is justified and signals a need for substantial improvement in the performance of our court system" and that lawyers who defend judges from valid criticism are doing a disservice to the public). Attorney Sommer also quotes Lewis M. Isaacs, Jr., a "prominent New York housing lawyer," who described a judge as often a person "whose ignorance, intolerance and impatience are such as to sicken anyone who stops to think about them . . . the judiciary is overloaded with bias, intolerance, cowardice, impatience, and sometimes graft." Id. See also VINCENT BUGLIOSI, OUTRAGE: THE FIVE REASONS WHY O.J. SIMPSON GOT AWAY WITH MURDER 88 (1996) (criticizing most judges as having "little or no trial experience as a lawyer, or is pompous and dictatorial on the bench, or worst of all, is clearly partial to one side or the other in a lawsuit . . . and [s]ometimes the judge displays all three"). See generally LAZARUS, supra note 20. "[T]he Justices knew, there were hundreds of cases like Tompkins', in which prosecutors, state courts, or both abused or avoided Batson's command" to ban race-biased jury selection. BUGLIOSI, supra, at 71. Yet four justices, even with the "egregious facts" in Tompkins, broke the Court's command in Batson. See id. "The corrosiveness of this fact . . . foster[s] precisely the kind of legitimate mistrust of the judicial system that pervades the black community and destroys the possibility of a shared vision of justice." Id.
82. Joseph C. Sommer, Editorial, Shielding Judges Won't Help, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Jan. 31, 1998, at 11A. One author wrote that "in many - far too many - instances, the benches of our courts in the United States are occupied by mediocrities - men of small talent, undistinguished in performance, technically deficient and inept." ANNE STRICK, INJUSTICE FOR ALL 159 (1977) (quoting Judge Samuel Rosenman at 48 J. AM.JUD. SOC'Y 87). A recent controversy involving Common Pleas Judge, Patricia Cleary, illustrated for some observers their concern about the selection, competency and ethics of some Ohio judges and their lack of accountability. Judge Cleary opposes abortion and precluded a university student from obtaining an abortion by sentencing her to six months in jail for a minor forgery charge. At sentencing, Judge Cleary told the student's lawyer, "I'm saying she is not having a second-term abortion." Girl Is Born to Ex-Inmate Who Stud Over Abortion, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 1999, at 33. The crime usually warrants probation rather than confinement, especially when the defendant cooperates as in this case. See id. The defendant asserted that the judge was going to release her on bond until the judge learned that she planned to have an abortion. The Eighth District Court of Appeals quickly rejected Judge deary's rationale for confinement and ordered the defendant's release upon posting ten percent of her $15,000 bond. See Abortion Issue in Ohio Case, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 1998, at A19; see also James Ewinger, Judge Sued for Blocking Abortion, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, Nov. 6, 1998, at B1 (reporting defendant's suit against Judge Cleary for failing to allow abortion). The defense of absolute Judicial immunity protects Judge Cleary from civil liability for her decision. Although this doctrine is necessary and vital to an independent judiciary, it also underscores the difficulty in holding judges accountable and the need for an effective judicial disciplinary process to penalize judges for misconduct. Public concern about Ohio's judiciary includes the revelation that there were two sets of files regarding judicial disqualification cases. One set, the "gray files," maintained by the Ohio Supreme Court near its chambers on a floor separate from the other set, contained important information about subsequent dealings in these cases, and although available to the public was largely unknown by it. See James Bradshaw, Gray Area on Judges Needs Clearing Up, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Jan. 31, 1998, at 10A. "A system that makes information readily available only when government volunteers it is no protection against government, which is the ultimate purpose of laws guaranteeing access to public records." Id. Concern over or criticism of judges is also common in other states. See David M. Halbfinger, For a Judge, Yankee Call Just Another In a Blizzard, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 1998, at B5 (discussion of the New York Commission on Judicial Conduct panel's rebuke of Justice McKeon of the State Supreme Court in the Bronx for "discussing a pending case with a reporter for the New York Times, appearing on television to comment on the civil case against O.J. Simpson, and asking the city's Law Department to speed its hiring of a woman who once worked for him" and with whom he had a personal relationship and then lobbying for her retention when the department sought to dismiss her); see also Dan Barry, Judge Blocks Giuliani Move Over Stadium, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 1998, at B1 (stating that New York City Mayor Giuliani denounced a state judge who ordered a referendum on the future of Yankee Stadium "as a tool of the Bronx Democratic Party machine, and dismissed his ruling as being devoid of objective legal analysis." Mayor Giuliani noted that, "'judges are not supposed to [play politics]'").
83. Joseph C. Sommer, Editorial, Shielding Judges Won't Help, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Jan. 31, 1998, at 11A. One author wrote that "in many - far too many - instances, the benches of our courts in the United States are occupied by mediocrities - men of small talent, undistinguished in performance, technically deficient and inept." ANNE STRICK, INJUSTICE FOR ALL 159 (1977) (quoting Judge Samuel Rosenman at 48 J. AM.JUD. SOC'Y 87). A recent controversy involving Common Pleas Judge, Patricia Cleary, illustrated for some observers their concern about the selection, competency and ethics of some Ohio judges and their lack of accountability. Judge Cleary opposes abortion and precluded a university student from obtaining an abortion by sentencing her to six months in jail for a minor forgery charge. At sentencing, Judge Cleary told the student's lawyer, "I'm saying she is not having a second-term abortion." Girl Is Born to Ex-Inmate Who Stud Over Abortion, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 1999, at 33. The crime usually warrants probation rather than confinement, especially when the defendant cooperates as in this case. See id. The defendant asserted that the judge was going to release her on bond until the judge learned that she planned to have an abortion. The Eighth District Court of Appeals quickly rejected Judge deary's rationale for confinement and ordered the defendant's release upon posting ten percent of her $15,000 bond. See Abortion Issue in Ohio Case, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 1998, at A19; see also James Ewinger, Judge Sued for Blocking Abortion, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, Nov. 6, 1998, at B1 (reporting defendant's suit against Judge Cleary for failing to allow abortion). The defense of absolute Judicial immunity protects Judge Cleary from civil liability for her decision. Although this doctrine is necessary and vital to an independent judiciary, it also underscores the difficulty in holding judges accountable and the need for an effective judicial disciplinary process to penalize judges for misconduct. Public concern about Ohio's judiciary includes the revelation that there were two sets of files regarding judicial disqualification cases. One set, the "gray files," maintained by the Ohio Supreme Court near its chambers on a floor separate from the other set, contained important information about subsequent dealings in these cases, and although available to the public was largely unknown by it. See James Bradshaw, Gray Area on Judges Needs Clearing Up, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Jan. 31, 1998, at 10A. "A system that makes information readily available only when government volunteers it is no protection against government, which is the ultimate purpose of laws guaranteeing access to public records." Id. Concern over or criticism of judges is also common in other states. See David M. Halbfinger, For a Judge, Yankee Call Just Another In a Blizzard, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 1998, at B5 (discussion of the New York Commission on Judicial Conduct panel's rebuke of Justice McKeon of the State Supreme Court in the Bronx for "discussing a pending case with a reporter for the New York Times, appearing on television to comment on the civil case against O.J. Simpson, and asking the city's Law Department to speed its hiring of a woman who once worked for him" and with whom he had a personal relationship and then lobbying for her retention when the department sought to dismiss her); see also Dan Barry, Judge Blocks Giuliani Move Over Stadium, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 1998, at B1 (stating that New York City Mayor Giuliani denounced a state judge who ordered a referendum on the future of Yankee Stadium "as a tool of the Bronx Democratic Party machine, and dismissed his ruling as being devoid of objective legal analysis." Mayor Giuliani noted that, "'judges are not supposed to [play politics]'").
84. Joseph C. Sommer, Editorial, Shielding Judges Won't Help, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Jan. 31, 1998, at 11A. One author wrote that "in many - far too many - instances, the benches of our courts in the United States are occupied by mediocrities - men of small talent, undistinguished in performance, technically deficient and inept." ANNE STRICK, INJUSTICE FOR ALL 159 (1977) (quoting Judge Samuel Rosenman at 48 J. AM.JUD. SOC'Y 87). A recent controversy involving Common Pleas Judge, Patricia Cleary, illustrated for some observers their concern about the selection, competency and ethics of some Ohio judges and their lack of accountability. Judge Cleary opposes abortion and precluded a university student from obtaining an abortion by sentencing her to six months in jail for a minor forgery charge. At sentencing, Judge Cleary told the student's lawyer, "I'm saying she is not having a second-term abortion." Girl Is Born to Ex-Inmate Who Stud Over Abortion, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 1999, at 33. The crime usually warrants probation rather than confinement, especially when the defendant cooperates as in this case. See id. The defendant asserted that the judge was going to release her on bond until the judge learned that she planned to have an abortion. The Eighth District Court of Appeals quickly rejected Judge deary's rationale for confinement and ordered the defendant's release upon posting ten percent of her $15,000 bond. See Abortion Issue in Ohio Case, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 1998, at A19; see also James Ewinger, Judge Sued for Blocking Abortion, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, Nov. 6, 1998, at B1 (reporting defendant's suit against Judge Cleary for failing to allow abortion). The
85. Joseph C. Sommer, Editorial, Shielding Judges Won't Help, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Jan. 31, 1998, at 11A. One author wrote that "in many - far too many - instances, the benches of our courts in the United States are occupied by mediocrities - men of small talent, undistinguished in performance, technically deficient and inept." ANNE STRICK, INJUSTICE FOR ALL 159 (1977) (quoting Judge Samuel Rosenman at 48 J. AM.JUD. SOC'Y 87). A recent controversy involving Common Pleas Judge, Patricia Cleary, illustrated for some observers their concern about the selection, competency and ethics of some Ohio judges and their lack of accountability. Judge Cleary opposes abortion and precluded a university student from obtaining an abortion by sentencing her to six months in jail for a minor forgery charge. At sentencing, Judge Cleary told the student's lawyer, "I'm saying she is not having a second-term abortion." Girl Is Born to Ex-Inmate Who Stud Over Abortion, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 1999, at 33. The crime usually warrants probation rather than confinement, especially when the defendant cooperates as in this case. See id. The defendant asserted that the judge was going to release her on bond until the judge learned that she planned to have an abortion. The Eighth District Court of Appeals quickly rejected Judge deary's rationale for confinement and ordered the defendant's release upon posting ten percent of her $15,000 bond. See Abortion Issue in Ohio Case, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 1998, at A19; see also James Ewinger, Judge Sued for Blocking Abortion, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, Nov. 6, 1998, at B1 (reporting defendant's suit against Judge Cleary for failing to allow abortion). The defense of absolute Judicial immunity protects Judge Cleary from civil liability for her decision. Although this doctrine is necessary and vital to an independent judiciary, it also underscores the difficulty in holding judges accountable and the need for an effective judicial disciplinary process to penalize judges for misconduct. Public concern about Ohio's judiciary includes the revelation that there were two sets of files regarding judicial disqualification cases. One set, the "gray files," maintained by the Ohio Supreme Court near its chambers on a floor separate from the other set, contained important information about subsequent dealings in these cases, and although available to the public was largely unknown by it. See James Bradshaw, Gray Area on Judges Needs Clearing Up, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Jan. 31, 1998, at 10A. "A system that makes information readily available only when government volunteers it is no protection against government, which is the ultimate purpose of laws guaranteeing access to public records." Id. Concern over or criticism of judges is also common in other states. See David M. Halbfinger, For a Judge, Yankee Call Just Another In a Blizzard, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 1998, at B5 (discussion of the New York Commission on Judicial Conduct panel's rebuke of Justice McKeon of the State Supreme Court in the Bronx for "discussing a pending case with a reporter for the New York Times, appearing on television to comment on the civil case against O.J. Simpson, and asking the city's Law Department to speed its hiring of a woman who once worked for him" and with whom he had a personal relationship and then lobbying for her retention when the department sought to dismiss her); see also Dan Barry, Judge Blocks Giuliani Move Over Stadium, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 1998, at B1 (stating that New York City Mayor Giuliani denounced a state judge who ordered a referendum on the future of Yankee Stadium "as a tool of the Bronx Democratic Party machine, and dismissed his ruling as being devoid of objective legal analysis." Mayor Giuliani noted that, "'judges are not supposed to [play politics]'").
86. Joseph C. Sommer, Editorial, Shielding Judges Won't Help, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Jan. 31, 1998, at 11A. One author wrote that "in many - far too many - instances, the benches of our courts in the United States are occupied by mediocrities - men of small talent, undistinguished in performance, technically deficient and inept." ANNE STRICK, INJUSTICE FOR ALL 159 (1977) (quoting Judge Samuel Rosenman at 48 J. AM.JUD. SOC'Y 87). A recent controversy involving Common Pleas Judge, Patricia Cleary, illustrated for some observers their concern about the selection, competency and ethics of some Ohio judges and their lack of accountability. Judge Cleary opposes abortion and precluded a university student from obtaining an abortion by sentencing her to six months in jail for a minor forgery charge. At sentencing, Judge Cleary told the student's lawyer, "I'm saying she is not having a second-term abortion." Girl Is Born to Ex-Inmate Who Stud Over Abortion, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 1999, at 33. The crime usually warrants probation rather than confinement, especially when the defendant cooperates as in this case. See id. The defendant asserted that the judge was going to release her on bond until the judge learned that she planned to have an abortion. The Eighth District Court of Appeals quickly rejected Judge deary's rationale for confinement and ordered the defendant's release upon posting ten percent of her $15,000 bond. See Abortion Issue in Ohio Case, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 1998, at A19; see also James Ewinger, Judge Sued for Blocking Abortion, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, Nov. 6, 1998, at B1 (reporting defendant's suit against Judge Cleary for failing to allow abortion). The defense of absolute Judicial immunity protects Judge Cleary from civil liability for her decision. Although this doctrine is necessary and vital to an independent judiciary, it also underscores the difficulty in holding judges accountable and the need for an effective judicial disciplinary process to penalize judges for misconduct. Public concern about Ohio's judiciary includes the revelation that there were two sets of files regarding judicial disqualification cases. One set, the "gray files," maintained by the Ohio Supreme Court near its chambers on a floor separate from the other set, contained important information about subsequent dealings in these cases, and although available to the public was largely unknown by it. See James Bradshaw, Gray Area on Judges Needs Clearing Up, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Jan. 31, 1998, at 10A. "A system that makes information readily available only when government volunteers it is no protection against government, which is the ultimate purpose of laws guaranteeing access to public records." Id. Concern over or criticism of judges is also common in other states. See David M. Halbfinger, For a Judge, Yankee Call Just Another In a Blizzard, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 1998, at B5 (discussion of the New York Commission on Judicial Conduct panel's rebuke of Justice McKeon of the State Supreme Court in the Bronx for "discussing a pending case with a reporter for the New York Times, appearing on television to comment on the civil case against O.J. Simpson, and asking the city's Law Department to speed its hiring of a woman who once worked for him" and with whom he had a personal relationship and then lobbying for her retention when the department sought to dismiss her); see also Dan Barry, Judge Blocks Giuliani Move Over Stadium, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 1998, at B1 (stating that New York City Mayor Giuliani denounced a state judge who ordered a referendum on the future of Yankee Stadium "as a tool of the Bronx Democratic Party machine, and dismissed his ruling as being devoid of objective legal analysis." Mayor Giuliani noted that, "'judges are not supposed to [play politics]'").
87. Joseph C. Sommer, Editorial, Shielding Judges Won't Help, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Jan. 31, 1998, at 11A. One author wrote that "in many - far too many - instances, the benches of our courts in the United States are occupied by mediocrities - men of small talent, undistinguished in performance, technically deficient and inept." ANNE STRICK, INJUSTICE FOR ALL 159 (1977) (quoting Judge Samuel Rosenman at 48 J. AM.JUD. SOC'Y 87). A recent controversy involving Common Pleas Judge, Patricia Cleary, illustrated for some observers their concern about the selection, competency and ethics of some Ohio judges and their lack of accountability. Judge Cleary opposes abortion and precluded a university student from obtaining an abortion by sentencing her to six months in jail for a minor forgery charge. At sentencing, Judge Cleary told the student's lawyer, "I'm saying she is not having a second-term abortion." Girl Is Born to Ex-Inmate Who Stud Over Abortion, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 1999, at 33. The crime usually warrants probation rather than confinement, especially when the defendant cooperates as in this case. See id. The defendant asserted that the judge was going to release her on bond until the judge learned that she planned to have an abortion. The Eighth District Court of Appeals quickly rejected Judge deary's rationale for confinement and ordered the defendant's release upon posting ten percent of her $15,000 bond. See Abortion Issue in Ohio Case, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 1998, at A19; see also James Ewinger, Judge Sued for Blocking Abortion, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, Nov. 6, 1998, at B1 (reporting defendant's suit against Judge Cleary for failing to allow abortion). The defense of absolute Judicial immunity protects Judge Cleary from civil liability for her decision. Although this doctrine is necessary and vital to an independent judiciary, it also underscores the difficulty in holding judges accountable and the need for an effective judicial disciplinary process to penalize judges for misconduct. Public concern about Ohio's judiciary includes the revelation that there were two sets of files regarding judicial disqualification cases. One set, the "gray files," maintained by the Ohio Supreme Court near its chambers on a floor separate from the other set, contained important information about subsequent dealings in these cases, and although available to the public was largely unknown by it. See James Bradshaw, Gray Area on Judges Needs Clearing Up, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Jan. 31, 1998, at 10A. "A system that makes information readily available only when government volunteers it is no protection against government, which is the ultimate purpose of laws guaranteeing access to public records." Id. Concern over or criticism of judges is also common in other states. See David M. Halbfinger, For a Judge, Yankee Call Just Another In a Blizzard, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 1998, at B5 (discussion of the New York Commission on Judicial Conduct panel's rebuke of Justice McKeon of the State Supreme Court in the Bronx for "discussing a pending case with a reporter for the New York Times, appearing on television to comment on the civil case against O.J. Simpson, and asking the city's Law Department to speed its hiring of a woman who once worked for him" and with whom he had a personal relationship and then lobbying for her retention when the department sought to dismiss her); see also Dan Barry, Judge Blocks Giuliani Move Over Stadium, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 1998, at B1 (stating that New York City Mayor Giuliani denounced a state judge who ordered a referendum on the future of Yankee Stadium "as a tool of the Bronx Democratic Party machine, and dismissed his ruling as being devoid of objective legal analysis." Mayor Giuliani noted that, "'judges are not supposed to [play politics]'").
88. Joseph C. Sommer, Editorial, Shielding Judges Won't Help, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Jan. 31, 1998, at 11A. One author wrote that "in many - far too many - instances, the benches of our courts in the United States are occupied by mediocrities - men of small talent, undistinguished in performance, technically deficient and inept." ANNE STRICK, INJUSTICE FOR ALL 159 (1977) (quoting Judge Samuel Rosenman at 48 J. AM.JUD. SOC'Y 87). A recent controversy involving Common Pleas Judge, Patricia Cleary, illustrated for some observers their concern about the selection, competency and ethics of some Ohio judges and their lack of accountability. Judge Cleary opposes abortion and precluded a university student from obtaining an abortion by sentencing her to six months in jail for a minor forgery charge. At sentencing, Judge Cleary told the student's lawyer, "I'm saying she is not having a second-term abortion." Girl Is Born to Ex-Inmate Who Stud Over Abortion, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 1999, at 33. The crime usually warrants probation rather than confinement, especially when the defendant cooperates as in this case. See id. The defendant asserted that the judge was going to release her on bond until the judge learned that she planned to have an abortion. The Eighth District Court of Appeals quickly rejected Judge deary's rationale for confinement and ordered the defendant's release upon posting ten percent of her $15,000 bond. See Abortion Issue in Ohio Case, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 1998, at A19; see also James Ewinger, Judge Sued for Blocking Abortion, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, Nov. 6, 1998, at B1 (reporting defendant's suit against Judge Cleary for failing to allow abortion). The defense of absolute Judicial immunity protects Judge Cleary from civil liability for her decision. Although this doctrine is necessary and vital to an independent judiciary, it also underscores the difficulty in holding judges accountable and the need for an effective judicial disciplinary process to penalize judges for misconduct. Public concern about Ohio's judiciary includes the revelation that there were two sets of files regarding judicial disqualification cases. One set, the "gray files," maintained by the Ohio Supreme Court near its chambers on a floor separate from the other set, contained important information about subsequent dealings in these cases, and although available to the public was largely unknown by it. See James Bradshaw, Gray Area on Judges Needs Clearing Up, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Jan. 31, 1998, at 10A. "A system that makes information readily available only when government volunteers it is no protection against government, which is the ultimate purpose of laws guaranteeing access to public records." Id. Concern over or criticism of judges is also common in other states. See David M. Halbfinger, For a Judge, Yankee Call Just Another In a Blizzard, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 1998, at B5 (discussion of the New York Commission on Judicial Conduct panel's rebuke of Justice McKeon of the State Supreme Court in the Bronx for "discussing a pending case with a reporter for the New York Times, appearing on television to comment on the civil case against O.J. Simpson, and asking the city's Law Department to speed its hiring of a woman who once worked for him" and with whom he had a personal relationship and then lobbying for her retention when the department sought to dismiss her); see also Dan Barry, Judge Blocks Giuliani Move Over Stadium, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 1998, at B1 (stating that New York City Mayor Giuliani denounced a state judge who ordered a referendum on the future of Yankee Stadium "as a tool of the Bronx Democratic Party machine, and dismissed his ruling as being devoid of objective legal analysis." Mayor Giuliani noted that, "'judges are not supposed to [play politics]'").
89. Joseph C. Sommer, Editorial, Shielding Judges Won't Help, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Jan. 31, 1998, at 11A. One author wrote that "in many - far too many - instances, the benches of our courts in the United States are occupied by mediocrities - men of small talent, undistinguished in performance, technically deficient and inept." ANNE STRICK, INJUSTICE FOR ALL 159 (1977) (quoting Judge Samuel Rosenman at 48 J. AM.JUD. SOC'Y 87). A recent controversy involving Common Pleas Judge, Patricia Cleary, illustrated for some observers their concern about the selection, competency and ethics of some Ohio judges and their lack of accountability. Judge Cleary opposes abortion and precluded a university student from obtaining an abortion by sentencing her to six months in jail for a minor forgery charge. At sentencing, Judge Cleary told the student's lawyer, "I'm saying she is not having a second-term abortion." Girl Is Born to Ex-Inmate Who Stud Over Abortion, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 1999, at 33. The crime usually warrants probation rather than confinement, especially when the defendant cooperates as in this case. See id. The defendant asserted that the judge was going to release her on bond until the judge learned that she planned to have an abortion. The Eighth District Court of Appeals quickly rejected Judge deary's rationale for confinement and ordered the defendant's release upon posting ten percent of her $15,000 bond. See Abortion Issue in Ohio Case, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 1998, at A19; see also James Ewinger, Judge Sued for Blocking Abortion, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, Nov. 6, 1998, at B1 (reporting defendant's suit against Judge Cleary for failing to allow abortion). The defense of absolute Judicial immunity protects Judge Cleary from civil liability for her decision. Although this doctrine is necessary and vital to an independent judiciary, it also underscores the difficulty in holding judges accountable and the need for an effective judicial disciplinary process to penalize judges for misconduct. Public concern about Ohio's judiciary includes the revelation that there were two sets of files regarding judicial disqualification cases. One set, the "gray files," maintained by the Ohio Supreme Court near its chambers on a floor separate from the other set, contained important information about subsequent dealings in these cases, and although available to the public was largely unknown by it. See James Bradshaw, Gray Area on Judges Needs Clearing Up, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Jan. 31, 1998, at 10A. "A system that makes information readily available only when government volunteers it is no protection against government, which is the ultimate purpose of laws guaranteeing access to public records." Id. Concern over or criticism of judges is also common in other states. See David M. Halbfinger, For a Judge, Yankee Call Just Another In a Blizzard, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 1998, at B5 (discussion of the New York Commission on Judicial Conduct panel's rebuke of Justice McKeon of the State Supreme Court in the Bronx for "discussing a pending case with a reporter for the New York Times, appearing on television to comment on the civil case against O.J. Simpson, and asking the city's Law Department to speed its hiring of a woman who once worked for him" and with whom he had a personal relationship and then lobbying for her retention when the department sought to dismiss her); see also Dan Barry, Judge Blocks Giuliani Move Over Stadium, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 1998, at B1 (stating that New York City Mayor Giuliani denounced a state judge who ordered a referendum on the future of Yankee Stadium "as a tool of the Bronx Democratic Party machine, and dismissed his ruling as being devoid of objective legal analysis." Mayor Giuliani noted that, "'judges are not supposed to [play politics]'").
90. Joseph C. Sommer, Editorial, Shielding Judges Won't Help, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Jan. 31, 1998, at 11A. One author wrote that "in many - far too many - instances, the benches of our courts in the United States are occupied by mediocrities - men of small talent, undistinguished in performance, technically deficient and inept." ANNE STRICK, INJUSTICE FOR ALL 159 (1977) (quoting Judge Samuel Rosenman at 48 J. AM.JUD. SOC'Y 87). A recent controversy involving Common Pleas Judge, Patricia Cleary, illustrated for some observers their concern about the selection, competency and ethics of some Ohio judges and their lack of accountability. Judge Cleary opposes abortion and precluded a university student from obtaining an abortion by sentencing her to six months in jail for a minor forgery charge. At sentencing, Judge Cleary told the student's lawyer, "I'm saying she is not having a second-term abortion." Girl Is Born to Ex-Inmate Who Stud Over Abortion, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 1999, at 33. The crime usually warrants probation rather than confinement, especially when the defendant cooperates as in this case. See id. The defendant asserted that the judge was going to release her on bond until the judge learned that she planned to have an abortion. The Eighth District Court of Appeals quickly rejected Judge deary's rationale for confinement and ordered the defendant's release upon posting ten percent of her $15,000 bond. See Abortion Issue in Ohio Case, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 1998, at A19; see also James Ewinger, Judge Sued for Blocking Abortion, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, Nov. 6, 1998, at B1 (reporting defendant's suit against Judge Cleary for failing to allow abortion). The defense of absolute Judicial immunity protects Judge Cleary from civil liability for her decision. Although this doctrine is necessary and vital to an independent judiciary, it also underscores the difficulty in holding judges accountable and the need for an effective judicial disciplinary process to penalize judges for misconduct. Public concern about Ohio's judiciary includes the revelation that there were two sets of files regarding judicial disqualification cases. One set, the "gray files," maintained by the Ohio Supreme Court near its chambers on a floor separate from the other set, contained important information about subsequent dealings in these cases, and although available to the public was largely unknown by it. See James Bradshaw, Gray Area on Judges Needs Clearing Up, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Jan. 31, 1998, at 10A. "A system that makes information readily available only when government volunteers it is no protection against government, which is the ultimate purpose of laws guaranteeing access to public records." Id. Concern over or criticism of judges is also common in other states. See David M. Halbfinger, For a Judge, Yankee Call Just Another In a Blizzard, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 1998, at B5 (discussion of the New York Commission on Judicial Conduct panel's rebuke of Justice McKeon of the State Supreme Court in the Bronx for "discussing a pending case with a reporter for the New York Times, appearing on television to comment on the civil case against O.J. Simpson, and asking the city's Law Department to speed its hiring of a woman who once worked for him" and with whom he had a personal relationship and then lobbying for her retention when the department sought to dismiss her); see also Dan Barry, Judge Blocks Giuliani Move Over Stadium, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 1998, at B1 (stating that New York City Mayor Giuliani denounced a state judge who ordered a referendum on the future of Yankee Stadium "as a tool of the Bronx Democratic Party machine, and dismissed his ruling as being devoid of objective legal analysis." Mayor Giuliani noted that, "'judges are not supposed to [play politics]'").
91. Catherine Candisky, Taking Lawyers To Task Found To Be Tasking, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Oct. 20, 1995, at 3B (reporting that several witnesses complained about Ohio's disciplinary system at the Ohio State Bar Association Committee to Review Ohio's Disciplinary Process hearing in Columbus, Ohio). For a discussion of the OSBA Committee to Review Ohio's Disciplinary Process, see infra notes 41-51 and accompanying text. See also Lisa Stern, The Survey of New York Practice, 70 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 839 (1996) (noting "public's skepticism" about lawyer discipline and citing the "secrecy of attorney disciplinary proceedings" as the "primary source"); Fern Schair Sussman, Lawyer Regulation for a New Century, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 8, 1993, at 2 (reporting on problems in lawyer discipline systems and highlighting several recommendations in the report of the ABA Commission on Evaluation of Disciplinary Enforcement to solve them).
92. Catherine Candisky, Taking Lawyers To Task Found To Be Tasking, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Oct. 20, 1995, at 3B (reporting that several witnesses complained about Ohio's disciplinary system at the Ohio State Bar Association Committee to Review Ohio's Disciplinary Process hearing in Columbus, Ohio). For a discussion of the OSBA Committee to Review Ohio's Disciplinary Process, see infra notes 41-51 and accompanying text. See also Lisa Stern, The Survey of New York Practice, 70 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 839 (1996) (noting "public's skepticism" about lawyer discipline and citing the "secrecy of attorney disciplinary proceedings" as the "primary source"); Fern Schair Sussman, Lawyer Regulation for a New Century, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 8, 1993, at 2 (reporting on problems in lawyer discipline systems and highlighting several recommendations in the report of the ABA Commission on Evaluation of Disciplinary Enforcement to solve them).
93. Catherine Candisky, Taking Lawyers To Task Found To Be Tasking, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Oct. 20, 1995, at 3B (reporting that several witnesses complained about Ohio's disciplinary system at the Ohio State Bar Association Committee to Review Ohio's Disciplinary Process hearing in Columbus, Ohio). For a discussion of the OSBA Committee to Review Ohio's Disciplinary Process, see infra notes 41-51 and accompanying text. See also Lisa Stern, The Survey of New York Practice, 70 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 839 (1996) (noting "public's skepticism" about lawyer discipline and citing the "secrecy of attorney disciplinary proceedings" as the "primary source"); Fern Schair Sussman, Lawyer Regulation for a New Century, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 8, 1993, at 2 (reporting on problems in lawyer discipline systems and highlighting several recommendations in the report of the ABA Commission on Evaluation of Disciplinary Enforcement to solve them).
94. Due partially to problems with lawyer self-regulation, administrative agencies, such as, the Securities and Exchange Commission, have created de facto lawyer regulatory regimes by increasing their control over the legal practice before them. See Richard W. Painter & Jennifer E. Duggan, SEC Discipline of Lawyers: In Search of a Firm Foundation, PROF. LAW. 97 (1997). But see MORGAN & ROTUNDA, supra note 11, at 35, 58-60 (noting, however, that the high courts and bar associations of each state still retain plenary power - over and beyond a particular field or agency - to discipline lawyers in general; describing discipline as one or more of the following actions: disbarment, suspension, fines, and both formal and informal reprimands).
95. See BELL REPORT, infra note 41, at 4, 8 (promoting public confidence in Ohio's legal profession requires that the "attorney disciplinary process must first and foremost protect the public" by "becom[ing] more efficient, more responsive to the public, more uniform, and more professional").
96. Guttenberg, supra note 6.
97. Id. at 949.
98. See id. at 955 n.11.
99. Id. at 949-50.
100. See id. at 950. Most of these volunteers staff the thirty-four local Certified Grievance Committees throughout the state charged with investigating and prosecuting grievances. See infra notes 79-93 and accompanying text (discussing quality of volunteers).
101. See Guttenberg, supra note 6, at 950; see also infra notes 200-39 and accompanying text (discussing the shroud of secrecy).
102. See Guttenberg, supra note 6, at 950. According to Professor Guttenberg, "Ohio disciplined between one-third and two-thirds fewer attorneys per thousand than the national average." Id. at 983.
103. See Guttenberg, supra note 6, at 949-50. In its introduction, the Bell Committee noted that past emphasis in fashioning Ohio's lawyer disciplinary process may have been to "insur[e] the effectiveness and fairness of the process when attorneys are disciplined." BELL REPORT, infra note 41, at 5. This emphasis, combined with the "fact that so many of the public's complaints about lawyers are rejected by the mechanism of self-regulation, makes the public's confidence in the integrity of the dismissal process of great importance." Id.
104. See Guttenberg, supra note 6, at 950, 959-61. In 1996, Ohio was the eighth largest state bar with active attorneys, but ranked tenth nationally in total budget for attorney discipline. See ABA Survey of Discipline Systems: 1996 Data, supra note 6, at 1-4 (Chart I), 24-28 (Chart VI). In 1996, California led state bar associations in spending on lawyer discipline - seventy percent of its $94.7 million budget. See Budget: Courage, or Foley?, CAL. ST. B.J., JAN. 1996, at 8. Partially in response to these findings, the Ohio Supreme Court, which regulates and controls the process for disciplining Ohio lawyers, recently increased the state registration or license fees from $100 to $250 per two-year period. See OHIO CONST, art. IV, § 2(B)(1)(g); Ohio Gov Bar R V, supra note 12; see also infra note 50 and accompanying text (discussing an earlier request to raise the registration fee to $210). The percentage of the fee increase targeted for supporting the attorney disciplinary process remains unknown. See Ohio Gov Bar R VI (B), supra note 12; see also Marshall Interview, supra note 14 (suggesting that increases over the last three or four years in the budgets for the Board and Disciplinary Counsel and additional funds for grievance committees' expenses may be attributable to the increase in registration fees).
105. See Guttenberg, supra note 6, at 950, 959-61. In 1996, Ohio was the eighth largest state bar with active attorneys, but ranked tenth nationally in total budget for attorney discipline. See ABA Survey of Discipline Systems: 1996 Data, supra note 6, at 1-4 (Chart I), 24-28 (Chart VI). In 1996, California led state bar associations in spending on lawyer discipline - seventy percent of its $94.7 million budget. See Budget: Courage, or Foley?, CAL. ST. B.J., JAN. 1996, at 8. Partially in response to these findings, the Ohio Supreme Court, which regulates and controls the process for disciplining Ohio lawyers, recently increased the state registration or license fees from $100 to $250 per two-year period. See OHIO CONST, art. IV, § 2(B)(1)(g); Ohio Gov Bar R V, supra note 12; see also infra note 50 and accompanying text (discussing an earlier request to raise the registration fee to $210). The percentage of the fee increase targeted for supporting the attorney disciplinary process remains unknown. See Ohio Gov Bar R VI (B), supra note 12; see also Marshall Interview, supra note 14 (suggesting that increases over the last three or four years in the budgets for the Board and Disciplinary Counsel and additional funds for grievance committees' expenses may be attributable to the increase in registration fees).
106. See Guttenberg, supra note 6, at 950, 959-61. In 1996, Ohio was the eighth largest state bar with active attorneys, but ranked tenth nationally in total budget for attorney discipline. See ABA Survey of Discipline Systems: 1996 Data, supra note 6, at 1-4 (Chart I), 24-28 (Chart VI). In 1996, California led state bar associations in spending on lawyer discipline - seventy percent of its $94.7 million budget. See Budget: Courage, or Foley?, CAL. ST. B.J., JAN. 1996, at 8. Partially in response to these findings, the Ohio Supreme Court, which regulates and controls the process for disciplining Ohio lawyers, recently increased the state registration or license fees from $100 to $250 per two-year period. See OHIO CONST, art. IV, § 2(B)(1)(g); Ohio Gov Bar R V, supra note 12; see also infra note 50 and accompanying text (discussing an earlier request to raise the registration fee to $210). The percentage of the fee increase targeted for supporting the attorney disciplinary process remains unknown. See Ohio Gov Bar R VI (B), supra note 12; see also Marshall Interview, supra note 14 (suggesting that increases over the last three or four years in the budgets for the Board and Disciplinary Counsel and additional funds for grievance committees' expenses may be attributable to the increase in registration fees).
107. See Guttenberg, supra note 6, at 950, 959-61. In 1996, Ohio was the eighth largest state bar with active attorneys, but ranked tenth nationally in total budget for attorney discipline. See ABA Survey of Discipline Systems: 1996 Data, supra note 6, at 1-4 (Chart I), 24-28 (Chart VI). In 1996, California led state bar associations in spending on lawyer discipline - seventy percent of its $94.7 million budget. See Budget: Courage, or Foley?, CAL. ST. B.J., JAN. 1996, at 8. Partially in response to these findings, the Ohio Supreme Court, which regulates and controls the process for disciplining Ohio lawyers, recently increased the state registration or license fees from $100 to $250 per two-year period. See OHIO CONST, art. IV, § 2(B)(1)(g); Ohio Gov Bar R V, supra note 12; see also infra note 50 and accompanying text (discussing an earlier request to raise the registration fee to $210). The percentage of the fee increase targeted for supporting the attorney disciplinary process remains unknown. See Ohio Gov Bar R VI (B), supra note 12; see also Marshall Interview, supra note 14 (suggesting that increases over the last three or four years in the budgets for the Board and Disciplinary Counsel and additional funds for grievance committees' expenses may be attributable to the increase in registration fees).
108. See Guttenberg, supra note 6, at 950, 959-61. In 1996, Ohio was the eighth largest state bar with active attorneys, but ranked tenth nationally in total budget for attorney discipline. See ABA Survey of Discipline Systems: 1996 Data, supra note 6, at 1-4 (Chart I), 24-28 (Chart VI). In 1996, California led state bar associations in spending on lawyer discipline - seventy percent of its $94.7 million budget. See Budget: Courage, or Foley?, CAL. ST. B.J., JAN. 1996, at 8. Partially in response to these findings, the Ohio Supreme Court, which regulates and controls the process for disciplining Ohio lawyers, recently increased the state registration or license fees from $100 to $250 per two-year period. See OHIO CONST, art. IV, § 2(B)(1)(g); Ohio Gov Bar R V, supra note 12; see also infra note 50 and accompanying text (discussing an earlier request to raise the registration fee to $210). The percentage of the fee increase targeted for supporting the attorney disciplinary process remains unknown. See Ohio Gov Bar R VI (B), supra note 12; see also Marshall Interview, supra note 14 (suggesting that increases over the last three or four years in the budgets for the Board and Disciplinary Counsel and additional funds for grievance committees' expenses may be attributable to the increase in registration fees).
109. Guttenberg, supra note 6, at 955. See also MCKAY REPORT, supra note 9, at 65 (recommending a central disciplinary and investigative authority).
110. See GREENBAUM, supra note 11, at 646. The Ohio Disciplinary Counsel's office in Columbus employs a staff of eighteen, including seven full-time attorneys and two investigators. See Coughlan Interview, supra note 6.
111. See GREENBAUM, supra note 11, at 646-48. In 1998, the volunteers of some the local grievance committees enjoyed the assistance of paid, full time bar counsel for investigating and prosecuting misconduct. They included two attorneys in the Cleveland Bar Association and one each in the Columbus, Cincinnati and Toledo Bar Associations. These attorneys along with the seven at the Ohio Disciplinary Counsel's office, brought the total number of paid, full-time attorneys involved in the investigation and prosecution of lawyer misconduct in Ohio to twelve.
112. See Guttenberg, supra note 6, at 956-57 (citing political motivation, inexperience, and slowness as some of the criticisms leveled against local certified grievance committees).
113. Prior to the publication of Professor Guttenberg's article, some lawyers, academicians, and other observers of Ohio's legal profession, perhaps best described as a group of professional responsibility experts, recognized some of the weaknesses plaguing Ohio's disciplinary regime. Guttenberg's article and its specific findings, however, galvanized the concerns of the professional responsibility community about the effectiveness of Ohio's disciplinary system. It also attracted sufficient attention from the public, lawyers and judges to force a response from the profession. In short, much of the discreteness that attended discussions about the weaknesses in Ohio's disciplinary system disappeared. In 1995, largely in response to Guttenberg's article, the Miller Institute of Professional Responsibility at the University of Akron School of Law sponsored a day-long, statewide conference in Cleveland to examine the disciplinary system and recommend improvements. See Miller Institute of Professional Responsibility and the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline, The Lawyer Grievance Process-A 1995 Perspective (May 1, 1995) (Cleveland, Ohio) [hereinafter May 1995 Miller Grievance Program]. Since 1995, the Miller Institute has annually sponsored or co-sponsored with the Board and the Ohio State Bar Association one or two similar statewide conferences in various locations. See e.g., Miller Institute of Professional Responsibility and the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline, The Lawyer Grievance Process-A 1995 Perspective (Cincinnati Dec. 19, 1995) [hereinafter Dec. 1995 Miller Grievance Program]; Miller Institute of Professional Responsibility and the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline, The Lawyer Grievance Process-A 1998 Perspective (Nov. 13, 1998) (Columbus, Ohio) [hereinafter Nov. 1998 Miller Grievance Program].
114. Prior to the publication of Professor Guttenberg's article, some lawyers, academicians, and other observers of Ohio's legal profession, perhaps best described as a group of professional responsibility experts, recognized some of the weaknesses plaguing Ohio's disciplinary regime. Guttenberg's article and its specific findings, however, galvanized the concerns of the professional responsibility community about the effectiveness of Ohio's disciplinary system. It also attracted sufficient attention from the public, lawyers and judges to force a response from the profession. In short, much of the discreteness that attended discussions about the weaknesses in Ohio's disciplinary system disappeared. In 1995, largely in response to Guttenberg's article, the Miller Institute of Professional Responsibility at the University of Akron School of Law sponsored a day-long, statewide conference in Cleveland to examine the disciplinary system and recommend improvements. See Miller Institute of Professional Responsibility and the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline, The Lawyer Grievance Process-A 1995 Perspective (May 1, 1995) (Cleveland, Ohio) [hereinafter May 1995 Miller Grievance Program]. Since 1995, the Miller Institute has annually sponsored or co-sponsored with the Board and the Ohio State Bar Association one or two similar statewide conferences in various locations. See e.g., Miller Institute of Professional Responsibility and the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline, The Lawyer Grievance Process-A 1995 Perspective (Cincinnati Dec. 19, 1995) [hereinafter Dec. 1995 Miller Grievance Program]; Miller Institute of Professional Responsibility and the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline, The Lawyer Grievance Process-A 1998 Perspective (Nov. 13, 1998) (Columbus, Ohio) [hereinafter Nov. 1998 Miller Grievance Program].
115. Prior to the publication of Professor Guttenberg's article, some lawyers, academicians, and other observers of Ohio's legal profession, perhaps best described as a group of professional responsibility experts, recognized some of the weaknesses plaguing Ohio's disciplinary regime. Guttenberg's article and its specific findings, however, galvanized the concerns of the professional responsibility community about the effectiveness of Ohio's disciplinary system. It also attracted sufficient attention from the public, lawyers and judges to force a response from the profession. In short, much of the discreteness that attended discussions about the weaknesses in Ohio's disciplinary system disappeared. In 1995, largely in response to Guttenberg's article, the Miller Institute of Professional Responsibility at the University of Akron School of Law sponsored a day-long, statewide conference in Cleveland to examine the disciplinary system and recommend improvements. See Miller Institute of Professional Responsibility and the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline, The Lawyer Grievance Process-A 1995 Perspective (May 1, 1995) (Cleveland, Ohio) [hereinafter May 1995 Miller Grievance Program]. Since 1995, the Miller Institute has annually sponsored or co-sponsored with the Board and the Ohio State Bar Association one or two similar statewide conferences in various locations. See e.g., Miller Institute of Professional Responsibility and the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline, The Lawyer Grievance Process-A 1995 Perspective (Cincinnati Dec. 19, 1995) [hereinafter Dec. 1995 Miller Grievance Program]; Miller Institute of Professional Responsibility and the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline, The Lawyer Grievance Process-A 1998 Perspective (Nov. 13, 1998) (Columbus, Ohio) [hereinafter Nov. 1998 Miller Grievance Program].
116. The best evidence of the article's enormous impact within the Ohio Bar was OSBA President Ray Michalski's decision to appoint a special committee - the Committee to Review Ohio's Disciplinary Process. President Michalski appointed former OSBA General Counsel (then Of Counsel), Albert L. Bell, as chair, and the committee was often referred to as the Bell Committee. See infra notes 42-51 and accompanying text (describing the broad representation on the committee). On April 25, 1997, the Bell Committee published its findings with recommendations for reforming and preserving elements of the current disciplinary system in the Report of the Committee to Review Ohio's Disciplinary Process. See Rep. of the Comm. to Review Ohio's Disciplinary Process (April 25, 1997) [hereinafter BELL REPORT]. Unless otherwise indicated, all references to the Bell Report in the text and footnotes allude to materials contained in this OSBA publication which provides the full report, including the sections titled introduction, background, and items as well as the comments for each recommendation and item. For a list of only the Bell Report's recommendations, see 69 OSBA REP. 820-25 (Oct. 7, 1996). The Bell Report's recommendations and items are also in APPENDIX A of this article. The Bell Report acknowledged that Professor Guttenberg's article was the impetus for creating the Committee. See BELL REPORT, supra, at 1. The Report also sparked controversy in and out of the bar. See Alan S. Kopit, Toward a Fully-Funded Disciplinary System, 68 CLEVELAND B.J., at 2, 3 (Feb. 1997) (The Cleveland Bar Association president urged members to comment on the Bell Report and complained that the OSBA delay in reviewing the Bell Report might have an "extremely negative effect on the disciplinary process, [and] severely damag[e] the ability of the state's 34 Certified Grievance Committees to operate efficiently"); see also BELL REPORT, supra, at 1; 69 OSBA REP., supra, at 820.
117. The best evidence of the article's enormous impact within the Ohio Bar was OSBA President Ray Michalski's decision to appoint a special committee - the Committee to Review Ohio's Disciplinary Process. President Michalski appointed former OSBA General Counsel (then Of Counsel), Albert L. Bell, as chair, and the committee was often referred to as the Bell Committee. See infra notes 42-51 and accompanying text (describing the broad representation on the committee). On April 25, 1997, the Bell Committee published its findings with recommendations for reforming and preserving elements of the current disciplinary system in the Report of the Committee to Review Ohio's Disciplinary Process. See Rep. of the Comm. to Review Ohio's Disciplinary Process (April 25, 1997) [hereinafter BELL REPORT]. Unless otherwise indicated, all references to the Bell Report in the text and footnotes allude to materials contained in this OSBA publication which provides the full report, including the sections titled introduction, background, and items as well as the comments for each recommendation and item. For a list of only the Bell Report's recommendations, see 69 OSBA REP. 820-25 (Oct. 7, 1996). The Bell Report's recommendations and items are also in APPENDIX A of this article. The Bell Report acknowledged that Professor Guttenberg's article was the impetus for creating the Committee. See BELL REPORT, supra, at 1. The Report also sparked controversy in and out of the bar. See Alan S. Kopit, Toward a Fully-Funded Disciplinary System, 68 CLEVELAND B.J., at 2, 3 (Feb. 1997) (The Cleveland Bar Association president urged members to comment on the Bell Report and complained that the OSBA delay in reviewing the Bell Report might have an "extremely negative effect on the disciplinary process, [and] severely damag[e] the ability of the state's 34 Certified Grievance Committees to operate efficiently"); see also BELL REPORT, supra, at 1; 69 OSBA REP., supra, at 820.
118. The best evidence of the article's enormous impact within the Ohio Bar was OSBA President Ray Michalski's decision to appoint a special committee - the Committee to Review Ohio's Disciplinary Process. President Michalski appointed former OSBA General Counsel (then Of Counsel), Albert L. Bell, as chair, and the committee was often referred to as the Bell Committee. See infra notes 42-51 and accompanying text (describing the broad representation on the committee). On April 25, 1997, the Bell Committee published its findings with recommendations for reforming and preserving elements of the current disciplinary system in the Report of the Committee to Review Ohio's Disciplinary Process. See Rep. of the Comm. to Review Ohio's Disciplinary Process (April 25, 1997) [hereinafter BELL REPORT]. Unless otherwise indicated, all references to the Bell Report in the text and footnotes allude to materials contained in this OSBA publication which provides the full report, including the sections titled introduction, background, and items as well as the comments for each recommendation and item. For a list of only the Bell Report's recommendations, see 69 OSBA REP. 820-25 (Oct. 7, 1996). The Bell Report's recommendations and items are also in APPENDIX A of this article. The Bell Report acknowledged that Professor Guttenberg's article was the impetus for creating the Committee. See BELL REPORT, supra, at 1. The Report also sparked controversy in and out of the bar. See Alan S. Kopit, Toward a Fully-Funded Disciplinary System, 68 CLEVELAND B.J., at 2, 3 (Feb. 1997) (The Cleveland Bar Association president urged members to comment on the Bell Report and complained that the OSBA delay in reviewing the Bell Report might have an "extremely negative effect on the disciplinary process, [and] severely damag[e] the ability of the state's 34 Certified Grievance Committees to operate efficiently"); see also BELL REPORT, supra, at 1; 69 OSBA REP., supra, at 820.
119. The best evidence of the article's enormous impact within the Ohio Bar was OSBA President Ray Michalski's decision to appoint a special committee - the Committee to Review Ohio's Disciplinary Process. President Michalski appointed former OSBA General Counsel (then Of Counsel), Albert L. Bell, as chair, and the committee was often referred to as the Bell Committee. See infra notes 42-51 and accompanying text (describing the broad representation on the committee). On April 25, 1997, the Bell Committee published its findings with recommendations for reforming and preserving elements of the current disciplinary system in the Report of the Committee to Review Ohio's Disciplinary Process. See Rep. of the Comm. to Review Ohio's Disciplinary Process (April 25, 1997) [hereinafter BELL REPORT]. Unless otherwise indicated, all references to the Bell Report in the text and footnotes allude to materials contained in this OSBA publication which provides the full report, including the sections titled introduction, background, and items as well as the comments for each recommendation and item. For a list of only the Bell Report's recommendations, see 69 OSBA REP. 820-25 (Oct. 7, 1996). The Bell Report's recommendations and items are also in APPENDIX A of this article. The Bell Report acknowledged that Professor Guttenberg's article was the impetus for creating the Committee. See BELL REPORT, supra, at 1. The Report also sparked controversy in and out of the bar. See Alan S. Kopit, Toward a Fully-Funded Disciplinary System, 68 CLEVELAND B.J., at 2, 3 (Feb. 1997) (The Cleveland Bar Association president urged members to comment on the Bell Report and complained that the OSBA delay in reviewing the Bell Report might have an "extremely negative effect on the disciplinary process, [and] severely damag[e] the ability of the state's 34 Certified Grievance Committees to operate efficiently"); see also BELL REPORT, supra, at 1; 69 OSBA REP., supra, at 820.
120. The best evidence of the article's enormous impact within the Ohio Bar was OSBA President Ray Michalski's decision to appoint a special committee - the Committee to Review Ohio's Disciplinary Process. President Michalski appointed former OSBA General Counsel (then Of Counsel), Albert L. Bell, as chair, and the committee was often referred to as the Bell Committee. See infra notes 42-51 and accompanying text (describing the broad representation on the committee). On April 25, 1997, the Bell Committee published its findings with recommendations for reforming and preserving elements of the current disciplinary system in the Report of the Committee to Review Ohio's Disciplinary Process. See Rep. of the Comm. to Review Ohio's Disciplinary Process (April 25, 1997) [hereinafter BELL REPORT]. Unless otherwise indicated, all references to the Bell Report in the text and footnotes allude to materials contained in this OSBA publication which provides the full report, including the sections titled introduction, background, and items as well as the comments for each recommendation and item. For a list of only the Bell Report's recommendations, see 69 OSBA REP. 820-25 (Oct. 7, 1996). The Bell Report's recommendations and items are also in APPENDIX A of this article. The Bell Report acknowledged that Professor Guttenberg's article was the impetus for creating the Committee. See BELL REPORT, supra, at 1. The Report also sparked controversy in and out of the bar. See Alan S. Kopit, Toward a Fully-Funded Disciplinary System, 68 CLEVELAND B.J., at 2, 3 (Feb. 1997) (The Cleveland Bar Association president urged members to comment on the Bell Report and complained that the OSBA delay in reviewing the Bell Report might have an "extremely negative effect on the disciplinary process, [and] severely damag[e] the ability of the state's 34 Certified Grievance Committees to operate efficiently"); see also BELL REPORT, supra, at 1; 69 OSBA REP., supra, at 820.
121. Albert L. Bell is "Of Counsel" to the OSBA. Eugene P. Whetzel succeeded him as OSBA General Counsel and served as secretary to the Bell Committee. See BELL REPORT, supra note 41, at 1.
122. The general counsel of the OSBA and the Secretary to the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline were included in the Bell Committee. One of the non-lawyers on the committee was a television reporter. See id. at Appendix I.
123. The nine schools are: Capital University Law School; Case Western Reserve University School of Law; Cleveland State University-Marshall College of Law; Ohio Northern University, Petitt College of Law; The Ohio State University College of Law; University of Akron School of Law; University of Cincinnati College of Law; University of Dayton School of Law; University of Toledo College of Law. See BELL REPORT, supra note 41, at Appendix II. Organizations invited to the five public hearings included: Common Cause of Ohio; Common Pleas Court Judges Association (trial judges); League of Women Voters of Ohio; Ohio Judicial Conference; Ohio Office of AARP (American Association of Retired Persons); Ohio State Legal Services Association; The Ohio Consumer Information & Safety Council; Court of Appeals Judges Association; Marital Rights Task Force of Northeast Ohio; The Ohio Human Rights Bar Association; The Committee for Judicial Review; Municipal and County Court Judges Association (trial judges with more limited jurisdiction than Common Pleas judges); HALT Americans for Legal Reform; Ohio Public Defender; Council for Ethics in Economics; and PRO Seniors (an Ohio state senior citizen advocacy group). See id.
124. See BELL REPORT, supra note 41, at 3.
125. For a list of the Bell Report's Recommendations and Items, including statements rejecting possible reforms, see APPENDIX A of this article. See also supra note 41 (explaining that the full Bell Report, including the introduction, background and comment sections, are contained in the April 25, 1996 OSBA publication and not in APPENDIX A of this article or OSBA Reports).
126. BELL REPORT, supra note 41, at 8 (Section II); 69 OSBA REP. at 823; APPENDIX A. For example, the Committee demanded additional financial resources to address the weaknesses "at all levels of the disciplinary process," especially to support the "volunteer attorneys and lay persons on the certified grievance committees and the Board." BELL REPORT, supra note 41, at 8-9; 69 OSBA REP. at 823; APPENDIX A. Such additional funding was vital for improving the disciplinary system's overall effectiveness, especially at the local certified grievance committee level. See infra notes 67-122 and accompanying text (discussing the benefits and detriments of maintaining local grievance committees).
127. BELL REPORT, supra note 41, at 8 (Section II); 69 OSBA REP. at 823; APPENDIX A. For example, the Committee demanded additional financial resources to address the weaknesses "at all levels of the disciplinary process," especially to support the "volunteer attorneys and lay persons on the certified grievance committees and the Board." BELL REPORT, supra note 41, at 8-9; 69 OSBA REP. at 823; APPENDIX A. Such additional funding was vital for improving the disciplinary system's overall effectiveness, especially at the local certified grievance committee level. See infra notes 67-122 and accompanying text (discussing the benefits and detriments of maintaining local grievance committees).
128. BELL REPORT, supra note 41, at 8 (Section II); 69 OSBA REP. at 823; APPENDIX A. For example, the Committee demanded additional financial resources to address the weaknesses "at all levels of the disciplinary process," especially to support the "volunteer attorneys and lay persons on the certified grievance committees and the Board." BELL REPORT, supra note 41, at 8-9; 69 OSBA REP. at 823; APPENDIX A. Such additional funding was vital for improving the disciplinary system's overall effectiveness, especially at the local certified grievance committee level. See infra notes 67-122 and accompanying text (discussing the benefits and detriments of maintaining local grievance committees).
129. BELL REPORT, supra note 41, at 8 (Section II); 69 OSBA REP. at 823; APPENDIX A. For example, the Committee demanded additional financial resources to address the weaknesses "at all levels of the disciplinary process," especially to support the "volunteer attorneys and lay persons on the certified grievance committees and the Board." BELL REPORT, supra note 41, at 8-9; 69 OSBA REP. at 823; APPENDIX A. Such additional funding was vital for improving the disciplinary system's overall effectiveness, especially at the local certified grievance committee level. See infra notes 67-122 and accompanying text (discussing the benefits and detriments of maintaining local grievance committees).
130. For example, Recommendation 10 called for the Board of Commissioners to adopt and publish time guidelines for the processing of formal cases through panel hearing and full Board review. See BELL REPORT, supra note 41, at 26;
131. 69 OSBA REP. at 823; APPENDIX A.
132. Recommendation 17 calls for mandatory ethics schools for attorneys and judges found to be in violation of ethics rules as part of the sanction or a condition to reinstatement. See BELL REPORT, supra note 41, at 34; 69 OSBA REP. at 824; APPENDIX A; see also infra notes 91-93 and accompanying text (discussing the Ohio Supreme Court's rejection of the Bell Committee's mandatory educational requirement for improving the quality of the volunteers involved in lawyer discipline).
133. Recommendation 17 calls for mandatory ethics schools for attorneys and judges found to be in violation of ethics rules as part of the sanction or a condition to reinstatement. See BELL REPORT, supra note 41, at 34; 69 OSBA REP. at 824; APPENDIX A; see also infra notes 91-93 and accompanying text (discussing the Ohio Supreme Court's rejection of the Bell Committee's mandatory educational requirement for improving the quality of the volunteers involved in lawyer discipline).
134. Section VII contained only Recommendation 23, which called for a sizeable increase in the attorney registration fee. See BELL REPORT, supra note 41, at 34; 69 OSBA REP. at 823; APPENDIX A. The Ohio Supreme Court raised the fee to $250, an amount beyond that called for in the recommendation. The Court's action renders Section VII and its lone recommendation moot.
135. Section VII contained only Recommendation 23, which called for a sizeable increase in the attorney registration fee. See BELL REPORT, supra note 41, at 34; 69 OSBA REP. at 823; APPENDIX A. The Ohio Supreme Court raised the fee to $250, an amount beyond that called for in the recommendation. The Court's action renders Section VII and its lone recommendation moot.
136. "Item 7 - Public Reprimand" urges the Ohio Supreme Court to retain public reprimand as one of several disciplinary sanctions because of its effectiveness. See BELL REPORT, supra note 41, at 45; APPENDIX A. The Bell Report also contained several appendices: I Committee Members; II Organizations Invited; III Standards For Grievance Committees; IV Procedural Statewide Standards For Certified Grievance Committees; V Discipline By Consent Minor Conduct Cases; VI Interim Remedial Suspension; VII Finance; and VIII Review of Judicial Disciplinary Rules. See BELL REPORT, supra note 41.
137. "Item 7 - Public Reprimand" urges the Ohio Supreme Court to retain public reprimand as one of several disciplinary sanctions because of its effectiveness. See BELL REPORT, supra note 41, at 45; APPENDIX A. The Bell Report also contained several appendices: I Committee Members; II Organizations Invited; III Standards For Grievance Committees; IV Procedural Statewide Standards For Certified Grievance Committees; V Discipline By Consent Minor Conduct Cases; VI Interim Remedial Suspension; VII Finance; and VIII Review of Judicial Disciplinary Rules. See BELL REPORT, supra note 41.
138. Bell Letter, supra note 19 (on file with author). See generally BELL REPORT, supra note 41 (explaining the Bell Committee's creation).
139. Bell Letter, supra note 19 (on file with author). See generally BELL REPORT, supra note 41 (explaining the Bell Committee's creation).
140. The Council adopted Bell Committee Recommendations 1, 2 (with amendment but deleted 2(F)(2)), 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 (with amendment), 8, 10, 11, 12, 13, 15 (with amendment), 16, 17, 18, 20, 21, and 22 with a minor change to No. 4. It also adopted two unnumbered recommendations calling for the appointment of a committee to consider mandatory malpractice insurance and a committee, such as the Bell Committee, to review the disciplinary process every five years. Compare OSBA DELEGATES COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 19, with BELL LETTER, supra note 19. See also APPENDIX A (containing the unnumbered recommendations).
141. The Council adopted Bell Committee Recommendations 1, 2 (with amendment but deleted 2(F)(2)), 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 (with amendment), 8, 10, 11, 12, 13, 15 (with amendment), 16, 17, 18, 20, 21, and 22 with a minor change to No. 4. It also adopted two unnumbered recommendations calling for the appointment of a committee to consider mandatory malpractice insurance and a committee, such as the Bell Committee, to review the disciplinary process every five years. Compare OSBA DELEGATES COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 19, with BELL LETTER, supra note 19. See also APPENDIX A (containing the unnumbered recommendations).
142. Compare OSBA DELEGATES COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 19 (providing the amended Recommendation 2A), with BELL REPORT, supra note 41, at 10-11 (containing the original Recommendation 2A). See also APPENDIX A (containing Recommendation 2A). The Council also rejected Recommendation 2F(2) of the Bell Report. It required minimum attorney and layperson committee membership; minimum attorney population in the grievance committee jurisdiction; a minimum of six meetings annually; committee costs to be borne by the sponsoring bar association(s); and notification to complainants of the "availability of non-local investigation, i.e., Office of Disciplinary Counsel." See BELL REPORT, supra note 41, at 3-14.
143. Compare OSBA DELEGATES COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 19 (providing the amended Recommendation 2A), with BELL REPORT, supra note 41, at 10-11 (containing the original Recommendation 2A). See also APPENDIX A (containing Recommendation 2A). The Council also rejected Recommendation 2F(2) of the Bell Report. It required minimum attorney and layperson committee membership; minimum attorney population in the grievance committee jurisdiction; a minimum of six meetings annually; committee costs to be borne by the sponsoring bar association(s); and notification to complainants of the "availability of non-local investigation, i.e., Office of Disciplinary Counsel." See BELL REPORT, supra note 41, at 3-14.
144. Compare OSBA DELEGATES COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 19 (providing the amended Recommendation 2A), with BELL REPORT, supra note 41, at 10-11 (containing the original Recommendation 2A). See also APPENDIX A (containing Recommendation 2A). The Council also rejected Recommendation 2F(2) of the Bell Report. It required minimum attorney and layperson committee membership; minimum attorney population in the grievance committee jurisdiction; a minimum of six meetings annually; committee costs to be borne by the sponsoring bar association(s); and notification to complainants of the "availability of non-local investigation, i.e., Office of Disciplinary Counsel." See BELL REPORT, supra note 41, at 3-14.
145. See Recommendation 7, BELL REPORT, supra note 41, at 22; 69 OSBA REP. at 823; APPENDIX A.
146. See Recommendation 7, BELL REPORT, supra note 41, at 22; 69 OSBA REP. at 823; APPENDIX A.
147. See OSBA DELEGATES COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 19; 70 OSBA REP. at 528.
148. See OSBA DELEGATES COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 19; 70 OSBA REP. at 528.
149. See BELL REPORT, supra note 41, at 22-23.
150. See Recommendation 15, BELL REPORT, supra note 41, at 32.
151. See OSBA DELEGATES COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 19; 70 OSBA REP. at 528.
152. See OSBA DELEGATES COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 19; 70 OSBA REP. at 528.
153. Compare Recommendation 15, BELL REPORT, supra note 41, at 36, with OSBA DELEGATES COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 19 and 69 OSBA REP. at 823, with 70 OSBA REP. at 528. See, e.g., CONN. RULES OF COURT, Statewide Grievance Committee Rules of Practice Rule 9 (A)(2). "A financial institution seeking approval by the Statewide Grievance Committee shall submit a form to the Statewide Bar Counsel by which it agrees to report to the Committee the fact that an instrument has been presented against an attorney trust account containing insufficient funds, irrespective of whether or not the instrument is honored." Id. See also NEW JERSEY RULES OF COURT, Rules of General Application, Rule 1:21-6(a)(2) (requiring financial institutions to report attorneys who have drawn upon their trust accounts with insufficient funds); PENNSYLVANIA RULES OF COURT, Pennsylvania Rules of Disciplinary Enforcement, Rule 221(c) (directing financial institutions to promptly report attorneys to Disciplinary Board when their trust accounts have insufficient, funds to cover an instrument). External audits of lawyers' books generate controversy because "[t]raditionally, lawyers have been the keepers and certifiers of their own books." CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 182 (1986). Deviation from this long and fundamental tradition is troubling to lawyers because it is premised, in part, on the belief that lawyers are not trustworthy. External audits are also perceived as intruding upon the confidential and highly personal nature of the attorney-client relationship.
154. Compare Recommendation 15, BELL REPORT, supra note 41, at 36, with OSBA DELEGATES COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 19 and 69 OSBA REP. at 823, with 70 OSBA REP. at 528. See, e.g., CONN. RULES OF COURT, Statewide Grievance Committee Rules of Practice Rule 9 (A)(2). "A financial institution seeking approval by the Statewide Grievance Committee shall submit a form to the Statewide Bar Counsel by which it agrees to report to the Committee the fact that an instrument has been presented against an attorney trust account containing insufficient funds, irrespective of whether or not the instrument is honored." Id. See also NEW JERSEY RULES OF COURT, Rules of General Application, Rule 1:21-6(a)(2) (requiring financial institutions to report attorneys who have drawn upon their trust accounts with insufficient funds); PENNSYLVANIA RULES OF COURT, Pennsylvania Rules of Disciplinary Enforcement, Rule 221(c) (directing financial institutions to promptly report attorneys to Disciplinary Board when their trust accounts have insufficient, funds to cover an instrument). External audits of lawyers' books generate controversy because "[t]raditionally, lawyers have been the keepers and certifiers of their own books." CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 182 (1986). Deviation from this long and fundamental tradition is troubling to lawyers because it is premised, in part, on the belief that lawyers are not trustworthy. External audits are also perceived as intruding upon the confidential and highly personal nature of the attorney-client relationship.
155. Compare Recommendation 15, BELL REPORT, supra note 41, at 36, with OSBA DELEGATES COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 19 and 69 OSBA REP. at 823, with 70 OSBA REP. at 528. See, e.g., CONN. RULES OF COURT, Statewide Grievance Committee Rules of Practice Rule 9 (A)(2). "A financial institution seeking approval by the Statewide Grievance Committee shall submit a form to the Statewide Bar Counsel by which it agrees to report to the Committee the fact that an instrument has been presented against an attorney trust account containing insufficient funds, irrespective of whether or not the instrument is honored." Id. See also NEW JERSEY RULES OF COURT, Rules of General Application, Rule 1:21-6(a)(2) (requiring financial institutions to report attorneys who have drawn upon their trust accounts with insufficient funds); PENNSYLVANIA RULES OF COURT, Pennsylvania Rules of Disciplinary Enforcement, Rule 221(c) (directing financial institutions to promptly report attorneys to Disciplinary Board when their trust accounts have insufficient, funds to cover an instrument). External audits of lawyers' books generate controversy because "[t]raditionally, lawyers have been the keepers and certifiers of their own books." CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 182 (1986). Deviation from this long and fundamental tradition is troubling to lawyers because it is premised, in part, on the belief that lawyers are not trustworthy. External audits are also perceived as intruding upon the confidential and highly personal nature of the attorney-client relationship.
156. Compare Recommendation 15, BELL REPORT, supra note 41, at 36, with OSBA DELEGATES COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 19 and 69 OSBA REP. at 823, with 70 OSBA REP. at 528. See, e.g., CONN. RULES OF COURT, Statewide Grievance Committee Rules of Practice Rule 9 (A)(2). "A financial institution seeking approval by the Statewide Grievance Committee shall submit a form to the Statewide Bar Counsel by which it agrees to report to the Committee the fact that an instrument has been presented against an attorney trust account containing insufficient funds, irrespective of whether or not the instrument is honored." Id. See also NEW JERSEY RULES OF COURT, Rules of General Application, Rule 1:21-6(a)(2) (requiring financial institutions to report attorneys who have drawn upon their trust accounts with insufficient funds); PENNSYLVANIA RULES OF COURT, Pennsylvania Rules of Disciplinary Enforcement, Rule 221(c) (directing financial institutions to promptly report attorneys to Disciplinary Board when their trust accounts have insufficient, funds to cover an instrument). External audits of lawyers' books generate controversy because "[t]raditionally, lawyers have been the keepers and certifiers of their own books." CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 182 (1986). Deviation from this long and fundamental tradition is troubling to lawyers because it is premised, in part, on the belief that lawyers are not trustworthy. External audits are also perceived as intruding upon the confidential and highly personal nature of the attorney-client relationship.
157. Compare Recommendation 15, BELL REPORT, supra note 41, at 36, with OSBA DELEGATES COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 19 and 69 OSBA REP. at 823, with 70 OSBA REP. at 528. See, e.g., CONN. RULES OF COURT, Statewide Grievance Committee Rules of Practice Rule 9 (A)(2). "A financial institution seeking approval by the Statewide Grievance Committee shall submit a form to the Statewide Bar Counsel by which it agrees to report to the Committee the fact that an instrument has been presented against an attorney trust account containing insufficient funds, irrespective of whether or not the instrument is honored." Id. See also NEW JERSEY RULES OF COURT, Rules of General Application, Rule 1:21-6(a)(2) (requiring financial institutions to report attorneys who have drawn upon their trust accounts with insufficient funds); PENNSYLVANIA RULES OF COURT, Pennsylvania Rules of Disciplinary Enforcement, Rule 221(c) (directing financial institutions to promptly report attorneys to Disciplinary Board when their trust accounts have insufficient, funds to cover an instrument). External audits of lawyers' books generate controversy because "[t]raditionally, lawyers have been the keepers and certifiers of their own books." CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 182 (1986). Deviation from this long and fundamental tradition is troubling to lawyers because it is premised, in part, on the belief that lawyers are not trustworthy. External audits are also perceived as intruding upon the confidential and highly personal nature of the attorney-client relationship.
158. Compare Recommendation 15, BELL REPORT, supra note 41, at 36, with OSBA DELEGATES COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 19 and 69 OSBA REP. at 823, with 70 OSBA REP. at 528. See, e.g., CONN. RULES OF COURT, Statewide Grievance Committee Rules of Practice Rule 9 (A)(2). "A financial institution seeking approval by the Statewide Grievance Committee shall submit a form to the Statewide Bar Counsel by which it agrees to report to the Committee the fact that an instrument has been presented against an attorney trust account containing insufficient funds, irrespective of whether or not the instrument is honored." Id. See also NEW JERSEY RULES OF COURT, Rules of General Application, Rule 1:21-6(a)(2) (requiring financial institutions to report attorneys who have drawn upon their trust accounts with insufficient funds); PENNSYLVANIA RULES OF COURT, Pennsylvania Rules of Disciplinary Enforcement, Rule 221(c) (directing financial institutions to promptly report attorneys to Disciplinary Board when their trust accounts have insufficient, funds to cover an instrument). External audits of lawyers' books generate controversy because "[t]raditionally, lawyers have been the keepers and certifiers of their own books." CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 182 (1986). Deviation from this long and fundamental tradition is troubling to lawyers because it is premised, in part, on the belief that lawyers are not trustworthy. External audits are also perceived as intruding upon the confidential and highly personal nature of the attorney-client relationship.
159. Compare Recommendation 15, BELL REPORT, supra note 41, at 36, with OSBA DELEGATES COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 19 and 69 OSBA REP. at 823, with 70 OSBA REP. at 528. See, e.g., CONN. RULES OF COURT, Statewide Grievance Committee Rules of Practice Rule 9 (A)(2). "A financial institution seeking approval by the Statewide Grievance Committee shall submit a form to the Statewide Bar Counsel by which it agrees to report to the Committee the fact that an instrument has been presented against an attorney trust account containing insufficient funds, irrespective of whether or not the instrument is honored." Id. See also NEW JERSEY RULES OF COURT, Rules of General Application, Rule 1:21-6(a)(2) (requiring financial institutions to report attorneys who have drawn upon their trust accounts with insufficient funds); PENNSYLVANIA RULES OF COURT, Pennsylvania Rules of Disciplinary Enforcement, Rule 221(c) (directing financial institutions to promptly report attorneys to Disciplinary Board when their trust accounts have insufficient, funds to cover an instrument). External audits of lawyers' books generate controversy because "[t]raditionally, lawyers have been the keepers and certifiers of their own books." CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 182 (1986). Deviation from this long and fundamental tradition is troubling to lawyers because it is premised, in part, on the belief that lawyers are not trustworthy. External audits are also perceived as intruding upon the confidential and highly personal nature of the attorney-client relationship.
160. Compare Recommendation 15, BELL REPORT, supra note 41, at 36, with OSBA DELEGATES COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 19 and 69 OSBA REP. at 823, with 70 OSBA REP. at 528. See, e.g., CONN. RULES OF COURT, Statewide Grievance Committee Rules of Practice Rule 9 (A)(2). "A financial institution seeking approval by the Statewide Grievance Committee shall submit a form to the Statewide Bar Counsel by which it agrees to report to the Committee the fact that an instrument has been presented against an attorney trust account containing insufficient funds, irrespective of whether or not the instrument is honored." Id. See also NEW JERSEY RULES OF COURT, Rules of General Application, Rule 1:21-6(a)(2) (requiring financial institutions to report attorneys who have drawn upon their trust accounts with insufficient funds); PENNSYLVANIA RULES OF COURT, Pennsylvania Rules of Disciplinary Enforcement, Rule 221(c) (directing financial institutions to promptly report attorneys to Disciplinary Board when their trust accounts have insufficient, funds to cover an instrument). External audits of lawyers' books generate controversy because "[t]raditionally, lawyers have been the keepers and certifiers of their own books." CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 182 (1986). Deviation from this long and fundamental tradition is troubling to lawyers because it is premised, in part, on the belief that lawyers are not trustworthy. External audits are also perceived as intruding upon the confidential and highly personal nature of the attorney-client relationship.
161. Compare Recommendation 15, BELL REPORT, supra note 41, at 36, with OSBA DELEGATES COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 19 and 69 OSBA REP. at 823, with 70 OSBA REP. at 528. See, e.g., CONN. RULES OF COURT, Statewide Grievance Committee Rules of Practice Rule 9 (A)(2). "A financial institution seeking approval by the Statewide Grievance Committee shall submit a form to the Statewide Bar Counsel by which it agrees to report to the Committee the fact that an instrument has been presented against an attorney trust account containing insufficient funds, irrespective of whether or not the instrument is honored." Id. See also NEW JERSEY RULES OF COURT, Rules of General Application, Rule 1:21-6(a)(2) (requiring financial institutions to report attorneys who have drawn upon their trust accounts with insufficient funds); PENNSYLVANIA RULES OF COURT, Pennsylvania Rules of Disciplinary Enforcement, Rule 221(c) (directing financial institutions to promptly report attorneys to Disciplinary Board when their trust accounts have insufficient, funds to cover an instrument). External audits of lawyers' books generate controversy because "[t]raditionally, lawyers have been the keepers and certifiers of their own books." CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 182 (1986). Deviation from this long and fundamental tradition is troubling to lawyers because it is premised, in part, on the belief that lawyers are not trustworthy. External audits are also perceived as intruding upon the confidential and highly personal nature of the attorney-client relationship.
162. Compare BELL REPORT, supra note 41, at 48, with OSBA DELEGATES COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 19, and 69 OSBA REP. at 824, with 70 OSBA REP. at 528. Traditional reasons for rejecting such a recommendation include the belief by many lawyers that written agreements, especially in minor matters, represent an intrusion into the attorney-client relationship, an administrative inconvenience, and an unnecessary client expense.
163. Compare BELL REPORT, supra note 41, at 48, with OSBA DELEGATES COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 19, and 69 OSBA REP. at 824, with 70 OSBA REP. at 528. Traditional reasons for rejecting such a recommendation include the belief by many lawyers that written agreements, especially in minor matters, represent an intrusion into the attorney-client relationship, an administrative inconvenience, and an unnecessary client expense.
164. Compare BELL REPORT, supra note 41, at 48, with OSBA DELEGATES COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 19, and 69 OSBA REP. at 824, with 70 OSBA REP. at 528. Traditional reasons for rejecting such a recommendation include the belief by many lawyers that written agreements, especially in minor matters, represent an intrusion into the attorney-client relationship, an administrative inconvenience, and an unnecessary client expense.
165. Compare BELL REPORT, supra note 41, at 48, with OSBA DELEGATES COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 19, and 69 OSBA REP. at 824, with 70 OSBA REP. at 528. Traditional reasons for rejecting such a recommendation include the belief by many lawyers that written agreements, especially in minor matters, represent an intrusion into the attorney-client relationship, an administrative inconvenience, and an unnecessary client expense.
166. See WOLFRAM, supra note 60, at 503.
167. See supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text.
168. See OSBA DELEGATES COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 19; 70 OSBA REP. at 528.
169. See OSBA DELEGATES COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 19; 70 OSBA REP. at 528.
170. 71 OSBA REP. lxvii - lxxxix (Sept. 21, 1998).
171. For example, the state Supreme Court rejected "mandatory ethics schools for attorneys and judges found to be in violation of ethics rules, as part of the sanction and/or as a condition of reinstatement." BELL REPORT, supra note 41, at 34; 69 OSBA REP. at 824. The Ohio Supreme Court also modified a Bell Committee proposal requiring certified grievance committees to meet once every other month instead of only once every third month. Compare supra note 42, at 13, with 71 OSBA REP. lxvii - lxxxix (Sept. 21, 1998).
172. For example, the state Supreme Court rejected "mandatory ethics schools for attorneys and judges found to be in violation of ethics rules, as part of the sanction and/or as a condition of reinstatement." BELL REPORT, supra note 41, at 34; 69 OSBA REP. at 824. The Ohio Supreme Court also modified a Bell Committee proposal requiring certified grievance committees to meet once every other month instead of only once every third month. Compare supra note 42, at 13, with 71 OSBA REP. lxvii - lxxxix (Sept. 21, 1998).
173. For example, the state Supreme Court rejected "mandatory ethics schools for attorneys and judges found to be in violation of ethics rules, as part of the sanction and/or as a condition of reinstatement." BELL REPORT, supra note 41, at 34; 69 OSBA REP. at 824. The Ohio Supreme Court also modified a Bell Committee proposal requiring certified grievance committees to meet once every other month instead of only once every third month. Compare supra note 42, at 13, with 71 OSBA REP. lxvii -lxxxix (Sept. 21, 1998).
174. This agreement is reflected in the Ohio Supreme Court's adoption of Recommendations 2(A)-(E), (G)-(J). See Jonathan W. Marshall, Secretary, Bd. of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline, Memorandum to All Certified Grievance Committees (Aug. 28, 1998) [hereinafter Marshall Memorandum] (on file with author); see also BELL REPORT, supra note 41, at 10; 69 OSBA REP. at 820. "Recommendation 1: A dual system of certified grievance committees and a centralized disciplinary counsel should be preserved and improved." Id.
175. This agreement is reflected in the Ohio Supreme Court's adoption of Recommendations 2(A)- (E), (G)-(J). See Jonathan W. Marshall, Secretary, Bd. of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline, Memorandum to All Certified Grievance Committees (Aug. 28, 1998) [hereinafter Marshall Memorandum] (on file with author); see also BELL REPORT, supra note 41, at 10; 69 OSBA REP. at 820. "Recommendation 1: A dual system of certified grievance committees and a centralized disciplinary counsel should be preserved and improved." Id.
176. This agreement is reflected in the Ohio Supreme Court's adoption of Recommendations 2(A)- (E), (G)-(J). See Jonathan W. Marshall, Secretary, Bd. of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline, Memorandum to All Certified Grievance Committees (Aug. 28, 1998) [hereinafter Marshall Memorandum] (on file with author); see also BELL REPORT, supra note 41, at 10; 69 OSBA REP. at 820. "Recommendation 1: A dual system of certified grievance committees and a centralized disciplinary counsel should be preserved and improved." Id.
177. See infra notes 188-201 and accompanying text.
178. Such sentiments from local grievance committee members surfaced during several statewide continuing legal education lawyer disciplinary programs co-sponsored by the Miller Institute of Professional Responsibility at the University of Akron School of Law and the Ohio Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline. See, e.g., Miller Institute of Professional Responsibility, Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline & Ohio State Bar Association, "The Lawyer Discipline Process-A 1998 Perspective," (Apr. 17, 1998, Columbus) [hereinafter Apr. 1998 Miller Program]; Miller Institute of Professional Responsibility, Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline & Ohio State Bar Association, "The Lawyer Discipline Process-A 1996 Perspective," (Oct. 24, 1996) [hereinafter Oct. 1996 Miller Program]. At one Miller Program, attendees were so concerned about the possible demise of Ohio's dual system that they disrupted the program with questions and comments defending the dual system. Some of them attacked the credibility of the Bell Committee. See "The Lawyer Discipline Process-A 1997 Perspective," (Columbus, Nov. 7, 1997) [hereinafter Nov. 1997 Miller Program].
179. BELL REPORT, supra note 41, at 10.
180. See Jonathan Coughlan, REMARKS, Apr. 1998 Miller Program, supra note 69. Counsel Coughlan also indicated that he had learned a great deal about local practice throughout Ohio because of his work with local grievance committees.
181. See GREENBAUM, supra note 11, at 646-48 (citing Ohio Gov Bar R V, § 3(B)).
182. Each certified grievance committee consists of at least fifteen members, the majority of whom are lawyers. Three of the members must be non-lawyers. See GREENBAUM, supra note 11, at 647. Cf. Coughlan Interview, supra note 6 (Ohio Disciplinary Counsel's office employs a staff of eighteen, including seven full-time attorneys). See also Gov Bar R V, supra note 1, § 3(B), supra note 12. Four of the thirty-four committees, Cleveland, Cincinnati, Columbus, and the Ohio State Bar Association, have full-time bar counsel to assist the volunteers. See Guttenberg, supra note 6, at 956 n.19; see also Jones, supra note 6, at 13 (reporting the Toledo Bar Association recently hired its first full-time counsel, in part, because of financial support from the Ohio Supreme Court). These counsels have other substantial responsibilities that may limit assistance to their respective grievance committees. Cleveland's bar counsel recently hired a second full-time lawyer to help meet the bar's ever-increasing needs. Because of the recent increase in the bi-annual license fee paid to the Attorney Registration Fund, other bar associations in Ohio will probably follow Toledo's example.
183. See BELL REPORT, supra note 41, at 25-26 (noting that Recommendation Nine was already submitted to the Court and called for the reimbursement of certified grievance committee expenses);
184. see also 69 OSBA REP. at 823 (containing Recommendation Nine). However, justifying full-time counsel may be difficult in areas with little disciplinary activity. See Telephone Interview with Professor William Becker (Nov. 6, 1998). One possible solution to this dilemma is to have one full-time counsel divide time between multiple bars or to have that person assume additional responsibilities, such as directing pro bono or substance abuse programs. Even if all four of Ohio's full-time bar counsel worked only on lawyer discipline, like the seven attorneys in the Disciplinary Counsel's Office, the statewide total of thirteen attorneys involved in discipline is small compared to other states. See Johnstone, infra note 200, at 213 n.112 (reporting that California has more than sixty attorneys, New York more than thirty, and Florida and Pennsylvania more than twenty);
185. MCKAY REPORT, supra note 9, at 90. It is important to note that volunteer members of certified grievance committees still perform the bulk of the disciplinary investigations and filing of complaints with the Board. Finding and selecting volunteers to investigate and prosecute grievances is not a simple matter. It requires considerable thought by the chairperson of a certified grievance committee, often with the assistance of full-time bar counsel in the few cities where they exist. Better qualified lawyers for investigative and prosecutorial service often have limited availability for such endeavors. See Interviews with Ann Zimmerman, Counsel, Cleveland Bar Association; Edwin W. Patterson, Counsel, Cincinnati Bar Association; Bruce Campbell, Counsel, Columbus Bar Association; and William Becker, Counsel (part-time), Akron Bar Association (1995-98).
186. See GREENBAUM, supra note 11, at 649-51. Although generally at least a majority of the quorum of the certified grievance committee must approve a probable cause finding, some grievance committees require more than a majority vote. See Guttenberg, supra note 6, at 957 n.27; see also Ohio Gov Bar R V, § 4 (I)(3), supra note 12. For example, the Columbus Bar Association requires a two-thirds affirmative vote. See Columbus Bar Ass'n, By-Laws of the Professional Ethics and Grievance Committee, art. 6.3 (1988). If the grievance is filed with the Disciplinary Counsel's Office, Disciplinary Counsel or another attorney in the office decides whether there is probable cause based on all the evidence. See Guttenberg, supra note 6, at 957 n.27; Ohio Gov Bar R V, § 4(I)(3), supra note 12. Once there is a probable cause finding, the certified grievance committee or Disciplinary Counsel may file a complaint with the Board. See GREENBAUM, supra note 11, at 643-671 (containing a scholarly discussion of the Ohio disciplinary process by Ruth Bope Dangle, a staff attorney with the Board); see also Guttenberg, supra note 6, at 951-53 (providing a good summary of the disciplinary process). If a three-member panel of the Board finds probable cause for the complaint, the Board certifies the complaint and a hearing is set. See GREENBAUM, supra note 11, at 652-53. The local grievance committee or Disciplinary Counsel then prosecutes the complaint before a different three-member Board panel and if it finds by clear and convincing evidence that there was misconduct, the panel files a certified report, with a recommended sanction, with the full Board. If the full Board agrees with the hearing panel's report and recommendation that misconduct occurred, it files a report with the Supreme Court that requires the prosecuting agency, called the Relator, and the miscreant attorney, the Respondent, to show cause why the report should not be adopted. The Supreme Court will conduct oral arguments if the Relator or Respondent file objections to the full Board's report and recommendations for a sanction. See id. The Supreme Court may accept, modify, or reject the Board's recommended sanctions. See Ohio Gov Bar R V, § 8(D), supra note 12.
187. See GREENBAUM, supra note 11, at 649-51. Although generally at least a majority of the quorum of the certified grievance committee must approve a probable cause finding, some grievance committees require more than a majority vote. See Guttenberg, supra note 6, at 957 n.27; see also Ohio Gov Bar R V, § 4 (I)(3), supra note 12. For example, the Columbus Bar Association requires a two-thirds affirmative vote. See Columbus Bar Ass'n, By-Laws of the Professional Ethics and Grievance Committee, art. 6.3 (1988). If the grievance is filed with the Disciplinary Counsel's Office, Disciplinary Counsel or another attorney in the office decides whether there is probable cause based on all the evidence. See Guttenberg, supra note 6, at 957 n.27; Ohio Gov Bar R V, § 4(I)(3), supra note 12. Once there is a probable cause finding, the certified grievance committee or Disciplinary Counsel may file a complaint with the Board. See GREENBAUM, supra note 11, at 643-671 (containing a scholarly discussion of the Ohio disciplinary process by Ruth Bope Dangle, a staff attorney with the Board); see also Guttenberg, supra note 6, at 951-53 (providing a good summary of the disciplinary process). If a three-member panel of the Board finds probable cause for the complaint, the Board certifies the complaint and a hearing is set. See GREENBAUM, supra note 11, at 652-53. The local grievance committee or Disciplinary Counsel then prosecutes the complaint before a different three-member Board panel and if it finds by clear and convincing evidence that there was misconduct, the panel files a certified report, with a recommended sanction, with the full Board. If the full Board agrees with the hearing panel's report and recommendation that misconduct occurred, it files a report with the Supreme Court that requires the prosecuting agency, called the Relator, and the miscreant attorney, the Respondent, to show cause why the report should not be adopted. The Supreme Court will conduct oral arguments if the Relator or Respondent file objections to the full Board's report and recommendations for a sanction. See id. The Supreme Court may accept, modify, or reject the Board's recommended sanctions. See Ohio Gov Bar R V, § 8(D), supra note 12.
188. See GREENBAUM, supra note 11, at 649-51. Although generally at least a majority of the quorum of the certified grievance committee must approve a probable cause finding, some grievance committees require more than a majority vote. See Guttenberg, supra note 6, at 957 n.27; see also Ohio Gov Bar R V, § 4 (I)(3), supra note 12. For example, the Columbus Bar Association requires a two-thirds affirmative vote. See Columbus Bar Ass'n, By-Laws of the Professional Ethics and Grievance Committee, art. 6.3 (1988). If the grievance is filed with the Disciplinary Counsel's Office, Disciplinary Counsel or another attorney in the office decides whether there is probable cause based on all the evidence. See Guttenberg, supra note 6, at 957 n.27; Ohio Gov Bar R V, § 4(I)(3), supra note 12. Once there is a probable cause finding, the certified grievance committee or Disciplinary Counsel may file a complaint with the Board. See GREENBAUM, supra note 11, at 643-671 (containing a scholarly discussion of the Ohio disciplinary process by Ruth Bope Dangle, a staff attorney with the Board); see also Guttenberg, supra note 6, at 951-53 (providing a good summary of the disciplinary process). If a three-member panel of the Board finds probable cause for the complaint, the Board certifies the complaint and a hearing is set. See GREENBAUM, supra note 11, at 652-53. The local grievance committee or Disciplinary Counsel then prosecutes the complaint before a different three-member Board panel and if it finds by clear and convincing evidence that there was misconduct, the panel files a certified report, with a recommended sanction, with the full Board. If the full Board agrees with the hearing panel's report and recommendation that misconduct occurred, it files a report with the Supreme Court that requires the prosecuting agency, called the Relator, and the miscreant attorney, the Respondent, to show cause why the report should not be adopted. The Supreme Court will conduct oral arguments if the Relator or Respondent file objections to the full Board's report and recommendations for a sanction. See id. The Supreme Court may accept, modify, or reject the Board's recommended sanctions. See Ohio Gov Bar R V, § 8(D), supra note 12.
189. Grievance committee members raised this point at the OSBA office during the program, "The Lawyer Grievance Process-A 1996 Perspective," on October, 24, 1996. See materials from The Lawyer Grievance Process-A 1996 Perspective, OSBA Headquarters (Fall Program, Oct. 24, 1996).
190. See generally Charles Gardner Geyh, Informal Methods of Judicial Discipline, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 243 (1993) (positing that informal disciplinary mechanisms, such as example peer pressure, help to regulate federal judicial behavior).
191. See supra notes 36-39, 75-76 and accompanying text.
192. Since Ohio already had a dual disciplinary system, it was unnecessary to amend the court rules for governing the bar. See Jonathan W. Marshall, August Update (Aug. 28, 1998) [hereinafter BOARD UPDATE-AUGUST 1998] (Secretary of Board informs all Ohio certified grievance committees of Supreme Court's draft Rule amendments for the Governance of the Bar that implement the Bell Committees proposals as approved by the OSBA Council of Delegates) (on file with author). Thus, the court's silence regarding Recommendation 1 and, more importantly, its actions concerning Recommendations 2 and others, underscored the court's endorsement of the dual disciplinary process. See BELL REPORT, supra note 41, at 10-14. Recommendation 2 states that "[i]n an effort to professionalize the certified grievance committees and maintain significant volunteer input into the attorney disciplinary process, a certified grievance committee should be authorized by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline to receive, investigate, and prosecute grievances only under the following conditions." Id. at 10-11. The Ohio Supreme Court's continued authorization of the thirty-four certified grievance committees preserves a second disciplinary level to proceed against miscreant lawyers or judges. Potential grievants can still file their allegations with either the local certified grievance committees or the centralized office of the Disciplinary Counsel which also investigates and prosecutes lawyer misconduct on a statewide basis before the Board.
193. Since Ohio already had a dual disciplinary system, it was unnecessary to amend the court rules for governing the bar. See Jonathan W. Marshall, August Update (Aug. 28, 1998) [hereinafter BOARD UPDATE-AUGUST 1998] (Secretary of Board informs all Ohio certified grievance committees of Supreme Court's draft Rule amendments for the Governance of the Bar that implement the Bell Committees proposals as approved by the OSBA Council of Delegates) (on file with author). Thus, the court's silence regarding Recommendation 1 and, more importantly, its actions concerning Recommendations 2 and others, underscored the court's endorsement of the dual disciplinary process. See BELL REPORT, supra note 41, at 10-14. Recommendation 2 states that "[i]n an effort to professionalize the certified grievance committees and maintain significant volunteer input into the attorney disciplinary process, a certified grievance committee should be authorized by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline to receive, investigate, and prosecute grievances only under the following conditions." Id. at 10-11. The Ohio Supreme Court's continued authorization of the thirty-four certified grievance committees preserves a second disciplinary level to proceed against miscreant lawyers or judges. Potential grievants can still file their allegations with either the local certified grievance committees or the centralized office of the Disciplinary Counsel which also investigates and prosecutes lawyer misconduct on a statewide basis before the Board.
194. The Bell Committee justified the authorization of certified grievance committees to maintain volunteer input in the lawyer discipline process. Presumably the Ohio Supreme Court also accepted this justification by continuing the dual disciplinary system. See generally supra note 78.
195. Chief Justice Moyer spoke primarily about Ohio's new Creed of Professionalism at the "The Lawyer Grievance Process-A 1998 Perspective" on April 17, 1998. See Apr. 1998 Miller Program, supra note 69. The Miller Institute of Professional Ethics at the University of Akron, the Ohio Board of Commissioners and the Ohio State Bar Association sponsored the program. Over 125 persons participated in the seminar. The Chief Justice concluded that such attendance reflected a commitment on the part of the attendees, local grievance committee members, to effectively police or at least participate in the disciplinary process. The Chief Justice's conclusion may be unwarranted given that there is mandatory continuing legal education (CLE) in Ohio. All lawyers must annually complete twelve credits with one credit devoted to professional ethics and another to professionalism. This can cost an attorney several hundred dollars. The Miller Program offered substantial incentives for attendance unrelated to any commitment to the dual disciplinary system. The program was rare because it was free and included a complimentary breakfast and lunch. Participants could earn five and one-half CLE credits in one convenient program, satisfying almost half of their annual CLE requirement. These incentives undermine Chief Justice Moyer's belief that the attendance indicated support for Ohio's dual disciplinary system.
196. It is worth noting that very recently the Ohio Supreme Court amended the disciplinary rules to ban one of the more obvious circumstances in which local favoritism threatened the integrity of the disciplinary process since its inception - local grievance committees investigating grievances against fellow members. Such incestuous investigations were premised, in part, on a fear that lawyers would not volunteer for grievance committees if grievances against them were automatically forwarded to some non-local entity, like the Board or Disciplinary Counsel. No longer can local grievance committees investigate grievances against fellow members. Ohio Gov Bar R V, Sect 3 (C) (requiring grievance committees to refer grievances against fellow members "to the Secretary of the Board"). Although the court's ban is commendable, its scope is too limited. The court's ban should also prohibit local grievance committees from investigating grievances against members' law firms, members' relatives and local bar officers and leaders, for example, officers-elect and committee chairpersons. To avoid any appearance of impropriety, such investigations should be referred to an outside authority, for example, the Board secretary. See Telephone Interview with Brucer Campbell, Columbus Bar Association Disciplinary Counsel (Mar. 12, 1999) (noting that the Columbus Bar Association's grievance committee has avoided the appearance of impropriety by referring investigations against committee members and bar officers to the state's Disciplinary Counsel). See Guttenberg, supra note 6, at 986 (concluding that Ohio's current decentralized disciplinary system "promotes or at least provides the opportunity for local politics and favoritism"); see also LINOWITZ, supra note 2, at 141 (lamenting that bar associations have not fulfilled their responsibility to protect the public because zealous prosecution of grievances has "an uncollegial look").
197. See supra notes 80-81 and accompanying text; see infra notes 83-119 and accompanying text; see also LIEBERMAN, supra note 21, at 215-20.
198. See Guttenberg, supra note 6, at 977.
199. See id.
200. In 1997 two of the thirty-four grievance committees had no investigations, seven others had a total of nine investigations, and another four committees each conducted less than four investigations. See Coughlan Interview, supra note 6.
201. See Guttenberg, supra note 6, at 978.
202. The Miller Institute of Professional Responsibility and the Board sponsors perhaps the most prominent CLE program, generally twice a year. See, e.g., supra note 40. There may be a trend emerging where greater attention is devoted to the nuts and bolts of filing, investigating, processing and resolving grievances. At a recent Miller program, Disciplinary Counsel Jonathan Coughlan explored ways for his investigators to assist local grievance committees. See Telephone Interview with Professor William Becker (Nov. 15, 1998) (commenting about the Nov. 1998 Miller Grievance Program, supra note 40).
203. Richard A. Dove, Proposed Amendments to Rule V of the Rules for the Government of the Bar of Ohio, (Aug. 28, 1998) (memorandum to Certified Grievance Committees, Bar Counsel, and interested parties) [hereinafter Dove Memorandum] (on file with author). The Ohio Supreme Court rejected Bell Recommendation Four that required "specific legal education" for all grievance committees and instead imposed a non-mandatory educational rule. See id. at 4 (containing proposed amendment to Ohio Gov Bar R V, § 3(C)(3), supra note 12); see also infra notes 89-91 and accompanying text; BELL REPORT, supra note 41, at 19 (providing original Bell Recommendation requiring education); 69 OSBA REP. at 822.
204. Richard A. Dove, Proposed Amendments to Rule V of the Rules for the Government of the Bar of Ohio, (Aug. 28, 1998) (memorandum to Certified Grievance Committees, Bar Counsel, and interested parties) [hereinafter Dove
205. Richard A. Dove, Proposed Amendments to Rule V of the Rules for the Government of the Bar of Ohio, (Aug. 28, 1998) (memorandum to Certified Grievance Committees, Bar Counsel, and interested parties) [hereinafter Dove Memorandum] (on file with author). The Ohio Supreme Court rejected Bell Recommendation Four that required "specific legal education" for all grievance committees and instead imposed a non-mandatory educational rule. See id. at 4 (containing proposed amendment to Ohio Gov Bar R V, § 3(C)(3), supra note 12); see also infra notes 89-91 and accompanying text; BELL REPORT, supra note 41, at 19 (providing original Bell Recommendation requiring education); 69 OSBA REP. at 822.
206. See OSBA DELEGATES COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 19; OSBA REP. at 528. It is important to note that although the Council adopted most of the Bell Committee Recommendations at its annual meeting in June 1997, the Council significantly revised and deleted some recommendations before forwarding them for consideration to the Ohio Supreme Court. Compare OSBA DELEGATES COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 19, with BELL LETTER, supra note 19, and 70 OSBA REP. at 528, with 69 OSBA REP. at 820-25. The Council adopted Bell Committee Recommendations 1-8, 10-13, 16-18, 20-22 "with a minor change to Recommendation 4." See OSBA DELEGATES COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 19. See also APPENDIX A (containing the Bell Committee Recommendations). The Council significantly amended Recommendation 2A and deleted 2(F)(2) to insure the continuation of "any existing certified grievance committee" that failed to meet the minimum attorney-population requirement of 600 that the Bell Committee set for the authorization of new certified grievance committees. See OSBA DELEGATES COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 19; 70 OSBA REP. at 528. The Council re-drafted Recommendation 2F to reflect its amendment to 2A and re-designated 2F's subparts with letters instead of Arabic numbers. The Council identified 2F's subparts as "F, G, H and I." Subsequent references to the re-designated subparts indicate however, that the letters were incorrect. The correct lettering for the subparts are G, H, I and J. Compare OSBA DELEGATES COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 19, with BOARD UPDATE-August 1998, supra note 78. The Council also amended Recommendation 7 to permit disciplinary counsel or a certified grievance committee "not to furnish the respondent's [attorney's] response" to the grievant "when . . . there is good reason." OSBA DELEGATES COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 19; 70 OSBA REP. at 528. Bell Committee Recommendation 15 permitted the Ohio Supreme Court to use an "expedited procedure" for issuing an interim remedial order to deal with a lawyer "who poses an immediate threat of harm to the public." Id. The Council significantly limited the availability of this procedure to cases involving "serious and substantial" harm. Id. The Council also deleted Recommendation 19 that required banks and other institutions with fiduciary accounts to notify the Ohio Supreme Court of overdrafts. Id. In the Item section of the Bell Report, the Council rejected the recommendation calling for written attorney-client fee agreements. Id. In the same section, the Council adopted the recommendation for the appointment of a special committee "to review the subject of mandatory malpractice insurance." Id. Before forwarding the amended Bell Report to the Ohio Supreme Court, the Council further deleted the "commentary to Recommendations 2 and 5 and [deleted] appendices 3 and 4." Id. See also 70 OSBA REP. at 528; BELL REPORT, supra note 41; 69 OSBA REP. at 820-25; APPENDIX A.
207. See OSBA DELEGATES COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 19; OSBA REP. at 528. It is important to note that although the Council adopted most of the Bell Committee Recommendations at its annual meeting in June 1997, the Council significantly revised and deleted some recommendations before forwarding them for consideration to the Ohio Supreme Court. Compare OSBA DELEGATES COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 19, with BELL LETTER, supra note 19, and 70 OSBA REP. at 528, with 69 OSBA REP. at 820-25. The Council adopted Bell Committee Recommendations 1-8, 10-13, 16-18, 20-22 "with a minor change to Recommendation 4." See OSBA DELEGATES COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 19. See also APPENDIX A (containing the Bell Committee Recommendations). The Council significantly amended Recommendation 2A and deleted 2(F)(2) to insure the continuation of "any existing certified grievance committee" that failed to meet the minimum attorney-population requirement of 600 that the Bell Committee set for the authorization of new certified grievance committees. See OSBA DELEGATES COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 19; 70 OSBA REP. at 528. The Council re-drafted Recommendation 2F to reflect its amendment to 2A and re-designated 2F's subparts with letters instead of Arabic numbers. The Council identified 2F's subparts as "F, G, H and I." Subsequent references to the re-designated subparts indicate however, that the letters were incorrect. The correct lettering for the subparts are G, H, I and J. Compare OSBA DELEGATES COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 19, with BOARD UPDATE-August 1998, supra note 78. The Council also amended Recommendation 7 to permit disciplinary counsel or a certified grievance committee "not to furnish the respondent's [attorney's] response" to the grievant "when . . . there is good reason." OSBA DELEGATES COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 19; 70 OSBA REP. at 528. Bell Committee Recommendation 15 permitted the Ohio Supreme Court to use an "expedited procedure" for issuing an interim remedial order to deal with a lawyer "who poses an immediate threat of harm to the public." Id. The Council significantly limited the availability of this procedure to cases involving "serious and substantial" harm. Id. The Council also deleted Recommendation 19 that required banks and other institutions with fiduciary accounts to notify the Ohio Supreme Court of overdrafts. Id. In the Item section of the Bell Report, the Council rejected the recommendation calling for written attorney-client fee agreements. Id. In the same section, the Council adopted the recommendation for the appointment of a special committee "to review the subject of mandatory malpractice insurance." Id. Before forwarding the amended Bell Report to the Ohio Supreme Court, the Council further deleted the "commentary to Recommendations 2 and 5 and [deleted] appendices 3 and 4." Id. See also 70 OSBA REP. at 528; BELL REPORT, supra note 41; 69 OSBA REP. at 820-25; APPENDIX A.
208. See OSBA DELEGATES COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 19; OSBA REP. at 528. It is important to note that although the Council adopted most of the Bell Committee Recommendations at its annual meeting in June 1997, the Council significantly revised and deleted some recommendations before forwarding them for consideration to the Ohio Supreme Court. Compare OSBA DELEGATES COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 19, with BELL LETTER, supra note 19, and 70 OSBA REP. at 528, with 69 OSBA REP. at 820-25. The Council adopted Bell Committee Recommendations 1-8, 10-13, 16-18, 20-22 "with a minor change to Recommendation 4." See OSBA DELEGATES COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 19. See also APPENDIX A (containing the Bell Committee Recommendations). The Council significantly amended Recommendation 2A and deleted 2(F)(2) to insure the continuation of "any existing certified grievance committee" that failed to meet the minimum attorney-population requirement of 600 that the Bell Committee set for the authorization of new certified grievance committees. See OSBA DELEGATES COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 19; 70 OSBA REP. at 528. The Council re-drafted Recommendation 2F to reflect its amendment to 2A and re-designated 2F's subparts with letters instead of Arabic numbers. The Council identified 2F's subparts as "F, G, H and I." Subsequent references to the re-designated subparts indicate however, that the letters were incorrect. The correct lettering for the subparts are G, H, I and J. Compare OSBA DELEGATES COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 19, with BOARD UPDATE-August 1998, supra note 78. The Council also amended Recommendation 7 to permit disciplinary counsel or a certified grievance committee "not to furnish the respondent's [attorney's] response" to the grievant "when . . . there is good reason." OSBA DELEGATES COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 19; 70 OSBA REP. at 528. Bell Committee Recommendation 15 permitted the Ohio Supreme Court to use an "expedited procedure" for issuing an interim remedial order to deal with a lawyer "who poses an immediate threat of harm to the public." Id. The Council significantly limited the availability of this procedure to cases involving "serious and substantial" harm. Id. The Council also deleted Recommendation 19 that required banks and other institutions with fiduciary accounts to notify the Ohio Supreme Court of overdrafts. Id. In the Item section of the Bell Report, the Council rejected the recommendation calling for written attorney-client fee agreements. Id. In the same section, the Council adopted the recommendation for the appointment of a special committee "to review the subject of mandatory malpractice insurance." Id. Before forwarding the amended Bell Report to the Ohio Supreme Court, the Council further deleted the "commentary to Recommendations 2 and 5 and [deleted] appendices 3 and 4." Id. See also 70 OSBA REP. at 528; BELL REPORT, supra note 41; 69 OSBA REP. at 820-25; APPENDIX A.
209. See OSBA DELEGATES COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 19; OSBA REP. at 528. It is important to note that although the Council adopted most of the Bell Committee Recommendations at its annual meeting in June 1997, the Council significantly revised and deleted some recommendations before forwarding them for consideration to the Ohio Supreme Court. Compare OSBA DELEGATES COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 19, with BELL LETTER, supra note 19, and 70 OSBA REP. at 528, with 69 OSBA REP. at 820-25. The Council adopted Bell Committee Recommendations 1-8, 10-13, 16-18, 20-22 "with a minor change to Recommendation 4." See OSBA DELEGATES COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 19. See also APPENDIX A (containing the Bell Committee Recommendations). The Council significantly amended Recommendation 2A and deleted 2(F)(2) to insure the continuation of "any existing certified grievance committee" that failed to meet the minimum attorney-population requirement of 600 that the Bell Committee set for the authorization of new certified grievance committees. See OSBA DELEGATES COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 19; 70 OSBA REP. at 528. The Council re-drafted Recommendation 2F to reflect its amendment to 2A and re-designated 2F's subparts with letters instead of Arabic numbers. The Council identified 2F's subparts as "F, G, H and I." Subsequent references to the re-designated subparts indicate however, that the letters were incorrect. The correct lettering for the subparts are G, H, I and J. Compare OSBA DELEGATES COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 19, with BOARD UPDATE-August 1998, supra note 78. The Council also amended Recommendation 7 to permit disciplinary counsel or a certified grievance committee "not to furnish the respondent's [attorney's] response" to the grievant "when . . . there is good reason." OSBA DELEGATES COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 19; 70 OSBA REP. at 528. Bell Committee Recommendation 15 permitted the Ohio Supreme Court to use an "expedited procedure" for issuing an interim remedial order to deal with a lawyer "who poses an immediate threat of harm to the public." Id. The Council significantly limited the availability of this procedure to cases involving "serious and substantial" harm. Id. The Council also deleted Recommendation 19 that required banks and other institutions with fiduciary accounts to notify the Ohio Supreme Court of overdrafts. Id. In the Item section of the Bell Report, the Council rejected the recommendation calling for written attorney-client fee agreements. Id. In the same section, the Council adopted the recommendation for the appointment of a special committee "to review the subject of mandatory malpractice insurance." Id. Before forwarding the amended Bell Report to the Ohio Supreme Court, the Council further deleted the "commentary to Recommendations 2 and 5 and [deleted] appendices 3 and 4." Id. See also 70 OSBA REP. at 528; BELL REPORT, supra note 41; 69 OSBA REP. at 820-25; APPENDIX A.
210. See OSBA DELEGATES COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 19; OSBA REP. at 528. It is important to note that although the Council adopted most of the Bell Committee Recommendations at its annual meeting in June 1997, the Council significantly revised and deleted some recommendations before forwarding them for consideration to the Ohio Supreme Court. Compare OSBA DELEGATES COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 19, with BELL LETTER, supra note 19, and 70 OSBA REP. at 528, with 69 OSBA REP. at 820-25. The Council adopted Bell Committee Recommendations 1-8, 10-13, 16-18, 20-22 "with a minor change to Recommendation 4." See OSBA DELEGATES COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 19. See also APPENDIX A (containing the Bell Committee Recommendations). The Council significantly amended Recommendation 2A and deleted 2(F)(2) to insure the continuation of "any existing certified grievance committee" that failed to meet the minimum attorney-population requirement of 600 that the Bell Committee set for the authorization of new certified grievance committees. See OSBA DELEGATES COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 19; 70 OSBA REP. at 528. The Council re-drafted Recommendation 2F to reflect its amendment to 2A and re-designated 2F's subparts with letters instead of Arabic numbers. The Council identified 2F's subparts as "F, G, H and I." Subsequent references to the re-designated subparts indicate however, that the letters were incorrect. The correct lettering for the subparts are G, H, I and J. Compare OSBA DELEGATES COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 19, with BOARD UPDATE-August 1998, supra note 78. The Council also amended Recommendation 7 to permit disciplinary counsel or a certified grievance committee "not to furnish the respondent's [attorney's] response" to the grievant "when . . . there is good reason." OSBA DELEGATES COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 19; 70 OSBA REP. at 528. Bell Committee Recommendation 15 permitted the Ohio Supreme Court to use an "expedited procedure" for issuing an interim remedial order to deal with a lawyer "who poses an immediate threat of harm to the public." Id. The Council significantly limited the availability of this procedure to cases involving "serious and substantial" harm. Id. The Council also deleted Recommendation 19 that required banks and other institutions with fiduciary accounts to notify the Ohio Supreme Court of overdrafts. Id. In the Item section of the Bell Report, the Council rejected the recommendation calling for written attorney-client fee agreements. Id. In the same section, the Council adopted the recommendation for the appointment of a special committee "to review the subject of mandatory malpractice insurance." Id. Before forwarding the amended Bell Report to the Ohio Supreme Court, the Council further deleted the "commentary to Recommendations 2 and 5 and [deleted] appendices 3 and 4." Id. See also 70 OSBA REP. at 528; BELL REPORT, supra note 41; 69 OSBA REP. at 820-25; APPENDIX A.
211. See OSBA DELEGATES COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 19; OSBA REP. at 528. It is important to note that although the Council adopted most of the Bell Committee Recommendations at its annual meeting in June 1997, the Council significantly revised and deleted some recommendations before forwarding them for consideration to the Ohio Supreme Court. Compare OSBA DELEGATES COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 19, with BELL LETTER, supra note 19, and 70 OSBA REP. at 528, with 69 OSBA REP. at 820-25. The Council adopted Bell Committee Recommendations 1-8, 10-13, 16-18, 20-22 "with a minor change to Recommendation 4." See OSBA DELEGATES COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 19. See also APPENDIX A (containing the Bell Committee Recommendations). The Council significantly amended Recommendation 2A and deleted 2(F)(2) to insure the continuation of "any existing certified grievance committee" that failed to meet the minimum attorney-population requirement of 600 that the Bell Committee set for the authorization of new certified grievance committees. See OSBA DELEGATES COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 19; 70 OSBA REP. at 528. The Council re-drafted Recommendation 2F to reflect its amendment to 2A and re-designated 2F's subparts with letters instead of Arabic numbers. The Council identified 2F's subparts as "F, G, H and I." Subsequent references to the re-designated subparts indicate however, that the letters were incorrect. The correct lettering for the subparts are G, H, I and J. Compare OSBA DELEGATES COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 19, with BOARD UPDATE-August 1998, supra note 78. The Council also amended Recommendation 7 to permit disciplinary counsel or a certified grievance committee "not to furnish the respondent's [attorney's] response" to the grievant "when . . . there is good reason." OSBA DELEGATES COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 19; 70 OSBA REP. at 528. Bell Committee Recommendation 15 permitted the Ohio Supreme Court to use an "expedited procedure" for issuing an interim remedial order to deal with a lawyer "who poses an immediate threat of harm to the public." Id. The Council significantly limited the availability of this procedure to cases involving "serious and substantial" harm. Id. The Council also deleted Recommendation 19 that required banks and other institutions with fiduciary accounts to notify the Ohio Supreme Court of overdrafts. Id. In the Item section of the Bell Report, the Council rejected the recommendation calling for written attorney-client fee agreements. Id. In the same section, the Council adopted the recommendation for the appointment of a special committee "to review the subject of mandatory malpractice insurance." Id. Before forwarding the amended Bell Report to the Ohio Supreme Court, the Council further deleted the "commentary to Recommendations 2 and 5 and [deleted] appendices 3 and 4." Id. See also 70 OSBA REP. at 528; BELL REPORT, supra note 41; 69 OSBA REP. at 820-25; APPENDIX A.
212. See OSBA DELEGATES COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 19; OSBA REP. at 528. It is important to note that although the Council adopted most of the Bell Committee Recommendations at its annual meeting in June 1997, the Council significantly revised and deleted some recommendations before forwarding them for consideration to the Ohio Supreme Court. Compare OSBA DELEGATES COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 19, with BELL LETTER, supra note 19, and 70 OSBA REP. at 528, with 69 OSBA REP. at 820-25. The Council adopted Bell Committee Recommendations 1-8, 10-13, 16-18, 20-22 "with a minor change to Recommendation 4." See OSBA DELEGATES COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 19. See also APPENDIX A (containing the Bell Committee Recommendations). The Council significantly amended Recommendation 2A and deleted 2(F)(2) to insure the continuation of "any existing certified grievance committee" that failed to meet the minimum attorney-population requirement of 600 that the Bell Committee set for the authorization of new certified grievance committees. See OSBA DELEGATES COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 19; 70 OSBA REP. at 528. The Council re-drafted Recommendation 2F to reflect its amendment to 2A and re-designated 2F's subparts with letters instead of Arabic numbers. The Council identified 2F's subparts as "F, G, H and I." Subsequent references to the re-designated subparts indicate however, that the letters were incorrect. The correct lettering for the subparts are G, H, I and J. Compare OSBA DELEGATES COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 19, with BOARD UPDATE-August 1998, supra note 78. The Council also amended Recommendation 7 to permit disciplinary counsel or a certified grievance committee "not to furnish the respondent's [attorney's] response" to the grievant "when . . . there is good reason." OSBA DELEGATES COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 19; 70 OSBA REP. at 528. Bell Committee Recommendation 15 permitted the Ohio Supreme Court to use an "expedited procedure" for issuing an interim remedial order to deal with a lawyer "who poses an immediate threat of harm to the public." Id. The Council significantly limited the availability of this procedure to cases involving "serious and substantial" harm. Id. The Council also deleted Recommendation 19 that required banks and other institutions with fiduciary accounts to notify the Ohio Supreme Court of overdrafts. Id. In the Item section of the Bell Report, the Council rejected the recommendation calling for written attorney-client fee agreements. Id. In the same section, the Council adopted the recommendation for the appointment of a special committee "to review the subject of mandatory malpractice insurance." Id. Before forwarding the amended Bell Report to the Ohio Supreme Court, the Council further deleted the "commentary to Recommendations 2 and 5 and [deleted] appendices 3 and 4." Id. See also 70 OSBA REP. at 528; BELL REPORT, supra note 41; 69 OSBA REP. at 820-25; APPENDIX A.
213. See OSBA DELEGATES COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 19; OSBA REP. at 528. It is important to note that although the Council adopted most of the Bell Committee Recommendations at its annual meeting in June 1997, the Council significantly revised and deleted some recommendations before forwarding them for consideration to the Ohio Supreme Court. Compare OSBA DELEGATES COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 19, with BELL LETTER, supra note 19, and 70 OSBA REP. at 528, with 69 OSBA REP. at 820-25. The Council adopted Bell Committee Recommendations 1-8, 10-13, 16-18, 20-22 "with a minor change to Recommendation 4." See OSBA DELEGATES COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 19. See also APPENDIX A (containing the Bell Committee Recommendations). The Council significantly amended Recommendation 2A and deleted 2(F)(2) to insure the continuation of "any existing certified grievance committee" that failed to meet the minimum attorney-population requirement of 600 that the Bell Committee set for the authorization of new certified grievance committees. See OSBA DELEGATES COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 19; 70 OSBA REP. at 528. The Council re-drafted Recommendation 2F to reflect its amendment to 2A and re-designated 2F's subparts with letters instead of Arabic numbers. The Council identified 2F's subparts as "F, G, H and I." Subsequent references to the re-designated subparts indicate however, that the letters were incorrect. The correct lettering for the subparts are G, H, I and J. Compare OSBA DELEGATES COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 19, with BOARD UPDATE-August 1998, supra note 78. The Council also amended Recommendation 7 to permit disciplinary counsel or a certified grievance committee "not to furnish the respondent's [attorney's] response" to the grievant "when . . . there is good reason." OSBA DELEGATES COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 19; 70 OSBA REP. at 528. Bell Committee Recommendation 15 permitted the Ohio Supreme Court to use an "expedited procedure" for issuing an interim remedial order to deal with a lawyer "who poses an immediate threat of harm to the public." Id. The Council significantly limited the availability of this procedure to cases involving "serious and substantial" harm. Id. The Council also deleted Recommendation 19 that required banks and other institutions with fiduciary accounts to notify the Ohio Supreme Court of overdrafts. Id. In the Item section of the Bell Report, the Council rejected the recommendation calling for written attorney-client fee agreements. Id. In the same section, the Council adopted the recommendation for the appointment of a special committee "to review the subject of mandatory malpractice insurance." Id. Before forwarding the amended Bell Report to the Ohio Supreme Court, the Council further deleted the "commentary to Recommendations 2 and 5 and [deleted] appendices 3 and 4." Id. See also 70 OSBA REP. at 528; BELL REPORT, supra note 41; 69 OSBA REP. at 820-25; APPENDIX A.
214. See OSBA DELEGATES COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 19; OSBA REP. at 528. It is important to note that although the Council adopted most of the Bell Committee Recommendations at its annual meeting in June 1997, the Council significantly revised and deleted some recommendations before forwarding them for consideration to the Ohio Supreme Court. Compare OSBA DELEGATES COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 19, with BELL LETTER, supra note 19, and 70 OSBA REP. at 528, with 69 OSBA REP. at 820-25. The Council adopted Bell Committee Recommendations 1-8, 10-13, 16-18, 20-22 "with a minor change to Recommendation 4." See OSBA DELEGATES COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 19. See also APPENDIX A (containing the Bell Committee Recommendations). The Council significantly amended Recommendation 2A and deleted 2(F)(2) to insure the continuation of "any existing certified grievance committee" that failed to meet the minimum attorney-population requirement of 600 that the Bell Committee set for the authorization of new certified grievance committees. See OSBA DELEGATES COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 19; 70 OSBA REP. at 528. The Council re-drafted Recommendation 2F to reflect its amendment to 2A and re-designated 2F's subparts with letters instead of Arabic numbers. The Council identified 2F's subparts as "F, G, H and I." Subsequent references to the re-designated subparts indicate however, that the letters were incorrect. The correct lettering for the subparts are G, H, I and J. Compare OSBA DELEGATES COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 19, with BOARD UPDATE-August 1998, supra note 78. The Council also amended Recommendation 7 to permit disciplinary counsel or a certified grievance committee "not to furnish the respondent's [attorney's] response" to the grievant "when . . . there is good reason." OSBA DELEGATES COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 19; 70 OSBA REP. at 528. Bell Committee Recommendation 15 permitted the Ohio Supreme Court to use an "expedited procedure" for issuing an interim remedial order to deal with a lawyer "who poses an immediate threat of harm to the public." Id. The Council significantly limited the availability of this procedure to cases involving "serious and substantial" harm. Id. The Council also deleted Recommendation 19 that required banks and other institutions with fiduciary accounts to notify the Ohio Supreme Court of overdrafts. Id. In the Item section of the Bell Report, the Council rejected the recommendation calling for written attorney-client fee agreements. Id. In the same section, the Council adopted the recommendation for the appointment of a special committee "to review the subject of mandatory malpractice insurance." Id. Before forwarding the amended Bell Report to the Ohio Supreme Court, the Council further deleted the "commentary to Recommendations 2 and 5 and [deleted] appendices 3 and 4." Id. See also 70 OSBA REP. at 528; BELL REPORT, supra note 41; 69 OSBA REP. at 820-25; APPENDIX A.
215. See OSBA DELEGATES COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 19; OSBA REP. at 528. It is important to note that although the Council adopted most of the Bell Committee Recommendations at its annual meeting in June 1997, the Council significantly revised and deleted some recommendations before forwarding them for consideration to the Ohio Supreme Court. Compare OSBA DELEGATES COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 19, with BELL LETTER, supra note 19, and 70 OSBA REP. at 528, with 69 OSBA REP. at 820-25. The Council adopted Bell Committee Recommendations 1-8, 10-13, 16-18, 20-22 "with a minor change to Recommendation 4." See OSBA DELEGATES COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 19. See also APPENDIX A (containing the Bell Committee Recommendations). The Council significantly amended Recommendation 2A and deleted 2(F)(2) to insure the continuation of "any existing certified grievance committee" that failed to meet the minimum attorney-population requirement of 600 that the Bell Committee set for the authorization of new certified grievance committees. See OSBA DELEGATES COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 19; 70 OSBA REP. at 528. The Council re-drafted Recommendation 2F to reflect its amendment to 2A and re-designated 2F's subparts with letters instead of Arabic numbers. The Council identified 2F's subparts as "F, G, H and I." Subsequent references to the re-designated subparts indicate however, that the letters were incorrect. The correct lettering for the subparts are G, H, I and J. Compare OSBA DELEGATES COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 19, with BOARD UPDATE-August 1998, supra note 78. The Council also amended Recommendation 7 to permit disciplinary counsel or a certified grievance committee "not to furnish the respondent's [attorney's] response" to the grievant "when . . . there is good reason." OSBA DELEGATES COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 19; 70 OSBA REP. at 528. Bell Committee Recommendation 15 permitted the Ohio Supreme Court to use an "expedited procedure" for issuing an interim remedial order to deal with a lawyer "who poses an immediate threat of harm to the public." Id. The Council significantly limited the availability of this procedure to cases involving "serious and substantial" harm. Id. The Council also deleted Recommendation 19 that required banks and other institutions with fiduciary accounts to notify the Ohio Supreme Court of overdrafts. Id. In the Item section of the Bell Report, the Council rejected the recommendation calling for written attorney-client fee agreements. Id. In the same section, the Council adopted the recommendation for the appointment of a special committee "to review the subject of mandatory malpractice insurance." Id. Before forwarding the amended Bell Report to the Ohio Supreme Court, the Council further deleted the "commentary to Recommendations 2 and 5 and [deleted] appendices 3 and 4." Id. See also 70 OSBA REP. at 528; BELL REPORT, supra note 41; 69 OSBA REP. at 820-25; APPENDIX A.
216. See OSBA DELEGATES COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 19; OSBA REP. at 528. It is important to note that although the Council adopted most of the Bell Committee Recommendations at its annual meeting in June 1997, the Council significantly revised and deleted some recommendations before forwarding them for consideration to the Ohio Supreme Court. Compare OSBA DELEGATES COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 19, with BELL LETTER, supra note 19, and 70 OSBA REP. at 528, with 69 OSBA REP. at 820-25. The Council adopted Bell Committee Recommendations 1-8, 10-13, 16-18, 20-22 "with a minor change to Recommendation 4." See OSBA DELEGATES COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 19. See also APPENDIX A (containing the Bell Committee Recommendations). The Council significantly amended Recommendation 2A and deleted 2(F)(2) to insure the continuation of "any existing certified grievance committee" that failed to meet the minimum attorney-population requirement of 600 that the Bell Committee set for the authorization of new certified grievance committees. See OSBA DELEGATES COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 19; 70 OSBA REP. at 528. The Council re-drafted Recommendation 2F to reflect its amendment to 2A and re-designated 2F's subparts with letters instead of Arabic numbers. The Council identified 2F's subparts as "F, G, H and I." Subsequent references to the re-designated subparts indicate however, that the letters were incorrect. The correct lettering for the subparts are G, H, I and J. Compare OSBA DELEGATES COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 19, with BOARD UPDATE-August 1998, supra note 78. The Council also amended Recommendation 7 to permit disciplinary counsel or a certified grievance committee "not to furnish the respondent's [attorney's] response" to the grievant "when . . . there is good reason." OSBA DELEGATES COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 19; 70 OSBA REP. at 528. Bell Committee Recommendation 15 permitted the Ohio Supreme Court to use an "expedited procedure" for issuing an interim remedial order to deal with a lawyer "who poses an immediate threat of harm to the public." Id. The Council significantly limited the availability of this procedure to cases involving "serious and substantial" harm. Id. The Council also deleted Recommendation 19 that required banks and other institutions with fiduciary accounts to notify the Ohio Supreme Court of overdrafts. Id. In the Item section of the Bell Report, the Council rejected the recommendation calling for written attorney-client fee agreements. Id. In the same section, the Council adopted the recommendation for the appointment of a special committee "to review the subject of mandatory malpractice insurance." Id. Before forwarding the amended Bell Report to the Ohio Supreme Court, the Council further deleted the "commentary to Recommendations 2 and 5 and [deleted] appendices 3 and 4." Id. See also 70 OSBA REP. at 528; BELL REPORT, supra note 41; 69 OSBA REP. at 820-25; APPENDIX A.
217. See OSBA DELEGATES COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 19; OSBA REP. at 528. It is important to note that although the Council adopted most of the Bell Committee Recommendations at its annual meeting in June 1997, the Council significantly revised and deleted some recommendations before forwarding them for consideration to the Ohio Supreme Court. Compare OSBA DELEGATES COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 19, with BELL LETTER, supra note 19, and 70 OSBA REP. at 528, with 69 OSBA REP. at 820-25. The Council adopted Bell Committee Recommendations 1-8, 10-13, 16-18, 20-22 "with a minor change to Recommendation 4." See OSBA DELEGATES COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 19. See also APPENDIX A (containing the Bell Committee Recommendations). The Council significantly amended Recommendation 2A and deleted 2(F)(2) to insure the continuation of "any existing certified grievance committee" that failed to meet the minimum attorney-population requirement of 600 that the Bell Committee set for the authorization of new certified grievance committees. See OSBA DELEGATES COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 19; 70 OSBA REP. at 528. The Council re-drafted Recommendation 2F to reflect its amendment to 2A and re-designated 2F's subparts with letters instead of Arabic numbers. The Council identified 2F's subparts as "F, G, H and I." Subsequent references to the re-designated subparts indicate however, that the letters were incorrect. The correct lettering for the subparts are G, H, I and J. Compare OSBA DELEGATES COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 19, with BOARD UPDATE-August 1998, supra note 78. The Council also amended Recommendation 7 to permit disciplinary counsel or a certified grievance committee "not to furnish the respondent's [attorney's] response" to the grievant "when . . . there is good reason." OSBA DELEGATES COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 19; 70 OSBA REP. at 528. Bell Committee Recommendation 15 permitted the Ohio Supreme Court to use an "expedited procedure" for issuing an interim remedial order to deal with a lawyer "who poses an immediate threat of harm to the public." Id. The Council significantly limited the availability of this procedure to cases involving "serious and substantial" harm. Id. The Council also deleted Recommendation 19 that required banks and other institutions with fiduciary accounts to notify the Ohio Supreme Court of overdrafts. Id. In the Item section of the Bell Report, the Council rejected the recommendation calling for written attorney-client fee agreements. Id. In the same section, the Council adopted the recommendation for the appointment of a special committee "to review the subject of mandatory malpractice insurance." Id. Before forwarding the amended Bell Report to the Ohio Supreme Court, the Council further deleted the "commentary to Recommendations 2 and 5 and [deleted] appendices 3 and 4." Id. See also 70 OSBA REP. at 528; BELL REPORT, supra note 41; 69 OSBA REP. at 820-25; APPENDIX A.
218. See OSBA DELEGATES COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 19; OSBA REP. at 528. It is important to note that although the Council adopted most of the Bell Committee Recommendations at its annual meeting in June 1997, the Council significantly revised and deleted some recommendations before forwarding them for consideration to the Ohio Supreme Court. Compare OSBA DELEGATES COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 19, with BELL LETTER, supra note 19, and 70 OSBA REP. at 528, with 69 OSBA REP. at 820-25. The Council adopted Bell Committee Recommendations 1-8, 10-13, 16-18, 20-22 "with a minor change to Recommendation 4." See OSBA DELEGATES COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 19. See also APPENDIX A (containing the Bell Committee Recommendations). The Council significantly amended Recommendation 2A and deleted 2(F)(2) to insure the continuation of "any existing certified grievance committee" that failed to meet the minimum attorney-population requirement of 600 that the Bell Committee set for the authorization of new certified grievance committees. See OSBA DELEGATES COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 19; 70 OSBA REP. at 528. The Council re-drafted Recommendation 2F to reflect its amendment to 2A and re-designated 2F's subparts with letters instead of Arabic numbers. The Council identified 2F's subparts as "F, G, H and I." Subsequent references to the re-designated subparts indicate however, that the letters were incorrect. The correct lettering for the subparts are G, H, I and J. Compare OSBA DELEGATES COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 19, with BOARD UPDATE-August 1998, supra note 78. The Council also amended Recommendation 7 to permit disciplinary counsel or a certified grievance committee "not to furnish the respondent's [attorney's] response" to the grievant "when . . . there is good reason." OSBA DELEGATES COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 19; 70 OSBA REP. at 528. Bell Committee Recommendation 15 permitted the Ohio Supreme Court to use an "expedited procedure" for issuing an interim remedial order to deal with a lawyer "who poses an immediate threat of harm to the public." Id. The Council significantly limited the availability of this procedure to cases involving "serious and substantial" harm. Id. The Council also deleted Recommendation 19 that required banks and other institutions with fiduciary accounts to notify the Ohio Supreme Court of overdrafts. Id. In the Item section of the Bell Report, the Council rejected the recommendation calling for written attorney-client fee agreements. Id. In the same section, the Council adopted the recommendation for the appointment of a special committee "to review the subject of mandatory malpractice insurance." Id. Before forwarding the amended Bell Report to the Ohio Supreme Court, the Council further deleted the "commentary to Recommendations 2 and 5 and [deleted] appendices 3 and 4." Id. See also 70 OSBA REP. at 528; BELL REPORT, supra note 41; 69 OSBA REP. at 820-25; APPENDIX A.
219. See OSBA DELEGATES COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 19; OSBA REP. at 528. It is important to note that although the Council adopted most of the Bell Committee Recommendations at its annual meeting in June 1997, the Council significantly revised and deleted some recommendations before forwarding them for consideration to the Ohio Supreme Court. Compare OSBA DELEGATES COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 19, with BELL LETTER, supra note 19, and 70 OSBA REP. at 528, with 69 OSBA REP. at 820-25. The Council adopted Bell Committee Recommendations 1-8, 10-13, 16-18, 20-22 "with a minor change to Recommendation 4." See OSBA DELEGATES COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 19. See also APPENDIX A (containing the Bell Committee Recommendations). The Council significantly amended Recommendation 2A and deleted 2(F)(2) to insure the continuation of "any existing certified grievance committee" that failed to meet the minimum attorney-population requirement of 600 that the Bell Committee set for the authorization of new certified grievance committees. See OSBA DELEGATES COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 19; 70 OSBA REP. at 528. The Council re-drafted Recommendation 2F to reflect its amendment to 2A and re-designated 2F's subparts with letters instead of Arabic numbers. The Council identified 2F's subparts as "F, G, H and I." Subsequent references to the re-designated subparts indicate however, that the letters were incorrect. The correct lettering for the subparts are G, H, I and J. Compare OSBA DELEGATES COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 19, with BOARD UPDATE-August 1998, supra note 78. The Council also amended Recommendation 7 to permit disciplinary counsel or a certified grievance committee "not to furnish the respondent's [attorney's] response" to the grievant "when . . . there is good reason." OSBA DELEGATES COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 19; 70 OSBA REP. at 528. Bell Committee Recommendation 15 permitted the Ohio Supreme Court to use an "expedited procedure" for issuing an interim remedial order to deal with a lawyer "who poses an immediate threat of harm to the public." Id. The Council significantly limited the availability of this procedure to cases involving "serious and substantial" harm. Id. The Council also deleted Recommendation 19 that required banks and other institutions with fiduciary accounts to notify the Ohio Supreme Court of overdrafts. Id. In the Item section of the Bell Report, the Council rejected the recommendation calling for written attorney-client fee agreements. Id. In the same section, the Council adopted the recommendation for the appointment of a special committee "to review the subject of mandatory malpractice insurance." Id. Before forwarding the amended Bell Report to the Ohio Supreme Court, the Council further deleted the "commentary to Recommendations 2 and 5 and [deleted] appendices 3 and 4." Id. See also 70 OSBA REP. at 528; BELL REPORT, supra note 41; 69 OSBA REP. at 820-25; APPENDIX A.
220. See OSBA DELEGATES COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 19; OSBA REP. at 528. It is important to note that although the Council adopted most of the Bell Committee Recommendations at its annual meeting in June 1997, the Council significantly revised and deleted some recommendations before forwarding them for consideration to the Ohio Supreme Court. Compare OSBA DELEGATES COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 19, with BELL LETTER, supra note 19, and 70 OSBA REP. at 528, with 69 OSBA REP. at 820-25. The Council adopted Bell Committee Recommendations 1-8, 10-13, 16-18, 20-22 "with a minor change to Recommendation 4." See OSBA DELEGATES COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 19. See also APPENDIX A (containing the Bell Committee Recommendations). The Council significantly amended Recommendation 2A and deleted 2(F)(2) to insure the continuation of "any existing certified grievance committee" that failed to meet the minimum attorney-population requirement of 600 that the Bell Committee set for the authorization of new certified grievance committees. See OSBA DELEGATES COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 19; 70 OSBA REP. at 528. The Council re-drafted Recommendation 2F to reflect its amendment to 2A and re-designated 2F's subparts with letters instead of Arabic numbers. The Council identified 2F's subparts as "F, G, H and I." Subsequent references to the re-designated subparts indicate however, that the letters were incorrect. The correct lettering for the subparts are G, H, I and J. Compare OSBA DELEGATES COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 19, with BOARD UPDATE-August 1998, supra note 78. The Council also amended Recommendation 7 to permit disciplinary counsel or a certified grievance committee "not to furnish the respondent's [attorney's] response" to the grievant "when . . . there is good reason." OSBA DELEGATES COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 19; 70 OSBA REP. at 528. Bell Committee Recommendation 15 permitted the Ohio Supreme Court to use an "expedited procedure" for issuing an interim remedial order to deal with a lawyer "who poses an immediate threat of harm to the public." Id. The Council significantly limited the availability of this procedure to cases involving "serious and substantial" harm. Id. The Council also deleted Recommendation 19 that required banks and other institutions with fiduciary accounts to notify the Ohio Supreme Court of overdrafts. Id. In the Item section of the Bell Report, the Council rejected the recommendation calling for written attorney-client fee agreements. Id. In the same section, the Council adopted the recommendation for the appointment of a special committee "to review the subject of mandatory malpractice insurance." Id. Before forwarding the amended Bell Report to the Ohio Supreme Court, the Council further deleted the "commentary to Recommendations 2 and 5 and [deleted] appendices 3 and 4." Id. See also 70 OSBA REP. at 528; BELL REPORT, supra note 41; 69 OSBA REP. at 820-25; APPENDIX A.
221. See OSBA DELEGATES COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 19; OSBA REP. at 528. It is important to note that although the Council adopted most of the Bell Committee Recommendations at its annual meeting in June 1997, the Council significantly revised and deleted some recommendations before forwarding them for consideration to the Ohio Supreme Court. Compare OSBA DELEGATES COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 19, with BELL LETTER, supra note 19, and 70 OSBA REP. at 528, with 69 OSBA REP. at 820-25. The Council adopted Bell Committee Recommendations 1-8, 10-13, 16-18, 20-22 "with a minor change to Recommendation 4." See OSBA DELEGATES COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 19. See also APPENDIX A (containing the Bell Committee Recommendations). The Council significantly amended Recommendation 2A and deleted 2(F)(2) to insure the continuation of "any existing certified grievance committee" that failed to meet the minimum attorney-population requirement of 600 that the Bell Committee set for the authorization of new certified grievance committees. See OSBA DELEGATES COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 19; 70 OSBA REP. at 528. The Council re-drafted Recommendation 2F to reflect its amendment to 2A and re-designated 2F's subparts with letters instead of Arabic numbers. The Council identified 2F's subparts as "F, G, H and I." Subsequent references to the re-designated subparts indicate however, that the letters were incorrect. The correct lettering for the subparts are G, H, I and J. Compare OSBA DELEGATES COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 19, with BOARD UPDATE-August 1998, supra note 78. The Council also amended Recommendation 7 to permit disciplinary counsel or a certified grievance committee "not to furnish the respondent's [attorney's] response" to the grievant "when . . . there is good reason." OSBA DELEGATES COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 19; 70 OSBA REP. at 528. Bell Committee Recommendation 15 permitted the Ohio Supreme Court to use an "expedited procedure" for issuing an interim remedial order to deal with a lawyer "who poses an immediate threat of harm to the public." Id. The Council significantly limited the availability of this procedure to cases involving "serious and substantial" harm. Id. The Council also deleted Recommendation 19 that required banks and other institutions with fiduciary accounts to notify the Ohio Supreme Court of overdrafts. Id. In the Item section of the Bell Report, the Council rejected the recommendation calling for written attorney-client fee agreements. Id. In the same section, the Council adopted the recommendation for the appointment of a special committee "to review the subject of mandatory malpractice insurance." Id. Before forwarding the amended Bell Report to the Ohio Supreme Court, the Council further deleted the "commentary to Recommendations 2 and 5 and [deleted] appendices 3 and 4." Id. See also 70 OSBA REP. at 528; BELL REPORT, supra note 41; 69 OSBA REP. at 820-25; APPENDIX A.
222. See OSBA DELEGATES COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 19; OSBA REP. at 528. It is important to note that although the Council adopted most of the Bell Committee Recommendations at its annual meeting in June 1997, the Council significantly revised and deleted some recommendations before forwarding them for consideration to the Ohio Supreme Court. Compare OSBA DELEGATES COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 19, with BELL LETTER, supra note 19, and 70 OSBA REP. at 528, with 69 OSBA REP. at 820-25. The Council adopted Bell Committee Recommendations 1-8, 10-13, 16-18, 20-22 "with a minor change to Recommendation 4." See OSBA DELEGATES COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 19. See also APPENDIX A (containing the Bell Committee Recommendations). The Council significantly amended Recommendation 2A and deleted 2(F)(2) to insure the continuation of "any existing certified grievance committee" that failed to meet the minimum attorney-population requirement of 600 that the Bell Committee set for the authorization of new certified grievance committees. See OSBA DELEGATES COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 19; 70 OSBA REP. at 528. The Council re-drafted Recommendation 2F to reflect its amendment to 2A and re-designated 2F's subparts with letters instead of Arabic numbers. The Council identified 2F's subparts as "F, G, H and I." Subsequent references to the re-designated subparts indicate however, that the letters were incorrect. The correct lettering for the subparts are G, H, I and J. Compare OSBA DELEGATES COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 19, with BOARD UPDATE-August 1998, supra note 78. The Council also amended Recommendation 7 to permit disciplinary counsel or a certified grievance committee "not to furnish the respondent's [attorney's] response" to the grievant "when . . . there is good reason." OSBA DELEGATES COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 19; 70 OSBA REP. at 528. Bell Committee Recommendation 15 permitted the Ohio Supreme Court to use an "expedited procedure" for issuing an interim remedial order to deal with a lawyer "who poses an immediate threat of harm to the public." Id. The Council significantly limited the availability of this procedure to cases involving "serious and substantial" harm. Id. The Council also deleted Recommendation 19 that required banks and other institutions with fiduciary accounts to notify the Ohio Supreme Court of overdrafts. Id. In the Item section of the Bell Report, the Council rejected the recommendation calling for written attorney-client fee agreements. Id. In the same section, the Council adopted the recommendation for the appointment of a special committee "to review the subject of mandatory malpractice insurance." Id. Before forwarding the amended Bell Report to the Ohio Supreme Court, the Council further deleted the "commentary to Recommendations 2 and 5 and [deleted] appendices 3 and 4." Id. See also 70 OSBA REP. at 528; BELL REPORT, supra note 41; 69 OSBA REP. at 820-25; APPENDIX A.
223. See OSBA DELEGATES COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 19; OSBA REP. at 528. It is important to note that although the Council adopted most of the Bell Committee Recommendations at its annual meeting in June 1997, the Council significantly revised and deleted some recommendations before forwarding them for consideration to the Ohio Supreme Court. Compare OSBA DELEGATES COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 19, with BELL LETTER, supra note 19, and 70 OSBA REP. at 528, with 69 OSBA REP. at 820-25. The Council adopted Bell Committee Recommendations 1-8, 10-13, 16-18, 20-22 "with a minor change to Recommendation 4." See OSBA DELEGATES COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 19. See also APPENDIX A (containing the Bell Committee Recommendations). The Council significantly amended Recommendation 2A and deleted 2(F)(2) to insure the continuation of "any existing certified grievance committee" that failed to meet the minimum attorney-population requirement of 600 that the Bell Committee set for the authorization of new certified grievance committees. See OSBA DELEGATES COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 19; 70 OSBA REP. at 528. The Council re-drafted Recommendation 2F to reflect its amendment to 2A and re-designated 2F's subparts with letters instead of Arabic numbers. The Council identified 2F's subparts as "F, G, H and I." Subsequent references to the re-designated subparts indicate however, that the letters were incorrect. The correct lettering for the subparts are G, H, I and J. Compare OSBA DELEGATES COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 19, with BOARD UPDATE-August 1998, supra note 78. The Council also amended Recommendation 7 to permit disciplinary counsel or a certified grievance committee "not to furnish the respondent's [attorney's] response" to the grievant "when . . . there is good reason." OSBA DELEGATES COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 19; 70 OSBA REP. at 528. Bell Committee Recommendation 15 permitted the Ohio Supreme Court to use an "expedited procedure" for issuing an interim remedial order to deal with a lawyer "who poses an immediate threat of harm to the public." Id. The Council significantly limited the availability of this procedure to cases involving "serious and substantial" harm. Id. The Council also deleted Recommendation 19 that required banks and other institutions with fiduciary accounts to notify the Ohio Supreme Court of overdrafts. Id. In the Item section of the Bell Report, the Council rejected the recommendation calling for written attorney-client fee agreements. Id. In the same section, the Council adopted the recommendation for the appointment of a special committee "to review the subject of mandatory malpractice insurance." Id. Before forwarding the amended Bell Report to the Ohio Supreme Court, the Council further deleted the "commentary to Recommendations 2 and 5 and [deleted] appendices 3 and 4." Id. See also 70 OSBA REP. at 528; BELL REPORT, supra note 41; 69 OSBA REP. at 820-25; APPENDIX A.
224. See OSBA DELEGATES COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 19; OSBA REP. at 528. It is important to note that although the Council adopted most of the Bell Committee Recommendations at its annual meeting in June 1997, the Council significantly revised and deleted some recommendations before forwarding them for consideration to the Ohio Supreme Court. Compare OSBA DELEGATES COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 19, with BELL LETTER, supra note 19, and 70 OSBA REP. at 528, with 69 OSBA REP. at 820-25. The Council adopted Bell Committee Recommendations 1-8, 10-13, 16-18, 20-22 "with a minor change to Recommendation 4." See OSBA DELEGATES COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 19. See also APPENDIX A (containing the Bell Committee Recommendations). The Council significantly amended Recommendation 2A and deleted 2(F)(2) to insure the continuation of "any existing certified grievance committee" that failed to meet the minimum attorney-population requirement of 600 that the Bell Committee set for the authorization of new certified grievance committees. See OSBA DELEGATES COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 19; 70 OSBA REP. at 528. The Council re-drafted Recommendation 2F to reflect its amendment to 2A and re-designated 2F's subparts with letters instead of Arabic numbers. The Council identified 2F's subparts as "F, G, H and I." Subsequent references to the re-designated subparts indicate however, that the letters were incorrect. The correct lettering for the subparts are G, H, I and J. Compare OSBA DELEGATES COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 19, with BOARD UPDATE-August 1998, supra note 78. The Council also amended Recommendation 7 to permit disciplinary counsel or a certified grievance committee "not to furnish the respondent's [attorney's] response" to the grievant "when . . . there is good reason." OSBA DELEGATES COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 19; 70 OSBA REP. at 528. Bell Committee Recommendation 15 permitted the Ohio Supreme Court to use an "expedited procedure" for issuing an interim remedial order to deal with a lawyer "who poses an immediate threat of harm to the public." Id. The Council significantly limited the availability of this procedure to cases involving "serious and substantial" harm. Id. The Council also deleted Recommendation 19 that required banks and other institutions with fiduciary accounts to notify the Ohio Supreme Court of overdrafts. Id. In the Item section of the Bell Report, the Council rejected the recommendation calling for written attorney-client fee agreements. Id. In the same section, the Council adopted the recommendation for the appointment of a special committee "to review the subject of mandatory malpractice insurance." Id. Before forwarding the amended Bell Report to the Ohio Supreme Court, the Council further deleted the "commentary to Recommendations 2 and 5 and [deleted] appendices 3 and 4." Id. See also 70 OSBA REP. at 528; BELL REPORT, supra note 41; 69 OSBA REP. at 820-25; APPENDIX A.
225. See BELL REPORT, supra note 41, at 10-17 (Recommendation 2); APPENDIX A. The OSBA Council of Delegates slightly modified the Bell Commission's Recommendation 2 by amending 2(A) and deleting (F)(2), both of which set minimum attorney-population requirements for the creation of a certified grievance committee. See supra note 89.
226. By refusing to make any major, substantive changes to the existing decertification provision in the rules, the Ohio Supreme Court rejected de facto Bell Recommendation 2F(1)-(5) and its re-certification requirements. Compare BELL REPORT, supra note 41, at 13-14 with Ohio Gov Bar R V, § 3(C)(5), supra note 12.
227. By refusing to make any major, substantive changes to the existing decertification provision in the rules, the Ohio Supreme Court rejected de facto Bell Recommendation 2F(1)-(5) and its re-certification requirements. Compare BELL REPORT, supra note 41, at 13-14 with Ohio Gov Bar R V, § 3(C)(5), supra note 12.
228. See Bell REPORT, supra note 41, at 19 (Recommendation 4); APPENDIX A; supra notes 83-85 and accompanying text.
229. Id.
230. See MCKAY REPORT, supra note 9, at xv. See Telephone Interview with Tony Boggs, Director of the Legal Division of the Florida Bar and Staff Counsel (Feb. 26, 1999) [hereinafter Boggs Interview]. The Florida Bar Association's budget for lawyer regulation is approximately $8 million for next year. See id. This amount excludes additional funds for other services, such as a statewide ethics hotline and an eight-lawyer unauthorized practice of law office. See id. The $8 million enables Florida to provide a variety of remedial programs, including law office management, an ethics school, trust accounting seminars, anger management control and mental health courses, and mediation training. See id; see also Manson, Helping Lawyers Who Need Help (But Won't Ask for It!), 9 ALI-ABA CLE REV. 6 (Feb. 10, 1978) (maintaining that a court should have corrective, and not punitive, jurisdiction over a single act of negligent performance; corrective action includes counseling a lawyer to "reduce his caseload, not to accept cases in a certain area of practice, [and] to establish certain office procedures").
231. See MCKAY REPORT, supra note 9, at xv. See Telephone Interview with Tony Boggs, Director of the Legal Division of the Florida Bar and Staff Counsel (Feb. 26, 1999) [hereinafter Boggs Interview]. The Florida Bar Association's budget for lawyer regulation is approximately $8 million for next year. See id. This amount excludes additional funds for other services, such as a statewide ethics hotline and an eight- lawyer unauthorized practice of law office. See id. The $8 million enables Florida to provide a variety of remedial programs, including law office management, an ethics school, trust accounting seminars, anger management control and mental health courses, and mediation training. See id; see also Manson, Helping Lawyers Who Need Help (But Won't Ask for It!), 9 ALI-ABA CLE REV. 6 (Feb. 10, 1978) (maintaining that a court should have corrective, and not punitive, jurisdiction over a single act of negligent performance; corrective action includes counseling a lawyer to "reduce his caseload, not to accept cases in a certain area of practice, [and] to establish certain office procedures").
232. "Some of the public's dissatisfaction is a misunderstanding of the lawyer's role." MCKAY REPORT, supra note 9, at xix-xx. "The thousands of dismissed complaints . . . show a gap exists between reasonable client expectations and existing [attorney] regulation." Id. at 11.
233. "Some of the public's dissatisfaction is a misunderstanding of the lawyer's role." MCKAY REPORT, supra note 9, at xix-xx. "The thousands of dismissed complaints . . . show a gap exists between reasonable client expectations and existing [attorney] regulation." Id. at 11.
234. The Bell Committee found "many grievants have no knowledge of disciplinary procedures" and "many persons are unaware of the existence of the disciplinary process." BELL REPORT, supra note 41, at 39. Recommendation 21 called upon the Supreme Court to "finance the distribution and continued availability of [Board and OSBA pamphlets]" to inform the public about the lawyer discipline. Id. Other states have similar pamphlets for informing the public about their disciplinary process. See Daniel Horwitch, Connecticut Statewide Grievance Counsel, Address, Quinnipiac College School of Law (June 1998).
235. The Bell Committee found "many grievants have no knowledge of disciplinary procedures" and "many persons are unaware of the existence of the disciplinary process." BELL REPORT, supra note 41, at 39. Recommendation 21 called upon the Supreme Court to "finance the distribution and continued availability of [Board and OSBA pamphlets]" to inform the public about the lawyer discipline. Id. Other states have similar pamphlets for informing the public about their disciplinary process. See Daniel Horwitch, Connecticut Statewide Grievance Counsel, Address, Quinnipiac College School of Law (June 1998).
236. See MCKAY REPORT, supra note 9, at 16.
237. See WOLFRAM, supra note 60, at 949-53. "[I]t is clear that the extent of pro bono work has never begun to match the need for legal services of poor people." Id. at 950.
238. Board Secretary Jonathan Marshall noted that grievances against lawyers in Ohio "'have risen to between 7,500 and 8,000 annually'" and that when he assumed his position almost ten years ago, '"there were 55 to 60 cases at any one time on the commission's docket. Now we have 120 to 130 active cases."' See Jones, supra note 73, at 13-14.
239. The seven-year period covers 1992-98. Telephone Interviews with Ruth Bope-Dangle, staff attorney with the Board (Dec. 2-3, 1999) (reporting the total number of grievances and the number of attorneys with active registration for the following years: 1990 - 5,200 grievances, 1991 - 5,734 grievances, 1992 - 6,500 grievances, 1993 - 6,987 grievances, 1994-7,713 grievances, 1995 - 7,734 grievances (35,005 attorneys), 1996 - 8,330 grievances (36,829 attorneys), 1997 - 8,371 grievances (37,226 attorneys), 1998 -7,879 grievances (38,330 attorneys)).
240. See Telephone Interview with Ruth Bope-Dangle, staff attorney with the Board (Nov. 30, 1999). See also Statistical Compilation of Grievances, Ohio Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline, in "The Lawyer Grievance Process - A 1999 Perspective," at 48a (Sept. 17, 1999). See generally, Shal supra note 14 and accompanying text (discussing the number of lawyers who are registered and unregistered to practice law in Ohio).
241. This is not a precise ratio because multiple grievances were filed against some lawyers. The ratio also does not reflect other factors, for example, the notion that lawyers working for governmental agencies and large law firms may have fewer grievances filed against them - suggesting an even higher ratio of grievances to lawyers for practitioners outside these groups.
242. See Telephone Interview with Ruth Bope-Dangle, staff attorney with the Board (Nov. 30, 1999). Ohio's Disciplinary Counsel reported that the rate of grievances filed with his office in 1999 is higher than for 1998. In 1998, 3,696 grievances were filed with the Disciplinary Counsel's office and as of November 29, 1999, there were already 3,386 grievances, some involving the unauthorized practice of law that involve non-lawyers. The Disciplinary Counsel suggested that the total number of grievances filed in his office alone might exceed 4,000. Telephone Interview with Jonathan Coughlan, Ohio Disciplinary Counsel (Nov. 29, 1999).
243. "The Clark Committee warned of a 'scandalous situation' in professional discipline . . . ." MCKAY REPORT, supra note 9, at xiv.
244. See supra notes 1-13 and accompanying text; see also Jones, supra note 73, at 13 (discussing the "alarming" increase in lawyer grievances).
245. Set Sahl, supra note 14, at 305; see also Poll: Potential jurors will follow own beliefs, Associated Press, COLUMBUS POST DISPATCH, Oct. 24, 1998, at 48 (Myrna Raeder, Chair of the ABA Criminal Justice Section, reporting that "we have more sophisticated court watchers these days").
246. See Mike Jones, supra note 5 (computer system tracking progress of estates and trusts accounts alerted court personnel to attorney's alleged misappropriation from estate); see also Jones, supra note 73, at 14 (recent computerization of Toledo grievance process should standardize the system locally and produce efficiencies).
247. Explaining one reason for the rise in grievances, Board Secretary Marshall remarked: '"It's also true that there are more lawyers entering the practice, which means economic times are more difficult for attorneys."' Jones, supra note 73, at 14.
248. Id. (Board Secretary Marshall hypothecating that "people are more inclined to file a grievance [,]" in part, because of publicity about dissatisfaction with attorneys); see also Johnson, supra note 2, at 749-50 (stating the "[i]f a lawyer falls short, the client expects to have the right to complain").
249. See Guttenberg, supra note 6, at 962-68 (discussing limitations of a system that relies on third-party complaints to initiate investigations of misconduct).
250. As early as 1970, fears of cronyism, "prejudice against unpopular respondents," and inconsistent rules and procedures prompted experts to strongly recommend to the ABA that local disciplinary enforcement be eliminated in favor of statewide or regional enforcement. MCKAY REPORT, supra note 9, at 65 (citing the Clark Report's concerns and recommendations). See Monopoli, supra note 12, at 423 (reporting that judicial regulation, the predominant model of lawyer discipline, is increasingly criticized because judges are lawyers who make judicial regulation just another form of self-regulation with inherent problems of cronyism).
251. The ABA established the Commission on the Evaluation of Disciplinary Enforcement in February 1989. Its charge "was to: (1) study the functioning of professional discipline systems; (2) examine the recommendations of the ABA Special Committee on Evaluation of Disciplinary Enforcement (the Clark Committee) and the results of later reforms; (3) conduct original research, surveys and regional hearings; (4) evaluate the state of disciplinary enforcement; and (5) formulate recommendations for action." MCKAY REPORT, supra note 9, at xiii.
252. MCKAY REPORT, supra note 9, at 16. Noting progress nationally in lawyer discipline since the 1970 Clark Report, in 1991 the McKay Commission stated: "[i]t is no exaggeration to say that revolutionary changes have occurred [in professional discipline]. Twenty years ago, most states conducted lawyer discipline at the local level with no professional staff . . . . Today almost all states have professional disciplinary staff with statewide jurisdiction. Most have eliminated duplicative procedures." Id. at xiv (emphasis added). See generally Jeffrey A. Parness, Enforcing Professional Norms for Federal Litigation Conduct: Achieving Reciprocal Cooperation, 60 ALB. L. Rev. 303, 304 (1996) (subjecting lawyers in the United States to "multiple centers of professional control" for controlling their conduct generates much confusion) (quoting David B. Wilkins, Who Should Regulate Lawyers?, HARV. L. REV. 799, 804 (1992)). Cf. Becker Interview, supra note 73 (indicating that a system of "local" filing is more conducive to the public filing of grievances than a central filing system).
253. MCKAY REPORT, supra note 9, at 16. Noting progress nationally in lawyer discipline since the 1970 Clark Report, in 1991 the McKay Commission stated: "[i]t is no exaggeration to say that revolutionary changes have occurred [in professional discipline]. Twenty years ago, most states conducted lawyer discipline at the local level with no professional staff . . . . Today almost all states have professional disciplinary staff with statewide jurisdiction. Most have eliminated duplicative procedures." Id. at xiv (emphasis added). See generally Jeffrey A. Parness, Enforcing Professional Norms for Federal Litigation Conduct: Achieving Reciprocal Cooperation, 60 ALB. L. Rev. 303, 304 (1996) (subjecting lawyers in the United States to "multiple centers of professional control" for controlling their conduct generates much confusion) (quoting David B. Wilkins, Who Should Regulate Lawyers?, HARV. L. REV. 799, 804 (1992)). Cf. Becker Interview, supra note 73 (indicating that a system of "local" filing is more conducive to the public filing of grievances than a central filing system).
254. MCKAY REPORT, supra note 9, at 16. Noting progress nationally in lawyer discipline since the 1970 Clark Report, in 1991 the McKay Commission stated: "[i]t is no exaggeration to say that revolutionary changes have occurred [in professional discipline]. Twenty years ago, most states conducted lawyer discipline at the local level with no professional staff . . . . Today almost all states have professional disciplinary staff with statewide jurisdiction. Most have eliminated duplicative procedures." Id. at xiv (emphasis added). See generally Jeffrey A. Parness, Enforcing Professional Norms for Federal Litigation Conduct: Achieving Reciprocal Cooperation, 60 ALB. L. Rev. 303, 304 (1996) (subjecting lawyers in the United States to "multiple centers of professional control" for controlling their conduct generates much confusion) (quoting David B. Wilkins, Who Should Regulate Lawyers?, HARV. L. REV. 799, 804 (1992)). Cf. Becker Interview, supra note 73 (indicating that a system of "local" filing is more conducive to the public filing of grievances than a central filing system).
255. MCKAY REPORT, supra note 9, at 16. Noting progress nationally in lawyer discipline since the 1970 Clark Report, in 1991 the McKay Commission stated: "[i]t is no exaggeration to say that revolutionary changes have occurred [in professional discipline]. Twenty years ago, most states conducted lawyer discipline at the local level with no professional staff . . . . Today almost all states have professional disciplinary staff with statewide jurisdiction. Most have eliminated duplicative procedures." Id. at xiv (emphasis added). See generally Jeffrey A. Parness, Enforcing Professional Norms for Federal Litigation Conduct: Achieving Reciprocal Cooperation, 60 ALB. L. Rev. 303, 304 (1996) (subjecting lawyers in the United States to "multiple centers of professional control" for controlling their conduct generates much confusion) (quoting David B. Wilkins, Who Should Regulate Lawyers?, HARV. L. REV. 799, 804 (1992)). Cf. Becker Interview, supra note 73 (indicating that a system of "local" filing is more conducive to the public filing of grievances than a central filing system).
256. See supra notes 72-81 and accompanying text for a discussion of the generally coextensive powers of the certified grievance committees and the Disciplinary Counsel.
257. See BELL REPORT, supra note 41 ,at 8, 14-17, 20; see also Guttenberg supra note 6, at 972-81 (while questioning the effectiveness of all Ohio disciplinary agencies to investigate and prosecute misconduct cases, he noted a wide disparity in the effectiveness rate among the thirty-four grievance committees and the Disciplinary Counsel).
258. See Eric H. Steele & Raymond T. Nimmer, Layers, Clients, and Professional Regulation, 1976 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 919, 948-96. Client self-interest is another reason for public avoidance of the lawyer disciplinary process. Clients usually do not report misconduct that benefits them. See Guttenberg, supra note 6, at 965; see also Wilkins, supra note 113, at 824 (indicating that sophisticated corporate clients rely on market forces to regulate attorney behavior instead of reporting misconduct to disciplinary agencies).
259. See LIEBERMAN, supra note 21, at 202; see also GREENBAUM, supra note 11, at 684 (stating "[t]he choice [of filing centrally or locally] creates some confusion); Guttenberg, supra note 6, at 965 (indicating that numerous factors affect the filing rate of grievances, including "the disciplinary agency's public visibility").
260. See Steele & Nimmer, supra note 116, at 982.
261. See Guttenberg, supra note 6, at 966.
262. See May 1995 Miller Grievance Program, supra note 40; Dec. 1995 Miller Grievance Program, supra note 40; Miller Institute of Professional Responsibility, Ohio Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline and Ohio State Bar Association, The Lawyer Grievance Process-A 1996 Perspective (Oct 24, 1996) (Columbus, OH); Miller Institute of Professional Responsibility, Ohio Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline and Ohio State Bar Association, The Lawyer Grievance Process-A 1998 Perspective (Apr. 17, 1998) (Columbus, OH); see also BELL REPORT, supra note 41, at 19-20 (expressing concern that there is "little similarity among [grievance committees'] procedures" and noting that some committees dismiss "a high number of grievances on intake before conducting any investigation"); Guttenberg, supra note 6, at 966, 985 (suggesting client failure to recognize misconduct or client belief that attorney conduct is not harmful results in attorney misconduct going unreported).
263. See May 1995 Miller Grievance Program, supra note 40; Dec. 1995 Miller Grievance Program, supra note 40; Miller Institute of Professional Responsibility, Ohio Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline and Ohio State Bar Association, The Lawyer Grievance Process-A 1996 Perspective (Oct 24, 1996) (Columbus, OH); Miller Institute of Professional Responsibility, Ohio Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline and Ohio State Bar Association, The Lawyer Grievance Process-A 1998 Perspective (Apr. 17, 1998) (Columbus, OH); see also BELL REPORT, supra note 41, at 19-20 (expressing concern that there is "little similarity among [grievance committees'] procedures" and noting that some committees dismiss "a high number of grievances on intake before conducting any investigation"); Guttenberg, supra note 6, at 966, 985 (suggesting client failure to recognize misconduct or client belief that attorney conduct is not harmful results in attorney misconduct going unreported).
264. See May 1995 Miller Grievance Program, supra note 40; Dec. 1995 Miller Grievance Program, supra note 40; Miller Institute of Professional Responsibility, Ohio Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline and Ohio State Bar Association, The Lawyer Grievance Process-A 1996 Perspective (Oct 24, 1996) (Columbus, OH); Miller Institute of Professional Responsibility, Ohio Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline and Ohio State Bar Association, The Lawyer Grievance Process-A 1998 Perspective (Apr. 17, 1998) (Columbus, OH); see also BELL REPORT, supra note 41, at 19-20 (expressing concern that there is "little similarity among [grievance committees'] procedures" and noting that some committees dismiss "a high number of grievances on intake before conducting any investigation"); Guttenberg, supra note 6, at 966, 985 (suggesting client failure to recognize misconduct or client belief that attorney conduct is not harmful results in attorney misconduct going unreported).
265. See CLARK REPORT, supra note 8, at 26. The Clark Committee concluded that centralization is "essential" to the success of state lawyer disciplinary systems. See ABA SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON EVALUATION OF DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT (Clark Committee), PROBLEMS AND RECOMMENDATION IN DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT (Preliminary Draft) (Jan. 15, 1970).
266. See MCKAY REPORT, supra note 9, at 15-16. See generally Parness, supra note 113, at 308 (writing that some, who urge a "new and comprehensive set of federal norms" for regulating attorney conduct in the federal courts, "summarily conclude that their enforcement must be undertaken in a new, unitary federal 'disciplinary control' system" - rejecting a "'disciplinary control' system established independently at the district or circuit court level").
267. See supra notes 118-22 and accompanying text (discussing the need for greater uniformity during the intake stage of the disciplinary process).
268. The McKay Commission found that "[complainants] need a central intake office." MCKAY REPORT, supra note 9, at 16 (Recommendation 3, Comments, Expanding the Scope of Public Protection).
269. BELL REPORT, supra note 41, at 19-20; APPENDIX A.
270. BELL REPORT, supra note 41, at 20; APPENDIX A.
271. CLARK REPORT, supra note 8, at 27. In advocating a centralized disciplinary structure, the Clark Committee noted the concerns of one local disciplinary agency chairman. "[W]e are still under tremendous pressures from the local bar in trying to bring charges against certain people. Certain people - as you well know, and everybody recognizes - are very popular and certain people are very influential and we are subject to the pressures put upon us either to go after somebody or to lay off of him." Id. 128.
272. CLARK REPORT, supra note 8, at 27. In advocating a centralized disciplinary structure, the Clark Committee noted the concerns of one local disciplinary agency chairman. "[W]e are still under tremendous pressures from the local bar in trying to bring charges against certain people. Certain people - as you well know, and everybody recognizes - are very popular and certain people are very influential and we are subject to the pressures put upon us either to go after somebody or to lay off of him." Id. 128.
273. See BELL REPORT, supra note 41, at 22; APPENDIX A.
274. See BELL REPORT, supra note 41, at 22; see also MCKAY REPORT, supra note 9, at 34-39 (discussing the McKay Commission's original Recommendation 7 - "Fully Public Discipline Process").
275. See BELL REPORT, supra note 41, at 22; see also MCKAY REPORT, supra note 9, at 34-39 (discussing the McKay Commission's original Recommendation 7 - "Fully Public Discipline Process").
276. See Guttenberg, supra note 6, at 987-88; see also Sahl supra note 34, at 248-49 (suggesting that an open disciplinary process for federal judges will enhance public understanding and respect for judicial self-regulation).
277. The respondent must be notified in writing of the certified grievance committee's or Disciplinary Counsel's determination to dismiss a grievance. See Ohio Gov Bar R V, § 4(H)(4), supra note 12.
278. See MCKAY REPORT, supra note 9, at 47 (noting that "[c]ases of minor misconduct seldom justify the resources needed to conduct formal disciplinary proceedings" and seldom require a sanction, and that "most of these cases call for [ ] a remedy for the client and a way to improve the lawyer's skills").
279. The benefits of disclosure to respondent attorneys also outweigh any privacy interests of the grievants. First, the rules already permit the respondent attorney or judge access to grievances. The Court apparently believes that the benefits of disclosure to respondents outweigh the risks of non-disclosure. Second, after conducting an investigation of a grievance, the rules require certified grievance committees or Disciplinary Counsel to notify respondents of their decision, including their reasons for not filing a complaint with the Board. See Ohio Gov Bar R V, § 4(H)(4), supra note 12. It is worth noting that such notification exposes the grievant to risk of retaliation by the respondent because the aggrieved attorney or judge will likely discern the grievant's identity even without seeing the original grievance. Last, the public's interest in the potential preventative educational benefits of automatic notification arguably outweighs the individual grievant's interest in confidentiality. The aggrieved attorney will hopefully appreciate the grievant's concern and take steps to avoid similar problems in the future.
280. See ABA Lawyer Discipline Systems Surveys 1996 (Chart I), 1995 (Chart I), 1994 (Chart II) and 1993 (Chart II), supra note 6; see also Guttenberg, supra note 6, at 954, 972-75. "More than half of the certified grievance committee investigations exceeded seven months, while only about a third of Disciplinary Counsel's investigations exceeded seven months." Id. at 986.
281. Guttenberg, supra note 6, at 986. A 1996 ABA Survey suggested a slightly quicker time for the processing of "complaints" or grievances. See ABA Survey of Discipline Systems: 1996 Data, supra note 6, at 22 (Chart I) (showing that the "average time" from the receipt of complaints to dismissal after investigation was sixty and 150 days; the average time from receipt of complaints to the filing of formal charges was 150 days; and the average time from receipt of complaints to impositions of public sanction was one year). Even these slight improvements place the public at risk that a miscreant attorney can continue to harm clients.
282. See Guttenberg, supra note 6, at 972-73. The sampled cases are based on data from the Disciplinary Counsel and the Cincinnati, Cleveland, Columbus, Dayton and Toledo Bar Associations. The data reveals the original date they received a grievance or opened an investigatory file on all prosecuted cases decided by the Ohio Supreme Court between 1988 and 1991. In some instances, the requested information was not supplied. See id. at 953 n.7.
283. BELL REPORT, supra note 41, at 8.
284. BELL REPORT, supra note 41, at 28-30 (Recommendation 12 & comments).
285. Id. at 29. The Bell Committee elaborated on the definition of misconduct and detailed expedited procedures based on criteria taken from Florida. See id. at Appendix V. In the absence of unusual circumstances, misconduct shall not be regarded as minor if any of the following conditions exist: (a) Misappropriation of a client's funds or property. (b) Respondent's conduct has resulted or is likely to result in substantial prejudice to a client, other person, or the administration of justice. (c) Respondent has been disciplined in the past three (3) years. (d) Misconduct involved is of the same nature as that for which Respondent has been disciplined in the past five (5) years. (e) Misconduct includes dishonesty, misrepresentation, deceit or fraud. (f) Misconduct constitutes the commission of a felony. Id. The expedited process requires one master commissioner or Board member to conduct a hearing, make findings of fact and conclusions of law and either dismiss the case or impose one of two sanctions - a public reprimand or a six-month suspension that is stayed in whole or in part. Either the Respondent's counsel or disciplinary Counsel shall have the right to appeal the sanction to the entire Board in writing. The Board imposes one of the two sanctions or asks the Board Secretary to assign the case to a regular hearing panel. If the Board imposes a final sanction, it is filed with the Clerk of the Ohio Supreme Court and becomes a final disciplinary order upon review by the Court. The Court can always grant a discretionary appeal and impose any sanction if it finds that thee Board has committed a clear abuse of discretion. See id.; see also MCKAY REPORT, supra note 9, at 47 (revealing that minor misconduct cases "seldom justify the resources needed to conduct formal disciplinary proceedings").
286. Id. at 29. The Bell Committee elaborated on the definition of misconduct and detailed expedited procedures based on criteria taken from Florida. See id. at Appendix V. In the absence of unusual circumstances, misconduct shall not be regarded as minor if any of the following conditions exist: (a) Misappropriation of a client's funds or property. (b) Respondent's conduct has resulted or is likely to result in substantial prejudice to a client, other person, or the administration of justice. (c) Respondent has been disciplined in the past three (3) years. (d) Misconduct involved is of the same nature as that for which Respondent has been disciplined in the past five (5) years. (e) Misconduct includes dishonesty, misrepresentation, deceit or fraud. (f) Misconduct constitutes the commission of a felony. Id. The expedited process requires one master commissioner or Board member to conduct a hearing, make findings of fact and conclusions of law and either dismiss the case or impose one of two sanctions - a public reprimand or a six-month suspension that is stayed in whole or in part. Either the Respondent's counsel or disciplinary Counsel shall have the right to appeal the sanction to the entire Board in writing. The Board imposes one of the two sanctions or asks the Board Secretary to assign the case to a regular hearing panel. If the Board imposes a final sanction, it is filed with the Clerk of the Ohio Supreme Court and becomes a final disciplinary order upon review by the Court. The Court can always grant a discretionary appeal and impose any sanction if it finds that thee Board has committed a clear abuse of discretion. See id.; see also MCKAY REPORT, supra note 9, at 47 (revealing that minor misconduct cases "seldom justify the resources needed to conduct formal disciplinary proceedings").
287. Id. at 29. The Bell Committee elaborated on the definition of misconduct and detailed expedited procedures based on criteria taken from Florida. See id. at Appendix V. In the absence of unusual circumstances, misconduct shall not be regarded as minor if any of the following conditions exist: (a) Misappropriation of a client's funds or property. (b) Respondent's conduct has resulted or is likely to result in substantial prejudice to a client, other person, or the administration of justice. (c) Respondent has been disciplined in the past three (3) years. (d) Misconduct involved is of the same nature as that for which Respondent has been disciplined in the past five (5) years. (e) Misconduct includes dishonesty, misrepresentation, deceit or fraud. (f) Misconduct constitutes the commission of a felony. Id. The expedited process requires one master commissioner or Board member to conduct a hearing, make findings of fact and conclusions of law and either dismiss the case or impose one of two sanctions - a public reprimand or a six-month suspension that is stayed in whole or in part. Either the Respondent's counsel or disciplinary Counsel shall have the right to appeal the sanction to the entire Board in writing. The Board imposes one of the two sanctions or asks the Board Secretary to assign the case to a regular hearing panel. If the Board imposes a final sanction, it is filed with the Clerk of the Ohio Supreme Court and becomes a final disciplinary order upon review by the Court. The Court can always grant a discretionary appeal and impose any sanction if it finds that thee Board has committed a clear abuse of discretion. See id.; see also MCKAY REPORT, supra note 9, at 47 (revealing that minor misconduct cases "seldom justify the resources needed to conduct formal disciplinary proceedings").
288. Id. at 29. The Bell Committee elaborated on the definition of misconduct and detailed expedited procedures based on criteria taken from Florida. See id. at Appendix V. In the absence of unusual circumstances, misconduct shall not be regarded as minor if any of the following conditions exist: (a) Misappropriation of a client's funds or property. (b) Respondent's conduct has resulted or is likely to result in substantial prejudice to a client, other person, or the administration of justice. (c) Respondent has been disciplined in the past three (3) years. (d) Misconduct involved is of the same nature as that for which Respondent has been disciplined in the past five (5) years. (e) Misconduct includes dishonesty, misrepresentation, deceit or fraud. (f) Misconduct constitutes the commission of a felony. Id. The expedited process requires one master commissioner or Board member to conduct a hearing, make findings of fact and conclusions of law and either dismiss the case or impose one of two sanctions - a public reprimand or a six-month suspension that is stayed in whole or in part. Either the Respondent's counsel or disciplinary Counsel shall have the right to appeal the sanction to the entire Board in writing. The Board imposes one of the two sanctions or asks the Board Secretary to assign the case to a regular hearing panel. If the Board imposes a final sanction, it is filed with the Clerk of the Ohio Supreme Court and becomes a final disciplinary order upon review by the Court. The Court can always grant a discretionary appeal and impose any sanction if it finds that thee Board has committed a clear abuse of discretion. See id.; see also MCKAY REPORT, supra note 9, at 47 (revealing that minor misconduct cases "seldom justify the resources needed to conduct formal disciplinary proceedings").
289. See MCKAY REPORT, supra note 9, at 47-52 (discussing the McKay Commission's Recommendation 9 - "Procedures In Lieu of Discipline for Minor Misconduct" - and Recommendation 10 - "Expedited Procedures for Minor Misconduct". The dismissal of a majority of minor misconduct grievances suggest that a new sanction is needed in Ohio. One possible solution is the reinstatement of the colorable grievance rule. See infra notes 148-54 and accompanying text A somewhat similar solution is for a subcommittee of the Board to issue a "Letter of Notice" or perhaps a "Letter of Concern" to the attorney who committed the minor misconduct, with a warning that similar letters might result in a formal reprimand or worse. The grievant should receive a copy of the letter. If a lawyer receives more than three such letters in a two-year period, the disciplinary authority sua sponte should conduct a formal investigation of the aggrieved lawyer.
290. BOARD UPDATE-AUGUST 1998, supra note 78, at Exhibit A.
291. See e.g., RULES REGULATING THE FLORIDA BAR Rule 3-7.3(e), 3-7.4(m); PA. RULES OF DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT Rule 208(a)(4) (cases resulting in informal admonition or private reprimand are determined by Hearing Committee of the Disciplinary Board). A Mississippi state bar association consumer assistance program handles minor complaints against attorneys, freeing other traditional disciplinary agencies to focus on more serous complaints. See Glen Waddle, The Mississippi Bar Consumer Assistance Program-How It Works, MISS. LAW., Mar.-Apr. 1995, at 12.
292. See e.g., RULES REGULATING THE FLORIDA BAR Rule 3-7.3(e), 3-7.4(m); PA. RULES OF DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT Rule 208(a)(4) (cases resulting in informal admonition or private reprimand are determined by Hearing Committee of the Disciplinary Board). A Mississippi state bar association consumer assistance program handles minor complaints against attorneys, freeing other traditional disciplinary agencies to focus on more serous complaints. See Glen Waddle, The Mississippi Bar Consumer Assistance Program-How It Works, MISS. LAW., Mar.-Apr. 1995, at 12.
293. See e.g., RULES REGULATING THE FLORIDA BAR Rule 3-7.3(e), 3-7.4(m); PA. RULES OF DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT Rule 208(a)(4) (cases resulting in informal admonition or private reprimand are determined by Hearing Committee of the Disciplinary Board). A Mississippi state bar association consumer assistance program handles minor complaints against attorneys, freeing other traditional disciplinary agencies to focus on more serous complaints. See Glen Waddle, The Mississippi Bar Consumer Assistance Program-How It Works, MISS. LAW., Mar.-Apr. 1995, at 12.
294. BELL REPORT, supra note 41, at 29.
295. BELL REPORT, supra note 41, at 29.
296. BELL REPORT, supra note 41, at 29.
297. BELL REPORT, supra note 41, at 30-31. The Bell Committee suggested that the Board publish a more complete discussion of its findings of fact and recommendations in a Board newsletter and provide copies to the state and local bar associations. See id.
298. BELL REPORT, supra note 41, at 30-31. The Bell Committee suggested that the Board publish a more complete discussion of its findings of fact and recommendations in a Board newsletter and provide copies to the state and local bar associations. See id.
299. BELL REPORT, supra note 41, at 30-31.
300. Sahl, supra note 14, at 311.
301. See Bell REPORT, supra note 41, at 39-40.
302. See WOLFRAM, supra note 60, at 126.
303. See id. at 127. 152. See Bell REPORT, supra note 41, at 40.
304. MCKAY REPORT, supra note 9, at 43. Although withdrawn, the McKay Commission's original Recommendation 8, entitled "Complainant's Rights," directed that grievants be informed of the "status of disciplinary proceedings at all stages" including contemporaneous receipt of all notices and orders to respondent as well as copies of respondent's "communications" to disciplinary agencies. Id. at 42-43.
305. MCKAY REPORT, supra note 9, at 43. Although withdrawn, the McKay Commission's original Recommendation 8, entitled "Complainant's Rights," directed that grievants be informed of the "status of disciplinary proceedings at all stages" including contemporaneous receipt of all notices and orders to respondent as well as copies of respondent's "communications" to disciplinary agencies. Id. at 42-43.
306. See id. at 44-45.
307. See BELL REPORT, supra note 41, at 48.
308. Set William C. Becker, The Client Retention Agreement-The Engagement Letter, 23 AKRON L. REV. 323 (1990).
309. See id.; see also Guttenberg, supra note 6, at 970 (revealing that from 1988 to 1991, certified grievance committees and the Disciplinary Counsel reported 13,877 grievances, of which 1,025 were categorized as relating to "Excessive Fees").
310. MCKAY REPORT, supra note 9, at 13.
311. See BELL REPORT, supra note 41, at 48.
312. See Becker, supra note 156. There is the risk that small fees deter lawyers from spending the time necessary to clearly establish the scope and other important details of their representation.
313. The Recommendation titled "Mandatory Malpractice Insurance" can be found in the Bell Report at Part IX ("Other Recommendations"). See BELL REPORT, supra note 41, at 49. "[A] malpractice action seeks damages against a lawyer for a wrong characterized in any of three ways - as a tort committed by the lawyer against the client, as a breach of the contract the client made for the lawyer's services, or as a breach of fiduciary duties owed by the lawyer to the client." MORGAN & ROTUNDA, supra note 11, at 73.
314. See BELL REPORT, supra note 41, at 49.
315. The Ohio Supreme Court revised Governance Bar Rule III, Disciplinary Rule (DR) 2-103, to require malpractice insurance or "proof of financial responsibility." See DR 2-103(C)(1)(c); see also infra notes 163-66 and accompanying text.
316. Id. Sse also MCKAY REPORT, supra note 9, at 81-82 (urging the ABA in Recommendation 18 to continue studies about requiring mandatory malpractice insurance to protect the public).
317. SUPREME COURT OF OHIO COMMISSION ON CERTIFICATION OF ATTORNEYS AS SPECIALISTS, STANDARDS FOR ACCREDITATION OF SPECIALTY CERTIFICATION PROGRAMS FOR LAWYERS, Ohio Gov Bar R XIV, § 4.02(J)(2), (4), supra note 12.
318. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. Gov Bar R III, § 4(A) (Baldwin 1995 & Supp. 1999) (requiring "[a] legal professional association, corporation, legal clinic, limited liability company, or registered partnership [to] maintain adequate professional liability insurance or other form of adequate financial responsibility for any liability" resulting from the entity's employees rendering legal services); DR 2-103(C)(1)(c) (obligating lawyers in lawyer referral programs to carry malpractice insurance or to provide proof of financial responsibility as established by the service); see also supra note 163.
319. See OR. REV. STAT. SECT. 9.080 (SUPP. 1977-78); Stephanie J. Johnston, Idaho Bar Looks at Mandatory Malpractice Insurance, BAR LEADER 9 (Mar.-Apr. 1994) (reporting that Idaho State Bar Association approved a resolution to study mandatory malpractice insurance requirement for licensure and that the Nebraska State Bar Association drafted, but did not submit to the legislature, mandatory malpractice insurance legislation similar to Oregon's); see also Nicole A. Cunitz, Mandatory Malpractice Insurance for Lawyers: Is There a Possibility of Public Protection Without Compulsion?, 8 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 637, 639 n.12 (1995) (reporting that attorneys in Canada, England, Ireland, and Australia must carry a minimum amount of insurance as a condition to licensure; and that Arizona, California, Colorado, Delaware, New Jersey, Washington and Wisconsin have expressly rejected mandatory malpractice insurance); MORGAN & ROTUNDA, supra note 11, at 132 (reporting that the bar of England and Wales, and the bar of Victoria, Australia, have both made malpractice insurance compulsory to increase bargaining power with insurance carriers and to insure that all lawyers are covered); John Leubsdorf, Legal Malpractice and Professional Responsibility, 48 RUTGERS L. REV. 101 (1995) (noting the French insurance requirement) (citing HAMELIN & DAMIEN, LES RE'GIS DE LA PROFESSION D'AVOCAT, 193 (8th ed. 1995)). The malpractice coverage costs each Oregon attorney $1900 annually. See Telephone Interview with Kirk R. Hall, Chief Executive Officer, Oregon State Bar Professional Liability Fund (Apr. 1, 1999) [hereinafter Hall Interview]. See generally Ogrinz v. James, 524 A.2d 77 (Md. 1987) (upholding taxation of attorneys to establish malpractice insurance company for bar to insure coverage for all attorneys).
320. See OR. REV. STAT. SECT. 9.080 (SUPP. 1977-78); Stephanie J. Johnston, Idaho Bar Looks at Mandatory Malpractice Insurance, BAR LEADER 9 (Mar.-Apr. 1994) (reporting that Idaho State Bar Association approved a resolution to study mandatory malpractice insurance requirement for licensure and that the Nebraska State Bar Association drafted, but did not submit to the legislature, mandatory malpractice insurance legislation similar to Oregon's); see also Nicole A. Cunitz, Mandatory Malpractice Insurance for Lawyers: Is There a Possibility of Public Protection Without Compulsion?, 8 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 637, 639 n.12 (1995) (reporting that attorneys in Canada, England, Ireland, and Australia must carry a minimum amount of insurance as a condition to licensure; and that Arizona, California, Colorado, Delaware, New Jersey, Washington and Wisconsin have expressly rejected mandatory malpractice insurance); MORGAN & ROTUNDA, supra note 11, at 132 (reporting that the bar of England and Wales, and the bar of Victoria, Australia, have both made malpractice insurance compulsory to increase bargaining power with insurance carriers and to insure that all lawyers are covered); John Leubsdorf, Legal Malpractice and Professional Responsibility, 48 RUTGERS L. REV. 101 (1995) (noting the French insurance requirement) (citing HAMELIN & DAMIEN, LES RE'GIS DE LA PROFESSION D'AVOCAT, 193 (8th ed. 1995)). The malpractice coverage costs each Oregon attorney $1900 annually. See Telephone Interview with Kirk R. Hall, Chief Executive Officer, Oregon State Bar Professional Liability Fund (Apr. 1, 1999) [hereinafter Hall Interview]. See generally Ogrinz v. James, 524 A.2d 77 (Md. 1987) (upholding taxation of attorneys to establish malpractice insurance company for bar to insure coverage for all attorneys).
321. See OR. REV. STAT. SECT. 9.080 (SUPP. 1977-78); Stephanie J. Johnston, Idaho Bar Looks at Mandatory Malpractice Insurance, BAR LEADER 9 (Mar.-Apr. 1994) (reporting that Idaho State Bar Association approved a resolution to study mandatory malpractice insurance requirement for licensure and that the Nebraska State Bar Association drafted, but did not submit to the legislature, mandatory malpractice insurance legislation similar to Oregon's); see also Nicole A. Cunitz, Mandatory Malpractice Insurance for Lawyers: Is There a Possibility of Public Protection Without Compulsion?, 8 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 637, 639 n.12 (1995) (reporting that attorneys in Canada, England, Ireland, and Australia must carry a minimum amount of insurance as a condition to licensure; and that Arizona, California, Colorado, Delaware, New Jersey, Washington and Wisconsin have expressly rejected mandatory malpractice insurance); MORGAN & ROTUNDA, supra note 11, at 132 (reporting that the bar of England and Wales, and the bar of Victoria, Australia, have both made malpractice insurance compulsory to increase bargaining power with insurance carriers and to insure that all lawyers are covered); John Leubsdorf, Legal Malpractice and Professional Responsibility, 48 RUTGERS L. REV. 101 (1995) (noting the French insurance requirement) (citing HAMELIN & DAMIEN, LES RE'GIS DE LA PROFESSION D'AVOCAT, 193 (8th ed. 1995)). The malpractice coverage costs each Oregon attorney $1900 annually. See Telephone Interview with Kirk R. Hall, Chief Executive Officer, Oregon State Bar Professional Liability Fund (Apr. 1, 1999) [hereinafter Hall Interview]. See generally Ogrinz v. James, 524 A.2d 77 (Md. 1987) (upholding taxation of attorneys to establish malpractice insurance company for bar to insure coverage for all attorneys).
322. See OR. REV. STAT. SECT. 9.080 (SUPP. 1977-78); Stephanie J. Johnston, Idaho Bar Looks at Mandatory Malpractice Insurance, BAR LEADER 9 (Mar.-Apr. 1994) (reporting that Idaho State Bar Association approved a resolution to study mandatory malpractice insurance requirement for licensure and that the Nebraska State Bar Association drafted, but did not submit to the legislature, mandatory malpractice insurance legislation similar to Oregon's); see also Nicole A. Cunitz, Mandatory Malpractice Insurance for Lawyers: Is There a Possibility of Public Protection Without Compulsion?, 8 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 637, 639 n.12 (1995) (reporting that attorneys in Canada, England, Ireland, and Australia must carry a minimum amount of insurance as a condition to licensure; and that Arizona, California, Colorado, Delaware, New Jersey, Washington and Wisconsin have expressly rejected mandatory malpractice insurance); MORGAN & ROTUNDA, supra note 11, at 132 (reporting that the bar of England and Wales, and the bar of Victoria, Australia, have both made malpractice insurance compulsory to increase bargaining power with insurance carriers and to insure that all lawyers are covered); John Leubsdorf, Legal Malpractice and Professional Responsibility, 48 RUTGERS L. REV. 101 (1995) (noting the French insurance requirement) (citing HAMELIN & DAMIEN, LES RE'GIS DE LA PROFESSION D'AVOCAT, 193 (8th ed. 1995)). The malpractice coverage costs each Oregon attorney $1900 annually. See Telephone Interview with Kirk R. Hall, Chief Executive Officer, Oregon State Bar Professional Liability Fund (Apr. 1, 1999) [hereinafter Hall Interview]. See generally Ogrinz v. James, 524 A.2d 77 (Md. 1987) (upholding taxation of attorneys to establish malpractice insurance company for bar to insure coverage for all attorneys).
323. See Roger C. Cramton, Delivery of Legal Service to Ordinary Americans, 44 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 531, 613 (1994) (advocating mandatory malpractice insurance for all attorneys); see also Hall Interview, supra note 167 (contending that Oregon's policy of mandatory malpractice insurance has served the interests of both the public and the bar and that the policy has not caused a significant increase in the number of malpractice claims against lawyers).
324. See Cunitz, supra note 167, at 650 (noting that "proponents of mandatory malpractice coverage for lawyers argue that an insurance requirement is the most efficient method for protecting the public against harm because lawyers are in a better position than their clients to insure against loss"). But see Ribstein, supra note 12, at 1710 (noting that malpractice liability may produce some market inefficiency because lawyers are sensitive to risk and thus in order to reduce that risk lawyers may do more work than the client needs).
325. See WOLFRAM, supra note 60, at 240.
326. See Telephone Interview with William C. Becker, Jr., Dec. 5, 1998 [hereinafter Becker Interview Dec. 1998].
327. See WOLFRAM, supra note 60, at 240.
328. See Becker Interview Dec. 1998, supra note 171.
329. Id. "The growth of insurance may reflect the fiscal conservatism of lawyers, or it may reflect real growth in the number of claims filed against lawyers and in the size of recoveries." Id.
330. RONALD E. MALLEN & JEFFREY M. SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE x (3rd ed. 1989).
331. "It has been estimated that 30 percent to 50 percent of practicing lawyers carry no malpractice coverage." ABA Standing Comm. on Lawyers' Professional Liability, Legal Malpractice Claims in the 1990s, at 5 (1996); see also Kirk Hall, Minimum Financial Responsibility For Lawyers, at 1 (Mar. 29, 1999) (unpublished manuscript on file with author); Hall Interview, supra note 167 (using "going bare" to describe lawyers practicing without malpractice coverage). The number and percentage of Ohio lawyers who do not have malpractice insurance is unknown. See Marshall Interview, supra note 14.
332. "It has been estimated that 30 percent to 50 percent of practicing lawyers carry no malpractice coverage." ABA Standing Comm. on Lawyers' Professional Liability, Legal Malpractice Claims in the 1990s, at 5 (1996); see also Kirk Hall, Minimum Financial Responsibility For Lawyers, at 1 (Mar. 29, 1999) (unpublished manuscript on file with author); Hall Interview, supra note 167 (using "going bare" to describe lawyers practicing without malpractice coverage). The number and percentage of Ohio lawyers who do not have malpractice insurance is unknown. See Marshall Interview, supra note 14.
333. Lawyers disciplined by the Ohio Supreme Court frequently do not have malpractice insurance. See Marshall Interview, supra note 14. From 1990 through 1995, the percentage of malpractice claims filed against various-sized law firms included the following: sixty-one percent, or 13,194, legal malpractice claims against firms with one to five attorneys; fourteen percent, or 3,101, against firms of 100 or more attorneys; ten percent, or 2,242, against firms of eleven to thirty-nine attorneys; ten percent, or 2,259, against firms with six to ten attorneys; and four percent, or 894 cases, against firms with forty to ninety-nine lawyers. See ABA Standing Committee on Lawyers' Professional Liability, Legal Malpractice Claims in the 1990s, at 9, Figure 2 (1996). These malpractice claims involved the following fields of law: personal injury (twenty-two percent); real estate (fourteen percent); business transactions/commercial law (eleven percent); family law (nine percent); corporate/business organizations (nine percent); collection/ bank (eight percent); estate and trust (eight percent); criminal (four percent). See id. at Figure 1A. All other fields claimed the remaining fifteen percent. See id.
334. Model attorney disclosure statements to clients concerning their rights and responsibilities during the selection of and continuation of legal representation fail to require notification to clients about malpractice insurance coverage. See The Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers, Consumer Bill of Rights (draft proposal) (Aug. 24, 1998) (on file with author).
335. See MAGALI SARFATTI LARSON, THE RISE OF PROFESSIONALISM, 48-49 (1977) (emphasizing that the "lay buyer of professional services is compelled to trust the seller because he does not have any other standard of evaluation" because of the imbalance of knowledge and power). See also William C. Becker, The Client Retention Agreement - The Engagement Letter, 23 U. AKRON L. REV 323, 326 (1990) (observing that clients lack the knowledge necessary to negotiate a contingency fee contract that fits their needs).
336. See MAGALI SARFATTI LARSON, THE RISE OF PROFESSIONALISM, 48-49 (1977) (emphasizing that the "lay buyer of professional services is compelled to trust the seller because he does not have any other standard of evaluation" because of the imbalance of knowledge and power). See also William C. Becker, The Client Retention Agreement - The Engagement Letter, 23 U. AKRON L. REV 323, 326 (1990) (observing that clients lack the knowledge necessary to negotiate a contingency fee contract that fits their needs).
337. See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 6147-48 (1995); see also Cunitz, supra note 167, at 663-65.
338. Id.
339. See Alaska Requires Lawyers to Inform Clients About Malpractice Insurance, 14 ABA/BNA LAW. MANUAL ON PROF. CONDUCT 625 (1999) (providing the amended text of Rule 1.4 on client communication pursuant to Alaska Supreme Court Older No. 1329, noting effective date of new rule is January 15, 1999).
340. See id. The South Dakota Rules of Conduct provide in part: Rule 1.4. Communication . . . (c) If a lawyer does not have professional liability insurance with limit of at least $100,000, or if during the course of representation, the insurance policy lapses or is terminated, a lawyer shall promptly disclose to a client by including as a component of the lawyer's letterhead, using the following specific language, either that: (1) "This lawyer is not covered by professional liability insurance;" or (2) "This firm is not covered by professional liability insurance." Id. The Comments indicate that disclosure must be made at the beginning of the attorney-client relationship, and that clients must be notified if the policy lapses or is terminated.
341. See Hall, supra note 176, at 6 (reporting that Rule 7.2 would be amended to incorporate the new disclosure requirements in lawyer advertising). South Dakota's annual bar membership renewal process requires each lawyer to certify "whether or not the lawyer carries professional liability coverage, the name of the insurance carrier, the policy number, and the limits of coverage." Id. 185. See David Z. Webster, Yes: It's Essential to Public Trust, ABAJ., Nov. 1993, at 44 (reporting that the Virginia State Bar requires members to disclose whether they have malpractice insurance as a condition of licensure; Rhode Island requires malpractice insurance for court appointed attorneys; and many bar association sponsored referral systems require malpractice insurance for participants). It is important to note that very recently the Ohio Supreme Court has initiated the process to adopt a malpractice insurance notification rule by publishing a proposal for public comment. See 72, No. 46 OSBA Report at iv (Nov. 15, 1999). There is no guarantee as to when or whether such a rule will be adopted. If the rule is adopted however, it would constitute a major step in protecting the public. The rule empowers clients with necessary information to make more informed choices when selecting counsel. The proposed rule follows. DR 1-104. Disclosure of Information to the Client. (A) A lawyer shall inform a client at the time of the client's engagement of the lawyer or at any time subsequent to the engagement if the lawyer does not maintain professional liability insurance in the amounts of at least one hundred thousand dollars per occurrence and three hundred thousand dollars in the aggregate or if the lawyer's professional liability is terminated. The notice shall be provided to the client in writing and on a separate form signed by the client. (B) A lawyer shall maintain a copy of the notice signed by the client for five years after termination of representation of the client.
342. See Hall, supra note 176, at 6 (reporting that Rule 7.2 would be amended to incorporate the new disclosure requirements in lawyer advertising). South Dakota's annual bar membership renewal process requires each lawyer to certify "whether or not the lawyer carries professional liability coverage, the name of the insurance carrier, the policy number, and the limits of coverage." Id. 185. See David Z. Webster, Yes: It's Essential to Public Trust, ABAJ., Nov. 1993, at 44 (reporting that the Virginia State Bar requires members to disclose whether they have malpractice insurance as a condition of licensure; Rhode Island requires malpractice insurance for court appointed attorneys; and many bar association sponsored referral systems require malpractice insurance for participants). It is important to note that very recently the Ohio Supreme Court has initiated the process to adopt a malpractice insurance notification rule by publishing a proposal for public comment. See 72, No. 46 OSBA Report at iv (Nov. 15, 1999). There is no guarantee as to when or whether such a rule will be adopted. If the rule is adopted however, it would constitute a major step in protecting the public. The rule empowers clients with necessary information to make more informed choices when selecting counsel. The proposed rule follows. DR 1-104. Disclosure of Information to the Client. (A) A lawyer shall inform a client at the time of the client's engagement of the lawyer or at any time subsequent to the engagement if the lawyer does not maintain professional liability insurance in the amounts of at least one hundred thousand dollars per occurrence and three hundred thousand dollars in the aggregate or if the lawyer's professional liability is terminated. The notice shall be provided to the client in writing and on a separate form signed by the client. (B) A lawyer shall maintain a copy of the notice signed by the client for five years after termination of representation of the client.
343. See Ohio Gov Bar R V, supra note 12, § 3(B)(1)(b). Requiring six meetings a year is not onerous, especially with the rate of grievances escalating and public and professional concern about the disciplinary process increasing. In the absence of disciplinary work, the grievance committee could devote time to continuing education courses in the field, informational outreach programs to the bar and the public, fine-tuning the local grievance committee process, and other important endeavors. See infra notes 187-92 and accompanying text for a discussion of non-lawyer membership on grievance committees.
344. MCKAY REPORT, supra note 9, at 64.
345. MCKAY REPORT, supra note 9, at 63.
346. See MCKAY REPORT, supra note 9, at 63. The MRLDE also advocated greater diversity within disciplinary agencies by suggesting that such agencies have an appropriate representative number of "minority, women, and solo and small firm practitioners." Id. See also Boggs Interview, supra note 94 (reporting that non-lawyers comprise one-third of the members of grievance committees).
347. See MCKAY REPORT, supra note 9, at 63. The MRLDE also advocated greater diversity within disciplinary agencies by suggesting that such agencies have an appropriate representative number of "minority, women, and solo and small firm practitioners." Id. See also Boggs Interview, supra note 94 (reporting that non-lawyers comprise one-third of the members of grievance committees).
348. See Ohio Gov Bar R V, supra note 12, § 3(B)(1)(b). The Ohio Supreme Court rule requires ten percent non-lawyer participation on grievance committees and a minimum of three non-lawyers. Since local certified grievance committees must have at least fifteen members, it is theoretically possible to have non-lawyer membership exceed ten percent when the total membership of a grievance committee is less than thirty.
349. See BELL REPORT, supra note 41, at 43 (Item 3-The composition of the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline).
350. See BELL REPORT, supra note 41, at 43.
351. MCKAY REPORT, supra note 9, at 63.
352. See MCKAY REPORT, supra note 9, at 64.
353. See BELL REPORT, supra note 41; see infra notes 196-201 and accompanying text.
354. 71 OSBA REP. at lxx; Dove Memorandum, supra note 88, at 3 (containing the new amendment, § 3(C)(1)).
355. See supra notes 110-22 and accompanying text.
356. The Supreme Court has amended the rules to permit Disciplinary Counsel to "retain one or more part[-]time investigators . . . to assist Certified Grievance Committees in the investigation of grievances." Dove Memorandum, supra note 88, at 2 (Aug. 28, 1998) (containing proposed amendments to Ohio Gov Bar R V, § 3 (B)(2)) (on file with author).
357. Requiring Disciplinary Counsel to certify grievance committee bar counsel could be viewed as an effort by the Ohio Supreme Court to insure the competency of bar counsel and the committees they serve. To the extent this is true, it is inconsistent with the Court's confidence in the abilities of the certified grievance committees. Alternatively, such certification may merely represent a compromise by the Ohio Supreme Court between total centralization and local control in the disciplinary process.
358. See Quintin Johnstone, Bar Associations: Policies and Performances, 15 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 193, 217 (1996).
359. Ohio Gov Bar R V, § 3 (B)(1), supra note 12.
360. Ohio Gov Bar R V, § 11(E)(1), (E)(2)(b), (E)(3), supra note 12. The veil of secrecy is lifted only if the respondent requests in writing that grievance matters be public; the respondent's actions show that privacy has been voluntarily waived; or "reasonable cause" exists that the respondent is abusing alcohol or other chemicals and information of such abuse is given to a bar committee or similar organization assisting lawyers with substance abuse. See id. § 11(E)(1)(a)-(c). See GREENBAUM, supra note 11, at 652-53; see also Sahl, supra note 14, at 304 (reporting that grievances become complaints when the Ohio Disciplinary Counsel or a certified grievance committee finds probable cause and a probable cause panel of the Board certifies the complaint).
361. Ohio Gov Bar R V, § 11(E)(1), (E)(2)(b), (E)(3), supra note 12. The veil of secrecy is lifted only if the respondent requests in writing that grievance matters be public; the respondent's actions show that privacy has been voluntarily waived; or "reasonable cause" exists that the respondent is abusing alcohol or other chemicals and information of such abuse is given to a bar committee or similar organization assisting lawyers with substance abuse. See id. § 11(E)(1)(a)-(c). See GREENBAUM, supra note 11, at 652-53; see also Sahl, supra note 14, at 304 (reporting that grievances become complaints when the Ohio Disciplinary Counsel or a certified grievance committee finds probable cause and a probable cause panel of the Board certifies the complaint).
362. See Guttenberg, supra note 6, at 961. "There is almost no accountability for decisions not to prosecute." Id. at n.47. "[I]nvestigative agencies report very little information about the cases they do not prosecute." Id. at 961. Disciplinary Counsel and certified local grievance committees are not required to "report to any authority the reasons for not prosecuting a complaint, other than the brief statement accompanying the notice of dismissal that is sent to the grievant." Id. at n.47. See supra notes 20-24 and accompanying text See generally Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Breaking Down Medicine's Culture of Silence, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 1999, § 4, at 1 (reporting that the "culture of silence . . . needs to be broken involving medical mistakes and that hospital mistakes alone kill as many as 98,000 people yearly.")
363. See Guttenberg, supra note 6, at 961. "There is almost no accountability for decisions not to prosecute." Id. at n.47. "[I]nvestigative agencies report very little information about the cases they do not prosecute." Id. at 961. Disciplinary Counsel and certified local grievance committees are not required to "report to any authority the reasons for not prosecuting a complaint, other than the brief statement accompanying the notice of dismissal that is sent to the grievant." Id. at n.47. See supra notes 20-24 and accompanying text See generally Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Breaking Down Medicine's Culture of Silence, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 1999, § 4, at 1 (reporting that the "culture of silence . . . needs to be broken involving medical mistakes and that hospital mistakes alone kill as many as 98,000 people yearly.")
364. See Guttenberg, supra note 6, at 961. "There is almost no accountability for decisions not to prosecute." Id. at n.47. "[I]nvestigative agencies report very little information about the cases they do not prosecute." Id. at 961. Disciplinary Counsel and certified local grievance committees are not required to "report to any authority the reasons for not prosecuting a complaint, other than the brief statement accompanying the notice of dismissal that is sent to the grievant." Id. at n.47. See supra notes 20-24 and accompanying text See generally Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Breaking Down Medicine's Culture of Silence, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 1999, § 4, at 1 (reporting that the "culture of silence . . . needs to be broken involving medical mistakes and that hospital mistakes alone kill as many as 98,000 people yearly.")
365. See GREENBAUM, supra note 11, at 652-53; Guttenberg, supra note 6, at 961-62.
366. See Guttenberg, supra note 6, at 961; see also GREENBAUM, supra note 11, at 652-53.
367. 206; See BELL REPORT, supra note 41, at 42; see APPENDIX A, Item 1 of this article.
368. See BELL REPORT, supra note 41, at 42; see APPENDIX A, Item 1 of this article.
369. See Ohio Gov Bar R V, § 11(E)(1)-(2), supra note12; BELL REPORT, supra note 41, at 42. The overwhelming sentiment among the bar favored the existing veil of secrecy. Leading critics of Ohio's practice of secrecy included Professor Jack Guttenberg, the Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, and this author. See Guttenberg, supra note 6, at 987-89; see also Sahl, supra note 34, at 224-50 (providing a detailed argument in favor of opening the federal judicial disciplinary process).
370. See Ohio Gov Bar R V, § 11(E)(1)-(2), supra note12; BELL REPORT, supra note 41, at 42. The overwhelming sentiment among the bar favored the existing veil of secrecy. Leading critics of Ohio's practice of secrecy included Professor Jack Guttenberg, the Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, and this author. See Guttenberg, supra note 6, at 987-89; see also Sahl, supra note 34, at 224-50 (providing a detailed argument in favor of opening the federal judicial disciplinary process).
371. BELL REPORT, supra note 41, at 42.
372. For example, for several years Professor Guttenberg and others have publicly criticized Ohio's secret disciplinary process. See Guttenberg, supra note 6, at 987-89 (recommending that disciplinary process be opened upon filing of grievance); Dec. 1995 Miller Program, supra note 38 (remarks by this author calling for public review immediately after the filing of a grievance); see also Kay A. Ostberg, ATTORNEY DISCIPLINE NATIONAL SURVEY (1990) [hereinafter HALT] (prepared for the Organization of Americans for Legal Reform) (arguing that disciplinary systems should be open to the public). See generally Sahl, supra note 34, at 199 (advocating that the federal judicial disciplinary process should be opened to the public when the grievance is filed).
373. See Proposed Amendments to the Rules for the Government of the Bar of Ohio, 71 OSBA REP., at lxvi-lxxxix (Sept. 21, 1998).
374. See ROSCOE POUND, THE LAWYER FROM ANTIQUITY TO MODERN TIMES vii (1953). Pound states that "[t]he legal profession is a public profession. Lawyers are public servants. They are stewards of all the legal rights and obligations of all the citizens. It is incumbent on stewards, if they are to be faithful to their trust, to render an accounting from time to time." Id. See also WOLFRAM, supra note 60, at 1,17-19 (indicating that the title, officer of the court, "implies a title bestowing special privileges upon lawyers"). Anthony T. Kronman, Professionalism, 2 J. INST. STUD. LEG. ETH. 89, 90 (1999) (describing law as a "public calling" entailing a duty to serve the good of the community).
375. See ROSCOE POUND, THE LAWYER FROM ANTIQUITY TO MODERN TIMES vii (1953). Pound states that "[t]he legal profession is a public profession. Lawyers are public servants. They are stewards of all the legal rights and obligations of all the citizens. It is incumbent on stewards, if they are to be faithful to their trust, to render an accounting from time to time." Id. See also WOLFRAM, supra note 60, at 1,17-19 (indicating that the title, officer of the court, "implies a title bestowing special privileges upon lawyers"). Anthony T. Kronman, Professionalism, 2 J. INST. STUD. LEG. ETH. 89, 90 (1999) (describing law as a "public calling" entailing a duty to serve the good of the community).
376. See ROSCOE POUND, THE LAWYER FROM ANTIQUITY TO MODERN TIMES vii (1953). Pound states that "[t]he legal profession is a public profession. Lawyers are public servants. They are stewards of all the legal rights and obligations of all the citizens. It is incumbent on stewards, if they are to be faithful to their trust, to render an accounting from time to time." Id. See also WOLFRAM, supra note 60, at 1,17-19 (indicating that the title, officer of the court, "implies a title bestowing special privileges upon lawyers"). Anthony T. Kronman, Professionalism, 2 J. INST. STUD. LEG. ETH. 89, 90 (1999) (describing law as a "public calling" entailing a duty to serve the good of the community).
377. L. RAY PATTERSON, LAWYER'S LAW: PROCEDURAL, MALPRACTICE AND DISCIPLINARY ISSUES 11 (1998) (indicating that the term "'officer of the court,' . . . is a synonym for fiduciary," since a lawyer exercises the power of the court as well as of the client). See also Sahl, supra note 34, at 245-50 (explaining that judges are subject to public accountability); WOLFRAM supra note 60, at 19 (writing "[occasionally the concept of 'officer of the court' is invoked to hold a lawyer to special obligations . . . to uphold particular public policies"); City Council Supports Further Oversight of Los Angeles Police, N.Y. TIMES, February 7, 1999, at A31 (discussing the need for public accountability concerning a governmental agency and its officials, Los Angeles City Councilwoman Laura Chick said "the department must have oversight beyond its own internal checks and balances."). See generally LARSON, supra note 179, at 52, 189 (analyzing how various professions claim allegiance to the public service ideal and use secrecy to protect their power even at the expense of clients).
378. L. RAY PATTERSON, LAWYER'S LAW: PROCEDURAL, MALPRACTICE AND DISCIPLINARY ISSUES 11 (1998) (indicating that the term "'officer of the court,' . . . is a synonym for fiduciary," since a lawyer exercises the power of the court as well as of the client). See also Sahl, supra note 34, at 245-50 (explaining that judges are subject to public accountability); WOLFRAM supra note 60, at 19 (writing "[occasionally the concept of 'officer of the court' is invoked to hold a lawyer to special obligations . . . to uphold particular public policies"); City Council Supports Further Oversight of Los Angeles Police, N.Y. TIMES, February 7, 1999, at A31 (discussing the need for public accountability concerning a governmental agency and its officials, Los Angeles City Councilwoman Laura Chick said "the department must have oversight beyond its own internal checks and balances."). See generally LARSON, supra note 179, at 52, 189 (analyzing how various professions claim allegiance to the public service ideal and use secrecy to protect their power even at the expense of clients).
379. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN., Canon 1 (Baldwin 1995) (A Lawyer Should Assist in Maintaining the Integrity and Competence of the Legal Profession); ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct. Lawyers are central functionaries in administering law for clients, and the strength of a legal system depends ultimately upon how lawyers administer the law. See PATTERSON, supra note 213, at 8.
380. MCKAY REPORT, supra note 9, at 33.
381. MCKAY REPORT, supra note 9, at 33. The McKay Commission originally recommended, with some exceptions, that "all records" of lawyer discipline agencies be open to the public "from the time of the complainant's initial communication with the agency." Id. at 34.
382. MCKAY REPORT, supra note 9, at 33. The McKay Commission originally recommended, with some exceptions, that "all records" of lawyer discipline agencies be open to the public "from the time of the complainant's initial communication with the agency." Id. at 34.
383. MCKAY REPORT, supra note 9, at 33.
384. See Guttenberg, supra note 6, at 987-88.
385. See PATTERSON, supra note 213, at 9 (suggesting that consistent procedures and results promote the integrity of law).
386. See supra notes 110-21 and accompanying text.
387. See supra notes 202-05 and accompanying text. But see Johnstone, supra note 200, at 217-18. Professor Quintin Johnstone, a distinguished scholar of professional responsibility, believes that charges that confidentiality in the disciplinary process promotes favorable treatment or self-serving results are not "proven." See id. Furthermore, he suggests that a "large measure of professional self-regulation leads to more effective control due to the added authority and influence of respected persons inside the profession." Id. at 218.
388. See Johnstone, supra note 200, at 217.
389. WOLFRAM, supra note 60, at 4. A classic, albeit simple, case to illustrate the potential for a client to be unfairly frustrated with an attorney is a child custody battle in which divorcing parents both seek sole custody of their children. Anything less than full custody inevitably leaves one or more of the parties unsatisfied because they have had to compromise their expectations. A decision to grant joint custody promises to frustrate both parties and possibly even their children. Clients and other parties may blame their lawyers in this and other contexts for what they see as unfavorable results. Assuming the attorneys acted ethically and competently, it would be unfair to grieve them for failing to gain sole custody. See generally id. at 570. Because of their role in the adversary system, lawyers serve as diligent and dedicated facilitators of client objectives - not judges as to the goodness or badness of their clients. See id. "A large portion of the non[-]lawyer public rejects the moral and political isolation of lawyers that the principle of professional detachment posits." Id. at 569.
390. See Telephone Interview with George Riemer, Deputy Director and General Counsel, Oregon State Bar (Feb. 11, 1999) [hereinafter Riemer Interview 1999]; Boggs Interview, supra, note 94 (reporting that generally about ninety-two percent of Florida's grievances become open to the public almost "right away"); Mary M. Devlin, Historical Overview: The Development of Lawyer Disciplinary Procedures in the United States, 7 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 911, 931-32 (1994) (noting that the McKay Commission recommended an open disciplinary system based on the experiences of Oregon, Florida and West Virginia); see also Guttenberg, supra note 6, at 988 (referring to the "experiences of Oregon and Florida" as proof that an open disciplinary system will not "unduly harm the reputations" of Ohio attorneys); Telephone Interview with James L. De Hart, Administrator of the New Hampshire Supreme Court Professional Conduct Committee (Feb. 16, 1999) [hereinafter De Hart Interview] (indicating that the disciplinary process becomes open to the public without the necessity for a finding of probable cause after all of the following has occurred: the grievant's written complaint, the respondent's written answer, the Committee's staff attorneys refer the file to a member of the state Professional Conduct Committee who, after conducting a review of the file, refers the matter to the full Committee, and the full Committee's vote to hold a hearing). For many years, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit permitted the public direct access to complaints against judges. See Sahl, supra note 34, at 234-45 (citing Telephone Interviews with Henry A. Politz & Charles Clark, former Chief Judges of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit (Apr. 25, 1994) & (May 4, 1994)). Both judges reported that there were no problems with having complaints completely open to the public. See id. at 242 n.261. However, motivated by the federal judiciary's desire to have a uniform national policy, the Fifth Circuit agreed to end its policy of openness. See ul. at n.260.
391. OR. REV. STAT. § 192.620 (1997).
392. Oregon State Bar v. Wright, 573 P.2d 283, 286 (Or.1977); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 9.010, 9.460-565.
393. See Telephone Interview with George Riemer, Associate Executive Director and General Counsel, Oregon State Bar (May 20 & June 29, 1994) [hereinafter Riemer Interview 1994]. The State Professional Responsibility Board (SPRB) is part of the Oregon State Bar's disciplinary process, and the bar is a "public corporation and an instrumentality of the Judicial Department of the government of the State of Oregon." OR. REV. STAT. § 9.010 (1) (1999); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 192.630, 192.650 (requiring public bodies to provide the public with notice of meetings and to keep minutes of meetings); Or. Bar R P 1.7(b) (entitling the public to inspect records related to bar disciplinary proceedings). See also Frohnmayer v. Oregon State Bar, 767 P.2d 893 (Or. 1989) (holding that records filed as part of disciplinary complaint against a lawyer are subject to disclosure under Public Records Act); Sadler v. Oregon State Bar, 550 P.2d 1218 (Or. 1976). For a list of the exemptions to Oregon's Public Records and Meetings Law, see OR. REV. STAT. §§ 192.501-05 (1999). See also Oregonian Publ'g Co. v. Oregon State Board of Parole, 95 Or. App. 501, 506, 769 P.2d 795, 798 (1989) (consistent with the statute's expressed policy, courts broadly construe the scope of the statute and narrowly define exemptions).
394. See Telephone Interview with George Riemer, Associate Executive Director and General Counsel, Oregon State Bar (May 20 & June 29, 1994) [hereinafter Riemer Interview 1994]. The State Professional Responsibility Board (SPRB) is part of the Oregon State Bar's disciplinary process, and the bar is a "public corporation and an instrumentality of the Judicial Department of the government of the State of Oregon." OR. REV. STAT. § 9.010 (1) (1999); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 192.630, 192.650 (requiring public bodies to provide the public with notice of meetings and to keep minutes of meetings); Or. Bar R P 1.7(b) (entitling the public to inspect records related to bar disciplinary proceedings). See also Frohnmayer v. Oregon State Bar, 767 P.2d 893 (Or. 1989) (holding that records filed as part of disciplinary complaint against a lawyer are subject to disclosure under Public Records Act); Sadler v. Oregon State Bar, 550 P.2d 1218 (Or. 1976). For a list of the exemptions to Oregon's Public Records and Meetings Law, see OR. REV. STAT. §§ 192.501-05 (1999). See also Oregonian Publ'g Co. v. Oregon State Board of Parole, 95 Or. App. 501, 506, 769 P.2d 795, 798 (1989) (consistent with the statute's expressed policy, courts broadly construe the scope of the statute and narrowly define exemptions).
395. See Telephone Interview with George Riemer, Associate Executive Director and General Counsel, Oregon State Bar (May 20 & June 29, 1994) [hereinafter Riemer Interview 1994]. The State Professional Responsibility Board (SPRB) is part of the Oregon State Bar's disciplinary process, and the bar is a "public corporation and an instrumentality of the Judicial Department of the government of the State of Oregon." OR. REV. STAT. § 9.010 (1) (1999); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 192.630, 192.650 (requiring public bodies to provide the public with notice of meetings and to keep minutes of meetings); Or. Bar R P 1.7(b) (entitling the public to inspect records related to bar disciplinary proceedings). See also Frohnmayer v. Oregon State Bar, 767 P.2d 893 (Or. 1989) (holding that records filed as part of disciplinary complaint against a lawyer are subject to disclosure under Public Records Act); Sadler v. Oregon State Bar, 550 P.2d 1218 (Or. 1976). For a list of the exemptions to Oregon's Public Records and Meetings Law, see OR. REV. STAT. §§ 192.501-05 (1999). See also Oregonian Publ'g Co. v. Oregon State Board of Parole, 95 Or. App. 501, 506, 769 P.2d 795, 798 (1989) (consistent with the statute's expressed policy, courts broadly construe the scope of the statute and narrowly define exemptions).
396. See Telephone Interview with George Riemer, Associate Executive Director and General Counsel, Oregon State Bar (May 20 & June 29, 1994) [hereinafter Riemer Interview 1994]. The State Professional Responsibility Board (SPRB) is part of the Oregon State Bar's disciplinary process, and the bar is a "public corporation and an instrumentality of the Judicial Department of the government of the State of Oregon." OR. REV. STAT. § 9.010 (1) (1999); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 192.630, 192.650 (requiring public bodies to provide the public with notice of meetings and to keep minutes of meetings); Or. Bar R P 1.7(b) (entitling the public to inspect records related to bar disciplinary proceedings). See also Frohnmayer v. Oregon State Bar, 767 P.2d 893 (Or. 1989) (holding that records filed as part of disciplinary complaint against a lawyer are subject to disclosure under Public Records Act); Sadler v. Oregon State Bar, 550 P.2d 1218 (Or. 1976). For a list of the exemptions to Oregon's Public Records and Meetings Law, see OR. REV. STAT. §§ 192.501-05 (1999). See also Oregonian Publ'g Co. v. Oregon State Board of Parole, 95 Or. App. 501, 506, 769 P.2d 795, 798 (1989) (consistent with the statute's expressed policy, courts broadly construe the scope of the statute and narrowly define exemptions).
397. See Telephone Interview with George Riemer, Associate Executive Director and General Counsel, Oregon State Bar (May 20 & June 29, 1994) [hereinafter Riemer Interview 1994]. The State Professional Responsibility Board (SPRB) is part of the Oregon State Bar's disciplinary process, and the bar is a "public corporation and an instrumentality of the Judicial Department of the government of the State of Oregon." OR. REV. STAT. § 9.010 (1) (1999); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 192.630, 192.650 (requiring public bodies to provide the public with notice of meetings and to keep minutes of meetings); Or. Bar R P 1.7(b) (entitling the public to inspect records related to bar disciplinary proceedings). See also Frohnmayer v. Oregon State Bar, 767 P.2d 893 (Or. 1989) (holding that records filed as part of disciplinary complaint against a lawyer are subject to disclosure under Public Records Act); Sadler v. Oregon State Bar, 550 P.2d 1218 (Or. 1976). For a list of the exemptions to Oregon's Public Records and Meetings Law, see OR. REV. STAT. §§ 192.501-05 (1999). See also Oregonian Publ'g Co. v. Oregon State Board of Parole, 95 Or. App. 501, 506, 769 P.2d 795, 798 (1989) (consistent with the statute's expressed policy, courts broadly construe the scope of the statute and narrowly define exemptions).
398. See Riemer Interview 1999, supra note 224 (reporting that both the bar and the citizens of Oregon are satisfied with the open disciplinary system); see also Sahl, supra note 34, at 243-45; Guttenberg, supra note 6, at 988.
399. See Riemer Interview 1999, supra note 224 (indicating that a significant number of Oregonians request access to the bar's records concerning grievances against lawyers and occasionally the media covers such cases, noting that such public review has been handled responsibly); see also Boggs Interview, supra note 94 (reporting that few Floridians scrutinize closed disciplinary files, however many call the bar before retaining a lawyer to learn his or her disciplinary history). Concerns about a negative effect from opening the Florida lawyer disciplinary process to public review never materialized.
400. See Riemer Interview 1999, supra note 224 (indicating that a significant number of Oregonians request access to the bar's records concerning grievances against lawyers and occasionally the media covers such cases, noting that such public review has been handled responsibly); see also Boggs Interview, supra note 94 (reporting that few Floridians scrutinize closed disciplinary files, however many call the bar before retaining a lawyer to learn his or her disciplinary history). Concerns about a negative effect from opening the Florida lawyer disciplinary process to public review never materialized.
401. See id. Instead, public confidence in the process improved. See id.
402. See Chief Justice David A. Brock Before the House Judiciary Committee of the New Hampshire Legislature, 6 (Jan. 27, 1999) [hereinafter Brock Remarks] (underscoring that "virtually every complaint, answer and committee decision will be made available to the public"); New Hampshire Supreme Court Order, R-99- 001, In re Rulemaking Regarding Opening Judicial and Professional Conduct Committee Proceedings (Feb. 3, 1999) (announcing that on or before March 5, 1999, anyone may file with the clerk of the New Hampshire Supreme Court comments on all issues related to opening the judicial and lawyer disciplinary processes to public review);
403. See Chief Justice David A. Brock Before the House Judiciary Committee of the New Hampshire Legislature, 6 (Jan. 27, 1999) [hereinafter Brock Remarks] (underscoring that "virtually every complaint, answer and committee decision will be made available to the public"); New Hampshire Supreme Court Order, R-99-001, In re Rulemaking Regarding Opening Judicial and Professional Conduct Committee Proceedings (Feb. 3, 1999) (announcing that on or before March 5, 1999, anyone may file with the clerk of the New Hampshire Supreme Court comments on all issues related to opening the judicial and lawyer disciplinary processes to public review);
404. see also De Hart Interview, supra note 224.
405. Brock Remarks, supra note 230, at 6, 8.
406. Id. at 7-8 (noting that the public holds a plurality (five of the eleven) seats on the judicial conduct committee and five of the eighteen seats on the lawyer conduct committee, and promising to increase public representation on the lawyer professional conduct committee).
407. See Sahl, supra note 34, at 228-29; see also Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 839 (1978) (striking down a statute requiring confidentiality when grieving judges by suggesting that protection of the judges' privacy and reputation interests are outweighed by the public's First Amendment interest in reviewing the effectiveness of its courts). See generally Lind v. Grimmer, 30 F.3d 1115, 1120-21 (9th Cir. 1994) (rejecting Hawaii's Campaign Spending Commission's reasons for confidentiality and ruling that First Amendment protects citizen's public disclosure of complaint).
408. The need for attorneys to respond in public to frivolous and public grievances is especially important in Ohio since many investigations last well over six months. See supra notes 134-37 and accompanying text.
409. See Sahl, supra note 34, at 230 (asserting that judges are highly trained professionals who can execute their responsibilities in the face of non-meritorious complaints).
410. See id. at 225-42; McKay Report, supra note 9, at 37-39. Compare Alex Kozinski, 108 YALE L.J. 835, 871-72, 74 (1999) (defending the tradition of secrecy involving the United States Supreme Court, especially as it applies to law clerks) with LAZARUS, supra note 20, at 12 (providing a "clear window" into the closed culture of the Rehnquist Court to examine the "unsettling interactions of Justices and law clerks as they write the law of the land, and, ultimately to evaluate the arguments and strategies of the various factions at the Court"). See generally Frank Bruni, Verdict May Bt Determined Tomorrow, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 1999, at A1 (reporting that Senate's closure of deliberations for the Clinton Impeachment might expedite the process; Iowa Senator Tom Harkin criticized closure, '"[t]he floor of the Senate, no matter how clubby we think it is, is not a private club . . .[t]he public has every right to see and hear us deliberate"').
411. See id. at 225-42; McKay Report, supra note 9, at 37-39. Compare Alex Kozinski, 108 YALE L.J. 835, 871-72, 74 (1999) (defending the tradition of secrecy involving the United States Supreme Court, especially as it applies to law clerks) with LAZARUS, supra note 20, at 12 (providing a "clear window" into the closed culture of the Rehnquist Court to examine the "unsettling interactions of Justices and law clerks as they write the law of the land, and, ultimately to evaluate the arguments and strategies of the various factions at the Court"). See generally Frank Bruni, Verdict May Bt Determined Tomorrow, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 1999, at A1 (reporting that Senate's closure of deliberations for the Clinton Impeachment might expedite the process; Iowa Senator Tom Harkin criticized closure, '"[t]he floor of the Senate, no matter how clubby we think it is, is not a private club . . .[t]he public has every right to see and hear us deliberate"').
412. See id. at 225-42; McKay Report, supra note 9, at 37-39. Compare Alex Kozinski, 108 YALE L.J. 835, 871-72, 74 (1999) (defending the tradition of secrecy involving the United States Supreme Court, especially as it applies to law clerks) with LAZARUS, supra note 20, at 12 (providing a "clear window" into the closed culture of the Rehnquist Court to examine the "unsettling interactions of Justices and law clerks as they write the law of the land, and, ultimately to evaluate the arguments and strategies of the various factions at the Court"). See generally Frank Bruni, Verdict May Bt Determined Tomorrow, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 1999, at A1 (reporting that Senate's closure of deliberations for the Clinton Impeachment might expedite the process; Iowa Senator Tom Harkin criticized closure, '"[t]he floor of the Senate, no matter how clubby we think it is, is not a private club . . .[t]he public has every right to see and hear us deliberate"').
413. See WOLFRAM, supra note 60, at 22; see also Geyh, supra note 76, at 309 (contending that informal discipline, such as peer admonishment, is effective in the federal judiciary and depends on confidentiality).
414. See WOLFRAM, supra note 60, at 22. See generally Stolberg, supra note 203.
415. Whereas informal sanctions should be encouraged because they provide a useful, if somewhat nebulous, adjunct to lawyer discipline, such sanctions do not justify maintaining Ohio's secret disciplinary regime. See supra notes 99-109 and accompanying text.
416. See WOLFRAM, supra note 60, at 22. See generally supra notes 176-85 and accompanying text (discussing the significance of lawyer liability insurance to consumers and suggesting that lawyers inform clients about insurance before representation).
417. See Katharine Q. Seelye, Secrecy is a Working Tool in the Hands of the Senate, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 1999, § 4, at 3 (quoting United States Senator Charles E. Schumer of New York who said the "public has a right to know about things [impeachment deliberations regarding President Clinton] as important as this," and noting that Massachusetts Senator John Kerry voted for secrecy because he believed the issue would be '"more frankly discussed and to become less polarized quickly"').
418. See supra notes 123-201 and accompanying text (discussing other reforms, such as, the need for uniform rules of procedure; increasing non-lawyer representation in the disciplinary process; furnishing the grievant with a copy of the respondent-lawyer's response; establishing mandatory ethics schools for miscreant lawyers; conducting random audits of lawyers' fiduciary accounts; and requiring lawyers to inform clients about whether or not they have malpractice insurance).
419. See ABA Center for Professional Responsibility, Model Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement, 4 (1993) (calling for the establishment of "permanent statewide agency to administer the lawyer discipline and disability system").
420. See Johnson, supra note 2, at 751 (noting that "[i]n a democracy, people need access to information about public affairs" and officials to make intelligent evaluations). See also Joseph Kahn, Seattle Talks Reflect a Burst of Conflicts and Trade Hopes, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 1999 at 1 (reporting that President Clinton has called the World Trade Organization to "introduce more transparency into the way [it] reaches its decisions, and allow observers to attend some sessions" in light of public protests about the organization). Cf, Stolberg, supra note 203, at 8 (discussing an idea for a federal agency, the Center for Patient Safety, that would report all medical mistakes causing death or serious injury, but recommending that harmless errors be protected from discovery in a lawsuit) (emphasis added).
421. Telephone Interview with Professor Jack A. Guttenberg (Nov. 4, 1998).
422. See generally Steve Hoffman, Senators Challenge Authority of Court, AKRON BEACON J., Mar. 3, 1999, at A1 (underscoring the willingness of some legislators to hold state courts accountable for actions that may be inconsistent with the public's opinion); Tony Mauro, House Panel to Question Justices About Clerks, USA TODAY, Mar. 10, 1999, at 3A (reporting that U.S. Supreme Court justices will be "grilled" by Congress "about the dearth of minority law clerks at the court"). Cf.
423. See generally Steve Hoffman, Senators Challenge Authority of Court, AKRON BEACON J., Mar. 3, 1999, at A1 (underscoring the willingness of some legislators to hold state courts accountable for actions that may be inconsistent with the public's opinion); Tony Mauro, House Panel to Question Justices About Clerks, USA TODAY, Mar. 10, 1999, at 3A (reporting that U.S. Supreme Court justices will be "grilled" by Congress "about the dearth of minority law clerks at the court"). Cf.
424. Robert Pear, A Clinton Order Seeks to Reduce Medical Errors, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 1999, at A 1(relating that "President Clinton will order federal agencies to take steps to reduce medical errors blamed for tens of thousands of deaths . . ." and revealing that U.S. Senator Kennedy will introduce a bill to establish a new Center for Patient Safety with a $30 million budget to protect the public from errors involving health care professionals).