Can carbon tax eat OPEC's rents?

Journal of Environmental Economics and Management

Volumn 47, Issue 1, 2004, Pages 1-12

  Liski, Matti ^a   Tahvonen, Olli ^b  

^a HELSINKI SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (Finland)

^b FINNISH FOREST RESEARCH INSTITUTE   (Finland)

Author keywords

Climate change; Dynamic games; Energy; Nonrenewable resources

Indexed keywords

COSTS; PARTICULATE EMISSIONS; PROBLEM SOLVING; PUBLIC POLICY; TAXATION;

STOCK POLLUTANTS;

AIR POLLUTION;

CARBON EMISSION; CLIMATE CHANGE; ECONOMIC INSTRUMENT; ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS; OPEC;

EID: 0346305196     PISSN: 00950696     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0095-0696(03)00052-4     Document Type: Article

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