The Evolution of the Electoral System and Party Politics in Hong Kong

Issues and Studies

Volumn 35, Issue 1, 1999, Pages 167-194

  Ngok, Ma ^a   Chi Keung, Choy ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

Electoral system; Hong Kong; Legislative elections; Party politics

Indexed keywords

EID: 0346303948     PISSN: 10132511     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (46)

1. This paper will only deal with the effect of the change of the electoral system on the Legislative Council. While the electoral systems for the Municipal Councils and District Boards have undergone minor changes since 1982, their effects are not as significant and are not within the purview of this article.
2. Martin Harrop and William Miller, Elections and Voters: A Comparative Introduction (London: Macmillan Press, 1987), 60.
3. Giovanni Sartori, "Political Development and Political Engineering," in Public Policy, ed. John D. Montgomery and Albert O. Hirschman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968), 261-98.
4. Since their inception in 1982, the District Boards had no more than two-thirds of their seats elected by a mixture of "double-seat, single-seat" constituencies, all by the plurality formula. The rest were appointed by the government. The district magnitude depended on the size of local communities. In 1994, as part of the political reform proposed by Governor Chris Patten, all District Board members were elected on a single-member basis.
5. Based on the personal conversation of one of the authors with some of the pro-democracy leaders, who said that government officials told them explicitly this was the calculation behind the double-seat system.
6. Lam and Lee considered forty-one of the fifty-four candidates in 1991 to have political affiliations. However, they treated trade unions, local groupings of residential associations, and other minor groups as political groups. See Jermain Lam and Jane Lee, The Dynamic Political Actors in Hong Kong's Transition (Hong Kong: Writers' and Publishers' Cooperative, 1993), 74-76. This study counts only those candidates who ran as representatives of
7. See Louie King-shuen and Fung Wing-kam, "The 'Joint-Ticket Effect' of the Double-Seat System," in Xianggang zhengzhi yu xuanju (Politics and elections of Hong Kong), ed. Joseph Cheng and Louie King-shuen (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1995), 287-94.
8. Choy Chi-keung, Lau Sai-leung, and Chow Pak-kwan, Xuanju yu yihui zhengzhi: Zhengdang jueqi hou de Xianggang zhanxin zhengzhi mianmao (Election and parliamentary politics: The new political face of Hong Kong after the rise of political parties) (Hong Kong: Hong Kong Humanities Press, 1995). Motion debates in the Hong Kong Legislative Council had no binding force on the colonial government. As in Britain, interpellation sessions mostly served to embarrass or put pressure on government officials, rather than forcing policy changes.
9. See Choy Chi-keung and Lau Sai-leung, "The Executive-Legislative Relations in Hong Kong on the Eve of the 1997 Handover," Hong Kong Journal of Social Sciences, no. 8 (Autumn 1996): 237-66.
10. For example, on the issue of freezing of government fee-hikes in 1995. See ibid., 250-51.
11. Lau Sai-leung, "Still Executive-Led: Evolution of the Parliamentary System in Hong Kong after 1991," in Choy, Lau, and Chow, Xuanju yu yihui zhengzhi, 193-201. See also Norman Miners, "The Transformation of the Hong Kong Legislative Council 1970-1994: From Consensus to Confrontation," Asian Journal of Public Administration 16, no. 2 (December 1994): 224-48.
12. Lau Sai-leung, "Still Executive-Led: Evolution of the Parliamentary System in Hong Kong after 1991," in Choy, Lau, and Chow, Xuanju yu yihui zhengzhi, 193-201. See also Norman Miners, "The Transformation of the Hong Kong Legislative Council 1970-1994: From Consensus to Confrontation," Asian Journal of Public Administration 16, no. 2 (December 1994): 224-48.
13. Kathleen Cheek-Milby, A Legislature Comes of Age (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1995), chap. 6.
14. Ming Pao Daily News (Hong Kong), July 13, 1992, 52. The suggested SNTV system has the territory divided into constituencies that elect four to five members each, but each voter is only allowed to choose one candidate on the ballot.
15. United Democrats of Hong Kong, "The Proposal of the Constitutional Development Group of UDHK on the Review of the 1991 Election."
16. Lo Shiu-hing and Yu Wing-yat, "The Electoral System of Hong Kong's Legislative Council: Results under Different Proportional Representation Formulae," in The 1995 Legislative Council Elections in Hong Kong, ed. Hsin-chi Kuan et al. (Hong Kong: Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1996), 97-134.
17. The d'Hondt formula will calculate the "averages" of the votes obtained by each candidate, and the N candidates that has the highest vote averages in an N-seat constituency will be elected. For example, if a party list receives K votes, the first, second, and third candidates on that party list will have vote averages of K/1, K/2, and K/3 respectively.
18. Gary Cheng Kai-nam, "On Proportional Representation," Hong Kong Economic Times, April 23, 1993.
19. See Ma Ngok, "The Sino-British Dispute over Hong Kong: A Game Theory Interpretation," Asian Survey 37, no. 8 (August 1997): 738-51. See also British Foreign Office, "White Paper on Representative Government" (February 24, 1994), paragraphs 32-44, and New China News Agency, "The Truth About Some Major Questions" (February 28, 1994), paragraph 2. The two documents were published by the British and Chinese governments respectively shortly after the talks formally broke off in February 1994. See also Jonathan Dimbleby, The Last Governor (London: Warner, 1997), 244-52.
20. See Ma Ngok, "The Sino-British Dispute over Hong Kong: A Game Theory Interpretation," Asian Survey 37, no. 8 (August 1997): 738-51. See also British Foreign Office, "White Paper on Representative Government" (February 24, 1994), paragraphs 32-44, and New China News Agency, "The Truth About Some Major Questions" (February 28, 1994), paragraph 2. The two documents were published by the British and Chinese governments respectively shortly after the talks formally broke off in February 1994. See also Jonathan Dimbleby, The Last Governor (London: Warner, 1997), 244-52.
21. See Ma Ngok, "The Sino-British Dispute over Hong Kong: A Game Theory Interpretation," Asian Survey 37, no. 8 (August 1997): 738-51. See also British Foreign Office, "White Paper on Representative Government" (February 24, 1994), paragraphs 32-44, and New China News Agency, "The Truth About Some Major Questions" (February 28, 1994), paragraph 2. The two documents were published by the British and Chinese governments respectively shortly after the talks formally broke off in February 1994. See also Jonathan Dimbleby, The Last Governor (London: Warner, 1997), 244-52.
22. See Ma Ngok, "The Sino-British Dispute over Hong Kong: A Game Theory Interpretation," Asian Survey 37, no. 8 (August 1997): 738-51. See also British Foreign Office, "White Paper on Representative Government" (February 24, 1994), paragraphs 32-44, and New China News Agency, "The Truth About Some Major Questions" (February 28, 1994), paragraph 2. The two documents were published by the British and Chinese governments respectively shortly after the talks formally broke off in February 1994. See also Jonathan Dimbleby, The Last Governor (London: Warner, 1997), 244-52.
23. See Leung Sai-wing, "The 'China Factor' in the 1991 Legislative Council Election: The June 4th Incident and the Anti-Communist China Syndrome," in Hong Kong Tried Democracy: The 1991 Elections in Hong Kong, ed. Lau Siu-kai and Louie King-shuen (Hong Kong: Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1993), 187-235.
24. Leung Sai-wing, "The 'China Factor' and Voters' Choice in the 1995 Legislative Council Election," in Kuan, The 1995 Legislative Council Elections in Hong Kong, 201-44.
25. For a more comprehensive account, see Choy Chi-keung and Tsoi Yiu-cheung, Xianggang lifaju zhongyao toupiao jilu huibian 1995-1997 (Selected vote counts of the Hong Kong Legislative Council 1995-1997) (Hong Kong: Hong Kong Humanities Press, 1997).
26. This does not include Legco Chairman Andrew Wong, who is an independent.
27. Ming Pao Daily News, September 29, 1995; and The Apple Daily (Hong Kong), October 5, 1995.
28. Ming Pao Daily News, September 29, 1995; and The Apple Daily (Hong Kong), October 5, 1995.
29. According to the Basic Law, the PRC National People's Congress should set up a Preparatory Committee for the HKSAR in 1996 in order to prepare the establishment of the SAR and prescribe the method for setting up the first government and the first legislature of the SAR. The Basic Law did not include anything about the existence of a Preliminary Working Committee for the Preparatory Committee.
30. South China Morning Post, May 4, 1994.
31. The Preparatory Committee was largely made up of leaders of pro-PRC political and community groups, businessmen, and social leaders.
32. See Hong Kong Economic Journal, February 24, 1997.
33. Choy Chi-keung, Xianggang xuanju zhidu toushi (The Hong Kong electoral system) (Hong Kong: Ming Pao Publishers, 1998), 23.
34. Hong Kong Economic Journal, March 25, 1997.
35. Choy Chi-keung, "The DAB Benefits Most from the Double-Seat, One-Vote System," Ming Pao Daily News, May 20, 1997.
36. See Choy, Xianggang xuanju zhidu toushi, 25.
37. Choy Chi-keung, "The 'Multi-Seat, Single-Vote' System Has Been Discarded All over the World," Ming Pao Daily News, March 17, 1997.
38. Hong Kong Economic Journal, May 10, 1997.
39. Ibid., May 16, 1997.
40. Ibid., May 23, 1997. DAB persuaded a couple of HKPA candidates to withdraw, in exchange for DAB's support for HKPA candidates in the Election Committee.
41. For a more detailed discussion of the party competition pattern in the 1998 election, see Ma Ngok and Choy Chi-keung, "Party Competition Pattern under the New Electoral System" (Paper presented at the Conference on the 1998 Legislative Council Elections, Chinese University of Hong Kong, September 24, 1998).
42. The party chairmen of both the Association for Democracy and People's Livelihood and the Liberal Party, respectively Frederick Fung and Allen Lee, lost by relatively narrow margins and with high vote shares. Frederick Fung, contesting in the three-seat district of Kowloon West, received 19.2 percent of the votes but still lost by a margin of 2.5 percent. Allen Lee contested in the five-seat district of New Territories East and lost by 0.7 percent of the vote when he obtained 10.32 percent of the total votes.
43. "The Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China" (April 1990), Article 74. We can expect that very few bills that will be discussed in a legislature do not fall into these three categories.
44. Ibid., Annex II.
45. The Association for Democracy and People's Livelihood, one of the significant minority parties with four members in 1995-97, lost all their seats in the 1998 election and thus was not represented.
46. The motion on public utilities received twenty-two votes in favor, one against, and five abstentions in the direct election/Election Committee group, but received eleven, votes in favor and eleven against in the functional group and was vetoed. Overall it was thirty-three votes in favor and twelve against. The motion on vote of thanks received twenty-three votes in support and five votes against in the functional group, but fifteen in favor fourteen against, and one abstention in the direct election/Election Committee group, and was vetoed. Overall the motion had thirty-eight votes in favor and nineteen against.