On the competitive effects of price-matching policies

International Journal of Industrial Organization

Volumn 15, Issue 3, 1997, Pages 283-299

  Corts, Kenneth S ^a  

^a HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Antitrust policy; Imperfect competition; Price discrimination; Price matching

Indexed keywords

EID: 0346158763     PISSN: 01677187     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/s0167-7187(96)01035-1     Document Type: Article

References (14)

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