The Look Within: Property, Capacity, and Suffrage in Nineteenth-Century America

Yale Law Journal

Volumn 107, Issue 2, 1997, Pages 473-498

  Cogan, Jacob Katz ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0346096770     PISSN: 00440094     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/797262     Document Type: Article

References (370)

1. See, e.g., CHILTON WILLIAMSON, AMERICAN SUFFRAGE FROM PROPERTY TO DEMOCRACY, 1760-1860 (1960) (offering a narrative of suffrage reform with a progressive bias).
2. Cf. Robert J. Steinfeld, Property and Suffrage in the Early American Republic, 41 STAN. L. REV. 335, 337 (1989) ("If we adopted [a] whig history of suffrage . . . , we would be radically simplifying a vastly more complex process, and would be engaging in the worst kind of ahistorical thinking."). There is no intellectual history of American suffrage. General histories include: MARCHETTE CHUTE, THE FIRST LIBERTY: A HISTORY OF THE RIGHT TO VOTE IN AMERICA, 1619-1850 (1969); KIRK HAROLD PORTER, A HISTORY OF SUFFRAGE IN THE UNITED STATES (1918); and WILLIAMSON, supra note 1. Specialized studies are divided by period and topic, and will be referred to infra. For short, introductory essays on the history of voting, see VOTING AND THE SPIRIT OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (Donald W. Rogers ed., 1992).
3. Cf. Robert J. Steinfeld, Property and Suffrage in the Early American Republic, 41 STAN. L. REV. 335, 337 (1989) ("If we adopted [a] whig history of suffrage . . . , we would be radically simplifying a vastly more complex process, and would be engaging in the worst kind of ahistorical thinking."). There is no intellectual history of American suffrage. General histories include: MARCHETTE CHUTE, THE FIRST LIBERTY: A HISTORY OF THE RIGHT TO VOTE IN AMERICA, 1619-1850 (1969); KIRK HAROLD PORTER, A HISTORY OF SUFFRAGE IN THE UNITED STATES (1918); and WILLIAMSON, supra note 1. Specialized studies are divided by period and topic, and will be referred to infra. For short, introductory essays on the history of voting, see VOTING AND THE SPIRIT OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (Donald W. Rogers ed., 1992).
4. Cf. Robert J. Steinfeld, Property and Suffrage in the Early American Republic, 41 STAN. L. REV. 335, 337 (1989) ("If we adopted [a] whig history of suffrage . . . , we would be radically simplifying a vastly more complex process, and would be engaging in the worst kind of ahistorical thinking."). There is no intellectual history of American suffrage. General histories include: MARCHETTE CHUTE, THE FIRST LIBERTY: A HISTORY OF THE RIGHT TO VOTE IN AMERICA, 1619-1850 (1969); KIRK HAROLD PORTER, A HISTORY OF SUFFRAGE IN THE UNITED STATES (1918); and WILLIAMSON, supra note 1. Specialized studies are divided by period and topic, and will be referred to infra. For short, introductory essays on the history of voting, see VOTING AND THE SPIRIT OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (Donald W. Rogers ed., 1992).
5. Cf. Robert J. Steinfeld, Property and Suffrage in the Early American Republic, 41 STAN. L. REV. 335, 337 (1989) ("If we adopted [a] whig history of suffrage . . . , we would be radically simplifying a vastly more complex process, and would be engaging in the worst kind of ahistorical thinking."). There is no intellectual history of American suffrage. General histories include: MARCHETTE CHUTE, THE FIRST LIBERTY: A HISTORY OF THE RIGHT TO VOTE IN AMERICA, 1619-1850 (1969); KIRK HAROLD PORTER, A HISTORY OF SUFFRAGE IN THE UNITED STATES (1918); and WILLIAMSON, supra note 1. Specialized studies are divided by period and topic, and will be referred to infra. For short, introductory essays on the history of voting, see VOTING AND THE SPIRIT OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (Donald W. Rogers ed., 1992).
6. Kenneth Greenberg has used the word "superficial" to describe the penchant of antebellum southerners to be "concerned, to a degree we would consider unusual, with the surface of things - with the world of appearances." Kenneth S. Greenberg, The Nose, the Lie, and the Duel in the Antebellum South, 95 AM. HIST. REV. 57, 58 (1990). These same persons would be the staunchest defenders of property qualifications, discussed infra in Section I.B.
7. Qualifications for office holding and jury service followed this same path, though the latter often lagged. See Albert W. Alschuler & Andrew G. Deiss, A Brief History of the Criminal Jury in the United States, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 867, 876-901 (1994). Intellectual histories of the scientific basis of intelligence include CARL N. DEGLER, IN SEARCH OF HUMAN NATURE: THE DECLINE AND REVIVAL OF DARWINISM IN AMERICAN SOCIAL THOUGHT (1991);
8. Qualifications for office holding and jury service followed this same path, though the latter often lagged. See Albert W. Alschuler & Andrew G. Deiss, A Brief History of the Criminal Jury in the United States, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 867, 876-901 (1994). Intellectual histories of the scientific basis of intelligence include CARL N. DEGLER, IN SEARCH OF HUMAN NATURE: THE DECLINE AND REVIVAL OF DARWINISM IN AMERICAN SOCIAL THOUGHT (1991);
9. and John Samuel Carson, Talents, Intelligence, and the Constructions of Human Difference in France and America, 1750-1920 (1994) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton University) (on file with the Princeton University Library).
10. See also WARREN SUSMAN, "Personality" and the Making of Twentieth-Century Culture, in CULTURE AS HISTORY 271, 272 (1984) ("Impulses that control human behavior and destiny were felt to arise more and more within the individual [as the world became more modern].").
11. This Note does not discuss three important restrictions on the suffrage: residency requirements and the disenfranchisement of both U.S. military personnel and nonresident students. The Supreme Court has held that residency requirements that seek to maintain informed voting do not further any compelling state interest. See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 359-60 (1972). Similarly, in Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 96-97 (1965), the Court held that the permanent presumption of nonresidence for voting by military personnel was not reasonable in light of its stated purposes and was therefore unconstitutional. The effect of duration-of-residence and domicile restrictions on student voters is discussed in, for example, Kenneth J. Guido, Jr., Student Voting and Residency Qualifications: The Aftermath of the Twenty-Sixth Amendment, 47 N.Y.U. L. REV. 32 (1972); Rakesh C. Lal, What Johnny Didn't Learn in College: The Conflict over Where Students May Vote, 26 BEVERLY HILLS B. ASS'N J. 28 (1992); Joseph A. Bollhofer, Comment, Disenfranchisement of the College Student Vote: When a Resident Is Not a Resident, 11 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 489 (1983); Paul R. Rentenbach, Comment, Student Voting Rights in University Communities, 6 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 397 (1971); and Christopher J. Reynolds, Comment, State Residency Requirements for Purposes of Voting: The Eligibility of Students To Vote in Their College Communities, 21 AM. U. L. REV. 774 (1972).
12. This Note does not discuss three important restrictions on the suffrage: residency requirements and the disenfranchisement of both U.S. military personnel and nonresident students. The Supreme Court has held that residency requirements that seek to maintain informed voting do not further any compelling state interest. See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 359-60 (1972). Similarly, in Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 96-97 (1965), the Court held that the permanent presumption of nonresidence for voting by military personnel was not reasonable in light of its stated purposes and was therefore unconstitutional. The effect of duration-of-residence and domicile restrictions on student voters is discussed in, for example, Kenneth J. Guido, Jr., Student Voting and Residency Qualifications: The Aftermath of the Twenty-Sixth Amendment, 47 N.Y.U. L. REV. 32 (1972); Rakesh C. Lal, What Johnny Didn't Learn in College: The Conflict over Where Students May Vote, 26 BEVERLY HILLS B. ASS'N J. 28 (1992); Joseph A. Bollhofer, Comment, Disenfranchisement of the College Student Vote: When a Resident Is Not a Resident, 11 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 489 (1983); Paul R. Rentenbach, Comment, Student Voting Rights in University Communities, 6 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 397 (1971); and Christopher J. Reynolds, Comment, State Residency Requirements for Purposes of Voting: The Eligibility of Students To Vote in Their College Communities, 21 AM. U. L. REV. 774 (1972).
13. This Note does not discuss three important restrictions on the suffrage: residency requirements and the disenfranchisement of both U.S. military personnel and nonresident students. The Supreme Court has held that residency requirements that seek to maintain informed voting do not further any compelling state interest. See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 359-60 (1972). Similarly, in Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 96-97 (1965), the Court held that the permanent presumption of nonresidence for voting by military personnel was not reasonable in light of its stated purposes and was therefore unconstitutional. The effect of duration-of-residence and domicile restrictions on student voters is discussed in, for example, Kenneth J. Guido, Jr., Student Voting and Residency Qualifications: The Aftermath of the Twenty-Sixth Amendment, 47 N.Y.U. L. REV. 32 (1972); Rakesh C. Lal, What Johnny Didn't Learn in College: The Conflict over Where Students May Vote, 26 BEVERLY HILLS B. ASS'N J. 28 (1992); Joseph A. Bollhofer, Comment, Disenfranchisement of the College Student Vote: When a Resident Is Not a Resident, 11 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 489 (1983); Paul R. Rentenbach, Comment, Student Voting Rights in University Communities, 6 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 397 (1971); and Christopher J. Reynolds, Comment, State Residency Requirements for Purposes of Voting: The Eligibility of Students To Vote in Their College Communities, 21 AM. U. L. REV. 774 (1972).
14. This Note does not discuss three important restrictions on the suffrage: residency requirements and the disenfranchisement of both U.S. military personnel and nonresident students. The Supreme Court has held that residency requirements that seek to maintain informed voting do not further any compelling state interest. See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 359-60 (1972). Similarly, in Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 96-97 (1965), the Court held that the permanent presumption of nonresidence for voting by military personnel was not reasonable in light of its stated purposes and was therefore unconstitutional. The effect of duration-of-residence and domicile restrictions on student voters is discussed in, for example, Kenneth J. Guido, Jr., Student Voting and Residency Qualifications: The Aftermath of the Twenty-Sixth Amendment, 47 N.Y.U. L. REV. 32 (1972); Rakesh C. Lal, What Johnny Didn't Learn in College: The Conflict over Where Students May Vote, 26 BEVERLY HILLS B. ASS'N J. 28 (1992); Joseph A. Bollhofer, Comment, Disenfranchisement of the College Student Vote: When a Resident Is Not a Resident, 11 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 489 (1983); Paul R. Rentenbach, Comment, Student Voting Rights in University Communities, 6 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 397 (1971); and Christopher J. Reynolds, Comment, State Residency Requirements for Purposes of Voting: The Eligibility of Students To Vote in Their College Communities, 21 AM. U. L. REV. 774 (1972).
15. This Note does not discuss three important restrictions on the suffrage: residency requirements and the disenfranchisement of both U.S. military personnel and nonresident students. The Supreme Court has held that residency requirements that seek to maintain informed voting do not further any compelling state interest. See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 359-60 (1972). Similarly, in Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 96-97 (1965), the Court held that the permanent presumption of nonresidence for voting by military personnel was not reasonable in light of its stated purposes and was therefore unconstitutional. The effect of duration-of-residence and domicile restrictions on student voters is discussed in, for example, Kenneth J. Guido, Jr., Student Voting and Residency Qualifications: The Aftermath of the Twenty-Sixth Amendment, 47 N.Y.U. L. REV. 32 (1972); Rakesh C. Lal, What Johnny Didn't Learn in College: The Conflict over Where Students May Vote, 26 BEVERLY HILLS B. ASS'N J. 28 (1992); Joseph A. Bollhofer, Comment, Disenfranchisement of the College Student Vote: When a Resident Is Not a Resident, 11 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 489 (1983); Paul R. Rentenbach, Comment, Student Voting Rights in University Communities, 6 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 397 (1971); and Christopher J. Reynolds, Comment, State Residency Requirements for Purposes of Voting: The Eligibility of Students To Vote in Their College Communities, 21 AM. U. L. REV. 774 (1972).
16. See Albert L. Sturm, The Development of American State Constitutions, 12 PUBLIUS 57, 82 tbl.5 (1982).
17. For introductions to the antebellum state conventions, see JAMES WILLARD HURST, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW: THE LAW MAKERS 199-246 (1950); and Christian G. Fritz, The American Constitutional Tradition Revisited: Preliminary Observations on State Constitution-Making in the Nineteenth-Century West, 1994 RUTGERS L.J. 945.
18. For introductions to the antebellum state conventions, see JAMES WILLARD HURST, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW: THE LAW MAKERS 199-246 (1950); and Christian G. Fritz, The American Constitutional Tradition Revisited: Preliminary Observations on State Constitution-Making in the Nineteenth-Century West, 1994 RUTGERS L.J. 945.
19. For a recent review of the uses of intellectual history in legal history, see William W. Fisher III, Texts and Contexts: The Application to American Legal History of the Methodologies of Intellectual History, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1065 (1997). On the method applied in this Note, see id. at 1068.
20. See Quentin Skinner, Motives, Intentions and the Interpretation of Texts, in MEANING AND CONTEXT: QUENTIN SKINNER AND HIS CRITICS 68, 95 (James Tully ed., 1988).
21. See DANIEL T. RODGERS, CONTESTED TRUTHS: KEYWORDS IN AMERICAN POLITICS SINCE INDEPENDENCE 6 (1987) ("We use words, and we are used by words."); 1 QUENTIN SKINNER, THE FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN POLITICAL THOUGHT at xii-xiii (1978) (positing that a person cannot simply "tailor[] his normative language in order to fit his projects," but that such a person "must [also] . . . tailor[] his projects in order to fit the available normative language").
22. See DANIEL T. RODGERS, CONTESTED TRUTHS: KEYWORDS IN AMERICAN POLITICS SINCE INDEPENDENCE 6 (1987) ("We use words, and we are used by words."); 1 QUENTIN SKINNER, THE FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN POLITICAL THOUGHT at xii-xiii (1978) (positing that a person cannot simply "tailor[] his normative language in order to fit his projects," but that such a person "must [also] . . . tailor[] his projects in order to fit the available normative language").
23. A number of historians have recently reached this conclusion about other 19th-century legal reforms. See, e.g., Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms of Status-Enforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1111, 1148 (1997) (asking "to what extent have these changes in our practices disestablished historically entrenched systems of social stratification").
24. As Hendrik Hartog has written, "Reform may have been for the most part symbolic. Yet, the symbols had potency." Hendrik Hartog, Lawyering, Husbands' Rights, and "the Unwritten Law" in Nineteenth-Century America, 84 J. AM. HIST. 67, 95 (1997).
25. See EDMUND S. MORGAN, INVENTING THE PEOPLE: THE RISE OF POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA (1988); GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 344-89 (1969); Akhil Reed Amar, The Central Meaning of Republican Government: Popular Sovereignty, Majority Rule, and the Denominator Problem, 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 749, 749-52 (1994); Christian G. Fritz, Alternative Visions of American Constitutionalism: Popular Sovereignty and the Early American Constitutional Debate, 24 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 287 (1997); John M. Murrin, A Roof Without Walls: The Dilemma of American National Identity, in BEYOND CONFEDERATION: ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION AND AMERICAN NATIONAL IDENTITY 333 (Richard Beeman et al. eds., 1987).
26. See EDMUND S. MORGAN, INVENTING THE PEOPLE: THE RISE OF POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA (1988); GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 344-89 (1969); Akhil Reed Amar, The Central Meaning of Republican Government: Popular Sovereignty, Majority Rule, and the Denominator Problem, 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 749, 749-52 (1994); Christian G. Fritz, Alternative Visions of American Constitutionalism: Popular Sovereignty and the Early American Constitutional Debate, 24 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 287 (1997); John M. Murrin, A Roof Without Walls: The Dilemma of American National Identity, in BEYOND CONFEDERATION: ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION AND AMERICAN NATIONAL IDENTITY 333 (Richard Beeman et al. eds., 1987).
27. See EDMUND S. MORGAN, INVENTING THE PEOPLE: THE RISE OF POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA (1988); GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 344-89 (1969); Akhil Reed Amar, The Central Meaning of Republican Government: Popular Sovereignty, Majority Rule, and the Denominator Problem, 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 749, 749-52 (1994); Christian G. Fritz, Alternative Visions of American Constitutionalism: Popular Sovereignty and the Early American Constitutional Debate, 24 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 287 (1997); John M. Murrin, A Roof Without Walls: The Dilemma of American National Identity, in BEYOND CONFEDERATION: ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION AND AMERICAN NATIONAL IDENTITY 333 (Richard Beeman et al. eds., 1987).
28. See EDMUND S. MORGAN, INVENTING THE PEOPLE: THE RISE OF POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA (1988); GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 344-89 (1969); Akhil Reed Amar, The Central Meaning of Republican Government: Popular Sovereignty, Majority Rule, and the Denominator Problem, 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 749, 749-52 (1994); Christian G. Fritz, Alternative Visions of American Constitutionalism: Popular Sovereignty and the Early American Constitutional Debate, 24 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 287 (1997); John M. Murrin, A Roof Without Walls: The Dilemma of American National Identity, in BEYOND CONFEDERATION: ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION AND AMERICAN NATIONAL IDENTITY 333 (Richard Beeman et al. eds., 1987).
29. See EDMUND S. MORGAN, INVENTING THE PEOPLE: THE RISE OF POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA (1988); GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 344-89 (1969); Akhil Reed Amar, The Central Meaning of Republican Government: Popular Sovereignty, Majority Rule, and the Denominator Problem, 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 749, 749-52 (1994); Christian G. Fritz, Alternative Visions of American Constitutionalism: Popular Sovereignty and the Early American Constitutional Debate, 24 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 287 (1997); John M. Murrin, A Roof Without Walls: The Dilemma of American National Identity, in BEYOND CONFEDERATION: ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION AND AMERICAN NATIONAL IDENTITY 333 (Richard Beeman et al. eds., 1987).
30. That is, the acceptance of popular political behavior became accepted as normative. On the process of accepting the concept of "the people," see RICHARD BUEL, JR., SECURING THE REVOLUTION: IDEOLOGY IN AMERICAN POLITICS, 1789-1815 (1972).
31. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 201 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1937) (statement of Oliver Ellsworth).
32. Id. at 202 (statement of Pierce Butler).
33. THE FEDERALIST No. 52, at 326 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
34. Article I, Section 2 of the Federal Constitution was one of the few exceptions to this general pattern of delegation. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2 (providing suffrage and apportionment requirements for congressional elections). Congress also received the power of naturalization. See id. § 8. See generally JAMES H. KETTNER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP, 1608-1870 (1978) (examining the sources of American citizenship); ROGERS M. SMITH, CIVIC IDEALS: CONFLICTING VISIONS OF CITIZENSHIP IN U.S. HISTORY (1997) (tracing the illiberal character of American citizenship laws up to the early 20th century).
35. Article I, Section 2 of the Federal Constitution was one of the few exceptions to this general pattern of delegation. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2 (providing suffrage and apportionment requirements for congressional elections). Congress also received the power of naturalization. See id. § 8. See generally JAMES H. KETTNER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP, 1608-1870 (1978) (examining the sources of American citizenship); ROGERS M. SMITH, CIVIC IDEALS: CONFLICTING VISIONS OF CITIZENSHIP IN U.S. HISTORY (1997) (tracing the illiberal character of American citizenship laws up to the early 20th century).
36. Article I, Section 2 of the Federal Constitution was one of the few exceptions to this general pattern of delegation. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2 (providing suffrage and apportionment requirements for congressional elections). Congress also received the power of naturalization. See id. § 8. See generally JAMES H. KETTNER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP, 1608-1870 (1978) (examining the sources of American citizenship); ROGERS M. SMITH, CIVIC IDEALS: CONFLICTING VISIONS OF CITIZENSHIP IN U.S. HISTORY (1997) (tracing the illiberal character of American citizenship laws up to the early 20th century).
37. For a detailed list of state constitutional provisions pertaining to the suffrage, see WILLI PAUL ADAMS, THE FIRST AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS: REPUBLICAN IDEOLOGY AND THE MAKING OF THE STATE CONSTITUTIONS IN THE REVOLUTIONARY ERA 293-307 (Rita Kimber & Robert Kimber trans., University of N.C. Press 1980) (1973). Histories of the suffrage in colonial and revolutionary America include: CORTLANDT F. BISHOP, HISTORY OF ELECTIONS IN THE AMERICAN COLONIES 46-98 (Studies in History, Econ. & Pub. Law Vol. III, No. 1, New York, Columbia College 1893); ROBERT J. DINKIN, VOTING IN PROVINCIAL AMERICA: A STUDY OF ELECTIONS IN THE THIRTEEN COLONIES, 1688-1776, at 28-49 (1977); ROBERT J. DINKIN, VOTING IN REVOLUTIONARY AMERICA: A STUDY OF ELECTIONS IN THE ORIGINAL THIRTEEN STATES, 1776-1789, at 27-43 (1982); and ALBERT EDWARD MCKINLEY, THE SUFFRAGE FRANCHISE IN THE THIRTEEN ENGLISH COLONIES IN AMERICA (1905).
38. For a detailed list of state constitutional provisions pertaining to the suffrage, see WILLI PAUL ADAMS, THE FIRST AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS: REPUBLICAN IDEOLOGY AND THE MAKING OF THE STATE CONSTITUTIONS IN THE REVOLUTIONARY ERA 293-307 (Rita Kimber & Robert Kimber trans., University of N.C. Press 1980) (1973). Histories of the suffrage in colonial and revolutionary America include: CORTLANDT F. BISHOP, HISTORY OF ELECTIONS IN THE AMERICAN COLONIES 46-98 (Studies in History, Econ. & Pub. Law Vol. III, No. 1, New York, Columbia College 1893); ROBERT J. DINKIN, VOTING IN PROVINCIAL AMERICA: A STUDY OF ELECTIONS IN THE THIRTEEN COLONIES, 1688-1776, at 28-49 (1977); ROBERT J. DINKIN, VOTING IN REVOLUTIONARY AMERICA: A STUDY OF ELECTIONS IN THE ORIGINAL THIRTEEN STATES, 1776-1789, at 27-43 (1982); and ALBERT EDWARD MCKINLEY, THE SUFFRAGE FRANCHISE IN THE THIRTEEN ENGLISH COLONIES IN AMERICA (1905).
39. For a detailed list of state constitutional provisions pertaining to the suffrage, see WILLI PAUL ADAMS, THE FIRST AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS: REPUBLICAN IDEOLOGY AND THE MAKING OF THE STATE CONSTITUTIONS IN THE REVOLUTIONARY ERA 293-307 (Rita Kimber & Robert Kimber trans., University of N.C. Press 1980) (1973). Histories of the suffrage in colonial and revolutionary America include: CORTLANDT F. BISHOP, HISTORY OF ELECTIONS IN THE AMERICAN COLONIES 46-98 (Studies in History, Econ. & Pub. Law Vol. III, No. 1, New York, Columbia College 1893); ROBERT J. DINKIN, VOTING IN PROVINCIAL AMERICA: A STUDY OF ELECTIONS IN THE THIRTEEN COLONIES, 1688-1776, at 28-49 (1977); ROBERT J. DINKIN, VOTING IN REVOLUTIONARY AMERICA: A STUDY OF ELECTIONS IN THE ORIGINAL THIRTEEN STATES, 1776-1789, at 27-43 (1982); and ALBERT EDWARD MCKINLEY, THE SUFFRAGE FRANCHISE IN THE THIRTEEN ENGLISH COLONIES IN AMERICA (1905).
40. For a detailed list of state constitutional provisions pertaining to the suffrage, see WILLI PAUL ADAMS, THE FIRST AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS: REPUBLICAN IDEOLOGY AND THE MAKING OF THE STATE CONSTITUTIONS IN THE REVOLUTIONARY ERA 293-307 (Rita Kimber & Robert Kimber trans., University of N.C. Press 1980) (1973). Histories of the suffrage in colonial and revolutionary America include: CORTLANDT F. BISHOP, HISTORY OF ELECTIONS IN THE AMERICAN COLONIES 46-98 (Studies in History, Econ. & Pub. Law Vol. III, No. 1, New York, Columbia College 1893); ROBERT J. DINKIN, VOTING IN PROVINCIAL AMERICA: A STUDY OF ELECTIONS IN THE THIRTEEN COLONIES, 1688-1776, at 28-49 (1977); ROBERT J. DINKIN, VOTING IN REVOLUTIONARY AMERICA: A STUDY OF ELECTIONS IN THE ORIGINAL THIRTEEN STATES, 1776-1789, at 27-43 (1982); and ALBERT EDWARD MCKINLEY, THE SUFFRAGE FRANCHISE IN THE THIRTEEN ENGLISH COLONIES IN AMERICA (1905).
41. For a detailed list of state constitutional provisions pertaining to the suffrage, see WILLI PAUL ADAMS, THE FIRST AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS: REPUBLICAN IDEOLOGY AND THE MAKING OF THE STATE CONSTITUTIONS IN THE REVOLUTIONARY ERA 293-307 (Rita Kimber & Robert Kimber trans., University of N.C. Press 1980) (1973). Histories of the suffrage in colonial and revolutionary America include: CORTLANDT F. BISHOP, HISTORY OF ELECTIONS IN THE AMERICAN COLONIES 46-98 (Studies in History, Econ. & Pub. Law Vol. III, No. 1, New York, Columbia College 1893); ROBERT J. DINKIN, VOTING IN PROVINCIAL AMERICA: A STUDY OF ELECTIONS IN THE THIRTEEN COLONIES, 1688-1776, at 28-49 (1977); ROBERT J. DINKIN, VOTING IN REVOLUTIONARY AMERICA: A STUDY OF ELECTIONS IN THE ORIGINAL THIRTEEN STATES, 1776-1789, at 27-43 (1982); and ALBERT EDWARD MCKINLEY, THE SUFFRAGE FRANCHISE IN THE THIRTEEN ENGLISH COLONIES IN AMERICA (1905).
42. See WILLIAMSON, supra note 1, at 5. See generally DREW R. MCCOY, THE ELUSIVE REPUBLIC: POLITICAL ECONOMY IN JEFFERSONIAN AMERICA 67-69 (1980) (situating property within the ideology of classical republicanism); Chester E. Eisinger, The Freehold Concept in Eighteenth-Century American Letters, 4 WM. & MARY Q. 42 (1947) (describing the "Jeffersonian Myth" and its emphasis on the moral value of land ownership).
43. See WILLIAMSON, supra note 1, at 5. See generally DREW R. MCCOY, THE ELUSIVE REPUBLIC: POLITICAL ECONOMY IN JEFFERSONIAN AMERICA 67-69 (1980) (situating property within the ideology of classical republicanism); Chester E. Eisinger, The Freehold Concept in Eighteenth-Century American Letters, 4 WM. & MARY Q. 42 (1947) (describing the "Jeffersonian Myth" and its emphasis on the moral value of land ownership).
44. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *170.
45. Letter from John Adams to James Sullivan (May 26, 1776), in 4 PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS 208, 210 (Robert J. Taylor ed., 1979); cf. WOOD, supra note 13, at 168-69 (setting out the class bias of even some of the more radical Revolutionaries).
46. See, e.g., DEL. CONST. of 1776, art. V; MASS. CONST. pt. 2, ch. 1, § 3, art. IV (1780) (amended 1821); N.J. CONST. of 1776, art. IV; N.Y. CONST. of 1777, art. VII (applying only to assemblymen).
47. See, e.g., DEL. CONST. of 1776, art. V; MASS. CONST. pt. 2, ch. 1, § 3, art. IV (1780) (amended 1821); N.J. CONST. of 1776, art. IV; N.Y. CONST. of 1777, art. VII (applying only to assemblymen).
48. See, e.g., DEL. CONST. of 1776, art. V; MASS. CONST. pt. 2, ch. 1, § 3, art. IV (1780) (amended 1821); N.J. CONST. of 1776, art. IV; N.Y. CONST. of 1777, art. VII (applying only to assemblymen).
49. See, e.g., DEL. CONST. of 1776, art. V; MASS. CONST. pt. 2, ch. 1, § 3, art. IV (1780) (amended 1821); N.J. CONST. of 1776, art. IV; N.Y. CONST. of 1777, art. VII (applying only to assemblymen).
50. Catholics were disenfranchised in Maryland and New York during the colonial period; non-Christians (specifically Jews) were disenfranchised in Maryland, New York, Rhode Island, and South Carolina. See WILLIAMSON, supra note 1, at 15-16. After the Revolution, only the South Carolina constitution retained a clause that required voters to recognize the existence of God. See S.C. CONST. of 1778, art. XIII.
51. New Jersey was the lone exception to the exclusion of women from the suffrage. See Judith Apter Klinghoffer & Lois Elkis, "The Petticoat Electors": Women's Suffrage in New Jersey, 1776-1807, 12 J. EARLY REPUBLIC 159 (1992).
52. Free blacks were disenfranchised in Georgia, South Carolina, and Virginia. See WILLIAMSON, supra note 1, at 15.
53. See GORDON S. WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 311-18 (1992).
54. See MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860, at 31-62 (1977); JAMES WILLARD HURST, LAW AND THE CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM IN THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY UNITED STATES 25 (1956).
55. See MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860, at 31-62 (1977); JAMES WILLARD HURST, LAW AND THE CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM IN THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY UNITED STATES 25 (1956).
56. See infra Section II.A.
57. In its 1796 constitution, Tennessee adopted a nominal freehold requirement: The freehold could be of any size. See TENN. CONST. of 1796, art. III, § 1.
58. See MD. CONST. of 1776, amends. 12 & 14 (1810); S.C. CONST. of 1790, art. I, § 4 (1810); Act of Nov. 16, 1807, 1811 N.J. Laws (Bloomfield) 33 (amended 1875).
59. See MD. CONST. of 1776, amends. 12 & 14 (1810); S.C. CONST. of 1790, art. I, § 4 (1810); Act of Nov. 16, 1807, 1811 N.J. Laws (Bloomfield) 33 (amended 1875).
60. See MD. CONST. of 1776, amends. 12 & 14 (1810); S.C. CONST. of 1790, art. I, § 4 (1810); Act of Nov. 16, 1807, 1811 N.J. Laws (Bloomfield) 33 (amended 1875).
61. These states held constitutional conventions as follows: Connecticut in 1818; Massachusetts in 1820-1821; New York in 1821; North Carolina in 1835; Rhode Island in 1824; and Virginia in 1829-1830. See Sturm, supra note 6, at 82 tbl.5.
62. North Carolina dropped its freehold requirement for voting for governor in 1835, but retained one for the election of senators until 1857. See N.C. CONST. of 1835, art. I, § 3 (1857) (senators); id. art. II, § 1 (governor); Thomas E. Jeffrey, "Free Suffrage" Revisited: Party Politics and Constitutional Reform in Antebellum North Carolina, 59 N.C. HIST. REV. 24, 25 n.3 (1982). Rhode Island stubbornly kept its restrictions until the onset of civil strife in the Dorr Rebellion in 1842. See R.I. CONST. art. II, §§ 1-2 (1842) (amended 1888) (providing an alternative to the property qualification). See generally PATRICK T. CONLEY, DEMOCRACY IN DECLINE: RHODE ISLAND'S CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT, 1776-1841 (1977); GEORGE M. DENNISON, THE DORR WAR (1976); MARVIN E. GETTLEMAN, THE DORR REBELLION (1973). Tennessee dropped its freehold requirement in 1834. See TENN. CONST. of 1834, art. IV, § 1. Virginia eliminated its freehold requirement in 1851. Compare VA. CONST. of 1830, art. III, § 14 (elaborating the freehold qualifications), with VA. CONST. of 1851, art. III, § 1 (eliminating the freehold requirement). See generally WILLIAM G. SHADE, DEMOCRATIZING THE OLD DOMINION 278 (1996).
63. North Carolina dropped its freehold requirement for voting for governor in 1835, but retained one for the election of senators until 1857. See N.C. CONST. of 1835, art. I, § 3 (1857) (senators); id. art. II, § 1 (governor); Thomas E. Jeffrey, "Free Suffrage" Revisited: Party Politics and Constitutional Reform in Antebellum North Carolina, 59 N.C. HIST. REV. 24, 25 n.3 (1982). Rhode Island stubbornly kept its restrictions until the onset of civil strife in the Dorr Rebellion in 1842. See R.I. CONST. art. II, §§ 1-2 (1842) (amended 1888) (providing an alternative to the property qualification). See generally PATRICK T. CONLEY, DEMOCRACY IN DECLINE: RHODE ISLAND'S CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT, 1776-1841 (1977); GEORGE M. DENNISON, THE DORR WAR (1976); MARVIN E. GETTLEMAN, THE DORR REBELLION (1973). Tennessee dropped its freehold requirement in 1834. See TENN. CONST. of 1834, art. IV, § 1. Virginia eliminated its freehold requirement in 1851. Compare VA. CONST. of 1830, art. III, § 14 (elaborating the freehold qualifications), with VA. CONST. of 1851, art. III, § 1 (eliminating the freehold requirement). See generally WILLIAM G. SHADE, DEMOCRATIZING THE OLD DOMINION 278 (1996).
64. North Carolina dropped its freehold requirement for voting for governor in 1835, but retained one for the election of senators until 1857. See N.C. CONST. of 1835, art. I, § 3 (1857) (senators); id. art. II, § 1 (governor); Thomas E. Jeffrey, "Free Suffrage" Revisited: Party Politics and Constitutional Reform in Antebellum North Carolina, 59 N.C. HIST. REV. 24, 25 n.3 (1982). Rhode Island stubbornly kept its restrictions until the onset of civil strife in the Dorr Rebellion in 1842. See R.I. CONST. art. II, §§ 1-2 (1842) (amended 1888) (providing an alternative to the property qualification). See generally PATRICK T. CONLEY, DEMOCRACY IN DECLINE: RHODE ISLAND'S CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT, 1776-1841 (1977); GEORGE M. DENNISON, THE DORR WAR (1976); MARVIN E. GETTLEMAN, THE DORR REBELLION (1973). Tennessee dropped its freehold requirement in 1834. See TENN. CONST. of 1834, art. IV, § 1. Virginia eliminated its freehold requirement in 1851. Compare VA. CONST. of 1830, art. III, § 14 (elaborating the freehold qualifications), with VA. CONST. of 1851, art. III, § 1 (eliminating the freehold requirement). See generally WILLIAM G. SHADE, DEMOCRATIZING THE OLD DOMINION 278 (1996).
65. North Carolina dropped its freehold requirement for voting for governor in 1835, but retained one for the election of senators until 1857. See N.C. CONST. of 1835, art. I, § 3 (1857) (senators); id. art. II, § 1 (governor); Thomas E. Jeffrey, "Free Suffrage" Revisited: Party Politics and Constitutional Reform in Antebellum North Carolina, 59 N.C. HIST. REV. 24, 25 n.3 (1982). Rhode Island stubbornly kept its restrictions until the onset of civil strife in the Dorr Rebellion in 1842. See R.I. CONST. art. II, §§ 1-2 (1842) (amended 1888) (providing an alternative to the property qualification). See generally PATRICK T. CONLEY, DEMOCRACY IN DECLINE: RHODE ISLAND'S CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT, 1776-1841 (1977); GEORGE M. DENNISON, THE DORR WAR (1976); MARVIN E. GETTLEMAN, THE DORR REBELLION (1973). Tennessee dropped its freehold requirement in 1834. See TENN. CONST. of 1834, art. IV, § 1. Virginia eliminated its freehold requirement in 1851. Compare VA. CONST. of 1830, art. III, § 14 (elaborating the freehold qualifications), with VA. CONST. of 1851, art. III, § 1 (eliminating the freehold requirement). See generally WILLIAM G. SHADE, DEMOCRATIZING THE OLD DOMINION 278 (1996).
66. North Carolina dropped its freehold requirement for voting for governor in 1835, but retained one for the election of senators until 1857. See N.C. CONST. of 1835, art. I, § 3 (1857) (senators); id. art. II, § 1 (governor); Thomas E. Jeffrey, "Free Suffrage" Revisited: Party Politics and Constitutional Reform in Antebellum North Carolina, 59 N.C. HIST. REV. 24, 25 n.3 (1982). Rhode Island stubbornly kept its restrictions until the onset of civil strife in the Dorr Rebellion in 1842. See R.I. CONST. art. II, §§ 1-2 (1842) (amended 1888) (providing an alternative to the property qualification). See generally PATRICK T. CONLEY, DEMOCRACY IN DECLINE: RHODE ISLAND'S CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT, 1776-1841 (1977); GEORGE M. DENNISON, THE DORR WAR (1976); MARVIN E. GETTLEMAN, THE DORR REBELLION (1973). Tennessee dropped its freehold requirement in 1834. See TENN. CONST. of 1834, art. IV, § 1. Virginia eliminated its freehold requirement in 1851. Compare VA. CONST. of 1830, art. III, § 14 (elaborating the freehold qualifications), with VA. CONST. of 1851, art. III, § 1 (eliminating the freehold requirement). See generally WILLIAM G. SHADE, DEMOCRATIZING THE OLD DOMINION 278 (1996).
67. North Carolina dropped its freehold requirement for voting for governor in 1835, but retained one for the election of senators until 1857. See N.C. CONST. of 1835, art. I, § 3 (1857) (senators); id. art. II, § 1 (governor); Thomas E. Jeffrey, "Free Suffrage" Revisited: Party Politics and Constitutional Reform in Antebellum North Carolina, 59 N.C. HIST. REV. 24, 25 n.3 (1982). Rhode Island stubbornly kept its restrictions until the onset of civil strife in the Dorr Rebellion in 1842. See R.I. CONST. art. II, §§ 1-2 (1842) (amended 1888) (providing an alternative to the property qualification). See generally PATRICK T. CONLEY, DEMOCRACY IN DECLINE: RHODE ISLAND'S CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT, 1776-1841 (1977); GEORGE M. DENNISON, THE DORR WAR (1976); MARVIN E. GETTLEMAN, THE DORR REBELLION (1973). Tennessee dropped its freehold requirement in 1834. See TENN. CONST. of 1834, art. IV, § 1. Virginia eliminated its freehold requirement in 1851. Compare VA. CONST. of 1830, art. III, § 14 (elaborating the freehold qualifications), with VA. CONST. of 1851, art. III, § 1 (eliminating the freehold requirement). See generally WILLIAM G. SHADE, DEMOCRATIZING THE OLD DOMINION 278 (1996).
68. North Carolina dropped its freehold requirement for voting for governor in 1835, but retained one for the election of senators until 1857. See N.C. CONST. of 1835, art. I, § 3 (1857) (senators); id. art. II, § 1 (governor); Thomas E. Jeffrey, "Free Suffrage" Revisited: Party Politics and Constitutional Reform in Antebellum North Carolina, 59 N.C. HIST. REV. 24, 25 n.3 (1982). Rhode Island stubbornly kept its restrictions until the onset of civil strife in the Dorr Rebellion in 1842. See R.I. CONST. art. II, §§ 1-2 (1842) (amended 1888) (providing an alternative to the property qualification). See generally PATRICK T. CONLEY, DEMOCRACY IN DECLINE: RHODE ISLAND'S CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT, 1776-1841 (1977); GEORGE M. DENNISON, THE DORR WAR (1976); MARVIN E. GETTLEMAN, THE DORR REBELLION (1973). Tennessee dropped its freehold requirement in 1834. See TENN. CONST. of 1834, art. IV, § 1. Virginia eliminated its freehold requirement in 1851. Compare VA. CONST. of 1830, art. III, § 14 (elaborating the freehold qualifications), with VA. CONST. of 1851, art. III, § 1 (eliminating the freehold requirement). See generally WILLIAM G. SHADE, DEMOCRATIZING THE OLD DOMINION 278 (1996).
69. North Carolina dropped its freehold requirement for voting for governor in 1835, but retained one for the election of senators until 1857. See N.C. CONST. of 1835, art. I, § 3 (1857) (senators); id. art. II, § 1 (governor); Thomas E. Jeffrey, "Free Suffrage" Revisited: Party Politics and Constitutional Reform in Antebellum North Carolina, 59 N.C. HIST. REV. 24, 25 n.3 (1982). Rhode Island stubbornly kept its restrictions until the onset of civil strife in the Dorr Rebellion in 1842. See R.I. CONST. art. II, §§ 1-2 (1842) (amended 1888) (providing an alternative to the property qualification). See generally PATRICK T. CONLEY, DEMOCRACY IN DECLINE: RHODE ISLAND'S CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT, 1776-1841 (1977); GEORGE M. DENNISON, THE DORR WAR (1976); MARVIN E. GETTLEMAN, THE DORR REBELLION (1973). Tennessee dropped its freehold requirement in 1834. See TENN. CONST. of 1834, art. IV, § 1. Virginia eliminated its freehold requirement in 1851. Compare VA. CONST. of 1830, art. III, § 14 (elaborating the freehold qualifications), with VA. CONST. of 1851, art. III, § 1 (eliminating the freehold requirement). See generally WILLIAM G. SHADE, DEMOCRATIZING THE OLD DOMINION 278 (1996).
70. This section focuses on the constitutional conventions of Connecticut, New York, and Virginia. On these conventions, see, respectively, RICHARD J. PURCELL, CONNECTICUT IN TRANSITION, 1775-1818, at 236-64 (Wesleyan Univ. Press 1963) (1918); John Antony Casais, The New York State Constitutional Convention of 1821 and Its Aftermath (1967) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University) (on file with the Columbia University Library); SHADE, supra note 33, at 50-77; and ROBERT P. SUTTON, REVOLUTION TO SECESSION: CONSTITUTION MAKING IN THE OLD DOMINION 72-102 (1989).
71. This section focuses on the constitutional conventions of Connecticut, New York, and Virginia. On these conventions, see, respectively, RICHARD J. PURCELL, CONNECTICUT IN TRANSITION, 1775-1818, at 236-64 (Wesleyan Univ. Press 1963) (1918); John Antony Casais, The New York State Constitutional Convention of 1821 and Its Aftermath (1967) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University) (on file with the Columbia University Library); SHADE, supra note 33, at 50-77; and ROBERT P. SUTTON, REVOLUTION TO SECESSION: CONSTITUTION MAKING IN THE OLD DOMINION 72-102 (1989).
72. This section focuses on the constitutional conventions of Connecticut, New York, and Virginia. On these conventions, see, respectively, RICHARD J. PURCELL, CONNECTICUT IN TRANSITION, 1775-1818, at 236-64 (Wesleyan Univ. Press 1963) (1918); John Antony Casais, The New York State Constitutional Convention of 1821 and Its Aftermath (1967) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University) (on file with the Columbia University Library); SHADE, supra note 33, at 50-77; and ROBERT P. SUTTON, REVOLUTION TO SECESSION: CONSTITUTION MAKING IN THE OLD DOMINION 72-102 (1989).
73. PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE VIRGINIA STATE CONVENTION OF 1829-30, at 71 (Richmond, Samuel Shepherd & Co. 1830) [hereinafter VIRGINIA CONVENTION OF 1829-1830] (statement of Abel Parker Upshur).
74. Id.
75. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2; cf. JENNIFER NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE LIMITS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM (1990) (articulating the ways in which private property was protected at the Founding).
76. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2; cf. JENNIFER NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE LIMITS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM (1990) (articulating the ways in which private property was protected at the Founding).
77. VIRGINIA CONVENTION OF 1829-1830, supra note 35, at 111 (statement of Richard Morris); see also JOURNAL OF DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS IN THE CONVENTION OF DELEGATES, CHOSEN To REVISE THE CONSTITUTION OF MASSACHUSETTS (Boston, Boston Daily Advertiser rev. ed. 1853) [hereinafter MASSACHUSETTS CONVENTION OF 1820-1821) (statement of Daniel Webster) ("[I]t is entirely just that property should have its due weight and consideration in political arrangements.").
78. VIRGINIA CONVENTION OF 1829-1830, supra note 35, at 111 (statement of Richard Morris); see also JOURNAL OF DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS IN THE CONVENTION OF DELEGATES, CHOSEN To REVISE THE CONSTITUTION OF MASSACHUSETTS (Boston, Boston Daily Advertiser rev. ed. 1853) [hereinafter MASSACHUSETTS CONVENTION OF 1820-1821) (statement of Daniel Webster) ("[I]t is entirely just that property should have its due weight and consideration in political arrangements.").
79. VIRGINIA CONVENTION OF 1829-1830, supra note 35, at 113 (statement of Richard Morris).
80. Id. at 167 (statement of Benjamin Watkins Leigh).
81. Id. at 114 (statement of Richard Morris).
82. Id. at 158 (statement of Benjamin Watkins Leigh); see also NOAH WEBSTER, JR., AN ORATION, PRONOUNCED BEFORE THE CITIZENS OF NEW HAVEN, ON THE ANNIVERSARY OF THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 18 n.* (New Haven, William W. Morse 1802) ("[A]s property is unequally and suffrage equally divided, the principle of equal suffrage becomes the basis of inequality of power.").
83. See VIRGINIA CONVENTION OF 1829-1830, supra note 35, at 98 (statement of Philip P. Barbour); id. at 205-16 (statement of Thomas Joynes).
84. See SUTTON, supra note 34, at 128-29; see also, e.g., Harold J. Counihan, The North Carolina Constitutional Convention of 1835: A Study in Jacksonian Democracy, 46 N.C. HIST. REV. 335, 347-62 (1969).
85. REPORTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE CONVENTION OF 1821, ASSEMBLED FOR THE PURPOSE OF AMENDING THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF NEW-YORK 281 (Albany, E. & E. Hosford 1821) [hereinafter NEW YORK CONVENTION OF 1821] (statement of Jacob Sutherland).
86. Id.
87. Id.; see also MASSACHUSETTS CONVENTION OF 1820-1821, supra note 38, at 251 (statement of Josiah Quincy) ("[T]he rich [person], by the influence resulting from his property over the class of paupers, has a power of indemnifying himself a hundred fold.").
88. NEW YORK CONVENTION OF 1821, supra note 45, at 285 (statement of Ezekiel Bacon).
89. Id.
90. DAVID DAGGETT, FACTS ARE STUBBORN THINGS, OR NINE PLAIN QUESTIONS TO THE PEOPLE OF CONNECTICUT 20 (Hartford, Hudson & Goodwin 1803).
91. MASSACHUSETTS CONVENTION OF 1820-1821, supra note 38, at 247 (statement of Warren Dutton).
92. HENRY FORD, AN ORATION, DELIVERED IN THE PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH AT MORRIS-TOWN, JULY 4, 1806, at 8-9 (Morristown, Henry P. Russell 1806).
93. A Freeman, CONN. COURANT, Sept. 29, 1818, at 2.
94. See R., Connecticut Convention, CONN. COURANT. Sept. 22, 1818, at 3.
95. VIRGINIA CONVENTION OF 1829-1830, supra note 35, at 27 (Memorial of the Non-Freeholders of the City of Richmond) (paraphrasing the arguments of their opponents).
96. NEW YORK CONVENTION OF 1821, supra note 45, at 223 (statement of Erastus Root).
97. Id. at 225 (statement of Jacob Radcliff).
98. Id. (statement of P.R. Livingston).
99. Id. at 239 (statement of John Cramer).
100. Id. at 225 (statement of P.R. Livingston).
101. Id.
102. VIRGINIA CONVENTION OF 1829-1830, supra note 35, at 27 (Memorial of the Non-Freeholders of the City of Richmond).
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. MASSACHUSETTS CONVENTION OF 1820-1821, supra note 38, at 252 (statement of Benjamin Austin).
106. Letter from Rufus King to Christopher Gore (Dec. 18, 1820), in 6 THE LIFE AND CORRESPONDENCE OF RUFUS KING 365, 365-66 (Charles R. King ed., 1900).
107. NEW YORK CONVENTION OF 1821, supra note 45, at 225 (statement of P.R. Livingston); see also MASSACHUSETTS CONVENTION OF 1820-1821, supra note 38, at 253 (statement of Joseph Richardson) ("Want of property in a free government, should be the last thing to prevent men from voting, unless the possession of property were shown to be necessarily connected with virtue.").
108. NEW YORK CONVENTION OF 1821, supra note 45, at 225 (statement of P.R. Livingston); see also MASSACHUSETTS CONVENTION OF 1820-1821, supra note 38, at 253 (statement of Joseph Richardson) ("Want of property in a free government, should be the last thing to prevent men from voting, unless the possession of property were shown to be necessarily connected with virtue.").
109. See MARC W. KRUMAN, BETWEEN AUTHORITY AND LIBERTY: STATE CONSTITUTION MAKING IN REVOLUTIONARY AMERICA 92-95 (1997).
110. A Citizen, To the Citizens of Richmond, Not Freeholders, VA. ARGUS (Richmond), July 31, 1801, reprinted in THE FAITH OF OUR FATHERS 14, 15 (Irving Mark & Eugene L. Schwaab eds., 1952). The author of this article was William Munford. See THE FAITH OF OUR FATHERS, supra, at 14.
111. A Citizen, To the Citizens of Richmond, Not Freeholders, VA. ARGUS (Richmond), July 31, 1801, reprinted in THE FAITH OF OUR FATHERS 14, 15 (Irving Mark & Eugene L. Schwaab eds., 1952). The author of this article was William Munford. See THE FAITH OF OUR FATHERS, supra, at 14.
112. A Citizen, To the Citizens of Richmond, Not Freeholders, VA. ARGUS (Richmond), July 31, 1801, reprinted in THE FAITH OF OUR FATHERS 14, 15 (Irving Mark & Eugene L. Schwaab eds., 1952). The author of this article was William Munford. See THE FAITH OF OUR FATHERS, supra, at 14.
113. NEW YORK CONVENTION OF 1821, supra note 45, at 178 (statement of Nathan Sanford).
114. Id.
115. E.g., id. at 257 (statement of Martin Van Buren).
116. See PA. CONST. of 1776, § 6. The taxpaying provisions were retained in Pennsylvania's later constitutions. See PA. CONST. of 1838, art. III, § 1; PA. CONST. of 1790, art. III, § 1.
117. See PA. CONST. of 1776, § 6. The taxpaying provisions were retained in Pennsylvania's later constitutions. See PA. CONST. of 1838, art. III, § 1; PA. CONST. of 1790, art. III, § 1.
118. See PA. CONST. of 1776, § 6. The taxpaying provisions were retained in Pennsylvania's later constitutions. See PA. CONST. of 1838, art. III, § 1; PA. CONST. of 1790, art. III, § 1.
119. See, e.g., CONN. CONST. of 1818, art. VI, § 2 (giving alternative suffrage requirements of freehold, tax, or militia service); DEL. CONST. of 1792, art. IV, § 1; GA. CONST. of 1798, art. IV, § 1; LA. CONST. of 1812, art. II, § 8 (establishing taxpaying as an alternative to a property requirement); MASS. CONST. amend. III (1821) (amended 1891); MISS. CONST. of 1817, art. III, § 1 (giving alternative suffrage requirements of militia service or tax); N.H. CONST. of 1784, pt. II; N.Y. CONST. of 1822, art. II, § 1 (giving alternative suffrage requirements of militia service, tax, or public highway duty); N.C. CONST. of 1776, art. VIII (applying to assemblymen only); OHIO CONST. of 1802, art. IV, § 1; R.I. CONST. art. II, § 2 (1842) (amended 1888) (giving a taxpaying alternative in legislative elections to the freehold suffrage requirement for native-born citizens); S.C. CONST. of 1790, art. I, § 4 (giving a taxpaying alternative to the freehold suffrage requirement). All of these provisions were revoked by 1902.
120. See, e.g., CONN. CONST. of 1818, art. VI, § 2 (giving alternative suffrage requirements of freehold, tax, or militia service); DEL. CONST. of 1792, art. IV, § 1; GA. CONST. of 1798, art. IV, § 1; LA. CONST. of 1812, art. II, § 8 (establishing taxpaying as an alternative to a property requirement); MASS. CONST. amend. III (1821) (amended 1891); MISS. CONST. of 1817, art. III, § 1 (giving alternative suffrage requirements of militia service or tax); N.H. CONST. of 1784, pt. II; N.Y. CONST. of 1822, art. II, § 1 (giving alternative suffrage requirements of militia service, tax, or public highway duty); N.C. CONST. of 1776, art. VIII (applying to assemblymen only); OHIO CONST. of 1802, art. IV, § 1; R.I. CONST. art. II, § 2 (1842) (amended 1888) (giving a taxpaying alternative in legislative elections to the freehold suffrage requirement for native-born citizens); S.C. CONST. of 1790, art. I, § 4 (giving a taxpaying alternative to the freehold suffrage requirement). All of these provisions were revoked by 1902.
121. See, e.g., CONN. CONST. of 1818, art. VI, § 2 (giving alternative suffrage requirements of freehold, tax, or militia service); DEL. CONST. of 1792, art. IV, § 1; GA. CONST. of 1798, art. IV, § 1; LA. CONST. of 1812, art. II, § 8 (establishing taxpaying as an alternative to a property requirement); MASS. CONST. amend. III (1821) (amended 1891); MISS. CONST. of 1817, art. III, § 1 (giving alternative suffrage requirements of militia service or tax); N.H. CONST. of 1784, pt. II; N.Y. CONST. of 1822, art. II, § 1 (giving alternative suffrage requirements of militia service, tax, or public highway duty); N.C. CONST. of 1776, art. VIII (applying to assemblymen only); OHIO CONST. of 1802, art. IV, § 1; R.I. CONST. art. II, § 2 (1842) (amended 1888) (giving a taxpaying alternative in legislative elections to the freehold suffrage requirement for native-born citizens); S.C. CONST. of 1790, art. I, § 4 (giving a taxpaying alternative to the freehold suffrage requirement). All of these provisions were revoked by 1902.
122. See, e.g., CONN. CONST. of 1818, art. VI, § 2 (giving alternative suffrage requirements of freehold, tax, or militia service); DEL. CONST. of 1792, art. IV, § 1; GA. CONST. of 1798, art. IV, § 1; LA. CONST. of 1812, art. II, § 8 (establishing taxpaying as an alternative to a property requirement); MASS. CONST. amend. III (1821) (amended 1891); MISS. CONST. of 1817, art. III, § 1 (giving alternative suffrage requirements of militia service or tax); N.H. CONST. of 1784, pt. II; N.Y. CONST. of 1822, art. II, § 1 (giving alternative suffrage requirements of militia service, tax, or public highway duty); N.C. CONST. of 1776, art. VIII (applying to assemblymen only); OHIO CONST. of 1802, art. IV, § 1; R.I. CONST. art. II, § 2 (1842) (amended 1888) (giving a taxpaying alternative in legislative elections to the freehold suffrage requirement for native-born citizens); S.C. CONST. of 1790, art. I, § 4 (giving a taxpaying alternative to the freehold suffrage requirement). All of these provisions were revoked by 1902.
123. See, e.g., CONN. CONST. of 1818, art. VI, § 2 (giving alternative suffrage requirements of freehold, tax, or militia service); DEL. CONST. of 1792, art. IV, § 1; GA. CONST. of 1798, art. IV, § 1; LA. CONST. of 1812, art. II, § 8 (establishing taxpaying as an alternative to a property requirement); MASS. CONST. amend. III (1821) (amended 1891); MISS. CONST. of 1817, art. III, § 1 (giving alternative suffrage requirements of militia service or tax); N.H. CONST. of 1784, pt. II; N.Y. CONST. of 1822, art. II, § 1 (giving alternative suffrage requirements of militia service, tax, or public highway duty); N.C. CONST. of 1776, art. VIII (applying to assemblymen only); OHIO CONST. of 1802, art. IV, § 1; R.I. CONST. art. II, § 2 (1842) (amended 1888) (giving a taxpaying alternative in legislative elections to the freehold suffrage requirement for native-born citizens); S.C. CONST. of 1790, art. I, § 4 (giving a taxpaying alternative to the freehold suffrage requirement). All of these provisions were revoked by 1902.
124. See, e.g., CONN. CONST. of 1818, art. VI, § 2 (giving alternative suffrage requirements of freehold, tax, or militia service); DEL. CONST. of 1792, art. IV, § 1; GA. CONST. of 1798, art. IV, § 1; LA. CONST. of 1812, art. II, § 8 (establishing taxpaying as an alternative to a property requirement); MASS. CONST. amend. III (1821) (amended 1891); MISS. CONST. of 1817, art. III, § 1 (giving alternative suffrage requirements of militia service or tax); N.H. CONST. of 1784, pt. II; N.Y. CONST. of 1822, art. II, § 1 (giving alternative suffrage requirements of militia service, tax, or public highway duty); N.C. CONST. of 1776, art. VIII (applying to assemblymen only); OHIO CONST. of 1802, art. IV, § 1; R.I. CONST. art. II, § 2 (1842) (amended 1888) (giving a taxpaying alternative in legislative elections to the freehold suffrage requirement for native-born citizens); S.C. CONST. of 1790, art. I, § 4 (giving a taxpaying alternative to the freehold suffrage requirement). All of these provisions were revoked by 1902.
125. See, e.g., CONN. CONST. of 1818, art. VI, § 2 (giving alternative suffrage requirements of freehold, tax, or militia service); DEL. CONST. of 1792, art. IV, § 1; GA. CONST. of 1798, art. IV, § 1; LA. CONST. of 1812, art. II, § 8 (establishing taxpaying as an alternative to a property requirement); MASS. CONST. amend. III (1821) (amended 1891); MISS. CONST. of 1817, art. III, § 1 (giving alternative suffrage requirements of militia service or tax); N.H. CONST. of 1784, pt. II; N.Y. CONST. of 1822, art. II, § 1 (giving alternative suffrage requirements of militia service, tax, or
126. See, e.g., CONN. CONST. of 1818, art. VI, § 2 (giving alternative suffrage requirements of freehold, tax, or militia service); DEL. CONST. of 1792, art. IV, § 1; GA. CONST. of 1798, art. IV, § 1; LA. CONST. of 1812, art. II, § 8 (establishing taxpaying as an alternative to a property requirement); MASS. CONST. amend. III (1821) (amended 1891); MISS. CONST. of 1817, art. III, § 1 (giving alternative suffrage requirements of militia service or tax); N.H. CONST. of 1784, pt. II; N.Y. CONST. of 1822, art. II, § 1 (giving alternative suffrage requirements of militia service, tax, or public highway duty); N.C. CONST. of 1776, art. VIII (applying to assemblymen only); OHIO CONST. of 1802, art. IV, § 1; R.I. CONST. art. II, § 2 (1842) (amended 1888) (giving a taxpaying alternative in legislative elections to the freehold suffrage requirement for native-born citizens); S.C. CONST. of 1790, art. I, § 4 (giving a taxpaying alternative to the freehold suffrage requirement). All of these provisions were revoked by 1902.
127. See, e.g., CONN. CONST. of 1818, art. VI, § 2 (giving alternative suffrage requirements of freehold, tax, or militia service); DEL. CONST. of 1792, art. IV, § 1; GA. CONST. of 1798, art. IV, § 1; LA. CONST. of 1812, art. II, § 8 (establishing taxpaying as an alternative to a property requirement); MASS. CONST. amend. III (1821) (amended 1891); MISS. CONST. of 1817, art. III, § 1 (giving alternative suffrage requirements of militia service or tax); N.H. CONST. of 1784, pt. II; N.Y. CONST. of 1822, art. II, § 1 (giving alternative suffrage requirements of militia service, tax, or public highway duty); N.C. CONST. of 1776, art. VIII (applying to assemblymen only); OHIO CONST. of 1802, art. IV, § 1; R.I. CONST. art. II, § 2 (1842) (amended 1888) (giving a taxpaying alternative in legislative elections to the freehold suffrage requirement for native-born citizens); S.C. CONST. of 1790, art. I, § 4 (giving a taxpaying alternative to the freehold suffrage requirement). All of these provisions were revoked by 1902.
128. See, e.g., CONN. CONST. of 1818, art. VI, § 2 (giving alternative suffrage requirements of freehold, tax, or militia service); DEL. CONST. of 1792, art. IV, § 1; GA. CONST. of 1798, art. IV, § 1; LA. CONST. of 1812, art. II, § 8 (establishing taxpaying as an alternative to a property requirement); MASS. CONST. amend. III (1821) (amended 1891); MISS. CONST. of 1817, art. III, § 1 (giving alternative suffrage requirements of militia service or tax); N.H. CONST. of 1784, pt. II; N.Y. CONST. of 1822, art. II, § 1 (giving alternative suffrage requirements of militia service, tax, or public highway duty); N.C. CONST. of 1776, art. VIII (applying to assemblymen only); OHIO CONST. of 1802, art. IV, § 1; R.I. CONST. art. II, § 2 (1842) (amended 1888) (giving a taxpaying alternative in legislative elections to the freehold suffrage requirement for native-born citizens); S.C. CONST. of 1790, art. I, § 4 (giving a taxpaying alternative to the freehold suffrage requirement). All of these provisions were revoked by 1902.
129. See, e.g., CONN. CONST. of 1818, art. VI, § 2 (giving alternative suffrage requirements of freehold, tax, or militia service); DEL. CONST. of 1792, art. IV, § 1; GA. CONST. of 1798, art. IV, § 1; LA. CONST. of 1812, art. II, § 8 (establishing taxpaying as an alternative to a property requirement); MASS. CONST. amend. III (1821) (amended 1891); MISS. CONST. of 1817, art. III, § 1 (giving alternative suffrage requirements of militia service or tax); N.H. CONST. of 1784, pt. II; N.Y. CONST. of 1822, art. II, § 1 (giving alternative suffrage requirements of militia service, tax, or public highway duty); N.C. CONST. of 1776, art. VIII (applying to assemblymen only); OHIO CONST. of 1802, art. IV, § 1; R.I. CONST. art. II, § 2 (1842) (amended 1888) (giving a taxpaying alternative in legislative elections to the freehold suffrage requirement for native-born citizens); S.C. CONST. of 1790, art. I, § 4 (giving a taxpaying alternative to the freehold suffrage requirement). All of these provisions were revoked by 1902.
130. See, e.g., CONN. CONST. of 1818, art. VI, § 2 (giving alternative suffrage requirements of freehold, tax, or militia service); DEL. CONST. of 1792, art. IV, § 1; GA. CONST. of 1798, art. IV, § 1; LA. CONST. of 1812, art. II, § 8 (establishing taxpaying as an alternative to a property requirement); MASS. CONST. amend. III (1821) (amended 1891); MISS. CONST. of 1817, art. III, § 1 (giving alternative suffrage requirements of militia service or tax); N.H. CONST. of 1784, pt. II; N.Y. CONST. of 1822, art. II, § 1 (giving alternative suffrage requirements of militia service, tax, or public highway duty); N.C. CONST. of 1776, art. VIII (applying to assemblymen only); OHIO CONST. of 1802, art. IV, § 1; R.I. CONST. art. II, § 2 (1842) (amended 1888) (giving a taxpaying alternative in legislative elections to the freehold suffrage requirement for native-born citizens); S.C. CONST. of 1790, art. I, § 4 (giving a taxpaying alternative to the freehold suffrage requirement). All of these provisions were revoked by 1902.
131. VIRGINIA CONVENTION OF 1829-1830, supra note 35, at 101 (statement of Briscoe G. Baldwin).
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. NEW YORK CONVENTION OF 1821, supra note 45, at 274 (statement of Samuel Young).
135. Franklin, The Constitution, AM. MERCURY (Hartford), Sept. 29, 1818, at 3.
136. The Right and Power of Suffrage, 19 NILES' REG. (Baltimore) 115, 115 (1820) (emphasis omitted).
137. New York's constitution of 1822 provided for just that. See N.Y. CONST. of 1822, art. II, § 1 (giving alternative suffrage requirements of militia service, tax, or public highway duty).
138. VIRGINIA CONVENTION OF 1829-1830, supra note 35, at 102 (statement of Briscoe G. Baldwin).
139. Call of a Convention, ENQUIRER (Richmond), Feb. 1, 1806, at 3 (statement of James Robertson in the Virginia House of Delegates debate on the calling of a constitutional convention).
140. Id.
141. NEW YORK CONVENTION OF 1821, supra note 45, at 235 (statement of Daniel D. Tompkins).
142. Id.
143. VIRGINIA CONVENTION OF 1829-1830, supra note 35, at 27 (Memorial of the Non-Freeholders of the City of Richmond).
144. Id.
145. See id.
146. Id. at 107 (statement of Alfred H. Powell).
147. See PORTER, supra note 2, at 110 tbl.; WlLLIAMSON, supra note 1, at 260-61.
148. 1 OFFICIAL REPORT OF THE DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS IN THE STATE CONVENTION, ASSEMBLED MAY 4TH, 1853, TO REVISE AND AMEND THE CONSTITUTION OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS 554 (Boston, White & Potter 1853) (hereinafter MASSACHUSETTS CONVENTION OF 1853] (statement of John W. Simonds).
149. Id. at 566 (statement of Benjamin F. Hallett).
150. Id. at 554 (statement of John Simonds).
151. Id. at 564 (statement of Benjamin F. Hallett).
152. But see KRUMAN, supra note 68, at 103-06 (noting a few persons who questioned the disenfranchisement of widows and unmarried propertied women in the 1770s).
153. WILLIAM C. JARVIS, THE REPUBLICAN; OR, A SERIES OF ESSAYS ON THE PRINCIPLES AND POLICY OF FREE STATES, HAVING A PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE INDIVIDUAL STATES 66 (Pittsfield, Phineas Allen 1820).
154. Id. at 67.
155. 2 MASSACHUSETTS CONVENTION OF 1853, supra note 92, at 735 (statement of Edward L. Keyes).
156. See Klinghoffer & Elkis, supra note 25, at 159-60.
157. See, e.g., VIRGINIA CONVENTION OF 1829-1830, supra note 35, at 227 (statement of Samuel M'D. Moore) ("Women have never claimed the right to participate in the formation of the Government.").
158. Id. at 92 (statement of Philip P. Barbour).
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.; see also G.S. Hillard, The Letters of Silas Steadfast, BOSTON COURIER & ATLAS, 1853 (arguing that the right to vote is based on expediency and not on capacity), reprinted in DISCUSSIONS ON THE CONSTITUTION PROPOSED TO THE PEOPLE OF MASSACHUSETTS BY THE CONVENTION OF 1853, at 117, 117-20 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1854).
162. Id.; see also G.S. Hillard, The Letters of Silas Steadfast, BOSTON COURIER & ATLAS, 1853 (arguing that the right to vote is based on expediency and not on capacity), reprinted in DISCUSSIONS ON THE CONSTITUTION PROPOSED TO THE PEOPLE OF MASSACHUSETTS BY THE CONVENTION OF 1853, at 117, 117-20 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1854).
163. VIRGINIA CONVENTION OF 1829-1830, supra note 35, at 55 (statement of John R. Cooke).
164. Id.
165. Id. (emphasis added).
166. On the concept of separate spheres, see NANCY F. COTT, THE BONDS OF WOMANHOOD: "WOMAN'S SPHERE" IN NEW ENGLAND, 1780-1835 (1977). For an example of the rhetoric of separate spheres, see infra text accompanying notes 124-130.
167. Virginia Freewoman, The Rights of Women, ENQUIRER (Richmond), Oct. 10, 1829, at 2.
168. MARY WOLLSTONECRAFT, A VINDICATION OF THE RIGHTS OF WOMAN 223-30 (Miriam Brody ed., Penguin Books 1992) (1792) (discussing the effects of education on development).
169. Freewoman, supra note 110, at 2.
170. On women's gradual recognition of their need and right to enter the political sphere, see LORI D. GINZBERG, WOMEN AND THE WORK OF BENEVOLENCE: MORALITY, POLITICS, AND CLASS IN THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY UNITED STATES 67-132 (1990).
171. Letter from Elizabeth Cady Stanton to George G. Cooper, Editor, National Reformer (Sept. 14, 1848) [hereinafter Letter to George G. Cooper], in 2 ELIZABETH CADY STANTON: As REVEALED IN HER LETTERS, DIARY, AND REMINISCENCES 18, 19 (Theodore Stanton & Harriot Stanton Blatch eds., Arno Press Inc. 1969) (1922) [hereinafter STANTON PAPERS]. On Elizabeth Cady Stanton and the early woman suffrage movement, see ELLEN CAROL DUBOIS, FEMINISM AND SUFFRAGE: THE EMERGENCE OF AN INDEPENDENT WOMEN'S MOVEMENT IN AMERICA, 1848-1869 (1978).
172. Letter from Elizabeth Cady Stanton to George G. Cooper, Editor, National Reformer (Sept. 14, 1848) [hereinafter Letter to George G. Cooper], in 2 ELIZABETH CADY STANTON: As REVEALED IN HER LETTERS, DIARY, AND REMINISCENCES 18, 19 (Theodore Stanton & Harriot Stanton Blatch eds., Arno Press Inc. 1969) (1922) [hereinafter STANTON PAPERS]. On Elizabeth Cady Stanton and the early woman suffrage movement, see ELLEN CAROL DUBOIS, FEMINISM AND SUFFRAGE: THE EMERGENCE OF AN INDEPENDENT WOMEN'S MOVEMENT IN AMERICA, 1848-1869 (1978).
173. Letter to George G. Cooper, supra note 114, in STANTON PAPERS, supra note 114, at 19.
174. 2 MASSACHUSETTS CONVENTION OF 1853, supra note 92, at 726 (statement of William Greene).
175. Id.
176. 2 REPORT OF THE DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONVENTION FOR THE REVISION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF OHIO, 1850-51, at 555 (Columbus, S. Medary 1851) (statement of Norton Townshend).
177. See NORMA BASCH, IN THE EYES OF THE LAW: WOMEN, MARRIAGE, AND PROPERTY IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY NEW YORK 197 (1982).
178. Letter from Elizabeth Cady Stanton to Gerrit Smith (Jan. 3, 1856), in 2 STANTON PAPERS, supra note 114, at 63, 63.
179. Id., in 1 STANTON PAPERS, supra note 114, at 63-64.
180. On this petition, see Jacob Katz Cogan & Lori D. Ginzberg, 1846 Petition for Woman's Suffrage, New York State Constitutional Convention, 22 SIGNS 427 (1997).
181. REPORT OF THE DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONVENTION FOR THE REVISION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 646 (Albany, Evening Atlas 1846) [hereinafter NEW YORK CONVENTION OF 1846] (Memorial of Six Ladies of Jefferson County, Asking for the Extension of the Elective Franchise to Women).
182. See 2 MASSACHUSETTS CONVENTION OF 1853, supra note 92, at 747 (statement of Abijah Marvin).
183. Id.
184. Id. at 748.
185. See id.
186. Id. at 598 (statement of George Boutwell).
187. Id. at 598-99.
188. See Ruth H. Bloch, The Gendered Meanings of Virtue in Revolutionary America, 13 SIGNS 37, 38 (1987); Jan Lewis, Motherhood and the Construction of the Male Citizen in the United States, 1750-1850, in CONSTRUCTIONS OF THE SELF 143, 155 (George Levine ed., 1992).
189. See Ruth H. Bloch, The Gendered Meanings of Virtue in Revolutionary America, 13 SIGNS 37, 38 (1987); Jan Lewis, Motherhood and the Construction of the Male Citizen in the United States, 1750-1850, in CONSTRUCTIONS OF THE SELF 143, 155 (George Levine ed., 1992).
190. See AILEEN S. KRADITOR, THE IDEAS OF THE WOMAN SUFFRAGE MOVEMENT, 1890-1920, at 42-74 (1965).
191. See Counihan, supra note 44. Although this section discusses racial classifications only with regard to blacks, its argument applies equally to the treatment of Native Americans and Asian Americans, who were often specifically disqualified as well. See, e.g., MINN. CONST. art. VII, § 1 (1857) (amended 1960) (enfranchising only "civilized" Indians); OR. CONST. art. II, § 6 (1857) (repealed 1927) (disqualifying "negro[es]," "chinam[e]n," and "mullato[es]" from the vote).
192. See Counihan, supra note 44. Although this section discusses racial classifications only with regard to blacks, its argument applies equally to the treatment of Native Americans and Asian Americans, who were often specifically disqualified as well. See, e.g., MINN. CONST. art. VII, § 1 (1857) (amended 1960) (enfranchising only "civilized" Indians); OR. CONST. art. II, § 6 (1857) (repealed 1927) (disqualifying "negro[es]," "chinam[e]n," and "mullato[es]" from the vote).
193. See JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN, THE FREE NEGRO IN NORTH CAROLINA, 1790-1860, at 105-16 (1943) (recounting the discussion of black suffrage in the North Carolina constitutional convention of 1835).
194. See, e.g., ALA. CONST. of 1819, art. III, § 5; CONN. CONST. of 1818, art. VI, § 2; DEL. CONST. of 1831, art. IV, § 1; ILL. CONST. of 1818, art. II, § 27; IND. CONST. of 1816, art. VI, § 1; KY. CONST. of 1792, art. III, § 1; MD. CONST. of 1776, amends. 12 & 14 (1810); MICH. CONST. of 1835, art. II, § 1; MISS. CONST. of 1832, art. III, § 1; MO. CONST. of 1820, art. III, § 10; S.C. CONST. of 1790, art. I, § 4; VA. CONST. of 1830, art. III, § 14; Act of Nov. 16, 1807, 1811 N.J. Laws (Bloomfield) 33 (amended 1875); J. Stanley Lemons & Michael A. McKenna, Re-Enfranchisement of Rhode Island Negroes, 30 R.I. HIST. 3 (1971) (discussing the Rhode Island qualification, which was adopted in 1822); see also Marion Thompson Wright, Negro Suffrage in New Jersey, 1776-1875, 33 J. NEGRO HIST. 168, 175 (1948) (describing the process of disenfranchisement in New Jersey); cf. N.Y. CONST. of 1822, art. II, § 1 (establishing a property requirement specific to blacks).
195. See, e.g., ALA. CONST. of 1819, art. III, § 5; CONN. CONST. of 1818, art. VI, § 2; DEL. CONST. of 1831, art. IV, § 1; ILL. CONST. of 1818, art. II, § 27; IND. CONST. of 1816, art. VI, § 1; KY. CONST. of 1792, art. III, § 1; MD. CONST. of 1776, amends. 12 & 14 (1810); MICH. CONST. of 1835, art. II, § 1; MISS. CONST. of 1832, art. III, § 1; MO. CONST. of 1820, art. III, § 10; S.C. CONST. of 1790, art. I, § 4; VA. CONST. of 1830, art. III, § 14; Act of Nov. 16, 1807, 1811 N.J. Laws (Bloomfield) 33 (amended 1875); J. Stanley Lemons & Michael A. McKenna, Re-Enfranchisement of Rhode Island Negroes, 30 R.I. HIST. 3 (1971) (discussing the Rhode Island qualification, which was adopted in 1822); see also Marion Thompson Wright, Negro Suffrage in New Jersey, 1776-1875, 33 J. NEGRO HIST. 168, 175 (1948) (describing the process of disenfranchisement in New Jersey); cf. N.Y. CONST. of 1822, art. II, § 1 (establishing a property requirement specific to blacks).
196. See, e.g., ALA. CONST. of 1819, art. III, § 5; CONN. CONST. of 1818, art. VI, § 2; DEL. CONST. of 1831, art. IV, § 1; ILL. CONST. of 1818, art. II, § 27; IND. CONST. of 1816, art. VI, § 1; KY. CONST. of 1792, art. III, § 1; MD. CONST. of 1776, amends. 12 & 14 (1810); MICH. CONST. of 1835, art. II, § 1; MISS. CONST. of 1832, art. III, § 1; MO. CONST. of 1820, art. III, § 10; S.C. CONST. of 1790, art. I, § 4; VA. CONST. of 1830, art. III, § 14; Act of Nov. 16, 1807, 1811 N.J. Laws (Bloomfield) 33 (amended 1875); J. Stanley Lemons & Michael A. McKenna, Re-Enfranchisement of Rhode Island Negroes, 30 R.I. HIST. 3 (1971) (discussing the Rhode Island qualification, which was adopted in 1822); see also Marion Thompson Wright, Negro Suffrage in New Jersey, 1776-1875, 33 J. NEGRO HIST. 168, 175 (1948) (describing the process of disenfranchisement in New Jersey); cf. N.Y. CONST. of 1822, art. II, § 1 (establishing a property requirement specific to blacks).
197. See, e.g., ALA. CONST. of 1819, art. III, § 5; CONN. CONST. of 1818, art. VI, § 2; DEL. CONST. of 1831, art. IV, § 1; ILL. CONST. of 1818, art. II, § 27; IND. CONST. of 1816, art. VI, § 1; KY. CONST. of 1792, art. III, § 1; MD. CONST. of 1776, amends. 12 & 14 (1810); MICH. CONST. of 1835, art. II, § 1; MISS. CONST. of 1832, art. III, § 1; MO. CONST. of 1820, art. III, § 10; S.C. CONST. of 1790, art. I, § 4; VA. CONST. of 1830, art. III, § 14; Act of Nov. 16, 1807, 1811 N.J. Laws (Bloomfield) 33 (amended 1875); J. Stanley Lemons & Michael A. McKenna, Re-Enfranchisement of Rhode Island Negroes, 30 R.I. HIST. 3 (1971) (discussing the Rhode Island qualification, which was adopted in 1822); see also Marion Thompson Wright, Negro Suffrage in New Jersey, 1776-1875, 33 J. NEGRO HIST. 168, 175 (1948) (describing the process of disenfranchisement in New Jersey); cf. N.Y. CONST. of 1822, art. II, § 1 (establishing a property requirement specific to blacks).
198. See, e.g., ALA. CONST. of 1819, art. III, § 5; CONN. CONST. of 1818, art. VI, § 2; DEL. CONST. of 1831, art. IV, § 1; ILL. CONST. of 1818, art. II, § 27; IND. CONST. of 1816, art. VI, § 1; KY. CONST. of 1792, art. III, § 1; MD. CONST. of 1776, amends. 12 & 14 (1810); MICH. CONST. of 1835, art. II, § 1; MISS. CONST. of 1832, art. III, § 1; MO. CONST. of 1820, art. III, § 10; S.C. CONST. of 1790, art. I, § 4; VA. CONST. of 1830, art. III, § 14; Act of Nov. 16, 1807, 1811 N.J. Laws (Bloomfield) 33 (amended 1875); J. Stanley Lemons & Michael A. McKenna, Re-Enfranchisement of Rhode Island Negroes, 30 R.I. HIST. 3 (1971) (discussing the Rhode Island qualification, which was adopted in 1822); see also Marion Thompson Wright, Negro Suffrage in New Jersey, 1776-1875, 33 J. NEGRO HIST. 168, 175 (1948) (describing the process of disenfranchisement in New Jersey); cf. N.Y. CONST. of 1822, art. II, § 1 (establishing a property requirement specific to blacks).
199. See, e.g., ALA. CONST. of 1819, art. III, § 5; CONN. CONST. of 1818, art. VI, § 2; DEL. CONST. of 1831, art. IV, § 1; ILL. CONST. of 1818, art. II, § 27; IND. CONST. of 1816, art. VI, § 1; KY. CONST. of 1792, art. III, § 1; MD. CONST. of 1776, amends. 12 & 14 (1810); MICH. CONST. of 1835, art. II, § 1; MISS. CONST. of 1832, art. III, § 1; MO. CONST. of 1820, art. III, § 10; S.C. CONST. of 1790, art. I, § 4; VA. CONST. of 1830, art. III, § 14; Act of Nov. 16, 1807, 1811 N.J. Laws (Bloomfield) 33 (amended 1875); J. Stanley Lemons & Michael A. McKenna, Re-Enfranchisement of Rhode Island Negroes, 30 R.I. HIST. 3 (1971) (discussing the Rhode Island qualification, which was adopted in 1822); see also Marion Thompson Wright, Negro Suffrage in New Jersey, 1776-1875, 33 J. NEGRO HIST. 168, 175 (1948) (describing the process of disenfranchisement in New Jersey); cf. N.Y. CONST. of 1822, art. II, § 1 (establishing a property requirement specific to blacks).
200. See, e.g., ALA. CONST. of 1819, art. III, § 5; CONN. CONST. of 1818, art. VI, § 2; DEL. CONST. of 1831, art. IV, § 1; ILL. CONST. of 1818, art. II, § 27; IND. CONST. of 1816, art. VI, § 1; KY. CONST. of 1792, art. III, § 1; MD. CONST. of 1776, amends. 12 & 14 (1810); MICH. CONST. of 1835, art. II, § 1; MISS. CONST. of 1832, art. III, § 1; MO. CONST. of 1820, art. III, § 10; S.C. CONST. of 1790, art. I, § 4; VA. CONST. of 1830, art. III, § 14; Act of Nov. 16, 1807, 1811 N.J. Laws (Bloomfield) 33 (amended 1875); J. Stanley Lemons & Michael A. McKenna, Re-Enfranchisement of Rhode Island Negroes, 30 R.I. HIST. 3 (1971) (discussing the Rhode Island qualification, which was adopted in 1822); see also Marion Thompson Wright, Negro Suffrage in New Jersey, 1776-1875, 33 J. NEGRO HIST. 168, 175 (1948) (describing the process of disenfranchisement in New Jersey); cf. N.Y. CONST. of 1822, art. II, § 1 (establishing a property requirement specific to blacks).
201. See, e.g., ALA. CONST. of 1819, art. III, § 5; CONN. CONST. of 1818, art. VI, § 2; DEL. CONST. of 1831, art. IV, § 1; ILL. CONST. of 1818, art. II, § 27; IND. CONST. of 1816, art. VI, § 1; KY. CONST. of 1792, art. III, § 1; MD. CONST. of 1776, amends. 12 & 14 (1810); MICH. CONST. of 1835, art. II, § 1; MISS. CONST. of 1832, art. III, § 1; MO. CONST. of 1820, art. III, § 10; S.C. CONST. of 1790, art. I, § 4; VA. CONST. of 1830, art. III, § 14; Act of Nov. 16, 1807, 1811 N.J. Laws (Bloomfield) 33 (amended 1875); J. Stanley Lemons & Michael A. McKenna, Re-Enfranchisement of Rhode Island Negroes, 30 R.I. HIST. 3 (1971) (discussing the Rhode Island qualification, which was adopted in 1822); see also Marion Thompson Wright, Negro Suffrage in New Jersey, 1776-1875, 33 J. NEGRO HIST. 168, 175 (1948) (describing the process of disenfranchisement in New Jersey); cf. N.Y. CONST. of 1822, art. II, § 1 (establishing a property requirement specific to blacks).
202. See, e.g., ALA. CONST. of 1819, art. III, § 5; CONN. CONST. of 1818, art. VI, § 2; DEL. CONST. of 1831, art. IV, § 1; ILL. CONST. of 1818, art. II, § 27; IND. CONST. of 1816, art. VI, § 1; KY. CONST. of 1792, art. III, § 1; MD. CONST. of 1776, amends. 12 & 14 (1810); MICH. CONST. of 1835, art. II, § 1; MISS. CONST. of 1832, art. III, § 1; MO. CONST. of 1820, art. III, § 10; S.C. CONST. of 1790, art. I, § 4; VA. CONST. of 1830, art. III, § 14; Act of Nov. 16, 1807, 1811 N.J. Laws (Bloomfield) 33 (amended 1875); J. Stanley Lemons & Michael A. McKenna, Re-Enfranchisement of Rhode Island Negroes, 30 R.I. HIST. 3 (1971) (discussing the Rhode Island qualification, which was adopted in 1822); see also Marion Thompson Wright, Negro Suffrage in New Jersey, 1776-1875, 33 J. NEGRO HIST. 168, 175 (1948) (describing the process of disenfranchisement in New Jersey); cf. N.Y. CONST. of 1822, art. II, § 1 (establishing a property requirement specific to blacks).
203. See, e.g., ALA. CONST. of 1819, art. III, § 5; CONN. CONST. of 1818, art. VI, § 2; DEL. CONST. of 1831, art. IV, § 1; ILL. CONST. of 1818, art. II, § 27; IND. CONST. of 1816, art. VI, § 1; KY. CONST. of 1792, art. III, § 1; MD. CONST. of 1776, amends. 12 & 14 (1810); MICH. CONST. of 1835, art. II, § 1; MISS. CONST. of 1832, art. III, § 1; MO. CONST. of 1820, art. III, § 10; S.C. CONST. of 1790, art. I, § 4; VA. CONST. of 1830, art. III, § 14; Act of Nov. 16, 1807, 1811 N.J. Laws (Bloomfield) 33 (amended 1875); J. Stanley Lemons & Michael A. McKenna, Re-Enfranchisement of Rhode Island Negroes, 30 R.I. HIST. 3 (1971) (discussing the Rhode Island qualification, which was adopted in 1822); see also Marion Thompson Wright, Negro Suffrage in New Jersey, 1776-1875, 33 J. NEGRO HIST. 168, 175 (1948) (describing the process of disenfranchisement in New Jersey); cf. N.Y. CONST. of 1822, art. II, § 1 (establishing a property requirement specific to blacks).
204. See, e.g., ALA. CONST. of 1819, art. III, § 5; CONN. CONST. of 1818, art. VI, § 2; DEL. CONST. of 1831, art. IV, § 1; ILL. CONST. of 1818, art. II, § 27; IND. CONST. of 1816, art. VI, § 1; KY. CONST. of 1792, art. III, § 1; MD. CONST. of 1776, amends. 12 & 14 (1810); MICH. CONST. of 1835, art. II, § 1; MISS. CONST. of 1832, art. III, § 1; MO. CONST. of 1820, art. III, § 10; S.C. CONST. of 1790, art. I, § 4; VA. CONST. of 1830, art. III, § 14; Act of Nov. 16, 1807, 1811 N.J. Laws (Bloomfield) 33 (amended 1875); J. Stanley Lemons & Michael A. McKenna, Re-Enfranchisement of Rhode Island Negroes, 30 R.I. HIST. 3 (1971) (discussing the Rhode Island qualification, which was adopted in 1822); see also Marion Thompson Wright, Negro Suffrage in New Jersey, 1776-1875, 33 J. NEGRO HIST. 168, 175 (1948) (describing the process of disenfranchisement in New Jersey); cf. N.Y. CONST. of 1822, art. II, § 1 (establishing a property requirement specific to blacks).
205. See, e.g., ALA. CONST. of 1819, art. III, § 5; CONN. CONST. of 1818, art. VI, § 2; DEL. CONST. of 1831, art. IV, § 1; ILL. CONST. of 1818, art. II, § 27; IND. CONST. of 1816, art. VI, § 1; KY. CONST. of 1792, art. III, § 1; MD. CONST. of 1776, amends. 12 & 14 (1810); MICH. CONST. of 1835, art. II, § 1; MISS. CONST. of 1832, art. III, § 1; MO. CONST. of 1820, art. III, § 10; S.C. CONST. of 1790, art. I, § 4; VA. CONST. of 1830, art. III, § 14; Act of Nov. 16, 1807, 1811 N.J. Laws (Bloomfield) 33 (amended 1875); J. Stanley Lemons & Michael A. McKenna, Re-Enfranchisement of Rhode Island Negroes, 30 R.I. HIST. 3 (1971) (discussing the Rhode Island qualification, which was adopted in 1822); see also Marion Thompson Wright, Negro Suffrage in New Jersey, 1776-1875, 33 J. NEGRO HIST. 168, 175 (1948) (describing the process of disenfranchisement in New Jersey); cf. N.Y. CONST. of 1822, art. II, § 1 (establishing a property requirement specific to blacks).
206. See, e.g., ALA. CONST. of 1819, art. III, § 5; CONN. CONST. of 1818, art. VI, § 2; DEL. CONST. of 1831, art. IV, § 1; ILL. CONST. of 1818, art. II, § 27; IND. CONST. of 1816, art. VI, § 1; KY. CONST. of 1792, art. III, § 1; MD. CONST. of 1776, amends. 12 & 14 (1810); MICH. CONST. of 1835, art. II, § 1; MISS. CONST. of 1832, art. III, § 1; MO. CONST. of 1820, art. III, § 10; S.C. CONST. of 1790, art. I, § 4; VA. CONST. of 1830, art. III, § 14; Act of Nov. 16, 1807, 1811 N.J. Laws (Bloomfield) 33 (amended 1875); J. Stanley Lemons & Michael A. McKenna, Re-Enfranchisement of Rhode Island Negroes, 30 R.I. HIST. 3 (1971) (discussing the Rhode Island qualification, which was adopted in 1822); see also Marion Thompson Wright, Negro Suffrage in New Jersey, 1776-1875, 33 J. NEGRO HIST. 168, 175 (1948) (describing the process of disenfranchisement in New Jersey); cf. N.Y. CONST. of 1822, art. II, § 1 (establishing a property requirement specific to blacks).
207. See, e.g., ALA. CONST. of 1819, art. III, § 5; CONN. CONST. of 1818, art. VI, § 2; DEL. CONST. of 1831, art. IV, § 1; ILL. CONST. of 1818, art. II, § 27; IND. CONST. of 1816, art. VI, § 1; KY. CONST. of 1792, art. III, § 1; MD. CONST. of 1776, amends. 12 & 14 (1810); MICH. CONST. of 1835, art. II, § 1; MISS. CONST. of 1832, art. III, § 1; MO. CONST. of 1820, art. III, § 10; S.C. CONST. of 1790, art. I, § 4; VA. CONST. of 1830, art. III, § 14; Act of Nov. 16, 1807, 1811 N.J. Laws (Bloomfield) 33 (amended 1875); J. Stanley Lemons & Michael A. McKenna, Re-Enfranchisement of Rhode Island Negroes, 30 R.I. HIST. 3 (1971) (discussing the Rhode Island qualification, which was adopted in 1822); see also Marion Thompson Wright, Negro Suffrage in New Jersey, 1776-1875, 33 J. NEGRO HIST. 168, 175 (1948) (describing the process of disenfranchisement in New Jersey); cf. N.Y. CONST. of 1822, art. II, § 1 (establishing a property requirement specific to blacks).
208. See, e.g., ALA. CONST. of 1819, art. III, § 5; CONN. CONST. of 1818, art. VI, § 2; DEL. CONST. of 1831, art. IV, § 1; ILL. CONST. of 1818, art. II, § 27; IND. CONST. of 1816, art. VI, § 1; KY. CONST. of 1792, art. III, § 1; MD. CONST. of 1776, amends. 12 & 14 (1810); MICH. CONST. of 1835, art. II, § 1; MISS. CONST. of 1832, art. III, § 1; MO. CONST. of 1820, art. III, § 10; S.C. CONST. of 1790, art. I, § 4; VA. CONST. of 1830, art. III, § 14; Act of Nov. 16, 1807, 1811 N.J. Laws (Bloomfield) 33 (amended 1875); J. Stanley Lemons & Michael A. McKenna, Re-Enfranchisement of Rhode Island Negroes, 30 R.I. HIST. 3 (1971) (discussing the Rhode Island qualification, which was adopted in 1822); see also Marion Thompson Wright, Negro Suffrage in New Jersey, 1776-1875, 33 J. NEGRO HIST. 168, 175 (1948) (describing the process of disenfranchisement in New Jersey); cf. N.Y. CONST. of 1822, art. II, § 1 (establishing a property requirement specific to blacks).
209. See, e.g., ALA. CONST. of 1819, art. III, § 5; CONN. CONST. of 1818, art. VI, § 2; DEL. CONST. of 1831, art. IV, § 1; ILL. CONST. of 1818, art. II, § 27; IND. CONST. of 1816, art. VI, § 1; KY. CONST. of 1792, art. III, § 1; MD. CONST. of 1776, amends. 12 & 14 (1810); MICH. CONST. of 1835, art. II, § 1; MISS. CONST. of 1832, art. III, § 1; MO. CONST. of 1820, art. III, § 10; S.C. CONST. of 1790, art. I, § 4; VA. CONST. of 1830, art. III, § 14; Act of Nov. 16, 1807, 1811 N.J. Laws (Bloomfield) 33 (amended 1875); J. Stanley Lemons & Michael A. McKenna, Re-Enfranchisement of Rhode Island Negroes, 30 R.I. HIST. 3 (1971) (discussing the Rhode Island qualification, which was adopted in 1822); see also Marion Thompson Wright, Negro Suffrage in New Jersey, 1776-1875, 33 J. NEGRO HIST. 168, 175 (1948) (describing the process of disenfranchisement in New Jersey); cf. N.Y. CONST. of 1822, art. II, § 1 (establishing a property requirement specific to blacks).
210. See FRANKLIN, supra note 133, at 106-08; Counihan, supra note 44, at 346; Roger Wallace Shugg, Negro Voting in the Ante-Bellum South, 21 J. NEGRO HIST. 357, 358 (1936).
211. See PHYLLIS F. FIELD, THE POLITICS OF RACE IN NEW YORK: THE STRUGGLE FOR BLACK SUFFRAGE IN THE CIVIL WAR ERA 29 (1982).
212. See TENN. CONST. of 1834, art. IV, § 1; J.W. Patton, The Progress of Emancipation in Tennessee, 1796-1860, 17 J. NEGRO HIST. 67, 72-74 (1932).
213. See TENN. CONST. of 1834, art. IV, § 1; J.W. Patton, The Progress of Emancipation in Tennessee, 1796-1860, 17 J. NEGRO HIST. 67, 72-74 (1932).
214. The proposition to limit suffrage to whites passed by only five votes. See PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE CONVENTION OF NORTH-CAROLINA, CALLED To AMEND THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE, WHICH ASSEMBLED AT RALEIGH, JUNE 4, 1835, at 80 (Raleigh, Joseph Gales & Son 1836) [hereinafter NORTH CAROLINA CONVENTION OF 1835].
215. See LEON F. LITWACK, NORTH OF SLAVERY: THE NEGRO IN THE FREE STATES, 1790-1860, at 75-79 (1961).
216. See FIELD, supra note 136, at 43-52.
217. See EUGENE H. BERWANGER, THE FRONTIER AGAINST SLAVERY: WESTERN ANTI-NEGRO PREJUDICE AND THE SLAVERY EXTENSION CONTROVERSY (1967) (detailing the antiblack laws in the western and midwestern states during the antebellum period); ROBERT R. DYKSTRA, BRIGHT RADICAL STAR: BLACK FREEDOM AND WHITE SUPREMACY ON THE HAWKEYE FRONTIER passim (1993) (telling the story of the struggle for black suffrage in Iowa); Tom LeRoy McLaughlin, Popular Reactions to the Idea of Negro Equality in Twelve Nonslaveholding States, 1846-1869: A Quantitative Analysis 37-38 tbl.1 (1969) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Washington State University) (on file with the Washington State University Library) (detailing the outcome of 19 state referenda on black suffrage from 1846 to 1869). Useful surveys of black suffrage during this period include: LITWACK, supra note 139, at 74-93; EMIL OLBRICH, THE DEVELOPMENT OF SENTIMENT ON NEGRO SUFFRAGE TO 1860 (Negro Univ. Press 1969) (1912); James Truslow Adams, Disfranchisement of Negroes in New England, 30 AM. HIST. REV. 543 (1925); and Charles H. Wesley, Negro Suffrage in the Period of Constitution-Making, 1787-1865, 32 J. NEGRO HIST. 143 (1947).
218. See EUGENE H. BERWANGER, THE FRONTIER AGAINST SLAVERY: WESTERN ANTI-NEGRO PREJUDICE AND THE SLAVERY EXTENSION CONTROVERSY (1967) (detailing the antiblack laws in the western and midwestern states during the antebellum period); ROBERT R. DYKSTRA, BRIGHT RADICAL STAR: BLACK FREEDOM AND WHITE SUPREMACY ON THE HAWKEYE FRONTIER passim (1993) (telling the story of the struggle for black suffrage in Iowa); Tom LeRoy McLaughlin, Popular Reactions to the Idea of Negro Equality in Twelve Nonslaveholding States, 1846-1869: A Quantitative Analysis 37-38 tbl.1 (1969) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Washington State University) (on file with the Washington State University Library) (detailing the outcome of 19 state referenda on black suffrage from 1846 to 1869). Useful surveys of black suffrage during this period include: LITWACK, supra note 139, at 74-93; EMIL OLBRICH, THE DEVELOPMENT OF SENTIMENT ON NEGRO SUFFRAGE TO 1860 (Negro Univ. Press 1969) (1912); James Truslow Adams, Disfranchisement of Negroes in New England, 30 AM. HIST. REV. 543 (1925); and Charles H. Wesley, Negro Suffrage in the Period of Constitution-Making, 1787-1865, 32 J. NEGRO HIST. 143 (1947).
219. See EUGENE H. BERWANGER, THE FRONTIER AGAINST SLAVERY: WESTERN ANTI-NEGRO PREJUDICE AND THE SLAVERY EXTENSION CONTROVERSY (1967) (detailing the antiblack laws in the western and midwestern states during the antebellum period); ROBERT R. DYKSTRA, BRIGHT RADICAL STAR: BLACK FREEDOM AND WHITE SUPREMACY ON THE HAWKEYE FRONTIER passim (1993) (telling the story of the struggle for black suffrage in Iowa); Tom LeRoy McLaughlin, Popular Reactions to the Idea of Negro Equality in Twelve Nonslaveholding States, 1846-1869: A Quantitative Analysis 37-38 tbl.1 (1969) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Washington State University) (on file with the Washington State University Library) (detailing the outcome of 19 state referenda on black suffrage from 1846 to 1869). Useful surveys of black suffrage during this period include: LITWACK, supra note 139, at 74-93; EMIL OLBRICH, THE DEVELOPMENT OF SENTIMENT ON NEGRO SUFFRAGE TO 1860 (Negro Univ. Press 1969) (1912); James Truslow Adams, Disfranchisement of Negroes in New England, 30 AM. HIST. REV. 543 (1925); and Charles H. Wesley, Negro Suffrage in the Period of Constitution-Making, 1787-1865, 32 J. NEGRO HIST. 143 (1947).
220. See EUGENE H. BERWANGER, THE FRONTIER AGAINST SLAVERY: WESTERN ANTI-NEGRO PREJUDICE AND THE SLAVERY EXTENSION CONTROVERSY (1967) (detailing the antiblack laws in the western and midwestern states during the antebellum period); ROBERT R. DYKSTRA, BRIGHT RADICAL STAR: BLACK FREEDOM AND WHITE SUPREMACY ON THE HAWKEYE FRONTIER passim (1993) (telling the story of the struggle for black suffrage in Iowa); Tom LeRoy McLaughlin, Popular Reactions to the Idea of Negro Equality in Twelve Nonslaveholding States, 1846-1869: A Quantitative Analysis 37-38 tbl.1 (1969) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Washington State University) (on file with the Washington State University Library) (detailing the outcome of 19 state referenda on black suffrage from 1846 to 1869). Useful surveys of black suffrage during this period include: LITWACK, supra note 139, at 74-93; EMIL OLBRICH, THE DEVELOPMENT OF SENTIMENT ON NEGRO SUFFRAGE TO 1860 (Negro Univ. Press 1969) (1912); James Truslow Adams, Disfranchisement of Negroes in New England, 30 AM. HIST. REV. 543 (1925); and Charles H. Wesley, Negro Suffrage in the Period of Constitution-Making, 1787-1865, 32 J. NEGRO HIST. 143 (1947).
221. See EUGENE H. BERWANGER, THE FRONTIER AGAINST SLAVERY: WESTERN ANTI-NEGRO PREJUDICE AND THE SLAVERY EXTENSION CONTROVERSY (1967) (detailing the antiblack laws in the western and midwestern states during the antebellum period); ROBERT R. DYKSTRA, BRIGHT RADICAL STAR: BLACK FREEDOM AND WHITE SUPREMACY ON THE HAWKEYE FRONTIER passim (1993) (telling the story of the struggle for black suffrage in Iowa); Tom LeRoy McLaughlin, Popular Reactions to the Idea of Negro Equality in Twelve Nonslaveholding States, 1846-1869: A Quantitative Analysis 37-38 tbl.1 (1969) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Washington State University) (on file with the Washington State University Library) (detailing the outcome of 19 state referenda on black suffrage from 1846 to 1869). Useful surveys of black suffrage during this period include: LITWACK, supra note 139, at 74-93; EMIL OLBRICH, THE DEVELOPMENT OF SENTIMENT ON NEGRO SUFFRAGE TO 1860 (Negro Univ. Press 1969) (1912); James Truslow Adams, Disfranchisement of Negroes in New England, 30 AM. HIST. REV. 543 (1925); and Charles H. Wesley, Negro Suffrage in the Period of Constitution-Making, 1787-1865, 32 J. NEGRO HIST. 143 (1947).
222. See EUGENE H. BERWANGER, THE FRONTIER AGAINST SLAVERY: WESTERN ANTI-NEGRO PREJUDICE AND THE SLAVERY EXTENSION CONTROVERSY (1967) (detailing the antiblack laws in the western and midwestern states during the antebellum period); ROBERT R. DYKSTRA, BRIGHT RADICAL STAR: BLACK FREEDOM AND WHITE SUPREMACY ON THE HAWKEYE FRONTIER passim (1993) (telling the story of the struggle for black suffrage in Iowa); Tom LeRoy McLaughlin, Popular Reactions to the Idea of Negro Equality in Twelve Nonslaveholding States, 1846-1869: A Quantitative Analysis 37-38 tbl.1 (1969) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Washington State University) (on file with the Washington State University Library) (detailing the outcome of 19 state referenda on black suffrage from 1846 to 1869). Useful surveys of black suffrage during this period include: LITWACK, supra note 139, at 74-93; EMIL OLBRICH, THE DEVELOPMENT OF SENTIMENT ON NEGRO SUFFRAGE TO 1860 (Negro Univ. Press 1969) (1912); James Truslow Adams, Disfranchisement of Negroes in New England, 30 AM. HIST. REV. 543 (1925); and Charles H. Wesley, Negro Suffrage in the Period of Constitution-Making, 1787-1865, 32 J. NEGRO HIST. 143 (1947).
223. See Lemons & McKenna, supra note 134, at 30.
224. On the conception of blacks as innately inferior, see GEORGE M. FREDRICKSON, THE BLACK IMAGE IN THE WHITE MIND: THE DEBATE ON AFRO-AMERICAN CHARACTER AND DESTINY, 1817-1914, at 43-96 (1971); and JAMES M. MCPHERSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY: ABOLITIONISTS AND THE NEGRO IN THE CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION 134-53 (1964).
225. On the conception of blacks as innately inferior, see GEORGE M. FREDRICKSON, THE BLACK IMAGE IN THE WHITE MIND: THE DEBATE ON AFRO-AMERICAN CHARACTER AND DESTINY, 1817-1914, at 43-96 (1971); and JAMES M. MCPHERSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY: ABOLITIONISTS AND THE NEGRO IN THE CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION 134-53 (1964).
226. NEW YORK CONVENTION OF 1821, supra note 45, at 191 (statement of Samuel Young).
227. NORTH CAROLINA CONVENTION OF 1835, supra note 138, at 80 (statement of Louis D. Wilson).
228. NEW YORK CONVENTION OF 1821, supra note 45, at 180 (statement of John Ross).
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 191 (statement of Samuel Young).
232. Id.
233. 9 PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE CONVENTION OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA To PROPOSE AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION, COMMENCED AND HELD AT HARRISBURG 364 (Harrisburg, Packer, Barrett & Park 1838) [hereinafter PENNSYLVANIA CONVENTION OF 1837-1838] (statement of John Sterigere).
234. NEW YORK CONVENTION OF 1821, supra note 45, at 191 (statement of Samuel Young). On popular white opinion in North Carolina against continued black enfranchisement, see CHARLOTTE J., July 3, 1835, at 3; on opinion in Pennsylvania, see GARY B. NASH, FORGING FREEDOM: THE FORMATION OF PHILADELPHIA's BLACK COMMUNITY, 1720-1840, at 223-27 (1988).
235. NEW YORK CONVENTION OF 1821, supra note 45, at 191 (statement of Samuel Young). On popular white opinion in North Carolina against continued black enfranchisement, see CHARLOTTE J., July 3, 1835, at 3; on opinion in Pennsylvania, see GARY B. NASH, FORGING FREEDOM: THE FORMATION OF PHILADELPHIA's BLACK COMMUNITY, 1720-1840, at 223-27 (1988).
236. NEW YORK CONVENTION OF 1821, supra note 45, at 191 (statement of Samuel Young). On popular white opinion in North Carolina against continued black enfranchisement, see CHARLOTTE J., July 3, 1835, at 3; on opinion in Pennsylvania, see GARY B. NASH, FORGING FREEDOM: THE FORMATION OF PHILADELPHIA's BLACK COMMUNITY, 1720-1840, at 223-27 (1988).
237. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 406-27 (1857).
238. See 9 PENNSYLVANIA CONVENTION OF 1837-1838, supra note 151, at 323-30 (statement of E.M. Sturdevant); see also id. at 356-67 (statement of John Sterigere).
239. 10 THE STATUTES AT LARGE OF PENNSYLVANIA FROM 1682 TO 1801, at 67-73 (James T. Mitchell & Henry Flanders eds., 1904).
240. See PA. CONST. of 1790; PA. CONST. of 1776.
241. See PA. CONST. of 1790; PA. CONST. of 1776.
242. Convention, NEWBERN SPECTATOR & POL. REG. (North Carolina), June 19, 1835, at 3.
243. Madison, N.C. J. (Fayetteville), June 24, 1835, at 3.
244. Id.; see also FAYETTEVILLE OBSERVER, June 16, 1835, at 3 ("There is, so far as we can learn, a general feeling of regret in this community at the total disenfranchisement of the free coloured people.").
245. Smith, N.C. J. (Fayetteville), July I, 1835, at 3.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. See FIELD, supra note 136, at 29, 53.
249. See, e.g., NORTH CAROLINA CONVENTION OF 1835, supra note 138, at 69-70 (statement of Nathaniel Macon); id. at 71 (statement of Richard D. Spaight).
250. See, e.g., MEMORIAL. TO THE HONORABLE THE SENATE AND HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN GENERAL ASSEMBLY MET 6 (n.p. 1855) (noting that the black population "compares favorably with the white population in intelligence, and morality"). See generally PROCEEDINGS OF THE BLACK STATE CONVENTIONS, 1840-1865 (Philip S. Foner & George E. Walker eds., 1979) (printing the proceedings of the antebellum black state conventions).
251. See, e.g., MEMORIAL. TO THE HONORABLE THE SENATE AND HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN GENERAL ASSEMBLY MET 6 (n.p. 1855) (noting that the black population "compares favorably with the white population in intelligence, and morality"). See generally PROCEEDINGS OF THE BLACK STATE CONVENTIONS, 1840-1865 (Philip S. Foner & George E. Walker eds., 1979) (printing the proceedings of the antebellum black state conventions).
252. NEW YORK CONVENTION OF 1846, supra note 123, at 1027 (statement of John A. Kennedy).
253. Id.
254. Id. at 1016 (statement of Benjamin F. Bruce).
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION FOR THE TERRITORY OF MINNESOTA, To FORM A STATE CONSTITUTION PREPARATORY TO ITS ADMISSION INTO THE UNION AS A STATE 341 (St. Paul, George W. Moore 1858) (statement of Thomas Foster).
258. CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 690 (1869) (statement of Rep. Beck).
259. Id. at 982 (statement of Sen. Welch).
260. Id. at 911 (statement of Sen. Vickers).
261. See ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863-1877, at 447 (1988) ("[I]t was not a limited commitment to blacks' rights, but the desire to retain other inequalities, affecting whites, that produced a Fifteenth Amendment . . . ."); FREDRICKSON, supra note 143, at 183 ("What made Negro suffrage in the South acceptable to the North by 1867 was not a profound belief in the black man's capacity for intelligent citizenship but the political necessities of restructuring the Union under Northern or Republican hegemony."); WILLIAM GILLETTE, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: POLITICS AND THE PASSAGE OF THE FIFTEENTH AMENDMENT 165 (1965) (arguing that Republicans favored the Fifteenth Amendment for partisan purposes); EARL M. MALTZ, CIVIL RIGHTS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND CONGRESS, 1863-1869, at 156 (1990) (noting that the drafters of the Amendment "understood that the only new requirement they were adding was that any qualification for voting has to be applied equally to all races [and that s]uch a requirement might have little practical impact"); Xi Wang, Black Suffrage and the Redefinition of American Freedom, 1860-1870, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 2153, 2222-23 (1996) (arguing that the Fifteenth Amendment was a compromise measure). But see MCPHERSON, supra note 143, at 417-32 (portraying the Fifteenth Amendment as the culmination of the abolitionist struggle); LaWanda Cox & John H. Cox, Negro Suffrage and Republican Politics: The Problem of Motivation in Reconstruction Historiography, 33 J.S. HIST. 303, 330 (1967) (arguing that Republicans were motivated by principle).
262. See ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863-1877, at 447 (1988) ("[I]t was not a limited commitment to blacks' rights, but the desire to retain other inequalities, affecting whites, that produced a Fifteenth Amendment . . . ."); FREDRICKSON, supra note 143, at 183 ("What made Negro suffrage in the South acceptable to the North by 1867 was not a profound belief in the black man's capacity for intelligent citizenship but the political necessities of restructuring the Union under Northern or Republican hegemony."); WILLIAM GILLETTE, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: POLITICS AND THE PASSAGE OF THE FIFTEENTH AMENDMENT 165 (1965) (arguing that Republicans favored the Fifteenth Amendment for partisan purposes); EARL M. MALTZ, CIVIL RIGHTS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND CONGRESS, 1863-1869, at 156 (1990) (noting that the drafters of the Amendment "understood that the only new requirement they were adding was that any qualification for voting has to be applied equally to all races [and that s]uch a requirement might have little practical impact"); Xi Wang, Black Suffrage and the Redefinition of American Freedom, 1860-1870, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 2153, 2222-23 (1996) (arguing that the Fifteenth Amendment was a compromise measure). But see MCPHERSON, supra note 143, at 417-32 (portraying the Fifteenth Amendment as the culmination of the abolitionist struggle); LaWanda Cox & John H. Cox, Negro Suffrage and Republican Politics: The Problem of Motivation in Reconstruction Historiography, 33 J.S. HIST. 303, 330 (1967) (arguing that Republicans were motivated by principle).
263. See ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863-1877, at 447 (1988) ("[I]t was not a limited commitment to blacks' rights, but the desire to retain other inequalities, affecting whites, that produced a Fifteenth Amendment . . . ."); FREDRICKSON, supra note 143, at 183 ("What made Negro suffrage in the South acceptable to the North by 1867 was not a profound belief in the black man's capacity for intelligent citizenship but the political necessities of restructuring the Union under Northern or Republican hegemony."); WILLIAM GILLETTE, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: POLITICS AND THE PASSAGE OF THE FIFTEENTH AMENDMENT 165 (1965) (arguing that Republicans favored the Fifteenth Amendment for partisan purposes); EARL M. MALTZ, CIVIL RIGHTS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND CONGRESS, 1863-1869, at 156 (1990) (noting that the drafters of the Amendment "understood that the only new requirement they were adding was that any qualification for voting has to be applied equally to all races [and that s]uch a requirement might have little practical impact"); Xi Wang, Black Suffrage and the Redefinition of American Freedom, 1860-1870, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 2153, 2222-23 (1996) (arguing that the Fifteenth Amendment was a compromise measure). But see MCPHERSON, supra note 143, at 417-32 (portraying the Fifteenth Amendment as the culmination of the abolitionist struggle); LaWanda Cox & John H. Cox, Negro Suffrage and Republican Politics: The Problem of Motivation in Reconstruction Historiography, 33 J.S. HIST. 303, 330 (1967) (arguing that Republicans were motivated by principle).
264. See ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863-1877, at 447 (1988) ("[I]t was not a limited commitment to blacks' rights, but the desire to retain other inequalities, affecting whites, that produced a Fifteenth Amendment . . . ."); FREDRICKSON, supra note 143, at 183 ("What made Negro suffrage in the South acceptable to the North by 1867 was not a profound belief in the black man's capacity for intelligent citizenship but the political necessities of restructuring the Union under Northern or Republican hegemony."); WILLIAM GILLETTE, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: POLITICS AND THE PASSAGE OF THE FIFTEENTH AMENDMENT 165 (1965) (arguing that Republicans favored the Fifteenth Amendment for partisan purposes); EARL M. MALTZ, CIVIL RIGHTS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND CONGRESS, 1863-1869, at 156 (1990) (noting that the drafters of the Amendment "understood that the only new requirement they were adding was that any qualification for voting has to be applied equally to all races [and that s]uch a requirement might have little practical impact"); Xi Wang, Black Suffrage and the Redefinition of American Freedom, 1860-1870, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 2153, 2222-23 (1996) (arguing that the Fifteenth Amendment was a compromise measure). But see MCPHERSON, supra note 143, at 417-32 (portraying the Fifteenth Amendment as the culmination of the abolitionist struggle); LaWanda Cox & John H. Cox, Negro Suffrage and Republican Politics: The Problem of Motivation in Reconstruction Historiography, 33 J.S. HIST. 303, 330 (1967) (arguing that Republicans were motivated by principle).
265. See ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863-1877, at 447 (1988) ("[I]t was not a limited commitment to blacks' rights, but the desire to retain other inequalities, affecting whites, that produced a Fifteenth Amendment . . . ."); FREDRICKSON, supra note 143, at 183 ("What made Negro suffrage in the South acceptable to the North by 1867 was not a profound belief in the black man's capacity for intelligent citizenship but the political necessities of restructuring the Union under Northern or Republican hegemony."); WILLIAM GILLETTE, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: POLITICS AND THE PASSAGE OF THE FIFTEENTH AMENDMENT 165 (1965) (arguing that Republicans favored the Fifteenth Amendment for partisan purposes); EARL M. MALTZ, CIVIL RIGHTS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND CONGRESS, 1863-1869, at 156 (1990) (noting that the drafters of the Amendment "understood that the only new requirement they were adding was that any qualification for voting has to be applied equally to all races [and that s]uch a requirement might have little practical impact"); Xi Wang, Black Suffrage and the Redefinition of American Freedom, 1860-1870, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 2153, 2222-23 (1996) (arguing that the Fifteenth Amendment was a compromise measure). But see MCPHERSON, supra note 143, at 417-32 (portraying the Fifteenth Amendment as the culmination of the abolitionist struggle); LaWanda Cox & John H. Cox, Negro Suffrage and Republican Politics: The Problem of Motivation in Reconstruction Historiography, 33 J.S. HIST. 303, 330 (1967) (arguing that Republicans were motivated by principle).
266. See generally J. MORGAN KOUSSER, THE SHAPING OF SOUTHERN POLITICS: SUFFRAGE RESTRICTION AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ONE-PARTY SOUTH, 1880-1910 (1974) (detailing the concerted effort to disenfranchise blacks in the South at the turn of the century); XI WANG, THE TRIAL OF DEMOCRACY: BLACK SUFFRAGE AND NORTHERN REPUBLICANS, 1860-1910 (1997) (detailing the failure of federal enforcement of the Fifteenth Amendment).
267. See generally J. MORGAN KOUSSER, THE SHAPING OF SOUTHERN POLITICS: SUFFRAGE RESTRICTION AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ONE-PARTY SOUTH, 1880-1910 (1974) (detailing the concerted effort to disenfranchise blacks in the South at the turn of the century); XI WANG, THE TRIAL OF DEMOCRACY: BLACK SUFFRAGE AND NORTHERN REPUBLICANS, 1860-1910 (1997) (detailing the failure of federal enforcement of the Fifteenth Amendment).
268. This is a far cry from the 19th-century distinction of political rights, like suffrage, and civil rights, like citizenship, as exemplified by Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162, 176 (1874), which upheld Missouri's restriction of the vote to males and denied the identity of citizenship rights and voting rights. Still, the equation today is not perfect, as the disenfranchisement of felons and insane persons in many states attests. See infra notes 190, 194. On the importance of voting to citizenship, see JUDITH N. SHKLAR, AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP: THE QUEST FOR INCLUSION 25-62 (1991).
269. The 19th century, on the whole, felt comfortable enfranchising aliens. See GERALD L. NEUMAN, STRANGERS TO THE CONSTITUTION: IMMIGRANTS, BORDERS, AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW 63-70 (1996). In 1926, Arkansas became the last state to disenfranchise aliens. See Leon E. Aylsworth, The Passing of Alien Suffrage, 25 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 114 (1931). A number of recent articles have advocated the enfranchisement of aliens. See, e.g., Gerald L. Neuman, "We Are the People": Alien Suffrage in German and American Perspective, 13 MICH. J. INT'L L. 259 (1992); Jamin B. Raskin, Legal Aliens, Local Citizens: The Historical, Constitutional and Theoretical Meanings of Alien Suffrage, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1391 (1993); Gerald M. Rosberg, Aliens and Equal Protection: Why Not the Right To Vote?, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1092 (1977).
270. The 19th century, on the whole, felt comfortable enfranchising aliens. See GERALD L. NEUMAN, STRANGERS TO THE CONSTITUTION: IMMIGRANTS, BORDERS, AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW 63-70 (1996). In 1926, Arkansas became the last state to disenfranchise aliens. See Leon E. Aylsworth, The Passing of Alien Suffrage, 25 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 114 (1931). A number of recent articles have advocated the enfranchisement of aliens. See, e.g., Gerald L. Neuman, "We Are the People": Alien Suffrage in German and American Perspective, 13 MICH. J. INT'L L. 259 (1992); Jamin B. Raskin, Legal Aliens, Local Citizens: The Historical, Constitutional and Theoretical Meanings of Alien Suffrage, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1391 (1993); Gerald M. Rosberg, Aliens and Equal Protection: Why Not the Right To Vote?, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1092 (1977).
271. The 19th century, on the whole, felt comfortable enfranchising aliens. See GERALD L. NEUMAN, STRANGERS TO THE CONSTITUTION: IMMIGRANTS, BORDERS, AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW 63-70 (1996). In 1926, Arkansas became the last state to disenfranchise aliens. See Leon E. Aylsworth, The Passing of Alien Suffrage, 25 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 114 (1931). A number of recent articles have advocated the
272. The 19th century, on the whole, felt comfortable enfranchising aliens. See GERALD L. NEUMAN, STRANGERS TO THE CONSTITUTION: IMMIGRANTS, BORDERS, AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW 63-70 (1996). In 1926, Arkansas became the last state to disenfranchise aliens. See Leon E. Aylsworth, The Passing of Alien Suffrage, 25 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 114 (1931). A number of recent articles have advocated the enfranchisement of aliens. See, e.g., Gerald L. Neuman, "We Are the People": Alien Suffrage in German and American Perspective, 13 MICH. J. INT'L L. 259 (1992); Jamin B. Raskin, Legal Aliens, Local Citizens: The Historical, Constitutional and Theoretical Meanings of Alien Suffrage, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1391 (1993); Gerald M. Rosberg, Aliens and Equal Protection: Why Not the Right To Vote?, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1092 (1977).
273. The 19th century, on the whole, felt comfortable enfranchising aliens. See GERALD L. NEUMAN, STRANGERS TO THE CONSTITUTION: IMMIGRANTS, BORDERS, AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW 63-70 (1996). In 1926, Arkansas became the last state to disenfranchise aliens. See Leon E. Aylsworth, The Passing of Alien Suffrage, 25 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 114 (1931). A number of recent articles have advocated the enfranchisement of aliens. See, e.g., Gerald L. Neuman, "We Are the People": Alien Suffrage in German and American Perspective, 13 MICH. J. INT'L L. 259 (1992); Jamin B. Raskin, Legal Aliens, Local Citizens: The Historical, Constitutional and Theoretical Meanings of Alien Suffrage, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1391 (1993); Gerald M. Rosberg, Aliens and Equal Protection: Why Not the Right To Vote?, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1092 (1977).
274. A version of the Fifteenth Amendment proposed by Senator Henry Wilson failed. This version would have abolished qualifications for voting and office holding based on "race, color, nativity, property, education, or religious belief." See GILLETTE, supra note 175, at 59 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 1029 (1869)). The poll tax qualification for federal elections was outlawed by the Twenty-Fourth Amendment in 1964 and declared unconstitutional for state elections in Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966). See generally DUDLEY O. MCGoVNEY, THE AMERICAN SUFFRAGE MEDLEY 110-80 (1949) (advocating the abolition of the poll tax). It is important to note as well that the decline in the significance of property in the context of voting rights in the 19th century did not lead to a representational system of "one person, one vote." Property (as well as other interests) maintained its disproportionate influence in the apportionment of representative districts until Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964), which held that legislators represent people and not areas and that legislative districts must be apportioned, as nearly as practicable, on the basis of equal population.
275. A version of the Fifteenth Amendment proposed by Senator Henry Wilson failed. This version would have abolished qualifications for voting and office holding based on "race, color, nativity, property, education, or religious belief." See GILLETTE, supra note 175, at 59 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 1029 (1869)). The poll tax qualification for federal elections was outlawed by the Twenty-Fourth Amendment in 1964 and declared unconstitutional for state elections in Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966). See generally DUDLEY O. MCGoVNEY, THE AMERICAN SUFFRAGE MEDLEY 110-80 (1949) (advocating the abolition of the poll tax). It is important to note as well that the decline in the significance of property in the context of voting rights in the 19th century did not lead to a representational system of "one person, one vote." Property (as well as other interests) maintained its disproportionate influence in the apportionment of representative districts until Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964), which held that legislators represent people and not areas and that legislative districts must be apportioned, as nearly as practicable, on the basis of equal population.
276. 2 MASSACHUSETTS CONVENTION OF 1853, supra note 92, at 726 (statement of William Greene).
277. Id.
278. JAMES R. LEIB, THOUGHTS ON THE ELECTIVE FRANCHISE 14 (Philadelphia, John C. Clark 1839).
279. SAMUEL JONES, A TREATISE ON THE RIGHT OF SUFFRAGE 84 (Boston, Otis, Broaders & Co. 1842).
280. See id. at 128-34.
281. See DAVID W. ROBSON, EDUCATING REPUBLICANS 251-52 (1985).
282. LEIB, supra note 182, at 17. See generally WENDELL W. CULTICE, YOUTH'S BATTLE FOR THE BALLOT (1992) (providing a history of voting age requirements).
283. See CONN. CONST. of 1818, amend. XI (1855);
284. MASS. CONST. amend. XX (1857);
285. TYLER ANBINDER, NATIVISM AND SLAVERY: THE NORTHERN KNOW NOTHINGS AND THE POLITICS OF THE 1850s, at 138, 248-52 (1992).
286. See KOUSSER, supra note 176, at 55 tbl.2.1; MCGOVNEY, supra note 179, at 59-60; Arthur W. Bromage, Literacy and the Electorate, 24 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 946 (1930). Literacy tests were upheld, under minimum scrutiny, in Lassiter v. Northampton County Board of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 51 (1959), because, as the Court noted, "[t]he ability to read and write . . . has some relation to standards designed to promote intelligent use of the ballot." Congress, however, prohibited such tests in the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-285, 84 Stat. 314, 315 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(b)-(c) (1994)). See also Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 118 (1970) (upholding the literacy test provisions of the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970).
287. See Steinfeld, supra note 2, at 335. Steinfeld concludes that in the early 19th century the "republican precept that only the self-governing should exercise political authority . . . was recast [with] the liberal idea that the self-governing were those who owned and disposed of themselves." Id. at 375. Steinfeld's article now serves as the conventional wisdom. See, e.g., James A. Henretta, The Rise and Decline of "Democratic Republicanism": Political Rights in New York and the Several States, 1800-1915, 53 ALB. L. REV. 357, 369 (1989) (citing Steinfeld). Steinfeld's labor theory of suffrage is part of the story, but not the full story. The theory's most obvious shortcoming is its failure to clarify other restrictions, such as those based on race and sex.
288. See PORTER, supra note 2, at 148 tbl.III. Fourteen states currently disenfranchise felons for life. See Jesse Furman, Note, Political Illiberalism: The Paradox of Disenfranchisement and the Ambivalences of Rawlsian Justice, 106 YALE L.J. 1197, 1217 n.125 (1997) (listing the pertinent constitutional and statutory provisions). There have been a number of discussions of disenfranchisement of felons since Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 41-56 (1974), which upheld disenfranchisement of felons under Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., Note, The Disenfranchisement of Ex-Felons: Citizenship, Criminality, and "The Purity of the Ballot Box," 102 HARV. L. REV. 1300 (1989) (arguing that felon disenfranchisement is illegitimate since its purpose is to define the boundaries of the community by placing some outside those boundaries); Furman, supra (arguing for the repeal of felon disenfranchisement laws on the basis of their Illiberalism); Gary L. Reback, Note, Disenfranchisement of Ex-Felons: A Reassessment, 25 STAN. L. REV. 845, 858-60 (1973) (criticizing felon disenfranchisement on Eighth Amendment grounds); Andrew L. Shapiro, Note, Challenging Criminal Disenfranchisement Under the Voting Rights Act: A New Strategy, 103 YALE L.J. 537 (1993) (challenging felon disenfranchisement under the Voting Rights Act); see also Steven B. Snyder, Note, Let My People Run: The Rights of Voters and Candidates Under State Laws Barring Felons from Holding Elective Office, 4 J.L. & POL. 543 (1988) (finding state statutes barring felons from holding elective office unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause).
289. See PORTER, supra note 2, at 148 tbl.III. Fourteen states currently disenfranchise felons for life. See Jesse Furman, Note, Political Illiberalism: The Paradox of Disenfranchisement and the Ambivalences of Rawlsian Justice, 106 YALE L.J. 1197, 1217 n.125 (1997) (listing the pertinent constitutional and statutory provisions). There have been a number of discussions of disenfranchisement of felons since Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 41-56 (1974), which upheld disenfranchisement of felons under Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., Note, The Disenfranchisement of Ex-Felons: Citizenship, Criminality, and "The Purity of the Ballot Box," 102 HARV. L. REV. 1300 (1989) (arguing that felon disenfranchisement is illegitimate since its purpose is to define the boundaries of the community by placing some outside those boundaries); Furman, supra (arguing for the repeal of felon disenfranchisement laws on the basis of their Illiberalism); Gary L. Reback, Note, Disenfranchisement of Ex-Felons: A Reassessment, 25 STAN. L. REV. 845, 858-60 (1973) (criticizing felon disenfranchisement on Eighth Amendment grounds); Andrew L. Shapiro, Note, Challenging Criminal Disenfranchisement Under the Voting Rights Act: A New Strategy, 103 YALE L.J. 537 (1993) (challenging felon disenfranchisement under the Voting Rights Act); see also Steven B. Snyder, Note, Let My People Run: The Rights of Voters and Candidates Under State Laws Barring Felons from Holding Elective Office, 4 J.L. & POL. 543 (1988) (finding state statutes barring felons from holding elective office unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause).
290. See PORTER, supra note 2, at 148 tbl.III. Fourteen states currently disenfranchise felons for life. See Jesse Furman, Note, Political Illiberalism: The Paradox of Disenfranchisement and the Ambivalences of Rawlsian Justice, 106 YALE L.J. 1197, 1217 n.125 (1997) (listing the pertinent constitutional and statutory provisions). There have been a number of discussions of disenfranchisement of felons since Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 41-56 (1974), which upheld disenfranchisement of felons under Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., Note, The Disenfranchisement of Ex-Felons: Citizenship, Criminality, and "The Purity of the Ballot Box," 102 HARV. L. REV. 1300 (1989) (arguing that felon disenfranchisement is illegitimate since its purpose is to define the boundaries of the community by placing some outside those boundaries); Furman, supra (arguing for the repeal of felon disenfranchisement laws on the basis of their Illiberalism); Gary L. Reback, Note, Disenfranchisement of Ex-Felons: A Reassessment, 25 STAN. L. REV. 845, 858-60 (1973) (criticizing felon disenfranchisement on Eighth Amendment grounds); Andrew L. Shapiro, Note, Challenging Criminal Disenfranchisement Under the Voting Rights Act: A New Strategy, 103 YALE L.J. 537 (1993) (challenging felon disenfranchisement under the Voting Rights Act); see also Steven B. Snyder, Note, Let My People Run: The Rights of Voters and Candidates Under State Laws Barring Felons from Holding Elective Office, 4 J.L. & POL. 543 (1988) (finding state statutes barring felons from holding elective office unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause).
291. See PORTER, supra note 2, at 148 tbl.III. Fourteen states currently disenfranchise felons for life. See Jesse Furman, Note, Political Illiberalism: The Paradox of Disenfranchisement and the Ambivalences of Rawlsian Justice, 106 YALE L.J. 1197, 1217 n.125 (1997) (listing the pertinent constitutional and statutory provisions). There have been a number of discussions of disenfranchisement of felons since Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 41-56 (1974), which upheld disenfranchisement of felons under Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., Note, The Disenfranchisement of Ex-Felons: Citizenship, Criminality, and "The Purity of the Ballot Box," 102 HARV. L. REV. 1300 (1989) (arguing that felon disenfranchisement is illegitimate since its purpose is to define the boundaries of the community by placing some outside those boundaries); Furman, supra (arguing for the repeal of felon disenfranchisement laws on the basis of their Illiberalism); Gary L. Reback, Note, Disenfranchisement of Ex-Felons: A Reassessment, 25 STAN. L. REV. 845, 858-60 (1973) (criticizing felon disenfranchisement on Eighth Amendment grounds); Andrew L. Shapiro, Note, Challenging Criminal Disenfranchisement Under the Voting Rights Act: A New Strategy, 103 YALE L.J. 537 (1993) (challenging felon disenfranchisement under the Voting Rights Act); see also Steven B. Snyder, Note, Let My People Run: The Rights of Voters and Candidates Under State Laws Barring Felons from Holding Elective Office, 4 J.L. & POL. 543 (1988) (finding state statutes barring felons from holding elective office unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause).
292. See PORTER, supra note 2, at 148 tbl.III. Fourteen states currently disenfranchise felons for life. See Jesse Furman, Note, Political Illiberalism: The Paradox of Disenfranchisement and the Ambivalences of Rawlsian Justice, 106 YALE L.J. 1197, 1217 n.125 (1997) (listing the pertinent constitutional and statutory provisions). There have been a number of discussions of disenfranchisement of felons since Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 41-56 (1974), which upheld disenfranchisement of felons under Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., Note, The Disenfranchisement of Ex-Felons: Citizenship, Criminality, and "The Purity of the Ballot Box," 102 HARV. L. REV. 1300 (1989) (arguing that felon disenfranchisement is illegitimate since its purpose is to define the boundaries of the community by placing some outside those boundaries); Furman, supra (arguing for the repeal of felon disenfranchisement laws on the basis of their Illiberalism); Gary L. Reback, Note, Disenfranchisement of Ex-Felons: A Reassessment, 25 STAN. L. REV. 845, 858-60 (1973) (criticizing felon disenfranchisement on Eighth Amendment grounds); Andrew L. Shapiro, Note, Challenging Criminal Disenfranchisement Under the Voting Rights Act: A New Strategy, 103 YALE L.J. 537 (1993) (challenging felon disenfranchisement under the Voting Rights Act); see also Steven B. Snyder, Note, Let My People Run: The Rights of Voters and Candidates Under State Laws Barring Felons from Holding Elective Office, 4 J.L. & POL. 543 (1988) (finding state statutes barring felons from holding elective office unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause).
293. See MASS. CONST. amend. III (1821).
294. VA. CONST. of 1830, art. III, § 14.
295. See CAL. CONST. of 1849, art. II, § 5; DEL. CONST. of 1831, art. IV, § 1; IOWA CONST. art. II, § 5 (1857); IOWA CONST. of 1846, art. II, § 5; KAN. CONST. art. V, § 2 (1859) (amended 1974); MD. CONST. of 1851, art. I, § 5; MINN. CONST. art. VII, § 2 (1857) (amended 1974); N.J. CONST. of 1844, art. II, § 1; OHIO CONST. art. V, § 6 (1851); OR. CONST. art. II, § 3 (1857) (amended 1944); R.I. CONST. art. II, § 4 (1842) (amended 1950); WIS. CONST. art. III, § 2 (1848) (amended 1986). Virginia retained the clause in its 1851 constitution. See VA. CONST. of 1851, art. III, § 1. Nineteenth-century constitution-makers did not differentiate between varieties of mental illness. They used a number of words interchangeably, such as "lunatic," TEX. CONST. art. VI, § 1, cl. 2 (1876) (amended 1932); "insane," WIS. CONST. art. III, § 2 (1848) (amended 1986); "idiot," WYO. CONST. art. VI, § 6 (1889) (amended 1996); and "non compos mentis," id. This lack of precision has persisted in modern constitutions. See BRUCE DENNIS SALES ET AL., DISABLED PERSONS AND THE LAW 100 (1982) (noting the variation in terminology).
296. See CAL. CONST. of 1849, art. II, § 5; DEL. CONST. of 1831, art. IV, § 1; IOWA CONST. art. II, § 5 (1857); IOWA CONST. of 1846, art. II, § 5; KAN. CONST. art. V, § 2 (1859) (amended 1974); MD. CONST. of 1851, art. I, § 5; MINN. CONST. art. VII, § 2 (1857) (amended 1974); N.J. CONST. of 1844, art. II, § 1; OHIO CONST. art. V, § 6 (1851); OR. CONST. art. II, § 3 (1857) (amended 1944); R.I. CONST. art. II, § 4 (1842) (amended 1950); WIS. CONST. art. III, § 2 (1848) (amended 1986). Virginia retained the clause in its 1851 constitution. See VA. CONST. of 1851, art. III, § 1. Nineteenth-century constitution-makers did not differentiate between varieties of mental illness. They used a number of words interchangeably, such as "lunatic," TEX. CONST. art. VI, § 1, cl. 2 (1876) (amended 1932); "insane," WIS. CONST. art. III, § 2 (1848) (amended 1986); "idiot," WYO. CONST. art. VI, § 6 (1889) (amended 1996); and "non compos mentis," id. This lack of precision has persisted in modern constitutions. See BRUCE DENNIS SALES ET AL., DISABLED PERSONS AND THE LAW 100 (1982) (noting the variation in terminology).
297. See CAL. CONST. of 1849, art. II, § 5; DEL. CONST. of 1831, art. IV, § 1; IOWA CONST. art. II, § 5 (1857); IOWA CONST. of 1846, art. II, § 5; KAN. CONST. art. V, § 2 (1859) (amended 1974); MD. CONST. of 1851, art. I, § 5; MINN. CONST. art. VII, § 2 (1857) (amended 1974); N.J. CONST. of 1844, art. II, § 1; OHIO CONST. art. V, § 6 (1851); OR. CONST. art. II, § 3 (1857) (amended 1944); R.I. CONST. art. II, § 4 (1842) (amended 1950); WIS. CONST. art. III, § 2 (1848) (amended 1986). Virginia retained the clause in its 1851 constitution. See VA. CONST. of 1851, art. III, § 1. Nineteenth-century constitution-makers did not differentiate between varieties of mental illness. They used a number of words interchangeably, such as "lunatic," TEX. CONST. art. VI, § 1, cl. 2 (1876) (amended 1932); "insane," WIS. CONST. art. III, § 2 (1848) (amended 1986); "idiot," WYO. CONST. art. VI, § 6 (1889) (amended 1996); and "non compos mentis," id. This lack of precision has persisted in modern constitutions. See BRUCE DENNIS SALES ET AL., DISABLED PERSONS AND THE LAW 100 (1982) (noting the variation in terminology).
298. See CAL. CONST. of 1849, art. II, § 5; DEL. CONST. of 1831, art. IV, § 1; IOWA CONST. art. II, § 5 (1857); IOWA CONST. of 1846, art. II, § 5; KAN. CONST. art. V, § 2 (1859) (amended 1974); MD. CONST. of 1851, art. I, § 5; MINN. CONST. art. VII, § 2 (1857) (amended 1974); N.J. CONST. of 1844, art. II, § 1; OHIO CONST. art. V, § 6 (1851); OR. CONST. art. II, § 3 (1857) (amended 1944); R.I. CONST. art. II, § 4 (1842) (amended 1950); WIS. CONST. art. III, § 2 (1848) (amended 1986). Virginia retained the clause in its 1851 constitution. See VA. CONST. of 1851, art. III, § 1. Nineteenth-century constitution-makers did not differentiate between varieties of mental illness. They used a number of words interchangeably, such as "lunatic," TEX. CONST. art. VI, § 1, cl. 2 (1876) (amended 1932); "insane," WIS. CONST. art. III, § 2 (1848) (amended 1986); "idiot," WYO. CONST. art. VI, § 6 (1889) (amended 1996); and "non compos mentis," id. This lack of precision has persisted in modern constitutions. See BRUCE DENNIS SALES ET AL., DISABLED PERSONS AND THE LAW 100 (1982) (noting the variation in terminology).
299. See CAL. CONST. of 1849, art. II, § 5; DEL. CONST. of 1831, art. IV, § 1; IOWA CONST. art. II, § 5 (1857); IOWA CONST. of 1846, art. II, § 5; KAN. CONST. art. V, § 2 (1859) (amended 1974); MD. CONST. of 1851, art. I, § 5; MINN. CONST. art. VII, § 2 (1857) (amended 1974); N.J. CONST. of 1844, art. II, § 1; OHIO CONST. art. V, § 6 (1851); OR. CONST. art. II, § 3 (1857) (amended 1944); R.I. CONST. art. II, § 4 (1842) (amended 1950); WIS. CONST. art. III, § 2 (1848) (amended 1986). Virginia retained the clause in its 1851 constitution. See VA. CONST. of 1851, art. III, § 1. Nineteenth-century constitution-makers did not differentiate between varieties of mental illness. They used a number of words interchangeably, such as "lunatic," TEX. CONST. art. VI, § 1, cl. 2 (1876) (amended 1932); "insane," WIS. CONST. art. III, § 2 (1848) (amended 1986); "idiot," WYO. CONST. art. VI, § 6 (1889) (amended 1996); and "non compos mentis," id. This lack of precision has persisted in modern constitutions. See BRUCE DENNIS SALES ET AL., DISABLED PERSONS AND THE LAW 100 (1982) (noting the variation in terminology).
300. See CAL. CONST. of 1849, art. II, § 5; DEL. CONST. of 1831, art. IV, § 1; IOWA CONST. art. II, § 5 (1857); IOWA CONST. of 1846, art. II, § 5; KAN. CONST. art. V, § 2 (1859) (amended 1974); MD. CONST. of 1851, art. I, § 5; MINN. CONST. art. VII, § 2 (1857) (amended 1974); N.J. CONST. of 1844, art. II, § 1; OHIO CONST. art. V, § 6 (1851); OR. CONST. art. II, § 3 (1857) (amended 1944); R.I. CONST. art. II, § 4 (1842) (amended 1950); WIS. CONST. art. III, § 2 (1848) (amended 1986). Virginia retained the clause in its 1851 constitution. See VA. CONST. of 1851, art. III, § 1. Nineteenth-century constitution-makers did not differentiate between varieties of mental illness. They used a number of words interchangeably, such as "lunatic," TEX. CONST. art. VI, § 1, cl. 2 (1876) (amended 1932); "insane," WIS. CONST. art. III, § 2 (1848) (amended 1986); "idiot," WYO. CONST. art. VI, § 6 (1889) (amended 1996); and "non compos mentis," id. This lack of precision has persisted in modern constitutions. See BRUCE DENNIS SALES ET AL., DISABLED PERSONS AND THE LAW 100 (1982) (noting the variation in terminology).
301. See CAL. CONST. of 1849, art. II, § 5; DEL. CONST. of 1831, art. IV, § 1; IOWA CONST. art. II, § 5 (1857); IOWA CONST. of 1846, art. II, § 5; KAN. CONST. art. V, § 2 (1859) (amended 1974); MD. CONST. of 1851, art. I, § 5; MINN. CONST. art. VII, § 2 (1857) (amended 1974); N.J. CONST. of 1844, art. II, § 1; OHIO CONST. art. V, § 6 (1851); OR. CONST. art. II, § 3 (1857) (amended 1944); R.I. CONST. art. II, § 4 (1842) (amended 1950); WIS. CONST. art. III, § 2 (1848) (amended 1986). Virginia retained the clause in its 1851 constitution. See VA. CONST. of 1851, art. III, § 1. Nineteenth-century constitution-makers did not differentiate between varieties of mental illness. They used a number of words interchangeably, such as "lunatic," TEX. CONST. art. VI, § 1, cl. 2 (1876) (amended 1932); "insane," WIS. CONST. art. III, § 2 (1848) (amended 1986); "idiot," WYO. CONST. art. VI, § 6 (1889) (amended 1996); and "non compos mentis," id. This lack of precision has persisted in modern constitutions. See BRUCE DENNIS SALES ET AL., DISABLED PERSONS AND THE LAW 100 (1982) (noting the variation in terminology).
302. See CAL. CONST. of 1849, art. II, § 5; DEL. CONST. of 1831, art. IV, § 1; IOWA CONST. art. II, § 5 (1857); IOWA CONST. of 1846, art. II, § 5; KAN. CONST. art. V, § 2 (1859) (amended 1974); MD. CONST. of 1851, art. I, § 5; MINN. CONST. art. VII, § 2 (1857) (amended 1974); N.J. CONST. of 1844, art. II, § 1; OHIO CONST. art. V, § 6 (1851); OR. CONST. art. II, § 3 (1857) (amended 1944); R.I. CONST. art. II, § 4 (1842) (amended 1950); WIS. CONST. art. III, § 2 (1848) (amended 1986). Virginia retained the clause in its 1851 constitution. See VA. CONST. of 1851, art. III, § 1. Nineteenth-century constitution-makers did not differentiate between varieties of mental illness. They used a number of words interchangeably, such as "lunatic," TEX. CONST. art. VI, § 1, cl. 2 (1876) (amended 1932); "insane," WIS. CONST. art. III, § 2 (1848) (amended 1986); "idiot," WYO. CONST. art. VI, § 6 (1889) (amended 1996); and "non compos mentis," id. This lack of precision has persisted in modern constitutions. See BRUCE DENNIS SALES ET AL., DISABLED PERSONS AND THE LAW 100 (1982) (noting the variation in terminology).
303. See CAL. CONST. of 1849, art. II, § 5; DEL. CONST. of 1831, art. IV, § 1; IOWA CONST. art. II, § 5 (1857); IOWA CONST. of 1846, art. II, § 5; KAN. CONST. art. V, § 2 (1859) (amended 1974); MD. CONST. of 1851, art. I, § 5; MINN. CONST. art. VII, § 2 (1857) (amended 1974); N.J. CONST. of 1844, art. II, § 1; OHIO CONST. art. V, § 6 (1851); OR. CONST. art. II, § 3 (1857) (amended 1944); R.I. CONST. art. II, § 4 (1842) (amended 1950); WIS. CONST. art. III, § 2 (1848) (amended 1986). Virginia retained the clause in its 1851 constitution. See VA. CONST. of 1851, art. III, § 1. Nineteenth-century constitution-makers did not differentiate between varieties of mental illness. They used a number of words interchangeably, such as "lunatic," TEX. CONST. art. VI, § 1, cl. 2 (1876) (amended 1932); "insane," WIS. CONST. art. III, § 2 (1848) (amended 1986); "idiot," WYO. CONST. art. VI, § 6 (1889) (amended 1996); and "non compos mentis," id. This lack of precision has persisted in modern constitutions. See BRUCE DENNIS SALES ET AL., DISABLED PERSONS AND THE LAW 100 (1982) (noting the variation in terminology).
304. See CAL. CONST. of 1849, art. II, § 5; DEL. CONST. of 1831, art. IV, § 1; IOWA CONST. art. II, § 5 (1857); IOWA CONST. of 1846, art. II, § 5; KAN. CONST. art. V, § 2 (1859) (amended 1974); MD. CONST. of 1851, art. I, § 5; MINN. CONST. art. VII, § 2 (1857) (amended 1974); N.J. CONST. of 1844, art. II, § 1; OHIO CONST. art. V, § 6 (1851); OR. CONST. art. II, § 3 (1857) (amended 1944); R.I. CONST. art. II, § 4 (1842) (amended 1950); WIS. CONST. art. III, § 2 (1848) (amended 1986). Virginia retained the clause in its 1851 constitution. See VA. CONST. of 1851, art. III, § 1. Nineteenth-century constitution-makers did not differentiate between varieties of mental illness. They used a number of words interchangeably, such as "lunatic," TEX. CONST. art. VI, § 1, cl. 2 (1876) (amended 1932); "insane," WIS. CONST. art. III, § 2 (1848) (amended 1986); "idiot," WYO. CONST. art. VI, § 6 (1889) (amended 1996); and "non compos mentis," id. This lack of precision has persisted in modern constitutions. See BRUCE DENNIS SALES ET AL., DISABLED PERSONS AND THE LAW 100 (1982) (noting the variation in terminology).
305. See CAL. CONST. of 1849, art. II, § 5; DEL. CONST. of 1831, art. IV, § 1; IOWA CONST. art. II, § 5 (1857); IOWA CONST. of 1846, art. II, § 5; KAN. CONST. art. V, § 2 (1859) (amended 1974); MD. CONST. of 1851, art. I, § 5; MINN. CONST. art. VII, § 2 (1857) (amended 1974); N.J. CONST. of 1844, art. II, § 1; OHIO CONST. art. V, § 6 (1851); OR. CONST. art. II, § 3 (1857) (amended 1944); R.I. CONST. art. II, § 4 (1842) (amended 1950); WIS. CONST. art. III, § 2 (1848) (amended 1986). Virginia retained the clause in its 1851 constitution. See VA. CONST. of 1851, art. III, § 1. Nineteenth-century constitution-makers did not differentiate between varieties of mental illness. They used a number of words interchangeably, such as "lunatic," TEX. CONST. art. VI, § 1, cl. 2 (1876) (amended 1932); "insane," WIS. CONST. art. III, § 2 (1848) (amended 1986); "idiot," WYO. CONST. art. VI, § 6 (1889) (amended 1996); and "non compos mentis," id. This lack of precision has persisted in modern constitutions. See BRUCE DENNIS SALES ET AL., DISABLED PERSONS AND THE LAW 100 (1982) (noting the variation in terminology).
306. See CAL. CONST. of 1849, art. II, § 5; DEL. CONST. of 1831, art. IV, § 1; IOWA CONST. art. II, § 5 (1857); IOWA CONST. of 1846, art. II, § 5; KAN. CONST. art. V, § 2 (1859) (amended 1974); MD. CONST. of 1851, art. I, § 5; MINN. CONST. art. VII, § 2 (1857) (amended 1974); N.J. CONST. of 1844, art. II, § 1; OHIO CONST. art. V, § 6 (1851); OR. CONST. art. II, § 3 (1857) (amended 1944); R.I. CONST. art. II, § 4 (1842) (amended 1950); WIS. CONST. art. III, § 2 (1848) (amended 1986). Virginia retained the clause in its 1851 constitution. See VA. CONST. of 1851, art. III, § 1. Nineteenth-century constitution-makers did not differentiate between varieties of mental illness. They used a number of words interchangeably, such as "lunatic," TEX. CONST. art. VI, § 1, cl. 2 (1876) (amended 1932); "insane," WIS. CONST. art. III, § 2 (1848) (amended 1986); "idiot," WYO. CONST. art. VI, § 6 (1889) (amended 1996); and "non compos mentis," id. This lack of precision has persisted in modern constitutions. See BRUCE DENNIS SALES ET AL., DISABLED PERSONS AND THE LAW 100 (1982) (noting the variation in terminology).
307. See CAL. CONST. of 1849, art. II, § 5; DEL. CONST. of 1831, art. IV, § 1; IOWA CONST. art. II, § 5 (1857); IOWA CONST. of 1846, art. II, § 5; KAN. CONST. art. V, § 2 (1859) (amended 1974); MD. CONST. of 1851, art. I, § 5; MINN. CONST. art. VII, § 2 (1857) (amended 1974); N.J. CONST. of 1844, art. II, § 1; OHIO CONST. art. V, § 6 (1851); OR. CONST. art. II, § 3 (1857) (amended 1944); R.I. CONST. art. II, § 4 (1842) (amended 1950); WIS. CONST. art. III, § 2 (1848) (amended 1986). Virginia retained the clause in its 1851 constitution. See VA. CONST. of 1851, art. III, § 1. Nineteenth-century constitution-makers did not differentiate between varieties of mental illness. They used a number of words interchangeably, such as "lunatic," TEX. CONST. art. VI, § 1, cl. 2 (1876) (amended 1932); "insane," WIS. CONST. art. III, § 2 (1848) (amended 1986); "idiot," WYO. CONST. art. VI, § 6 (1889) (amended 1996); and "non compos mentis," id. This lack of precision has persisted in modern constitutions. See BRUCE DENNIS SALES ET AL., DISABLED PERSONS AND THE LAW 100 (1982) (noting the variation in terminology).
308. See CAL. CONST. of 1849, art. II, § 5; DEL. CONST. of 1831, art. IV, § 1; IOWA CONST. art. II, § 5 (1857); IOWA CONST. of 1846, art. II, § 5; KAN. CONST. art. V, § 2 (1859) (amended 1974); MD. CONST. of 1851, art. I, § 5; MINN. CONST. art. VII, § 2 (1857) (amended 1974); N.J. CONST. of 1844, art. II, § 1; OHIO CONST. art. V, § 6 (1851); OR. CONST. art. II, § 3 (1857) (amended 1944); R.I. CONST. art. II, § 4 (1842) (amended 1950); WIS. CONST. art. III, § 2 (1848) (amended 1986). Virginia retained the clause in its 1851 constitution. See VA. CONST. of 1851, art. III, § 1. Nineteenth-century constitution-makers did not differentiate between varieties of mental illness. They used a number of words interchangeably, such as "lunatic," TEX. CONST. art. VI, § 1, cl. 2 (1876) (amended 1932); "insane," WIS. CONST. art. III, § 2 (1848) (amended 1986); "idiot," WYO. CONST. art. VI, § 6 (1889) (amended 1996); and "non compos mentis," id. This lack of precision has persisted in modern constitutions. See BRUCE DENNIS SALES ET AL., DISABLED PERSONS AND THE LAW 100 (1982) (noting the variation in terminology).
309. See CAL. CONST. of 1849, art. II, § 5; DEL. CONST. of 1831, art. IV, § 1; IOWA CONST. art. II, § 5 (1857); IOWA CONST. of 1846, art. II, § 5; KAN. CONST. art. V, § 2 (1859) (amended 1974); MD. CONST. of 1851, art. I, § 5; MINN. CONST. art. VII, § 2 (1857) (amended 1974); N.J. CONST. of 1844, art. II, § 1; OHIO CONST. art. V, § 6 (1851); OR. CONST. art. II, § 3 (1857) (amended 1944); R.I. CONST. art. II, § 4 (1842) (amended 1950); WIS. CONST. art. III, § 2 (1848) (amended 1986). Virginia retained the clause in its 1851 constitution. See VA. CONST. of 1851, art. III, § 1. Nineteenth-century constitution-makers did not differentiate between varieties of mental illness. They used a number of words interchangeably, such as "lunatic," TEX. CONST. art. VI, § 1, cl. 2 (1876) (amended 1932); "insane," WIS. CONST. art. III, § 2 (1848) (amended 1986); "idiot," WYO. CONST. art. VI, § 6 (1889) (amended 1996); and "non compos mentis," id. This lack of precision has persisted in modern constitutions. See BRUCE DENNIS SALES ET AL., DISABLED PERSONS AND THE LAW 100 (1982) (noting the variation in terminology).
310. See CAL. CONST. of 1849, art. II, § 5; DEL. CONST. of 1831, art. IV, § 1; IOWA CONST. art. II, § 5 (1857); IOWA CONST. of 1846, art. II, § 5; KAN. CONST. art. V, § 2 (1859) (amended 1974); MD. CONST. of 1851, art. I, § 5; MINN. CONST. art. VII, § 2 (1857) (amended 1974); N.J. CONST. of 1844, art. II, § 1; OHIO CONST. art. V, § 6 (1851); OR. CONST. art. II, § 3 (1857) (amended 1944); R.I. CONST. art. II, § 4 (1842) (amended 1950); WIS. CONST. art. III, § 2 (1848) (amended 1986). Virginia retained the clause in its 1851 constitution. See VA. CONST. of 1851, art. III, § 1. Nineteenth-century constitution-makers did not differentiate between varieties of mental illness. They used a number of words interchangeably, such as "lunatic," TEX. CONST. art. VI, § 1, cl. 2 (1876) (amended 1932); "insane," WIS. CONST. art. III, § 2 (1848) (amended 1986); "idiot," WYO. CONST. art. VI, § 6 (1889) (amended 1996); and "non compos mentis," id. This lack of precision has persisted in modern constitutions. See BRUCE DENNIS SALES ET AL., DISABLED PERSONS AND THE LAW 100 (1982) (noting the variation in terminology).
311. See CAL. CONST. of 1849, art. II, § 5; DEL. CONST. of 1831, art. IV, § 1; IOWA CONST. art. II, § 5 (1857); IOWA CONST. of 1846, art. II, § 5; KAN. CONST. art. V, § 2 (1859) (amended 1974); MD. CONST. of 1851, art. I, § 5; MINN. CONST. art. VII, § 2 (1857) (amended 1974); N.J. CONST. of 1844, art. II, § 1; OHIO CONST. art. V, § 6 (1851); OR. CONST. art. II, § 3 (1857) (amended 1944); R.I. CONST. art. II, § 4 (1842) (amended 1950); WIS. CONST. art. III, § 2 (1848) (amended 1986). Virginia retained the clause in its 1851 constitution. See VA. CONST. of 1851, art. III, § 1. Nineteenth-century constitution-makers did not differentiate between varieties of mental illness. They used a number of words interchangeably, such as "lunatic," TEX. CONST. art. VI, § 1, cl. 2 (1876) (amended 1932); "insane," WIS. CONST. art. III, § 2 (1848) (amended 1986); "idiot," WYO. CONST. art. VI, § 6 (1889) (amended 1996); and "non compos mentis," id. This lack of precision has persisted in modern constitutions. See BRUCE DENNIS SALES ET AL., DISABLED PERSONS AND THE LAW 100 (1982) (noting the variation in terminology).
312. See, e.g., ALA. CONST. art. VIII, § 182 (1901) (amended 1996), ALA. CONST. of 1875, art. VIII, § 3, cl. 2; ARK. CONST. art. III, § 5 (1874); ARK. CONST. of 1868, art. VIII, § 3, cl. 6; DEL. CONST. art. V, § 2 (1897); FLA. CONST. of 1886, art. VI, § 4; FLA. CONST. of 1868, art. XV, § 2; GA. CONST. of 1877, art. II, § 2, cl. 2; GA. CONST. of 1868, art. II, § 6, cl. 2; IDAHO CONST. art. VI, § 3 (1889) (amended 1950); KY. CONST. § 145, cl. 3 (1891) (amended 1955); LA. CONST. of 1879, art. 187; MD. CONST. art. I, § 2 (1867) (amended 1972); MD. CONST. of 1864, art. I, § 3; MISS. CONST. art. XII, § 241 (1890) (amended 1935); MISS. CONST. of 1869, art. VII, § 2; MO. CONST. of 1875, art. VIII, § 8; MONT. CONST. of 1889, art. IX, § 8; NEB. CONST. art. VII, § 2 (1875); NEV. CONST. art. II, § 1 (1864) (amended 1880); N.J. CONST. art. II, ¶ 6 (1947) (amended 1995); N.M. CONST. art. VII, § 1 (1911) (amended 1967); N.D. CONST. art. V, § 127 (1889) (amended 1978); OKLA. CONST. art. III, § 1 (1907) (amended 1918); S.C. CONST. art. II, § 6, cl. 2 (1895) (amended 1971); S.D. CONST. art. VII, § 8 (1889) (amended 1974); TEX. CONST. art. VI, § 1, cl. 2 (1876) (amended 1932); TEX. CONST. of 1869, art. VI; UTAH CONST. art. IV, § 6 (1895) (amended 1975); W. VA. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (1872) (amended 1994); W. VA. CONST. of 1863, art. III, § 1; WYO. CONST. art. VI, § 6 (1889) (amended 1996). Until recently, nearly every state prohibited "mental incompetents" from voting, either by constitution or by statute. See RICHARD C. ALLEN ET AL., MENTAL IMPAIRMENT AND LEGAL INCOMPETENCY 364-67 (1968) (reviewing the case law); THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 333-40 (Samuel J. Brakel & Ronald S. Rock eds., rev. ed. 1971) (reviewing constitutional and statutory provisions in chart form); SALES ET AL., supra note 193, at 101-04 (same); Joseph F. Vargyas, Voting Rights and Jury Duty, in 3 LEGAL RIGHTS OF MENTALLY DISABLED PERSONS 1771, 1771-81 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Criminal Law & Urban Problems Course Handbook Series No. 116, 1979) (reviewing the case law); Robert W. Stockstill, Comment, Voting and Election Law in the Louisiana Constitution, 46 LA. L. REV. 1253, 1258-60 (1986); Joel E. Smith, Annotation, Voting Rights of Persons Mentally Incapacitated, 80 A.L.R.3d 1116, 1116-33 (1977) (same). For recent developments, see BARBARA A. WEINER, Rights of Institutionalized Persons, in SAMUEL JAN BRAKEL ET AL., THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 251 (3d ed. 1985). Weiner writes: "While disenfranchisement of the mentally disabled was common in the past, today statutes in a number of states secure the vote to such individuals." Id. at 259. While occasional dicta in the 1970s suggested that disenfranchisement of the mentally disabled was constitutional, see, e.g., Shepherd v. Trevino, 575 F.2d 1110, 1115 (5th Cir. 1978) (comparing felons with "insane persons [who] have raised questions about their ability to vote responsibly"); Kronlund v. Honstein, 327 F. Supp. 71, 73 (N.D. Ga. 1971) (noting the state's interest in "preserving the integrity of her electoral process by removing from the process those persons with proven anti-social behavior whose behavior can be said to be destructive of society's aims," and declaring that "a State may prohibit idiots and insane persons . . . from participating in her elections"), it is unclear how the Supreme Court would rule today on an equal protection challenge to insanity clauses given its decision in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985). Cleburne held that mental retardation is not a quasi-suspect classification, see id. at 442, but rejected a ban on group homes under a rational basis standard, see id. at 450. Both before and after Cleburne, commentators argued that mental illness should be treated as a suspect classification under equal protection doctrine and that, consequently, mental disability restrictions on suffrage should he declared unconstitutional. See, e.g., ROBERT M. LEVY & LEONARD S. RUBENSTEIN, THE RIGHTS OF PEOPLE WITH MENTAL DISABILITIES 293 & nn.50-51 (1996) (arguing that institutionalized persons have a constitutional right to vote); Steven K. Metcalf, Comment, The Right To Vote of the Mentally Disabled in Oklahoma: A Case Study of Overinclusive Language and Fundamental Rights, 25 TULSA L.J. 171 (1989) (urging that strict scrutiny be applied to render unconstitutional statutes that prohibit the mentally ill from voting); Note, Mental Disability and the Right To Vote, 88 YALE L.J. 1644 (1979) (same); Note, Mental Illness: A Suspect Classification?, 83 YALE L.J. 1237, 1267 (1974) (arguing that mental disability restrictions violate equal protection).
313. See, e.g., ALA. CONST. art. VIII, § 182 (1901) (amended 1996), ALA. CONST. of 1875, art. VIII, § 3, cl. 2; ARK. CONST. art. III, § 5 (1874); ARK. CONST. of 1868, art. VIII, § 3, cl. 6; DEL. CONST. art. V, § 2 (1897); FLA. CONST. of 1886, art. VI, § 4; FLA. CONST. of 1868, art. XV, § 2; GA. CONST. of 1877, art. II, § 2, cl. 2; GA. CONST. of 1868, art. II, § 6, cl. 2; IDAHO CONST. art. VI, § 3 (1889) (amended 1950); KY. CONST. § 145, cl. 3 (1891) (amended 1955); LA. CONST. of 1879, art. 187; MD. CONST. art. I, § 2 (1867) (amended 1972); MD. CONST. of 1864, art. I, § 3; MISS. CONST. art. XII, § 241 (1890) (amended 1935); MISS. CONST. of 1869, art. VII, § 2; MO. CONST. of 1875, art. VIII, § 8; MONT. CONST. of 1889, art. IX, § 8; NEB. CONST. art. VII, § 2 (1875); NEV. CONST. art. II, § 1 (1864) (amended 1880); N.J. CONST. art. II, ¶ 6 (1947) (amended 1995); N.M. CONST. art. VII, § 1 (1911) (amended 1967); N.D. CONST. art. V, § 127 (1889) (amended 1978); OKLA. CONST. art. III, § 1 (1907) (amended 1918); S.C. CONST. art. II, § 6, cl. 2 (1895) (amended 1971); S.D. CONST. art. VII, § 8 (1889) (amended 1974); TEX. CONST. art. VI, § 1, cl. 2 (1876) (amended 1932); TEX. CONST. of 1869, art. VI; UTAH CONST. art. IV, § 6 (1895) (amended 1975); W. VA. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (1872) (amended 1994); W. VA. CONST. of 1863, art. III, § 1; WYO. CONST. art. VI, § 6 (1889) (amended 1996). Until recently, nearly every state prohibited "mental incompetents" from voting, either by constitution or by statute. See RICHARD C. ALLEN ET AL., MENTAL IMPAIRMENT AND LEGAL INCOMPETENCY 364-67 (1968) (reviewing the case law); THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 333-40 (Samuel J. Brakel & Ronald S. Rock eds., rev. ed. 1971) (reviewing constitutional and statutory provisions in chart form); SALES ET AL., supra note 193, at 101-04 (same); Joseph F. Vargyas, Voting Rights and Jury Duty, in 3 LEGAL RIGHTS OF MENTALLY DISABLED PERSONS 1771, 1771-81 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Criminal Law & Urban Problems Course Handbook Series No. 116, 1979) (reviewing the case law); Robert W. Stockstill, Comment, Voting and Election Law in the Louisiana Constitution, 46 LA. L. REV. 1253, 1258-60 (1986); Joel E. Smith, Annotation, Voting Rights of Persons Mentally Incapacitated, 80 A.L.R.3d 1116, 1116-33 (1977) (same). For recent developments, see BARBARA A. WEINER, Rights of Institutionalized Persons, in SAMUEL JAN BRAKEL ET AL., THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 251 (3d ed. 1985). Weiner writes: "While disenfranchisement of the mentally disabled was common in the past, today statutes in a number of states secure the vote to such individuals." Id. at 259. While occasional dicta in the 1970s suggested that disenfranchisement of the mentally disabled was constitutional, see, e.g., Shepherd v. Trevino, 575 F.2d 1110, 1115 (5th Cir. 1978) (comparing felons with "insane persons [who] have raised questions about their ability to vote responsibly"); Kronlund v. Honstein, 327 F. Supp. 71, 73 (N.D. Ga. 1971) (noting the state's interest in "preserving the integrity of her electoral process by removing from the process those persons with proven anti-social behavior whose behavior can be said to be destructive of society's aims," and declaring that "a State may prohibit idiots and insane persons . . . from participating in her elections"), it is unclear how the Supreme Court would rule today on an equal protection challenge to insanity clauses given its decision in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985). Cleburne held that mental retardation is not a quasi-suspect classification, see id. at 442, but rejected a ban on group homes under a rational basis standard, see id. at 450. Both before and after Cleburne, commentators argued that mental illness should be treated as a suspect classification under equal protection doctrine and that, consequently, mental disability restrictions on suffrage should he declared unconstitutional. See, e.g., ROBERT M. LEVY & LEONARD S. RUBENSTEIN, THE RIGHTS OF PEOPLE WITH MENTAL DISABILITIES 293 & nn.50-51 (1996) (arguing that institutionalized persons have a constitutional right to vote); Steven K. Metcalf, Comment, The Right To Vote of the Mentally Disabled in Oklahoma: A Case Study of Overinclusive Language and Fundamental Rights, 25 TULSA L.J. 171 (1989) (urging that strict scrutiny be applied to render unconstitutional statutes that prohibit the mentally ill from voting); Note, Mental Disability and the Right To Vote, 88 YALE L.J. 1644 (1979) (same); Note, Mental Illness: A Suspect Classification?, 83 YALE L.J. 1237, 1267 (1974) (arguing that mental disability restrictions violate equal protection).
314. See, e.g., ALA. CONST. art. VIII, § 182 (1901) (amended 1996), ALA. CONST. of 1875, art. VIII, § 3, cl. 2; ARK. CONST. art. III, § 5 (1874); ARK. CONST. of 1868, art. VIII, § 3, cl. 6; DEL. CONST. art. V, § 2 (1897); FLA. CONST. of 1886, art. VI, § 4; FLA. CONST. of 1868, art. XV, § 2; GA. CONST. of 1877, art. II, § 2, cl. 2; GA. CONST. of 1868, art. II, § 6, cl. 2; IDAHO CONST. art. VI, § 3 (1889) (amended 1950); KY. CONST. § 145, cl. 3 (1891) (amended 1955); LA. CONST. of 1879, art. 187; MD. CONST. art. I, § 2 (1867) (amended 1972); MD. CONST. of 1864, art. I, § 3; MISS. CONST. art. XII, § 241 (1890) (amended 1935); MISS. CONST. of 1869, art. VII, § 2; MO. CONST. of 1875, art. VIII, § 8; MONT. CONST. of 1889, art. IX, § 8; NEB. CONST. art. VII, § 2 (1875); NEV. CONST. art. II, § 1 (1864) (amended 1880); N.J. CONST. art. II, ¶ 6 (1947) (amended 1995); N.M. CONST. art. VII, § 1 (1911) (amended 1967); N.D. CONST. art. V, § 127 (1889) (amended 1978); OKLA. CONST. art. III, § 1 (1907) (amended 1918); S.C. CONST. art. II, § 6, cl. 2 (1895) (amended 1971); S.D. CONST. art. VII, § 8 (1889) (amended 1974); TEX. CONST. art. VI, § 1, cl. 2 (1876) (amended 1932); TEX. CONST. of 1869, art. VI; UTAH CONST. art. IV, § 6 (1895) (amended 1975); W. VA. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (1872) (amended 1994); W. VA. CONST. of 1863, art. III, § 1; WYO. CONST. art. VI, § 6 (1889) (amended 1996). Until recently, nearly every state prohibited "mental incompetents" from voting, either by constitution or by statute. See RICHARD C. ALLEN ET AL., MENTAL IMPAIRMENT AND LEGAL INCOMPETENCY 364-67 (1968) (reviewing the case law); THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 333-40 (Samuel J. Brakel & Ronald S. Rock eds., rev. ed. 1971) (reviewing constitutional and statutory provisions in chart form); SALES ET AL., supra note 193, at 101-04 (same); Joseph F. Vargyas, Voting Rights and Jury Duty, in 3 LEGAL RIGHTS OF MENTALLY DISABLED PERSONS 1771, 1771-81 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Criminal Law & Urban Problems Course Handbook Series No. 116, 1979) (reviewing the case law); Robert W. Stockstill, Comment, Voting and Election Law in the Louisiana Constitution, 46 LA. L. REV. 1253, 1258-60 (1986); Joel E. Smith, Annotation, Voting Rights of Persons Mentally Incapacitated, 80 A.L.R.3d 1116, 1116-33 (1977) (same). For recent developments, see BARBARA A. WEINER, Rights of Institutionalized Persons, in SAMUEL JAN BRAKEL ET AL., THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 251 (3d ed. 1985). Weiner writes: "While disenfranchisement of the mentally disabled was common in the past, today statutes in a number of states secure the vote to such individuals." Id. at 259. While occasional dicta in the 1970s suggested that disenfranchisement of the mentally disabled was constitutional, see, e.g., Shepherd v. Trevino, 575 F.2d 1110, 1115 (5th Cir. 1978) (comparing felons with "insane persons [who] have raised questions about their ability to vote responsibly"); Kronlund v. Honstein, 327 F. Supp. 71, 73 (N.D. Ga. 1971) (noting the state's interest in "preserving the integrity of her electoral process by removing from the process those persons with proven anti-social behavior whose behavior can be said to be destructive of society's aims," and declaring that "a State may prohibit idiots and insane persons . . . from participating in her elections"), it is unclear how the Supreme Court would rule today on an equal protection challenge to insanity clauses given its decision in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985). Cleburne held that mental retardation is not a quasi-suspect classification, see id. at 442, but rejected a ban on group homes under a rational basis standard, see id. at 450. Both before and after Cleburne, commentators argued that mental illness should be treated as a suspect classification under equal protection doctrine and that, consequently, mental disability restrictions on suffrage should he declared unconstitutional. See, e.g., ROBERT M. LEVY & LEONARD S. RUBENSTEIN, THE RIGHTS OF PEOPLE WITH MENTAL DISABILITIES 293 & nn.50-51 (1996) (arguing that institutionalized persons have a constitutional right to vote); Steven K. Metcalf, Comment, The Right To Vote of the Mentally Disabled in Oklahoma: A Case Study of Overinclusive Language and Fundamental Rights, 25 TULSA L.J. 171 (1989) (urging that strict scrutiny be applied to render unconstitutional statutes that prohibit the mentally ill from voting); Note, Mental Disability and the Right To Vote, 88 YALE L.J. 1644 (1979) (same); Note, Mental Illness: A Suspect Classification?, 83 YALE L.J. 1237, 1267 (1974) (arguing that mental disability restrictions violate equal protection).
315. See, e.g., ALA. CONST. art. VIII, § 182 (1901) (amended 1996), ALA. CONST. of 1875, art. VIII, § 3, cl. 2; ARK. CONST. art. III, § 5 (1874); ARK. CONST. of 1868, art. VIII, § 3, cl. 6; DEL. CONST. art. V, § 2 (1897); FLA. CONST. of 1886, art. VI, § 4; FLA. CONST. of 1868, art. XV, § 2; GA. CONST. of 1877, art. II, § 2, cl. 2; GA. CONST. of 1868, art. II, § 6, cl. 2; IDAHO CONST. art. VI, § 3 (1889) (amended 1950); KY. CONST. § 145, cl. 3 (1891) (amended 1955); LA. CONST. of 1879, art. 187; MD. CONST. art. I, § 2 (1867) (amended 1972); MD. CONST. of 1864, art. I, § 3; MISS. CONST. art. XII, § 241 (1890) (amended 1935); MISS. CONST. of 1869, art. VII, § 2; MO. CONST. of 1875, art. VIII, § 8; MONT. CONST. of 1889, art. IX, § 8; NEB. CONST. art. VII, § 2 (1875); NEV. CONST. art. II, § 1 (1864) (amended 1880); N.J. CONST. art. II, ¶ 6 (1947) (amended 1995); N.M. CONST. art. VII, § 1 (1911) (amended 1967); N.D. CONST. art. V, § 127 (1889) (amended 1978); OKLA. CONST. art. III, § 1 (1907) (amended 1918); S.C. CONST. art. II, § 6, cl. 2 (1895) (amended 1971); S.D. CONST. art. VII, § 8 (1889) (amended 1974); TEX. CONST. art. VI, § 1, cl. 2 (1876) (amended 1932); TEX. CONST. of 1869, art. VI; UTAH CONST. art. IV, § 6 (1895) (amended 1975); W. VA. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (1872) (amended 1994); W. VA. CONST. of 1863, art. III, § 1; WYO. CONST. art. VI, § 6 (1889) (amended 1996). Until recently, nearly every state prohibited "mental incompetents" from voting, either by constitution or by statute. See RICHARD C. ALLEN ET AL., MENTAL IMPAIRMENT AND LEGAL INCOMPETENCY 364-67 (1968) (reviewing the case law); THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 333-40 (Samuel J. Brakel & Ronald S. Rock eds., rev. ed. 1971) (reviewing constitutional and statutory provisions in chart form); SALES ET AL., supra note 193, at 101-04 (same); Joseph F. Vargyas, Voting Rights and Jury Duty, in 3 LEGAL RIGHTS OF MENTALLY DISABLED PERSONS 1771, 1771-81 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Criminal Law & Urban Problems Course Handbook Series No. 116, 1979) (reviewing the case law); Robert W. Stockstill, Comment, Voting and Election Law in the Louisiana Constitution, 46 LA. L. REV. 1253, 1258-60 (1986); Joel E. Smith, Annotation, Voting Rights of Persons Mentally Incapacitated, 80 A.L.R.3d 1116, 1116-33 (1977) (same). For recent developments, see BARBARA A. WEINER, Rights of Institutionalized Persons, in SAMUEL JAN BRAKEL ET AL., THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 251 (3d ed. 1985). Weiner writes: "While disenfranchisement of the mentally disabled was common in the past, today statutes in a number of states secure the vote to such individuals." Id. at 259. While occasional dicta in the 1970s suggested that disenfranchisement of the mentally disabled was constitutional, see, e.g., Shepherd v. Trevino, 575 F.2d 1110, 1115 (5th Cir. 1978) (comparing felons with "insane persons [who] have raised questions about their ability to vote responsibly"); Kronlund v. Honstein, 327 F. Supp. 71, 73 (N.D. Ga. 1971) (noting the state's interest in "preserving the integrity of her electoral process by removing from the process those persons with proven anti-social behavior whose behavior can be said to be destructive of society's aims," and declaring that "a State may prohibit idiots and insane persons . . . from participating in her elections"), it is unclear how the Supreme Court would rule today on an equal protection challenge to insanity clauses given its decision in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985). Cleburne held that mental retardation is not a quasi-suspect classification, see id. at 442, but rejected a ban on group homes under a rational basis standard, see id. at 450. Both before and after Cleburne, commentators argued that mental illness should be treated as a suspect classification under equal protection doctrine and that, consequently, mental disability restrictions on suffrage should he declared unconstitutional. See, e.g., ROBERT M. LEVY & LEONARD S. RUBENSTEIN, THE RIGHTS OF PEOPLE WITH MENTAL DISABILITIES 293 & nn.50-51 (1996) (arguing that institutionalized persons have a constitutional right to vote); Steven K. Metcalf, Comment, The Right To Vote of the Mentally Disabled in Oklahoma: A Case Study of Overinclusive Language and Fundamental Rights, 25 TULSA L.J. 171 (1989) (urging that strict scrutiny be applied to render unconstitutional statutes that prohibit the mentally ill from voting); Note, Mental Disability and the Right To Vote, 88 YALE L.J. 1644 (1979) (same); Note, Mental Illness: A Suspect Classification?, 83 YALE L.J. 1237, 1267 (1974) (arguing that mental disability restrictions violate equal protection).
316. See, e.g., ALA. CONST. art. VIII, § 182 (1901) (amended 1996), ALA. CONST. of 1875, art. VIII, § 3, cl. 2; ARK. CONST. art. III, § 5 (1874); ARK. CONST. of 1868, art. VIII, § 3, cl. 6; DEL. CONST. art. V, § 2 (1897); FLA. CONST. of 1886, art. VI, § 4; FLA. CONST. of 1868, art. XV, § 2; GA. CONST. of 1877, art. II, § 2, cl. 2; GA. CONST. of 1868, art. II, § 6, cl. 2; IDAHO CONST. art. VI, § 3 (1889) (amended 1950); KY. CONST. § 145, cl. 3 (1891) (amended 1955); LA. CONST. of 1879, art. 187; MD. CONST. art. I, § 2 (1867) (amended 1972); MD. CONST. of 1864, art. I, § 3; MISS. CONST. art. XII, § 241 (1890) (amended 1935); MISS. CONST. of 1869, art. VII, § 2; MO. CONST. of 1875, art. VIII, § 8; MONT. CONST. of 1889, art. IX, § 8; NEB. CONST. art. VII, § 2 (1875); NEV. CONST. art. II, § 1 (1864) (amended 1880); N.J. CONST. art. II, ¶ 6 (1947) (amended 1995); N.M. CONST. art. VII, § 1 (1911) (amended 1967); N.D. CONST. art. V, § 127 (1889) (amended 1978); OKLA. CONST. art. III, § 1 (1907) (amended 1918); S.C. CONST. art. II, § 6, cl. 2 (1895) (amended 1971); S.D. CONST. art. VII, § 8 (1889) (amended 1974); TEX. CONST. art. VI, § 1, cl. 2 (1876) (amended 1932); TEX. CONST. of 1869, art. VI; UTAH CONST. art. IV, § 6 (1895) (amended 1975); W. VA. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (1872) (amended 1994); W. VA. CONST. of 1863, art. III, § 1; WYO. CONST. art. VI, § 6 (1889) (amended 1996). Until recently, nearly every state prohibited "mental incompetents" from voting, either by constitution or by statute. See RICHARD C. ALLEN ET AL., MENTAL IMPAIRMENT AND LEGAL INCOMPETENCY 364-67 (1968) (reviewing the case law); THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 333-40 (Samuel J. Brakel & Ronald S. Rock eds., rev. ed. 1971) (reviewing constitutional and statutory provisions in chart form); SALES ET AL., supra note 193, at 101-04 (same); Joseph F. Vargyas, Voting Rights and Jury Duty, in 3 LEGAL RIGHTS OF MENTALLY DISABLED PERSONS 1771, 1771-81 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Criminal Law & Urban Problems Course Handbook Series No. 116, 1979) (reviewing the case law); Robert W. Stockstill, Comment, Voting and Election Law in the Louisiana Constitution, 46 LA. L. REV. 1253, 1258-60 (1986); Joel E. Smith, Annotation, Voting Rights of Persons Mentally Incapacitated, 80 A.L.R.3d 1116, 1116-33 (1977) (same). For recent developments, see BARBARA A. WEINER, Rights of Institutionalized Persons, in SAMUEL JAN BRAKEL ET AL., THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 251 (3d ed. 1985). Weiner writes: "While disenfranchisement of the mentally disabled was common in the past, today statutes in a number of states secure the vote to such individuals." Id. at 259. While occasional dicta in the 1970s suggested that disenfranchisement of the mentally disabled was constitutional, see, e.g., Shepherd v. Trevino, 575 F.2d 1110, 1115 (5th Cir. 1978) (comparing felons with "insane persons [who] have raised questions about their ability to vote responsibly"); Kronlund v. Honstein, 327 F. Supp. 71, 73 (N.D. Ga. 1971) (noting the state's interest in "preserving the integrity of her electoral process by removing from the process those persons with proven anti-social behavior whose behavior can be said to be destructive of society's aims," and declaring that "a State may prohibit idiots and insane persons . . . from participating in her elections"), it is unclear how the Supreme Court would rule today on an equal protection challenge to insanity clauses given its decision in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985). Cleburne held that mental retardation is not a quasi-suspect classification, see id. at 442, but rejected a ban on group homes under a rational basis standard, see id. at 450. Both before and after Cleburne, commentators argued that mental illness should be treated as a suspect classification under equal protection doctrine and that, consequently, mental disability restrictions on suffrage should he declared unconstitutional. See, e.g., ROBERT M. LEVY & LEONARD S. RUBENSTEIN, THE RIGHTS OF PEOPLE WITH MENTAL DISABILITIES 293 & nn.50-51 (1996) (arguing that institutionalized persons have a constitutional right to vote); Steven K. Metcalf, Comment, The Right To Vote of the Mentally Disabled in Oklahoma: A Case Study of Overinclusive Language and Fundamental Rights, 25 TULSA L.J. 171 (1989) (urging that strict scrutiny be applied to render unconstitutional statutes that prohibit the mentally ill from voting); Note, Mental Disability and the Right To Vote, 88 YALE L.J. 1644 (1979) (same); Note, Mental Illness: A Suspect Classification?, 83 YALE L.J. 1237, 1267 (1974) (arguing that mental disability restrictions violate equal protection).
317. See, e.g., ALA. CONST. art. VIII, § 182 (1901) (amended 1996), ALA. CONST. of 1875, art. VIII, § 3, cl. 2; ARK. CONST. art. III, § 5 (1874); ARK. CONST. of 1868, art. VIII, § 3, cl. 6; DEL. CONST. art. V, § 2 (1897); FLA. CONST. of 1886, art. VI, § 4; FLA. CONST. of 1868, art. XV, § 2; GA. CONST. of 1877, art. II, § 2, cl. 2; GA. CONST. of 1868, art. II, § 6, cl. 2; IDAHO CONST. art. VI, § 3 (1889) (amended 1950); KY. CONST. § 145, cl. 3 (1891) (amended 1955); LA. CONST. of 1879, art. 187; MD. CONST. art. I, § 2 (1867) (amended 1972); MD. CONST. of 1864, art. I, § 3; MISS. CONST. art. XII, § 241 (1890) (amended 1935); MISS. CONST. of 1869, art. VII, § 2; MO. CONST. of 1875, art. VIII, § 8; MONT. CONST. of 1889, art. IX, § 8; NEB. CONST. art. VII, § 2 (1875); NEV. CONST. art. II, § 1 (1864) (amended 1880); N.J. CONST. art. II, ¶ 6 (1947) (amended 1995); N.M. CONST. art. VII, § 1 (1911) (amended 1967); N.D. CONST. art. V, § 127 (1889) (amended 1978); OKLA. CONST. art. III, § 1 (1907) (amended 1918); S.C. CONST. art. II, § 6, cl. 2 (1895) (amended 1971); S.D. CONST. art. VII, § 8 (1889) (amended 1974); TEX. CONST. art. VI, § 1, cl. 2 (1876) (amended 1932); TEX. CONST. of 1869, art. VI; UTAH CONST. art. IV, § 6 (1895) (amended 1975); W. VA. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (1872) (amended 1994); W. VA. CONST. of 1863, art. III, § 1; WYO. CONST. art. VI, § 6 (1889) (amended 1996). Until recently, nearly every state prohibited "mental incompetents" from voting, either by
318. See, e.g., ALA. CONST. art. VIII, § 182 (1901) (amended 1996), ALA. CONST. of 1875, art. VIII, § 3, cl. 2; ARK. CONST. art. III, § 5 (1874); ARK. CONST. of 1868, art. VIII, § 3, cl. 6; DEL. CONST. art. V, § 2 (1897); FLA. CONST. of 1886, art. VI, § 4; FLA. CONST. of 1868, art. XV, § 2; GA. CONST. of 1877, art. II, § 2, cl. 2; GA. CONST. of 1868, art. II, § 6, cl. 2; IDAHO CONST. art. VI, § 3 (1889) (amended 1950); KY. CONST. § 145, cl. 3 (1891) (amended 1955); LA. CONST. of 1879, art. 187; MD. CONST. art. I, § 2 (1867) (amended 1972); MD. CONST. of 1864, art. I, § 3; MISS. CONST. art. XII, § 241 (1890) (amended 1935); MISS. CONST. of 1869, art. VII, § 2; MO. CONST. of 1875, art. VIII, § 8; MONT. CONST. of 1889, art. IX, § 8; NEB. CONST. art. VII, § 2 (1875); NEV. CONST. art. II, § 1 (1864) (amended 1880); N.J. CONST. art. II, ¶ 6 (1947) (amended 1995); N.M. CONST. art. VII, § 1 (1911) (amended 1967); N.D. CONST. art. V, § 127 (1889) (amended 1978); OKLA. CONST. art. III, § 1 (1907) (amended 1918); S.C. CONST. art. II, § 6, cl. 2 (1895) (amended 1971); S.D. CONST. art. VII, § 8 (1889) (amended 1974); TEX. CONST. art. VI, § 1, cl. 2 (1876) (amended 1932); TEX. CONST. of 1869, art. VI; UTAH CONST. art. IV, § 6 (1895) (amended 1975); W. VA. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (1872) (amended 1994); W. VA. CONST. of 1863, art. III, § 1; WYO. CONST. art. VI, § 6 (1889) (amended 1996). Until recently, nearly every state prohibited "mental incompetents" from voting, either by constitution or by statute. See RICHARD C. ALLEN ET AL., MENTAL IMPAIRMENT AND LEGAL INCOMPETENCY 364-67 (1968) (reviewing the case law); THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 333-40 (Samuel J. Brakel & Ronald S. Rock eds., rev. ed. 1971) (reviewing constitutional and statutory provisions in chart form); SALES ET AL., supra note 193, at 101-04 (same); Joseph F. Vargyas, Voting Rights and Jury Duty, in 3 LEGAL RIGHTS OF MENTALLY DISABLED PERSONS 1771, 1771-81 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Criminal Law & Urban Problems Course Handbook Series No. 116, 1979) (reviewing the case law); Robert W. Stockstill, Comment, Voting and Election Law in the Louisiana Constitution, 46 LA. L. REV. 1253, 1258-60 (1986); Joel E. Smith, Annotation, Voting Rights of Persons Mentally Incapacitated, 80 A.L.R.3d 1116, 1116-33 (1977) (same). For recent developments, see BARBARA A. WEINER, Rights of Institutionalized Persons, in SAMUEL JAN BRAKEL ET AL., THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 251 (3d ed. 1985). Weiner writes: "While disenfranchisement of the mentally disabled was common in the past, today statutes in a number of states secure the vote to such individuals." Id. at 259. While occasional dicta in the 1970s suggested that disenfranchisement of the mentally disabled was constitutional, see, e.g., Shepherd v. Trevino, 575 F.2d 1110, 1115 (5th Cir. 1978) (comparing felons with "insane persons [who] have raised questions about their ability to vote responsibly"); Kronlund v. Honstein, 327 F. Supp. 71, 73 (N.D. Ga. 1971) (noting the state's interest in "preserving the integrity of her electoral process by removing from the process those persons with proven anti-social behavior whose behavior can be said to be destructive of society's aims," and declaring that "a State may prohibit idiots and insane persons . . . from participating in her elections"), it is unclear how the Supreme Court would rule today on an equal protection challenge to insanity clauses given its decision in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985). Cleburne held that mental retardation is not a quasi-suspect classification, see id. at 442, but rejected a ban on group homes under a rational basis standard, see id. at 450. Both before and after Cleburne, commentators argued that mental illness should be treated as a suspect classification under equal protection doctrine and that, consequently, mental disability restrictions on suffrage should he declared unconstitutional. See, e.g., ROBERT M. LEVY & LEONARD S. RUBENSTEIN, THE RIGHTS OF PEOPLE WITH MENTAL DISABILITIES 293 & nn.50-51 (1996) (arguing that institutionalized persons have a constitutional right to vote); Steven K. Metcalf, Comment, The Right To Vote of the Mentally Disabled in Oklahoma: A Case Study of Overinclusive Language and Fundamental Rights, 25 TULSA L.J. 171 (1989) (urging that strict scrutiny be applied to render unconstitutional statutes that prohibit the mentally ill from voting); Note, Mental Disability and the Right To Vote, 88 YALE L.J. 1644 (1979) (same); Note, Mental Illness: A Suspect Classification?, 83 YALE L.J. 1237, 1267 (1974) (arguing that mental disability restrictions violate equal protection).
319. See, e.g., ALA. CONST. art. VIII, § 182 (1901) (amended 1996), ALA. CONST. of 1875, art. VIII, § 3, cl. 2; ARK. CONST. art. III, § 5 (1874); ARK. CONST. of 1868, art. VIII, § 3, cl. 6; DEL. CONST. art. V, § 2 (1897); FLA. CONST. of 1886, art. VI, § 4; FLA. CONST. of 1868, art. XV, § 2; GA. CONST. of 1877, art. II, § 2, cl. 2; GA. CONST. of 1868, art. II, § 6, cl. 2; IDAHO CONST. art. VI, § 3 (1889) (amended 1950); KY. CONST. § 145, cl. 3 (1891) (amended 1955); LA. CONST. of 1879, art. 187; MD. CONST. art. I, § 2 (1867) (amended 1972); MD. CONST. of 1864, art. I, § 3; MISS. CONST. art. XII, § 241 (1890) (amended 1935); MISS. CONST. of 1869, art. VII, § 2; MO. CONST. of 1875, art. VIII, § 8; MONT. CONST. of 1889, art. IX, § 8; NEB. CONST. art. VII, § 2 (1875); NEV. CONST. art. II, § 1 (1864) (amended 1880); N.J. CONST. art. II, ¶ 6 (1947) (amended 1995); N.M. CONST. art. VII, § 1 (1911) (amended 1967); N.D. CONST. art. V, § 127 (1889) (amended 1978); OKLA. CONST. art. III, § 1 (1907) (amended 1918); S.C. CONST. art. II, § 6, cl. 2 (1895) (amended 1971); S.D. CONST. art. VII, § 8 (1889) (amended 1974); TEX. CONST. art. VI, § 1, cl. 2 (1876) (amended 1932); TEX. CONST. of 1869, art. VI; UTAH CONST. art. IV, § 6 (1895) (amended 1975); W. VA. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (1872) (amended 1994); W. VA. CONST. of 1863, art. III, § 1; WYO. CONST. art. VI, § 6 (1889) (amended 1996). Until recently, nearly every state prohibited "mental incompetents" from voting, either by constitution or by statute. See RICHARD C. ALLEN ET AL., MENTAL IMPAIRMENT AND LEGAL INCOMPETENCY 364-67 (1968) (reviewing the case law); THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 333-40 (Samuel J. Brakel & Ronald S. Rock eds., rev. ed. 1971) (reviewing constitutional and statutory provisions in chart form); SALES ET AL., supra note 193, at 101-04 (same); Joseph F. Vargyas, Voting Rights and Jury Duty, in 3 LEGAL RIGHTS OF MENTALLY DISABLED PERSONS 1771, 1771-81 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Criminal Law & Urban Problems Course Handbook Series No. 116, 1979) (reviewing the case law); Robert W. Stockstill, Comment, Voting and Election Law in the Louisiana Constitution, 46 LA. L. REV. 1253, 1258-60 (1986); Joel E. Smith, Annotation, Voting Rights of Persons Mentally Incapacitated, 80 A.L.R.3d 1116, 1116-33 (1977) (same). For recent developments, see BARBARA A. WEINER, Rights of Institutionalized Persons, in SAMUEL JAN BRAKEL ET AL., THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 251 (3d ed. 1985). Weiner writes: "While disenfranchisement of the mentally disabled was common in the past, today statutes in a number of states secure the vote to such individuals." Id. at 259. While occasional dicta in the 1970s suggested that disenfranchisement of the mentally disabled was constitutional, see, e.g., Shepherd v. Trevino, 575 F.2d 1110, 1115 (5th Cir. 1978) (comparing felons with "insane persons [who] have raised questions about their ability to vote responsibly"); Kronlund v. Honstein, 327 F. Supp. 71, 73 (N.D. Ga. 1971) (noting the state's interest in "preserving the integrity of her electoral process by removing from the process those persons with proven anti-social behavior whose behavior can be said to be destructive of society's aims," and declaring that "a State may prohibit idiots and insane persons . . . from participating in her elections"), it is unclear how the Supreme Court would rule today on an equal protection challenge to insanity clauses given its decision in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985). Cleburne held that mental retardation is not a quasi-suspect classification, see id. at 442, but rejected a ban on group homes under a rational basis standard, see id. at 450. Both before and after Cleburne, commentators argued that mental illness should be treated as a suspect classification under equal protection doctrine and that, consequently, mental disability restrictions on suffrage should he declared unconstitutional. See, e.g., ROBERT M. LEVY & LEONARD S. RUBENSTEIN, THE RIGHTS OF PEOPLE WITH MENTAL DISABILITIES 293 & nn.50-51 (1996) (arguing that institutionalized persons have a constitutional right to vote); Steven K. Metcalf, Comment, The Right To Vote of the Mentally Disabled in Oklahoma: A Case Study of Overinclusive Language and Fundamental Rights, 25 TULSA L.J. 171 (1989) (urging that strict scrutiny be applied to render unconstitutional statutes that prohibit the mentally ill from voting); Note, Mental Disability and the Right To Vote, 88 YALE L.J. 1644 (1979) (same); Note, Mental Illness: A Suspect Classification?, 83 YALE L.J. 1237, 1267 (1974) (arguing that mental disability restrictions violate equal protection).
320. See, e.g., ALA. CONST. art. VIII, § 182 (1901) (amended 1996), ALA. CONST. of 1875, art. VIII, § 3, cl. 2; ARK. CONST. art. III, § 5 (1874); ARK. CONST. of 1868, art. VIII, § 3, cl. 6; DEL. CONST. art. V, § 2 (1897); FLA. CONST. of 1886, art. VI, § 4; FLA. CONST. of 1868, art. XV, § 2; GA. CONST. of 1877, art. II, § 2, cl. 2; GA. CONST. of 1868, art. II, § 6, cl. 2; IDAHO CONST. art. VI, § 3 (1889) (amended 1950); KY. CONST. § 145, cl. 3 (1891) (amended 1955); LA. CONST. of 1879, art. 187; MD. CONST. art. I, § 2 (1867) (amended 1972); MD. CONST. of 1864, art. I, § 3; MISS. CONST. art. XII, § 241 (1890) (amended 1935); MISS. CONST. of 1869, art. VII, § 2; MO. CONST. of 1875, art. VIII, § 8; MONT. CONST. of 1889, art. IX, § 8; NEB. CONST. art. VII, § 2 (1875); NEV. CONST. art. II, § 1 (1864) (amended 1880); N.J. CONST. art. II, ¶ 6 (1947) (amended 1995); N.M. CONST. art. VII, § 1 (1911) (amended 1967); N.D. CONST. art. V, § 127 (1889) (amended 1978); OKLA. CONST. art. III, § 1 (1907) (amended 1918); S.C. CONST. art. II, § 6, cl. 2 (1895) (amended 1971); S.D. CONST. art. VII, § 8 (1889) (amended 1974); TEX. CONST. art. VI, § 1, cl. 2 (1876) (amended 1932); TEX. CONST. of 1869, art. VI; UTAH CONST. art. IV, § 6 (1895) (amended 1975); W. VA. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (1872) (amended 1994); W. VA. CONST. of 1863, art. III, § 1; WYO. CONST. art. VI, § 6 (1889) (amended 1996). Until recently, nearly every state prohibited "mental incompetents" from voting, either by constitution or by statute. See RICHARD C. ALLEN ET AL., MENTAL IMPAIRMENT AND LEGAL INCOMPETENCY 364-67 (1968) (reviewing the case law); THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 333-40 (Samuel J. Brakel & Ronald S. Rock eds., rev. ed. 1971) (reviewing constitutional and statutory provisions in chart form); SALES ET AL., supra note 193, at 101-04 (same); Joseph F. Vargyas, Voting Rights and Jury Duty, in 3 LEGAL RIGHTS OF MENTALLY DISABLED PERSONS 1771, 1771-81 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Criminal Law & Urban Problems Course Handbook Series No. 116, 1979) (reviewing the case law); Robert W. Stockstill, Comment, Voting and Election Law in the Louisiana Constitution, 46 LA. L. REV. 1253, 1258-60 (1986); Joel E. Smith, Annotation, Voting Rights of Persons Mentally Incapacitated, 80 A.L.R.3d 1116, 1116-33 (1977) (same). For recent developments, see BARBARA A. WEINER, Rights of Institutionalized Persons, in SAMUEL JAN BRAKEL ET AL., THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 251 (3d ed. 1985). Weiner writes: "While disenfranchisement of the mentally disabled was common in the past, today statutes in a number of states secure the vote to such individuals." Id. at 259. While occasional dicta in the 1970s suggested that disenfranchisement of the mentally disabled was constitutional, see, e.g., Shepherd v. Trevino, 575 F.2d 1110, 1115 (5th Cir. 1978) (comparing felons with "insane persons [who] have raised questions about their ability to vote responsibly"); Kronlund v. Honstein, 327 F. Supp. 71, 73 (N.D. Ga. 1971) (noting the state's interest in "preserving the integrity of her electoral process by removing from the process those persons with proven anti-social behavior whose behavior can be said to be destructive of society's aims," and declaring that "a State may prohibit idiots and insane persons . . . from participating in her elections"), it is unclear how the Supreme Court would rule today on an equal protection challenge to insanity clauses given its decision in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985). Cleburne held that mental retardation is not a quasi-suspect classification, see id. at 442, but rejected a ban on group homes under a rational basis standard, see id. at 450. Both before and after Cleburne, commentators argued that mental illness should be treated as a suspect classification under equal protection doctrine and that, consequently, mental disability restrictions on suffrage should he declared unconstitutional. See, e.g., ROBERT M. LEVY & LEONARD S. RUBENSTEIN, THE RIGHTS OF PEOPLE WITH MENTAL DISABILITIES 293 & nn.50-51 (1996) (arguing that institutionalized persons have a constitutional right to vote); Steven K. Metcalf, Comment, The Right To Vote of the Mentally Disabled in Oklahoma: A Case Study of Overinclusive Language and Fundamental Rights, 25 TULSA L.J. 171 (1989) (urging that strict scrutiny be applied to render unconstitutional statutes that prohibit the mentally ill from voting); Note, Mental Disability and the Right To Vote, 88 YALE L.J. 1644 (1979) (same); Note, Mental Illness: A Suspect Classification?, 83 YALE L.J. 1237, 1267 (1974) (arguing that mental disability restrictions violate equal protection).
321. See, e.g., ALA. CONST. art. VIII, § 182 (1901) (amended 1996), ALA. CONST. of 1875, art. VIII, § 3, cl. 2; ARK. CONST. art. III, § 5 (1874); ARK. CONST. of 1868, art. VIII, § 3, cl. 6; DEL. CONST. art. V, § 2 (1897); FLA. CONST. of 1886, art. VI, § 4; FLA. CONST. of 1868, art. XV, § 2; GA. CONST. of 1877, art. II, § 2, cl. 2; GA. CONST. of 1868, art. II, § 6, cl. 2; IDAHO CONST. art. VI, § 3 (1889) (amended 1950); KY. CONST. § 145, cl. 3 (1891) (amended 1955); LA. CONST. of 1879, art. 187; MD. CONST. art. I, § 2 (1867) (amended 1972); MD. CONST. of 1864, art. I, § 3; MISS. CONST. art. XII, § 241 (1890) (amended 1935); MISS. CONST. of 1869, art. VII, § 2; MO. CONST. of 1875, art. VIII, § 8; MONT. CONST. of 1889, art. IX, § 8; NEB. CONST. art. VII, § 2 (1875); NEV. CONST. art. II, § 1 (1864) (amended 1880); N.J. CONST. art. II, ¶ 6 (1947) (amended 1995); N.M. CONST. art. VII, § 1 (1911) (amended 1967); N.D. CONST. art. V, § 127 (1889) (amended 1978); OKLA. CONST. art. III, § 1 (1907) (amended 1918); S.C. CONST. art. II, § 6, cl. 2 (1895) (amended 1971); S.D. CONST. art. VII, § 8 (1889) (amended 1974); TEX. CONST. art. VI, § 1, cl. 2 (1876) (amended 1932); TEX. CONST. of 1869, art. VI; UTAH CONST. art. IV, § 6 (1895) (amended 1975); W. VA. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (1872) (amended 1994); W. VA. CONST. of 1863, art. III, § 1; WYO. CONST. art. VI, § 6 (1889) (amended 1996). Until recently, nearly every state prohibited "mental incompetents" from voting, either by constitution or by statute. See RICHARD C. ALLEN ET AL., MENTAL IMPAIRMENT AND LEGAL INCOMPETENCY 364-67 (1968) (reviewing the case law); THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 333-40 (Samuel J. Brakel & Ronald S. Rock eds., rev. ed. 1971) (reviewing constitutional and statutory provisions in chart form); SALES ET AL., supra note 193, at 101-04 (same); Joseph F. Vargyas, Voting Rights and Jury Duty, in 3 LEGAL RIGHTS OF MENTALLY DISABLED PERSONS 1771, 1771-81 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Criminal Law & Urban Problems Course Handbook Series No. 116, 1979) (reviewing the case law); Robert W. Stockstill, Comment, Voting and Election Law in the Louisiana Constitution, 46 LA. L. REV. 1253, 1258-60 (1986); Joel E. Smith, Annotation, Voting Rights of Persons Mentally Incapacitated, 80 A.L.R.3d 1116, 1116-33 (1977) (same). For recent developments, see BARBARA A. WEINER, Rights of Institutionalized Persons, in SAMUEL JAN BRAKEL ET AL., THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 251 (3d ed. 1985). Weiner writes: "While disenfranchisement of the mentally disabled was common in the past, today statutes in a number of states secure the vote to such individuals." Id. at 259. While occasional dicta in the 1970s suggested that disenfranchisement of the mentally disabled was constitutional, see, e.g., Shepherd v. Trevino, 575 F.2d 1110, 1115 (5th Cir. 1978) (comparing felons with "insane persons [who] have raised questions about their ability to vote responsibly"); Kronlund v. Honstein, 327 F. Supp. 71, 73 (N.D. Ga. 1971) (noting the state's interest in "preserving the integrity of her electoral process by removing from the process those persons with proven anti-social behavior whose behavior can be said to be destructive of society's aims," and declaring that "a State may prohibit idiots and insane persons . . . from participating in her elections"), it is unclear how the Supreme Court would rule today on an equal protection challenge to insanity clauses given its decision in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985). Cleburne held that mental retardation is not a quasi-suspect classification, see id. at 442, but rejected a ban on group homes under a rational basis standard, see id. at 450. Both before and after Cleburne, commentators argued that mental illness should be treated as a suspect classification under equal protection doctrine and that, consequently, mental disability restrictions on suffrage should he declared unconstitutional. See, e.g., ROBERT M. LEVY & LEONARD S. RUBENSTEIN, THE RIGHTS OF PEOPLE WITH MENTAL DISABILITIES 293 & nn.50-51 (1996) (arguing that institutionalized persons have a constitutional right to vote); Steven K. Metcalf, Comment, The Right To Vote of the Mentally Disabled in Oklahoma: A Case Study of Overinclusive Language and Fundamental Rights, 25 TULSA L.J. 171 (1989) (urging that strict scrutiny be applied to render unconstitutional statutes that prohibit the mentally ill from voting); Note, Mental Disability and the Right To Vote, 88 YALE L.J. 1644 (1979) (same); Note, Mental Illness: A Suspect Classification?, 83 YALE L.J. 1237, 1267 (1974) (arguing that mental disability restrictions violate equal protection).
322. See, e.g., ALA. CONST. art. VIII, § 182 (1901) (amended 1996), ALA. CONST. of 1875, art. VIII, § 3, cl. 2; ARK. CONST. art. III, § 5 (1874); ARK. CONST. of 1868, art. VIII, § 3, cl. 6; DEL. CONST. art. V, § 2 (1897); FLA. CONST. of 1886, art. VI, § 4; FLA. CONST. of 1868, art. XV, § 2; GA. CONST. of 1877, art. II, § 2, cl. 2; GA. CONST. of 1868, art. II, § 6, cl. 2; IDAHO CONST. art. VI, § 3 (1889) (amended 1950); KY. CONST. § 145, cl. 3 (1891) (amended 1955); LA. CONST. of 1879, art. 187; MD. CONST. art. I, § 2 (1867) (amended 1972); MD. CONST. of 1864, art. I, § 3; MISS. CONST. art. XII, § 241 (1890) (amended 1935); MISS. CONST. of 1869, art. VII, § 2; MO. CONST. of 1875, art. VIII, § 8; MONT. CONST. of 1889, art. IX, § 8; NEB. CONST. art. VII, § 2 (1875); NEV. CONST. art. II, § 1 (1864) (amended 1880); N.J. CONST. art. II, ¶ 6 (1947) (amended 1995); N.M. CONST. art. VII, § 1 (1911) (amended 1967); N.D. CONST. art. V, § 127 (1889) (amended 1978); OKLA. CONST. art. III, § 1 (1907) (amended 1918); S.C. CONST. art. II, § 6, cl. 2 (1895) (amended 1971); S.D. CONST. art. VII, § 8 (1889) (amended 1974); TEX. CONST. art. VI, § 1, cl. 2 (1876) (amended 1932); TEX. CONST. of 1869, art. VI; UTAH CONST. art. IV, § 6 (1895) (amended 1975); W. VA. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (1872) (amended 1994); W. VA. CONST. of 1863, art. III, § 1; WYO. CONST. art. VI, § 6 (1889) (amended 1996). Until recently, nearly every state prohibited "mental incompetents" from voting, either by constitution or by statute. See RICHARD C. ALLEN ET AL., MENTAL IMPAIRMENT AND LEGAL INCOMPETENCY 364-67 (1968) (reviewing the case law); THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 333-40 (Samuel J. Brakel & Ronald S. Rock eds., rev. ed. 1971) (reviewing constitutional and statutory provisions in chart form); SALES ET AL., supra note 193, at 101-04 (same); Joseph F. Vargyas, Voting Rights and Jury Duty, in 3 LEGAL RIGHTS OF MENTALLY DISABLED PERSONS 1771, 1771-81 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Criminal Law & Urban Problems Course Handbook Series No. 116, 1979) (reviewing the case law); Robert W. Stockstill, Comment, Voting and Election Law in the Louisiana Constitution, 46 LA. L. REV. 1253, 1258-60 (1986); Joel E. Smith, Annotation, Voting Rights of Persons Mentally Incapacitated, 80 A.L.R.3d 1116, 1116-33 (1977) (same). For recent developments, see BARBARA A. WEINER, Rights of Institutionalized Persons, in SAMUEL JAN BRAKEL ET AL., THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 251 (3d ed. 1985). Weiner writes: "While disenfranchisement of the mentally disabled was common in the past, today statutes in a number of states secure the vote to such individuals." Id. at 259. While occasional dicta in the 1970s suggested that disenfranchisement of the mentally disabled was constitutional, see, e.g., Shepherd v. Trevino, 575 F.2d 1110, 1115 (5th Cir. 1978) (comparing felons with "insane persons [who] have raised questions about their ability to vote responsibly"); Kronlund v. Honstein, 327 F. Supp. 71, 73 (N.D. Ga. 1971) (noting the state's interest in "preserving the integrity of her electoral process by removing from the process those persons with proven anti-social behavior whose behavior can be said to be destructive of society's aims," and declaring that "a State may prohibit idiots and insane persons . . . from participating in her elections"), it is unclear how the Supreme Court would rule today on an equal protection challenge to insanity clauses given its decision in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985). Cleburne held that mental retardation is not a quasi-suspect classification, see id. at 442, but rejected a ban on group homes under a rational basis standard, see id. at 450. Both before and after Cleburne, commentators argued that mental illness should be treated as a suspect classification under equal protection doctrine and that, consequently, mental disability restrictions on suffrage should he declared unconstitutional. See, e.g., ROBERT M. LEVY & LEONARD S. RUBENSTEIN, THE RIGHTS OF PEOPLE WITH MENTAL DISABILITIES 293 & nn.50-51 (1996) (arguing that institutionalized persons have a constitutional right to vote); Steven K. Metcalf, Comment, The Right To Vote of the Mentally Disabled in Oklahoma: A Case Study of Overinclusive Language and Fundamental Rights, 25 TULSA L.J. 171 (1989) (urging that strict scrutiny be applied to render unconstitutional statutes that prohibit the mentally ill from voting); Note, Mental Disability and the Right To Vote, 88 YALE L.J. 1644 (1979) (same); Note, Mental Illness: A Suspect Classification?, 83 YALE L.J. 1237, 1267 (1974) (arguing that mental disability restrictions violate equal protection).
323. See, e.g., ALA. CONST. art. VIII, § 182 (1901) (amended 1996), ALA. CONST. of 1875, art. VIII, § 3, cl. 2; ARK. CONST. art. III, § 5 (1874); ARK. CONST. of 1868, art. VIII, § 3, cl. 6; DEL. CONST. art. V, § 2 (1897); FLA. CONST. of 1886, art. VI, § 4; FLA. CONST. of 1868, art. XV, § 2; GA. CONST. of 1877, art. II, § 2, cl. 2; GA. CONST. of 1868, art. II, § 6, cl. 2; IDAHO CONST. art. VI, § 3 (1889) (amended 1950); KY. CONST. § 145, cl. 3 (1891) (amended 1955); LA. CONST. of 1879, art. 187; MD. CONST. art. I, § 2 (1867) (amended 1972); MD. CONST. of 1864, art. I, § 3; MISS. CONST. art. XII, § 241 (1890) (amended 1935); MISS. CONST. of 1869, art. VII, § 2; MO. CONST. of 1875, art. VIII, § 8; MONT. CONST. of 1889, art. IX, § 8; NEB. CONST. art. VII, § 2 (1875); NEV. CONST. art. II, § 1 (1864) (amended 1880); N.J. CONST. art. II, ¶ 6 (1947) (amended 1995); N.M. CONST. art. VII, § 1 (1911) (amended 1967); N.D. CONST. art. V, § 127 (1889) (amended 1978); OKLA. CONST. art. III, § 1 (1907) (amended 1918); S.C. CONST. art. II, § 6, cl. 2 (1895) (amended 1971); S.D. CONST. art. VII, § 8 (1889) (amended 1974); TEX. CONST. art. VI, § 1, cl. 2 (1876) (amended 1932); TEX. CONST. of 1869, art. VI; UTAH CONST. art. IV, § 6 (1895) (amended 1975); W. VA. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (1872) (amended 1994); W. VA. CONST. of 1863, art. III, § 1; WYO. CONST. art. VI, § 6 (1889) (amended 1996). Until recently, nearly every state prohibited "mental incompetents" from voting, either by constitution or by statute. See RICHARD C. ALLEN ET AL., MENTAL IMPAIRMENT AND LEGAL INCOMPETENCY 364-67 (1968) (reviewing the case law); THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 333-40 (Samuel J. Brakel & Ronald S. Rock eds., rev. ed. 1971) (reviewing constitutional and statutory provisions in chart form); SALES ET AL., supra note 193, at 101-04 (same); Joseph F. Vargyas, Voting Rights and Jury Duty, in 3 LEGAL RIGHTS OF MENTALLY DISABLED PERSONS 1771, 1771-81 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Criminal Law & Urban Problems Course Handbook Series No. 116, 1979) (reviewing the case law); Robert W. Stockstill, Comment, Voting and Election Law in the Louisiana Constitution, 46 LA. L. REV. 1253, 1258-60 (1986); Joel E. Smith, Annotation, Voting Rights of Persons Mentally Incapacitated, 80 A.L.R.3d 1116, 1116-33 (1977) (same). For recent developments, see BARBARA A. WEINER, Rights of Institutionalized Persons, in SAMUEL JAN BRAKEL ET AL., THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 251 (3d ed. 1985). Weiner writes: "While disenfranchisement of the mentally disabled was common in the past, today statutes in a number of states secure the vote to such individuals." Id. at 259. While occasional dicta in the 1970s suggested that disenfranchisement of the mentally disabled was constitutional, see, e.g., Shepherd v. Trevino, 575 F.2d 1110, 1115 (5th Cir. 1978) (comparing felons with "insane persons [who] have raised questions about their ability to vote responsibly"); Kronlund v. Honstein, 327 F. Supp. 71, 73 (N.D. Ga. 1971) (noting the state's interest in "preserving the integrity of her electoral process by removing from the process those persons with proven anti-social behavior whose behavior can be said to be destructive of society's aims," and declaring that "a State may prohibit idiots and insane persons . . . from participating in her elections"), it is unclear how the Supreme Court would rule today on an equal protection challenge to insanity clauses given its decision in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985). Cleburne held that mental retardation is not a quasi-suspect classification, see id. at 442, but rejected a ban on group homes under a rational basis standard, see id. at 450. Both before and after Cleburne, commentators argued that mental illness should be treated as a suspect classification under equal protection doctrine and that, consequently, mental disability restrictions on suffrage should he declared unconstitutional. See, e.g., ROBERT M. LEVY & LEONARD S. RUBENSTEIN, THE RIGHTS OF PEOPLE WITH MENTAL DISABILITIES 293 & nn.50-51 (1996) (arguing that institutionalized persons have a constitutional right to vote); Steven K. Metcalf, Comment, The Right To Vote of the Mentally Disabled in Oklahoma: A Case Study of Overinclusive Language and Fundamental Rights, 25 TULSA L.J. 171 (1989) (urging that strict scrutiny be applied to render unconstitutional statutes that prohibit the mentally ill from voting); Note, Mental Disability and the Right To Vote, 88 YALE L.J. 1644 (1979) (same); Note, Mental Illness: A Suspect Classification?, 83 YALE L.J. 1237, 1267 (1974) (arguing that mental disability restrictions violate equal protection).
324. See, e.g., ALA. CONST. art. VIII, § 182 (1901) (amended 1996), ALA. CONST. of 1875, art. VIII, § 3, cl. 2; ARK. CONST. art. III, § 5 (1874); ARK. CONST. of 1868, art. VIII, § 3, cl. 6; DEL. CONST. art. V, § 2 (1897); FLA. CONST. of 1886, art. VI, § 4; FLA. CONST. of 1868, art. XV, § 2; GA. CONST. of 1877, art. II, § 2, cl. 2; GA. CONST. of 1868, art. II, § 6, cl. 2; IDAHO CONST. art. VI, § 3 (1889) (amended 1950); KY. CONST. § 145, cl. 3 (1891) (amended 1955); LA. CONST. of 1879, art. 187; MD. CONST. art. I, § 2 (1867) (amended 1972); MD. CONST. of 1864, art. I, § 3; MISS. CONST. art. XII, § 241 (1890) (amended 1935); MISS. CONST. of 1869, art. VII, § 2; MO. CONST. of 1875, art. VIII, § 8; MONT. CONST. of 1889, art. IX, § 8; NEB. CONST. art. VII, § 2 (1875); NEV. CONST. art. II, § 1 (1864) (amended 1880); N.J. CONST. art. II, ¶ 6 (1947) (amended 1995); N.M. CONST. art. VII, § 1 (1911) (amended 1967); N.D. CONST. art. V, § 127 (1889) (amended 1978); OKLA. CONST. art. III, § 1 (1907) (amended 1918); S.C. CONST. art. II, § 6, cl. 2 (1895) (amended 1971); S.D. CONST. art. VII, § 8 (1889) (amended 1974); TEX. CONST. art. VI, § 1, cl. 2 (1876) (amended 1932); TEX. CONST. of 1869, art. VI; UTAH CONST. art. IV, § 6 (1895) (amended 1975); W. VA. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (1872) (amended 1994); W. VA. CONST. of 1863, art. III, § 1; WYO. CONST. art. VI, § 6 (1889) (amended 1996). Until recently, nearly every state prohibited "mental incompetents" from voting, either by constitution or by statute. See RICHARD C. ALLEN ET AL., MENTAL IMPAIRMENT AND LEGAL INCOMPETENCY 364-67 (1968) (reviewing the case law); THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 333-40 (Samuel J. Brakel & Ronald S. Rock eds., rev. ed. 1971) (reviewing constitutional and statutory provisions in chart form); SALES ET AL., supra note 193, at 101-04 (same); Joseph F. Vargyas, Voting Rights and Jury Duty, in 3 LEGAL RIGHTS OF MENTALLY DISABLED PERSONS 1771, 1771-81 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Criminal Law & Urban Problems Course Handbook Series No. 116, 1979) (reviewing the case law); Robert W. Stockstill, Comment, Voting and Election Law in the Louisiana Constitution, 46 LA. L. REV. 1253, 1258-60 (1986); Joel E. Smith, Annotation, Voting Rights of Persons Mentally Incapacitated, 80 A.L.R.3d 1116, 1116-33 (1977) (same). For recent developments, see BARBARA A. WEINER, Rights of Institutionalized Persons, in SAMUEL JAN BRAKEL ET AL., THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 251 (3d ed. 1985). Weiner writes: "While disenfranchisement of the mentally disabled was common in the past, today statutes in a number of states secure the vote to such individuals." Id. at 259. While occasional dicta in the 1970s suggested that disenfranchisement of the mentally disabled was constitutional, see, e.g., Shepherd v. Trevino, 575 F.2d 1110, 1115 (5th Cir. 1978) (comparing felons with "insane persons [who] have raised questions about their ability to vote responsibly"); Kronlund v. Honstein, 327 F. Supp. 71, 73 (N.D. Ga. 1971) (noting the state's interest in "preserving the integrity of her electoral process by removing from the process those persons with proven anti-social behavior whose behavior can be said to be destructive of society's aims," and declaring that "a State may prohibit idiots and insane persons . . . from participating in her elections"), it is unclear how the Supreme Court would rule today on an equal protection challenge to insanity clauses given its decision in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985). Cleburne held that mental retardation is not a quasi-suspect classification, see id. at 442, but rejected a ban on group homes under a rational basis standard, see id. at 450. Both before and after Cleburne, commentators argued that mental illness should be treated as a suspect classification under equal protection doctrine and that, consequently, mental disability restrictions on suffrage should he declared unconstitutional. See, e.g., ROBERT M. LEVY & LEONARD S. RUBENSTEIN, THE RIGHTS OF PEOPLE WITH MENTAL DISABILITIES 293 & nn.50-51 (1996) (arguing that institutionalized persons have a constitutional right to vote); Steven K. Metcalf, Comment, The Right To Vote of the Mentally Disabled in Oklahoma: A Case Study of Overinclusive Language and Fundamental Rights, 25 TULSA L.J. 171 (1989) (urging that strict scrutiny be applied to render unconstitutional statutes that prohibit the mentally ill from voting); Note, Mental Disability and the Right To Vote, 88 YALE L.J. 1644 (1979) (same); Note, Mental Illness: A Suspect Classification?, 83 YALE L.J. 1237, 1267 (1974) (arguing that mental disability restrictions violate equal protection).
325. See, e.g., ALA. CONST. art. VIII, § 182 (1901) (amended 1996), ALA. CONST. of 1875, art. VIII, § 3, cl. 2; ARK. CONST. art. III, § 5 (1874); ARK. CONST. of 1868, art. VIII, § 3, cl. 6; DEL. CONST. art. V, § 2 (1897); FLA. CONST. of 1886, art. VI, § 4; FLA. CONST. of 1868, art. XV, § 2; GA. CONST. of 1877, art. II, § 2, cl. 2; GA. CONST. of 1868, art. II, § 6, cl. 2; IDAHO CONST. art. VI, § 3 (1889) (amended 1950); KY. CONST. § 145, cl. 3 (1891) (amended 1955); LA. CONST. of 1879, art. 187; MD. CONST. art. I, § 2 (1867) (amended 1972); MD. CONST. of 1864, art. I, § 3; MISS. CONST. art. XII, § 241 (1890) (amended 1935); MISS. CONST. of 1869, art. VII, § 2; MO. CONST. of 1875, art. VIII, § 8; MONT. CONST. of 1889, art. IX, § 8; NEB. CONST. art. VII, § 2 (1875); NEV. CONST. art. II, § 1 (1864) (amended 1880); N.J. CONST. art. II, ¶ 6 (1947) (amended 1995); N.M. CONST. art. VII, § 1 (1911) (amended 1967); N.D. CONST. art. V, § 127 (1889) (amended 1978); OKLA. CONST. art. III, § 1 (1907) (amended 1918); S.C. CONST. art. II, § 6, cl. 2 (1895) (amended 1971); S.D. CONST. art. VII, § 8 (1889) (amended 1974); TEX. CONST. art. VI, § 1, cl. 2 (1876) (amended 1932); TEX. CONST. of 1869, art. VI; UTAH CONST. art. IV, § 6 (1895) (amended 1975); W. VA. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (1872) (amended 1994); W. VA. CONST. of 1863, art. III, § 1; WYO. CONST. art. VI, § 6 (1889) (amended 1996). Until recently, nearly every state prohibited "mental incompetents" from voting, either by constitution or by statute. See RICHARD C. ALLEN ET AL., MENTAL IMPAIRMENT AND LEGAL INCOMPETENCY 364-67 (1968) (reviewing the case law); THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 333-40 (Samuel J. Brakel & Ronald S. Rock eds., rev. ed. 1971) (reviewing constitutional and statutory provisions in chart form); SALES ET AL., supra note 193, at 101-04 (same); Joseph F. Vargyas, Voting Rights and Jury Duty, in 3 LEGAL RIGHTS OF MENTALLY DISABLED PERSONS 1771, 1771-81 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Criminal Law & Urban Problems Course Handbook Series No. 116, 1979) (reviewing the case law); Robert W. Stockstill, Comment, Voting and Election Law in the Louisiana Constitution, 46 LA. L. REV. 1253, 1258-60 (1986); Joel E. Smith, Annotation, Voting Rights of Persons Mentally Incapacitated, 80 A.L.R.3d 1116, 1116-33 (1977) (same). For recent developments, see BARBARA A. WEINER, Rights of Institutionalized Persons, in SAMUEL JAN BRAKEL ET AL., THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 251 (3d ed. 1985). Weiner writes: "While disenfranchisement of the mentally disabled was common in the past, today statutes in a number of states secure the vote to such individuals." Id. at 259. While occasional dicta in the 1970s suggested that disenfranchisement of the mentally disabled was constitutional, see, e.g., Shepherd v. Trevino, 575 F.2d 1110, 1115 (5th Cir. 1978) (comparing felons with "insane persons [who] have raised questions about their ability to vote responsibly"); Kronlund v. Honstein, 327 F. Supp. 71, 73 (N.D. Ga. 1971) (noting the state's interest in "preserving the integrity of her electoral process by removing from the process those persons with proven anti-social behavior whose behavior can be said to be destructive of society's aims," and declaring that "a State may prohibit idiots and insane persons . . . from participating in her elections"), it is unclear how the Supreme Court would rule today on an equal protection challenge to insanity clauses given its decision in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985). Cleburne held that mental retardation is not a quasi-suspect classification, see id. at 442, but rejected a ban on group homes under a rational basis standard, see id. at 450. Both before and after Cleburne, commentators argued that mental illness should be treated as a suspect classification under equal protection doctrine and that, consequently, mental disability restrictions on suffrage should he declared unconstitutional. See, e.g., ROBERT M. LEVY & LEONARD S. RUBENSTEIN, THE RIGHTS OF PEOPLE WITH MENTAL DISABILITIES 293 & nn.50-51 (1996) (arguing that institutionalized persons have a constitutional right to vote); Steven K. Metcalf, Comment, The Right To Vote of the Mentally Disabled in Oklahoma: A Case Study of Overinclusive Language and Fundamental Rights, 25 TULSA L.J. 171 (1989) (urging that strict scrutiny be applied to render unconstitutional statutes that prohibit the mentally ill from voting); Note, Mental Disability and the Right To Vote, 88 YALE L.J. 1644 (1979) (same); Note, Mental Illness: A Suspect Classification?, 83 YALE L.J. 1237, 1267 (1974) (arguing that mental disability restrictions violate equal protection).
326. See, e.g., ALA. CONST. art. VIII, § 182 (1901) (amended 1996), ALA. CONST. of 1875, art. VIII, § 3, cl. 2; ARK. CONST. art. III, § 5 (1874); ARK. CONST. of 1868, art. VIII, § 3, cl. 6; DEL. CONST. art. V, § 2 (1897); FLA. CONST. of 1886, art. VI, § 4; FLA. CONST. of 1868, art. XV, § 2; GA. CONST. of 1877, art. II, § 2, cl. 2; GA. CONST. of 1868, art. II, § 6, cl. 2; IDAHO CONST. art. VI, § 3 (1889) (amended 1950); KY. CONST. § 145, cl. 3 (1891) (amended 1955); LA. CONST. of 1879, art. 187; MD. CONST. art. I, § 2 (1867) (amended 1972); MD. CONST. of 1864, art. I, § 3; MISS. CONST. art. XII, § 241 (1890) (amended 1935); MISS. CONST. of 1869, art. VII, § 2; MO. CONST. of 1875, art. VIII, § 8; MONT. CONST. of 1889, art. IX, § 8; NEB. CONST. art. VII, § 2 (1875); NEV. CONST. art. II, § 1 (1864) (amended 1880); N.J. CONST. art. II, ¶ 6 (1947) (amended 1995); N.M. CONST. art. VII, § 1 (1911) (amended 1967); N.D. CONST. art. V, § 127 (1889) (amended 1978); OKLA. CONST. art. III, § 1 (1907) (amended 1918); S.C. CONST. art. II, § 6, cl. 2 (1895) (amended 1971); S.D. CONST. art. VII, § 8 (1889) (amended 1974); TEX. CONST. art. VI, § 1, cl. 2 (1876) (amended 1932); TEX. CONST. of 1869, art. VI; UTAH CONST. art. IV, § 6 (1895) (amended 1975); W. VA. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (1872) (amended 1994); W. VA. CONST. of 1863, art. III, § 1; WYO. CONST. art. VI, § 6 (1889) (amended 1996). Until recently, nearly every state prohibited "mental incompetents" from voting, either by constitution or by statute. See RICHARD C. ALLEN ET AL., MENTAL IMPAIRMENT AND LEGAL INCOMPETENCY 364-67 (1968) (reviewing the case law); THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 333-40 (Samuel J. Brakel & Ronald S. Rock eds., rev. ed. 1971) (reviewing constitutional and statutory provisions in chart form); SALES ET AL., supra note 193, at 101-04 (same); Joseph F. Vargyas, Voting Rights and Jury Duty, in 3 LEGAL RIGHTS OF MENTALLY DISABLED PERSONS 1771, 1771-81 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Criminal Law & Urban Problems Course Handbook Series No. 116, 1979) (reviewing the case law); Robert W. Stockstill, Comment, Voting and Election Law in the Louisiana Constitution, 46 LA. L. REV. 1253, 1258-60 (1986); Joel E. Smith, Annotation, Voting Rights of Persons Mentally Incapacitated, 80 A.L.R.3d 1116, 1116-33 (1977) (same). For recent developments, see BARBARA A. WEINER, Rights of Institutionalized Persons, in SAMUEL JAN BRAKEL ET AL., THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 251 (3d ed. 1985). Weiner writes: "While disenfranchisement of the mentally disabled was common in the past, today statutes in a number of states secure the vote to such individuals." Id. at 259. While occasional dicta in the 1970s suggested that disenfranchisement of the mentally disabled was constitutional, see, e.g., Shepherd v. Trevino, 575 F.2d 1110, 1115 (5th Cir. 1978) (comparing felons with "insane persons [who] have raised questions about their ability to vote responsibly"); Kronlund v. Honstein, 327 F. Supp. 71, 73 (N.D. Ga. 1971) (noting the state's interest in "preserving the integrity of her electoral process by removing from the process those persons with proven anti-social behavior whose behavior can be said to be destructive of society's aims," and declaring that "a State may prohibit idiots and insane persons . . . from participating in her elections"), it is unclear how the Supreme Court would rule today on an equal protection challenge to insanity clauses given its decision in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985). Cleburne held that mental retardation is not a quasi-suspect classification, see id. at 442, but rejected a ban on group homes under a rational basis standard, see id. at 450. Both before and after Cleburne, commentators argued that mental illness should be treated as a suspect classification under equal protection doctrine and that, consequently, mental disability restrictions on suffrage should he declared unconstitutional. See, e.g., ROBERT M. LEVY & LEONARD S. RUBENSTEIN, THE RIGHTS OF PEOPLE WITH MENTAL DISABILITIES 293 & nn.50-51 (1996) (arguing that institutionalized persons have a constitutional right to vote); Steven K. Metcalf, Comment, The Right To Vote of the Mentally Disabled in Oklahoma: A Case Study of Overinclusive Language and Fundamental Rights, 25 TULSA L.J. 171 (1989) (urging that strict scrutiny be applied to render unconstitutional statutes that prohibit the mentally ill from voting); Note, Mental Disability and the Right To Vote, 88 YALE L.J. 1644 (1979) (same); Note, Mental Illness: A Suspect Classification?, 83 YALE L.J. 1237, 1267 (1974) (arguing that mental disability restrictions violate equal protection).
327. See, e.g., ALA. CONST. art. VIII, § 182 (1901) (amended 1996), ALA. CONST. of 1875, art. VIII, § 3, cl. 2; ARK. CONST. art. III, § 5 (1874); ARK. CONST. of 1868, art. VIII, § 3, cl. 6; DEL. CONST. art. V, § 2 (1897); FLA. CONST. of 1886, art. VI, § 4; FLA. CONST. of 1868, art. XV, § 2; GA. CONST. of 1877, art. II, § 2, cl. 2; GA. CONST. of 1868, art. II, § 6, cl. 2; IDAHO CONST. art. VI, § 3 (1889) (amended 1950); KY. CONST. § 145, cl. 3 (1891) (amended 1955); LA. CONST. of 1879, art. 187; MD. CONST. art. I, § 2 (1867) (amended 1972); MD. CONST. of 1864, art. I, § 3; MISS. CONST. art. XII, § 241 (1890) (amended 1935); MISS. CONST. of 1869, art. VII, § 2; MO. CONST. of 1875, art. VIII, § 8; MONT. CONST. of 1889, art. IX, § 8; NEB. CONST. art. VII, § 2 (1875); NEV. CONST. art. II, § 1 (1864) (amended 1880); N.J. CONST. art. II, ¶ 6 (1947) (amended 1995); N.M. CONST. art. VII, § 1 (1911) (amended 1967); N.D. CONST. art. V, § 127 (1889) (amended 1978); OKLA. CONST. art. III, § 1 (1907) (amended 1918); S.C. CONST. art. II, § 6, cl. 2 (1895) (amended 1971); S.D. CONST. art. VII, § 8 (1889) (amended 1974); TEX. CONST. art. VI, § 1, cl. 2 (1876) (amended 1932); TEX. CONST. of 1869, art. VI; UTAH CONST. art. IV, § 6 (1895) (amended 1975); W. VA. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (1872) (amended 1994); W. VA. CONST. of 1863, art. III, § 1; WYO. CONST. art. VI, § 6 (1889) (amended 1996). Until recently, nearly every state prohibited "mental incompetents" from voting, either by constitution or by statute. See RICHARD C. ALLEN ET AL., MENTAL IMPAIRMENT AND LEGAL INCOMPETENCY 364-67 (1968) (reviewing the case law); THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 333-40 (Samuel J. Brakel & Ronald S. Rock eds., rev. ed. 1971) (reviewing constitutional and statutory provisions in chart form); SALES ET AL., supra note 193, at 101-04 (same); Joseph F. Vargyas, Voting Rights and Jury Duty, in 3 LEGAL RIGHTS OF MENTALLY DISABLED PERSONS 1771, 1771-81 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Criminal Law & Urban Problems Course Handbook Series No. 116, 1979) (reviewing the case law); Robert W. Stockstill, Comment, Voting and Election Law in the Louisiana Constitution, 46 LA. L. REV. 1253, 1258-60 (1986); Joel E. Smith, Annotation, Voting Rights of Persons Mentally Incapacitated, 80 A.L.R.3d 1116, 1116-33 (1977) (same). For recent developments, see BARBARA A. WEINER, Rights of Institutionalized Persons, in SAMUEL JAN BRAKEL ET AL., THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 251 (3d ed. 1985). Weiner writes: "While disenfranchisement of the mentally disabled was common in the past, today statutes in a number of states secure the vote to such individuals." Id. at 259. While occasional dicta in the 1970s suggested that disenfranchisement of the mentally disabled was constitutional, see, e.g., Shepherd v. Trevino, 575 F.2d 1110, 1115 (5th Cir. 1978) (comparing felons with "insane persons [who] have raised questions about their ability to vote responsibly"); Kronlund v. Honstein, 327 F. Supp. 71, 73 (N.D. Ga. 1971) (noting the state's interest in "preserving the integrity of her electoral process by removing from the process those persons with proven anti-social behavior whose behavior can be said to be destructive of society's aims," and declaring that "a State may prohibit idiots and insane persons . . . from participating in her elections"), it is unclear how the Supreme Court would rule today on an equal protection challenge to insanity clauses given its decision in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985). Cleburne held that mental retardation is not a quasi-suspect classification, see id. at 442, but rejected a ban on group homes under a rational basis standard, see id. at 450. Both before and after Cleburne, commentators argued that mental illness should be treated as a suspect classification under equal protection doctrine and that, consequently, mental disability restrictions on suffrage should he declared unconstitutional. See, e.g., ROBERT M. LEVY & LEONARD S. RUBENSTEIN, THE RIGHTS OF PEOPLE WITH MENTAL DISABILITIES 293 & nn.50-51 (1996) (arguing that institutionalized persons have a constitutional right to vote); Steven K. Metcalf, Comment, The Right To Vote of the Mentally Disabled in Oklahoma: A Case Study of Overinclusive Language and Fundamental Rights, 25 TULSA L.J. 171 (1989) (urging that strict scrutiny be applied to render unconstitutional statutes that prohibit the mentally ill from voting); Note, Mental Disability and the Right To Vote, 88 YALE L.J. 1644 (1979) (same); Note, Mental Illness: A Suspect Classification?, 83 YALE L.J. 1237, 1267 (1974) (arguing that mental disability restrictions violate equal protection).
328. See, e.g., ALA. CONST. art. VIII, § 182 (1901) (amended 1996), ALA. CONST. of 1875, art. VIII, § 3, cl. 2; ARK. CONST. art. III, § 5 (1874); ARK. CONST. of 1868, art. VIII, § 3, cl. 6; DEL. CONST. art. V, § 2 (1897); FLA. CONST. of 1886, art. VI, § 4; FLA. CONST. of 1868, art. XV, § 2; GA. CONST. of 1877, art. II, § 2, cl. 2; GA. CONST. of 1868, art. II, § 6, cl. 2; IDAHO CONST. art. VI, § 3 (1889) (amended 1950); KY. CONST. § 145, cl. 3 (1891) (amended 1955); LA. CONST. of 1879, art. 187; MD. CONST. art. I, § 2 (1867) (amended 1972); MD. CONST. of 1864, art. I, § 3; MISS. CONST. art. XII, § 241 (1890) (amended 1935); MISS. CONST. of 1869, art. VII, § 2; MO. CONST. of 1875, art. VIII, § 8; MONT. CONST. of 1889, art. IX, § 8; NEB. CONST. art. VII, § 2 (1875); NEV. CONST. art. II, § 1 (1864) (amended 1880); N.J. CONST. art. II, ¶ 6 (1947) (amended 1995); N.M. CONST. art. VII, § 1 (1911) (amended 1967); N.D. CONST. art. V, § 127 (1889) (amended 1978); OKLA. CONST. art. III, § 1 (1907) (amended 1918); S.C. CONST. art. II, § 6, cl. 2 (1895) (amended 1971); S.D. CONST. art. VII, § 8 (1889) (amended 1974); TEX. CONST. art. VI, § 1, cl. 2 (1876) (amended 1932); TEX. CONST. of 1869, art. VI; UTAH CONST. art. IV, § 6 (1895) (amended 1975); W. VA. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (1872) (amended 1994); W. VA. CONST. of 1863, art. III, § 1; WYO. CONST. art. VI, § 6 (1889) (amended 1996). Until recently, nearly every state prohibited "mental incompetents" from voting, either by constitution or by statute. See RICHARD C. ALLEN ET AL., MENTAL IMPAIRMENT AND LEGAL INCOMPETENCY 364-67 (1968) (reviewing the case law); THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 333-40 (Samuel J. Brakel & Ronald S. Rock eds., rev. ed. 1971) (reviewing constitutional and statutory provisions in chart form); SALES ET AL., supra note 193, at 101-04 (same); Joseph F. Vargyas, Voting Rights and Jury Duty, in 3 LEGAL RIGHTS OF MENTALLY DISABLED PERSONS 1771, 1771-81 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Criminal Law & Urban Problems Course Handbook Series No. 116, 1979) (reviewing the case law); Robert W. Stockstill, Comment, Voting and Election Law in the Louisiana Constitution, 46 LA. L. REV. 1253, 1258-60 (1986); Joel E. Smith, Annotation, Voting Rights of Persons Mentally Incapacitated, 80 A.L.R.3d 1116, 1116-33 (1977) (same). For recent developments, see BARBARA A. WEINER, Rights of Institutionalized Persons, in SAMUEL JAN BRAKEL ET AL., THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 251 (3d ed. 1985). Weiner writes: "While disenfranchisement of the mentally disabled was common in the past, today statutes in a number of states secure the vote to such individuals." Id. at 259. While occasional dicta in the 1970s suggested that disenfranchisement of the mentally disabled was constitutional, see, e.g., Shepherd v. Trevino, 575 F.2d 1110, 1115 (5th Cir. 1978) (comparing felons with "insane persons [who] have raised questions about their ability to vote responsibly"); Kronlund v. Honstein, 327 F. Supp. 71, 73 (N.D. Ga. 1971) (noting the state's interest in "preserving the integrity of her electoral process by removing from the process those persons with proven anti-social behavior whose behavior can be said to be destructive of society's aims," and declaring that "a State may prohibit idiots and insane persons . . . from participating in her elections"), it is unclear how the Supreme Court would rule today on an equal protection challenge to insanity clauses given its decision in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985). Cleburne held that mental retardation is not a quasi-suspect classification, see id. at 442, but rejected a ban on group homes under a rational basis standard, see id. at 450. Both before and after Cleburne, commentators argued that mental illness should be treated as a suspect classification under equal protection doctrine and that, consequently, mental disability restrictions on suffrage should he declared unconstitutional. See, e.g., ROBERT M. LEVY & LEONARD S. RUBENSTEIN, THE RIGHTS OF PEOPLE WITH MENTAL DISABILITIES 293 & nn.50-51 (1996) (arguing that institutionalized persons have a constitutional right to vote); Steven K. Metcalf, Comment, The Right To Vote of the Mentally Disabled in Oklahoma: A Case Study of Overinclusive Language and Fundamental Rights, 25 TULSA L.J. 171 (1989) (urging that strict scrutiny be applied to render unconstitutional statutes that prohibit the mentally ill from voting); Note, Mental Disability and the Right To Vote, 88 YALE L.J. 1644 (1979) (same); Note, Mental Illness: A Suspect Classification?, 83 YALE L.J. 1237, 1267 (1974) (arguing that mental disability restrictions violate equal protection).
329. See, e.g., ALA. CONST. art. VIII, § 182 (1901) (amended 1996), ALA. CONST. of 1875, art. VIII, § 3, cl. 2; ARK. CONST. art. III, § 5 (1874); ARK. CONST. of 1868, art. VIII, § 3, cl. 6; DEL. CONST. art. V, § 2 (1897); FLA. CONST. of 1886, art. VI, § 4; FLA. CONST. of 1868, art. XV, § 2; GA. CONST. of 1877, art. II, § 2, cl. 2; GA. CONST. of 1868, art. II, § 6, cl. 2; IDAHO CONST. art. VI, § 3 (1889) (amended 1950); KY. CONST. § 145, cl. 3 (1891) (amended 1955); LA. CONST. of 1879, art. 187; MD. CONST. art. I, § 2 (1867) (amended 1972); MD. CONST. of 1864, art. I, § 3; MISS. CONST. art. XII, § 241 (1890) (amended 1935); MISS. CONST. of 1869, art. VII, § 2; MO. CONST. of 1875, art. VIII, § 8; MONT. CONST. of 1889, art. IX, § 8; NEB. CONST. art. VII, § 2 (1875); NEV. CONST. art. II, § 1 (1864) (amended 1880); N.J. CONST. art. II, ¶ 6 (1947) (amended 1995); N.M. CONST. art. VII, § 1 (1911) (amended 1967); N.D. CONST. art. V, § 127 (1889) (amended 1978); OKLA. CONST. art. III, § 1 (1907) (amended 1918); S.C. CONST. art. II, § 6, cl. 2 (1895) (amended 1971); S.D. CONST. art. VII, § 8 (1889) (amended 1974); TEX. CONST. art. VI, § 1, cl. 2 (1876) (amended 1932); TEX. CONST. of 1869, art. VI; UTAH CONST. art. IV, § 6 (1895) (amended 1975); W. VA. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (1872) (amended 1994); W. VA. CONST. of 1863, art. III, § 1; WYO. CONST. art. VI, § 6 (1889) (amended 1996). Until recently, nearly every state prohibited "mental incompetents" from voting, either by constitution or by statute. See RICHARD C. ALLEN ET AL., MENTAL IMPAIRMENT AND LEGAL INCOMPETENCY 364-67 (1968) (reviewing the case law); THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 333-40 (Samuel J. Brakel & Ronald S. Rock eds., rev. ed. 1971) (reviewing constitutional and statutory provisions in chart form); SALES ET AL., supra note 193, at 101-04 (same); Joseph F. Vargyas, Voting Rights and Jury Duty, in 3 LEGAL RIGHTS OF MENTALLY DISABLED PERSONS 1771, 1771-81 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Criminal Law & Urban Problems Course Handbook Series No. 116, 1979) (reviewing the case law); Robert W. Stockstill, Comment, Voting and Election Law in the Louisiana Constitution, 46 LA. L. REV. 1253, 1258-60 (1986); Joel E. Smith, Annotation, Voting Rights of Persons Mentally Incapacitated, 80 A.L.R.3d 1116, 1116-33 (1977) (same). For recent developments, see BARBARA A. WEINER, Rights of Institutionalized Persons, in SAMUEL JAN BRAKEL ET AL., THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 251 (3d ed. 1985). Weiner writes: "While disenfranchisement of the mentally disabled was common in the past, today statutes in a number of states secure the vote to such individuals." Id. at 259. While occasional dicta in the 1970s suggested that disenfranchisement of the mentally disabled was constitutional, see, e.g., Shepherd v. Trevino, 575 F.2d 1110, 1115 (5th Cir. 1978) (comparing felons with "insane persons [who] have raised questions about their ability to vote responsibly"); Kronlund v. Honstein, 327 F. Supp. 71, 73 (N.D. Ga. 1971) (noting the state's interest in "preserving the integrity of her electoral process by removing from the process those persons with proven anti-social behavior whose behavior can be said to be destructive of society's aims," and declaring that "a State may prohibit idiots and insane persons . . . from participating in her elections"), it is unclear how the Supreme Court would rule today on an equal protection challenge to insanity clauses given its decision in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985). Cleburne held that mental retardation is not a quasi-suspect classification, see id. at 442, but rejected a ban on group homes under a rational basis standard, see id. at 450. Both before and after Cleburne, commentators argued that mental illness should be treated as a suspect classification under equal protection doctrine and that, consequently, mental disability restrictions on suffrage should he declared unconstitutional. See, e.g., ROBERT M. LEVY & LEONARD S. RUBENSTEIN, THE RIGHTS OF PEOPLE WITH MENTAL DISABILITIES 293 & nn.50-51 (1996) (arguing that institutionalized persons have a constitutional right to vote); Steven K. Metcalf, Comment, The Right To Vote of the Mentally Disabled in Oklahoma: A Case Study of Overinclusive Language and Fundamental Rights, 25 TULSA L.J. 171 (1989) (urging that strict scrutiny be applied to render unconstitutional statutes that prohibit the mentally ill from voting); Note, Mental Disability and the Right To Vote, 88 YALE L.J. 1644 (1979) (same); Note, Mental Illness: A Suspect Classification?, 83 YALE L.J. 1237, 1267 (1974) (arguing that mental disability restrictions violate equal protection).
330. See, e.g., ALA. CONST. art. VIII, § 182 (1901) (amended 1996), ALA. CONST. of 1875, art. VIII, § 3, cl. 2; ARK. CONST. art. III, § 5 (1874); ARK. CONST. of 1868, art. VIII, § 3, cl. 6; DEL. CONST. art. V, § 2 (1897); FLA. CONST. of 1886, art. VI, § 4; FLA. CONST. of 1868, art. XV, § 2; GA. CONST. of 1877, art. II, § 2, cl. 2; GA. CONST. of 1868, art. II, § 6, cl. 2; IDAHO CONST. art. VI, § 3 (1889) (amended 1950); KY. CONST. § 145, cl. 3 (1891) (amended 1955); LA. CONST. of 1879, art. 187; MD. CONST. art. I, § 2 (1867) (amended 1972); MD. CONST. of 1864, art. I, § 3; MISS. CONST. art. XII, § 241 (1890) (amended 1935); MISS. CONST. of 1869, art. VII, § 2; MO. CONST. of 1875, art. VIII, § 8; MONT. CONST. of 1889, art. IX, § 8; NEB. CONST. art. VII, § 2 (1875); NEV. CONST. art. II, § 1 (1864) (amended 1880); N.J. CONST. art. II, ¶ 6 (1947) (amended 1995); N.M. CONST. art. VII, § 1 (1911) (amended 1967); N.D. CONST. art. V, § 127 (1889) (amended 1978); OKLA. CONST. art. III, § 1 (1907) (amended 1918); S.C. CONST. art. II, § 6, cl. 2 (1895) (amended 1971); S.D. CONST. art. VII, § 8 (1889) (amended 1974); TEX.
331. See, e.g., ALA. CONST. art. VIII, § 182 (1901) (amended 1996), ALA. CONST. of 1875, art. VIII, § 3, cl. 2; ARK. CONST. art. III, § 5 (1874); ARK. CONST. of 1868, art. VIII, § 3, cl. 6; DEL. CONST. art. V, § 2 (1897); FLA. CONST. of 1886, art. VI, § 4; FLA. CONST. of 1868, art. XV, § 2; GA. CONST. of 1877, art. II, § 2, cl. 2; GA. CONST. of 1868, art. II, § 6, cl. 2; IDAHO CONST. art. VI, § 3 (1889) (amended 1950); KY. CONST. § 145, cl. 3 (1891) (amended 1955); LA. CONST. of 1879, art. 187; MD. CONST. art. I, § 2 (1867) (amended 1972); MD. CONST. of 1864, art. I, § 3; MISS. CONST. art. XII, § 241 (1890) (amended 1935); MISS. CONST. of 1869, art. VII, § 2; MO. CONST. of 1875, art. VIII, § 8; MONT. CONST. of 1889, art. IX, § 8; NEB. CONST. art. VII, § 2 (1875); NEV. CONST. art. II, § 1 (1864) (amended 1880); N.J. CONST. art. II, ¶ 6 (1947) (amended 1995); N.M. CONST. art. VII, § 1 (1911) (amended 1967); N.D. CONST. art. V, § 127 (1889) (amended 1978); OKLA. CONST. art. III, § 1 (1907) (amended 1918); S.C. CONST. art. II, § 6, cl. 2 (1895) (amended 1971); S.D. CONST. art. VII, § 8 (1889) (amended 1974); TEX. CONST. art. VI, § 1, cl. 2 (1876) (amended 1932); TEX. CONST. of 1869, art. VI; UTAH CONST. art. IV, § 6 (1895) (amended 1975); W. VA. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (1872) (amended 1994); W. VA. CONST. of 1863, art. III, § 1; WYO. CONST. art. VI, § 6 (1889) (amended 1996). Until recently, nearly every state prohibited "mental incompetents" from voting, either by constitution or by statute. See RICHARD C. ALLEN ET AL., MENTAL IMPAIRMENT AND LEGAL INCOMPETENCY 364-67 (1968) (reviewing the case law); THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 333-40 (Samuel J. Brakel & Ronald S. Rock eds., rev. ed. 1971) (reviewing constitutional and statutory provisions in chart form); SALES ET AL., supra note 193, at 101-04 (same); Joseph F. Vargyas, Voting Rights and Jury Duty, in 3 LEGAL RIGHTS OF MENTALLY DISABLED PERSONS 1771, 1771-81 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Criminal Law & Urban Problems Course Handbook Series No. 116, 1979) (reviewing the case law); Robert W. Stockstill, Comment, Voting and Election Law in the Louisiana Constitution, 46 LA. L. REV. 1253, 1258-60 (1986); Joel E. Smith, Annotation, Voting Rights of Persons Mentally Incapacitated, 80 A.L.R.3d 1116, 1116-33 (1977) (same). For recent developments, see BARBARA A. WEINER, Rights of Institutionalized Persons, in SAMUEL JAN BRAKEL ET AL., THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 251 (3d ed. 1985). Weiner writes: "While disenfranchisement of the mentally disabled was common in the past, today statutes in a number of states secure the vote to such individuals." Id. at 259. While occasional dicta in the 1970s suggested that disenfranchisement of the mentally disabled was constitutional, see, e.g., Shepherd v. Trevino, 575 F.2d 1110, 1115 (5th Cir. 1978) (comparing felons with "insane persons [who] have raised questions about their ability to vote responsibly"); Kronlund v. Honstein, 327 F. Supp. 71, 73 (N.D. Ga. 1971) (noting the state's interest in "preserving the integrity of her electoral process by removing from the process those persons with proven anti-social behavior whose behavior can be said to be destructive of society's aims," and declaring that "a State may prohibit idiots and insane persons . . . from participating in her elections"), it is unclear how the Supreme Court would rule today on an equal protection challenge to insanity clauses given its decision in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985). Cleburne held that mental retardation is not a quasi-suspect classification, see id. at 442, but rejected a ban on group homes under a rational basis standard, see id. at 450. Both before and after Cleburne, commentators argued that mental illness should be treated as a suspect classification under equal protection doctrine and that, consequently, mental disability restrictions on suffrage should he declared unconstitutional. See, e.g., ROBERT M. LEVY & LEONARD S. RUBENSTEIN, THE RIGHTS OF PEOPLE WITH MENTAL DISABILITIES 293 & nn.50-51 (1996) (arguing that institutionalized persons have a constitutional right to vote); Steven K. Metcalf, Comment, The Right To Vote of the Mentally Disabled in Oklahoma: A Case Study of Overinclusive Language and Fundamental Rights, 25 TULSA L.J. 171 (1989) (urging that strict scrutiny be applied to render unconstitutional statutes that prohibit the mentally ill from voting); Note, Mental Disability and the Right To Vote, 88 YALE L.J. 1644 (1979) (same); Note, Mental Illness: A Suspect Classification?, 83 YALE L.J. 1237, 1267 (1974) (arguing that mental disability restrictions violate equal protection).
332. See, e.g., ALA. CONST. art. VIII, § 182 (1901) (amended 1996), ALA. CONST. of 1875, art. VIII, § 3, cl. 2; ARK. CONST. art. III, § 5 (1874); ARK. CONST. of 1868, art. VIII, § 3, cl. 6; DEL. CONST. art. V, § 2 (1897); FLA. CONST. of 1886, art. VI, § 4; FLA. CONST. of 1868, art. XV, § 2; GA. CONST. of 1877, art. II, § 2, cl. 2; GA. CONST. of 1868, art. II, § 6, cl. 2; IDAHO CONST. art. VI, § 3 (1889) (amended 1950); KY. CONST. § 145, cl. 3 (1891) (amended 1955); LA. CONST. of 1879, art. 187; MD. CONST. art. I, § 2 (1867) (amended 1972); MD. CONST. of 1864, art. I, § 3; MISS. CONST. art. XII, § 241 (1890) (amended 1935); MISS. CONST. of 1869, art. VII, § 2; MO. CONST. of 1875, art. VIII, § 8; MONT. CONST. of 1889, art. IX, § 8; NEB. CONST. art. VII, § 2 (1875); NEV. CONST. art. II, § 1 (1864) (amended 1880); N.J. CONST. art. II, ¶ 6 (1947) (amended 1995); N.M. CONST. art. VII, § 1 (1911) (amended 1967); N.D. CONST. art. V, § 127 (1889) (amended 1978); OKLA. CONST. art. III, § 1 (1907) (amended 1918); S.C. CONST. art. II, § 6, cl. 2 (1895) (amended 1971); S.D. CONST. art. VII, § 8 (1889) (amended 1974); TEX. CONST. art. VI, § 1, cl. 2 (1876) (amended 1932); TEX. CONST. of 1869, art. VI; UTAH CONST. art. IV, § 6 (1895) (amended 1975); W. VA. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (1872) (amended 1994); W. VA. CONST. of 1863, art. III, § 1; WYO. CONST. art. VI, § 6 (1889) (amended 1996). Until recently, nearly every state prohibited "mental incompetents" from voting, either by constitution or by statute. See RICHARD C. ALLEN ET AL., MENTAL IMPAIRMENT AND LEGAL INCOMPETENCY 364-67 (1968) (reviewing the case law); THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 333-40 (Samuel J. Brakel & Ronald S. Rock eds., rev. ed. 1971) (reviewing constitutional and statutory provisions in chart form); SALES ET AL., supra note 193, at 101-04 (same); Joseph F. Vargyas, Voting Rights and Jury Duty, in 3 LEGAL RIGHTS OF MENTALLY DISABLED PERSONS 1771, 1771-81 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Criminal Law & Urban Problems Course Handbook Series No. 116, 1979) (reviewing the case law); Robert W. Stockstill, Comment, Voting and Election Law in the Louisiana Constitution, 46 LA. L. REV. 1253, 1258-60 (1986); Joel E. Smith, Annotation, Voting Rights of Persons Mentally Incapacitated, 80 A.L.R.3d 1116, 1116-33 (1977) (same). For recent developments, see BARBARA A. WEINER, Rights of Institutionalized Persons, in SAMUEL JAN BRAKEL ET AL., THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 251 (3d ed. 1985). Weiner writes: "While disenfranchisement of the mentally disabled was common in the past, today statutes in a number of states secure the vote to such individuals." Id. at 259. While occasional dicta in the 1970s suggested that disenfranchisement of the mentally disabled was constitutional, see, e.g., Shepherd v. Trevino, 575 F.2d 1110, 1115 (5th Cir. 1978) (comparing felons with "insane persons [who] have raised questions about their ability to vote responsibly"); Kronlund v. Honstein, 327 F. Supp. 71, 73 (N.D. Ga. 1971) (noting the state's interest in "preserving the integrity of her electoral process by removing from the process those persons with proven anti-social behavior whose behavior can be said to be destructive of society's aims," and declaring that "a State may prohibit idiots and insane persons . . . from participating in her elections"), it is unclear how the Supreme Court would rule today on an equal protection challenge to insanity clauses given its decision in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985). Cleburne held that mental retardation is not a quasi-suspect classification, see id. at 442, but rejected a ban on group homes under a rational basis standard, see id. at 450. Both before and after Cleburne, commentators argued that mental illness should be treated as a suspect classification under equal protection doctrine and that, consequently, mental disability restrictions on suffrage should he declared unconstitutional. See, e.g., ROBERT M. LEVY & LEONARD S. RUBENSTEIN, THE RIGHTS OF PEOPLE WITH MENTAL DISABILITIES 293 & nn.50-51 (1996) (arguing that institutionalized persons have a constitutional right to vote); Steven K. Metcalf, Comment, The Right To Vote of the Mentally Disabled in Oklahoma: A Case Study of Overinclusive Language and Fundamental Rights, 25 TULSA L.J. 171 (1989) (urging that strict scrutiny be applied to render unconstitutional statutes that prohibit the mentally ill from voting); Note, Mental Disability and the Right To Vote, 88 YALE L.J. 1644 (1979) (same); Note, Mental Illness: A Suspect Classification?, 83 YALE L.J. 1237, 1267 (1974) (arguing that mental disability restrictions violate equal protection).
333. See, e.g., ALA. CONST. art. VIII, § 182 (1901) (amended 1996), ALA. CONST. of 1875, art. VIII, § 3, cl. 2; ARK. CONST. art. III, § 5 (1874); ARK. CONST. of 1868, art. VIII, § 3, cl. 6; DEL. CONST. art. V, § 2 (1897); FLA. CONST. of 1886, art. VI, § 4; FLA. CONST. of 1868, art. XV, § 2; GA. CONST. of 1877, art. II, § 2, cl. 2; GA. CONST. of 1868, art. II, § 6, cl. 2; IDAHO CONST. art. VI, § 3 (1889) (amended 1950); KY. CONST. § 145, cl. 3 (1891) (amended 1955); LA. CONST. of 1879, art. 187; MD. CONST. art. I, § 2 (1867) (amended 1972); MD. CONST. of 1864, art. I, § 3; MISS. CONST. art. XII, § 241 (1890) (amended 1935); MISS. CONST. of 1869, art. VII, § 2; MO. CONST. of 1875, art. VIII, § 8; MONT. CONST. of 1889, art. IX, § 8; NEB. CONST. art. VII, § 2 (1875); NEV. CONST. art. II, § 1 (1864) (amended 1880); N.J. CONST. art. II, ¶ 6 (1947) (amended 1995); N.M. CONST. art. VII, § 1 (1911) (amended 1967); N.D. CONST. art. V, § 127 (1889) (amended 1978); OKLA. CONST. art. III, § 1 (1907) (amended 1918); S.C. CONST. art. II, § 6, cl. 2 (1895) (amended 1971); S.D. CONST. art. VII, § 8 (1889) (amended 1974); TEX. CONST. art. VI, § 1, cl. 2 (1876) (amended 1932); TEX. CONST. of 1869, art. VI; UTAH CONST. art. IV, § 6 (1895) (amended 1975); W. VA. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (1872) (amended 1994); W. VA. CONST. of 1863, art. III, § 1; WYO. CONST. art. VI, § 6 (1889) (amended 1996). Until recently, nearly every state prohibited "mental incompetents" from voting, either by constitution or by statute. See RICHARD C. ALLEN ET AL., MENTAL IMPAIRMENT AND LEGAL INCOMPETENCY 364-67 (1968) (reviewing the case law); THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 333-40 (Samuel J. Brakel & Ronald S. Rock eds., rev. ed. 1971) (reviewing constitutional and statutory provisions in chart form); SALES ET AL., supra note 193, at 101-04 (same); Joseph F. Vargyas, Voting Rights and Jury Duty, in 3 LEGAL RIGHTS OF MENTALLY DISABLED PERSONS 1771, 1771-81 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Criminal Law & Urban Problems Course Handbook Series No. 116, 1979) (reviewing the case law); Robert W. Stockstill, Comment, Voting and Election Law in the Louisiana Constitution, 46 LA. L. REV. 1253, 1258-60 (1986); Joel E. Smith, Annotation, Voting Rights of Persons Mentally Incapacitated, 80 A.L.R.3d 1116, 1116-33 (1977) (same). For recent developments, see BARBARA A. WEINER, Rights of Institutionalized Persons, in SAMUEL JAN BRAKEL ET AL., THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 251 (3d ed. 1985). Weiner writes: "While disenfranchisement of the mentally disabled was common in the past, today statutes in a number of states secure the vote to such individuals." Id. at 259. While occasional dicta in the 1970s suggested that disenfranchisement of the mentally disabled was constitutional, see, e.g., Shepherd v. Trevino, 575 F.2d 1110, 1115 (5th Cir. 1978) (comparing felons with "insane persons [who] have raised questions about their ability to vote responsibly"); Kronlund v. Honstein, 327 F. Supp. 71, 73 (N.D. Ga. 1971) (noting the state's interest in "preserving the integrity of her electoral process by removing from the process those persons with proven anti-social behavior whose behavior can be said to be destructive of society's aims," and declaring that "a State may prohibit idiots and insane persons . . . from participating in her elections"), it is unclear how the Supreme Court would rule today on an equal protection challenge to insanity clauses given its decision in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985). Cleburne held that mental retardation is not a quasi-suspect classification, see id. at 442, but rejected a ban on group homes under a rational basis standard, see id. at 450. Both before and after Cleburne, commentators argued that mental illness should be treated as a suspect classification under equal protection doctrine and that, consequently, mental disability restrictions on suffrage should he declared unconstitutional. See, e.g., ROBERT M. LEVY & LEONARD S. RUBENSTEIN, THE RIGHTS OF PEOPLE WITH MENTAL DISABILITIES 293 & nn.50-51 (1996) (arguing that institutionalized persons have a constitutional right to vote); Steven K. Metcalf, Comment, The Right To Vote of the Mentally Disabled in Oklahoma: A Case Study of Overinclusive Language and Fundamental Rights, 25 TULSA L.J. 171 (1989) (urging that strict scrutiny be applied to render unconstitutional statutes that prohibit the mentally ill from voting); Note, Mental Disability and the Right To Vote, 88 YALE L.J. 1644 (1979) (same); Note, Mental Illness: A Suspect Classification?, 83 YALE L.J. 1237, 1267 (1974) (arguing that mental disability restrictions violate equal protection).
334. See, e.g., ALA. CONST. art. VIII, § 182 (1901) (amended 1996), ALA. CONST. of 1875, art. VIII, § 3, cl. 2; ARK. CONST. art. III, § 5 (1874); ARK. CONST. of 1868, art. VIII, § 3, cl. 6; DEL. CONST. art. V, § 2 (1897); FLA. CONST. of 1886, art. VI, § 4; FLA. CONST. of 1868, art. XV, § 2; GA. CONST. of 1877, art. II, § 2, cl. 2; GA. CONST. of 1868, art. II, § 6, cl. 2; IDAHO CONST. art. VI, § 3 (1889) (amended 1950); KY. CONST. § 145, cl. 3 (1891) (amended 1955); LA. CONST. of 1879, art. 187; MD. CONST. art. I, § 2 (1867) (amended 1972); MD. CONST. of 1864, art. I, § 3; MISS. CONST. art. XII, § 241 (1890) (amended 1935); MISS. CONST. of 1869, art. VII, § 2; MO. CONST. of 1875, art. VIII, § 8; MONT. CONST. of 1889, art. IX, § 8; NEB. CONST. art. VII, § 2 (1875); NEV. CONST. art. II, § 1 (1864) (amended 1880); N.J. CONST. art. II, ¶ 6 (1947) (amended 1995); N.M. CONST. art. VII, § 1 (1911) (amended 1967); N.D. CONST. art. V, § 127 (1889) (amended 1978); OKLA. CONST. art. III, § 1 (1907) (amended 1918); S.C. CONST. art. II, § 6, cl. 2 (1895) (amended 1971); S.D. CONST. art. VII, § 8 (1889) (amended 1974); TEX. CONST. art. VI, § 1, cl. 2 (1876) (amended 1932); TEX. CONST. of 1869, art. VI; UTAH CONST. art. IV, § 6 (1895) (amended 1975); W. VA. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (1872) (amended 1994); W. VA. CONST. of 1863, art. III, § 1; WYO. CONST. art. VI, § 6 (1889) (amended 1996). Until recently, nearly every state prohibited "mental incompetents" from voting, either by constitution or by statute. See RICHARD C. ALLEN ET AL., MENTAL IMPAIRMENT AND LEGAL INCOMPETENCY 364-67 (1968) (reviewing the case law); THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 333-40 (Samuel J. Brakel & Ronald S. Rock eds., rev. ed. 1971) (reviewing constitutional and statutory provisions in chart form); SALES ET AL., supra note 193, at 101-04 (same); Joseph F. Vargyas, Voting Rights and Jury Duty, in 3 LEGAL RIGHTS OF MENTALLY DISABLED PERSONS 1771, 1771-81 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Criminal Law & Urban Problems Course Handbook Series No. 116, 1979) (reviewing the case law); Robert W. Stockstill, Comment, Voting and Election Law in the Louisiana Constitution, 46 LA. L. REV. 1253, 1258-60 (1986); Joel E. Smith, Annotation, Voting Rights of Persons Mentally Incapacitated, 80 A.L.R.3d 1116, 1116-33 (1977) (same). For recent developments, see BARBARA A. WEINER, Rights of Institutionalized Persons, in SAMUEL JAN BRAKEL ET AL., THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 251 (3d ed. 1985). Weiner writes: "While disenfranchisement of the mentally disabled was common in the past, today statutes in a number of states secure the vote to such individuals." Id. at 259. While occasional dicta in the 1970s suggested that disenfranchisement of the mentally disabled was constitutional, see, e.g., Shepherd v. Trevino, 575 F.2d 1110, 1115 (5th Cir. 1978) (comparing felons with "insane persons [who] have raised questions about their ability to vote responsibly"); Kronlund v. Honstein, 327 F. Supp. 71, 73 (N.D. Ga. 1971) (noting the state's interest in "preserving the integrity of her electoral process by removing from the process those persons with proven anti-social behavior whose behavior can be said to be destructive of society's aims," and declaring that "a State may prohibit idiots and insane persons . . . from participating in her elections"), it is unclear how the Supreme Court would rule today on an equal protection challenge to insanity clauses given its decision in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985). Cleburne held that mental retardation is not a quasi-suspect classification, see id. at 442, but rejected a ban on group homes under a rational basis standard, see id. at 450. Both before and after Cleburne, commentators argued that mental illness should be treated as a suspect classification under equal protection doctrine and that, consequently, mental disability restrictions on suffrage should he declared unconstitutional. See, e.g., ROBERT M. LEVY & LEONARD S. RUBENSTEIN, THE RIGHTS OF PEOPLE WITH MENTAL DISABILITIES 293 & nn.50-51 (1996) (arguing that institutionalized persons have a constitutional right to vote); Steven K. Metcalf, Comment, The Right To Vote of the Mentally Disabled in Oklahoma: A Case Study of Overinclusive Language and Fundamental Rights, 25 TULSA L.J. 171 (1989) (urging that strict scrutiny be applied to render unconstitutional statutes that prohibit the mentally ill from voting); Note, Mental Disability and the Right To Vote, 88 YALE L.J. 1644 (1979) (same); Note, Mental Illness: A Suspect Classification?, 83 YALE L.J. 1237, 1267 (1974) (arguing that mental disability restrictions violate equal protection).
335. See, e.g., ALA. CONST. art. VIII, § 182 (1901) (amended 1996), ALA. CONST. of 1875, art. VIII, § 3, cl. 2; ARK. CONST. art. III, § 5 (1874); ARK. CONST. of 1868, art. VIII, § 3, cl. 6; DEL. CONST. art. V, § 2 (1897); FLA. CONST. of 1886, art. VI, § 4; FLA. CONST. of 1868, art. XV, § 2; GA. CONST. of 1877, art. II, § 2, cl. 2; GA. CONST. of 1868, art. II, § 6, cl. 2; IDAHO CONST. art. VI, § 3 (1889) (amended 1950); KY. CONST. § 145, cl. 3 (1891) (amended 1955); LA. CONST. of 1879, art. 187; MD. CONST. art. I, § 2 (1867) (amended 1972); MD. CONST. of 1864, art. I, § 3; MISS. CONST. art. XII, § 241 (1890) (amended 1935); MISS. CONST. of 1869, art. VII, § 2; MO. CONST. of 1875, art. VIII, § 8; MONT. CONST. of 1889, art. IX, § 8; NEB. CONST. art. VII, § 2 (1875); NEV. CONST. art. II, § 1 (1864) (amended 1880); N.J. CONST. art. II, ¶ 6 (1947) (amended 1995); N.M. CONST. art. VII, § 1 (1911) (amended 1967); N.D. CONST. art. V, § 127 (1889) (amended 1978); OKLA. CONST. art. III, § 1 (1907) (amended 1918); S.C. CONST. art. II, § 6, cl. 2 (1895) (amended 1971); S.D. CONST. art. VII, § 8 (1889) (amended 1974); TEX. CONST. art. VI, § 1, cl. 2 (1876) (amended 1932); TEX. CONST. of 1869, art. VI; UTAH CONST. art. IV, § 6 (1895) (amended 1975); W. VA. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (1872) (amended 1994); W. VA. CONST. of 1863, art. III, § 1; WYO. CONST. art. VI, § 6 (1889) (amended 1996). Until recently, nearly every state prohibited "mental incompetents" from voting, either by constitution or by statute. See RICHARD C. ALLEN ET AL., MENTAL IMPAIRMENT AND LEGAL INCOMPETENCY 364-67 (1968) (reviewing the case law); THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 333-40 (Samuel J. Brakel & Ronald S. Rock eds., rev. ed. 1971) (reviewing constitutional and statutory provisions in chart form); SALES ET AL., supra note 193, at 101-04 (same); Joseph F. Vargyas, Voting Rights and Jury Duty, in 3 LEGAL RIGHTS OF MENTALLY DISABLED PERSONS 1771, 1771-81 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Criminal Law & Urban Problems Course Handbook Series No. 116, 1979) (reviewing the case law); Robert W. Stockstill, Comment, Voting and Election Law in the Louisiana Constitution, 46 LA. L. REV. 1253, 1258-60 (1986); Joel E. Smith, Annotation, Voting Rights of Persons Mentally Incapacitated, 80 A.L.R.3d 1116, 1116-33 (1977) (same). For recent developments, see BARBARA A. WEINER, Rights of Institutionalized Persons, in SAMUEL JAN BRAKEL ET AL., THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 251 (3d ed. 1985). Weiner writes: "While disenfranchisement of the mentally disabled was common in the past, today statutes in a number of states secure the vote to such individuals." Id. at 259. While occasional dicta in the 1970s suggested that disenfranchisement of the mentally disabled was constitutional, see, e.g., Shepherd v. Trevino, 575 F.2d 1110, 1115 (5th Cir. 1978) (comparing felons with "insane persons [who] have raised questions about their ability to vote responsibly"); Kronlund v. Honstein, 327 F. Supp. 71, 73 (N.D. Ga. 1971) (noting the state's interest in "preserving the integrity of her electoral process by removing from the process those persons with proven anti-social behavior whose behavior can be said to be destructive of society's aims," and declaring that "a State may prohibit idiots and insane persons . . . from participating in her elections"), it is unclear how the Supreme Court would rule today on an equal protection challenge to insanity clauses given its decision in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985). Cleburne held that mental retardation is not a quasi-suspect classification, see id. at 442, but rejected a ban on group homes under a rational basis standard, see id. at 450. Both before and after Cleburne, commentators argued that mental illness should be treated as a suspect classification under equal protection doctrine and that, consequently, mental disability restrictions on suffrage should he declared unconstitutional. See, e.g., ROBERT M. LEVY & LEONARD S. RUBENSTEIN, THE RIGHTS OF PEOPLE WITH MENTAL DISABILITIES 293 & nn.50-51 (1996) (arguing that institutionalized persons have a constitutional right to vote); Steven K. Metcalf, Comment, The Right To Vote of the Mentally Disabled in Oklahoma: A Case Study of Overinclusive Language and Fundamental Rights, 25 TULSA L.J. 171 (1989) (urging that strict scrutiny be applied to render unconstitutional statutes that prohibit the mentally ill from voting); Note, Mental Disability and the Right To Vote, 88 YALE L.J. 1644 (1979) (same); Note, Mental Illness: A Suspect Classification?, 83 YALE L.J. 1237, 1267 (1974) (arguing that mental disability restrictions violate equal protection).
336. See, e.g., ALA. CONST. art. VIII, § 182 (1901) (amended 1996), ALA. CONST. of 1875, art. VIII, § 3, cl. 2; ARK. CONST. art. III, § 5 (1874); ARK. CONST. of 1868, art. VIII, § 3, cl. 6; DEL. CONST. art. V, § 2 (1897); FLA. CONST. of 1886, art. VI, § 4; FLA. CONST. of 1868, art. XV, § 2; GA. CONST. of 1877, art. II, § 2, cl. 2; GA. CONST. of 1868, art. II, § 6, cl. 2; IDAHO CONST. art. VI, § 3 (1889) (amended 1950); KY. CONST. § 145, cl. 3 (1891) (amended 1955); LA. CONST. of 1879, art. 187; MD. CONST. art. I, § 2 (1867) (amended 1972); MD. CONST. of 1864, art. I, § 3; MISS. CONST. art. XII, § 241 (1890) (amended 1935); MISS. CONST. of 1869, art. VII, § 2; MO. CONST. of 1875, art. VIII, § 8; MONT. CONST. of 1889, art. IX, § 8; NEB. CONST. art. VII, § 2 (1875); NEV. CONST. art. II, § 1 (1864) (amended 1880); N.J. CONST. art. II, ¶ 6 (1947) (amended 1995); N.M. CONST. art. VII, § 1 (1911) (amended 1967); N.D. CONST. art. V, § 127 (1889) (amended 1978); OKLA. CONST. art. III, § 1 (1907) (amended 1918); S.C. CONST. art. II, § 6, cl. 2 (1895) (amended 1971); S.D. CONST. art. VII, § 8 (1889) (amended 1974); TEX. CONST. art. VI, § 1, cl. 2 (1876) (amended 1932); TEX. CONST. of 1869, art. VI; UTAH CONST. art. IV, § 6 (1895) (amended 1975); W. VA. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (1872) (amended 1994); W. VA. CONST. of 1863, art. III, § 1; WYO. CONST. art. VI, § 6 (1889) (amended 1996). Until recently, nearly every state prohibited "mental incompetents" from voting, either by constitution or by statute. See RICHARD C. ALLEN ET AL., MENTAL IMPAIRMENT AND LEGAL INCOMPETENCY 364-67 (1968) (reviewing the case law); THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 333-40 (Samuel J. Brakel & Ronald S. Rock eds., rev. ed. 1971) (reviewing constitutional and statutory provisions in chart form); SALES ET AL., supra note 193, at 101-04 (same); Joseph F. Vargyas, Voting Rights and Jury Duty, in 3 LEGAL RIGHTS OF MENTALLY DISABLED PERSONS 1771, 1771-81 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Criminal Law & Urban Problems Course Handbook Series No. 116, 1979) (reviewing the case law); Robert W. Stockstill, Comment, Voting and Election Law in the Louisiana Constitution, 46 LA. L. REV. 1253, 1258-60 (1986); Joel E. Smith, Annotation, Voting Rights of Persons Mentally Incapacitated, 80 A.L.R.3d 1116, 1116-33 (1977) (same). For recent developments, see BARBARA A. WEINER, Rights of Institutionalized Persons, in SAMUEL JAN BRAKEL ET AL., THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 251 (3d ed. 1985). Weiner writes: "While disenfranchisement of the mentally disabled was common in the past, today statutes in a number of states secure the vote to such individuals." Id. at 259. While occasional dicta in the 1970s suggested that disenfranchisement of the mentally disabled was constitutional, see, e.g., Shepherd v. Trevino, 575 F.2d 1110, 1115 (5th Cir. 1978) (comparing felons with "insane persons [who] have raised questions about their ability to vote responsibly"); Kronlund v. Honstein, 327 F. Supp. 71, 73 (N.D. Ga. 1971) (noting the state's interest in "preserving the integrity of her electoral process by removing from the process those persons with proven anti-social behavior whose behavior can be said to be destructive of society's aims," and declaring that "a State may prohibit idiots and insane persons . . . from participating in her elections"), it is unclear how the Supreme Court would rule today on an equal protection challenge to insanity clauses given its decision in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985). Cleburne held that mental retardation is not a quasi-suspect classification, see id. at 442, but rejected a ban on group homes under a rational basis standard, see id. at 450. Both before and after Cleburne, commentators argued that mental illness should be treated as a suspect classification under equal protection doctrine and that, consequently, mental disability restrictions on suffrage should he declared unconstitutional. See, e.g., ROBERT M. LEVY & LEONARD S. RUBENSTEIN, THE RIGHTS OF PEOPLE WITH MENTAL DISABILITIES 293 & nn.50-51 (1996) (arguing that institutionalized persons have a constitutional right to vote); Steven K. Metcalf, Comment, The Right To Vote of the Mentally Disabled in Oklahoma: A Case Study of Overinclusive Language and Fundamental Rights, 25 TULSA L.J. 171 (1989) (urging that strict scrutiny be applied to render unconstitutional statutes that prohibit the mentally ill from voting); Note, Mental Disability and the Right To Vote, 88 YALE L.J. 1644 (1979) (same); Note, Mental Illness: A Suspect Classification?, 83 YALE L.J. 1237, 1267 (1974) (arguing that mental disability restrictions violate equal protection).
337. See, e.g., ALA. CONST. art. VIII, § 182 (1901) (amended 1996), ALA. CONST. of 1875, art. VIII, § 3, cl. 2; ARK. CONST. art. III, § 5 (1874); ARK. CONST. of 1868, art. VIII, § 3, cl. 6; DEL. CONST. art. V, § 2 (1897); FLA. CONST. of 1886, art. VI, § 4; FLA. CONST. of 1868, art. XV, § 2; GA. CONST. of 1877, art. II, § 2, cl. 2; GA. CONST. of 1868, art. II, § 6, cl. 2; IDAHO CONST. art. VI, § 3 (1889) (amended 1950); KY. CONST. § 145, cl. 3 (1891) (amended 1955); LA. CONST. of 1879, art. 187; MD. CONST. art. I, § 2 (1867) (amended 1972); MD. CONST. of 1864, art. I, § 3; MISS. CONST. art. XII, § 241 (1890) (amended 1935); MISS. CONST. of 1869, art. VII, § 2; MO. CONST. of 1875, art. VIII, § 8; MONT. CONST. of 1889, art. IX, § 8; NEB. CONST. art. VII, § 2 (1875); NEV. CONST. art. II, § 1 (1864) (amended 1880); N.J. CONST. art. II, ¶ 6 (1947) (amended 1995); N.M. CONST. art. VII, § 1 (1911) (amended 1967); N.D. CONST. art. V, § 127 (1889) (amended 1978); OKLA. CONST. art. III, § 1 (1907) (amended 1918); S.C. CONST. art. II, § 6, cl. 2 (1895) (amended 1971); S.D. CONST. art. VII, § 8 (1889) (amended 1974); TEX. CONST. art. VI, § 1, cl. 2 (1876) (amended 1932); TEX. CONST. of 1869, art. VI; UTAH CONST. art. IV, § 6 (1895) (amended 1975); W. VA. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (1872) (amended 1994); W. VA. CONST. of 1863, art. III, § 1; WYO. CONST. art. VI, § 6 (1889) (amended 1996). Until recently, nearly every state prohibited "mental incompetents" from voting, either by constitution or by statute. See RICHARD C. ALLEN ET AL., MENTAL IMPAIRMENT AND LEGAL INCOMPETENCY 364-67 (1968) (reviewing the case law); THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 333-40 (Samuel J. Brakel & Ronald S. Rock eds., rev. ed. 1971) (reviewing constitutional and statutory provisions in chart form); SALES ET AL., supra note 193, at 101-04 (same); Joseph F. Vargyas, Voting Rights and Jury Duty, in 3 LEGAL RIGHTS OF MENTALLY DISABLED PERSONS 1771, 1771-81 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Criminal Law & Urban Problems Course Handbook Series No. 116, 1979) (reviewing the case law); Robert W. Stockstill, Comment, Voting and Election Law in the Louisiana Constitution, 46 LA. L. REV. 1253, 1258-60 (1986); Joel E. Smith, Annotation, Voting Rights of Persons Mentally Incapacitated, 80 A.L.R.3d 1116, 1116-33 (1977) (same). For recent developments, see BARBARA A. WEINER, Rights of Institutionalized Persons, in SAMUEL JAN BRAKEL ET AL., THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 251 (3d ed. 1985). Weiner writes: "While disenfranchisement of the mentally disabled was common in the past, today statutes in a number of states secure the vote to such individuals." Id. at 259. While occasional dicta in the 1970s suggested that disenfranchisement of the mentally disabled was constitutional, see, e.g., Shepherd v. Trevino, 575 F.2d 1110, 1115 (5th Cir. 1978) (comparing felons with "insane persons [who] have raised questions about their ability to vote responsibly"); Kronlund v. Honstein, 327 F. Supp. 71, 73 (N.D. Ga. 1971) (noting the state's interest in "preserving the integrity of her electoral process by removing from the process those persons with proven anti-social behavior whose behavior can be said to be destructive of society's aims," and declaring that "a State may prohibit idiots and insane persons . . . from participating in her elections"), it is unclear how the Supreme Court would rule today on an equal protection challenge to insanity clauses given its decision in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985). Cleburne held that mental retardation is not a quasi-suspect classification, see id. at 442, but rejected a ban on group homes under a rational basis standard, see id. at 450. Both before and after Cleburne, commentators argued that mental illness should be treated as a suspect classification under equal protection doctrine and that, consequently, mental disability restrictions on suffrage should he declared unconstitutional. See, e.g., ROBERT M. LEVY & LEONARD S. RUBENSTEIN, THE RIGHTS OF PEOPLE WITH MENTAL DISABILITIES 293 & nn.50-51 (1996) (arguing that institutionalized persons have a constitutional right to vote); Steven K. Metcalf, Comment, The Right To Vote of the Mentally Disabled in Oklahoma: A Case Study of Overinclusive Language and Fundamental Rights, 25 TULSA L.J. 171 (1989) (urging that strict scrutiny be applied to render unconstitutional statutes that prohibit the mentally ill from voting); Note, Mental Disability and the Right To Vote, 88 YALE L.J. 1644 (1979) (same); Note, Mental Illness: A Suspect Classification?, 83 YALE L.J. 1237, 1267 (1974) (arguing that mental disability restrictions violate equal protection).
338. See, e.g., ALA. CONST. art. VIII, § 182 (1901) (amended 1996), ALA. CONST. of 1875, art. VIII, § 3, cl. 2; ARK. CONST. art. III, § 5 (1874); ARK. CONST. of 1868, art. VIII, § 3, cl. 6; DEL. CONST. art. V, § 2 (1897); FLA. CONST. of 1886, art. VI, § 4; FLA. CONST. of 1868, art. XV, § 2; GA. CONST. of 1877, art. II, § 2, cl. 2; GA. CONST. of 1868, art. II, § 6, cl. 2; IDAHO CONST. art. VI, § 3 (1889) (amended 1950); KY. CONST. § 145, cl. 3 (1891) (amended 1955); LA. CONST. of 1879, art. 187; MD. CONST. art. I, § 2 (1867) (amended 1972); MD. CONST. of 1864, art. I, § 3; MISS. CONST. art. XII, § 241 (1890) (amended 1935); MISS. CONST. of 1869, art. VII, § 2; MO. CONST. of 1875, art. VIII, § 8; MONT. CONST. of 1889, art. IX, § 8; NEB. CONST. art. VII, § 2 (1875); NEV. CONST. art. II, § 1 (1864) (amended 1880); N.J. CONST. art. II, ¶ 6 (1947) (amended 1995); N.M. CONST. art. VII, § 1 (1911) (amended 1967); N.D. CONST. art. V, § 127 (1889) (amended 1978); OKLA. CONST. art. III, § 1 (1907) (amended 1918); S.C. CONST. art. II, § 6, cl. 2 (1895) (amended 1971); S.D. CONST. art. VII, § 8 (1889) (amended 1974); TEX. CONST. art. VI, § 1, cl. 2 (1876) (amended 1932); TEX. CONST. of 1869, art. VI; UTAH CONST. art. IV, § 6 (1895) (amended 1975); W. VA. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (1872) (amended 1994); W. VA. CONST. of 1863, art. III, § 1; WYO. CONST. art. VI, § 6 (1889) (amended 1996). Until recently, nearly every state prohibited "mental incompetents" from voting, either by constitution or by statute. See RICHARD C. ALLEN ET AL., MENTAL IMPAIRMENT AND LEGAL INCOMPETENCY 364-67 (1968) (reviewing the case law); THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 333-40 (Samuel J. Brakel & Ronald S. Rock eds., rev. ed. 1971) (reviewing constitutional and statutory provisions in chart form); SALES ET AL., supra note 193, at 101-04 (same); Joseph F. Vargyas, Voting Rights and Jury Duty, in 3 LEGAL RIGHTS OF MENTALLY DISABLED PERSONS 1771, 1771-81 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Criminal Law & Urban Problems Course Handbook Series No. 116, 1979) (reviewing the case law); Robert W. Stockstill, Comment, Voting and Election Law in the Louisiana Constitution, 46 LA. L. REV. 1253, 1258-60 (1986); Joel E. Smith, Annotation, Voting Rights of Persons Mentally Incapacitated, 80 A.L.R.3d 1116, 1116-33 (1977) (same). For recent developments, see BARBARA A. WEINER, Rights of Institutionalized Persons, in SAMUEL JAN BRAKEL ET AL., THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 251 (3d ed. 1985). Weiner writes: "While disenfranchisement of the mentally disabled was common in the past, today statutes in a number of states secure the vote to such individuals." Id. at 259. While occasional dicta in the 1970s suggested that disenfranchisement of the mentally disabled was constitutional, see, e.g., Shepherd v. Trevino, 575 F.2d 1110, 1115 (5th Cir. 1978) (comparing felons with "insane persons [who] have raised questions about their ability to vote responsibly"); Kronlund v. Honstein, 327 F. Supp. 71, 73 (N.D. Ga. 1971) (noting the state's interest in "preserving the integrity of her electoral process by removing from the process those persons with proven anti-social behavior whose behavior can be said to be destructive of society's aims," and declaring that "a State may prohibit idiots and insane persons . . . from participating in her elections"), it is unclear how the Supreme Court would rule today on an equal protection challenge to insanity clauses given its decision in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985). Cleburne held that mental retardation is not a quasi-suspect classification, see id. at 442, but rejected a ban on group homes under a rational basis standard, see id. at 450. Both before and after Cleburne, commentators argued that mental illness should be treated as a suspect classification under equal protection doctrine and that, consequently, mental disability restrictions on suffrage should he declared unconstitutional. See, e.g., ROBERT M. LEVY & LEONARD S. RUBENSTEIN, THE RIGHTS OF PEOPLE WITH MENTAL DISABILITIES 293 & nn.50-51 (1996) (arguing that institutionalized persons have a constitutional right to vote); Steven K. Metcalf, Comment, The Right To Vote of the Mentally Disabled in Oklahoma: A Case Study of Overinclusive Language and Fundamental Rights, 25 TULSA L.J. 171 (1989) (urging that strict scrutiny be applied to render unconstitutional statutes that prohibit the mentally ill from voting); Note, Mental Disability and the Right To Vote, 88 YALE L.J. 1644 (1979) (same); Note, Mental Illness: A Suspect Classification?, 83 YALE L.J. 1237, 1267 (1974) (arguing that mental disability restrictions violate equal protection).
339. See, e.g., ALA. CONST. art. VIII, § 182 (1901) (amended 1996), ALA. CONST. of 1875, art. VIII, § 3, cl. 2; ARK. CONST. art. III, § 5 (1874); ARK. CONST. of 1868, art. VIII, § 3, cl. 6; DEL. CONST. art. V, § 2 (1897); FLA. CONST. of 1886, art. VI, § 4; FLA. CONST. of 1868, art. XV, § 2; GA. CONST. of 1877, art. II, § 2, cl. 2; GA. CONST. of 1868, art. II, § 6, cl. 2; IDAHO CONST. art. VI, § 3 (1889) (amended 1950); KY. CONST. § 145, cl. 3 (1891) (amended 1955); LA. CONST. of 1879, art. 187; MD. CONST. art. I, § 2 (1867) (amended 1972); MD. CONST. of 1864, art. I, § 3; MISS. CONST. art. XII, § 241 (1890) (amended 1935); MISS. CONST. of 1869, art. VII, § 2; MO. CONST. of 1875, art. VIII, § 8; MONT. CONST. of 1889, art. IX, § 8; NEB. CONST. art. VII, § 2 (1875); NEV. CONST. art. II, § 1 (1864) (amended 1880); N.J. CONST. art. II, ¶ 6 (1947) (amended 1995); N.M. CONST. art. VII, § 1 (1911) (amended 1967); N.D. CONST. art. V, § 127 (1889) (amended 1978); OKLA. CONST. art. III, § 1 (1907) (amended 1918); S.C. CONST. art. II, § 6, cl. 2 (1895) (amended 1971); S.D. CONST. art. VII, § 8 (1889) (amended 1974); TEX. CONST. art. VI, § 1, cl. 2 (1876) (amended 1932); TEX. CONST. of 1869, art. VI; UTAH CONST. art. IV, § 6 (1895) (amended 1975); W. VA. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (1872) (amended 1994); W. VA. CONST. of 1863, art. III, § 1; WYO. CONST. art. VI, § 6 (1889) (amended 1996). Until recently, nearly every state prohibited "mental incompetents" from voting, either by constitution or by statute. See RICHARD C. ALLEN ET AL., MENTAL IMPAIRMENT AND LEGAL INCOMPETENCY 364-67 (1968) (reviewing the case law); THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 333-40 (Samuel J. Brakel & Ronald S. Rock eds., rev. ed. 1971) (reviewing constitutional and statutory provisions in chart form); SALES ET AL., supra note 193, at 101-04 (same); Joseph F. Vargyas, Voting Rights and Jury Duty, in 3 LEGAL RIGHTS OF MENTALLY DISABLED PERSONS 1771, 1771-81 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Criminal Law & Urban Problems Course Handbook Series No. 116, 1979) (reviewing the case law); Robert W. Stockstill, Comment, Voting and Election Law in the Louisiana Constitution, 46 LA. L. REV. 1253, 1258-60 (1986); Joel E. Smith, Annotation, Voting Rights of Persons Mentally Incapacitated, 80 A.L.R.3d 1116, 1116-33 (1977) (same). For recent developments, see BARBARA A. WEINER, Rights of Institutionalized Persons, in SAMUEL JAN BRAKEL ET AL., THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 251 (3d ed. 1985). Weiner writes: "While disenfranchisement of the mentally disabled was common in the past, today statutes in a number of states secure the vote to such individuals." Id. at 259. While occasional dicta in the 1970s suggested that disenfranchisement of the mentally disabled was constitutional, see, e.g., Shepherd v. Trevino, 575 F.2d 1110, 1115 (5th Cir. 1978) (comparing felons with "insane persons [who] have raised questions about their ability to vote responsibly"); Kronlund v. Honstein, 327 F. Supp. 71, 73 (N.D. Ga. 1971) (noting the state's interest in "preserving the integrity of her electoral process by removing from the process those persons with proven anti-social behavior whose behavior can be said to be destructive of society's aims," and declaring that "a State may prohibit idiots and insane persons . . . from participating in her elections"), it is unclear how the Supreme Court would rule today on an equal protection challenge to insanity clauses given its decision in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985). Cleburne held that mental retardation is not a quasi-suspect classification, see id. at 442, but rejected a ban on group homes under a rational basis standard, see id. at 450. Both before and after Cleburne, commentators argued that mental illness should be treated as a suspect classification under equal protection doctrine and that, consequently, mental disability restrictions on suffrage should he declared unconstitutional. See, e.g., ROBERT M. LEVY & LEONARD S. RUBENSTEIN, THE RIGHTS OF PEOPLE WITH MENTAL DISABILITIES 293 & nn.50-51 (1996) (arguing that institutionalized persons have a constitutional right to vote); Steven K. Metcalf, Comment, The Right To Vote of the Mentally Disabled in Oklahoma: A Case Study of Overinclusive Language and Fundamental Rights, 25 TULSA L.J. 171 (1989) (urging that strict scrutiny be applied to render unconstitutional statutes that prohibit the mentally ill from voting); Note, Mental Disability and the Right To Vote, 88 YALE L.J. 1644 (1979) (same); Note, Mental Illness: A Suspect Classification?, 83 YALE L.J. 1237, 1267 (1974) (arguing that mental disability restrictions violate equal protection).
340. See, e.g., ALA. CONST. art. VIII, § 182 (1901) (amended 1996), ALA. CONST. of 1875, art. VIII, § 3, cl. 2; ARK. CONST. art. III, § 5 (1874); ARK. CONST. of 1868, art. VIII, § 3, cl. 6; DEL. CONST. art. V, § 2 (1897); FLA. CONST. of 1886, art. VI, § 4; FLA. CONST. of 1868, art. XV, § 2; GA. CONST. of 1877, art. II, § 2, cl. 2; GA. CONST. of 1868, art. II, § 6, cl. 2; IDAHO CONST. art. VI, § 3 (1889) (amended 1950); KY. CONST. § 145, cl. 3 (1891) (amended 1955); LA. CONST. of 1879, art. 187; MD. CONST. art. I, § 2 (1867) (amended 1972); MD. CONST. of 1864, art. I, § 3; MISS. CONST. art. XII, § 241 (1890) (amended 1935); MISS. CONST. of 1869, art. VII, § 2; MO. CONST. of 1875, art. VIII, § 8; MONT. CONST. of 1889, art. IX, § 8; NEB. CONST. art. VII, § 2 (1875); NEV. CONST. art. II, § 1 (1864) (amended 1880); N.J. CONST. art. II, ¶ 6 (1947) (amended 1995); N.M. CONST. art. VII, § 1 (1911) (amended 1967); N.D. CONST. art. V, § 127 (1889) (amended 1978); OKLA. CONST. art. III, § 1 (1907) (amended 1918); S.C. CONST. art. II, § 6, cl. 2 (1895) (amended 1971); S.D. CONST. art. VII, § 8 (1889) (amended 1974); TEX. CONST. art. VI, § 1, cl. 2 (1876) (amended 1932); TEX. CONST. of 1869, art. VI; UTAH CONST. art. IV, § 6 (1895) (amended 1975); W. VA. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (1872) (amended 1994); W. VA. CONST. of 1863, art. III, § 1; WYO. CONST. art. VI, § 6 (1889) (amended 1996). Until recently, nearly every state prohibited "mental incompetents" from voting, either by constitution or by statute. See RICHARD C. ALLEN ET AL., MENTAL IMPAIRMENT AND LEGAL INCOMPETENCY 364-67 (1968) (reviewing the case law); THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 333-40 (Samuel J. Brakel & Ronald S. Rock eds., rev. ed. 1971) (reviewing constitutional and statutory provisions in chart form); SALES ET AL., supra note 193, at 101-04 (same); Joseph F. Vargyas, Voting Rights and Jury Duty, in 3 LEGAL RIGHTS OF MENTALLY DISABLED PERSONS 1771, 1771-81 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Criminal Law & Urban Problems Course Handbook Series No. 116, 1979) (reviewing the case law); Robert W. Stockstill, Comment, Voting and Election Law in the Louisiana Constitution, 46 LA. L. REV. 1253, 1258-60 (1986); Joel E. Smith, Annotation, Voting Rights of Persons Mentally Incapacitated, 80 A.L.R.3d 1116, 1116-33 (1977) (same). For recent developments, see BARBARA A. WEINER, Rights of Institutionalized Persons, in SAMUEL JAN BRAKEL ET AL., THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 251 (3d ed. 1985). Weiner writes: "While disenfranchisement of the mentally disabled was common in the past, today statutes in a number of states secure the vote to such individuals." Id. at 259. While occasional dicta in the 1970s suggested that disenfranchisement of the mentally disabled was constitutional, see, e.g., Shepherd v. Trevino, 575 F.2d 1110, 1115 (5th Cir. 1978) (comparing felons with "insane persons [who] have raised questions about their ability to vote responsibly"); Kronlund v. Honstein, 327 F. Supp. 71, 73 (N.D. Ga. 1971) (noting the state's interest in "preserving the integrity of her electoral process by removing from the process those persons with proven anti-social behavior whose behavior can be said to be destructive of society's aims," and declaring that "a State may prohibit idiots and insane persons . . . from participating in her elections"), it is unclear how the Supreme Court would rule today on an equal protection challenge to insanity clauses given its decision in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985). Cleburne held that mental retardation is not a quasi-suspect classification, see id. at 442, but rejected a ban on group homes under a rational basis standard, see id. at 450. Both before and after Cleburne, commentators argued that mental illness should be treated as a suspect classification under equal protection doctrine and that, consequently, mental disability restrictions on suffrage should he declared unconstitutional. See, e.g., ROBERT M. LEVY & LEONARD S. RUBENSTEIN, THE RIGHTS OF PEOPLE WITH MENTAL DISABILITIES 293 & nn.50-51 (1996) (arguing that institutionalized persons have a constitutional right to vote); Steven K. Metcalf, Comment, The Right To Vote of the Mentally Disabled in Oklahoma: A Case Study of Overinclusive Language and Fundamental Rights, 25 TULSA L.J. 171 (1989) (urging that strict scrutiny be applied to render unconstitutional statutes that prohibit the mentally ill from voting); Note, Mental Disability and the Right To Vote, 88 YALE L.J. 1644 (1979) (same); Note, Mental Illness: A Suspect Classification?, 83 YALE L.J. 1237, 1267 (1974) (arguing that mental disability restrictions violate equal protection).
341. See, e.g., ALA. CONST. art. VIII, § 182 (1901) (amended 1996), ALA. CONST. of 1875, art. VIII, § 3, cl. 2; ARK. CONST. art. III, § 5 (1874); ARK. CONST. of 1868, art. VIII, § 3, cl. 6; DEL. CONST. art. V, § 2 (1897); FLA. CONST. of 1886, art. VI, § 4; FLA. CONST. of 1868, art. XV, § 2; GA. CONST. of 1877, art. II, § 2, cl. 2; GA. CONST. of 1868, art. II, § 6, cl. 2; IDAHO CONST. art. VI, § 3 (1889) (amended 1950); KY. CONST. § 145, cl. 3 (1891) (amended 1955); LA. CONST. of 1879, art. 187; MD. CONST. art. I, § 2 (1867) (amended 1972); MD. CONST. of 1864, art. I, § 3; MISS. CONST. art. XII, § 241 (1890) (amended 1935); MISS. CONST. of 1869, art. VII, § 2; MO. CONST. of 1875, art. VIII, § 8; MONT. CONST. of 1889, art. IX, § 8; NEB. CONST. art. VII, § 2 (1875); NEV. CONST. art. II, § 1 (1864) (amended 1880); N.J. CONST. art. II, ¶ 6 (1947) (amended 1995); N.M. CONST. art. VII, § 1 (1911) (amended 1967); N.D. CONST. art. V, § 127 (1889) (amended 1978); OKLA. CONST. art. III, § 1 (1907) (amended 1918); S.C. CONST. art. II, § 6, cl. 2 (1895) (amended 1971); S.D. CONST. art. VII, § 8 (1889) (amended 1974); TEX. CONST. art. VI, § 1, cl. 2 (1876) (amended 1932); TEX. CONST. of 1869, art. VI; UTAH CONST. art. IV, § 6 (1895) (amended 1975); W. VA. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (1872) (amended 1994); W. VA. CONST. of 1863, art. III, § 1; WYO. CONST. art. VI, § 6 (1889) (amended 1996). Until recently, nearly every state prohibited "mental incompetents" from voting, either by constitution or by statute. See RICHARD C. ALLEN ET AL., MENTAL IMPAIRMENT AND LEGAL INCOMPETENCY 364-67 (1968) (reviewing the case law); THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 333-40 (Samuel J. Brakel & Ronald S. Rock eds., rev. ed. 1971) (reviewing constitutional and statutory provisions in chart form); SALES ET AL., supra note 193, at 101-04 (same); Joseph F. Vargyas, Voting Rights and Jury Duty, in 3 LEGAL RIGHTS OF MENTALLY DISABLED PERSONS 1771, 1771-81 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Criminal Law & Urban Problems Course Handbook Series No. 116, 1979) (reviewing the case law); Robert W. Stockstill, Comment, Voting and Election Law in the Louisiana Constitution, 46 LA. L. REV. 1253, 1258-60 (1986); Joel E. Smith, Annotation, Voting Rights of Persons Mentally Incapacitated, 80 A.L.R.3d 1116, 1116-33 (1977) (same). For recent developments, see BARBARA A. WEINER, Rights of Institutionalized Persons, in SAMUEL JAN BRAKEL ET AL., THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 251 (3d ed. 1985). Weiner writes: "While disenfranchisement of the mentally disabled was common in the past, today statutes in a number of states secure the vote to such individuals." Id. at 259. While occasional dicta in the 1970s suggested that disenfranchisement of the mentally disabled was constitutional, see, e.g., Shepherd v. Trevino, 575 F.2d 1110, 1115 (5th Cir. 1978) (comparing felons with "insane persons [who] have raised questions about their ability to vote responsibly"); Kronlund v. Honstein, 327 F. Supp. 71, 73 (N.D. Ga. 1971) (noting the state's interest in "preserving the integrity of her electoral process by removing from the process those persons with proven anti-social behavior whose behavior can be said to be destructive of society's aims," and declaring that "a State may prohibit idiots and insane persons . . . from participating in her elections"), it is unclear how the Supreme Court would rule today on an equal protection challenge to insanity clauses given its decision in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985). Cleburne held that mental retardation is not a quasi-suspect classification, see id. at 442, but rejected a ban on group homes under a rational basis standard, see id. at 450. Both before and after Cleburne, commentators argued that mental illness should be treated as a suspect classification under equal protection doctrine and that, consequently, mental disability restrictions on suffrage should he declared unconstitutional. See, e.g., ROBERT M. LEVY & LEONARD S. RUBENSTEIN, THE RIGHTS OF PEOPLE WITH MENTAL DISABILITIES 293 & nn.50-51 (1996) (arguing that institutionalized persons have a constitutional right to vote); Steven K. Metcalf, Comment, The Right To Vote of the Mentally Disabled in Oklahoma: A Case Study of Overinclusive Language and Fundamental Rights, 25 TULSA L.J. 171 (1989) (urging that strict scrutiny be applied to render unconstitutional statutes that prohibit the mentally ill from voting); Note, Mental Disability and the Right To Vote, 88 YALE L.J. 1644 (1979) (same); Note, Mental Illness: A Suspect Classification?, 83 YALE L.J. 1237, 1267 (1974) (arguing that mental disability restrictions violate equal protection).
342. See, e.g., ALA. CONST. art. VIII, § 182 (1901) (amended 1996), ALA. CONST. of 1875, art. VIII, § 3, cl. 2; ARK. CONST. art. III, § 5 (1874); ARK. CONST. of 1868, art. VIII, § 3, cl. 6; DEL. CONST. art. V, § 2 (1897); FLA. CONST. of 1886, art. VI, § 4; FLA. CONST. of 1868, art. XV, § 2; GA. CONST. of 1877, art. II, § 2, cl. 2; GA. CONST. of 1868, art. II, § 6, cl. 2; IDAHO CONST. art. VI, § 3 (1889) (amended 1950); KY. CONST. § 145, cl. 3 (1891) (amended 1955); LA. CONST. of 1879, art. 187; MD. CONST. art. I, § 2 (1867) (amended 1972); MD. CONST. of 1864, art. I, § 3; MISS. CONST. art. XII, § 241 (1890) (amended 1935); MISS. CONST. of 1869, art. VII, § 2; MO. CONST. of 1875, art. VIII, § 8; MONT. CONST. of 1889, art. IX, § 8; NEB. CONST. art. VII, § 2 (1875); NEV. CONST. art. II, § 1 (1864) (amended 1880); N.J. CONST. art. II, ¶ 6 (1947) (amended 1995); N.M. CONST. art. VII, § 1 (1911) (amended 1967); N.D. CONST. art. V, § 127 (1889) (amended 1978); OKLA. CONST. art. III, § 1 (1907) (amended 1918); S.C. CONST. art. II, § 6, cl. 2 (1895) (amended 1971); S.D. CONST. art. VII, § 8 (1889) (amended 1974); TEX. CONST. art. VI, § 1, cl. 2 (1876) (amended 1932); TEX. CONST. of 1869, art. VI; UTAH CONST. art. IV, § 6 (1895) (amended 1975); W. VA. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (1872) (amended 1994); W. VA. CONST. of 1863, art. III, § 1; WYO. CONST. art. VI, § 6 (1889) (amended 1996). Until recently, nearly every state prohibited "mental incompetents" from voting, either by constitution or by statute. See RICHARD C. ALLEN ET AL., MENTAL IMPAIRMENT AND LEGAL INCOMPETENCY 364-67 (1968) (reviewing the case law); THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 333-40 (Samuel J. Brakel & Ronald S. Rock eds., rev. ed. 1971) (reviewing constitutional and statutory provisions in chart form); SALES ET AL., supra note 193, at 101-04 (same); Joseph F. Vargyas, Voting Rights and Jury Duty, in 3 LEGAL RIGHTS OF MENTALLY DISABLED PERSONS 1771, 1771-81 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Criminal Law & Urban Problems Course Handbook Series No. 116, 1979) (reviewing the case law); Robert W. Stockstill, Comment, Voting and Election Law in the Louisiana Constitution, 46 LA. L. REV. 1253, 1258-60 (1986); Joel E. Smith, Annotation, Voting Rights of Persons Mentally Incapacitated, 80 A.L.R.3d 1116, 1116-33 (1977) (same). For recent developments, see BARBARA A. WEINER, Rights of Institutionalized Persons, in SAMUEL JAN BRAKEL ET AL., THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 251 (3d ed. 1985). Weiner writes: "While disenfranchisement of the mentally disabled was common in the past, today statutes in a number of states secure the vote to such individuals." Id. at 259. While occasional dicta in the 1970s suggested that disenfranchisement of the mentally disabled was constitutional, see, e.g., Shepherd v. Trevino, 575 F.2d 1110, 1115 (5th Cir. 1978) (comparing felons with "insane persons [who] have raised questions about their ability to vote responsibly"); Kronlund v. Honstein, 327 F. Supp. 71, 73 (N.D. Ga. 1971) (noting the state's interest in "preserving the integrity of her electoral process by removing from the process those persons with proven anti-social behavior whose behavior can be said to be destructive of society's aims," and declaring that "a State may prohibit idiots and insane persons . . . from participating in her elections"), it is unclear how the Supreme Court would rule today on an equal protection challenge to insanity clauses given its decision in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985). Cleburne held that mental retardation is not a quasi-suspect classification, see id. at 442, but rejected a ban on group homes under a rational basis standard, see id. at 450. Both before and after Cleburne, commentators argued that mental illness should be treated as a suspect classification under equal protection doctrine and that, consequently, mental disability restrictions on suffrage should he declared unconstitutional. See, e.g., ROBERT M. LEVY & LEONARD S. RUBENSTEIN, THE RIGHTS OF PEOPLE WITH MENTAL DISABILITIES 293 & nn.50-51 (1996) (arguing that institutionalized persons have a constitutional right to vote); Steven K. Metcalf, Comment, The Right To Vote of the Mentally Disabled in Oklahoma: A Case Study of Overinclusive Language and Fundamental Rights, 25 TULSA L.J. 171 (1989) (urging that strict scrutiny be applied to render unconstitutional statutes that prohibit the mentally ill from voting); Note, Mental Disability and the Right To Vote, 88 YALE L.J. 1644 (1979) (same); Note, Mental Illness: A Suspect Classification?, 83 YALE L.J. 1237, 1267 (1974) (arguing that mental disability restrictions violate equal protection).
343. See, e.g., ALA. CONST. art. VIII, § 182 (1901) (amended 1996), ALA. CONST. of 1875, art. VIII, § 3, cl. 2; ARK. CONST. art. III, § 5 (1874); ARK. CONST. of 1868, art. VIII, § 3, cl. 6; DEL. CONST. art. V, § 2 (1897); FLA. CONST. of 1886, art. VI, § 4; FLA. CONST. of 1868, art. XV, § 2; GA. CONST. of 1877, art. II, § 2, cl. 2; GA. CONST. of 1868, art. II, § 6, cl. 2; IDAHO CONST. art. VI, § 3 (1889) (amended 1950); KY. CONST. § 145, cl. 3 (1891) (amended 1955); LA. CONST. of 1879, art. 187; MD. CONST. art. I, § 2 (1867) (amended 1972); MD. CONST. of 1864, art. I, § 3; MISS. CONST. art. XII, § 241 (1890) (amended 1935); MISS. CONST. of 1869, art. VII, § 2; MO. CONST. of 1875, art. VIII, § 8; MONT. CONST. of 1889, art. IX, § 8; NEB. CONST. art. VII, § 2 (1875); NEV. CONST. art. II, § 1 (1864) (amended 1880); N.J. CONST. art. II, ¶ 6 (1947) (amended 1995); N.M. CONST. art. VII, § 1 (1911) (amended 1967); N.D. CONST. art. V, § 127 (1889) (amended 1978); OKLA. CONST. art. III, § 1 (1907) (amended 1918); S.C. CONST. art. II, § 6, cl. 2 (1895)
344. See, e.g., ALA. CONST. art. VIII, § 182 (1901) (amended 1996), ALA. CONST. of 1875, art. VIII, § 3, cl. 2; ARK. CONST. art. III, § 5 (1874); ARK. CONST. of 1868, art. VIII, § 3, cl. 6; DEL. CONST. art. V, § 2 (1897); FLA. CONST. of 1886, art. VI, § 4; FLA. CONST. of 1868, art. XV, § 2; GA. CONST. of 1877, art. II, § 2, cl. 2; GA. CONST. of 1868, art. II, § 6, cl. 2; IDAHO CONST. art. VI, § 3 (1889) (amended 1950); KY. CONST. § 145, cl. 3 (1891) (amended 1955); LA. CONST. of 1879, art. 187; MD. CONST. art. I, § 2 (1867) (amended 1972); MD. CONST. of 1864, art. I, § 3; MISS. CONST. art. XII, § 241 (1890) (amended 1935); MISS. CONST. of 1869, art. VII, § 2; MO. CONST. of 1875, art. VIII, § 8; MONT. CONST. of 1889, art. IX, § 8; NEB. CONST. art. VII, § 2 (1875); NEV. CONST. art. II, § 1 (1864) (amended 1880); N.J. CONST. art. II, ¶ 6 (1947) (amended 1995); N.M. CONST. art. VII, § 1 (1911) (amended 1967); N.D. CONST. art. V, § 127 (1889) (amended 1978); OKLA. CONST. art. III, § 1 (1907) (amended 1918); S.C. CONST. art. II, § 6, cl. 2 (1895) (amended 1971); S.D. CONST. art. VII, § 8 (1889) (amended 1974); TEX. CONST. art. VI, § 1, cl. 2 (1876) (amended 1932); TEX. CONST. of 1869, art. VI; UTAH CONST. art. IV, § 6 (1895) (amended 1975); W. VA. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (1872) (amended 1994); W. VA. CONST. of 1863, art. III, § 1; WYO. CONST. art. VI, § 6 (1889) (amended 1996). Until recently, nearly every state prohibited "mental incompetents" from voting, either by constitution or by statute. See RICHARD C. ALLEN ET AL., MENTAL IMPAIRMENT AND LEGAL INCOMPETENCY 364-67 (1968) (reviewing the case law); THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 333-40 (Samuel J. Brakel & Ronald S. Rock eds., rev. ed. 1971) (reviewing constitutional and statutory provisions in chart form); SALES ET AL., supra note 193, at 101-04 (same); Joseph F. Vargyas, Voting Rights and Jury Duty, in 3 LEGAL RIGHTS OF MENTALLY DISABLED PERSONS 1771, 1771-81 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Criminal Law & Urban Problems Course Handbook Series No. 116, 1979) (reviewing the case law); Robert W. Stockstill, Comment, Voting and Election Law in the Louisiana Constitution, 46 LA. L. REV. 1253, 1258-60 (1986); Joel E. Smith, Annotation, Voting Rights of Persons Mentally Incapacitated, 80 A.L.R.3d 1116, 1116-33 (1977) (same). For recent developments, see BARBARA A. WEINER, Rights of Institutionalized Persons, in SAMUEL JAN BRAKEL ET AL., THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 251 (3d ed. 1985). Weiner writes: "While disenfranchisement of the mentally disabled was common in the past, today statutes in a number of states secure the vote to such individuals." Id. at 259. While occasional dicta in the 1970s suggested that disenfranchisement of the mentally disabled was constitutional, see, e.g., Shepherd v. Trevino, 575 F.2d 1110, 1115 (5th Cir. 1978) (comparing felons with "insane persons [who] have raised questions about their ability to vote responsibly"); Kronlund v. Honstein, 327 F. Supp. 71, 73 (N.D. Ga. 1971) (noting the state's interest in "preserving the integrity of her electoral process by removing from the process those persons with proven anti-social behavior whose behavior can be said to be destructive of society's aims," and declaring that "a State may prohibit idiots and insane persons . . . from participating in her elections"), it is unclear how the Supreme Court would rule today on an equal protection challenge to insanity clauses given its decision in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985). Cleburne held that mental retardation is not a quasi-suspect classification, see id. at 442, but rejected a ban on group homes under a rational basis standard, see id. at 450. Both before and after Cleburne, commentators argued that mental illness should be treated as a suspect classification under equal protection doctrine and that, consequently, mental disability restrictions on suffrage should he declared unconstitutional. See, e.g., ROBERT M. LEVY & LEONARD S. RUBENSTEIN, THE RIGHTS OF PEOPLE WITH MENTAL DISABILITIES 293 & nn.50-51 (1996) (arguing that institutionalized persons have a constitutional right to vote); Steven K. Metcalf, Comment, The Right To Vote of the Mentally Disabled in Oklahoma: A Case Study of Overinclusive Language and Fundamental Rights, 25 TULSA L.J. 171 (1989) (urging that strict scrutiny be applied to render unconstitutional statutes that prohibit the mentally ill from voting); Note, Mental Disability and the Right To Vote, 88 YALE L.J. 1644 (1979) (same); Note, Mental Illness: A Suspect Classification?, 83 YALE L.J. 1237, 1267 (1974) (arguing that mental disability restrictions violate equal protection).
345. See, e.g., ALA. CONST. art. VIII, § 182 (1901) (amended 1996), ALA. CONST. of 1875, art. VIII, § 3, cl. 2; ARK. CONST. art. III, § 5 (1874); ARK. CONST. of 1868, art. VIII, § 3, cl. 6; DEL. CONST. art. V, § 2 (1897); FLA. CONST. of 1886, art. VI, § 4; FLA. CONST. of 1868, art. XV, § 2; GA. CONST. of 1877, art. II, § 2, cl. 2; GA. CONST. of 1868, art. II, § 6, cl. 2; IDAHO CONST. art. VI, § 3 (1889) (amended 1950); KY. CONST. § 145, cl. 3 (1891) (amended 1955); LA. CONST. of 1879, art. 187; MD. CONST. art. I, § 2 (1867) (amended 1972); MD. CONST. of 1864, art. I, § 3; MISS. CONST. art. XII, § 241 (1890) (amended 1935); MISS. CONST. of 1869, art. VII, § 2; MO. CONST. of 1875, art. VIII, § 8; MONT. CONST. of 1889, art. IX, § 8; NEB. CONST. art. VII, § 2 (1875); NEV. CONST. art. II, § 1 (1864) (amended 1880); N.J. CONST. art. II, ¶ 6 (1947) (amended 1995); N.M. CONST. art. VII, § 1 (1911) (amended 1967); N.D. CONST. art. V, § 127 (1889) (amended 1978); OKLA. CONST. art. III, § 1 (1907) (amended 1918); S.C. CONST. art. II, § 6, cl. 2 (1895) (amended 1971); S.D. CONST. art. VII, § 8 (1889) (amended 1974); TEX. CONST. art. VI, § 1, cl. 2 (1876) (amended 1932); TEX. CONST. of 1869, art. VI; UTAH CONST. art. IV, § 6 (1895) (amended 1975); W. VA. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (1872) (amended 1994); W. VA. CONST. of 1863, art. III, § 1; WYO. CONST. art. VI, § 6 (1889) (amended 1996). Until recently, nearly every state prohibited "mental incompetents" from voting, either by constitution or by statute. See RICHARD C. ALLEN ET AL., MENTAL IMPAIRMENT AND LEGAL INCOMPETENCY 364-67 (1968) (reviewing the case law); THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 333-40 (Samuel J. Brakel & Ronald S. Rock eds., rev. ed. 1971) (reviewing constitutional and statutory provisions in chart form); SALES ET AL., supra note 193, at 101-04 (same); Joseph F. Vargyas, Voting Rights and Jury Duty, in 3 LEGAL RIGHTS OF MENTALLY DISABLED PERSONS 1771, 1771-81 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Criminal Law & Urban Problems Course Handbook Series No. 116, 1979) (reviewing the case law); Robert W. Stockstill, Comment, Voting and Election Law in the Louisiana Constitution, 46 LA. L. REV. 1253, 1258-60 (1986); Joel E. Smith, Annotation, Voting Rights of Persons Mentally Incapacitated, 80 A.L.R.3d 1116, 1116-33 (1977) (same). For recent developments, see BARBARA A. WEINER, Rights of Institutionalized Persons, in SAMUEL JAN BRAKEL ET AL., THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 251 (3d ed. 1985). Weiner writes: "While disenfranchisement of the mentally disabled was common in the past, today statutes in a number of states secure the vote to such individuals." Id. at 259. While occasional dicta in the 1970s suggested that disenfranchisement of the mentally disabled was constitutional, see, e.g., Shepherd v. Trevino, 575 F.2d 1110, 1115 (5th Cir. 1978) (comparing felons with "insane persons [who] have raised questions about their ability to vote responsibly"); Kronlund v. Honstein, 327 F. Supp. 71, 73 (N.D. Ga. 1971) (noting the state's interest in "preserving the integrity of her electoral process by removing from the process those persons with proven anti-social behavior whose behavior can be said to be destructive of society's aims," and declaring that "a State may prohibit idiots and insane persons . . . from participating in her elections"), it is unclear how the Supreme Court would rule today on an equal protection challenge to insanity clauses given its decision in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985). Cleburne held that mental retardation is not a quasi-suspect classification, see id. at 442, but rejected a ban on group homes under a rational basis standard, see id. at 450. Both before and after Cleburne, commentators argued that mental illness should be treated as a suspect classification under equal protection doctrine and that, consequently, mental disability restrictions on suffrage should he declared unconstitutional. See, e.g., ROBERT M. LEVY & LEONARD S. RUBENSTEIN, THE RIGHTS OF PEOPLE WITH MENTAL DISABILITIES 293 & nn.50-51 (1996) (arguing that institutionalized persons have a constitutional right to vote); Steven K. Metcalf, Comment, The Right To Vote of the Mentally Disabled in Oklahoma: A Case Study of Overinclusive Language and Fundamental Rights, 25 TULSA L.J. 171 (1989) (urging that strict scrutiny be applied to render unconstitutional statutes that prohibit the mentally ill from voting); Note, Mental Disability and the Right To Vote, 88 YALE L.J. 1644 (1979) (same); Note, Mental Illness: A Suspect Classification?, 83 YALE L.J. 1237, 1267 (1974) (arguing that mental disability restrictions violate equal protection).
346. See, e.g., ALA. CONST. art. VIII, § 182 (1901) (amended 1996), ALA. CONST. of 1875, art. VIII, § 3, cl. 2; ARK. CONST. art. III, § 5 (1874); ARK. CONST. of 1868, art. VIII, § 3, cl. 6; DEL. CONST. art. V, § 2 (1897); FLA. CONST. of 1886, art. VI, § 4; FLA. CONST. of 1868, art. XV, § 2; GA. CONST. of 1877, art. II, § 2, cl. 2; GA. CONST. of 1868, art. II, § 6, cl. 2; IDAHO CONST. art. VI, § 3 (1889) (amended 1950); KY. CONST. § 145, cl. 3 (1891) (amended 1955); LA. CONST. of 1879, art. 187; MD. CONST. art. I, § 2 (1867) (amended 1972); MD. CONST. of 1864, art. I, § 3; MISS. CONST. art. XII, § 241 (1890) (amended 1935); MISS. CONST. of 1869, art. VII, § 2; MO. CONST. of 1875, art. VIII, § 8; MONT. CONST. of 1889, art. IX, § 8; NEB. CONST. art. VII, § 2 (1875); NEV. CONST. art. II, § 1 (1864) (amended 1880); N.J. CONST. art. II, ¶ 6 (1947) (amended 1995); N.M. CONST. art. VII, § 1 (1911) (amended 1967); N.D. CONST. art. V, § 127 (1889) (amended 1978); OKLA. CONST. art. III, § 1 (1907) (amended 1918); S.C. CONST. art. II, § 6, cl. 2 (1895) (amended 1971); S.D. CONST. art. VII, § 8 (1889) (amended 1974); TEX. CONST. art. VI, § 1, cl. 2 (1876) (amended 1932); TEX. CONST. of 1869, art. VI; UTAH CONST. art. IV, § 6 (1895) (amended 1975); W. VA. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (1872) (amended 1994); W. VA. CONST. of 1863, art. III, § 1; WYO. CONST. art. VI, § 6 (1889) (amended 1996). Until recently, nearly every state prohibited "mental incompetents" from voting, either by constitution or by statute. See RICHARD C. ALLEN ET AL., MENTAL IMPAIRMENT AND LEGAL INCOMPETENCY 364-67 (1968) (reviewing the case law); THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 333-40 (Samuel J. Brakel & Ronald S. Rock eds., rev. ed. 1971) (reviewing constitutional and statutory provisions in chart form); SALES ET AL., supra note 193, at 101-04 (same); Joseph F. Vargyas, Voting Rights and Jury Duty, in 3 LEGAL RIGHTS OF MENTALLY DISABLED PERSONS 1771, 1771-81 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Criminal Law & Urban Problems Course Handbook Series No. 116, 1979) (reviewing the case law); Robert W. Stockstill, Comment, Voting and Election Law in the Louisiana Constitution, 46 LA. L. REV. 1253, 1258-60 (1986); Joel E. Smith, Annotation, Voting Rights of Persons Mentally Incapacitated, 80 A.L.R.3d 1116, 1116-33 (1977) (same). For recent developments, see BARBARA A. WEINER, Rights of Institutionalized Persons, in SAMUEL JAN BRAKEL ET AL., THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 251 (3d ed. 1985). Weiner writes: "While disenfranchisement of the mentally disabled was common in the past, today statutes in a number of states secure the vote to such individuals." Id. at 259. While occasional dicta in the 1970s suggested that disenfranchisement of the mentally disabled was constitutional, see, e.g., Shepherd v. Trevino, 575 F.2d 1110, 1115 (5th Cir. 1978) (comparing felons with "insane persons [who] have raised questions about their ability to vote responsibly"); Kronlund v. Honstein, 327 F. Supp. 71, 73 (N.D. Ga. 1971) (noting the state's interest in "preserving the integrity of her electoral process by removing from the process those persons with proven anti-social behavior whose behavior can be said to be destructive of society's aims," and declaring that "a State may prohibit idiots and insane persons . . . from participating in her elections"), it is unclear how the Supreme Court would rule today on an equal protection challenge to insanity clauses given its decision in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985). Cleburne held that mental retardation is not a quasi-suspect classification, see id. at 442, but rejected a ban on group homes under a rational basis standard, see id. at 450. Both before and after Cleburne, commentators argued that mental illness should be treated as a suspect classification under equal protection doctrine and that, consequently, mental disability restrictions on suffrage should he declared unconstitutional. See, e.g., ROBERT M. LEVY & LEONARD S. RUBENSTEIN, THE RIGHTS OF PEOPLE WITH MENTAL DISABILITIES 293 & nn.50-51 (1996) (arguing that institutionalized persons have a constitutional right to vote); Steven K. Metcalf, Comment, The Right To Vote of the Mentally Disabled in Oklahoma: A Case Study of Overinclusive Language and Fundamental Rights, 25 TULSA L.J. 171 (1989) (urging that strict scrutiny be applied to render unconstitutional statutes that prohibit the mentally ill from voting); Note, Mental Disability and the Right To Vote, 88 YALE L.J. 1644 (1979) (same); Note, Mental Illness: A Suspect Classification?, 83 YALE L.J. 1237, 1267 (1974) (arguing that mental disability restrictions violate equal protection).
347. See, e.g., ALA. CONST. art. VIII, § 182 (1901) (amended 1996), ALA. CONST. of 1875, art. VIII, § 3, cl. 2; ARK. CONST. art. III, § 5 (1874); ARK. CONST. of 1868, art. VIII, § 3, cl. 6; DEL. CONST. art. V, § 2 (1897); FLA. CONST. of 1886, art. VI, § 4; FLA. CONST. of 1868, art. XV, § 2; GA. CONST. of 1877, art. II, § 2, cl. 2; GA. CONST. of 1868, art. II, § 6, cl. 2; IDAHO CONST. art. VI, § 3 (1889) (amended 1950); KY. CONST. § 145, cl. 3 (1891) (amended 1955); LA. CONST. of 1879, art. 187; MD. CONST. art. I, § 2 (1867) (amended 1972); MD. CONST. of 1864, art. I, § 3; MISS. CONST. art. XII, § 241 (1890) (amended 1935); MISS. CONST. of 1869, art. VII, § 2; MO. CONST. of 1875, art. VIII, § 8; MONT. CONST. of 1889, art. IX, § 8; NEB. CONST. art. VII, § 2 (1875); NEV. CONST. art. II, § 1 (1864) (amended 1880); N.J. CONST. art. II, ¶ 6 (1947) (amended 1995); N.M. CONST. art. VII, § 1 (1911) (amended 1967); N.D. CONST. art. V, § 127 (1889) (amended 1978); OKLA. CONST. art. III, § 1 (1907) (amended 1918); S.C. CONST. art. II, § 6, cl. 2 (1895) (amended 1971); S.D. CONST. art. VII, § 8 (1889) (amended 1974); TEX. CONST. art. VI, § 1, cl. 2 (1876) (amended 1932); TEX. CONST. of 1869, art. VI; UTAH CONST. art. IV, § 6 (1895) (amended 1975); W. VA. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (1872) (amended 1994); W. VA. CONST. of 1863, art. III, § 1; WYO. CONST. art. VI, § 6 (1889) (amended 1996). Until recently, nearly every state prohibited "mental incompetents" from voting, either by constitution or by statute. See RICHARD C. ALLEN ET AL., MENTAL IMPAIRMENT AND LEGAL INCOMPETENCY 364-67 (1968) (reviewing the case law); THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 333-40 (Samuel J. Brakel & Ronald S. Rock eds., rev. ed. 1971) (reviewing constitutional and statutory provisions in chart form); SALES ET AL., supra note 193, at 101-04 (same); Joseph F. Vargyas, Voting Rights and Jury Duty, in 3 LEGAL RIGHTS OF MENTALLY DISABLED PERSONS 1771, 1771-81 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Criminal Law & Urban Problems Course Handbook Series No. 116, 1979) (reviewing the case law); Robert W. Stockstill, Comment, Voting and Election Law in the Louisiana Constitution, 46 LA. L. REV. 1253, 1258-60 (1986); Joel E. Smith, Annotation, Voting Rights of Persons Mentally Incapacitated, 80 A.L.R.3d 1116, 1116-33 (1977) (same). For recent developments, see BARBARA A. WEINER, Rights of Institutionalized Persons, in SAMUEL JAN BRAKEL ET AL., THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 251 (3d ed. 1985). Weiner writes: "While disenfranchisement of the mentally disabled was common in the past, today statutes in a number of states secure the vote to such individuals." Id. at 259. While occasional dicta in the 1970s suggested that disenfranchisement of the mentally disabled was constitutional, see, e.g., Shepherd v. Trevino, 575 F.2d 1110, 1115 (5th Cir. 1978) (comparing felons with "insane persons [who] have raised questions about their ability to vote responsibly"); Kronlund v. Honstein, 327 F. Supp. 71, 73 (N.D. Ga. 1971) (noting the state's interest in "preserving the integrity of her electoral process by removing from the process those persons with proven anti-social behavior whose behavior can be said to be destructive of society's aims," and declaring that "a State may prohibit idiots and insane persons . . . from participating in her elections"), it is unclear how the Supreme Court would rule today on an equal protection challenge to insanity clauses given its decision in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985). Cleburne held that mental retardation is not a quasi-suspect classification, see id. at 442, but rejected a ban on group homes under a rational basis standard, see id. at 450. Both before and after Cleburne, commentators argued that mental illness should be treated as a suspect classification under equal protection doctrine and that, consequently, mental disability restrictions on suffrage should he declared unconstitutional. See, e.g., ROBERT M. LEVY & LEONARD S. RUBENSTEIN, THE RIGHTS OF PEOPLE WITH MENTAL DISABILITIES 293 & nn.50-51 (1996) (arguing that institutionalized persons have a constitutional right to vote); Steven K. Metcalf, Comment, The Right To Vote of the Mentally Disabled in Oklahoma: A Case Study of Overinclusive Language and Fundamental Rights, 25 TULSA L.J. 171 (1989) (urging that strict scrutiny be applied to render unconstitutional statutes that prohibit the mentally ill from voting); Note, Mental Disability and the Right To Vote, 88 YALE L.J. 1644 (1979) (same); Note, Mental Illness: A Suspect Classification?, 83 YALE L.J. 1237, 1267 (1974) (arguing that mental disability restrictions violate equal protection).
348. See, e.g., ALA. CONST. art. VIII, § 182 (1901) (amended 1996), ALA. CONST. of 1875, art. VIII, § 3, cl. 2; ARK. CONST. art. III, § 5 (1874); ARK. CONST. of 1868, art. VIII, § 3, cl. 6; DEL. CONST. art. V, § 2 (1897); FLA. CONST. of 1886, art. VI, § 4; FLA. CONST. of 1868, art. XV, § 2; GA. CONST. of 1877, art. II, § 2, cl. 2; GA. CONST. of 1868, art. II, § 6, cl. 2; IDAHO CONST. art. VI, § 3 (1889) (amended 1950); KY. CONST. § 145, cl. 3 (1891) (amended 1955); LA. CONST. of 1879, art. 187; MD. CONST. art. I, § 2 (1867) (amended 1972); MD. CONST. of 1864, art. I, § 3; MISS. CONST. art. XII, § 241 (1890) (amended 1935); MISS. CONST. of 1869, art. VII, § 2; MO. CONST. of 1875, art. VIII, § 8; MONT. CONST. of 1889, art. IX, § 8; NEB. CONST. art. VII, § 2 (1875); NEV. CONST. art. II, § 1 (1864) (amended 1880); N.J. CONST. art. II, ¶ 6 (1947) (amended 1995); N.M. CONST. art. VII, § 1 (1911) (amended 1967); N.D. CONST. art. V, § 127 (1889) (amended 1978); OKLA. CONST. art. III, § 1 (1907) (amended 1918); S.C. CONST. art. II, § 6, cl. 2 (1895) (amended 1971); S.D. CONST. art. VII, § 8 (1889) (amended 1974); TEX. CONST. art. VI, § 1, cl. 2 (1876) (amended 1932); TEX. CONST. of 1869, art. VI; UTAH CONST. art. IV, § 6 (1895) (amended 1975); W. VA. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (1872) (amended 1994); W. VA. CONST. of 1863, art. III, § 1; WYO. CONST. art. VI, § 6 (1889) (amended 1996). Until recently, nearly every state prohibited "mental incompetents" from voting, either by constitution or by statute. See RICHARD C. ALLEN ET AL., MENTAL IMPAIRMENT AND LEGAL INCOMPETENCY 364-67 (1968) (reviewing the case law); THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 333-40 (Samuel J. Brakel & Ronald S. Rock eds., rev. ed. 1971) (reviewing constitutional and statutory provisions in chart form); SALES ET AL., supra note 193, at 101-04 (same); Joseph F. Vargyas, Voting Rights and Jury Duty, in 3 LEGAL RIGHTS OF MENTALLY DISABLED PERSONS 1771, 1771-81 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Criminal Law & Urban Problems Course Handbook Series No. 116, 1979) (reviewing the case law); Robert W. Stockstill, Comment, Voting and Election Law in the Louisiana Constitution, 46 LA. L. REV. 1253, 1258-60 (1986); Joel E. Smith, Annotation, Voting Rights of Persons Mentally Incapacitated, 80 A.L.R.3d 1116, 1116-33 (1977) (same). For recent developments, see BARBARA A. WEINER, Rights of Institutionalized Persons, in SAMUEL JAN BRAKEL ET AL., THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 251 (3d ed. 1985). Weiner writes: "While disenfranchisement of the mentally disabled was common in the past, today statutes in a number of states secure the vote to such individuals." Id. at 259. While occasional dicta in the 1970s suggested that disenfranchisement of the mentally disabled was constitutional, see, e.g., Shepherd v. Trevino, 575 F.2d 1110, 1115 (5th Cir. 1978) (comparing felons with "insane persons [who] have raised questions about their ability to vote responsibly"); Kronlund v. Honstein, 327 F. Supp. 71, 73 (N.D. Ga. 1971) (noting the state's interest in "preserving the integrity of her electoral process by removing from the process those persons with proven anti-social behavior whose behavior can be said to be destructive of society's aims," and declaring that "a State may prohibit idiots and insane persons . . . from participating in her elections"), it is unclear how the Supreme Court would rule today on an equal protection challenge to insanity clauses given its decision in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985). Cleburne held that mental retardation is not a quasi-suspect classification, see id. at 442, but rejected a ban on group homes under a rational basis standard, see id. at 450. Both before and after Cleburne, commentators argued that mental illness should be treated as a suspect classification under equal protection doctrine and that, consequently, mental disability restrictions on suffrage should he declared unconstitutional. See, e.g., ROBERT M. LEVY & LEONARD S. RUBENSTEIN, THE RIGHTS OF PEOPLE WITH MENTAL DISABILITIES 293 & nn.50-51 (1996) (arguing that institutionalized persons have a constitutional right to vote); Steven K. Metcalf, Comment, The Right To Vote of the Mentally Disabled in Oklahoma: A Case Study of Overinclusive Language and Fundamental Rights, 25 TULSA L.J. 171 (1989) (urging that strict scrutiny be applied to render unconstitutional statutes that prohibit the mentally ill from voting); Note, Mental Disability and the Right To Vote, 88 YALE L.J. 1644 (1979) (same); Note, Mental Illness: A Suspect Classification?, 83 YALE L.J. 1237, 1267 (1974) (arguing that mental disability restrictions violate equal protection).
349. See, e.g., ALA. CONST. art. VIII, § 182 (1901) (amended 1996), ALA. CONST. of 1875, art. VIII, § 3, cl. 2; ARK. CONST. art. III, § 5 (1874); ARK. CONST. of 1868, art. VIII, § 3, cl. 6; DEL. CONST. art. V, § 2 (1897); FLA. CONST. of 1886, art. VI, § 4; FLA. CONST. of 1868, art. XV, § 2; GA. CONST. of 1877, art. II, § 2, cl. 2; GA. CONST. of 1868, art. II, § 6, cl. 2; IDAHO CONST. art. VI, § 3 (1889) (amended 1950); KY. CONST. § 145, cl. 3 (1891) (amended 1955); LA. CONST. of 1879, art. 187; MD. CONST. art. I, § 2 (1867) (amended 1972); MD. CONST. of 1864, art. I, § 3; MISS. CONST. art. XII, § 241 (1890) (amended 1935); MISS. CONST. of 1869, art. VII, § 2; MO. CONST. of 1875, art. VIII, § 8; MONT. CONST. of 1889, art. IX, § 8; NEB. CONST. art. VII, § 2 (1875); NEV. CONST. art. II, § 1 (1864) (amended 1880); N.J. CONST. art. II, ¶ 6 (1947) (amended 1995); N.M. CONST. art. VII, § 1 (1911) (amended 1967); N.D. CONST. art. V, § 127 (1889) (amended 1978); OKLA. CONST. art. III, § 1 (1907) (amended 1918); S.C. CONST. art. II, § 6, cl. 2 (1895) (amended 1971); S.D. CONST. art. VII, § 8 (1889) (amended 1974); TEX. CONST. art. VI, § 1, cl. 2 (1876) (amended 1932); TEX. CONST. of 1869, art. VI; UTAH CONST. art. IV, § 6 (1895) (amended 1975); W. VA. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (1872) (amended 1994); W. VA. CONST. of 1863, art. III, § 1; WYO. CONST. art. VI, § 6 (1889) (amended 1996). Until recently, nearly every state prohibited "mental incompetents" from voting, either by constitution or by statute. See RICHARD C. ALLEN ET AL., MENTAL IMPAIRMENT AND LEGAL INCOMPETENCY 364-67 (1968) (reviewing the case law); THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 333-40 (Samuel J. Brakel & Ronald S. Rock eds., rev. ed. 1971) (reviewing constitutional and statutory provisions in chart form); SALES ET AL., supra note 193, at 101-04 (same); Joseph F. Vargyas, Voting Rights and Jury Duty, in 3 LEGAL RIGHTS OF MENTALLY DISABLED PERSONS 1771, 1771-81 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Criminal Law & Urban Problems Course Handbook Series No. 116, 1979) (reviewing the case law); Robert W. Stockstill, Comment, Voting and Election Law in the Louisiana Constitution, 46 LA. L. REV. 1253, 1258-60 (1986); Joel E. Smith, Annotation, Voting Rights of Persons Mentally Incapacitated, 80 A.L.R.3d 1116, 1116-33 (1977) (same). For recent developments, see BARBARA A. WEINER, Rights of Institutionalized Persons, in SAMUEL JAN BRAKEL ET AL., THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 251 (3d ed. 1985). Weiner writes: "While disenfranchisement of the mentally disabled was common in the past, today statutes in a number of states secure the vote to such individuals." Id. at 259. While occasional dicta in the 1970s suggested that disenfranchisement of the mentally disabled was constitutional, see, e.g., Shepherd v. Trevino, 575 F.2d 1110, 1115 (5th Cir. 1978) (comparing felons with "insane persons [who] have raised questions about their ability to vote responsibly"); Kronlund v. Honstein, 327 F. Supp. 71, 73 (N.D. Ga. 1971) (noting the state's interest in "preserving the integrity of her electoral process by removing from the process those persons with proven anti-social behavior whose behavior can be said to be destructive of society's aims," and declaring that "a State may prohibit idiots and insane persons . . . from participating in her elections"), it is unclear how the Supreme Court would rule today on an equal protection challenge to insanity clauses given its decision in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985). Cleburne held that mental retardation is not a quasi-suspect classification, see id. at 442, but rejected a ban on group homes under a rational basis standard, see id. at 450. Both before and after Cleburne, commentators argued that mental illness should be treated as a suspect classification under equal protection doctrine and that, consequently, mental disability restrictions on suffrage should he declared unconstitutional. See, e.g., ROBERT M. LEVY & LEONARD S. RUBENSTEIN, THE RIGHTS OF PEOPLE WITH MENTAL DISABILITIES 293 & nn.50-51 (1996) (arguing that institutionalized persons have a constitutional right to vote); Steven K. Metcalf, Comment, The Right To Vote of the Mentally Disabled in Oklahoma: A Case Study of Overinclusive Language and Fundamental Rights, 25 TULSA L.J. 171 (1989) (urging that strict scrutiny be applied to render unconstitutional statutes that prohibit the mentally ill from voting); Note, Mental Disability and the Right To Vote, 88 YALE L.J. 1644 (1979) (same); Note, Mental Illness: A Suspect Classification?, 83 YALE L.J. 1237, 1267 (1974) (arguing that mental disability restrictions violate equal protection).
350. See, e.g., ALA. CONST. art. VIII, § 182 (1901) (amended 1996), ALA. CONST. of 1875, art. VIII, § 3, cl. 2; ARK. CONST. art. III, § 5 (1874); ARK. CONST. of 1868, art. VIII, § 3, cl. 6; DEL. CONST. art. V, § 2 (1897); FLA. CONST. of 1886, art. VI, § 4; FLA. CONST. of 1868, art. XV, § 2; GA. CONST. of 1877, art. II, § 2, cl. 2; GA. CONST. of 1868, art. II, § 6, cl. 2; IDAHO CONST. art. VI, § 3 (1889) (amended 1950); KY. CONST. § 145, cl. 3 (1891) (amended 1955); LA. CONST. of 1879, art. 187; MD. CONST. art. I, § 2 (1867) (amended 1972); MD. CONST. of 1864, art. I, § 3; MISS. CONST. art. XII, § 241 (1890) (amended 1935); MISS. CONST. of 1869, art. VII, § 2; MO. CONST. of 1875, art. VIII, § 8; MONT. CONST. of 1889, art. IX, § 8; NEB. CONST. art. VII, § 2 (1875); NEV. CONST. art. II, § 1 (1864) (amended 1880); N.J. CONST. art. II, ¶ 6 (1947) (amended 1995); N.M. CONST. art. VII, § 1 (1911) (amended 1967); N.D. CONST. art. V, § 127 (1889) (amended 1978); OKLA. CONST. art. III, § 1 (1907) (amended 1918); S.C. CONST. art. II, § 6, cl. 2 (1895) (amended 1971); S.D. CONST. art. VII, § 8 (1889) (amended 1974); TEX. CONST. art. VI, § 1, cl. 2 (1876) (amended 1932); TEX. CONST. of 1869, art. VI; UTAH CONST. art. IV, § 6 (1895) (amended 1975); W. VA. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (1872) (amended 1994); W. VA. CONST. of 1863, art. III, § 1; WYO. CONST. art. VI, § 6 (1889) (amended 1996). Until recently, nearly every state prohibited "mental incompetents" from voting, either by constitution or by statute. See RICHARD C. ALLEN ET AL., MENTAL IMPAIRMENT AND LEGAL INCOMPETENCY 364-67 (1968) (reviewing the case law); THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 333-40 (Samuel J. Brakel & Ronald S. Rock eds., rev. ed. 1971) (reviewing constitutional and statutory provisions in chart form); SALES ET AL., supra note 193, at 101-04 (same); Joseph F. Vargyas, Voting Rights and Jury Duty, in 3 LEGAL RIGHTS OF MENTALLY DISABLED PERSONS 1771, 1771-81 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Criminal Law & Urban Problems Course Handbook Series No. 116, 1979) (reviewing the case law); Robert W. Stockstill, Comment, Voting and Election Law in the Louisiana Constitution, 46 LA. L. REV. 1253, 1258-60 (1986); Joel E. Smith, Annotation, Voting Rights of Persons Mentally Incapacitated, 80 A.L.R.3d 1116, 1116-33 (1977) (same). For recent developments, see BARBARA A. WEINER, Rights of Institutionalized Persons, in SAMUEL JAN BRAKEL ET AL., THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 251 (3d ed. 1985). Weiner writes: "While disenfranchisement of the mentally disabled was common in the past, today statutes in a number of states secure the vote to such individuals." Id. at 259. While occasional dicta in the 1970s suggested that disenfranchisement of the mentally disabled was constitutional, see, e.g., Shepherd v. Trevino, 575 F.2d 1110, 1115 (5th Cir. 1978) (comparing felons with "insane persons [who] have raised questions about their ability to vote responsibly"); Kronlund v. Honstein, 327 F. Supp. 71, 73 (N.D. Ga. 1971) (noting the state's interest in "preserving the integrity of her electoral process by removing from the process those persons with proven anti-social behavior whose behavior can be said to be destructive of society's aims," and declaring that "a State may prohibit idiots and insane persons . . . from participating in her elections"), it is unclear how the Supreme Court would rule today on an equal protection challenge to insanity clauses given its decision in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985). Cleburne held that mental retardation is not a quasi-suspect classification, see id. at 442, but rejected a ban on group homes under a rational basis standard, see id. at 450. Both before and after Cleburne, commentators argued that mental illness should be treated as a suspect classification under equal protection doctrine and that, consequently, mental disability restrictions on suffrage should he declared unconstitutional. See, e.g., ROBERT M. LEVY & LEONARD S. RUBENSTEIN, THE RIGHTS OF PEOPLE WITH MENTAL DISABILITIES 293 & nn.50-51 (1996) (arguing that institutionalized persons have a constitutional right to vote); Steven K. Metcalf, Comment, The Right To Vote of the Mentally Disabled in Oklahoma: A Case Study of Overinclusive Language and Fundamental Rights, 25 TULSA L.J. 171 (1989) (urging that strict scrutiny be applied to render unconstitutional statutes that prohibit the mentally ill from voting); Note, Mental Disability and the Right To Vote, 88 YALE L.J. 1644 (1979) (same); Note, Mental Illness: A Suspect Classification?, 83 YALE L.J. 1237, 1267 (1974) (arguing that mental disability restrictions violate equal protection).
351. See, e.g., ALA. CONST. art. VIII, § 182 (1901) (amended 1996), ALA. CONST. of 1875, art. VIII, § 3, cl. 2; ARK. CONST. art. III, § 5 (1874); ARK. CONST. of 1868, art. VIII, § 3, cl. 6; DEL. CONST. art. V, § 2 (1897); FLA. CONST. of 1886, art. VI, § 4; FLA. CONST. of 1868, art. XV, § 2; GA. CONST. of 1877, art. II, § 2, cl. 2; GA. CONST. of 1868, art. II, § 6, cl. 2; IDAHO CONST. art. VI, § 3 (1889) (amended 1950); KY. CONST. § 145, cl. 3 (1891) (amended 1955); LA. CONST. of 1879, art. 187; MD. CONST. art. I, § 2 (1867) (amended 1972); MD. CONST. of 1864, art. I, § 3; MISS. CONST. art. XII, § 241 (1890) (amended 1935); MISS. CONST. of 1869, art. VII, § 2; MO. CONST. of 1875, art. VIII, § 8; MONT. CONST. of 1889, art. IX, § 8; NEB. CONST. art. VII, § 2 (1875); NEV. CONST. art. II, § 1 (1864) (amended 1880); N.J. CONST. art. II, ¶ 6 (1947) (amended 1995); N.M. CONST. art. VII, § 1 (1911) (amended 1967); N.D. CONST. art. V, § 127 (1889) (amended 1978); OKLA. CONST. art. III, § 1 (1907) (amended 1918); S.C. CONST. art. II, § 6, cl. 2 (1895) (amended 1971); S.D. CONST. art. VII, § 8 (1889) (amended 1974); TEX. CONST. art. VI, § 1, cl. 2 (1876) (amended 1932); TEX. CONST. of 1869, art. VI; UTAH CONST. art. IV, § 6 (1895) (amended 1975); W. VA. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (1872) (amended 1994); W. VA. CONST. of 1863, art. III, § 1; WYO. CONST. art. VI, § 6 (1889) (amended 1996). Until recently, nearly every state prohibited "mental incompetents" from voting, either by constitution or by statute. See RICHARD C. ALLEN ET AL., MENTAL IMPAIRMENT AND LEGAL INCOMPETENCY 364-67 (1968) (reviewing the case law); THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 333-40 (Samuel J. Brakel & Ronald S. Rock eds., rev. ed. 1971) (reviewing constitutional and statutory provisions in chart form); SALES ET AL., supra note 193, at 101-04 (same); Joseph F. Vargyas, Voting Rights and Jury Duty, in 3 LEGAL RIGHTS OF MENTALLY DISABLED PERSONS 1771, 1771-81 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Criminal Law & Urban Problems Course Handbook Series No. 116, 1979) (reviewing the case law); Robert W. Stockstill, Comment, Voting and Election Law in the Louisiana Constitution, 46 LA. L. REV. 1253, 1258-60 (1986); Joel E. Smith, Annotation, Voting Rights of Persons Mentally Incapacitated, 80 A.L.R.3d 1116, 1116-33 (1977) (same). For recent developments, see BARBARA A. WEINER, Rights of Institutionalized Persons, in SAMUEL JAN BRAKEL ET AL., THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 251 (3d ed. 1985). Weiner writes: "While disenfranchisement of the mentally disabled was common in the past, today statutes in a number of states secure the vote to such individuals." Id. at 259. While occasional dicta in the 1970s suggested that disenfranchisement of the mentally disabled was constitutional, see, e.g., Shepherd v. Trevino, 575 F.2d 1110, 1115 (5th Cir. 1978) (comparing felons with "insane persons [who] have raised questions about their ability to vote responsibly"); Kronlund v. Honstein, 327 F. Supp. 71, 73 (N.D. Ga. 1971) (noting the state's interest in "preserving the integrity of her electoral process by removing from the process those persons with proven anti-social behavior whose behavior can be said to be destructive of society's aims," and declaring that "a State may prohibit idiots and insane persons . . . from participating in her elections"), it is unclear how the Supreme Court would rule today on an equal protection challenge to insanity clauses given its decision in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985). Cleburne held that mental retardation is not a quasi-suspect classification, see id. at 442, but rejected a ban on group homes under a rational basis standard, see id. at 450. Both before and after Cleburne, commentators argued that mental illness should be treated as a suspect classification under equal protection doctrine and that, consequently, mental disability restrictions on suffrage should he declared unconstitutional. See, e.g., ROBERT M. LEVY & LEONARD S. RUBENSTEIN, THE RIGHTS OF PEOPLE WITH MENTAL DISABILITIES 293 & nn.50-51 (1996) (arguing that institutionalized persons have a constitutional right to vote); Steven K. Metcalf, Comment, The Right To Vote of the Mentally Disabled in Oklahoma: A Case Study of Overinclusive Language and Fundamental Rights, 25 TULSA L.J. 171 (1989) (urging that strict scrutiny be applied to render unconstitutional statutes that prohibit the mentally ill from voting); Note, Mental Disability and the Right To Vote, 88 YALE L.J. 1644 (1979) (same); Note, Mental Illness: A Suspect Classification?, 83 YALE L.J. 1237, 1267 (1974) (arguing that mental disability restrictions violate equal protection).
352. See, e.g., ALA. CONST. art. VIII, § 182 (1901) (amended 1996), ALA. CONST. of 1875, art. VIII, § 3, cl. 2; ARK. CONST. art. III, § 5 (1874); ARK. CONST. of 1868, art. VIII, § 3, cl. 6; DEL. CONST. art. V, § 2 (1897); FLA. CONST. of 1886, art. VI, § 4; FLA. CONST. of 1868, art. XV, § 2; GA. CONST. of 1877, art. II, § 2, cl. 2; GA. CONST. of 1868, art. II, § 6, cl. 2; IDAHO CONST. art. VI, § 3 (1889) (amended 1950); KY. CONST. § 145, cl. 3 (1891) (amended 1955); LA. CONST. of 1879, art. 187; MD. CONST. art. I, § 2 (1867) (amended 1972); MD. CONST. of 1864, art. I, § 3; MISS. CONST. art. XII, § 241 (1890) (amended 1935); MISS. CONST. of 1869, art. VII, § 2; MO. CONST. of 1875, art. VIII, § 8; MONT. CONST. of 1889, art. IX, § 8; NEB. CONST. art. VII, § 2 (1875); NEV. CONST. art. II, § 1 (1864) (amended 1880); N.J. CONST. art. II, ¶ 6 (1947) (amended 1995); N.M. CONST. art. VII, § 1 (1911) (amended 1967); N.D. CONST. art. V, § 127 (1889) (amended 1978); OKLA. CONST. art. III, § 1 (1907) (amended 1918); S.C. CONST. art. II, § 6, cl. 2 (1895) (amended 1971); S.D. CONST. art. VII, § 8 (1889) (amended 1974); TEX. CONST. art. VI, § 1, cl. 2 (1876) (amended 1932); TEX. CONST. of 1869, art. VI; UTAH CONST. art. IV, § 6 (1895) (amended 1975); W. VA. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (1872) (amended 1994); W. VA. CONST. of 1863, art. III, § 1; WYO. CONST. art. VI, § 6 (1889) (amended 1996). Until recently, nearly every state prohibited "mental incompetents" from voting, either by constitution or by statute. See RICHARD C. ALLEN ET AL., MENTAL IMPAIRMENT AND LEGAL INCOMPETENCY 364-67 (1968) (reviewing the case law); THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 333-40 (Samuel J. Brakel & Ronald S. Rock eds., rev. ed. 1971) (reviewing constitutional and statutory provisions in chart form); SALES ET AL., supra note 193, at 101-04 (same); Joseph F. Vargyas, Voting Rights and Jury Duty, in 3 LEGAL RIGHTS OF MENTALLY DISABLED PERSONS 1771, 1771-81 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Criminal Law & Urban Problems Course Handbook Series No. 116, 1979) (reviewing the case law); Robert W. Stockstill, Comment, Voting and Election Law in the Louisiana Constitution, 46 LA. L. REV. 1253, 1258-60 (1986); Joel E. Smith, Annotation, Voting Rights of Persons Mentally Incapacitated, 80 A.L.R.3d 1116, 1116-33 (1977) (same). For recent developments, see BARBARA A. WEINER, Rights of Institutionalized Persons, in SAMUEL JAN BRAKEL ET AL., THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 251 (3d ed. 1985). Weiner writes: "While disenfranchisement of the mentally disabled was common in the past, today statutes in a number of states secure the vote to such individuals." Id. at 259. While occasional dicta in the 1970s suggested that disenfranchisement of the mentally disabled was constitutional, see, e.g., Shepherd v. Trevino, 575 F.2d 1110, 1115 (5th Cir. 1978) (comparing felons with "insane persons [who] have raised questions about their ability to vote responsibly"); Kronlund v. Honstein, 327 F. Supp. 71, 73 (N.D. Ga. 1971) (noting the state's interest in "preserving the integrity of her electoral process by removing from the process those persons with proven anti-social behavior whose behavior can be said to be destructive of society's aims," and declaring that "a State may prohibit idiots and insane persons . . . from participating in her elections"), it is unclear how the Supreme Court would rule today on an equal protection challenge to insanity clauses given its decision in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985). Cleburne held that mental retardation is not a quasi-suspect classification, see id. at 442, but rejected a ban on group homes under a rational basis standard, see id. at 450. Both before and after Cleburne, commentators argued that mental illness should be treated as a suspect classification under equal protection doctrine and that, consequently, mental disability restrictions on suffrage should he declared unconstitutional. See, e.g., ROBERT M. LEVY & LEONARD S. RUBENSTEIN, THE RIGHTS OF PEOPLE WITH MENTAL DISABILITIES 293 & nn.50-51 (1996) (arguing that institutionalized persons have a constitutional right to vote); Steven K. Metcalf, Comment, The Right To Vote of the Mentally Disabled in Oklahoma: A Case Study of Overinclusive Language and Fundamental Rights, 25 TULSA L.J. 171 (1989) (urging that strict scrutiny be applied to render unconstitutional statutes that prohibit the mentally ill from voting); Note, Mental Disability and the Right To Vote, 88 YALE L.J. 1644 (1979) (same); Note, Mental Illness: A Suspect Classification?, 83 YALE L.J. 1237, 1267 (1974) (arguing that mental disability restrictions violate equal protection).
353. See, e.g., ALA. CONST. art. VIII, § 182 (1901) (amended 1996), ALA. CONST. of 1875, art. VIII, § 3, cl. 2; ARK. CONST. art. III, § 5 (1874); ARK. CONST. of 1868, art. VIII, § 3, cl. 6; DEL. CONST. art. V, § 2 (1897); FLA. CONST. of 1886, art. VI, § 4; FLA. CONST. of 1868, art. XV, § 2; GA. CONST. of 1877, art. II, § 2, cl. 2; GA. CONST. of 1868, art. II, § 6, cl. 2; IDAHO CONST. art. VI, § 3 (1889) (amended 1950); KY. CONST. § 145, cl. 3 (1891) (amended 1955); LA. CONST. of 1879, art. 187; MD. CONST. art. I, § 2 (1867) (amended 1972); MD. CONST. of 1864, art. I, § 3; MISS. CONST. art. XII, § 241 (1890) (amended 1935); MISS. CONST. of 1869, art. VII, § 2; MO. CONST. of 1875, art. VIII, § 8; MONT. CONST. of 1889, art. IX, § 8; NEB. CONST. art. VII, § 2 (1875); NEV. CONST. art. II, § 1 (1864) (amended 1880); N.J. CONST. art. II, ¶ 6 (1947) (amended 1995); N.M. CONST. art. VII, § 1 (1911) (amended 1967); N.D. CONST. art. V, § 127 (1889) (amended 1978); OKLA. CONST. art. III, § 1 (1907) (amended 1918); S.C. CONST. art. II, § 6, cl. 2 (1895) (amended 1971); S.D. CONST. art. VII, § 8 (1889) (amended 1974); TEX. CONST. art. VI, § 1, cl. 2 (1876) (amended 1932); TEX. CONST. of 1869, art. VI; UTAH CONST. art. IV, § 6 (1895) (amended 1975); W. VA. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (1872) (amended 1994); W. VA. CONST. of 1863, art. III, § 1; WYO. CONST. art. VI, § 6 (1889) (amended 1996). Until recently, nearly every state prohibited "mental incompetents" from voting, either by constitution or by statute. See RICHARD C. ALLEN ET AL., MENTAL IMPAIRMENT AND LEGAL INCOMPETENCY 364-67 (1968) (reviewing the case law); THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 333-40 (Samuel J. Brakel & Ronald S. Rock eds., rev. ed. 1971) (reviewing constitutional and statutory provisions in chart form); SALES ET AL., supra note 193, at 101-04 (same); Joseph F. Vargyas, Voting Rights and Jury Duty, in 3 LEGAL RIGHTS OF MENTALLY DISABLED PERSONS 1771, 1771-81 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Criminal Law & Urban Problems Course Handbook Series No. 116, 1979) (reviewing the case law); Robert W. Stockstill, Comment, Voting and Election Law in the Louisiana Constitution, 46 LA. L. REV. 1253, 1258-60 (1986); Joel E. Smith, Annotation, Voting Rights of Persons Mentally Incapacitated, 80 A.L.R.3d 1116, 1116-33 (1977) (same). For recent developments, see BARBARA A. WEINER, Rights of Institutionalized Persons, in SAMUEL JAN BRAKEL ET AL., THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 251 (3d ed. 1985). Weiner writes: "While disenfranchisement of the mentally disabled was common in the past, today statutes in a number of states secure the vote to such individuals." Id. at 259. While occasional dicta in the 1970s suggested that disenfranchisement of the mentally disabled was constitutional, see, e.g., Shepherd v. Trevino, 575 F.2d 1110, 1115 (5th Cir. 1978) (comparing felons with "insane persons [who] have raised questions about their ability to vote responsibly"); Kronlund v. Honstein, 327 F. Supp. 71, 73 (N.D. Ga. 1971) (noting the state's interest in "preserving the integrity of her electoral process by removing from the process those persons with proven anti-social behavior whose behavior can be said to be destructive of society's aims," and declaring that "a State may prohibit idiots and insane persons . . . from participating in her elections"), it is unclear how the Supreme Court would rule today on an equal protection challenge to insanity clauses given its decision in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985). Cleburne held that mental retardation is not a quasi-suspect classification, see id. at 442, but rejected a ban on group homes under a rational basis standard, see id. at 450. Both before and after Cleburne, commentators argued that mental illness should be treated as a suspect classification under equal protection doctrine and that, consequently, mental disability restrictions on suffrage should he declared unconstitutional. See, e.g., ROBERT M. LEVY & LEONARD S. RUBENSTEIN, THE RIGHTS OF PEOPLE WITH MENTAL DISABILITIES 293 & nn.50-51 (1996) (arguing that institutionalized persons have a constitutional right to vote); Steven K. Metcalf, Comment, The Right To Vote of the Mentally Disabled in Oklahoma: A Case Study of Overinclusive Language and Fundamental Rights, 25 TULSA L.J. 171 (1989) (urging that strict scrutiny be applied to render unconstitutional statutes that prohibit the mentally ill from voting); Note, Mental Disability and the Right To Vote, 88 YALE L.J. 1644 (1979) (same); Note, Mental Illness: A Suspect Classification?, 83 YALE L.J. 1237, 1267 (1974) (arguing that mental disability restrictions violate equal protection).
354. Robert L. Hayman, Jr., Presumptions of Justice: Law, Politics, and the Mentally Retarded Parent, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1202, 1204 (1990); see also MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND AMERICAN LAW 121-28 (1990) (delineating the legal history of competence and incompetence).
355. Robert L. Hayman, Jr., Presumptions of Justice: Law, Politics, and the Mentally Retarded Parent, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1202, 1204 (1990); see also MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND AMERICAN LAW 121-28 (1990) (delineating the legal history of competence and incompetence).
356. Phrenologists, like Elisha P. Hurlbut, did not miss the connections between phrenology's biological discoveries and political reform. In his Essays on Human Rights and Their Political Guaranties, Hurlbut argued that all who had the proper "intelligence and . . . moral impulse" deserved the vote. E.P. HURLBUT, ESSAYS ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND THEIR POLITICAL GUARANTIES 109 (New York, Greeley & McElrath 1845). By the same token, all those "whose moral and intellectual faculties are immature" (children), "whose intellectual perceptions are so disordered as to depart from the standard of truth and reason" (the insane), "whose moral natures are so defective as that their impulses are chiefly in favor of the licentious indulgence of their animal desires" (felons), and those "grossly ignorant and unenlightened" (the illiterate) should "be excluded from a participation in Government." Id. at 111-12 (emphasis omitted). Using these rules, Hurlbut argued that women should be allowed to vote since their natures differed enough from men that they could not adequately be represented. See id. at 112-23. It is no wonder, then, that Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Susan B. Anthony, in their History of Woman Suffrage, listed phrenology together with the Protestant Reformation, Quakerism, and transcendentalism as among the major revelations of science, religion, and philosophy that led to the woman's rights movement of the 19th century. See 1 HISTORY OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE 51 (Elizabeth Cady Stanton et al. eds., New York, Fowler & Wells 1881). Hurlbut did not address the question of black suffrage. On Hurlbut, see JOHN D. DAVIES, PHRENOLOGY, FAD AND SCIENCE 167 (1955); L. RAY GUNN, THE DECLINE OF AUTHORITY: PUBLIC ECONOMIC POLICY AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IN NEW YORK, 1800-1860, at 175-76 (1988); and 1 LEGAL AND JUDICIAL HISTORY OF NEW YORK 403 (Alden Chester ed., 1911). On phrenology, see ROGER COOTER, THE CULTURAL MEANING OF POPULAR SCIENCE: PHRENOLOGY AND THE ORGANIZATION OF CONSENT IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY BRITAIN (1984); DAVIES, supra; DAVID DE GIUSTINO, CONQUEST OF MIND: PHRENOLOGY AND VICTORIAN SOCIAL THOUGHT (1975); ROBERT M. YOUNG, MIND, BRAIN AND ADAPTATION IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 9-53 (1970); and Pierre Schlag, Law and Phrenology, 110 HARV. L. REV. 877 (1997).
357. Phrenologists, like Elisha P. Hurlbut, did not miss the connections between phrenology's biological discoveries and political reform. In his Essays on Human Rights and Their Political Guaranties, Hurlbut argued that all who had the proper "intelligence and . . . moral impulse" deserved the vote. E.P. HURLBUT, ESSAYS ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND THEIR POLITICAL GUARANTIES 109 (New York, Greeley & McElrath 1845). By the same token, all those "whose moral and intellectual faculties are immature" (children), "whose intellectual perceptions are so disordered as to depart from the standard of truth and reason" (the insane), "whose moral natures are so defective as that their impulses are chiefly in favor of the licentious indulgence of their animal desires" (felons), and those "grossly ignorant and unenlightened" (the illiterate) should "be excluded from a participation in Government." Id. at 111-12 (emphasis omitted). Using these rules, Hurlbut argued that women should be allowed to vote since their natures differed enough from men that they could not adequately be represented. See id. at 112-23. It is no wonder, then, that Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Susan B. Anthony, in their History of Woman Suffrage, listed phrenology together with the Protestant Reformation, Quakerism, and transcendentalism as among the major revelations of science, religion, and philosophy that led to the woman's rights movement of the 19th century. See 1 HISTORY OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE 51 (Elizabeth Cady Stanton et al. eds., New York, Fowler & Wells 1881). Hurlbut did not address the question of black suffrage. On Hurlbut, see JOHN D. DAVIES, PHRENOLOGY, FAD AND SCIENCE 167 (1955); L. RAY GUNN, THE DECLINE OF AUTHORITY: PUBLIC ECONOMIC POLICY AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IN NEW YORK, 1800-1860, at 175-76 (1988); and 1 LEGAL AND JUDICIAL HISTORY OF NEW YORK 403 (Alden Chester ed., 1911). On phrenology, see ROGER COOTER, THE CULTURAL MEANING OF POPULAR SCIENCE: PHRENOLOGY AND THE ORGANIZATION OF CONSENT IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY BRITAIN (1984); DAVIES, supra; DAVID DE GIUSTINO, CONQUEST OF MIND: PHRENOLOGY AND VICTORIAN SOCIAL THOUGHT (1975); ROBERT M. YOUNG, MIND, BRAIN AND ADAPTATION IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 9-53 (1970); and Pierre Schlag, Law and Phrenology, 110 HARV. L. REV. 877 (1997).
358. Phrenologists, like Elisha P. Hurlbut, did not miss the connections between phrenology's biological discoveries and political reform. In his Essays on Human Rights and Their Political Guaranties, Hurlbut argued that all who had the proper "intelligence and . . . moral impulse" deserved the vote. E.P. HURLBUT, ESSAYS ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND THEIR POLITICAL GUARANTIES 109 (New York, Greeley & McElrath 1845). By the same token, all those "whose moral and intellectual faculties are immature" (children), "whose intellectual perceptions are so disordered as to depart from the standard of truth and reason" (the insane), "whose moral natures are so defective as that their impulses are chiefly in favor of the licentious indulgence of their animal desires" (felons), and those "grossly ignorant and unenlightened" (the illiterate) should "be excluded from a participation in Government." Id. at 111-12 (emphasis omitted). Using these rules, Hurlbut argued that women should be allowed to vote since their natures differed enough from men that they could not adequately be represented. See id. at 112-23. It is no wonder, then, that Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Susan B. Anthony, in their History of Woman Suffrage, listed phrenology together with the Protestant Reformation, Quakerism, and transcendentalism as among the major revelations of science, religion, and philosophy that led to the woman's rights movement of the 19th century. See 1 HISTORY OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE 51 (Elizabeth Cady Stanton et al. eds., New York, Fowler & Wells 1881). Hurlbut did not address the question of black suffrage. On Hurlbut, see JOHN D. DAVIES, PHRENOLOGY, FAD AND SCIENCE 167 (1955); L. RAY GUNN, THE DECLINE OF AUTHORITY: PUBLIC ECONOMIC POLICY AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IN NEW YORK, 1800-1860, at 175-76 (1988); and 1 LEGAL AND JUDICIAL HISTORY OF NEW YORK 403 (Alden Chester ed., 1911). On phrenology, see ROGER COOTER, THE CULTURAL MEANING OF POPULAR SCIENCE: PHRENOLOGY AND THE ORGANIZATION OF CONSENT IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY BRITAIN (1984); DAVIES, supra; DAVID DE GIUSTINO, CONQUEST OF MIND: PHRENOLOGY AND VICTORIAN SOCIAL THOUGHT (1975); ROBERT M. YOUNG, MIND, BRAIN AND ADAPTATION IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 9-53 (1970); and Pierre Schlag, Law and Phrenology, 110 HARV. L. REV. 877 (1997).
359. Phrenologists, like Elisha P. Hurlbut, did not miss the connections between phrenology's biological discoveries and political reform. In his Essays on Human Rights and Their Political Guaranties, Hurlbut argued that all who had the proper "intelligence and . . . moral impulse" deserved the vote. E.P. HURLBUT, ESSAYS ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND THEIR POLITICAL GUARANTIES 109 (New York, Greeley & McElrath 1845). By the same token, all those "whose moral and intellectual faculties are immature" (children), "whose intellectual perceptions are so disordered as to depart from the standard of truth and reason" (the insane), "whose moral natures are so defective as that their impulses are chiefly in favor of the licentious indulgence of their animal desires" (felons), and those "grossly ignorant and unenlightened" (the illiterate) should "be excluded from a participation in Government." Id. at 111-12 (emphasis omitted). Using these rules, Hurlbut argued that women should be allowed to vote since their natures differed enough from men that they could not adequately be represented. See id. at 112-23. It is no wonder, then, that Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Susan B. Anthony, in their History of Woman Suffrage, listed phrenology together with the Protestant Reformation, Quakerism, and transcendentalism as among the major revelations of science, religion, and philosophy that led to the woman's rights movement of the 19th century. See 1 HISTORY OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE 51 (Elizabeth Cady Stanton et al. eds., New York, Fowler & Wells 1881). Hurlbut did not address the question of black suffrage. On Hurlbut, see JOHN D. DAVIES, PHRENOLOGY, FAD AND SCIENCE 167 (1955); L. RAY GUNN, THE DECLINE OF AUTHORITY: PUBLIC ECONOMIC POLICY AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IN NEW YORK, 1800-1860, at 175-76 (1988); and 1 LEGAL AND JUDICIAL HISTORY OF NEW YORK 403 (Alden Chester ed., 1911). On phrenology, see ROGER COOTER, THE CULTURAL MEANING OF POPULAR SCIENCE: PHRENOLOGY AND THE ORGANIZATION OF CONSENT IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY BRITAIN (1984); DAVIES, supra; DAVID DE GIUSTINO, CONQUEST OF MIND: PHRENOLOGY AND VICTORIAN SOCIAL THOUGHT (1975); ROBERT M. YOUNG, MIND, BRAIN AND ADAPTATION IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 9-53 (1970); and Pierre Schlag, Law and Phrenology, 110 HARV. L. REV. 877 (1997).
360. Phrenologists, like Elisha P. Hurlbut, did not miss the connections between phrenology's biological discoveries and political reform. In his Essays on Human Rights and Their Political Guaranties, Hurlbut argued that all who had the proper "intelligence and . . . moral impulse" deserved the vote. E.P. HURLBUT, ESSAYS ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND THEIR POLITICAL GUARANTIES 109 (New York, Greeley & McElrath 1845). By the same token, all those "whose moral and intellectual faculties are immature" (children), "whose intellectual perceptions are so disordered as to depart from the standard of truth and reason" (the insane), "whose moral natures are so defective as that their impulses are chiefly in favor of the licentious indulgence of their animal desires" (felons), and those "grossly ignorant and unenlightened" (the illiterate) should "be excluded from a participation in Government." Id. at 111-12 (emphasis omitted). Using these rules, Hurlbut argued that women should be allowed to vote since their natures differed enough from men that they could not adequately be represented. See id. at 112-23. It is no wonder, then, that Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Susan B. Anthony, in their History of Woman Suffrage, listed phrenology together with the Protestant Reformation, Quakerism, and transcendentalism as among the major revelations of science, religion, and philosophy that led to the woman's rights movement of the 19th century. See 1 HISTORY OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE 51 (Elizabeth Cady Stanton et al. eds., New York, Fowler & Wells 1881). Hurlbut did not address the question of black suffrage. On Hurlbut, see JOHN D. DAVIES, PHRENOLOGY, FAD AND SCIENCE 167 (1955); L. RAY GUNN, THE DECLINE OF AUTHORITY: PUBLIC ECONOMIC POLICY AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IN NEW YORK, 1800-1860, at 175-76 (1988); and 1 LEGAL AND JUDICIAL HISTORY OF NEW YORK 403 (Alden Chester ed., 1911). On phrenology, see ROGER COOTER, THE CULTURAL MEANING OF POPULAR SCIENCE: PHRENOLOGY AND THE ORGANIZATION OF CONSENT IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY BRITAIN (1984); DAVIES, supra; DAVID DE GIUSTINO, CONQUEST OF MIND: PHRENOLOGY AND VICTORIAN SOCIAL THOUGHT (1975); ROBERT M. YOUNG, MIND, BRAIN AND ADAPTATION IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 9-53 (1970); and Pierre Schlag, Law and Phrenology, 110 HARV. L. REV. 877 (1997).
361. Phrenologists, like Elisha P. Hurlbut, did not miss the connections between phrenology's biological discoveries and political reform. In his Essays on Human Rights and Their Political Guaranties, Hurlbut argued that all who had the proper "intelligence and . . . moral impulse" deserved the vote. E.P. HURLBUT, ESSAYS ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND THEIR POLITICAL GUARANTIES 109 (New York, Greeley & McElrath 1845). By the same token, all those "whose moral and intellectual faculties are immature" (children), "whose intellectual perceptions are so disordered as to depart from the standard of truth and reason" (the insane), "whose moral natures are so defective as that their impulses are chiefly in favor of the licentious indulgence of their animal desires" (felons), and those "grossly ignorant and unenlightened" (the illiterate) should "be excluded from a participation in Government." Id. at 111-12 (emphasis omitted). Using these rules, Hurlbut argued that women should be allowed to vote since their natures differed enough from men that they could not adequately be represented. See id. at 112-23. It is no wonder, then, that Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Susan B. Anthony, in their History of Woman Suffrage, listed phrenology together with the Protestant Reformation, Quakerism, and transcendentalism as among the major revelations of science, religion, and philosophy that led to the woman's rights movement of the 19th century. See 1 HISTORY OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE 51 (Elizabeth Cady Stanton et al. eds., New York, Fowler & Wells 1881). Hurlbut did not address the question of black suffrage. On Hurlbut, see JOHN D. DAVIES, PHRENOLOGY, FAD AND SCIENCE 167 (1955); L. RAY GUNN, THE DECLINE OF AUTHORITY: PUBLIC ECONOMIC POLICY AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IN NEW YORK, 1800-1860, at 175-76 (1988); and 1 LEGAL AND JUDICIAL HISTORY OF NEW YORK 403 (Alden Chester ed., 1911). On phrenology, see ROGER COOTER, THE CULTURAL MEANING OF POPULAR SCIENCE: PHRENOLOGY AND THE ORGANIZATION OF CONSENT IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY BRITAIN (1984); DAVIES, supra; DAVID DE GIUSTINO, CONQUEST OF MIND: PHRENOLOGY AND VICTORIAN SOCIAL THOUGHT (1975); ROBERT M. YOUNG, MIND, BRAIN AND ADAPTATION IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 9-53 (1970); and Pierre Schlag, Law and Phrenology, 110 HARV. L. REV. 877 (1997).
362. Phrenologists, like Elisha P. Hurlbut, did not miss the connections between phrenology's biological discoveries and political reform. In his Essays on Human Rights and Their Political Guaranties, Hurlbut argued that all who had the proper "intelligence and . . . moral impulse" deserved the vote. E.P. HURLBUT, ESSAYS ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND THEIR POLITICAL GUARANTIES 109 (New York, Greeley & McElrath 1845). By the same token, all those "whose moral and intellectual faculties are immature" (children), "whose intellectual perceptions are so disordered as to depart from the standard of truth and reason" (the insane), "whose moral natures are so defective as that their impulses are chiefly in favor of the licentious indulgence of their animal desires" (felons), and those "grossly ignorant and unenlightened" (the illiterate) should "be excluded from a participation in Government." Id. at 111-12 (emphasis omitted). Using these rules, Hurlbut argued that women should be allowed to vote since their natures differed enough from men that they could not adequately be represented. See id. at 112-23. It is no wonder, then, that Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Susan B. Anthony, in their History of Woman Suffrage, listed phrenology together with the Protestant Reformation, Quakerism, and transcendentalism as among the major revelations of science, religion, and philosophy that led to the woman's rights movement of the 19th century. See 1 HISTORY OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE 51 (Elizabeth Cady Stanton et al. eds., New York, Fowler & Wells 1881). Hurlbut did not address the question of black suffrage. On Hurlbut, see JOHN D. DAVIES, PHRENOLOGY, FAD AND SCIENCE 167 (1955); L. RAY GUNN, THE DECLINE OF AUTHORITY: PUBLIC ECONOMIC POLICY AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IN NEW YORK, 1800-1860, at 175-76 (1988); and 1 LEGAL AND JUDICIAL HISTORY OF NEW YORK 403 (Alden Chester ed., 1911). On phrenology, see ROGER COOTER, THE CULTURAL MEANING OF POPULAR SCIENCE: PHRENOLOGY AND THE ORGANIZATION OF CONSENT IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY BRITAIN (1984); DAVIES, supra; DAVID DE GIUSTINO, CONQUEST OF MIND: PHRENOLOGY AND VICTORIAN SOCIAL THOUGHT (1975); ROBERT M. YOUNG, MIND, BRAIN AND ADAPTATION IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 9-53 (1970); and Pierre Schlag, Law and Phrenology, 110 HARV. L. REV. 877 (1997).
363. Phrenologists, like Elisha P. Hurlbut, did not miss the connections between phrenology's biological discoveries and political reform. In his Essays on Human Rights and Their Political Guaranties, Hurlbut argued that all who had the proper "intelligence and . . . moral impulse" deserved the vote. E.P. HURLBUT, ESSAYS ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND THEIR POLITICAL GUARANTIES 109 (New York, Greeley & McElrath 1845). By the same token, all those "whose moral and intellectual faculties are immature" (children), "whose intellectual perceptions are so disordered as to depart from the standard of truth and reason" (the insane), "whose moral natures are so defective as that their impulses are chiefly in favor of the licentious indulgence of their animal desires" (felons), and those "grossly ignorant and unenlightened" (the illiterate) should "be excluded from a participation in Government." Id. at 111-12 (emphasis omitted). Using these rules, Hurlbut argued that women should be allowed to vote since their natures differed enough from men that they could not adequately be represented. See id. at 112-23. It is no wonder, then, that Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Susan B. Anthony, in their History of Woman Suffrage, listed phrenology together with the Protestant Reformation, Quakerism, and transcendentalism as among the major revelations of science, religion, and philosophy that led to the woman's rights movement of the 19th century. See 1 HISTORY OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE 51 (Elizabeth Cady Stanton et al. eds., New York, Fowler & Wells 1881). Hurlbut did not address the question of black suffrage. On Hurlbut, see JOHN D. DAVIES, PHRENOLOGY, FAD AND SCIENCE 167 (1955); L. RAY GUNN, THE DECLINE OF AUTHORITY: PUBLIC ECONOMIC POLICY AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IN NEW YORK, 1800-1860, at 175-76 (1988); and 1 LEGAL AND JUDICIAL HISTORY OF NEW YORK 403 (Alden Chester ed., 1911). On phrenology, see ROGER COOTER, THE CULTURAL MEANING OF POPULAR SCIENCE: PHRENOLOGY AND THE ORGANIZATION OF CONSENT IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY BRITAIN (1984); DAVIES, supra; DAVID DE GIUSTINO, CONQUEST OF MIND: PHRENOLOGY AND VICTORIAN SOCIAL THOUGHT (1975); ROBERT M. YOUNG, MIND, BRAIN AND ADAPTATION IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 9-53 (1970); and Pierre Schlag, Law and Phrenology, 110 HARV. L. REV. 877 (1997).
364. Phrenologists, like Elisha P. Hurlbut, did not miss the connections between phrenology's biological discoveries and political reform. In his Essays on Human Rights and Their Political Guaranties, Hurlbut argued that all who had the proper "intelligence and . . . moral impulse" deserved the vote. E.P. HURLBUT, ESSAYS ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND THEIR POLITICAL GUARANTIES 109 (New York, Greeley & McElrath 1845). By the same token, all those "whose moral and intellectual faculties are immature" (children), "whose intellectual perceptions are so disordered as to depart from the standard of truth and reason" (the insane), "whose moral natures are so defective as that their impulses are chiefly in favor of the licentious indulgence of their animal desires" (felons), and those "grossly ignorant and unenlightened" (the illiterate) should "be excluded from a participation in Government." Id. at 111-12 (emphasis omitted). Using these rules, Hurlbut argued that women should be allowed to vote since their natures differed enough from men that they could not adequately be represented. See id. at 112-23. It is no wonder, then, that Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Susan B. Anthony, in their History of Woman Suffrage, listed phrenology together with the Protestant Reformation, Quakerism, and transcendentalism as among the major revelations of science, religion, and philosophy that led to the woman's rights movement of the 19th century. See 1 HISTORY OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE 51 (Elizabeth Cady Stanton et al. eds., New York, Fowler & Wells 1881). Hurlbut did not address the question of black suffrage. On Hurlbut, see JOHN D. DAVIES, PHRENOLOGY, FAD AND SCIENCE 167 (1955); L. RAY GUNN, THE DECLINE OF AUTHORITY: PUBLIC ECONOMIC POLICY AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IN NEW YORK, 1800-1860, at 175-76 (1988); and 1 LEGAL AND JUDICIAL HISTORY OF NEW YORK 403 (Alden Chester ed., 1911). On phrenology, see ROGER COOTER, THE CULTURAL MEANING OF POPULAR SCIENCE: PHRENOLOGY AND THE ORGANIZATION OF CONSENT IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY BRITAIN (1984); DAVIES, supra; DAVID DE GIUSTINO, CONQUEST OF MIND: PHRENOLOGY AND VICTORIAN SOCIAL THOUGHT (1975); ROBERT M. YOUNG, MIND, BRAIN AND ADAPTATION IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 9-53 (1970); and Pierre Schlag, Law and Phrenology, 110 HARV. L. REV. 877 (1997).
365. See STEPHEN JAY GOULD, THE MISMEASURE OF MAN 62-104 (rev. ed. 1996); WILLIAM STANTON, THE LEOPARD'S SPOTS: SCIENTIFIC ATTITUDES TOWARD RACE IN AMERICA, 1815-59 (1960).
366. See STEPHEN JAY GOULD, THE MISMEASURE OF MAN 62-104 (rev. ed. 1996); WILLIAM STANTON, THE LEOPARD'S SPOTS: SCIENTIFIC ATTITUDES TOWARD RACE IN AMERICA, 1815-59 (1960).
367. See. e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 246 (1866) (statement of Sen. Davis) ("Camper, Soemmering, Lawrence, Virey, Ebel, and Blumenbach agree thai the brain of the negro is smaller; and Gall, Spurzheim, and Combe, that it is so distributed as to denote less capacity for reasoning and judging than the Caucasian."); CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 2248 (1864) (statement of Sen. Cowan) ("I exclude a black man [from the suffrage] because black is the evidence that he is an inferior man . . . ."); William A. Hammond, Woman in Politics, 137 N. AM. REV. 137, 141-42 (1883) ("The brain of woman is . . . different from that of man, and difference of structure necessarily involves difference of function."). It is important also to note that many of the capacity qualitications blended together. For instance, blacks were considered more likely to be insane than whites. See NORMAN DAIN, CONCEPTS OF INSANITY IN THE UNITED STATES, 1789-1865, at 104-08 (1964).
368. See. e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 246 (1866) (statement of Sen. Davis) ("Camper, Soemmering, Lawrence, Virey, Ebel, and Blumenbach agree thai the brain of the negro is smaller; and Gall, Spurzheim, and Combe, that it is so distributed as to denote less capacity for reasoning and judging than the Caucasian."); CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 2248 (1864) (statement of Sen. Cowan) ("I exclude a black man [from the suffrage] because black is the evidence that he is an inferior man . . . ."); William A. Hammond, Woman in Politics, 137 N. AM. REV. 137, 141-42 (1883) ("The brain of woman is . . . different from that of man, and difference of structure necessarily involves difference of function."). It is important also to note that many of the capacity qualitications blended together. For instance, blacks were considered more likely to be insane than whites. See NORMAN DAIN, CONCEPTS OF INSANITY IN THE UNITED STATES, 1789-1865, at 104-08 (1964).
369. See. e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 246 (1866) (statement of Sen. Davis) ("Camper, Soemmering, Lawrence, Virey, Ebel, and Blumenbach agree thai the brain of the negro is smaller; and Gall, Spurzheim, and Combe, that it is so distributed as to denote less capacity for reasoning and judging than the Caucasian."); CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 2248 (1864) (statement of Sen. Cowan) ("I exclude a black man [from the suffrage] because black is the evidence that he is an inferior man . . . ."); William A. Hammond, Woman in Politics, 137 N. AM. REV. 137, 141-42 (1883) ("The brain of woman is . . . different from that of man, and difference of structure necessarily involves difference of function."). It is important also to note that many of the capacity qualitications blended together. For instance, blacks were considered more likely to be insane than whites. See NORMAN DAIN, CONCEPTS OF INSANITY IN THE UNITED STATES, 1789-1865, at 104-08 (1964).
370. See. e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 246 (1866) (statement of Sen. Davis) ("Camper, Soemmering, Lawrence, Virey, Ebel, and Blumenbach agree thai the brain of the negro is smaller; and Gall, Spurzheim, and Combe, that it is so distributed as to denote less capacity for reasoning and judging than the Caucasian."); CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 2248 (1864) (statement of Sen. Cowan) ("I exclude a black man [from the suffrage] because black is the evidence that he is an inferior man . . . ."); William A. Hammond, Woman in Politics, 137 N. AM. REV. 137, 141-42 (1883) ("The brain of woman is . . . different from that of man, and difference of structure necessarily involves difference of function."). It is important also to note that many of the capacity qualitications blended together. For instance, blacks were considered more likely to be insane than whites. See NORMAN DAIN, CONCEPTS OF INSANITY IN THE UNITED STATES, 1789-1865, at 104-08 (1964).