Decision-makers: In defense of courts

American Bankruptcy Law Journal

Volumn 71, Issue 2, 1997, Pages 109-130

  Chemerinsky, Erwin ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA   (United States)

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EID: 0346066089     PISSN: 00279048     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (89)

1. 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
2. Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 [hereinafter 1978 Act].
3. Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 344.
4. See 28 U.S.C. § 157(b) (1994).
5. See id. § 157(c).
6. See id. § 158(b)(1).
7. In a provocative recent article, Professor Laura Bartell suggests that bankruptcy courts are not really courts at all and that it is therefore unconstitutional for them to exercise the contempt power. Laura B. Bartell, Contempt of the Bankruptcy Court - A New Look, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 1. Part III.A of this Article, infra, expressly disagrees with Professor Bartell's conclusions.
8. See Jethro K. Lieberman & James F. Henry, Lessons from the Alternative Dispute Resolution Movement, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 424 (1986). See also JEROLD S. AUERBACH, JUSTICE WITHOUT LAW? (1983).
9. See Jethro K. Lieberman & James F. Henry, Lessons from the Alternative Dispute Resolution Movement, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 424 (1986). See also JEROLD S. AUERBACH, JUSTICE WITHOUT LAW? (1983).
10. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1994).
11. Allied-Bruce Terminix Co. v. Dobson, 115 S. Ct. 834 (1995).
12. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 4607 (West 1997) (making mediation mandatory whenever custody or visitation of a minor child is in dispute).
13. See generally BARBARA S. MEIERHOEFER, COURT-ANNEXED ARBITRATION IN TEN DISTRICT COURTS (1990).
14. Whether bankruptcy courts can do this on their own or whether they must make a recommendation to the district court is immaterial for this point; what matters is that the federal judiciary has contempt power while private decision-makers do not.
15. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 and art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
16. See 28 U.S.C. § 152 (1994) (appointment of bankruptcy judges); id. § 631 (appointment and tenure of magistrate judges).
17. An earlier article by this author suggested three different models that might be used to evaluate judicial candidates: one focuses solely on professional qualifications; a second includes "judging skills;" and a third includes ideology. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Ideology, Judicial Selection and Judicial Ethics, 2 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 643, 644-46 (1989). For each of these approaches there would still be a need to operationalize the definitions of "quality."
18. U.S. CONST. art. III.
19. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 152 (1994).
20. Archibald Cox, The Independence of the Judiciary: History and Purposes, SAN FRANCISCO BARRISTER L.J. 3 (Feb. 1986) (quoting Senator Sam Ervin: "To my mind an independent judiciary is perhaps the most essential characteristic of a free society."). For an excellent discussion of the types of judicial independence, see Gordon Bermant & Russell R. Wheeler, Federal Judges and the Judicial Branch: Their Independence and Accountability, 46 MERCER L. REV. 835 (1995) (distinguishing four types of judicial independence: decisional, personal, procedural, and administrative).
21. Archibald Cox, The Independence of the Judiciary: History and Purposes, SAN FRANCISCO BARRISTER L.J. 3 (Feb. 1986) (quoting Senator Sam Ervin: "To my mind an independent judiciary is perhaps the most essential characteristic of a free society."). For an excellent discussion of the types of judicial independence, see Gordon Bermant & Russell R. Wheeler, Federal Judges and the Judicial Branch: Their Independence and Accountability, 46 MERCER L. REV. 835 (1995) (distinguishing four types of judicial independence: decisional, personal, procedural, and administrative).
22. See, e.g., Judith Resnick, History, Jurisdiction, and the Federal Courts: Changing Contexts, Selective Memories, and Limited Imagination, 98 W. VA. L. REV. 171, 233 (1995).
23. There recently has been discussion of whether public attacks on judges, especially sharp criticisms and even calls for resignation and impeachment, are a threat to judicial independence. See, e.g., Louis H. Pollak, Criticizing Judges, 79 JUDICATURE 298 (1996).
24. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332, 1367 (1994).
25. See 26 U.S.C. § 7441 (1994).
26. See 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (1994).
27. See id. § 1334.
28. See Martin H. Redish, Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies, and the Northern Pipeline Decision, 1983 DUKE L.J. 197 (1983).
29. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
30. See Young v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co., 995 F.2d 547, 548 (5th Cir. 1993).
31. Id.
32. 28 U.S.C. § 636 (1994) (magistrates); id. § 157 (bankruptcy).
33. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
34. For a review of the law concerning the permissible jurisdiction of Article I courts, see ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 207-45 (2d ed. 1994).
35. For example, abstention doctrines are often based on considerations of federalism. See, e.g., Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44-45 (1971).
36. For example, a verdict of not guilty in a criminal case is not reviewable under the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment. See U.S. CONST. amend. V. Also, the Seventh Amendment generally precludes appellate review of a jury's fact-finding.
37. See supra notes 8-11 and accompanying text.
38. See, e.g., Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105 (1977). See also Akhil Reed Amar, Parity as a Constitutional Question, 71 B.U. L. REV. 645 (1991); Erwin Chemerinsky, Parity Reconsidered: Defining a Role for the Federal Judiciary, 36 UCLA L. REV. 233 (1988); Susan N. Herman, Why Parity Matters, 71 B.U. L. REV. 651 (1991); Michael Wells, Beyond the Parity Debate: The Decline of the Legal Process Tradition in the Law of Federal Courts, 71 B.U. L. REV. 609 (1991).
39. See, e.g., Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105 (1977). See also Akhil Reed Amar, Parity as a Constitutional Question, 71 B.U. L. REV. 645 (1991); Erwin Chemerinsky, Parity Reconsidered: Defining a Role for the Federal Judiciary, 36 UCLA L. REV. 233 (1988); Susan N. Herman, Why Parity Matters, 71 B.U. L. REV. 651 (1991); Michael Wells, Beyond the Parity Debate: The Decline of the Legal Process Tradition in the Law of Federal Courts, 71 B.U. L. REV. 609 (1991).
40. See, e.g., Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105 (1977). See also Akhil Reed Amar, Parity as a Constitutional Question, 71 B.U. L. REV. 645 (1991); Erwin Chemerinsky, Parity Reconsidered: Defining a Role for the Federal Judiciary, 36 UCLA L. REV. 233 (1988); Susan N. Herman, Why Parity Matters, 71 B.U. L. REV. 651 (1991); Michael Wells, Beyond the Parity Debate: The Decline of the Legal Process Tradition in the Law of Federal Courts, 71 B.U. L. REV. 609 (1991).
41. See, e.g., Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105 (1977). See also Akhil Reed Amar, Parity as a Constitutional Question, 71 B.U. L. REV. 645 (1991); Erwin Chemerinsky, Parity Reconsidered: Defining a Role for the Federal Judiciary, 36 UCLA L. REV. 233 (1988); Susan N. Herman, Why Parity Matters, 71 B.U. L. REV. 651 (1991); Michael Wells, Beyond the Parity Debate: The Decline of the Legal Process Tradition in the Law of Federal Courts, 71 B.U. L. REV. 609 (1991).
42. See, e.g., Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105 (1977). See also Akhil Reed Amar, Parity as a Constitutional Question, 71 B.U. L. REV. 645 (1991); Erwin Chemerinsky, Parity Reconsidered: Defining a Role for the Federal Judiciary, 36 UCLA L. REV. 233 (1988); Susan N. Herman, Why Parity Matters, 71 B.U. L. REV. 651 (1991); Michael Wells, Beyond the Parity Debate: The Decline of the Legal Process Tradition in the Law of Federal Courts, 71 B.U. L. REV. 609 (1991).
43. Some have tried to measure "parity" between federal and state courts. See Michael E. Solimine & James L. Walker, Constitutional Litigation in Federal and State Courts: An Empirical Analysis of Judicial Parity, 10 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 213 (1983). I believe, however, that the effort is seriously methodologically flawed and that such flaws would haunt any similar studies. See generally Chemerinsky, supra note 36 (discussing in detail the debate over whether state courts are equal to federal courts in their ability and willingness to protect federal constitutional rights).
44. See, e.g., Tracy Weber et al., Orange County in Bankruptcy: Supervisors Clash Over Plan to Revamp County Crisis, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 31, 1994, at A1, available in 1994 WL 2383107.
45. 458 U.S. 50, 115 (1982) (White, J., dissenting). For an excellent defense of this approach to determining when Article I courts are permissible, see Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies, and Article III, 101 HARV. L. REV. 915 (1988).
46. 473 U.S. 568 (1985).
47. Id. at 593-94.
48. 458 U.S. at 113 (White, J., dissenting).
49. 478 U.S. 833 (1986).
50. Id. at 856.
51. Id.
52. See 458 U.S. at 84-88; id. at 90 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment).
53. 478 U.S. at 851 ("Thus, in reviewing Article III challenges, we have weighed a number of factors, none of which has been deemed determinative, with an eye to the practical effect that the congressional action will have on the constitutionally assigned role of the federal judiciary.").
54. Id. at 847.
55. Id. at 849-50.
56. Id. at 851.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 856.
59. Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1085 (1984).
60. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
61. See Edward Brunet, Questioning the Quality of Alternate Dispute Resolution, 62 TUL. L. REV. 1 (1987).
62. Harry T. Edwards, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panacea or Anathema?, 99 HARV. L. REV. 668, 679 (1986).
63. See supra notes 40-52 and accompanying text.
64. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Ending the Marathon: It is Time to Overrule Northern Pipeline, 65 AM. BANKR. L.J. 311 (1991).
65. See, e.g., S. 158, 97th Cong. (1981); H.R. 3225, 97th Cong. (1981) (bills restricting federal court jurisdiction in abortion cases); S. 481, 97th Cong. (1981); H.R. 4756, 97th Cong. (1981) (bills restricting federal court jurisdiction over voluntary school prayers).
66. Lawrence Gene Sager, Foreword: Constitutional Limitations on Congress' Authority to Regulate the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 95 HARV. L. REV. 17 (1981).
67. As an aside that is beyond the scope of this Article, I am deeply distressed by the Supreme Court's recent decision concerning the Eleventh Amendment that limits the ability of the federal courts to enforce federal law to secure state compliance. See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114 (1996) (holding that Congress cannot override the Eleventh Amendment except when acting pursuant to Section five of the Fourteenth Amendment and that suits cannot be brought against state officers to enforce federal laws that have comprehensive enforcement mechanisms).
68. Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 584 (1985).
69. See Bartell, supra note 7, at 1.
70. Id. at 25.
71. Id. at 27.
72. Id. at 27-28 (quoting Griffith v. Oles (In re Hipp, Inc.), 895 F.2d 1503, 1514 (5th Cir. 1990)).
73. 501 U.S. 868 (1991).
74. Id. at 882-83 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2).
75. Bartell, supra note 7, at 27.
76. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
77. Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 584 (1985).
78. See supra notes 40-52, 57-60 and accompanying text.
79. The argument might be that the greater prestige of the district court attracts the most qualified individuals. This assumes that there are not enough of the "most qualified individuals" to fill both the district court and bankruptcy court positions. There is no reason to believe that this assumption is true or that the selection process is sufficiently precise to find such people.
80. See Michael A. Berch, The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel and Its Implications for Adoption of Specialist Panels in the Courts of Appeals, in RESTRUCTURING JUSTICE 165 (Arthur D. Hellman ed., 1990).
81. As part of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Congress amended 28 U.S.C. § 158(b) to make BAPs the presumptively preferred method for reviewing appeals from orders of bankruptcy judges. Those amendments, in part, provide: (b)(1) The judicial council of a circuit shall establish a bankruptcy appellate panel service composed of bankruptcy judges of the districts in the circuit who are appointed by the judicial council in accordance with paragraph (3), to hear and determine, with the consent of all the parties, appeals under subsection (a) unless the judicial council finds that - (A) there are insufficient judicial resources available in the circuit; or (B) establishment of such service would result in undue delay or increased cost to parties in cases under title 11. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, § 104(c)(3), 108 Stat. 4106, 4109 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1) (1994)).
82. See supra notes 22-26 and accompanying text.
83. For an excellent discussion of these issues, see Daniel J. Bussel, Power, Authority, and Precedent in Interpreting the Bankruptcy Code, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1063 (1994).
84. See, e.g., In re Windmill Farms, 70 B.R. 618 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1987), rev'd on other grounds, 841 F.2d 1467 (9th Cir. 1988); Life Ins. Co. v. Barakat (In re Barakat), 173 B.R. 672 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1994) (bankruptcy courts are bound by BAP, but not by district courts); Coyne v. Westinghouse Credit Corp. (In re Globe Illumination Co.), 149 B.R. 614 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1993) (bankruptcy courts throughout the circuit are bound by BAP); In re Thunderbird Inn, 151 B.R. 224 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1993) (same).
85. Bryant v. Smith, 165 B.R. 176 (W.D. Va. 1994) (bankruptcy courts are bound by district courts); In re Shattuc Cable Corp., 138 B.R. 557 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1992) (bankruptcy courts not bound by district courts); First of America Bank v. Gaylor (In re Gaylor), 123 B.R. 236 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1991) (same).
86. Bank of Maui v. Estate Analysis, Inc., 904 F-2d 470, 472 (9th Cir. 1990) ("BAP decisions cannot bind the district courts themselves."); S.F. Drake Hotel Assoc. v. Security Pac. Nat'l Bank (In re S.F. Drake Hotel Assoc.), 147 B.R. 538, 539 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (same).
87. Barakat, 173 B.R. at 677.
88. Kathleen P. March & Roberto V. Obregon, Are BAP Decisions Binding on any Court?, 18 CAL. BANKR. J. 189 (1990).
89. See supra Part I.