The Staying Power of the Legislative Status Quo: Collective Choice in Canada's Parliament after Morgentaler

Canadian Journal of Political Science

Volumn 30, Issue 1, 1997, Pages 30-52

  Flanagan, Thomas ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALGARY   (Canada)

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EID: 0346047323     PISSN: 00084239     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/s000842390001492x     Document Type: Article

References (51)

1. The impact of Morgentaler upon the practical status quo is harder to describe because funding arrangements and the availability of abortion clinics vary considerably from province to province. However, time series data suggest that the decision did, in practice, help to make abortion more common. Statistics Canada calculates an index called "rate of known voluntary interruptions of pregnancy per 1,000 women aged 13 to 44." From a value of 7.3 in 1971, this index reached a pre-Morgentaler peak of 12.1 in 1982. In the three years prior to Morgentaler, it was 10.8, 10.7 and 10.7. It increased to 11.0 in 1988, to 11.6 in 1989 and to a new peak of 14.0 in 1990. In the same period, the reported number of abortions performed in the United States upon Canadian women fell from 2,757 in 1987 to 1,573 in 1990, so the increase in the rate of voluntary interruptions of pregnancy had to be due to abortions performed in Canada (Statistics Canada, Report on the Demographic Situation in Canada 1992: Current Demographic Analysis [Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 1992], 56).
2. Now s. 288 of the Criminal Code.
3. Morgentaler, Smoling and Scott v. the Queen, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30, reprinted in Research Unit for Socio-Legal Studies, University of Calgary, Leading Constitutional Decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada, 17.
4. Morgentaler, Smoling and Scott v. the Queen, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30, reprinted in Research Unit for Socio-Legal Studies, University of Calgary, Leading Constitutional Decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada, 17.
5. Ibid., 13.
6. Because all votes are free votes in the United States Congress, there has been a proliferation of research on structure-induced equilibrium in that body. See James D. Morrow, Game Theory for Political Scientists (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 138-45, 159-60, for overview and references.
7. I rely on Janine Brodie, Shelley A. M. Gavigan and Jane Jenson, The Politics of Abortion (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1992); F. L. Morton Morgentaler v. Borowski: Abortion, the Charter, and the Courts (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1992); and Robert M. Campbell and Leslie A. Pal, "Courts Politics, and Morality: Canada's Abortion Saga," in Robert M. Campbell and Leslie A. Pal, eds., The Real Worlds of Canadian Politics: Cases in Process and Policy (2nd ed.; Peterborough: Broadview Press, 1991).
8. I rely on Janine Brodie, Shelley A. M. Gavigan and Jane Jenson, The Politics of Abortion (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1992); F. L. Morton Morgentaler v. Borowski: Abortion, the Charter, and the Courts (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1992); and Robert M. Campbell and Leslie A. Pal, "Courts Politics, and Morality: Canada's Abortion Saga," in Robert M. Campbell and Leslie A. Pal, eds., The Real Worlds of Canadian Politics: Cases in Process and Policy (2nd ed.; Peterborough: Broadview Press, 1991).
9. I rely on Janine Brodie, Shelley A. M. Gavigan and Jane Jenson, The Politics of Abortion (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1992); F. L. Morton Morgentaler v. Borowski: Abortion, the Charter, and the Courts (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1992); and Robert M. Campbell and Leslie A. Pal, "Courts Politics, and Morality: Canada's Abortion Saga," in Robert M. Campbell and Leslie A. Pal, eds., The Real Worlds of Canadian Politics: Cases in Process and Policy (2nd ed.; Peterborough: Broadview Press, 1991).
10. Morrow, Game Theory for Political Scientists, 108-11.
11. Iain McLean, Public Choice: An Introduction (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987), 25-27.
12. Note that these preference orderings are purely stipulate. In the real world, there could be conservatives whose second preference is f rather than l, and so on.
13. Steven J. Brams, Rational Politics: Decisions, Games, and Strategy (Boston: Academic Press, 1985), 210.
14. William H. Riker, Liberalism against Populism: A Confrontation between the Theory of Democracy and the Theory of Social Choice (Prospect Heights, Ill.: Waveland Press, 1988), 69-73.
15. Ibid., 181-95; and "Implications from the Disequilibrium of Majority Rule for the Study of Institutions," in Peter C. Ordeshook and Kenneth A. Shepsle, eds., Political Equilibrium (Boston: Kluwer-Nijhoff, 1982), 3-24; Peter C. Ordeshook, "Comment on Riker," in ibid., 25-31; Morris P. Fiorina and Kenneth A. Shepsle, "Equilibrium, Disequilibrium, and the General Possibility of a Science of Politics," in ibid., 49-64; and Bryan D. Jones, Reconceiving Decision-Making in Democratic Politics: Attention, Choice, and Public Policy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994).
16. Ibid., 181-95; and "Implications from the Disequilibrium of Majority Rule for the Study of Institutions," in Peter C. Ordeshook and Kenneth A. Shepsle, eds., Political Equilibrium (Boston: Kluwer-Nijhoff, 1982), 3-24; Peter C. Ordeshook, "Comment on Riker," in ibid., 25-31; Morris P. Fiorina and Kenneth A. Shepsle, "Equilibrium, Disequilibrium, and the General Possibility of a Science of Politics," in ibid., 49-64; and Bryan D. Jones, Reconceiving Decision-Making in Democratic Politics: Attention, Choice, and Public Policy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994).
17. Ibid., 181-95; and "Implications from the Disequilibrium of Majority Rule for the Study of Institutions," in Peter C. Ordeshook and Kenneth A. Shepsle, eds., Political Equilibrium (Boston: Kluwer-Nijhoff, 1982), 3-24; Peter C. Ordeshook, "Comment on Riker," in ibid., 25-31; Morris P. Fiorina and Kenneth A. Shepsle, "Equilibrium, Disequilibrium, and the General Possibility of a Science of Politics," in ibid., 49-64; and Bryan D. Jones, Reconceiving Decision-Making in Democratic Politics: Attention, Choice, and Public Policy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994).
18. Ibid., 181-95; and "Implications from the Disequilibrium of Majority Rule for the Study of Institutions," in Peter C. Ordeshook and Kenneth A. Shepsle, eds., Political Equilibrium (Boston: Kluwer-Nijhoff, 1982), 3-24; Peter C. Ordeshook, "Comment on Riker," in ibid., 25-31; Morris P. Fiorina and Kenneth A. Shepsle, "Equilibrium, Disequilibrium, and the General Possibility of a Science of Politics," in ibid., 49-64; and Bryan D. Jones, Reconceiving Decision-Making in Democratic Politics: Attention, Choice, and Public Policy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994).
19. Ibid., 181-95; and "Implications from the Disequilibrium of Majority Rule for the Study of Institutions," in Peter C. Ordeshook and Kenneth A. Shepsle, eds., Political Equilibrium (Boston: Kluwer-Nijhoff, 1982), 3-24; Peter C. Ordeshook, "Comment on Riker," in ibid., 25-31; Morris P. Fiorina and Kenneth A. Shepsle, "Equilibrium, Disequilibrium, and the General Possibility of a Science of Politics," in ibid., 49-64; and Bryan D. Jones, Reconceiving Decision-Making in Democratic Politics: Attention, Choice, and Public Policy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994).
20. Brodie et al., Politics of Abortion, 67-68.
21. House of Commons, Journals, July 28, 1988, 3296-97; and House of Commons, Debates, July 26, 1988, 17964-66.
22. House of Commons, Journals, July 28, 1988, 3296-97; and House of Commons, Debates, July 26, 1988, 17964-66.
23. Details from House of Commons, Journals, July 28, 1988, 3296-302.
24. Brodie et al., Politics of Abortion, 87.
25. The few MPs who abstained on certain votes have been put into the category where they have the closest fit. Two Conservative MPs (Bob Pennock and Chuck Cook) voted somewhat inconsistently by supporting both pro-life and pro-choice amendments. However, both also voted for the government resolution in the end. Perhaps for them rationality meant trying to support any available compromise. Pennock is counted as a "Pro-Life Compromiser" in Figure 1 because he voted for the Mitges amendment; Cook is counted as a "Pro-Life-Leaning Moderate" because he voted for the James, but not for the Mitges, amendment.
26. Brams, Rational Politics, 28.
27. Graham Fraser, "MPs Vote Down Abortion Resolution," The Globe and Mail (Toronto), July 29, 1988. See Link Byfield, "A Pro-life Coup in Ottawa," Alberta Report, August 8, 1988, 38, for a similar view.
28. Graham Fraser, "MPs Vote Down Abortion Resolution," The Globe and Mail (Toronto), July 29, 1988. See Link Byfield, "A Pro-life Coup in Ottawa," Alberta Report, August 8, 1988, 38, for a similar view.
29. McLean, Public Choice, 133-34.
30. House of Commons, Journals, November 28, 1989, 897, and May 29, 1990, 1770-71.
31. Frith, in Senate Debates, June 7, 1990, 1866; Fairbairn, in ibid., January 29, 1991, 5209-13; and Kirby, in ibid., January 29, 1991, 5217-22. Neiman did not speak but seconded a pro-choice amendment introduced by Kirby, ibid., 5222.
32. Frith, in Senate Debates, June 7, 1990, 1866; Fairbairn, in ibid., January 29, 1991, 5209-13; and Kirby, in ibid., January 29, 1991, 5217-22. Neiman did not speak but seconded a pro-choice amendment introduced by Kirby, ibid., 5222.
33. Frith, in Senate Debates, June 7, 1990, 1866; Fairbairn, in ibid., January 29, 1991, 5209-13; and Kirby, in ibid., January 29, 1991, 5217-22. Neiman did not speak but seconded a pro-choice amendment introduced by Kirby, ibid., 5222.
34. Frith, in Senate Debates, June 7, 1990, 1866; Fairbairn, in ibid., January 29, 1991, 5209-13; and Kirby, in ibid., January 29, 1991, 5217-22. Neiman did not speak but seconded a pro-choice amendment introduced by Kirby, ibid., 5222.
35. Bélisle, in ibid., June 6, 1990, 1843; Bosa, in ibid., January 24, 1991, 5181-82; Ray Perrault, in ibid., January 30, 1991, 5259-60; and Haidasz, in ibid., June 26, 1990, 2149-53, and January 29, 1991, 5233-43. J.-P. Guay also expressed opposition on pro-life grounds (ibid., June 6, 1990, 1841-43), but was no longer in the Senate when the bill was voted upon. The other names will be found in the votes on the Haidasz amendments as recorded in the Senate, Journals, January 31, 1991, 2230-37.
36. Bélisle, in ibid., June 6, 1990, 1843; Bosa, in ibid., January 24, 1991, 5181-82; Ray Perrault, in ibid., January 30, 1991, 5259-60; and Haidasz, in ibid., June 26, 1990, 2149-53, and January 29, 1991, 5233-43. J.-P. Guay also expressed opposition on pro-life grounds (ibid., June 6, 1990, 1841-43), but was no longer in the Senate when the bill was voted upon. The other names will be found in the votes on the Haidasz amendments as recorded in the Senate, Journals, January 31, 1991, 2230-37.
37. Bélisle, in ibid., June 6, 1990, 1843; Bosa, in ibid., January 24, 1991, 5181-82; Ray Perrault, in ibid., January 30, 1991, 5259-60; and Haidasz, in ibid., June 26, 1990, 2149-53, and January 29, 1991, 5233-43. J.-P. Guay also expressed opposition on pro-life grounds (ibid., June 6, 1990, 1841-43), but was no longer in the Senate when the bill was voted upon. The other names will be found in the votes on the Haidasz amendments as recorded in the Senate, Journals, January 31, 1991, 2230-37.
38. Bélisle, in ibid., June 6, 1990, 1843; Bosa, in ibid., January 24, 1991, 5181-82; Ray Perrault, in ibid., January 30, 1991, 5259-60; and Haidasz, in ibid., June 26, 1990, 2149-53, and January 29, 1991, 5233-43. J.-P. Guay also expressed opposition on pro-life grounds (ibid., June 6, 1990, 1841-43), but was no longer in the Senate when the bill was voted upon. The other names will be found in the votes on the Haidasz amendments as recorded in the Senate, Journals, January 31, 1991, 2230-37.
39. Bélisle, in ibid., June 6, 1990, 1843; Bosa, in ibid., January 24, 1991, 5181-82; Ray Perrault, in ibid., January 30, 1991, 5259-60; and Haidasz, in ibid., June 26, 1990, 2149-53, and January 29, 1991, 5233-43. J.-P. Guay also expressed opposition on pro-life grounds (ibid., June 6, 1990, 1841-43), but was no longer in the Senate when the bill was voted upon. The other names will be found in the votes on the Haidasz amendments as recorded in the Senate, Journals, January 31, 1991, 2230-37.
40. Bélisle, in ibid., June 6, 1990, 1843; Bosa, in ibid., January 24, 1991, 5181-82; Ray Perrault, in ibid., January 30, 1991, 5259-60; and Haidasz, in ibid., June 26, 1990, 2149-53, and January 29, 1991, 5233-43. J.-P. Guay also expressed opposition on pro-life grounds (ibid., June 6, 1990, 1841-43), but was no longer in the Senate when the bill was voted upon. The other names will be found in the votes on the Haidasz amendments as recorded in the Senate, Journals, January 31, 1991, 2230-37.
41. Senate, Debates, June 13, 1990, 1932-33.
42. Ibid., June 5, 1990, 1828.
43. Ibid., January 29, 1991, 5224. See also the remarks of Solange Chaput-Rolland, in ibid., January 29, 1991, 5236-37.
44. Ibid., January 29, 1991, 5224. See also the remarks of Solange Chaput-Rolland, in ibid., January 29, 1991, 5236-37.
45. Geoffrey York, "Senators Kill Abortion Bill with Tied Vote," The Globe and Mail (Toronto), February 1, 1991.
46. Constitution Act, 1867, s. 49; and Beauchesne's Rules and Forms of the House of Commons of Canada (5th ed.; Toronto: Carswell, 1978), s. 226.
47. Constitution Act, 1867, s. 49; and Beauchesne's Rules and Forms of the House of Commons of Canada (5th ed.; Toronto: Carswell, 1978), s. 226.
48. W. H. McConnell, Commentary on the British North America Act (Toronto: Macmillan, 1977), 79.
49. Constitution Act, 1867, ss. 34, 36, also reflected in the Rules of the Senate of Canada: "Questions arising in the Senate shall be decided by a majority of voices. The Speaker shall in all cases have a vote. When the voices are equal the decision shall be deemed to be in the negative" (s. 66[5]).
50. F. A. Kunz, The Modern Senate of Canada, 1925-1963: A Re-Appraisal (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1965), 168.
51. Senate, Debates, January 30, 1991, 5260.