The virtues of a passionate life: Erotic love and "the will to power"

Social Philosophy and Policy

Volumn 15, Issue 1, 1998, Pages 91-117

  Solomon, Robert C ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0345983443     PISSN: 02650525     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/s0265052500003083     Document Type: Article

References (86)

1. Friedrich Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols, in The Portable Nietzsche, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Viking Press, 1954), section V, paragraph 3.
2. Rush Rhees, ed., Recollections of Wittgenstein (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984), p. 489; see also M. O'C. Drury, "Notes on Conversations," in ibid., pp. 76-171. See also Terry Eagleton and Derek Jarman, Wittgenstein (screenplay) (London: British Film Institute, 1993).
3. Rush Rhees, ed., Recollections of Wittgenstein (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984), p. 489; see also M. O'C. Drury, "Notes on Conversations," in ibid., pp. 76-171. See also Terry Eagleton and Derek Jarman, Wittgenstein (screenplay) (London: British Film Institute, 1993).
4. Rush Rhees, ed., Recollections of Wittgenstein (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984), p. 489; see also M. O'C. Drury, "Notes on Conversations," in ibid., pp. 76-171. See also Terry Eagleton and Derek Jarman, Wittgenstein (screenplay) (London: British Film Institute, 1993).
5. For example, see my essay "A More Severe Morality: Nietzsche's Affirmative Ethics," in my From Hegel to Existentialism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988); and Lester Hunt, Nietzsche and the Origin of Virtue (New York: Routledge, 1991).
6. For example, see my essay "A More Severe Morality: Nietzsche's Affirmative Ethics," in my From Hegel to Existentialism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988); and Lester Hunt, Nietzsche and the Origin of Virtue (New York: Routledge, 1991).
7. I owe this clarification to a good question by George Sher.
8. Barbara Herman, The Practice of Moral Judgment (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993).
9. There is, no doubt, some neurophysiological explanation of such behavior, probably in terms of such exotic brain-stem spots as the locus coeruleus and the deficiency or excess of such chemicals as norepinephrine/serotonin. I do not doubt that a good deal of "the passionate life" is chronic rather than cultivated, but the question - if we are not to beg such questions as whether a virtue must be something "under one's control" - is whether the passionate life can be considered virtuous and, if so, what its virtues might be.
10. Some of these themes were anticipated several years ago by Bernard Williams in "Morality and the Emotions," in his Problems of the Self (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), but long before that, of course, by Plato and Aristotle, and then by Nietzsche.
11. Philippa Foot, "Virtues and Vices," in her Virtues and Vices and Other Essays (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978). This view of Aristotle seems to have far-reaching influence, for example, in David Steward Nivison's comparison of Aristotle and Mencius in his excellent article "Mencius and Motivation," Journal of the American Academy of Religion, Special Issue on Classical Chinese Philosophy, September 1979, p. 419.
12. Philippa Foot, "Virtues and Vices," in her Virtues and Vices and Other Essays (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978). This view of Aristotle seems to have far-reaching influence, for example, in David Steward Nivison's comparison of Aristotle and Mencius in his excellent article "Mencius and Motivation," Journal of the American Academy of Religion, Special Issue on Classical Chinese Philosophy, September 1979, p. 419.
13. Notably, in Friedrich Nietzsche, Daybreak, trans. R. J. Hollingdale (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982).
14. Amélie Oksenberg Rorty, ed., Explaining Emotions (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980).
15. I owe this clarification to a probing question from John Cooper.
16. Bernard Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985), p. 9. Cf. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, trans. David Ross (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1954), Book III. William Frankena, no friend of "virtue ethics," has suggested that the virtues are no more than dispositions to obey rational principles, thus eviscerating the topic as worthy of study in its own right.
17. Bernard Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985), p. 9. Cf. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, trans. David Ross (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1954), Book III. William Frankena, no friend of "virtue ethics," has suggested that the virtues are no more than dispositions to obey rational principles, thus eviscerating the topic as worthy of study in its own right.
18. Gilbert Ryle, Concept of Mind (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1949).
19. See, e.g., O. H. Green, "Emotions and Belief," American Philosophical Quarterly Monograph, no. 6 (1972).
20. Of course, a new and different "character" may be revealed or may emerge from that lapse, as when one falls in love or is overwhelmed emotionally by the birth of a new baby. Nevertheless, the virtue lies in the having of the emotion, not the disposition of character that may follow. ("I didn't know he had it in him.")
21. Here I would include not only the great Scottish moralists, notably David Hume and Adam Smith (who placed far more emphasis on emotions than their colleagues Francis Hutcheson and Lord Shaftesbury), but also Jean-Jacques Rousseau, who in his educational works (e.g., Emile) also stressed the importance of the natural sentiments as opposed to those "unnatural" and "corrupt" calculations often called reason. An interesting contrast might be made here between this familiar "Western" view and classical Chinese thought. Thus, Confucian scholar Tu Wei-Ming distinguishes cultivated human sentiments from mere "natural" feelings, thereby reversing the Scots' emphasis on the naturalness of the moral sentiments. See Tu Wei-Ming, Centrality and Commonality (Albany: SUNY Press, 1989).
22. If love is a virtue, for instance, there may yet be instances in which love is folly, although one would balk at the idea that love could sometimes be vicious. (There are such passions, of course, yet perhaps they should not be called "love," but rather something like "obsession." Heathcliff's mutually destructive passion for Catherine in Emily Brontë's Wuthering Heights would seem be like this, for instance. We may well insist that love is a virtue even when it is foolish or destructive, however, just as we insist on calling justice a virtue even when the results are disastrous, or as we insist that honesty is a virtue, even when the outcome is much worse than it would be with a simple "white" lie. I owe this clarification to a good question by Robert Audi.
23. Confucius, in emphasizing what we would call "the unity of theory and practice," repeatedly stresses the "virtuosity" of the virtuous person (jen-ze). It is no coincidence that this is also a familiar term in music, and, given Confucius's sense of the centrality of music in life, "virtuosity" is not a mistranslation.
24. Alexander Nehamas, Nietzsche: Life as Literature (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985).
25. The heavy and, I would say, unwarranted emphasis on "the Will to Power" comes largely from Martin Heidegger, who had little or no respect for the texts he used so freely. In the American and Anglophone scene, Walter Kaufmann also gave the notion considerable attention in his Nietzsche (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1953), the book that made Nietzsche at least respectable in a still bitterly anti-Nazi, positivistic philosophical world. The primary texts for such interpretations, however, are to be found in Nietzsche's unpublished notes, which ought to be treated with considerable suspicion. The concept itself smacks too much of that Schopenhauerian willfulness that Nietzsche struggled through much of his career to shrug off. To be sure, Nietzsche utilizes the metaphors of strength, health, and power throughout his ethical works, and he does use the assertion of power to correct certain obvious flaws in hedonism and to answer certain psychological mysteries about extreme forms of religious behavior, particularly asceticism. I believe, however, that it is a serious mistake in interpretation to conceive of the Will to Power - or anything much like it - as the germ from which Nietzsche's entire philosophy grows. For an ingenious attempt to "reconstruct" just such a "system," see John Richardson, Nietzsche's System (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996). Regarding doubts about the overuse and abuse of Nietzsche's book (put together by others) called The Will to Power, see Bernd Magnus, "Author, Writer, Text: The Will to 'Power," International Studies in Philosophy, vol. 22, no. 2 (1990), pp. 49-57.
26. The heavy and, I would say, unwarranted emphasis on "the Will to Power" comes largely from Martin Heidegger, who had little or no respect for the texts he used so freely. In the American and Anglophone scene, Walter Kaufmann also gave the notion considerable attention in his Nietzsche (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1953), the book that made Nietzsche at least respectable in a still bitterly anti-Nazi, positivistic philosophical world. The primary texts for such interpretations, however, are to be found in Nietzsche's unpublished notes, which ought to be treated with considerable suspicion. The concept itself smacks too much of that Schopenhauerian willfulness that Nietzsche struggled through much of his career to shrug off. To be sure, Nietzsche utilizes the metaphors of strength, health, and power throughout his ethical works, and he does use the assertion of power to correct certain obvious flaws in hedonism and to answer certain psychological mysteries about extreme forms of religious behavior, particularly asceticism. I believe, however, that it is a serious mistake in interpretation to conceive of the Will to Power - or anything much like it - as the germ from which Nietzsche's entire philosophy grows. For an ingenious attempt to "reconstruct" just such a "system," see John Richardson, Nietzsche's System (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996). Regarding doubts about the overuse and abuse of Nietzsche's book (put together by others) called The Will to Power, see Bernd Magnus, "Author, Writer, Text: The Will to 'Power," International Studies in Philosophy, vol. 22, no. 2 (1990), pp. 49-57.
27. Kant's phrase "schmelzender Theilnehmung" (Grundlegung, Werke, Band IV, p. 399, Grounding of the Metaphysics of Morals, trans. James W. Ellington [Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 1981]) is translated as "melting compassion" by H. J. Paton (New York: Harper and Row, 1964), p. 67, and as "tender sympathy" by Lewis White Beck (Indianapolis: Bobbs- Merrill, 1959) and by Ellington, p. 12, from whom the rest of the quotation is borrowed. Neither translation adequately captures Kant's demeaning irony. "Melting" is much better than "tender" for "schmelzender," but neither "compassion" nor "sympathy" will do for "Theilnehmung," which is more like "participation" (and less like "Mitleid," usually translated as "compassion" or "pity").
28. Kant's phrase "schmelzender Theilnehmung" (Grundlegung, Werke, Band IV, p. 399, Grounding of the Metaphysics of Morals, trans. James W. Ellington [Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 1981]) is translated as "melting compassion" by H. J. Paton (New York: Harper and Row, 1964), p. 67, and as "tender sympathy" by Lewis White Beck (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1959) and by Ellington, p. 12, from whom the rest of the quotation is borrowed. Neither translation adequately captures Kant's demeaning irony. "Melting" is much better than "tender" for "schmelzender," but neither "compassion" nor "sympathy" will do for "Theilnehmung," which is more like "participation" (and less like "Mitleid," usually translated as "compassion" or "pity").
29. David Hume, Treatise of Human Nature (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977).
30. James R. Heichelbech has carried out an interesting exploration of the role of feelings in Kant's ethics in his dissertation, "Emotion in Kant's Moral Theory" (Ph.D. diss., University of Colorado, Boulder, 1996).
31. Joel Feinberg, "Sentiment and Sentimentality in Practical Ethics," Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association, March 26, 1982.
32. Ibid., p. 19.
33. Ibid., p. 42.
34. Jerome Shaffer, "An Assessment of Emotion," American Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 20, no. 2 (April 1983), reprinted in G. E. Myers and K. D. Irani, Emotion (New York: Haven, 1976). All page references are to the reprint.
35. Jerome Shaffer, "An Assessment of Emotion," American Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 20, no. 2 (April 1983), reprinted in G. E. Myers and K. D. Irani, Emotion (New York: Haven, 1976). All page references are to the reprint.
36. Ibid., pp. 202-3.
37. Ibid., p. 220.
38. There has been a lively debate in psychology on this issue, focusing in particular on what is called the "startle response." In recent years, even those theorists who once defended this "hardwired" reaction as an emotion have backed off and changed their minds -e.g., Paul Ekman, who once took surprise to be a "basic emotion" (Ekman, The Nature of Emotion [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994]). In philosophy, see Jenefer Robinson, "Startle," Journal of Philosophy, vol. 92, no. 2 (February 1995).
39. There has been a lively debate in psychology on this issue, focusing in particular on what is called the "startle response." In recent years, even those theorists who once defended this "hardwired" reaction as an emotion have backed off and changed their minds - e.g., Paul Ekman, who once took surprise to be a "basic emotion" (Ekman, The Nature of Emotion [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994]). In philosophy, see Jenefer Robinson, "Startle," Journal of Philosophy, vol. 92, no. 2 (February 1995).
40. Parts of this and the following section have been adapted from my essay "The Virtue of Love," p. 16ff.
41. Arthur Schopenhauer, World as Will and Idea, trans. R. B. Haldane and J. Kemp, 2d ed. (New York: Doubleday, 1962).
42. Immanuel Kant, Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime, trans. John T. Goldthwait (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1960).
43. Bernard Gert, The Moral Rules (New York: Harper and Row, 1973).
44. The shift of attention from action and character to feelings can be argued to have occurred in Europe in the eighteenth century, in the works of Rousseau, most obviously, but also in the work of the moral-sentiment theorists. There is an ancient argument against the passions, raised by Julia Annas, that holds that passion leads to excess. But what is meant by "excess," and is it not the desirability of such "excess" that is brought into question here? If "excess" means bad behavior, then there are plenty of arguments, in utilitarianism and in virtue ethics, to condemn such behavior. But if "excess" refers to the passions themselves, the ancient argument begs the question. My argument is that being passionate is, in a qualified sense, good in itself. And if that is so, then an "excess" of passion is impossible in just the same way that an excess of any virtue is impossible, according to Aristotle.
45. This is not to deny, however, that love might take inappropriate objects. Plato anticipates this possibility when he insists that love (eros) cannot be merely desire but must be desire for the Good. I take it, in a pedestrian illustration, that this means that one cannot love a person for features that are evil. This conflicts with some current popular wisdom, for instance, in the far too many movies in which one morally perverted character supposedly "loves" another precisely because of his or her moral perversions. I owe this clarification to a difficult question from Robert Audi.
46. Edward Sankowski, "Love and Moral Obligation," Journal of Value Inquiry, vol. 12, no. 2 (Spring 1978); see also Sankowski, "Responsibility of Persons for Their Emotions," Canadian Journal of Philosophy, vol. 7 (1977), pp. 829-40.
47. Edward Sankowski, "Love and Moral Obligation," Journal of Value Inquiry, vol. 12, no. 2 (Spring 1978); see also Sankowski, "Responsibility of Persons for Their Emotions," Canadian Journal of Philosophy, vol. 7 (1977), pp. 829-40.
48. Arthur Danto, "Basic Actions," in his Analytical Philosophy of Action (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973).
49. Nietzsche takes this view to the extreme by arguing that not only are virtues particular -that is, they have particular objects - but they are also particular in kind, that is, they are unique to the virtuous person.
50. See, e.g., Bernard Williams, "Morality and the Emotions" (supra note 7).
51. Rorty, ed., Explaining Emotions (supra note 10).
52. This is not an a priori argument, and it is subject to obvious empirical counterexamples, for example, the soaring divorce rate. But the fact that love often ends does not undermine the thesis that love is an emotional process that is (or can be) intensified and "deepened" with protracted intimacy, familiarity, knowledge and understanding, and shared experiences. The most poetic description of this process is the French Romantic Stendhal's description of "crystallization," as the beloved accrues more and more charms and virtues; see Stendhal (Marie-Henri Beyle), On Love, trans. C. K. Scott-Moncrieff (New York: Liveright, 1947), pp. 28-34.
53. Immanuel Kant, Lectures on Ethics (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1963), p. 164.
54. Sartre rather messes up this neat claim by insisting that, nevertheless, in sex we try to turn the other into a sexual subject-indeed, even into a purely sexual object - but, necessarily, we are unsuccessful; see Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, trans. Hazel Barnes (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1956), Part III, "Concrete Relations with Others."
55. Alan Goldman, "Plain Sex," Philosophy and Public Affairs, vol. 6, no. 3 (Spring 1977).
56. Ibid. Alan Soble discusses the ontology of love at tedious length in his The Structure of Low (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1990).
57. Ibid. Alan Soble discusses the ontology of love at tedious length in his The Structure of Low (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1990).
58. John Milton, "On Marriage and Divorce," in The Philosophy of (Erotic) Love, ed. Kathleen M. Higgins and Robert C. Solomon (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1990), pp. 79-84.
59. See my About Love (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1994), ch. 2.
60. The term "intensity" is overly one-dimensional and quantitative and is often confused with (and then measured by) physiological arousal. But the most powerful passions may be "calm" (Hume's term) while the most petty irritations can become "violent" (also Hume's term). See David Hume Treatise of Human Nature, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge, 2d ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1974), p. 276.
61. This is defended in detail in my About Love, pp. 194ff.
62. In the Tao Te Ching, distinctions are made between those who love life and live it fully, those who love life and fail to live it fully, and those who love life too much, and thereby overemphasize death. Lao-tzu might interestingly be compared to Epicurus in this regard. Lao-tzu, Tao Te Ching, trans. Stephen Addis and Stanley Lombardo (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 1993).
63. In The Secret Life of Dogs, Elizabeth Marshall Thomas reflects on a familiar finding of comparative neuroscience: that while the brains of dogs are homeostatically "wired," allowing them the peaceful restfulness and Zen-like stare that those of us who live with them have come to know and love, the brains of primates are "wired" in the sense that the term has taken on in the counterculture, "wired" as in overstimulated, "wired" as in perpetually restless, "wired" as in - human. Freud was wrong when he suggested the homeostatic model for the human psyche (although he would have been right about dogs). Elizabeth Marshall Thomas, The Secret Life of Dogs (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1993).
64. Friedrich Nietzsche, The Antichrist, trans. Walter Kaufmann, in The Portable Nietzsche (supra note 1), section 2.
65. Friedrich Nietzsche, The Antichrist, trans. Walter Kaufmann, in The Portable Nietzsche (supra note 1), section 2.
66. Kathleen M. Higgins, Nietzsche's Zarathustra (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1987), pp. ix-x.
67. The phrase comes from a letter from Nietzsche to Paul Rée. See my "A More Severe Morality" (supra note 3).
68. E.g.: "The only critique of a philosophy that . . . proves something, mainly trying to see whether one can live in accordance with it, has never been taught at universities: all that has ever been taught is a critique of words by means of other words" (Friedrich Nietzsche, "Schopenhauer as Educator," in Nietzsche, Untimely Meditations, trans. R. J. Hollingdale [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982], section 8, p. 187).
69. Bernd Magnus, Stanley Stewart, and Jean-Pierre Mileur, Nietzsche's Case: Philosophy as/and Literature (New York: Routledge, 1993); Nehamas, Nietzsche: Life as Literature (supra note 19). My own argument is elaborated in my "Nietzsche Ad Hominem: Perspectivism, Personality, and Ressentiment Revisited," in The Cambridge Companion to Nietzsche, ed. Bernd Magnus and Kathleen M. Higgins (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
70. Bernd Magnus, Stanley Stewart, and Jean-Pierre Mileur, Nietzsche's Case: Philosophy as/and Literature (New York: Routledge, 1993); Nehamas, Nietzsche: Life as Literature (supra note 19). My own argument is elaborated in my "Nietzsche Ad Hominem: Perspectivism, Personality, and Ressentiment Revisited," in The Cambridge Companion to Nietzsche, ed. Bernd Magnus and Kathleen M. Higgins (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
71. Bernd Magnus, Stanley Stewart, and Jean-Pierre Mileur, Nietzsche's Case: Philosophy as/and Literature (New York: Routledge, 1993); Nehamas, Nietzsche: Life as Literature (supra note 19). My own argument is elaborated in my "Nietzsche Ad Hominem: Perspectivism, Personality, and Ressentiment Revisited," in The Cambridge Companion to Nietzsche, ed. Bernd Magnus and Kathleen M. Higgins (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
72. As has been noted, the phrase "become what you are" comes from Pindar. (The quotations are from Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science, trans. Walter Kaufmann [New York: Random House, 1968], paragraph 270, p. 219.)
73. Nietzsche, Daybreak (supra note 9), 548.
74. In fact, the übermensch only appears at the beginning of Thus Spoke Zarathustra and plays virtually no role in Nietzsche's philosophy.
75. Notably in Friedrich Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols, trans. W. Kaufmann (New York: Random House, 1968), "Skirmishes of an Untimely Man," esp. sections 49-50.
76. Notably in Friedrich Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols, trans. W. Kaufmann (New York: Random House, 1968), "Skirmishes of an Untimely Man," esp. sections 49-50.
77. Homer, The Iliad, xv, 348-51; Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Book III, ch. 8, 1116. Ross points out that the quotation more likely resembles Agamemnon than Hector (Ross, trans., Nicomachean Ethics, p. 68), but cf. Aristotle (NE 1117), where he writes that "passion is sometimes reckoned as courage; . . . for passion above all things is eager to rush on danger. . . . Hence Homer's 'put strength into his passion.'" Aristotle goes on to say that men who act from passion are not truly brave but more akin to beasts. They do not act "for honor's sake nor as the rule directs" (ibid.). Nevertheless, he adds, "they have something akin to courage" (1117a5).
78. Homer, The Iliad, xv, 348-51; Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Book III, ch. 8, 1116. Ross points out that the quotation more likely resembles Agamemnon than Hector (Ross, trans., Nicomachean Ethics, p. 68), but cf. Aristotle (NE 1117), where he writes that "passion is sometimes reckoned as courage; . . . for passion above all things is eager to rush on danger. . . . Hence Homer's 'put strength into his passion.'" Aristotle goes on to say that men who act from passion are not truly brave but more akin to beasts. They do not act "for honor's sake nor as the rule directs" (ibid.). Nevertheless, he adds, "they have something akin to courage" (1117a5).
79. Homer, The Iliad, xv, 348-51; Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Book III, ch. 8, 1116. Ross points out that the quotation more likely resembles Agamemnon than Hector (Ross, trans., Nicomachean Ethics, p. 68), but cf. Aristotle (NE 1117), where he writes that "passion is sometimes reckoned as courage; . . . for passion above all things is eager to rush on danger. . . . Hence Homer's 'put strength into his passion.'" Aristotle goes on to say that men who act from passion are not truly brave but more akin to beasts. They do not act "for honor's sake nor as the rule directs" (ibid.). Nevertheless, he adds, "they have something akin to courage" (1117a5).
80. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Book II, ch. 5.
81. This was William Frankena's purported resolution in the last edition of his Ethics (Engelwood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1991).
82. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Book II, ch. 5.
83. I owe a good explanation of this to Fred Miller, who has questioned me on this; a lengthy reply is forthcoming: "On the Passivity of the Passions," in Robert C. Solomon, A Theory of the Emotions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999). A partial but overstated reply is in my article "Emotions and Choice," Review of Metaphysics, vol. 28, no. 1 (September 1973),
84. I owe a good explanation of this to Fred Miller, who has questioned me on this; a lengthy reply is forthcoming: "On the Passivity of the Passions," in Robert C. Solomon, A Theory of the Emotions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999). A partial but overstated reply is in my article "Emotions and Choice," Review of Metaphysics, vol. 28, no. 1 (September 1973),
85. reprinted in Rorty, ed., Explaining Emotions (supra note 10).
86. But see also Sankowski, "Responsibility of Persons for Their Emotions" (supra note 37).