Hungary, 1956: The Yugoslav Connection

Europe - Asia Studies

Volumn 50, Issue 3, 1998, Pages 493-517

  Granville, Johanna ^a,b  

^a CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b Department of International Security Studies   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0345920678     PISSN: 09668136     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/09668139808412549     Document Type: Article

References (132)

1. Explanation of Hungarian and Russian Abbreviations: AVH = Allam-Vedelmi Hatosag (State Security Authority; name of Hungarian secret police agency after 1949); AVO = Allam-Vedelmi Osztaly (State Security Department; name of Hungarian secret police agency until 1949); AVPRF = Arkhiv vneshnei politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii (Archive of Foreign Policy, Russian Federation), Moscow; CPSU = Communist Party of the Soviet Union; CPY = Communist Party of Yugoslavia; CC = Central Committee; GARF = Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii (State Archive of the Russian Federation); HSWP = Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party; HWP = Hungarian Workers' Party (under Rakosi's leadership); KGB = Committee for State Security; RTsKhIDNI = Russian Centre for the Preservation and Study of Documents of Contemporary History; Rolik = Reel; TsAMO = Tsentral'nyi arkhiv Ministerstva oborony Rossiiskoi Federatsii (Central Archive of the Ministry of Defence, Russian Federation); TsKhSD = Tsentr Khraneniya Sovremennoi Dokumentatsii (Centre for the Storage of Contemporary Documentation), Moscow; F = Fond (Fund); O = Opis' (Inventory); Por. = Portfel' (Portfolio); P. = Papka (Folder); Per. = Perechen' (List); D = Delo (File); Dok. = (Document); L = List (Page).
2. Since the collapse of the communist regime in Hungary a large number of studies have been published in Budapest by the Institute for the History of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution and the Institute of History at the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. In the 1956-89 period, however, reliable Hungarian-language accounts were relatively few in number. Countless books and articles about the Hungarian revolution were produced in the West during that period. See, for example, Ferenc A. Vali, Rift and Revolt in Hungary: Nationalism versus Communism (Cambridge, MA:, Harvard University Press, 1961); Bill Lomax, Hungary 1956 (London, Allison & Busby, 1976), especially pp. 106-123; Charles Gáti, Hungary and the Soviet Bloc (Durham, NC, Duke University Press, 1986), pp. 127-155; Paul E. Zinner, Revolution in Hungary (New York, Columbia University Press, 1962); and Paul Kecskeméti, The Unexpected Revolution: Social Forces in the Hungarian Uprising (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1961).
3. Since the collapse of the communist regime in Hungary a large number of studies have been published in Budapest by the Institute for the History of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution and the Institute of History at the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. In the 1956-89 period, however, reliable Hungarian-language accounts were relatively few in number. Countless books and articles about the Hungarian revolution were produced in the West during that period. See, for example, Ferenc A. Vali, Rift and Revolt in Hungary: Nationalism versus Communism (Cambridge, MA:, Harvard University Press, 1961); Bill Lomax, Hungary 1956 (London, Allison & Busby, 1976), especially pp. 106-123; Charles Gáti, Hungary and the Soviet Bloc (Durham, NC, Duke University Press, 1986), pp. 127-155; Paul E. Zinner, Revolution in Hungary (New York, Columbia University Press, 1962); and Paul Kecskeméti, The Unexpected Revolution: Social Forces in the Hungarian Uprising (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1961).
4. Since the collapse of the communist regime in Hungary a large number of studies have been published in Budapest by the Institute for the History of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution and the Institute of History at the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. In the 1956-89 period, however, reliable Hungarian-language accounts were relatively few in number. Countless books and articles about the Hungarian revolution were produced in the West during that period. See, for example, Ferenc A. Vali, Rift and Revolt in Hungary: Nationalism versus Communism (Cambridge, MA:, Harvard University Press, 1961); Bill Lomax, Hungary 1956 (London, Allison & Busby, 1976), especially pp. 106-123; Charles Gáti, Hungary and the Soviet Bloc (Durham, NC, Duke University Press, 1986), pp. 127-155; Paul E. Zinner, Revolution in Hungary (New York, Columbia University Press, 1962); and Paul Kecskeméti, The Unexpected Revolution: Social Forces in the Hungarian Uprising (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1961).
5. Since the collapse of the communist regime in Hungary a large number of studies have been published in Budapest by the Institute for the History of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution and the Institute of History at the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. In the 1956-89 period, however, reliable Hungarian-language accounts were relatively few in number. Countless books and articles about the Hungarian revolution were produced in the West during that period. See, for example, Ferenc A. Vali, Rift and Revolt in Hungary: Nationalism versus Communism (Cambridge, MA:, Harvard University Press, 1961); Bill Lomax, Hungary 1956 (London, Allison & Busby, 1976), especially pp. 106-123; Charles Gáti, Hungary and the Soviet Bloc (Durham, NC, Duke University Press, 1986), pp. 127-155; Paul E. Zinner, Revolution in Hungary (New York, Columbia University Press, 1962); and Paul Kecskeméti, The Unexpected Revolution: Social Forces in the Hungarian Uprising (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1961).
6. Since the collapse of the communist regime in Hungary a large number of studies have been published in Budapest by the Institute for the History of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution and the Institute of History at the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. In the 1956-89 period, however, reliable Hungarian-language accounts were relatively few in number. Countless books and articles about the Hungarian revolution were produced in the West during that period. See, for example, Ferenc A. Vali, Rift and Revolt in Hungary: Nationalism versus Communism (Cambridge, MA:, Harvard University Press, 1961); Bill Lomax, Hungary 1956 (London, Allison & Busby, 1976), especially pp. 106-123; Charles Gáti, Hungary and the Soviet Bloc (Durham, NC, Duke University Press, 1986), pp. 127-155; Paul E. Zinner, Revolution in Hungary (New York, Columbia University Press, 1962); and Paul Kecskeméti, The Unexpected Revolution: Social Forces in the Hungarian Uprising (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1961).
7. This study will attempt to synthesise the latest reassessments of Tito as ambitious opportunist rather than dogmatist. See, for example, Veselin Djuretic, Saveznici i Jugoslavenska Ratna Drama (The Allies and the Yugoslav War Drama) (Belgrade, Balkanoloski institut SANU, 1985); Stevan K. Pavlowitch, Tito, Yugoslavia's Great Dictator: A Reassessment (London;, C. Hurst, 1992); Kosta Cavoski, Tito-tehnologija Vlasti (Belgrade, Dosije, 1991); Michael Lees, The Rape of Serbia: The British Role in Tito's Grab for Power, 1943-44, 1st edition (San Diego, CA, Harcourt, Brace, and Jovanovich, 1990); Nora Beloff, Tito's Flawed Legacy: Yugoslavia and the West Since 1939 (Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1985); David Martin, The Web of Disinformation: Churchill's Yugoslav Blunder, 1st edition (San Diego, CA, Harcourt, Brace, and Jovanovich, 1990).
8. This study will attempt to synthesise the latest reassessments of Tito as ambitious opportunist rather than dogmatist. See, for example, Veselin Djuretic, Saveznici i Jugoslavenska Ratna Drama (The Allies and the Yugoslav War Drama) (Belgrade, Balkanoloski institut SANU, 1985); Stevan K. Pavlowitch, Tito, Yugoslavia's Great Dictator: A Reassessment (London;, C. Hurst, 1992); Kosta Cavoski, Tito-tehnologija Vlasti (Belgrade, Dosije, 1991); Michael Lees, The Rape of Serbia: The British Role in Tito's Grab for Power, 1943-44, 1st edition (San Diego, CA, Harcourt, Brace, and Jovanovich, 1990); Nora Beloff, Tito's Flawed Legacy: Yugoslavia and the West Since 1939 (Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1985); David Martin, The Web of Disinformation: Churchill's Yugoslav Blunder, 1st edition (San Diego, CA, Harcourt, Brace, and Jovanovich, 1990).
9. This study will attempt to synthesise the latest reassessments of Tito as ambitious opportunist rather than dogmatist. See, for example, Veselin Djuretic, Saveznici i Jugoslavenska Ratna Drama (The Allies and the Yugoslav War Drama) (Belgrade, Balkanoloski institut SANU, 1985); Stevan K. Pavlowitch, Tito, Yugoslavia's Great Dictator: A Reassessment (London;, C. Hurst, 1992); Kosta Cavoski, Tito-tehnologija Vlasti (Belgrade, Dosije, 1991); Michael Lees, The Rape of Serbia: The British Role in Tito's Grab for Power, 1943-44, 1st edition (San Diego, CA, Harcourt, Brace, and Jovanovich, 1990); Nora Beloff, Tito's Flawed Legacy: Yugoslavia and the West Since 1939 (Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1985); David Martin, The Web of Disinformation: Churchill's Yugoslav Blunder, 1st edition (San Diego, CA, Harcourt, Brace, and Jovanovich, 1990).
10. This study will attempt to synthesise the latest reassessments of Tito as ambitious opportunist rather than dogmatist. See, for example, Veselin Djuretic, Saveznici i Jugoslavenska Ratna Drama (The Allies and the Yugoslav War Drama) (Belgrade, Balkanoloski institut SANU, 1985); Stevan K. Pavlowitch, Tito, Yugoslavia's Great Dictator: A Reassessment (London;, C. Hurst, 1992); Kosta Cavoski, Tito-tehnologija Vlasti (Belgrade, Dosije, 1991); Michael Lees, The Rape of Serbia: The British Role in Tito's Grab for Power, 1943-44, 1st edition (San Diego, CA, Harcourt, Brace, and Jovanovich, 1990); Nora Beloff, Tito's Flawed Legacy: Yugoslavia and the West Since 1939 (Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1985); David Martin, The Web of Disinformation: Churchill's Yugoslav Blunder, 1st edition (San Diego, CA, Harcourt, Brace, and Jovanovich, 1990).
11. This study will attempt to synthesise the latest reassessments of Tito as ambitious opportunist rather than dogmatist. See, for example, Veselin Djuretic, Saveznici i Jugoslavenska Ratna Drama (The Allies and the Yugoslav War Drama) (Belgrade, Balkanoloski institut SANU, 1985); Stevan K. Pavlowitch, Tito, Yugoslavia's Great Dictator: A Reassessment (London;, C. Hurst, 1992); Kosta Cavoski, Tito-tehnologija Vlasti (Belgrade, Dosije, 1991); Michael Lees, The Rape of Serbia: The British Role in Tito's Grab for Power, 1943-44, 1st edition (San Diego, CA, Harcourt, Brace, and Jovanovich, 1990); Nora Beloff, Tito's Flawed Legacy: Yugoslavia and the West Since 1939 (Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1985); David Martin, The Web of Disinformation: Churchill's Yugoslav Blunder, 1st edition (San Diego, CA, Harcourt, Brace, and Jovanovich, 1990).
12. This study will attempt to synthesise the latest reassessments of Tito as ambitious opportunist rather than dogmatist. See, for example, Veselin Djuretic, Saveznici i Jugoslavenska Ratna Drama (The Allies and the Yugoslav War Drama) (Belgrade, Balkanoloski institut SANU, 1985); Stevan K. Pavlowitch, Tito, Yugoslavia's Great Dictator: A Reassessment (London;, C. Hurst, 1992); Kosta Cavoski, Tito-tehnologija Vlasti (Belgrade, Dosije, 1991); Michael Lees, The Rape of Serbia: The British Role in Tito's Grab for Power, 1943-44, 1st edition (San Diego, CA, Harcourt, Brace, and Jovanovich, 1990); Nora Beloff, Tito's Flawed Legacy: Yugoslavia and the West Since 1939 (Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1985); David Martin, The Web of Disinformation: Churchill's Yugoslav Blunder, 1st edition (San Diego, CA, Harcourt, Brace, and Jovanovich, 1990).
13. These are: the former top-secret working archive of the Communist Party's Central Committee, called the Centre for the Preservation of Contemporary Documents (TsKhSD), the Archive of the Russian Foreign Ministry (AVP RF), the Russian Centre for the Preservation and Study of Documents of Contemporary History (RTsKhIDNI), and the State Archive of the Russian Federation (GARF). Vladimir Malin, the head of the CPSU CC General Department during the entire Khrushchev period, took extensive notes of all Presidium meetings, although verbatim transcripts of CPSU Presidium meetings were not kept in the 1950s. Russian archival authorities released the Malin notes pertaining to the Hungarian uprising (October-November 1956) crisis in mid-1995 to a Russian historian, Vyacheslav Sereda, and to Hungarian scholars at the 1956 Institute in Budapest, who had exclusive access to the materials until the spring of 1996, when the full set were published in Hungarian translation. See Vyacheslav Sereda & Janos M. Rainer (eds) Döntés a Kremlben. 1956: A szovjet pártelnökség vital Magyarországról (Budapest, 1956-os Intézet, 1996). The Russian version was published in the summer and autumn of 1996. See 'Kak reshalis' voprosy Vengrii: Rabochie zapisi zasedanii Prezidiuma TsK KPSS, iyul'-noyabr' 1956 g.', Istoricheskii arkhiv, 1996, 2 and 3, pp. 73-104 and 87-121 respectively. Malin's handwritten notes are now available to all researchers in TsKhSD. See F. 3, Op. 12, D. 1005-6.
14. These are: the former top-secret working archive of the Communist Party's Central Committee, called the Centre for the Preservation of Contemporary Documents (TsKhSD), the Archive of the Russian Foreign Ministry (AVP RF), the Russian Centre for the Preservation and Study of Documents of Contemporary History (RTsKhIDNI), and the State Archive of the Russian Federation (GARF). Vladimir Malin, the head of the CPSU CC General Department during the entire Khrushchev period, took extensive notes of all Presidium meetings, although verbatim transcripts of CPSU Presidium meetings were not kept in the 1950s. Russian archival authorities released the Malin notes pertaining to the Hungarian uprising (October-November 1956) crisis in mid-1995 to a Russian historian, Vyacheslav Sereda, and to Hungarian scholars at the 1956 Institute in Budapest, who had exclusive access to the materials until the spring of 1996, when the full set were published in Hungarian translation. See Vyacheslav Sereda & Janos M. Rainer (eds) Döntés a Kremlben. 1956: A szovjet pártelnökség vital Magyarországról (Budapest, 1956-os Intézet, 1996). The Russian version was published in the summer and autumn of 1996. See 'Kak reshalis' voprosy Vengrii: Rabochie zapisi zasedanii Prezidiuma TsK KPSS, iyul'-noyabr' 1956 g.', Istoricheskii arkhiv, 1996, 2 and 3, pp. 73-104 and 87-121 respectively. Malin's handwritten notes are now available to all researchers in TsKhSD. See F. 3, Op. 12, D. 1005-6.
15. Josip Broz Tito, 'Features Peculiar to the Liberation Struggle and Revolutionary Transformation of the New Yugoslavia', Kommunist (Organ of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia), 1946, 1 (October), quoted in Military Thought and Work: Selected Writings [of Josip Broz Tito] (1936-1979), ed. Boro Pejcinovic (Belgrade, Vojnoizdavacki Zavod, 1982), p. 294.
16. Josip Broz Tito, 'Features Peculiar to the Liberation Struggle and Revolutionary Transformation of the New Yugoslavia', Kommunist (Organ of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia), 1946, 1 (October), quoted in Military Thought and Work: Selected Writings [of Josip Broz Tito] (1936-1979), ed. Boro Pejcinovic (Belgrade, Vojnoizdavacki Zavod, 1982), p. 294.
17. GARF, F 9401, Special Folder (Osobaya Papka) of Stalin, D. 97, L. 351-352, 13 July 1945, To Stalin from L. Beria, 'About the Guard on Tito and Security Measures in the City of Belgrade'. Also F 9401, Op. 2, D. 97, L. 69-70, 29 June 1945, To Stalin and Molotov From Beria, 'About the Measures for Strengthening the Guard of Marshal Tito'. A total of '509 cadres' were sent to serve in Tito's personal group of bodyguards or to keep order in the city.
18. Ivo Banać, With Stalin against Tito (New York, Cornell, 1988).
19. Nikita Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers: The Glasnost Tapes (Boston, Little, Brown, 1990), p. 72.
20. AVP RF, F. 077, Op. 37, For. 9, P. 187, L. 112, From the Diary of S. S. Satuchin, First Secretary of the Soviet Embassy in Hungary, 'Notes of a Conversation with the First Secretary of the Yugoslav Mission, Milan Georgiević', 2 July 1956. 'Georgiević said: "Despite the unfair accusations, as well as the difficulties arising as a result of the rupture in relations, Yugoslavia continued to proceed along the path and did not surrender to the pressure of the imperialist states"'.
21. Expression used by Khrushchev. See N. S. Khrushchev, The Crimes of the Stalin Era: Special Report to the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Closed Session, 24-25 February 1956', annotated by Boris Nicolaevsky, The New Leader (New York, 1956), p. S48. Also cited in New York Times, 15 March and 4 June 1956, p. 1, col. 8.
22. Expression used by Khrushchev. See N. S. Khrushchev, The Crimes of the Stalin Era: Special Report to the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Closed Session, 24-25 February 1956', annotated by Boris Nicolaevsky, The New Leader (New York, 1956), p. S48. Also cited in New York Times, 15 March and 4 June 1956, p. 1, col. 8.
23. TsKhSD, F. 89, Per. 45, Dok. 2, L. 3, 'Note by K. Voroshilov About a Conversation with Rákosi', 26 June 1956. Rákosi informed Voroshilov that the Yugoslav official Vukomanović-Tempo told him that in the beginning of the war in Korea 'guerrilla bases were created' in Yugoslavia 'in case of attack by the Soviet Army'. N.B. Yugoslavia's election to the UN Security Council in 1950-51 probably increased the chance of UN intervention if the USSR did attempt to intervene. A desire for such assistance may have been a motivating factor in Tito's decision to vote in favour of the UN 'police action' against North Korea in 1950.
24. See Dmitrii Volkogonov, 'Nesostoyavsheesya pokushenie: kak Sovetskii agent Maks gotovilsya k terroristicheskomu aktu protiv Tito', Izvestiya, 11 June 1993, p. 7 (No. 109 (23964)). Ironically, the appointed 'hit man' (Iosif Romual'dovich Grigulevich, alias 'Max') was also involved in one of the assassination attempts on Leon Trotsky in Mexico. Also see Khrushchev, The Glasnost Tapes, p. 72: '[Stalin] was ready to go to war against Yugoslavia, and I suspect that he was thinking about this, although I never heard any conversation mentioning military action. Stalin, however, began to send out agents and put on displays of strength as soon as the break with Tito occurred'.
25. See Dmitrii Volkogonov, 'Nesostoyavsheesya pokushenie: kak Sovetskii agent Maks gotovilsya k terroristicheskomu aktu protiv Tito', Izvestiya, 11 June 1993, p. 7 (No. 109 (23964)). Ironically, the appointed 'hit man' (Iosif Romual'dovich Grigulevich, alias 'Max') was also involved in one of the assassination attempts on Leon Trotsky in Mexico. Also see Khrushchev, The Glasnost Tapes, p. 72: '[Stalin] was ready to go to war against Yugoslavia, and I suspect that he was thinking about this, although I never heard any conversation mentioning military action. Stalin, however, began to send out agents and put on displays of strength as soon as the break with Tito occurred'.
26. TsKhSD, Rolik 5173, F. 5, Op. 28, D. 403, L. 2, By I. Vinogradov, to Comrade M. A. Suslov, 'About the Conversations of Comrade N. S. Khrushchev with Comrade Tito and the other leaders, which took place in Yugoslavia and in the Crimea in September-October 1956'. 'Comrade Khrushchev stated that we do not lay claim to any special leadership, but we understand our responsibility before the peoples' democracies on the strength of historical conditions, which developed in the struggle for socialism'.
27. The Little Entente during the interwar period consisted of Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia and Romania (the successor states of the Austro-Hungarian Empire). This should not be confused with Stalin's plan - when relations with Tito were good - for the formation of a Balkan Federation consisting of Yugoslavia, Albania and Bulgaria. Khrushchev, Glasnost Tapes, p. 105.
28. TsKhSD, F. 89, Per. 45, Dok. 83, L. 10, Resolution of the CC CPSU: 'About the Letter to the CC of the Yugoslav Communist Party, to Tito with Enclosed Text', 10 January 1957. 'What also does not help is the position of the Yugoslav comrades in the issue of the two world camps. You repeatedly speak out against military blocs, including the Warsaw Pact, and declare that Yugoslavia does not belong to any blocs and pacts. However, one cannot ignore the fact that Yugoslavia belongs to the Balkan Pact, and the Yugoslav military organs cooperate with the military circles of Greece and Turkey. Via these partners in the Balkan alliance, you are simultaneously members of NATO ... We cannot ignore the inconsistencies in the official Yugoslav position regarding blocs and pacts'.
29. See, for example, the anti-Yugoslav report prepared just after the invasion. AVP RF, F. 077, Op. 37, Por. 39, P. 191, L. 90. From I. Zamchevsky, Director of the Fifth European Department of the Soviet Foreign Ministry to the CC CPSU, 'About the Issue of the Yugoslav Leaders' Support of Imre Nagy and His Politics: A Reference', 4 December 1956. 'According to a report by Italian comrades, one of the leading workers of the Yugoslav Union of Communists, Mordic, who is now the director of the Institute of Party History in Zagreb, insinuated during a conversation with them that the USSR no longer reflects the interests of the workers of the small countries like Italy and Yugoslavia, and he even suggested that they "unite the organisations of the small countries into their own International, without the USSR"'.
30. However, scholars have not been able to ascertain just how much influence Tito's 'third path' idea had on the Hungarian population as a whole. Soviet fears may have been unwarranted, given the historic animosity between Hungary and Yugoslavia. The atrocities perpetrated by Hungarians against Yugoslav citizens in Bacska during World War II, for example, marred relations. Hungarians may have looked more to Poland - which had never been a military adversary - as a model. See Paul Zinner, Revolution in Hungary (New York, Columbia University Press, 1962), p. 179n.
31. TsKhSD, F. 89, Op. 2, D. 2, L. 1. 'Information of Mikhail Suslov from Budapest, 13 June 1956'. Many other documents state that the majority of Hungarian people were not involved in the uprising. See, for instance, TsKhSD, F. 5, Op. 28, Rolik 5195, D. 479, L. 14. 'Report of the Delegation of the World Federation of Unions About its Trip to Hungary', 23-27 November 1956. 'The overwhelming majority of the population tried to hide from the battle. A portion of the population demonstrated against the counterrevolutionaries and supported the new Revolutionary Workers' and Peasants' Government in order to end the fascist terror. A third group supported the counterrevolution'. The author of this document went on to explain that, of the members of this third group, a half of them simply didn't understand that the Soviet troops had come to help Hungary put an end to the 'white terror'. The other half actively fought against the Soviet army and socialist forces of Hungary. Also, Tito hinted at this misperception later in his Pula speech, on 11 November 1956, when he stated: 'Their [the Soviet leaders'] eyes have now been opened and they realise that not only the Horthyites are fighting, but also workers in factories and mines, that the whole nation is fighting (emphasis added)'. See Borba, 11 November 1956, address by the Secretary General of the Yugoslav League of Communists, Tito, before a meeting of League members in Pula, cited in Paul Zinner (ed.), National Communism and Popular Revolt in Eastern Europe (New York, Columbia University Press, 1957), p. 529.
32. TsKhSD, F. 3, Op. 12, D. 1005, L1. 54-63, 'Working Notes from the CPSU CC Presidium Session on 28 October 1956', compiled by V. N. Malin.
33. Veljko Mićunović, Moscow Diary (New York, Garden City, 1980), p. 134. Of course, Khrushchev apparently did understand that some workers were 'supporting the uprising', judging from Malin's notes of the 28 October CC CPSU Presidium meeting. See TsKhSD, F. 3, Op. 12, D. 1005, L1. 54-63, 'Working Notes from the CC CPSU Presidium Session on 28 October 1956', compiled by V. N. Malin.
34. AVP RF, F. 077, Op. 37, Papka 191, D. 39, L. 75. 23 August 1956, 'About the Activities of the Workers of the Yugoslav Mission in Budapest, Hindering the Normalisation of Hungarian-Yugoslav Relations. From the Soviet Embassy in Budapest'. 'It should be noted that there are people in the Yugoslav mission in Budapest who not only harbour hatred toward the USSR but try to undertake actions which have an obviously hostile character regarding the USSR. Also see TsKhSD, F. 89, Per. 45, Dok. 5, 17 September 1956. Gromyko wrote that 'the reactionary part of the intelligentsia and the opportunist elements in the party are conducting a policy to try to rip Hungary away from the Warsaw Pact and replace USSR influence with Yugoslav influence' (emphasis added).
35. See AVP RF, F. 77, Op. 37, Por. 9, P. 187, D. 036, L1. 55-56. From the Diary of V. N. Kelin, 'Notes of a Conversation with the Employee of the Newspaper Nepszava, Lorant, and the Editor of the Journal Csillag, Kiraly', 17 June 1956. 'Lately the Hungarian intelligentsia is very strongly attracted to the Yugoslav question. The fact that Tito went to Moscow through Romania, and not by the more natural route - through Budapest - is seen as an open demonstration against Hungary. In Hungary Dedijer's biography of Tito is passed from hand to hand. It was published in the Hungarian language for Hungarians living in Yugoslavia. The book is enjoying exceptional success ...'.
36. TsKhSD, F. 3, Op. 12, D. 1005, L1. 54-63, 'Working Notes from the CC CPSU Presidium Session on 28 October 1956', compiled by V. N. Malin. N.B. the other bloc countries - China, Bulgaria, Poland and Czechoslovakia - were also mentioned in the same sentence. As a result of this decision, the CPSU Presidium sent a cable to Tito expressing support for Nagy's new government and for the statement Nagy issued on 28 October. The following day, 29 October, the Yugoslav government published a message to the HWP in Politika (the main Belgrade daily) which urged 'an end to the fratricidal struggle' and warned that 'further bloodshed would only harm the interests of the Hungarian working people and socialism, and would only promote the aims of reactionaries'.
37. AVP RF, F. 077, Op. 37, P. 191, D. 39, L. 41, To Shepilov from Andropov, 'About the Visit of Kurimszki, the Hungarian Envoy, with Tito in Yugoslavia (Brioni)', 21 July 1956. Milovan Djilas was a high official under Tito, at first a zealous communist but later a harsh critic of communism. Tibor Déry and Tibor Tardos were veteran Hungarian communist writers who later turned against the Rákosi regime in the summer and autumn of 1956.
38. Ibid., L. 41. 'Tito didn't answer this question; he was only interested in what kinds of elements participated in the Petofi Circle discussions. "I've been informed that the majority of those present were workers and only comrades who didn't oppose what was being said there"'.
39. AVP RF, F. 077, Op. 37, P. 191, D. 39, L. 81. Erno Gero; in a talk with Andropov, said that Mikoyan called him from Sofia and reported that the Yugoslavs had 'agreed to try not to support the hostile elements in the press and radio, although they did not give firm assurances'.
40. TsKhSD, Rolik 5173, F. 5, Op. 28, D. 403, L. 9, by I. Vinogradov, to Comrade M. A. Suslov, 'About the Conversations of Comrade N. S. Khrushchev with Comrade Tito and the other leaders, which took place in Yugoslavia and in the Crimea in September-October, 1956'.
41. Ibid.
42. See note 2.
43. On 21 August 1952, in a television debate with Averell Harriman, Dulles said: 'The first thing I would do would be to shift from a purely defensive policy to a psychological offensive, a liberation policy, which will try to give hope and a resistance mood inside the Soviet empire'. Transcript of television programme 'Pick the Winner', 21 August 1952, Dulles Papers, cited in Townsend Hoopes, The Devil and John Foster Dulles (Boston, Little, Brown, 1973), p. 131. The liberation policy was quietly dropped early in the Eisenhower presidency; it was primarily for domestic consumption, and lacked operational content.
44. These are: (1) mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty; (2) mutual non-aggression; (3) mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs; (4) equality and mutual benefit; and (5) peaceful coexistence. See Imre Nagy, On Communism: In Defense of the New Course (New York, Praeger, 1957), pp. 22-23. Chinese prime minister Zhou Enlai and Indian prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru first endorsed these principles in a joint statement in New Delhi on 28 June 1954. The principles were intended to 'guide relations between the two countries' as well as 'relations with other countries in Asia and in other parts of the world'. For the full text of the statement, see G. V. Ambekar & V. D. Divekar (eds), Documents on China's Relations with South and South-East Asia (1949-1962) (New York, Allied Publishers, 1964), pp. 7-8.
45. These are: (1) mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty; (2) mutual non-aggression; (3) mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs; (4) equality and mutual benefit; and (5) peaceful coexistence. See Imre Nagy, On Communism: In Defense of the New Course (New York, Praeger, 1957), pp. 22-23. Chinese prime minister Zhou Enlai and Indian prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru first endorsed these principles in a joint statement in New Delhi on 28 June 1954. The principles were intended to 'guide relations between the two countries' as well as 'relations with other countries in Asia and in other parts of the world'. For the full text of the statement, see G. V. Ambekar & V. D. Divekar (eds), Documents on China's Relations with South and South-East Asia (1949-1962) (New York, Allied Publishers, 1964), pp. 7-8.
46. Ibid.
47. TsKhSD, F. 3, Op. 12, D. 1006, L1. 6-14, 'Working Notes from the Session of the CC CPSU Presidium on 30 October 1956', compiled by V. N. Malin.
48. AVP RF, F. 77, Op. 37, P. 191, D. 39, L. 99. From the First Secretary of the European Department of the Soviet Foreign Ministry, V. Bakunov, and Second Secretary of the European Division, A. Khanov, 'Information about the Position of the Yugoslavs toward the Events in Hungary', 12 December 1956. 'The display of revanchist aspirations by counterrevolutionary elements, uttering the slogan "Great Hungary", noticeably influenced the Yugoslavs' position. If before this the Yugoslav press praised the actions of the Nagy government, so after the counter-revolutionary nationalist demonstrations, the press and various Yugoslav representatives spoke with alarm about the growth of the anarchic, counterrevolutionary forces in Hungary. This anxiety was noticeable in Tito's letter to the CC of the HWP on 30 October'.
49. See Stevan K. Pavlowitch, Tito, Yugoslavia's Great Dictator (London, C. Hurst & Co, 1992), p. 43.
50. See, for example, Váli, Rift and Revolt in Hungary, pp. 350-351. It should be noted that many of these statements were reported by Soviet and Hungarian officials, and thus could be considered 'hearsay'. Given the numerous references, however, we have good reason to believe Tito actually did make these remarks.
51. TsKhSD, F. 89, Per. 45, Dok. 38, L1. 1-2, from the Central Committee of the Yugoslav Communist Party, Brioni, to the First Secretary of the CC CPSU Khrushchev, 8 November 1956. 'It is true that during our conversation on Brioni we agreed with your assessment, that the weakness of the Nagy government and its actions led to the danger of the destruction of the essential socialist achievements in Hungary. We agreed that the Hungarian communists should not remain in such a government, and that they should ... decisively resist the reaction. There is no need to remind you that we expressed our doubts about the consequences of open assistance from the Soviet army from the very beginning, as well as during all conversations. But ... such help became unavoidable'. Also see Tito's speech delivered in Pula, 11 November 1956, Borba, 16 November 1956, or cited in Zinner (ed.), National Communism, pp. 516-541.
52. 'I expected even more strenuous objections from Tito than the ones we had encountered during our discussions with the Polish comrades. But we were pleasantly surprised. Tito said we were absolutely right and that we should send our soldiers into action as quickly as possible'. Strobe Talbott (ed.), Khrushchev Remembers (Boston, Little, Brown, 1970), p. 421.
53. AVP RF, F. 77, Op. 37, Papka 191, Por. 39, L. 100. From the First Secretary of the European Department of the Soviet Foreign Ministry, V. Bakunov, and Second Secretary of the European Division, A. Khanov, 'Reference about the position of the Yugoslavs toward the events in Hungary', 12 December 1956. Also TsKhSD, F. 89, Per. 45, Dok. 83, L. 3, Resolution of the CC CPSU: 'About the Letter to the CC of the Yugoslav Communist Party, to Tito with Enclosed Text', 10 January 1957.
54. TsKhSD, F. 89, Op. 2, D. 4, L. 43, Information of Firyubin, Soviet Ambassador to Yugoslavia, 'Notes from a Conversation with the President of Yugoslavia (Josip Broz Tito), 11 January 1957.
55. Zinner (ed.), National Communism, pp. 516-541.
56. TsKhSD, F. 89, Per. 45, Dok. 83, L. 5, Resolution of the CC CPSU: 'About the Letter to the CC CPY (Tito) with Enclosed Text', 10 January 1957. Ivan Gosnjak, the Yugoslav State Secretary for Defence Matters, allegedly said something similar at the reception in the Soviet embassy in Belgrade on 23 November in honour of the Soviet military delegation. AVP RF, F. 77, Op. 37, Papka 191, For. 39, L1. 82-93, 'About the Issue of Imre Nagy and His Politics by the Yugoslav Leaders, Reference', 4 December 1956, by I. Zamchevsky, the Director of the Fifth European Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, USSR. Some speculate that Tito, and other prominent Yugoslav officials around him, may have contemplated this preemptive intervention, both to keep the Soviet army out and to prop up the communist government in Hungary. See Richard Lowenthal, 'Tito's Affair with Khrushchev', The New Leader, 41, 6 October 1958), p. 14. Also Váli, Rift and Revolt in Hungary, p. 351.
57. TsKhSD, F. 89, Per. 45, Dok. 83, L. 5, Resolution of the CC CPSU: 'About the Letter to the CC CPY (Tito) with Enclosed Text', 10 January 1957. Ivan Gosnjak, the Yugoslav State Secretary for Defence Matters, allegedly said something similar at the reception in the Soviet embassy in Belgrade on 23 November in honour of the Soviet military delegation. AVP RF, F. 77, Op. 37, Papka 191, For. 39, L1. 82-93, 'About the Issue of Imre Nagy and His Politics by the Yugoslav Leaders, Reference', 4 December 1956, by I. Zamchevsky, the Director of the Fifth European Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, USSR. Some speculate that Tito, and other prominent Yugoslav officials around him, may have contemplated this preemptive intervention, both to keep the Soviet army out and to prop up the communist government in Hungary. See Richard Lowenthal, 'Tito's Affair with Khrushchev', The New Leader, 41, 6 October 1958), p. 14. Also Váli, Rift and Revolt in Hungary, p. 351.
58. TsKhSD, F. 89, Per. 45, Dok. 83, L. 5, Resolution of the CC CPSU: 'About the Letter to the CC of the Yugoslav Communist Party, to Tito with enclosed Text', 10 January 1957.
59. TsKhSD, F. 3, Op. 12, D. 1006, L1. 15-18, 'Working Notes from the CC CPSU Presidium Session on 31 October, 1956', compiled by V. N. Malin.
60. TsKhSD, F. 89, Per. 45, Dok. 34, L. 3. 'Draft of the Telegram to the Soviet Ambassador in Budapest, Yurii Andropov, from the CC CPSU, 9 November 1956'.
61. Gáti, Hungary and the Soviet Bloc, p. 137. Thus, with Tito as a key player now, and Nagy as Tito's obvious choice, the Russians were increasingly interested in Nagy and the authority he could command' (emphasis added). See also Váli, Rift and Revolt in Hungary, pp. 249-250.
62. Gáti, Hungary and the Soviet Bloc, p. 137. Thus, with Tito as a key player now, and Nagy as Tito's obvious choice, the Russians were increasingly interested in Nagy and the authority he could command' (emphasis added). See also Váli, Rift and Revolt in Hungary, pp. 249-250.
63. TsKhSD, F. 89, Per. 45, Dok. 38, L. 2, Protocol 54, Resolution of the CC CPSU Presidium, 'About the Answer of the Yugoslavs on the Issue of Imre Nagy and His Group', 10 November 1956. 'You completely shared our positive view of Kádár, as a prominent and authoritative leading statesman of the communist movement of Hungary, who is capable in the present difficult conditions to lead a new revolutionary government ... You were very satisfied that the CC CPSU still in the summer after the departure of Rakosi tried to have Kádár appointed First Secretary of the CC Hungary (HWP)'. (This may suggest that Khrushchev's choice of Kádár was overruled by Molotov and other hardliners in favour of the Stalinist Gero.)
64. AVP RF, F. 077, Op. 37, P. 191, D. 39, L. 81, 23 August 1956, 'About the Activities of the Workers of the Yugoslav Mission in Budapest, Hindering the Normalisation of Hungarian-Yugoslav Relations. From the Soviet Embassy in Budapest', by V. Kazimirov. 'On 23 July 1956 Gero in a talk with Andropov said that Mikoyan called him from Sofia ... Gero stated that if he correctly understood comrade Mikoyan, the Yugoslav embassy considered the candidacy of Gero' as unacceptable for the post of First Secretary of the CC HWP, where they would have liked to see János Kádár or Zoltán Szántó' (emphasis added). Zoltán Szántó (1893-1977) was a revisionist communist who made up the moderate wing of the opposition before October 1956. He sought refuge in the Yugoslav embassy on 4 November along with Nagy and his other supporters, but was arrested on November 18 (along with Zoltán Vas, chairman of the Government Commission on Consumer Supplies, when he left the embassy. Although he was deported to Romania with Nagy and the others, he was permitted to return to Hungary in 1958.
65. AVP RF, F. 077, Op. 37, P. 191, D. 39, L. 41, From Andropov, Soviet Ambassador in Budapest, to D. T. Shepilov, Minister of Foreign Affairs, 14 August 1956. 'Then Tito unexpectedly started to ask [Kurimszki] about the state of health of comrades Gero, Kádár and Révai ... Comrade Tito did not mention Imre Nagy even once in the course of the whole conversation, and did not even drop a hint about him'.
66. More evidence would be needed to substantiate this view, of course. Prominent scholars have always believed that Tito did insist that Rákosi be dismissed before Yugoslav relations with the communist bloc countries could improve. See, for example, Sándor Kopácsi, In the Name of the Working Class (New York, Grove Press, 1986), p. 89: 'The Yugoslav leader wanted the head of the Hungarian dictator who had mounted the false trials of Rajk and Kádár - in which everybody had been "agent and spy for Tito's clique"', or Endre Marton, The Forbidden Sky (Boston, Little, Brown, 1971), p. 207: 'When Khrushchev begged Tito to forget how Stalin had treated him in 1948, Tito demanded Rakosi's ouster', and Ferenc Váli, Rift and Revolt in Hungary, p. 223: 'He [Tito] undertook to persuade the Kremlin to have Rákosi and his associates removed from the Hungarian leadership; but the Soviet Presidium steadfastly refused'.
67. More evidence would be needed to substantiate this view, of course. Prominent scholars have always believed that Tito did insist that Rákosi be dismissed before Yugoslav relations with the communist bloc countries could improve. See, for example, Sándor Kopácsi, In the Name of the Working Class (New York, Grove Press, 1986), p. 89: 'The Yugoslav leader wanted the head of the Hungarian dictator who had mounted the false trials of Rajk and Kádár - in which everybody had been "agent and spy for Tito's clique"', or Endre Marton, The Forbidden Sky (Boston, Little, Brown, 1971), p. 207: 'When Khrushchev begged Tito to forget how Stalin had treated him in 1948, Tito demanded Rakosi's ouster', and Ferenc Váli, Rift and Revolt in Hungary, p. 223: 'He [Tito] undertook to persuade the Kremlin to have Rákosi and his associates removed from the Hungarian leadership; but the Soviet Presidium steadfastly refused'.
68. More evidence would be needed to substantiate this view, of course. Prominent scholars have always believed that Tito did insist that Rákosi be dismissed before Yugoslav relations with the communist bloc countries could improve. See, for example, Sándor Kopácsi, In the Name of the Working Class (New York, Grove Press, 1986), p. 89: 'The Yugoslav leader wanted the head of the Hungarian dictator who had mounted the false trials of Rajk and Kádár - in which everybody had been "agent and spy for Tito's clique"', or Endre Marton, The Forbidden Sky (Boston, Little, Brown, 1971), p. 207: 'When Khrushchev begged Tito to forget how Stalin had treated him in 1948, Tito demanded Rakosi's ouster', and Ferenc Váli, Rift and Revolt in Hungary, p. 223: 'He [Tito] undertook to persuade the Kremlin to have Rákosi and his associates removed from the Hungarian leadership; but the Soviet Presidium steadfastly refused'.
69. AVP RF, F. 077, Op. 37, P. 191, D. 39, L. 40, From Andropov, Soviet Ambassador in Budapest, to D. T. Shepilov, Minister of Foreign Affairs, 14 August 1956.
70. See TsKhSD, F. 89, Per. 45, Dok. 84, L. 7. To the CC CPSU from the CC CPY, 7 February 1957. 'In the course of our conversations with comrades Khrushchev, Bulganin and others in May and June of 1955, we expressed our negative position regarding the policies of Rákosi. You passed by these remarks, defended Rákosi, and used the whole authority of the Soviet Union in defence of this person and his policies, which he personified, right to the very last moment, that is, until the majority of the Central Committee of the Hungarian Workers' Party eliminated him'. Also see Tito's speech in Pula, 11 November 1956 'When we were in Moscow ... we said that Rákosi's regime and Rákosi himself had no qualifications whatever to lead the Hungarian state ... Their actions could only bring about grave consequences ... We were not insistent enough with the Soviet leaders to have such a team as Rákosi and Gero eliminated' (emphasis added), cited in Zinner (ed.), National Communism, pp. 523-524.
71. John MacCormac, 'Hungary Meeting Yugoslav Claims', New York Times, 4 May 1956, p. 6, col. 3. 'In return for getting his way, it is believed that Marshal Tito will cease his active opposition to Mr Rákosi, who is chief of the Hungarian Workers (Communist) Party'.
72. See TsKhSD, F. 89, Op. 2, D. 2, L. 9. 'Information of Mikoyan from Budapest', 14 July 1956. When Mikoyan flew to Budapest on 13 July he had the impression that 'the Hungarian comrades [in the Central Committee] had long ago come to the conclusion that Rákosi must go', but that they were 'too afraid' to say so openly, and were simply waiting for the Soviet leaders to make the first move. Also see TsKhSD, F. 89, Per. 45, Dok. 84, L. 7. Letter of Tito of the CC CPY, Belgrade, to CC CPSU (Khrushchev), 7 February 1957, from Belgrade. 'We are forced, in the interests of truth, although we do it unwillingly, to draw your attention to the fact that the CPSU leadership, Soviet government and Soviet media rendered the greatest support to these people [i.e. Rákosi et al.] and their politics, even when it became clear that even the Central Committee of the HWP and all the members of the HWP no longer wanted these people to lead their party and government, not to mention the wider working masses' (emphasis added).
73. Imre Horváth's notes of Khrushchev's Speech at the 3 November Session, Magyar Orszagos Levéltár, XIX J-1-K Horváth Imre kulugyminiszter iratai, 55, doboz. This document is also contained in the Hungarian document collection edited by Vyacheslav Sereda & Janos Rainer, Dontés a Kremlben, 1956, pp. 92-93), cited in note 4.
74. TsKhSD, F. 5, Op. 28, D. 403, L. 9, From I. Vinogradov to Comrade M. A. Suslov, 'About the Conversations of Comrade N. S. Khrushchev with Comrade Tito and the Other Leaders in the Crimea, September-October 1956'.
75. These included Julia Rajk (widow of the executed communist leader), Zoltan Vás, György Lukács (the philosopher), Géza Losonczy, Ferenc Donáh, Gabor Tánczos (president of the Petofi Circle), journalists Sándor Haraszti, Miklós Vásárhelyi, György Fazekas, and others. Altogether there were 10 men, 15 women and 17 children in the group. Elie Abel, 'Nagy Is Abducted by Soviet Police; Sent to Romania', New York Times, 24 November 1956, p. 1, col. 7.
76. Aleksander Ranković (1909-1983) was the second most important public figure in Yugoslavia. He was minister of internal affairs (although not in 1956) and party secretary responsible for cadres.
77. Tito wrote: '... When they [the Nagy group] showed up here in our embassy, ... [we] persistently tried to prove to them the usefulness of such a resignation for the regulation of the situation in Hungary', TsKhSD, F. 89, Per. 45, Dok. 84, L. 8. Letter of Tito to Khrushchev, 7 February 1957.
78. Mićunović, Moscow Diary, p. 137.
79. TsKhSD, F. 89, Per. 45, Dok. 25, L. 2. Telegram from the CC CPSU (Khrushchev) to Soviet Ambassador to Yugoslavia (Firyubin), 4 November 1956.
80. Mićunović, Moscow Diary, p. 138.
81. TsKhSD, F. 89, Per. 45, Dok. 38, L. 13. Letter of Tito to Khrushchev, 8 November 1956.
82. TsKhSD F. 89, Per. 45, Dok. 25, L. 2 op. cit. Underlining is in the original document.
83. TsKhSD, F. 89, Per. 45, Dok. 38, L. 12, 'From the Central Committee of the Yugoslav Communist Party, Brioni, to the First Secretary of the CC CPSU Khrushchev', 8 November 1956.
84. TsKhSD, F. 89. Per. 45, Dok. 38, L. 13. 'From the Central Committee of the Yugoslav Communist Party to the First Secretary of the CC CPSU Khrushchev', Brioni, 8 November 1956. 'If you take all this into consideration, then it becomes clear that only the speed of events was not anticipated and created problems that now are essential to solve. We think the question of whether or not our embassy acted correctly in Budapest no longer has any significance. What is important now is that we work together to solve this problem in the spirit of friendly relations, which we already established between our countries and parties'.
85. TsKhSD, F. 89, Per. 45, Dok. 29, L. 3, From the Diary of D. T. Shepilov, Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs, 'About the Conversation with the Yugoslav Ambassador to the USSR Micunovic', 7 November 1956. There is a discrepancy in the time of the incident. Mićunović and Shepilov said it occurred on 6 November at 12.45 p.m. The Soviet investigatory commission, however, established the time of the occurrence as 5 November 'around' 3.00 p.m. See AVP RF, F. 077, Op. 37, Por. 18, P. 188, L. 38, From General-Lieutenant Belyusov, Chief of the Eighth Administration of the General Staff, to N. S. Patolichev, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, 'Act'.
86. See Shifrtelegramma, 5 November 1956 (Strictly Secret), in TsKhSD, F. 3, Op. 64, D. 485, L1. 143-144.
87. TsKhSD, F. 89, Op. 45, D. 29, L1. 1-3. From D. T. Shepilov to the CPSU Presidium, 'About the Conversation with the Yugoslav Ambassador to the USSR Mićunović', 7 November 1956. Shepilov told Mićunović that the Soviet military command would comply with the Yugoslav request to 'pull back the military unit next to the [Yugoslav] embassy compound'.
88. TsKhSD, F. 3, Op. 64, D. 485, L. 130. Telefonogramma, 5 November 1956.
89. TsKhSD, F. 3, Op. 12, D. 1006, L1. 41-45ob, compiled by V. N. Malin. See the formal protocol for this session, TsKhSD, F. 3, Op. 64, D. 485, L1. 141. 'Vypiska iz Protokola No. 53 zasedaniya Prezidiuma TsK KPSS ot 6 noyabrya 1956 g.'. The telegram, signed by foreign minister Dmitrii Shepilov, was sent to the Yugoslav foreign minister, Koća Popović, via the Yugoslav ambassador in Moscow, Veljko Mićunović. It stated that the Soviet military commander in Hungary had been ordered to make a careful study of how the incident happened.
90. Major-General Grebennik was Serov's deputy in the KGB and Soviet commandant of Budapest after 4 November 1956.
91. AVP RF, F. 77, Op. 37, D. 18, P. 188, L. 35, From Major-General Grebennik, Lieutenant-Colonel Kuzminov and Gáspár (Deputy of the Hungarian Government Assembly), 6 November 1956, 'About the Accident to the Employee of the Yugoslav Mission in Budapest on 5 November 1956'. This report was later sent directly to Colonel General N. Pavlovsky on 9 November 1956 and other superior officers in the Soviet General Staff. See AVP RF, F. 077, Op. 37, For. 18, P. 188, L1. 38-39, To Comrades N. S. Patolichev and Belyusov, 9 November 1956. From the Commission composed of Grebennik, Boskoboinik and Lukin. The Soviet soldiers said that the Soviet tanks were being shot at from the direction of apartment buildings situated near the Yugoslav mission. In reply to this shot, a Soviet tank opened fire on the indicated house. Apparently because the tanks were moving, a volley of shots fell on the embassy building, and as a result, one of the employees who was standing at the window was killed'. The Soviet authorities pledged to transport the body to Yugoslavia.
92. AVP RF, F. 144, Op. 18, For. 4, P. 41, L. 25, Telephone telegram no. 185 from V. Astafiev, Temporary Charge d'Affaires of the USSR in Hungary (Budapest) to I. K. Zamchevsky, Director of the Fifth European Division, Soviet Foreign Ministry, 14 April 1957.
93. TsKhSD, F. 89, Per. 45, Dok. 25, L. 4, Telegram from the CC CPSU to N. Firyubin, Soviet Ambassador in Belgrade, 4 November 1956.
94. Mićunović, Moscow Diary, p. 146.
95. Mićunović stated that ... 'During the conversations on Brioni it was agreed that Imre Nagy and others could facilitate the situation of the new revolutionary worker-peasant government [headed by Kádár] if they in some way or another declare their intention to cooperate with the government or, at least, not demonstrate against it. The present location of Imre Nagy and others in the Yugoslav embassy does not contradict that agreement that was made with comrades Khrushchev and Malenkov with Tito and the other Yugoslav leaders during the Brioni meeting'. TsKhSD, F. 89, Per. 45, Dok. 29. L. 2, From the Diary of D. T. Shepilov, 'About the Conversation with the Yugoslav Ambassador to the USSR, Mićunović', 7 November 1956.
96. TsKhSD, F. 89, Per. 45, Dok. 38, L. 13. 'From the Central Committee of the Yugoslav Communist Party to the First Secretary of the CC CPSU Khrushchev',
97. TsKhSD, F. 89, Per. 45, Dok. 84, L. 8. To the CC CPSU from the CC CPY, 7 February 1957. 'As far as the remark about the resignation of Nagy is concerned, we'd like to remind you that we informed Nagy and his comrades of our opinion when they ended up in our embassy and persistently tried to prove to them how useful such a resignation would be in regulating the situation in Hungary. The fact that Nagy did not take our advice is not the business of the Yugoslav Union of Communists: it is his personally. We even went too far in this, wishing to ease the situation of the Kádár government and USSR by taking advantage of Nagy's presence in the Yugoslav embassy'.
98. TsKhSD, F. 89, Per. 45, Dok. 25, L. 4. Telegram from Soviet Ambassador to Yugoslavia, N. Firyubin, Belgrade, to CC CPSU, 4 November 1956. 'Tito asked also for the Soviet government to tell the Kádár government not to carry out repression against those communists who did not immediately take the correct line during the latest events in Hungary'. Kádár also urged lenient treatment for many of the members in the Nagy group. Since Tito supported Kádár, he was receptive to this idea. TsKhSD, F. 89, Per. 45, Dok. 34, L. 2, Telegram from the CC CPSU to Andropov, Soviet Ambassador to Hungary, 9 November 1956.
99. See RTsKhIDNI, F. 495, Op. 42, D. 827, L. 10. 'Letter from Zoltán Szánto in Hungarian POW camp near Suzdal to Mátyás Rákosi', 24 December 1943.
100. TsKhSD, F. 89, Per. 45, Dok. 78, L. 12, 'Protocol 164 of the CC CPSU Presidium Session', 16 July 1958.
101. TsKhSD, F. 89, Per. 45, Dok. 83, L. 4, Resolution of the CC CPSU: 'About the Letter to the CC of the Yugoslav Communist Party, to Tito', 10 January 1957. [Paraphrased] Thus, because of your contacts with Nagy, he was warned about the coming action of the Soviet troops in Hungary.
102. TsKhSD, F. 3, Op. 12, D. 1006, L1. 34-36, 'Working Notes from the CPSU CC Presidium Session on 4 November 1956', compiled by V. N. Malin. In the 6 November Presidium meeting Khrushchev accused Molotov of thinking about 'bringing back Hegedüs and Rákosi'. TsKhSD, F. 3, Op. 12, D. 1006, L1. 41-45, 'Working Notes from the CPSU CC Presidium Session on 6 November 1956', compiled by V. N. Malin.
103. Endre Marton, the Hungarian journalist employed by the Associated Press, wrote: 'Béla Kovaćs was the first to tell me that Nagy and many communists who remained loyal to him went to the Yugoslav embassy after Ambassador Soldatić called Nagy at dawn to say that Khrushchev had informed Tito about his decision to use force to quell the revolt ... Nagy was invited to seek refuge in the Yugoslav embassy at one o'clock in the morning, November 4th, by Dalibor Soldatić'. (Béla Kovács was secretary-general of the Smallholders Party until his arrest in February 1947, and was later appointed minister of agriculture by Imre Nagy on 27 October 1956). See Marton, The Forbidden Sky, p. 197.
104. In his Pula speech on 11 November Tito said: 'We are against interference and the use of foreign armed forces ... [but] if it meant saving socialism in Hungary, then ... the Soviet intervention was necessary'. Earlier in the speech he stated: 'The first intervention, coming at the invitation of Gero, was absolutely wrong'.
105. Aleksandr Stykalin & Elena Orekhova, 'The 1956 Hungarian Events and the Position of the Soviet Leadership', unpublished paper presented at Cold War History Project Conference in Moscow, January 1993, p. 23.
106. TsKhSD, F. 89, Per. 45, Dok. 38, L. 14. Letter from CC CPY (Tito) to CC CPSU (Khrushchev), 8 November 1956.
107. Mićunović, Moscow Diary, p. 150.
108. TsKhSD, F. 89, Per. 45, Dok. 25, L. 106. Telegram from N. Firyubin (Soviet ambassador to Yugoslavia) to CC CPSU (Khrushchev), 4 November 1956. Tito asked the Soviet government to take measures to protect the Yugoslav embassy from these possible attacks.
109. Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince, ed. Peter Bondanella (New York, Oxford University Press, 1988), p. 60. Emphasis added.
110. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, 'The Captive Peoples', Four-H Club Speech, Chicago, Illinois, 29 November 1954.
111. AVP RF, F. 77, Op. 37 Papka 191, L. 89, 4 December 1956, 'On the Issue of Imre Nagy and His Politics by the Yugoslav Leaders, a Reference', by I. Zamchevsky, Director of the Fifth European Department of the Soviet Foreign Ministry, USSR.
112. TsKhSD, F. 5, Op. 28, D. 403, L. 9, From I. Vinogradov to Comrade M. A. Suslov, 'About the Conversations of Comrade N. S. Khrushchev with Comrade Tito and the other leaders in the Crimea, September-October 1956'.
113. TsKhSD, F. 89, Op. 2, D. 5, L1. 3-4, 'Information of Malenkov, Suslov and Aristov', 17 November 1956. 'Our recommendations are: (a) provide for the arrest of Nagy as soon as he is released from the Yugoslav embassy; (b) demand that Nagy sign a declaration in which he admits his mistakes; (c) send him and his group to Romania; and (d) prepare a text for the Hungarian government about Nagy'.
114. TsKhSD, F. 89, Per. 45, Dok. 56, L1. 9-10. Protocol 62 from the CC CPSU Presidium session of 6 December 1956, to Malenkov, Shepilov and Gromyko, 'About the Answering Note to the Yugoslav Government's Note of 24 November 1956 on the issue of Imre Nagy and his Group'. See also the note of protest that Yugoslav foreign minister Koća Popović sent to the Soviet and Hungarian embassies on 24 November 1956, in TsKhSD, F. 89, Op. 2, D. 5, L1. 19-26, and TsKhSD, F. 3, Op. 164, D. 488, L1. 95-96. Information from Malenkov, Suslov and Aristov, 23 November 1956. This elaborate plot was devised by Ivan Serov and other senior KGB officials. Interestingly, Serov thought about using the same trick to arrest Cardinal Mindszenty - who had sought refuge in the American embassy. TsKhSD, F. 89, Per. 45, Dok. 53, L. 2, 'Notes of Serov on 27 November 1956'.
115. For details on the abduction see the newly declassified correspondence between Tito and Khrushchev in early 1957, now stored in the former CPSU Central Committee archive. 'Pis'mo Tsentral'nogo Komiteta Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskogo Soyuza ot 10 yanvarya 1957 goda Tsentral'nomu Komitetu Soyuza Kommunistov Yugoslavii/Pis'mo Tsentral'nogo Komiteta Soyuza Kommunistov Yugoslavii ot 7 fevralya 1957 goda Tsentral'nomu Komitetu Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskogo Soyuza', (Top Secret), February 1957, in TsKhSD, F. 89, Op. 45, D. 83, L1. 1-12 and D. 84, L1. 1-18.
116. TsKhSD, F. 89, Per. 45, Dok. 56, L1. 10-11. Protocol 62 from the CC CPSU Presidium session of 6 December 1956 to Malenkov, Shepilov and Gromyko, 'About the Reply to the Yugoslav Note of 24 November 1956 on the issue of Imre Nagy and his Group, including enclosed copy of the 24 November letter'.
117. TsKhSD, F. 89, Per. 45, Dok. 49, L. 2, 'Information of Malenkov, Suslov and Aristov', 22 November 1956. In the end two promises were broken. The document 'guarantee[d] the security of the indicated persons', and pledged 'not to hold the Yugoslavs responsible' for the past events.
118. TsKhSD, F. 89, Op. 2, D. 5, L. 13-15, 'Information by V. Nikolaev from Bucharest', 26 November 1956. Emil Bodnaras (head of the Romanian armed forces from 1947 to 1957 and senior aide to Gheorghiu-Dej) told Nikolaev: 'We didn't think the Yugoslavs would raise a fuss (podnimut shum) about the transfer of Imre Nagy and his group to Romania. However, as you know, they appealed with notes of protest to the Soviet and Hungarian governments. It is possible that this issue can be presented at the United Nations and so on. We think we ought to be ready for various speeches and conversations in connection with Imre Nagy'. The CC CPSU Presidium later discussed this telegram, which went on to state that Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej (the Romanian leader) planned to have high-level talks with Yugoslavia to soften tensions between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union and Hungary about the fate of Imre Nagy. TsKhSD, F. 3, Op. 64, D. 488, L. 177, 'Excerpt from Protocol No. 60 of the CC CPSU Presidium Session', 27 November 1956. The protocol stated that 'on the basis of the exchange of opinions at the session of the CPSU CC Presidium, Comrade Bulganin is instructed to hold negotiations with Comrade Gheorghiu-Dej'. Later that same day Bulganin called Gheorghiu-Dej, which he later recounted in writing for the other CPSU Presidium members: 'I told Comrade Gheorghiu-Dej that, in our opinion, a meeting at the highest level with the Yugoslav leadership about Imre Nagy and his group will not produce a good solution, since the Yugoslavs have a set position on this matter, and such a meeting might complicate the situation. The Yugoslavs might demand a meeting with Imre Nagy and the others, which would hardly be worthwhile ...'. TsKhSD, F. 89, Op. 2, D. 5, L1. 16-17, 'Information of Bulganin to the CC CPSU Presidium about the telephone conversation with Gheorghiu-Dej', 27 November 1956.
119. TsKhSD, F. 3, Op. 12, D. 1006, L. 52, 'Working Notes from the Session of the CPSU CC Presidium on 27 November 1956', compiled by V. N. Chernukha.
120. 'We asked the Yugoslavs to refrain from any additional declarations about the Nagy affair. The Yugoslav ambassador said any talks are useful, but the situation is deteriorating, as if we are returning to 1948' (emphasis added). TsKhSD, F. 89, Op. 2, D. 3, L. 13-15, 'Information by V. Nikolaev', 26 November 1956.
121. AVP RF, F. 077, Op. 37, Papka 191, D. 39, L. 81, 23 August 1956. 'About the Activities of the Workers of the Yugoslav Mission in Budapest, Hindering the Normalisation of Hungarian-Yugoslav Relations. From the Soviet Embassy in Budapest'. On 23 July 1956 Gero, in a talk with Andropov, said that Mikoyan had called him from Sofia, and reported that the Yugoslavs had agreed not to support the hostile elements in the press and radio ... Gero' emphasised that if he correctly understood comrade Mikoyan, the Yugoslav embassy considered the candidacy of Gero as unacceptable for the post of First Secretary of the CC HWP, where they would have liked to see János Kádár or Zoltán Szántó' (emphasis added).
122. Micunovic, Moscow Diary, p. 135.
123. TsKhSD, F. 89, Op. 2, D. 3, L. 11. 'Yesterday, late last night, the negotiations of comrades Kádár and Vidić were concluded ... On the evening of 22 November Nagy and his group must leave the Yugoslav embassy. Essential measures (neobkhodimye mery) in connection with this have been prepared jointly by comrades Serov and Münnich' (emphasis added).
124. TsKhSD, F. 3, Op. 12, D. 1006, L. 24 (on the back), 'Working Notes of the CC CPSU Presidium Session on 2 November 1956', compiled by V. N. Malin. It is true that Kádár did agree to travel to Moscow without informing Nagy and other government officials, and he did say during the 3 November Presidium meeting that 'the correct course of action [in Hungary] is to form a revolutionary government'. Also, he emphasised the fact that the Nagy government had failed to prevent the 'killing of communists' and said he 'agreed with [Soviet officials]' that 'you cannot surrender a socialist country to counterrevolution'. However, even then Kádár stated that they should avoid creating a 'puppet government'. Apparently Kádár had not planned to head this new pro-Soviet regime either. TsKhSD, F. 3, Op. 12, D. 1006, L. 32, 'Working Notes from the CC CPSU Presidium Session on 3 November 1956', compiled by V. N. Malin. Until the declassification of the Malin notes scholars had not known what Kádár was doing in Moscow on 2 and 3 November. Both Kádár and Münnich participated in sessions of the CPSU Presidium on these two days, although Kadar spoke the most. On 2 November they were joined by Istvän Bata (Hungarian defence minister until 24 October), who was flown to Moscow on the evening of 28 October (along with Gero, Piros and Hegedüs). On 3 November they were joined by Imre Horváth (Hungarian defense minister until 2 November), who took detailed notes of that day's session.
125. Marton, Forbidden Sky, p. 211.
126. TsKhSD, F. 89, Op. 2, D. 5, L1. 13-14, 'Information of Malenkov, Suslov and Aristov', 17 November 1956. 'Kádár has agreed with these recommendations' (emphasis added).
127. TsKhSD, F. 89, Per. 45, Dok. 38, L. 4, 10 November 1956, Resolution of the CC CPSU Presidium, 'About the Answer of the Yugoslavs on the issue of Imre Nagy and his Group', with the enclosures: telegram from Andropov and Epishev in Budapest; letter of Khrushchev to Tito; letter of Tito to Khrushchev. 'Kádár, in a slightly worried tone, also said the information reached him that the United States had begun military mobilisation. He requested that someone tell him whether there was any truth to these rumours'.
128. TsKhSD, F. 89, Per. 45, Dok. 34, L. 2, 'Draft of the Telegram to the Soviet Ambassador Andropov in Hungary', 9 November 1956.
129. AVP RF, F. 077, Op. 39, For. 7, Papka 197, L. 39, From the Diaries of V. V. Astafiev and V. M. Baskakov, 'Notes of a Conversation with the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Hungary, János Péter', 5 September 1958. Also: AVP RF, F. 077, Op. 39, For. 3, Papka 197, L. 7, From the Diary of P. S. Dedushkin, Manager of the 5th European Division of the Soviet Foreign Ministry, 'Notes of a Conversation with János Boldoczki, Hungarian Ambassador to the USSR'. 23 January 1958.
130. Litván, p. 187.
131. AVP RF, F. 077, Op. 38, For. 14, Papka 193, From the Diary of V. K. Gulevsky, Attache, and V. Astafiev, Temporary Chargé D'Affaires, Notes of a Conversation with János Péter, Hungarian First Deputy Foreign Minister, and István Sebes, Hungarian Deputy Foreign Minister, 17 June 1958. Péter told Gulevsky about a recent talk he had had with Jovo Kapićić, the Yugoslav ambassador to Hungary. Kapićić had just learned about Nagy's sentence and execution. Péter told Kapićić that other material - about the role of Yugoslavia in the Hungarian events - would be included in the report of the Nagy execution. Péter warned that if the Yugoslav government began to attack Hungary, then 'Hungary will be forced to publish other materials in its possession'.
132. TsKhSD, F. 89, Per. 45, Dok. 77, L. 8, Text of the 'verbal note' from the Yugoslavs given to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry on 23 June 1958 by the Yugoslav Ambassador Kapićić, translated from Hungarian, enclosed with 'Telefonogram from Astafiev of the Soviet Embassy in Budapest to P. S. Dedushkin of the Soviet Foreign Ministry', 24 June 1958.