Accountability and the Economy

Journal of Philosophy of Education

Volumn 32, Issue 1, 1998, Pages 19-39

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Author keywords

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Indexed keywords

EID: 0345911572     PISSN: 03098249     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1467-9752.00075     Document Type: Article

References (2)

1. I will not attempt to spell out condition (4) in any detail. I do not know a way of doing so in an uncontroversial way, and even an attempt is likely to embroil me further in what has seemed to some to be a 'kind of private philosophical game, which is of no interest except to the players' (Dancy, J. (1985), Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology (Oxford, Blackwell)). Dancy discusses the 'irritating' cases stemming from E. L. Gettier (Gettier, E. (1963), Is justified true belief knowledge? Analysis 23. pp. 121-123) which show that the first three conditions for knowing are not in themselves sufficient for knowledge. He feels that they involve inference from a false but justified belief to a further justified belief which happens to be true. Gettier's examples have provoked an immense yet abstruse literature which is very much 'philosophers' philosophy'. I refer the interested reader to Dancy, as further consideration of this issue is not part of the philosophical framework within which I am going to examine educational assessment.
2. I will not attempt to spell out condition (4) in any detail. I do not know a way of doing so in an uncontroversial way, and even an attempt is likely to embroil me further in what has seemed to some to be a 'kind of private philosophical game, which is of no interest except to the players' (Dancy, J. (1985), Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology (Oxford, Blackwell)). Dancy discusses the 'irritating' cases stemming from E. L. Gettier (Gettier, E. (1963), Is justified true belief knowledge? Analysis 23. pp. 121-123) which show that the first three conditions for knowing are not in themselves sufficient for knowledge. He feels that they involve inference from a false but justified belief to a further justified belief which happens to be true. Gettier's examples have provoked an immense yet abstruse literature which is very much 'philosophers' philosophy'. I refer the interested reader to Dancy, as further consideration of this issue is not part of the philosophical framework within which I am going to examine educational assessment.