Public Versus Private Insurance with Dual Theory: A Political Economy Argument

GENEVA Papers on Risk and Insurance Theory

Volumn 26, Issue 3, 2001, Pages 225-241

  Hindriks, Jean ^a  

^a QUEEN MARY UNIVERSITY OF LONDON   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Adverse selection; Insurance; Voting

Indexed keywords

EID: 0345881051     PISSN: 09264957     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1015289903491     Document Type: Article

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