The Incomplete Blockade: Soviet Zone Supply of West Berlin, 1948-49

Diplomatic History

Volumn 21, Issue 4, 1997, Pages 569-602

  Stivers, William ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0345878836     PISSN: 01452096     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1467-7709.00089     Document Type: Article

References (162)

1. Frank Howley, Berlin Command (New York, 1950), 3, 197.
2. For exceptions to the rule see Eric Morris, Blockade: Berlin and the Cold War (London, 1973), 111-12, 120; Joyce and Gabriel Kolko, The Limits of Power: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1945-54 (New York, 1972), 488-98; Ann and John Tusa, The Berlin Blockade (London, 1988), 249-52, 347, 351-52, 415-16. The Cold War historian W. Phillips Davison noted that during the first two months of the blockade there were "some fairly large holes" in it, yet he still called it "complete," "total," and "efficient"; Davison, The Berlin Blockade: A Study in Cold War Politics (Princeton, 1958), 98, 135, 196, 256, 296. GDR historians portrayed the blockade as a Western propaganda myth; for example: Gerhard Keiderling, Die Berliner Krise 1948/49: Zur imperialistischen Strategie des kalten Krieges gegen den Sozialismus und der Spaltung Deutschlands [The Berlin crisis 1948/49: The division of Germany and imperialist Cold War strategy against socialism] (Berlin, 1982).
3. For exceptions to the rule see Eric Morris, Blockade: Berlin and the Cold War (London, 1973), 111-12, 120; Joyce and Gabriel Kolko, The Limits of Power: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1945-54 (New York, 1972), 488-98; Ann and John Tusa, The Berlin Blockade (London, 1988), 249-52, 347, 351-52, 415-16. The Cold War historian W. Phillips Davison noted that during the first two months of the blockade there were "some fairly large holes" in it, yet he still called it "complete," "total," and "efficient"; Davison, The Berlin Blockade: A Study in Cold War Politics (Princeton, 1958), 98, 135, 196, 256, 296. GDR historians portrayed the blockade as a Western propaganda myth; for example: Gerhard Keiderling, Die Berliner Krise 1948/49: Zur imperialistischen Strategie des kalten Krieges gegen den Sozialismus und der Spaltung Deutschlands [The Berlin crisis 1948/49: The division of Germany and imperialist Cold War strategy against socialism] (Berlin, 1982).
4. For exceptions to the rule see Eric Morris, Blockade: Berlin and the Cold War (London, 1973), 111-12, 120; Joyce and Gabriel Kolko, The Limits of Power: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1945-54 (New York, 1972), 488-98; Ann and John Tusa, The Berlin Blockade (London, 1988), 249-52, 347, 351-52, 415-16. The Cold War historian W. Phillips Davison noted that during the first two months of the blockade there were "some fairly large holes" in it, yet he still called it "complete," "total," and "efficient"; Davison, The Berlin Blockade: A Study in Cold War Politics (Princeton, 1958), 98, 135, 196, 256, 296. GDR historians portrayed the blockade as a Western propaganda myth; for example: Gerhard Keiderling, Die Berliner Krise 1948/49: Zur imperialistischen Strategie des kalten Krieges gegen den Sozialismus und der Spaltung Deutschlands [The Berlin crisis 1948/49: The division of Germany and imperialist Cold War strategy against socialism] (Berlin, 1982).
5. For exceptions to the rule see Eric Morris, Blockade: Berlin and the Cold War (London, 1973), 111-12, 120; Joyce and Gabriel Kolko, The Limits of Power: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1945-54 (New York, 1972), 488-98; Ann and John Tusa, The Berlin Blockade (London, 1988), 249-52, 347, 351-52, 415-16. The Cold War historian W. Phillips Davison noted that during the first two months of the blockade there were "some fairly large holes" in it, yet he still called it "complete," "total," and "efficient"; Davison, The Berlin Blockade: A Study in Cold War Politics (Princeton, 1958), 98, 135, 196, 256, 296. GDR historians portrayed the blockade as a Western propaganda myth; for example: Gerhard Keiderling, Die Berliner Krise 1948/49: Zur imperialistischen Strategie des kalten Krieges gegen den Sozialismus und der Spaltung Deutschlands [The Berlin crisis 1948/49: The division of Germany and imperialist Cold War strategy against socialism] (Berlin, 1982).
6. For exceptions to the rule see Eric Morris, Blockade: Berlin and the Cold War (London, 1973), 111-12, 120; Joyce and Gabriel Kolko, The Limits of Power: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1945-54 (New York, 1972), 488-98; Ann and John Tusa, The Berlin Blockade (London, 1988), 249-52, 347, 351-52, 415-16. The Cold War historian W. Phillips Davison noted that during the first two months of the blockade there were "some fairly large holes" in it, yet he still called it "complete," "total," and "efficient"; Davison, The Berlin Blockade: A Study in Cold War Politics (Princeton, 1958), 98, 135, 196, 256, 296. GDR historians portrayed the blockade as a Western propaganda myth; for example: Gerhard Keiderling, Die Berliner Krise 1948/49: Zur imperialistischen Strategie des kalten Krieges gegen den Sozialismus und der Spaltung Deutschlands [The Berlin crisis 1948/49: The division of Germany and imperialist Cold War strategy against socialism] (Berlin, 1982).
7. Soviet ambassador (Washington) to secretary of state, 14 July 1948, U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948 (Washington, 1973), 2:962.
8. Office of Director of Intelligence (ODI), Weekly Intelligence Report (WIR) no. 128, 23 October 1948, T & C 1-4, Office of United States Military Government for Germany (hereafter OMGUS), file 3/431/10, Bundesarchiv Koblenz (hereafter BAK).
9. Howley, Berlin Command, 197. On 26 June political adviser Robert Murphy cabled Washington: "Two trains loaded with potatoes arrived in Berlin today and also one barge from the West." Three days later he reported the arrival of ten food barges on 26-27 June; single barges arrived on 30 June and 1 July, followed by a train on 3 July. Murphy (Berlin) to Department of State, 26, 29, 30 June 1948, nos. 1489, 1528, and 1547, POLAD/2857/8, BAK; Murphy to Department of State, 2, 4 July 1948, nos. 1568, 1602, POLAD/2864/1, BAK. See also report in the Berlin SPD party newspaper Der Sozialdemokrat, 29 June 1948. Hans Liebe, "Die Ernährung" [Food], in Berlins Wirtschaft in der Blockade [Berlin's economy in the blockade], ed. Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (Berlin and Munich, 1949), 21-22. ODI, WIR no. 128, fn. 4. Paul Füllsack (chief, Berlin Magistrat Food Office), "Ernährung," in Berlin Magistrat, Berlin 1948. Jahresbericht des Magistrats [Berlin 1948. Annual report of the Magistrat] (Berlin, 1950), 87-90. "Bericht über die Dezernentensitzung am 7. September 1948, Berlin-Neukölln, 9 September 1948," in LAZ 11384, Landesarchiv Berlin (hereafter LAB). For discussion of official distribution of "free market" food see Andreas Hallen and Thomas Lindenberger, "Frontstadt mit Lücken" [Frontline city with gaps], in Der Wedding - hart an der Grenze: Weiterleben in Berlin nach dem Krieg [Wedding - Tight on the border: Surviving in Berlin after the war], ed. Berliner Geschichtswerkstatt (Berlin, 1987), 186-87. Der Sozialdemokrat, 2 September 1948; Telegraf, 2 September 1948. During the one-day truck seizure on 1 September, the reported pile-up of halted vehicles extended one kilometer; that gives some hint of what the traffic volume must have been during the whole two months of "blockade running."
10. Howley, Berlin Command, 197. On 26 June political adviser Robert Murphy cabled Washington: "Two trains loaded with potatoes arrived in Berlin today and also one barge from the West." Three days later he reported the arrival of ten food barges on 26-27 June; single barges arrived on 30 June and 1 July, followed by a train on 3 July. Murphy (Berlin) to Department of State, 26, 29, 30 June 1948, nos. 1489, 1528, and 1547, POLAD/2857/8, BAK; Murphy to Department of State, 2, 4 July 1948, nos. 1568, 1602, POLAD/2864/1, BAK. See also report in the Berlin SPD party newspaper Der Sozialdemokrat, 29 June 1948. Hans Liebe, "Die Ernährung" [Food], in Berlins Wirtschaft in der Blockade [Berlin's economy in the blockade], ed. Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (Berlin and Munich, 1949), 21-22. ODI, WIR no. 128, fn. 4. Paul Füllsack (chief, Berlin Magistrat Food Office), "Ernährung," in Berlin Magistrat, Berlin 1948. Jahresbericht des Magistrats [Berlin 1948. Annual report of the Magistrat] (Berlin, 1950), 87-90. "Bericht über die Dezernentensitzung am 7. September 1948, Berlin-Neukölln, 9 September 1948," in LAZ 11384, Landesarchiv Berlin (hereafter LAB). For discussion of official distribution of "free market" food see Andreas Hallen and Thomas Lindenberger, "Frontstadt mit Lücken" [Frontline city with gaps], in Der Wedding - hart an der Grenze: Weiterleben in Berlin nach dem Krieg [Wedding - Tight on the border: Surviving in Berlin after the war], ed. Berliner Geschichtswerkstatt (Berlin, 1987), 186-87. Der Sozialdemokrat, 2 September 1948; Telegraf, 2 September 1948. During the one-day truck seizure on 1 September, the reported pile-up of halted vehicles extended one kilometer; that gives some hint of what the traffic volume must have been during the whole two months of "blockade running."
11. Howley, Berlin Command, 197. On 26 June political adviser Robert Murphy cabled Washington: "Two trains loaded with potatoes arrived in Berlin today and also one barge from the West." Three days later he reported the arrival of ten food barges on 26-27 June; single barges arrived on 30 June and 1 July, followed by a train on 3 July. Murphy (Berlin) to Department of State, 26, 29, 30 June 1948, nos. 1489, 1528, and 1547, POLAD/2857/8, BAK; Murphy to Department of State, 2, 4 July 1948, nos. 1568, 1602, POLAD/2864/1, BAK. See also report in the Berlin SPD party newspaper Der Sozialdemokrat, 29 June 1948. Hans Liebe, "Die Ernährung" [Food], in Berlins Wirtschaft in der Blockade [Berlin's economy in the blockade], ed. Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (Berlin and Munich, 1949), 21-22. ODI, WIR no. 128, fn. 4. Paul Füllsack (chief, Berlin Magistrat Food Office), "Ernährung," in Berlin Magistrat, Berlin 1948. Jahresbericht des Magistrats [Berlin 1948. Annual report of the Magistrat] (Berlin, 1950), 87-90. "Bericht über die Dezernentensitzung am 7. September 1948, Berlin-Neukölln, 9 September 1948," in LAZ 11384, Landesarchiv Berlin (hereafter LAB). For discussion of official distribution of "free market" food see Andreas Hallen and Thomas Lindenberger, "Frontstadt mit Lücken" [Frontline city with gaps], in Der Wedding - hart an der Grenze: Weiterleben in Berlin nach dem Krieg [Wedding - Tight on the border: Surviving in Berlin after the war], ed. Berliner Geschichtswerkstatt (Berlin, 1987), 186-87. Der Sozialdemokrat, 2 September 1948; Telegraf, 2 September 1948. During the one-day truck seizure on 1 September, the reported pile-up of halted vehicles extended one kilometer; that gives some hint of what the traffic volume must have been during the whole two months of "blockade running."
12. Howley, Berlin Command, 197. On 26 June political adviser Robert Murphy cabled Washington: "Two trains loaded with potatoes arrived in Berlin today and also one barge from the West." Three days later he reported the arrival of ten food barges on 26-27 June; single barges arrived on 30 June and 1 July, followed by a train on 3 July. Murphy (Berlin) to Department of State, 26, 29, 30 June 1948, nos. 1489, 1528, and 1547, POLAD/2857/8, BAK; Murphy to Department of State, 2, 4 July 1948, nos. 1568, 1602, POLAD/2864/1, BAK. See also report in the Berlin SPD party newspaper Der Sozialdemokrat, 29 June 1948. Hans Liebe, "Die Ernährung" [Food], in Berlins Wirtschaft in der Blockade [Berlin's economy in the blockade], ed. Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (Berlin and Munich, 1949), 21-22. ODI, WIR no. 128, fn. 4. Paul Füllsack (chief, Berlin Magistrat Food Office), "Ernährung," in Berlin Magistrat, Berlin 1948. Jahresbericht des Magistrats [Berlin 1948. Annual report of the Magistrat] (Berlin, 1950), 87-90. "Bericht über die Dezernentensitzung am 7. September 1948, Berlin-Neukölln, 9 September 1948," in LAZ 11384, Landesarchiv Berlin (hereafter LAB). For discussion of official distribution of "free market" food see Andreas Hallen and Thomas Lindenberger, "Frontstadt mit Lücken" [Frontline city with gaps], in Der Wedding - hart an der Grenze: Weiterleben in Berlin nach dem Krieg [Wedding - Tight on the border: Surviving in Berlin after the war], ed. Berliner Geschichtswerkstatt (Berlin, 1987), 186-87. Der Sozialdemokrat, 2 September 1948; Telegraf, 2 September 1948. During the one-day truck seizure on 1 September, the reported pile-up of halted vehicles extended one kilometer; that gives some hint of what the traffic volume must have been during the whole two months of "blockade running."
13. Howley, Berlin Command, 197. On 26 June political adviser Robert Murphy cabled Washington: "Two trains loaded with potatoes arrived in Berlin today and also one barge from the West." Three days later he reported the arrival of ten food barges on 26-27 June; single barges arrived on 30 June and 1 July, followed by a train on 3 July. Murphy (Berlin) to Department of State, 26, 29, 30 June 1948, nos. 1489, 1528, and 1547, POLAD/2857/8, BAK; Murphy to Department of State, 2, 4 July 1948, nos. 1568, 1602, POLAD/2864/1, BAK. See also report in the Berlin SPD party newspaper Der Sozialdemokrat, 29 June 1948. Hans Liebe, "Die Ernährung" [Food], in Berlins Wirtschaft in der Blockade [Berlin's economy in the blockade], ed. Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (Berlin and Munich, 1949), 21-22. ODI, WIR no. 128, fn. 4. Paul Füllsack (chief, Berlin Magistrat Food Office), "Ernährung," in Berlin Magistrat, Berlin 1948. Jahresbericht des Magistrats [Berlin 1948. Annual report of the Magistrat] (Berlin, 1950), 87-90. "Bericht über die Dezernentensitzung am 7. September 1948, Berlin-Neukölln, 9 September 1948," in LAZ 11384, Landesarchiv Berlin (hereafter LAB). For discussion of official distribution of "free market" food see Andreas Hallen and Thomas Lindenberger, "Frontstadt mit Lücken" [Frontline city with gaps], in Der Wedding - hart an der Grenze: Weiterleben in Berlin nach dem Krieg [Wedding - Tight on the border: Surviving in Berlin after the war], ed. Berliner Geschichtswerkstatt (Berlin, 1987), 186-87. Der Sozialdemokrat, 2 September 1948; Telegraf, 2 September 1948. During the one-day truck seizure on 1 September, the reported pile-up of halted vehicles extended one kilometer; that gives some hint of what the traffic volume must have been during the whole two months of "blockade running."
14. Howley, Berlin Command, 197. On 26 June political adviser Robert Murphy cabled Washington: "Two trains loaded with potatoes arrived in Berlin today and also one barge from the West." Three days later he reported the arrival of ten food barges on 26-27 June; single barges arrived on 30 June and 1 July, followed by a train on 3 July. Murphy (Berlin) to Department of State, 26, 29, 30 June 1948, nos. 1489, 1528, and 1547, POLAD/2857/8, BAK; Murphy to Department of State, 2, 4 July 1948, nos. 1568, 1602, POLAD/2864/1, BAK. See also report in the Berlin SPD party newspaper Der Sozialdemokrat, 29 June 1948. Hans Liebe, "Die Ernährung" [Food], in Berlins Wirtschaft in der Blockade [Berlin's economy in the blockade], ed. Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (Berlin and Munich, 1949), 21-22. ODI, WIR no. 128, fn. 4. Paul Füllsack (chief, Berlin Magistrat Food Office), "Ernährung," in Berlin Magistrat, Berlin 1948. Jahresbericht des Magistrats [Berlin 1948. Annual report of the Magistrat] (Berlin, 1950), 87-90. "Bericht über die Dezernentensitzung am 7. September 1948, Berlin-Neukölln, 9 September 1948," in LAZ 11384, Landesarchiv Berlin (hereafter LAB). For discussion of official distribution of "free market" food see Andreas Hallen and Thomas Lindenberger, "Frontstadt mit Lücken" [Frontline city with gaps], in Der Wedding - hart an der Grenze: Weiterleben in Berlin nach dem Krieg [Wedding - Tight on the border: Surviving in Berlin after the war], ed. Berliner Geschichtswerkstatt (Berlin, 1987), 186-87. Der Sozialdemokrat, 2 September 1948; Telegraf, 2 September 1948. During the one-day truck seizure on 1 September, the reported pile-up of halted vehicles extended one kilometer; that gives some hint of what the traffic volume must have been during the whole two months of "blockade running."
15. Howley, Berlin Command, 197. On 26 June political adviser Robert Murphy cabled Washington: "Two trains loaded with potatoes arrived in Berlin today and also one barge from the West." Three days later he reported the arrival of ten food barges on 26-27 June; single barges arrived on 30 June and 1 July, followed by a train on 3 July. Murphy (Berlin) to Department of State, 26, 29, 30 June 1948, nos. 1489, 1528, and 1547, POLAD/2857/8, BAK; Murphy to Department of State, 2, 4 July 1948, nos. 1568, 1602, POLAD/2864/1, BAK. See also report in the Berlin SPD party newspaper Der Sozialdemokrat, 29 June 1948. Hans Liebe, "Die Ernährung" [Food], in Berlins Wirtschaft in der Blockade [Berlin's economy in the blockade], ed. Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (Berlin and Munich, 1949), 21-22. ODI, WIR no. 128, fn. 4. Paul Füllsack (chief, Berlin Magistrat Food Office), "Ernährung," in Berlin Magistrat, Berlin 1948. Jahresbericht des Magistrats [Berlin 1948. Annual report of the Magistrat] (Berlin, 1950), 87-90. "Bericht über die Dezernentensitzung am 7. September 1948, Berlin-Neukölln, 9 September 1948," in LAZ 11384, Landesarchiv Berlin (hereafter LAB). For discussion of official distribution of "free market" food see Andreas Hallen and Thomas Lindenberger, "Frontstadt mit Lücken" [Frontline city with gaps], in Der Wedding - hart an der Grenze: Weiterleben in Berlin nach dem Krieg [Wedding - Tight on the border: Surviving in Berlin after the war], ed. Berliner Geschichtswerkstatt (Berlin, 1987), 186-87. Der Sozialdemokrat, 2 September 1948; Telegraf, 2 September 1948. During the one-day truck seizure on 1 September, the reported pile-up of halted vehicles extended one kilometer; that gives some hint of what the traffic volume must have been during the whole two months of "blockade running."
16. Neues Deutschland, 30 June, 9, 16 July 1948; Tribüne, 30 June 1948.
17. Neues Deutschland, 30 June, 9, 16 July 1948; Tribüne, 30 June 1948.
18. Josef Orlopp (head, Administration for Interzonal and Foreign Trade), "Die Wurzeln der Wirtschaftskrise in Westberlin," Tägliche Rundschau, 6 July 1948. The speaker was Hans Jendretzky, chairman of the executive committee of the central trade union, FDGB; ibid., 14 July 1948.
19. Josef Orlopp (head, Administration for Interzonal and Foreign Trade), "Die Wurzeln der Wirtschaftskrise in Westberlin," Tägliche Rundschau, 6 July 1948. The speaker was Hans Jendretzky, chairman of the executive committee of the central trade union, FDGB; ibid., 14 July 1948.
20. Tägliche Rundschau, 1 August 1948. U. S. Department of State, Office of Intelligence Research, Report no. 4773, "The Disintegration of the Berlin Government," 1 October 1948, RG 407, box 1065, National Archives, College Park, Maryland.
21. Tägliche Rundschau, 1 August 1948. U. S. Department of State, Office of Intelligence Research, Report no. 4773, "The Disintegration of the Berlin Government," 1 October 1948, RG 407, box 1065, National Archives, College Park, Maryland.
22. U. S. Department of State, Documents on Germany, 1944-1948 (Washington, 1985), 161. In similar notes to the Soviets dated 6 July 1948, the Western powers demanded the lifting of the blockade, after which talks could take place over the Berlin issue. In their reply, the Soviets demanded quadripartite talks on the entire German problem, with no prior commitment to lift the blockade. Ibid., 156-62. For press mention see Der Tagesspiegel, 15, 16 July 1948; and Kurier, 15 July 1948. The offer is noted in Morris, Blockade, 120; Tusa, Berlin Blockade, 249-50; Davison, Berlin Blockade, 128; and Willy Brandt and Richard Löwenthal, Ernst Reuter: ein Leben für die Freiheit (München, 1957), 431, 436. For the GDR view see Keiderling, Berliner Krise, 138-44.
23. U. S. Department of State, Documents on Germany, 1944-1948 (Washington, 1985), 161. In similar notes to the Soviets dated 6 July 1948, the Western powers demanded the lifting of the blockade, after which talks could take place over the Berlin issue. In their reply, the Soviets demanded quadripartite talks on the entire German problem, with no prior commitment to lift the blockade. Ibid., 156-62. For press mention see Der Tagesspiegel, 15, 16 July 1948; and Kurier, 15 July 1948. The offer is noted in Morris, Blockade, 120; Tusa, Berlin Blockade, 249-50; Davison, Berlin Blockade, 128; and Willy Brandt and Richard Löwenthal, Ernst Reuter: ein Leben für die Freiheit (München, 1957), 431, 436. For the GDR view see Keiderling, Berliner Krise, 138-44.
24. U. S. Department of State, Documents on Germany, 1944-1948 (Washington, 1985), 161. In similar notes to the Soviets dated 6 July 1948, the Western powers demanded the lifting of the blockade, after which talks could take place over the Berlin issue. In their reply, the Soviets demanded quadripartite talks on the entire German problem, with no prior commitment to lift the blockade. Ibid., 156-62. For press mention see Der Tagesspiegel, 15, 16 July 1948; and Kurier, 15 July 1948. The offer is noted in Morris, Blockade, 120; Tusa, Berlin Blockade, 249-50; Davison, Berlin Blockade, 128; and Willy Brandt and Richard Löwenthal, Ernst Reuter: ein Leben für die Freiheit (München, 1957), 431, 436. For the GDR view see Keiderling, Berliner Krise, 138-44.
25. U. S. Department of State, Documents on Germany, 1944-1948 (Washington, 1985), 161. In similar notes to the Soviets dated 6 July 1948, the Western powers demanded the lifting of the blockade, after which talks could take place over the Berlin issue. In their reply, the Soviets demanded quadripartite talks on the entire German problem, with no prior commitment to lift the blockade. Ibid., 156-62. For press mention see Der Tagesspiegel, 15, 16 July 1948; and Kurier, 15 July 1948. The offer is noted in Morris, Blockade, 120; Tusa, Berlin Blockade, 249-50; Davison, Berlin Blockade, 128; and Willy Brandt and Richard Löwenthal, Ernst Reuter: ein Leben für die Freiheit (München, 1957), 431, 436. For the GDR view see Keiderling, Berliner Krise, 138-44.
26. U. S. Department of State, Documents on Germany, 1944-1948 (Washington, 1985), 161. In similar notes to the Soviets dated 6 July 1948, the Western powers demanded the lifting of the blockade, after which talks could take place over the Berlin issue. In their reply, the Soviets demanded quadripartite talks on the entire German problem, with no prior commitment to lift the blockade. Ibid., 156-62. For press mention see Der Tagesspiegel, 15, 16 July 1948; and Kurier, 15 July 1948. The offer is noted in Morris, Blockade, 120; Tusa, Berlin Blockade, 249-50; Davison, Berlin Blockade, 128; and Willy Brandt and Richard Löwenthal, Ernst Reuter: ein Leben für die Freiheit (München, 1957), 431, 436. For the GDR view see Keiderling, Berliner Krise, 138-44.
27. U. S. Department of State, Documents on Germany, 1944-1948 (Washington, 1985), 161. In similar notes to the Soviets dated 6 July 1948, the Western powers demanded the lifting of the blockade, after which talks could take place over the Berlin issue. In their reply, the Soviets demanded quadripartite talks on the entire German problem, with no prior commitment to lift the blockade. Ibid., 156-62. For press mention see Der Tagesspiegel, 15, 16 July 1948; and Kurier, 15 July 1948. The offer is noted in Morris, Blockade, 120; Tusa, Berlin Blockade, 249-50; Davison, Berlin Blockade, 128; and Willy Brandt and Richard Löwenthal, Ernst Reuter: ein Leben für die Freiheit (München, 1957), 431, 436. For the GDR view see Keiderling, Berliner Krise, 138-44.
28. U. S. Department of State, Documents on Germany, 1944-1948 (Washington, 1985), 161. In similar notes to the Soviets dated 6 July 1948, the Western powers demanded the lifting of the blockade, after which talks could take place over the Berlin issue. In their reply, the Soviets demanded quadripartite talks on the entire German problem, with no prior commitment to lift the blockade. Ibid., 156-62. For press mention see Der Tagesspiegel, 15, 16 July 1948; and Kurier, 15 July 1948. The offer is noted in Morris, Blockade, 120; Tusa, Berlin Blockade, 249-50; Davison, Berlin Blockade, 128; and Willy Brandt and Richard Löwenthal, Ernst Reuter: ein Leben für die Freiheit (München, 1957), 431, 436. For the GDR view see Keiderling, Berliner Krise, 138-44.
29. U. S. Department of State, Documents on Germany, 1944-1948 (Washington, 1985), 161. In similar notes to the Soviets dated 6 July 1948, the Western powers demanded the lifting of the blockade, after which talks could take place over the Berlin issue. In their reply, the Soviets demanded quadripartite talks on the entire German problem, with no prior commitment to lift the blockade. Ibid., 156-62. For press mention see Der Tagesspiegel, 15, 16 July 1948; and Kurier, 15 July 1948. The offer is noted in Morris, Blockade, 120; Tusa, Berlin Blockade, 249-50; Davison, Berlin Blockade, 128; and Willy Brandt and Richard Löwenthal, Ernst Reuter: ein Leben für die Freiheit (München, 1957), 431, 436. For the GDR view see Keiderling, Berliner Krise, 138-44.
30. U. S. Department of State, Documents on Germany, 1944-1948 (Washington, 1985), 161. In similar notes to the Soviets dated 6 July 1948, the Western powers demanded the lifting of the blockade, after which talks could take place over the Berlin issue. In their reply, the Soviets demanded quadripartite talks on the entire German problem, with no prior commitment to lift the blockade. Ibid., 156-62. For press mention see Der Tagesspiegel, 15, 16 July 1948; and Kurier, 15 July 1948. The offer is noted in Morris, Blockade, 120; Tusa, Berlin Blockade, 249-50; Davison, Berlin Blockade, 128; and Willy Brandt and Richard Löwenthal, Ernst Reuter: ein Leben für die Freiheit (München, 1957), 431, 436. For the GDR view see Keiderling, Berliner Krise, 138-44.
31. Tägliche Rundschau, 20 July 1948; Tribüne, 20, 21, 30 July 1948; Neues Deutschland, 20 July 1948.
32. Tägliche Rundschau, 20 July 1948; Tribüne, 20, 21, 30 July 1948; Neues Deutschland, 20 July 1948.
33. Tägliche Rundschau, 20 July 1948; Tribüne, 20, 21, 30 July 1948; Neues Deutschland, 20 July 1948.
34. Der Sozialdemokrat, 21 July 1948; Tägliche Rundschau, 22 July 1948; Neues Deutschland, 22, 25 July 1948. Berlin Senat, Quellen und Dokumente 1945-1951 (Berlin, 1964), 2:1463-64; Neues Deutschland, 25 July 1948.
35. Der Sozialdemokrat, 21 July 1948; Tägliche Rundschau, 22 July 1948; Neues Deutschland, 22, 25 July 1948. Berlin Senat, Quellen und Dokumente 1945-1951 (Berlin, 1964), 2:1463-64; Neues Deutschland, 25 July 1948.
36. Der Sozialdemokrat, 21 July 1948; Tägliche Rundschau, 22 July 1948; Neues Deutschland, 22, 25 July 1948. Berlin Senat, Quellen und Dokumente 1945-1951 (Berlin, 1964), 2:1463-64; Neues Deutschland, 25 July 1948.
37. Der Sozialdemokrat, 21 July 1948; Tägliche Rundschau, 22 July 1948; Neues Deutschland, 22, 25 July 1948. Berlin Senat, Quellen und Dokumente 1945-1951 (Berlin, 1964), 2:1463-64; Neues Deutschland, 25 July 1948.
38. Der Sozialdemokrat, 21 July 1948; Tägliche Rundschau, 22 July 1948; Neues Deutschland, 22, 25 July 1948. Berlin Senat, Quellen und Dokumente 1945-1951 (Berlin, 1964), 2:1463-64; Neues Deutschland, 25 July 1948.
39. Intelligence Report R-898-48, German Economic Commission, "Transport Planning Conference on 17 September 1948," 29 September 1948, OMGUS file 7/27-3/11/12, BAK; Intelligence Report R-1000-48, "Reichsbahn Report to the SMAD Railway Administration on Activities in September 1948," 30 September 1948, OMGUS file 7/27-3/13 BAK Circular, signed Nitt (district food councilor, Berlin-Mitte), "Versorgung der Westsektoren-Bewohner durch die sowjetische Besatzungsmacht im Ostsektor," nd [probably 27 June 1948], circular, signed Nitt, "An alle Gewerbetreibenden des Bezirkes Berlin-Mitte," 27 July 1948, circular, signed Nitt, "An alle Kleinverteiler des Bezirks Berlin-Mitte," 22 July 1948, "Resolution! Betrifft: Ausgabe von Lebensmittelkarten zur Versorgung der Bevölkerung von drei westlichen Bezirken," 24 July 1948, Food Office, Berlin-Mitte, to Major Gubisch (Soviet Kommandatura), 28 July 1948, all in LAZ 11247, LAB.
40. Füllsack, "Ernährung," in Berlin, 1948, 87; idem, "Ernährung," in Berlin Magistrat, Berlin, 1949. Jahresbericht des Magistrats (Berlin, 1950), 122; "Zahlen der Anmeldungen im Ostsektor," 263, LAZ 11169, LAB.
41. Füllsack, "Ernährung," in Berlin, 1948, 87; idem, "Ernährung," in Berlin Magistrat, Berlin, 1949. Jahresbericht des Magistrats (Berlin, 1950), 122; "Zahlen der Anmeldungen im Ostsektor," 263, LAZ 11169, LAB.
42. Füllsack, "Ernährung," in Berlin, 1948, 87; idem, "Ernährung," in Berlin Magistrat, Berlin, 1949. Jahresbericht des Magistrats (Berlin, 1950), 122; "Zahlen der Anmeldungen im Ostsektor," 263, LAZ 11169, LAB.
43. Neues Deutschland, 3 October 1948;
44. Quellen und Dokumente 2:1520-25.
45. Neues Deutschland, 8, 15 October 1948.
46. I am grateful for this observation to Professor Norman M. Naimark of Stanford University, who noticed the fact while researching his book, The Russians in Germany: A History of the Soviet Zone of Occupation, 1945-1949 (Cambridge, MA, 1995).
47. For example, in neighboring Wedding 10.3 percent of the population drew rations in East Berlin, in far-away Zehlendorf only 1.7 percent (figures for March and April); Hallen and Lindenberger, "Frontstadt mit Lücken," 192.
48. Der Sozialdemokrat, 28 July 1948.
49. Memorandum, Opinion Surveys Branch to Textor, "A Report on Berlin Morale," 30 July 1948, OMGBS file 4/8-3/16, LAB. Accurately put, the percentages reflect the views of the 92 percent who asserted that the airlift must be maintained despite the Soviet food offer.
50. Telegraf, 21, 24, 25 July, 4 August 1948; Der Sozialdemokrat, 21, 26 July 1948; Tagesspiegel, 23 July 1948.
51. Telegraf, 21, 24, 25 July, 4 August 1948; Der Sozialdemokrat, 21, 26 July 1948; Tagesspiegel, 23 July 1948.
52. Telegraf, 21, 24, 25 July, 4 August 1948; Der Sozialdemokrat, 21, 26 July 1948; Tagesspiegel, 23 July 1948.
53. Der Sozialdemokrat, 26 July 1948; Telegraf, 21, 27 July 1948.
54. Der Sozialdemokrat, 26 July 1948; Telegraf, 21, 27 July 1948.
55. Acording to Reuter's biographers, the population regarded those who registered for rations in East Berlin as "apostates." Brandt and Löwenthal, Ernst Reuter, 436. Arno Scholz, "- jetzt durchstoßen!" Telegraf, 18 August 1948; Gustav Klingelhöfer, "Hausbrandsorgen und Direktorenschuh," ibid., 19 August 1948; idem, "Gegen den General Winter," ibid., 30 October 1948; Der Tagesspiegel, 17 October, 15 December 1948. Timm (district mayor), Löevenich (councilor), and Backhaus (department head) to U.S. Military Government, Building and Housing Section, 6 November 1948, OMGBS file 4/10-1/2, LAB. The OMGBS deputy director termed the proposal "very good" but put off making a decision on it. Babcock to Timm, 9 December 1948, OMGBS file 4/10-1/2, LAB. For Further details on reprisals against "apostates" see Hallen and Lindenberger, "Frontstadt mit Lücken," 190-95.
56. Acording to Reuter's biographers, the population regarded those who registered for rations in East Berlin as "apostates." Brandt and Löwenthal, Ernst Reuter, 436. Arno Scholz, "- jetzt durchstoßen!" Telegraf, 18 August 1948; Gustav Klingelhöfer, "Hausbrandsorgen und Direktorenschuh," ibid., 19 August 1948; idem, "Gegen den General Winter," ibid., 30 October 1948; Der Tagesspiegel, 17 October, 15 December 1948. Timm (district mayor), Löevenich (councilor), and Backhaus (department head) to U.S. Military Government, Building and Housing Section, 6 November 1948, OMGBS file 4/10-1/2, LAB. The OMGBS deputy director termed the proposal "very good" but put off making a decision on it. Babcock to Timm, 9 December 1948, OMGBS file 4/10-1/2, LAB. For Further details on reprisals against "apostates" see Hallen and Lindenberger, "Frontstadt mit Lücken," 190-95.
57. Acording to Reuter's biographers, the population regarded those who registered for rations in East Berlin as "apostates." Brandt and Löwenthal, Ernst Reuter, 436. Arno Scholz, "- jetzt durchstoßen!" Telegraf, 18 August 1948; Gustav Klingelhöfer, "Hausbrandsorgen und Direktorenschuh," ibid., 19 August 1948; idem, "Gegen den General Winter," ibid., 30 October 1948; Der Tagesspiegel, 17 October, 15 December 1948. Timm (district mayor), Löevenich (councilor), and Backhaus (department head) to U.S. Military Government, Building and Housing Section, 6 November 1948, OMGBS file 4/10-1/2, LAB. The OMGBS deputy director termed the proposal "very good" but put off making a decision on it. Babcock to Timm, 9 December 1948, OMGBS file 4/10-1/2, LAB. For Further details on reprisals against "apostates" see Hallen and Lindenberger, "Frontstadt mit Lücken," 190-95.
58. Acording to Reuter's biographers, the population regarded those who registered for rations in East Berlin as "apostates." Brandt and Löwenthal, Ernst Reuter, 436. Arno Scholz, "- jetzt durchstoßen!" Telegraf, 18 August 1948; Gustav Klingelhöfer, "Hausbrandsorgen und Direktorenschuh," ibid., 19 August 1948; idem, "Gegen den General Winter," ibid., 30 October 1948; Der Tagesspiegel, 17 October, 15 December 1948. Timm (district mayor), Löevenich (councilor), and Backhaus (department head) to U.S. Military Government, Building and Housing Section, 6 November 1948, OMGBS file 4/10-1/2, LAB. The OMGBS deputy director termed the proposal "very good" but put off making a decision on it. Babcock to Timm, 9 December 1948, OMGBS file 4/10-1/2, LAB. For Further details on reprisals against "apostates" see Hallen and Lindenberger, "Frontstadt mit Lücken," 190-95.
59. Acording to Reuter's biographers, the population regarded those who registered for rations in East Berlin as "apostates." Brandt and Löwenthal, Ernst Reuter, 436. Arno Scholz, "- jetzt durchstoßen!" Telegraf, 18 August 1948; Gustav Klingelhöfer, "Hausbrandsorgen und Direktorenschuh," ibid., 19 August 1948; idem, "Gegen den General Winter," ibid., 30 October 1948; Der Tagesspiegel, 17 October, 15 December 1948. Timm (district mayor), Löevenich (councilor), and Backhaus (department head) to U.S. Military Government, Building and Housing Section, 6 November 1948, OMGBS file 4/10-1/2, LAB. The OMGBS deputy director termed the proposal "very good" but put off making a decision on it. Babcock to Timm, 9 December 1948, OMGBS file 4/10-1/2, LAB. For Further details on reprisals against "apostates" see Hallen and Lindenberger, "Frontstadt mit Lücken," 190-95.
60. Acording to Reuter's biographers, the population regarded those who registered for rations in East Berlin as "apostates." Brandt and Löwenthal, Ernst Reuter, 436. Arno Scholz, "- jetzt durchstoßen!" Telegraf, 18 August 1948; Gustav Klingelhöfer, "Hausbrandsorgen und Direktorenschuh," ibid., 19 August 1948; idem, "Gegen den General Winter," ibid., 30 October 1948; Der Tagesspiegel, 17 October, 15 December 1948. Timm (district mayor), Löevenich (councilor), and Backhaus (department head) to U.S. Military Government, Building and Housing Section, 6 November 1948, OMGBS file 4/10-1/2, LAB. The OMGBS deputy director termed the proposal "very good" but put off making a decision on it. Babcock to Timm, 9 December 1948, OMGBS file 4/10-1/2, LAB. For Further details on reprisals against "apostates" see Hallen and Lindenberger, "Frontstadt mit Lücken," 190-95.
61. Under terms of an Allied order regulating the introduction of the Western D-mark as sole legal tender in West Berlin, West Berlin residents working in West Berlin and registered for rations in the Soviet sector would receive only 10 percent of their net salaries in D-marks; the rest would be paid out in Eastmarks from a wage compensation fund. This made it almost impossible to pay for rent and utilities, much less buy consumer goods. By comparison, workers earning Eastmark income but registered for rations in West Berlin were entitled to draw 60 percent of net earnings in D-marks from the wage compensation fund at a one to one rate; West Berlin workers with Eastmark incomes and registered in the East would be allowed to trade 30 percent of net Eastmark income into D-marks at the one to one rate. While the regulation prescribing these discriminations was technically an Allied ordinance, it was drafted in consultation with the Western Magistrat and substantially reflected its views. "Dritte Verordnung zur Neuordnung des Geldwesens, 20 März 1949," Quellen und Dokumente 2:1418-20. For a detailed treatment of the currency changeover see Michael Wolff, Die Währungs reform in Berlin, 1948/49 (Berlin, 1991), 254-85.
62. Under terms of an Allied order regulating the introduction of the Western D-mark as sole legal tender in West Berlin, West Berlin residents working in West Berlin and registered for rations in the Soviet sector would receive only 10 percent of their net salaries in D-marks; the rest would be paid out in Eastmarks from a wage compensation fund. This made it almost impossible to pay for rent and utilities, much less buy consumer goods. By comparison, workers earning Eastmark income but registered for rations in West Berlin were entitled to draw 60 percent of net earnings in D-marks from the wage compensation fund at a one to one rate; West Berlin workers with Eastmark incomes and registered in the East would be allowed to trade 30 percent of net Eastmark income into D-marks at the one to one rate. While the regulation prescribing these discriminations was technically an Allied ordinance, it was drafted in consultation with the Western Magistrat and substantially reflected its views. "Dritte Verordnung zur Neuordnung des Geldwesens, 20 März 1949," Quellen und Dokumente 2:1418-20. For a detailed treatment of the currency changeover see Michael Wolff, Die Währungs reform in Berlin, 1948/49 (Berlin, 1991), 254-85.
63. Rolf Badstübner and Siegfried Thomas, Die Spaltung Deutschlands, 1945-49 [The splitting of Germany, 1945-1949] (Berlin, 1966), 334; Keiderling, Berliner Krise, 137-43; circular, Füllsack (chief, Food Office) to Bezirksämter (district offices), 7 August 1948, LAZ 3592, LAB. Füllsack notes that all military governments, the Soviet included, were agreed that no problems should be created for those wanting to reregister in the Western sectors. Herbert (British commandant) to Howley, 22 July 1948, OMGBS file 4/133-1/22, LAB. Herbert had three reasons for not encouraging people to accept the Soviet scheme: 1) it would impose hardship on Germans, mostly in the Soviet sector, who were "not principals in the game"; 2) it would create a confused situation and general disturbance; and 3) it would provide political capital to the Soviets.
64. Rolf Badstübner and Siegfried Thomas, Die Spaltung Deutschlands, 1945-49 [The splitting of Germany, 1945-1949] (Berlin, 1966), 334; Keiderling, Berliner Krise, 137-43; circular, Füllsack (chief, Food Office) to Bezirksämter (district offices), 7 August 1948, LAZ 3592, LAB. Füllsack notes that all military governments, the Soviet included, were agreed that no problems should be created for those wanting to reregister in the Western sectors. Herbert (British commandant) to Howley, 22 July 1948, OMGBS file 4/133-1/22, LAB. Herbert had three reasons for not encouraging people to accept the Soviet scheme: 1) it would impose hardship on Germans, mostly in the Soviet sector, who were "not principals in the game"; 2) it would create a confused situation and general disturbance; and 3) it would provide political capital to the Soviets.
65. Reuter made his remark to U.S. political adviser Robert Murphy, Diplomat among Warriors (Garden City, NY, 1964), 314.
66. Robertson to FO (personal for Strang), 16 July 1948, no. C5740, Foreign Office Political Correspondence, Record Class 371, file 70502, Public Record Office, Kew, England. Ferdinand Friedensburg, Es ging um Deutschlands Einheit [It concerned German unity] (Berlin, 1971), 239 (emphasis added).
67. Morris, Blockade, 111-12; Counterintelligence Corps, Berlin, "Berlin Situation Report No. 58," 10 November 1948, OMGUS file 7/2-2/8, BAK. In late January 1949, a Bulgarian front man (calling himself "Mr. Alexander") approached Robert Murphy with a proposal to sell 300,000 tons of coal briquettes and 184,000 tons of foodstuffs for $28-35 million - higher than world market prices but lower than airlift costs. Once the goods had been delivered, however, they would be distributed by a Communist-front charity. General Clay responded that OMGUS would be glad to purchase the goods without condition, or would also permit distribution of donated goods by a Communist-front charity. Murphy to Wilkinson, "Visit of Mr. Alexander," 25 January 1949, Riddleberger to Murphy, 28 January 1949, both in POLAD/455/27, BAK.
68. Morris, Blockade, 111-12; Counterintelligence Corps, Berlin, "Berlin Situation Report No. 58," 10 November 1948, OMGUS file 7/2-2/8, BAK. In late January 1949, a Bulgarian front man (calling himself "Mr. Alexander") approached Robert Murphy with a proposal to sell 300,000 tons of coal briquettes and 184,000 tons of foodstuffs for $28-35 million - higher than world market prices but lower than airlift costs. Once the goods had been delivered, however, they would be distributed by a Communist-front charity. General Clay responded that OMGUS would be glad to purchase the goods without condition, or would also permit distribution of donated goods by a Communist-front charity. Murphy to Wilkinson, "Visit of Mr. Alexander," 25 January 1949, Riddleberger to Murphy, 28 January 1949, both in POLAD/455/27, BAK.
69. Morris, Blockade, 111-12; Counterintelligence Corps, Berlin, "Berlin Situation Report No. 58," 10 November 1948, OMGUS file 7/2-2/8, BAK. In late January 1949, a Bulgarian front man (calling himself "Mr. Alexander") approached Robert Murphy with a proposal to sell 300,000 tons of coal briquettes and 184,000 tons of foodstuffs for $28-35 million - higher than world market prices but lower than airlift costs. Once the goods had been delivered, however, they would be distributed by a Communist-front charity. General Clay responded that OMGUS would be glad to purchase the goods without condition, or would also permit distribution of donated goods by a Communist-front charity. Murphy to Wilkinson, "Visit of Mr. Alexander," 25 January 1949, Riddleberger to Murphy, 28 January 1949, both in POLAD/455/27, BAK.
70. Intelligence Report R-865-48, "Trade Between East and West Sectors of Berlin," 9 November 1948, OMGUS file 7/26-1/33, BAK. Another report gave 150-200 calories per day as a "conservative" estimate of "extra-official" supplements to legal rations - roughly 10 percent of the calorie value of the average daily adult ration; the bulk of the imports were potatoes, followed by vegetables, with limited amounts of flour and vegetable oil. OMGBS, Weekly Intelligence Reports Nos. 9-10 for weeks ending 10 and 17 November 1948, "Special Report: Berlin, Winter 1948-49," POLAD/17/24-2/15, BAK.
71. Intelligence Report R-865-48, "Trade Between East and West Sectors of Berlin," 9 November 1948, OMGUS file 7/26-1/33, BAK. Another report gave 150-200 calories per day as a "conservative" estimate of "extra-official" supplements to legal rations - roughly 10 percent of the calorie value of the average daily adult ration; the bulk of the imports were potatoes, followed by vegetables, with limited amounts of flour and vegetable oil. OMGBS, Weekly Intelligence Reports Nos. 9-10 for weeks ending 10 and 17 November 1948, "Special Report: Berlin, Winter 1948-49," POLAD/17/24-2/15, BAK.
72. Memorandum, OMGBS Liaison Section to Howley, "Gist of Klingelhöfer's Statement during Conversation with Mr. Moran," 28 December 1948, OMGBS file 4/10-1/1, LAB. In this meeting Klingelhöfer demanded shipment by air of 700 metric tons/day of spaceheating coal; earlier he had demanded 50,000 tons/month. Gustav Klingelhöfer, "Gegen den General Winter."
73. Memorandum, OMGBS Liaison Section to Howley, "Gist of Klingelhöfer's Statement during Conversation with Mr. Moran," 28 December 1948, OMGBS file 4/10-1/1, LAB. In this meeting Klingelhöfer demanded shipment by air of 700 metric tons/day of spaceheating coal; earlier he had demanded 50,000 tons/month. Gustav Klingelhöfer, "Gegen den General Winter."
74. "Special Report, Berlin, Winter 1948-49"; memorandum, R. M. Berry to Ambassador Murphy, "The Economic Situation in the Western Sectors of Berlin," 17 November 1948, transmitted to State Department in Murphy to Department of State, 17 November 1948, no. 1614, POLAD/796/6, BAK; ODI, WIR no. 128; Opinion Surveys Branch, Report no. 150, "Attitudes and Resources of Berliners as They Look Forward to a Blockaded Winter," 15 December 1948, RG 407; memorandum, Opinion Surveys Section to Textor, "The Financial Status of West Sector Berliners," 29 July 1948, OMGBS file 4/8-3/16, LAB.
75. "Special Report, Berlin, Winter 1948-49"; memorandum, R. M. Berry to Ambassador Murphy, "The Economic Situation in the Western Sectors of Berlin," 17 November 1948, transmitted to State Department in Murphy to Department of State, 17 November 1948, no. 1614, POLAD/796/6, BAK; ODI, WIR no. 128; Opinion Surveys Branch, Report no. 150, "Attitudes and Resources of Berliners as They Look Forward to a Blockaded Winter," 15 December 1948, RG 407; memorandum, Opinion Surveys Section to Textor, "The Financial Status of West Sector Berliners," 29 July 1948, OMGBS file 4/8-3/16, LAB.
76. "Special Report, Berlin, Winter 1948-49"; memorandum, R. M. Berry to Ambassador Murphy, "The Economic Situation in the Western Sectors of Berlin," 17 November 1948, transmitted to State Department in Murphy to Department of State, 17 November 1948, no. 1614, POLAD/796/6, BAK; ODI, WIR no. 128; Opinion Surveys Branch, Report no. 150, "Attitudes and Resources of Berliners as They Look Forward to a Blockaded Winter," 15 December 1948, RG 407; memorandum, Opinion Surveys Section to Textor, "The Financial Status of West Sector Berliners," 29 July 1948, OMGBS file 4/8-3/16, LAB.
77. "Special Report, Berlin, Winter 1948-49"; memorandum, R. M. Berry to Ambassador Murphy, "The Economic Situation in the Western Sectors of Berlin," 17 November 1948, transmitted to State Department in Murphy to Department of State, 17 November 1948, no. 1614, POLAD/796/6, BAK; ODI, WIR no. 128; Opinion Surveys Branch, Report no. 150, "Attitudes and Resources of Berliners as They Look Forward to a Blockaded Winter," 15 December 1948, RG 407; memorandum, Opinion Surveys Section to Textor, "The Financial Status of West Sector Berliners," 29 July 1948, OMGBS file 4/8-3/16, LAB.
78. Wilhelm Pieck notes, "Besprechung am 16.10. 1948 um 6 Uhr abends mit G. L. Russkich, G. M. Russow, Semjonow, Tulpanow," in Wilhem Pieck - Aufzeichnungen zur Deutschlandpolitik, 1945-1953 [Wilhelm Pieck - Notes on the German question, 1945-1953], ed. Rolf Badstübner and Wilfried Loth (Berlin, 1994), 240-41.
79. Tägliche Rundschau, 16, 19, 26 October 1948; Neues Deutschland, 19, 20 October 1948; Tribüne, 19 October 1948; Telegraf, 20 October 1948; Der Tagesspiegel, 19 October, 28 December 1948; Hays (OMGUS) to ODI, Nürnberg, 6 January 1949, no. CC 7323, OMGUS file 7/29-2/8, BAK.
80. Tägliche Rundschau, 16, 19, 26 October 1948; Neues Deutschland, 19, 20 October 1948; Tribüne, 19 October 1948; Telegraf, 20 October 1948; Der Tagesspiegel, 19 October, 28 December 1948; Hays (OMGUS) to ODI, Nürnberg, 6 January 1949, no. CC 7323, OMGUS file 7/29-2/8, BAK.
81. Tägliche Rundschau, 16, 19, 26 October 1948; Neues Deutschland, 19, 20 October 1948; Tribüne, 19 October 1948; Telegraf, 20 October 1948; Der Tagesspiegel, 19 October, 28 December 1948; Hays (OMGUS) to ODI, Nürnberg, 6 January 1949, no. CC 7323, OMGUS file 7/29-2/8, BAK.
82. Tägliche Rundschau, 16, 19, 26 October 1948; Neues Deutschland, 19, 20 October 1948; Tribüne, 19 October 1948; Telegraf, 20 October 1948; Der Tagesspiegel, 19 October, 28 December 1948; Hays (OMGUS) to ODI, Nürnberg, 6 January 1949, no. CC 7323, OMGUS file 7/29-2/8, BAK.
83. Tägliche Rundschau, 16, 19, 26 October 1948; Neues Deutschland, 19, 20 October 1948; Tribüne, 19 October 1948; Telegraf, 20 October 1948; Der Tagesspiegel, 19 October, 28 December 1948; Hays (OMGUS) to ODI, Nürnberg, 6 January 1949, no. CC 7323, OMGUS file 7/29-2/8, BAK.
84. Memorandum, R. M. Berry to Ambassador Murphy, "The Economic Situation in Western Berlin in Late Winter, 1948/49," 19 February 1949, transmitted in Murphy to Department of State, no. 214, 19 February 1949, POLAD/455/27, BAK; Neues Deutschland, 27, 31 October, 10, 14 November, 1948; Tribüne, 16, 27 October 1948.
85. Memorandum, R. M. Berry to Ambassador Murphy, "The Economic Situation in Western Berlin in Late Winter, 1948/49," 19 February 1949, transmitted in Murphy to Department of State, no. 214, 19 February 1949, POLAD/455/27, BAK; Neues Deutschland, 27, 31 October, 10, 14 November, 1948; Tribüne, 16, 27 October 1948.
86. Memorandum, R. M. Berry to Ambassador Murphy, "The Economic Situation in Western Berlin in Late Winter, 1948/49," 19 February 1949, transmitted in Murphy to Department of State, no. 214, 19 February 1949, POLAD/455/27, BAK; Neues Deutschland, 27, 31 October, 10, 14 November, 1948; Tribüne, 16, 27 October 1948.
87. Tägliche Rundschau, 16 November 1948.
88. Tägliche Rundschau, 16, 17 November 1948;
89. Neues Deutschland, 16 November 1948.
90. "The Economic Situation in Western Berlin in Late Winter, 1948/49."
91. Tägliche Rundschau, 8, 9 April, 4 May 1949; Tribüne, 24 March, 8 April 1949.
92. Tägliche Rundschau, 8, 9 April, 4 May 1949; Tribüne, 24 March, 8 April 1949.
93. The "run" on HO shops was confirmed both by the East Berlin press and British Foreign Office analysts: Tribüne, 3 March 1949; Foreign Office Research Department, Fortnightly Background Notes No. 157, 3 March 1949, OMGUS file 7/32-1/3, BAK. According to German figures provided to U.S. intelligence, East Berlin HO shops realized a profit of DM (East) 50.8 million in April 1949, 27.7 million in May, and 20.8 million in June. Assuming the decline was attributable to a fall-off in sales to Westerners, 59 percent of April HO profits were generated by West Berliners. This figure does not include purchases made in Potsdam, which for many West Berliners was easier to get to than East Berlin. Memorandum, unsigned, "Kann Westberlin den Ostmarkurs verbessern?" 26 October 1949, OMGUS file 7/29-1/6; also, Hallen and Lindenberger, "Frontstadt mit Lücken," 185.
94. The "run" on HO shops was confirmed both by the East Berlin press and British Foreign Office analysts: Tribüne, 3 March 1949; Foreign Office Research Department, Fortnightly Background Notes No. 157, 3 March 1949, OMGUS file 7/32-1/3, BAK. According to German figures provided to U.S. intelligence, East Berlin HO shops realized a profit of DM (East) 50.8 million in April 1949, 27.7 million in May, and 20.8 million in June. Assuming the decline was attributable to a fall-off in sales to Westerners, 59 percent of April HO profits were generated by West Berliners. This figure does not include purchases made in Potsdam, which for many West Berliners was easier to get to than East Berlin. Memorandum, unsigned, "Kann Westberlin den Ostmarkurs verbessern?" 26 October 1949, OMGUS file 7/29-1/6; also, Hallen and Lindenberger, "Frontstadt mit Lücken," 185.
95. Clay, Decision in Germany (Garden City, NY, 1950), 365.
96. Memorandum, Holt to Murphy, "Airlift Requirements of Supplies for Berlin West-Sector Industries," 28 September 1948, POLAD/461/33, BAK; memorandum, Berry to Murphy, "Raw material needs for Western Berlin during the Blockade," 16 October 1948, POLAD/461/53, BAK; "The Economic Situation in the Western Sectors of Berlin"; minutes of the Airlift Committee Meeting, 29 December 1948, OMGBS file 4/134-4/1. The figure mentioned had been been part of an official "minimum" agreed in August but not acted on before October. EUCOM, The Berlin Airlift 2:75. Airlift tonnage reports put industrial and consumer deliveries under a common category "miscellaneous," which was not consistently broken down between uses. The average of "miscellaneous" deliveries for the period in question was 109 metric tons/day. Industrial materials constituted 65 percent of the planned combined totals of industrial and consumer goods to be lifted, leaving 70 metric tons/day as a reasonable estimate of actual performance. The estimate is confirmed by a graphical representation that depicts the industrial airlift without consumer goods. OMGBS, Statistical and Historical Branch, A Four Year Report, July 1, 1945-September 1, 1949, 43, OMGUS, RG 260/7/52/38/6-7, box 611, National Archives, College Park Maryland; Ferdinand Grünig and Heinz Otto, "Die Luftbrücke" [The airlift], in Berlins Wirtschaft in der Blockade, 8-10, 18; German Institute for Economic Research plan, submitted by Dr. Ferdinand Friedensburg (acting mayor), "Minimum Achievements of the Air-Bridge Required for the Winter Due to Blockade," 16 September 1948, OMGBS file 4/133-3/17, LAB.
97. Memorandum, Holt to Murphy, "Airlift Requirements of Supplies for Berlin West-Sector Industries," 28 September 1948, POLAD/461/33, BAK; memorandum, Berry to Murphy, "Raw material needs for Western Berlin during the Blockade," 16 October 1948, POLAD/461/53, BAK; "The Economic Situation in the Western Sectors of Berlin"; minutes of the Airlift Committee Meeting, 29 December 1948, OMGBS file 4/134-4/1. The figure mentioned had been been part of an official "minimum" agreed in August but not acted on before October. EUCOM, The Berlin Airlift 2:75. Airlift tonnage reports put industrial and consumer deliveries under a common category "miscellaneous," which was not consistently broken down between uses. The average of "miscellaneous" deliveries for the period in question was 109 metric tons/day. Industrial materials constituted 65 percent of the planned combined totals of industrial and consumer goods to be lifted, leaving 70 metric tons/day as a reasonable estimate of actual performance. The estimate is confirmed by a graphical representation that depicts the industrial airlift without consumer goods. OMGBS, Statistical and Historical Branch, A Four Year Report, July 1, 1945-September 1, 1949, 43, OMGUS, RG 260/7/52/38/6-7, box 611, National Archives, College Park Maryland; Ferdinand Grünig and Heinz Otto, "Die Luftbrücke" [The airlift], in Berlins Wirtschaft in der Blockade, 8-10, 18; German Institute for Economic Research plan, submitted by Dr. Ferdinand Friedensburg (acting mayor), "Minimum Achievements of the Air-Bridge Required for the Winter Due to Blockade," 16 September 1948, OMGBS file 4/133-3/17, LAB.
98. Memorandum, Holt to Murphy, "Airlift Requirements of Supplies for Berlin West-Sector Industries," 28 September 1948, POLAD/461/33, BAK; memorandum, Berry to Murphy, "Raw material needs for Western Berlin during the Blockade," 16 October 1948, POLAD/461/53, BAK; "The Economic Situation in the Western Sectors of Berlin"; minutes of the Airlift Committee Meeting, 29 December 1948, OMGBS file 4/134-4/1. The figure mentioned had been been part of an official "minimum" agreed in August but not acted on before October. EUCOM, The Berlin Airlift 2:75. Airlift tonnage reports put industrial and consumer deliveries under a common category "miscellaneous," which was not consistently broken down between uses. The average of "miscellaneous" deliveries for the period in question was 109 metric tons/day. Industrial materials constituted 65 percent of the
99. Memorandum, Holt to Murphy, "Airlift Requirements of Supplies for Berlin West-Sector Industries," 28 September 1948, POLAD/461/33, BAK; memorandum, Berry to Murphy, "Raw material needs for Western Berlin during the Blockade," 16 October 1948, POLAD/461/53, BAK; "The Economic Situation in the Western Sectors of Berlin"; minutes of the Airlift Committee Meeting, 29 December 1948, OMGBS file 4/134-4/1. The figure mentioned had been been part of an official "minimum" agreed in August but not acted on before October. EUCOM, The Berlin Airlift 2:75. Airlift tonnage reports put industrial and consumer deliveries under a common category "miscellaneous," which was not consistently broken down between uses. The average of "miscellaneous" deliveries for the period in question was 109 metric tons/day. Industrial materials constituted 65 percent of the planned combined totals of industrial and consumer goods to be lifted, leaving 70 metric tons/day as a reasonable estimate of actual performance. The estimate is confirmed by a graphical representation that depicts the industrial airlift without consumer goods. OMGBS, Statistical and Historical Branch, A Four Year Report, July 1, 1945-September 1, 1949, 43, OMGUS, RG 260/7/52/38/6-7, box 611, National Archives, College Park Maryland; Ferdinand Grünig and Heinz Otto, "Die Luftbrücke" [The airlift], in Berlins Wirtschaft in der Blockade, 8-10, 18; German Institute for Economic Research plan, submitted by Dr. Ferdinand Friedensburg (acting mayor), "Minimum Achievements of the Air-Bridge Required for the Winter Due to Blockade," 16 September 1948, OMGBS file 4/133-3/17, LAB.
100. Memorandum, Holt to Murphy, "Airlift Requirements of Supplies for Berlin West-Sector Industries," 28 September 1948, POLAD/461/33, BAK; memorandum, Berry to Murphy, "Raw material needs for Western Berlin during the Blockade," 16 October 1948, POLAD/461/53, BAK; "The Economic Situation in the Western Sectors of Berlin"; minutes of the Airlift Committee Meeting, 29 December 1948, OMGBS file 4/134-4/1. The figure mentioned had been been part of an official "minimum" agreed in August but not acted on before October. EUCOM, The Berlin Airlift 2:75. Airlift tonnage reports put industrial and consumer deliveries under a common category "miscellaneous," which was not consistently broken down between uses. The average of "miscellaneous" deliveries for the period in question was 109 metric tons/day. Industrial materials constituted 65 percent of the planned combined totals of industrial and consumer goods to be lifted, leaving 70 metric tons/day as a reasonable estimate of actual performance. The estimate is confirmed by a graphical representation that depicts the industrial airlift without consumer goods. OMGBS, Statistical and Historical Branch, A Four Year Report, July 1, 1945-September 1, 1949, 43, OMGUS, RG 260/7/52/38/6-7, box 611, National Archives, College Park Maryland; Ferdinand Grünig and Heinz Otto, "Die Luftbrücke" [The airlift], in Berlins Wirtschaft in der Blockade, 8-10, 18; German Institute for Economic Research plan, submitted by Dr. Ferdinand Friedensburg (acting mayor), "Minimum Achievements of the Air-Bridge Required for the Winter Due to Blockade," 16 September 1948, OMGBS file 4/133-3/17, LAB.
101. Memorandum, Holt to Murphy, "Airlift Requirements of Supplies for Berlin West-Sector Industries," 28 September 1948, POLAD/461/33, BAK; memorandum, Berry to Murphy, "Raw material needs for Western Berlin during the Blockade," 16 October 1948, POLAD/461/53, BAK; "The Economic Situation in the Western Sectors of Berlin"; minutes of the Airlift Committee Meeting, 29 December 1948, OMGBS file 4/134-4/1. The figure mentioned had been been part of an official "minimum" agreed in August but not acted on before October. EUCOM, The Berlin Airlift 2:75. Airlift tonnage reports put industrial and consumer deliveries under a common category "miscellaneous," which was not consistently broken down between uses. The average of "miscellaneous" deliveries for the period in question was 109 metric tons/day. Industrial materials constituted 65 percent of the planned combined totals of industrial and consumer goods to be lifted, leaving 70 metric tons/day as a reasonable estimate of actual performance. The estimate is confirmed by a graphical representation that depicts the industrial airlift without consumer goods. OMGBS, Statistical and Historical Branch, A Four Year Report, July 1, 1945-September 1, 1949, 43, OMGUS, RG 260/7/52/38/6-7, box 611, National Archives, College Park Maryland; Ferdinand Grünig and Heinz Otto, "Die Luftbrücke" [The airlift], in Berlins Wirtschaft in der Blockade, 8-10, 18; German Institute for Economic Research plan, submitted by Dr. Ferdinand Friedensburg (acting mayor), "Minimum Achievements of the Air-Bridge Required for the Winter Due to Blockade," 16 September 1948, OMGBS file 4/133-3/17, LAB.
102. Memorandum, Holt to Murphy, "Airlift Requirements of Supplies for Berlin West-Sector Industries," 28 September 1948, POLAD/461/33, BAK; memorandum, Berry to Murphy, "Raw material needs for Western Berlin during the Blockade," 16 October 1948, POLAD/461/53, BAK; "The Economic Situation in the Western Sectors of Berlin"; minutes of the Airlift Committee Meeting, 29 December 1948, OMGBS file 4/134-4/1. The figure mentioned had been been part of an official "minimum" agreed in August but not acted on before October. EUCOM, The Berlin Airlift 2:75. Airlift tonnage reports put industrial and consumer deliveries under a common category "miscellaneous," which was not consistently broken down between uses. The average of "miscellaneous" deliveries for the period in question was 109 metric tons/day. Industrial materials constituted 65 percent of the planned combined totals of industrial and consumer goods to be lifted, leaving 70 metric tons/day as a reasonable estimate of actual performance. The estimate is confirmed by a graphical representation that depicts the industrial airlift without consumer goods. OMGBS, Statistical and Historical Branch, A Four Year Report, July 1, 1945-September 1, 1949, 43, OMGUS, RG 260/7/52/38/6-7, box 611, National Archives, College Park Maryland; Ferdinand Grünig and Heinz Otto, "Die Luftbrücke" [The airlift], in Berlins Wirtschaft in der Blockade, 8-10, 18; German Institute for Economic Research plan, submitted by Dr. Ferdinand Friedensburg (acting mayor), "Minimum Achievements of the Air-Bridge Required for the Winter Due to Blockade," 16 September 1948, OMGBS file 4/133-3/17, LAB.
103. Berry to Murphy, Berlin Economic Series No. 40, "Effect of the Blockade on Western Berlin Industry," 15 November 1948, transmitted to State Department in Murphy to Hickerson, 15 November 1948, POLAD/17/24-2/13, BAK; "The Economic Situation in the Western Sectors of Berlin." In the American sector, only eighty-seven firms were put in the "essential category" entitling them to coal and raw materials. Berry memorandum, "The Economic Situation in Western Berlin in Late Winter, 1948-49."
104. Berry to Murphy, Berlin Economic Series No. 40, "Effect of the Blockade on Western Berlin Industry," 15 November 1948, transmitted to State Department in Murphy to Hickerson, 15 November 1948, POLAD/17/24-2/13, BAK; "The Economic Situation in the Western Sectors of Berlin." In the American sector, only eighty-seven firms were put in the "essential category" entitling them to coal and raw materials. Berry memorandum, "The Economic Situation in Western Berlin in Late Winter, 1948-49."
105. Berry to Murphy, Berlin Economic Series No. 40, "Effect of the Blockade on Western Berlin Industry," 15 November 1948, transmitted to State Department in Murphy to Hickerson, 15 November 1948, POLAD/17/24-2/13, BAK; "The Economic Situation in the Western Sectors of Berlin." In the American sector, only eighty-seven firms were put in the "essential category" entitling them to coal and raw materials. Berry memorandum, "The Economic Situation in Western Berlin in Late Winter, 1948-49."
106. The suggestion was made by J. W. Darling (deputy chief, Economics Branch). "Resumé of the 6th Meeting of the German Industrial Committee in the American Sector of Berlin, . . . 21 September 1948," 22 September 1948, OMGBS file 4/12-1/35, LAB.
107. Intelligence Report R-865-48; Intelligence Report R-25-49, "Effect of Complete Split of Berlin," 5 January 1949, OMGUS file 7/23-3/5, BAK; memorandum, Benson (U.K. deputy commandant) to Bourne (U.K. commandant), "Trade between the Western Sectors and the Soviet Area of Control," 31 January 1949, OMGBS file 4/137-2/5, LAB.
108. Intelligence Report R-865-48; Intelligence Report R-25-49, "Effect of Complete Split of Berlin," 5 January 1949, OMGUS file 7/23-3/5, BAK; memorandum, Benson (U.K. deputy commandant) to Bourne (U.K. commandant), "Trade between the Western Sectors and the Soviet Area of Control," 31 January 1949, OMGBS file 4/137-2/5, LAB.
109. Intelligence Report R-865-48; Intelligence Report R-25-49, "Effect of Complete Split of Berlin," 5 January 1949, OMGUS file 7/23-3/5, BAK; memorandum, Benson (U.K. deputy commandant) to Bourne (U.K. commandant), "Trade between the Western Sectors and the Soviet Area of Control," 31 January 1949, OMGBS file 4/137-2/5, LAB.
110. OMGBS, Monthly Operations Report, February 1949; OMGBS file 5/37-3/20, LAB. The electricity cutoff was an ancillary move to the Soviet suspension of rail traffic on 24 June 1948.
111. Berliner Kraft- und Licht (BEWAG)-Aktiengesellschaft, Geschäftsbericht 1948-1950, 28 November 1951, 8-9. Twenty-five percent is an extrapolated figure. The BEWAG report shows East German deliveries of electrical current to West Berlin of 100,984 megawatt hours from 6 December 1948 to 30 June 1949. Total current generated in West Berlin over that time was 180,260 megawatt hours. To disaggregate blockade period deliveries from postblockade deliveries, the assumption was made that immediate Eastern sector postblockade deliveries approximated 1,000 megawatt hours/day - the summertime volume agreed to in the formal contract concluded between the East and West BEWAG companies on 18 July 1949; it was further assumed that West Berlin daily average power generation over the 6 December-11 May period corresponded to the average of the whole period reported by BEWAG. The estimates for postblockade power production were then subtracted from the totals. The rough 25 percent figure does not include electrical current for operation of the East German-run S-Bahn rail system in West Berlin. That current was fully supplied from the Soviet sector and not debited to the Western sector account.
112. Berlin Economic Series No. 40.
113. The counterblockade began on 24 June with an Anglo-American rail traffic embargo that had the practical effect of cutting off steel and coal shipments to the Soviet zone. Over the subsequent months the "counterblockade" was steadily tightened. On 15 September 1948 all shipments to the Eastern zone were prohibited.
114. Intelligence Report R-865-48; Intelligence Report R-25-49; Benson to Bourne, 31 January 1949; "Deliveries to Soviet Area during February 1949," OMGBS file 4/80-1/11, LAB. This latter report gives a breakdown of Soviet-area transactions by company; it provides a detailed view of the importance of Soviet-area markets to individual firms.
115. Intelligence Report R-865-48; Intelligence Report R-25-49; Benson to Bourne, 31 January 1949; "Deliveries to Soviet Area during February 1949," OMGBS file 4/80-1/11, LAB. This latter report gives a breakdown of Soviet-area transactions by company; it provides a detailed view of the importance of Soviet-area markets to individual firms.
116. Intelligence Report R-865-48; Intelligence Report R-25-49; Benson to Bourne, 31 January 1949; "Deliveries to Soviet Area during February 1949," OMGBS file 4/80-1/11, LAB. This latter report gives a breakdown of Soviet-area transactions by company; it provides a detailed view of the importance of Soviet-area markets to individual firms.
117. Intelligence Report R-865-48; Intelligence Report R-25-49; Benson to Bourne, 31 January 1949; "Deliveries to Soviet Area during February 1949," OMGBS file 4/80-1/11, LAB. This latter report gives a breakdown of Soviet-area transactions by company; it provides a detailed view of the importance of Soviet-area markets to individual firms.
118. Berlin Economic Series No. 40.
119. Tägliche Rundschau, 26 October 1948; Tribüne, 20 October 1948.
120. Tägliche Rundschau, 26 October 1948; Tribüne, 20 October 1948.
121. Intelligence Report R-865-48; Franz Seume, "Die Industrie," in Berlins Wirtschaft in der Blockade, 42, 46; Benson to Bourne, 31 January 1949.
122. Intelligence Report R-865-48; Franz Seume, "Die Industrie," in Berlins Wirtschaft in der Blockade, 42, 46; Benson to Bourne, 31 January 1949.
123. Benson to Bourne, 31 January 1949; "The Economic Situation in Western Berlin in Late Winter, 1948-1949."
124. Quellen und Dokumente 2:1493; memorandum, Stearns (chief, OMGBS intelligence branch) to ODI, "Special Report on Trade Between the Western Sectors and the Soviet Area of Control," 21 January 1949, OMGUS file 7/30-3/18, BAK; memorandum, Curran (chief, OMGBS Commerce and Industry Section) to Garrett (Intelligence Branch), "Submission of Data in re Counter-blockade and Import-Export Statistics," 6 May 1949, OMGUS file 7/29-1/8, BAK.
125. Quellen und Dokumente 2:1493; memorandum, Stearns (chief, OMGBS intelligence branch) to ODI, "Special Report on Trade Between the Western Sectors and the Soviet Area of Control," 21 January 1949, OMGUS file 7/30-3/18, BAK; memorandum, Curran (chief, OMGBS Commerce and Industry Section) to Garrett (Intelligence Branch), "Submission of Data in re Counter-blockade and Import-Export Statistics," 6 May 1949, OMGUS file 7/29-1/8, BAK.
126. Quellen und Dokumente 2:1493; memorandum, Stearns (chief, OMGBS intelligence branch) to ODI, "Special Report on Trade Between the Western Sectors and the Soviet Area of Control," 21 January 1949, OMGUS file 7/30-3/18, BAK; memorandum, Curran (chief, OMGBS Commerce and Industry Section) to Garrett (Intelligence Branch), "Submission of Data in re Counter-blockade and Import-Export Statistics," 6 May 1949, OMGUS file 7/29-1/8, BAK.
127. Memorandum, Political Branch to Ambassador Murphy, "Review of the Berlin Situation as of July 9, 1948," POLAD/796/1, BAK; memorandum, CIA Director R. H. Hillenkoetter to secretary of defense, "Berlin Situation," 15 July 1948, Declassified Documents Reference System (hereafter DDRS), (82)756. Memorandum of conversation, Cox to German Political Department, 19 July 1948, no. C5887, Robertson to Foreign Office, 10 August 1948, no. C 6531/G, both in FO 371/70506.
128. Memorandum, Political Branch to Ambassador Murphy, "Review of the Berlin Situation as of July 9, 1948," POLAD/796/1, BAK; memorandum, CIA Director R. H. Hillenkoetter to secretary of defense, "Berlin Situation," 15 July 1948, Declassified Documents Reference System (hereafter DDRS), (82)756. Memorandum of conversation, Cox to German Political Department, 19 July 1948, no. C5887, Robertson to Foreign Office, 10 August 1948, no. C 6531/G, both in FO 371/70506.
129. Briefing speech of General Maxwell Taylor, "Berlin Situation, 14 November 1949," OMGBS file 4/133-1/12, LAB. Without saying so directly, Taylor attributed West Berlin's distressed condition chiefly to the Western monetary action of 20 March. Due to gains in productivity, production recovered more rapidly than employment but still compared poorly with West Germany: Whereas West German industry had exceeded the 1936 production index by the second quarter of 1950, West Berlin did not achieve this result until 1955.
130. Extract from ID Teleconference No. 1626, 25 November 1948, Records of Army Staff, Rep. 37, Acc. 2919, 61-65, LAB.
131. "Supply Position and Average Daily Air Lift Requirements," Tab L to memorandum, Moran (OMGBS deputy director for the airlift) to Howley, "Air Lift Planning," 3 August 1948, OMGBS file no. 4/133-3/18, LAB; "Requirements and Supply Position and Proposed British- American Daily Average Air Lift," nd, OMGBS file 4/133-3/20 LAB; Howley to Herbert, 18 August 1948, OMGBS file no. 4/133-3/17, LAB; EUCOM, Berlin Airlift 2:50, 123-24, 127-29; memorandum, Holt to Murphy, 21 February 1949, POLAD/461/56, BAK; OMGBS, Monthly Operations Report, February 1949, OMGBS file 5/37-3/20, LAB; OMGUS, signed Hays, to Department of the Army for Generals Bradley, Wedemeyer; and Maddox, no. CC-8206, "Weekly report as of 1220 hrs Wed., March 30, 1949," OMGBS file 4/133-3/20, LAB.
132. "Supply Position and Average Daily Air Lift Requirements," Tab L to memorandum, Moran (OMGBS deputy director for the airlift) to Howley, "Air Lift Planning," 3 August 1948, OMGBS file no. 4/133-3/18, LAB; "Requirements and Supply Position and Proposed British-American Daily Average Air Lift," nd, OMGBS file 4/133-3/20 LAB; Howley to Herbert, 18 August 1948, OMGBS file no. 4/133-3/17, LAB; EUCOM, Berlin Airlift 2:50, 123-24, 127-29; memorandum, Holt to Murphy, 21 February 1949, POLAD/461/56, BAK; OMGBS, Monthly Operations Report, February 1949, OMGBS file 5/37-3/20, LAB; OMGUS, signed Hays, to Department of the Army for Generals Bradley, Wedemeyer; and Maddox, no. CC-8206, "Weekly report as of 1220 hrs Wed., March 30, 1949," OMGBS file 4/133-3/20, LAB.
133. "Supply Position and Average Daily Air Lift Requirements," Tab L to memorandum, Moran (OMGBS deputy director for the airlift) to Howley, "Air Lift Planning," 3 August 1948, OMGBS file no. 4/133-3/18, LAB; "Requirements and Supply Position and Proposed British- American Daily Average Air Lift," nd, OMGBS file 4/133-3/20 LAB; Howley to Herbert, 18 August 1948, OMGBS file no. 4/133-3/17, LAB; EUCOM, Berlin Airlift 2:50, 123-24, 127-29; memorandum, Holt to Murphy, 21 February 1949, POLAD/461/56, BAK; OMGBS, Monthly Operations Report, February 1949, OMGBS file 5/37-3/20, LAB; OMGUS, signed Hays, to Department of the Army for Generals Bradley, Wedemeyer; and Maddox, no. CC-8206, "Weekly report as of 1220 hrs Wed., March 30, 1949," OMGBS file 4/133-3/20, LAB.
134. "Supply Position and Average Daily Air Lift Requirements," Tab L to memorandum, Moran (OMGBS deputy director for the airlift) to Howley, "Air Lift Planning," 3 August 1948, OMGBS file no. 4/133-3/18, LAB; "Requirements and Supply Position and Proposed British- American Daily Average Air Lift," nd, OMGBS file 4/133-3/20 LAB; Howley to Herbert, 18 August 1948, OMGBS file no. 4/133-3/17, LAB; EUCOM, Berlin Airlift 2:50, 123-24, 127-29; memorandum, Holt to Murphy, 21 February 1949, POLAD/461/56, BAK; OMGBS, Monthly Operations Report, February 1949, OMGBS file 5/37-3/20, LAB; OMGUS, signed Hays, to Department of the Army for Generals Bradley, Wedemeyer; and Maddox, no. CC-8206, "Weekly report as of 1220 hrs Wed., March 30, 1949," OMGBS file 4/133-3/20, LAB.
135. Robertson to Foreign Office, 10 August 1948, no. C6531/G, FO 371/70506.
136. Intelligence Report R-865-48.
137. For earlier treatments emphasizing the Soviet lack of planning see Daniel Harrington, "The Berlin Blockade Revisited," International History Review 5 (February 1984): 88-112; and Jean E. Smith, "The View from USFET: General Clay's and Washington's Interpretation of Soviet Intentions in Germany, 1945-1948," in U.S. Occupation in Europe after World War II, ed. Hans A. Schmitt (Lawrence, KS, 1978), 76-78.
138. For earlier treatments emphasizing the Soviet lack of planning see Daniel Harrington, "The Berlin Blockade Revisited," International History Review 5 (February 1984): 88-112; and Jean E. Smith, "The View from USFET: General Clay's and Washington's Interpretation of Soviet Intentions in Germany, 1945-1948," in U.S. Occupation in Europe after World War II, ed. Hans A. Schmitt (Lawrence, KS, 1978), 76-78.
139. "Wirtschaftsplan 1948 und der Zweijahresplan 1949/1950," Die Wirtschaft, Sonderheft 3 (July 1948): 1-2, 15-16; Neues Deutschland, 30 June, 22 July 1948. Die Wirtschaft was the official organ of the DWK. Rudolf Appelt (deputy head, Administration for Interzonal and Foreign Trade), "Der Interzonen- und Außenhandel der Ostzone," Die Wirtschaft 3 (September 1948): 347. In informal talks with the Berlin representative of the Frankfurt economics authorities, von Schumann, DWK head Heinrich Rau called for the restarting of interzonal trade within a framework that included West Berlin. He asked von Schumann to keep their talks confidential "for the time being." Von Schumann promptly reported them, and furnished a copy of a DWK draft declaration, to U.S. intelligence. ODI, WIR no. 150, 26 March 1949, OMGUS file 3/430-2/2, BAK. Tägliche Rundschau, 14, 21 April, 6 May 1949; N. Orlow, "Ein Beitrag zum Frieden," ibid., 11 May 1949; Neues Deutschland, 6 May 1949; Tribüne, 8 April 1949.
140. "Wirtschaftsplan 1948 und der Zweijahresplan 1949/1950," Die Wirtschaft, Sonderheft 3 (July 1948): 1-2, 15-16; Neues Deutschland, 30 June, 22 July 1948. Die Wirtschaft was the official organ of the DWK. Rudolf Appelt (deputy head, Administration for Interzonal and Foreign Trade), "Der Interzonen- und Außenhandel der Ostzone," Die Wirtschaft 3 (September 1948): 347. In informal talks with the Berlin representative of the Frankfurt economics authorities, von Schumann, DWK head Heinrich Rau called for the restarting of interzonal trade within a framework that included West Berlin. He asked von Schumann to keep their talks confidential "for the time being." Von Schumann promptly reported them, and furnished a copy of a DWK draft declaration, to U.S. intelligence. ODI, WIR no. 150, 26 March 1949, OMGUS file 3/430-2/2, BAK. Tägliche Rundschau, 14, 21 April, 6 May 1949; N. Orlow, "Ein Beitrag zum Frieden," ibid., 11 May 1949; Neues Deutschland, 6 May 1949; Tribüne, 8 April 1949.
141. "Wirtschaftsplan 1948 und der Zweijahresplan 1949/1950," Die Wirtschaft, Sonderheft 3 (July 1948): 1-2, 15-16; Neues Deutschland, 30 June, 22 July 1948. Die Wirtschaft was the official organ of the DWK. Rudolf Appelt (deputy head, Administration for Interzonal and Foreign Trade), "Der Interzonen- und Außenhandel der Ostzone," Die Wirtschaft 3 (September 1948): 347. In informal talks with the Berlin representative of the Frankfurt economics authorities, von Schumann, DWK head Heinrich Rau called for the restarting of interzonal trade within a framework that included West Berlin. He asked von Schumann to keep their talks confidential "for the time being." Von Schumann promptly reported them, and furnished a copy of a DWK draft declaration, to U.S. intelligence. ODI, WIR no. 150, 26 March 1949, OMGUS file 3/430-2/2, BAK. Tägliche Rundschau, 14, 21 April, 6 May 1949; N. Orlow, "Ein Beitrag zum Frieden," ibid., 11 May 1949; Neues Deutschland, 6 May 1949; Tribüne, 8 April 1949.
142. "Wirtschaftsplan 1948 und der Zweijahresplan 1949/1950," Die Wirtschaft, Sonderheft 3 (July 1948): 1-2, 15-16; Neues Deutschland, 30 June, 22 July 1948. Die Wirtschaft was the official organ of the DWK. Rudolf Appelt (deputy head, Administration for Interzonal and Foreign Trade), "Der Interzonen- und Außenhandel der Ostzone," Die Wirtschaft 3 (September 1948): 347. In informal talks with the Berlin representative of the Frankfurt economics authorities, von Schumann, DWK head Heinrich Rau called for the restarting of interzonal trade within a framework that included West Berlin. He asked von Schumann to keep their talks confidential "for the time being." Von Schumann promptly reported them, and furnished a copy of a DWK draft declaration, to U.S. intelligence. ODI, WIR no. 150, 26 March 1949, OMGUS file 3/430-2/2, BAK. Tägliche Rundschau, 14, 21 April, 6 May 1949; N. Orlow, "Ein Beitrag zum Frieden," ibid., 11 May 1949; Neues Deutschland, 6 May 1949; Tribüne, 8 April 1949.
143. "Wirtschaftsplan 1948 und der Zweijahresplan 1949/1950," Die Wirtschaft, Sonderheft 3 (July 1948): 1-2, 15-16; Neues Deutschland, 30 June, 22 July 1948. Die Wirtschaft was the official organ of the DWK. Rudolf Appelt (deputy head, Administration for Interzonal and Foreign Trade), "Der Interzonen- und Außenhandel der Ostzone," Die Wirtschaft 3 (September 1948): 347. In informal talks with the Berlin representative of the Frankfurt economics authorities, von Schumann, DWK head Heinrich Rau called for the restarting of interzonal trade within a framework that included West Berlin. He asked von Schumann to keep their talks confidential "for the time being." Von Schumann promptly reported them, and furnished a copy of a DWK draft declaration, to U.S. intelligence. ODI, WIR no. 150, 26 March 1949, OMGUS file 3/430-2/2, BAK. Tägliche Rundschau, 14, 21 April, 6 May 1949; N. Orlow, "Ein Beitrag zum Frieden," ibid., 11 May 1949; Neues Deutschland, 6 May 1949; Tribüne, 8 April 1949.
144. "Wirtschaftsplan 1948 und der Zweijahresplan 1949/1950," Die Wirtschaft, Sonderheft 3 (July 1948): 1-2, 15-16; Neues Deutschland, 30 June, 22 July 1948. Die Wirtschaft was the official organ of the DWK. Rudolf Appelt (deputy head, Administration for Interzonal and Foreign Trade), "Der Interzonen- und Außenhandel der Ostzone," Die Wirtschaft 3 (September 1948): 347. In informal talks with the Berlin representative of the Frankfurt economics authorities, von Schumann, DWK head Heinrich Rau called for the restarting of interzonal trade within a framework that included West Berlin. He asked von Schumann to keep their talks confidential "for the time being." Von Schumann promptly reported them, and furnished a copy of a DWK draft declaration, to U.S. intelligence. ODI, WIR no. 150, 26 March 1949, OMGUS file 3/430-2/2, BAK. Tägliche Rundschau, 14, 21 April, 6 May 1949; N. Orlow, "Ein Beitrag zum Frieden," ibid., 11 May 1949; Neues Deutschland, 6 May 1949; Tribüne, 8 April 1949.
145. "Wirtschaftsplan 1948 und der Zweijahresplan 1949/1950," Die Wirtschaft, Sonderheft 3 (July 1948): 1-2, 15-16; Neues Deutschland, 30 June, 22 July 1948. Die Wirtschaft was the official organ of the DWK. Rudolf Appelt (deputy head, Administration for Interzonal and Foreign Trade), "Der Interzonen- und Außenhandel der Ostzone," Die Wirtschaft 3 (September 1948): 347. In informal talks with the Berlin representative of the Frankfurt economics authorities, von Schumann, DWK head Heinrich Rau called for the restarting of interzonal trade within a framework that included West Berlin. He asked von Schumann to keep their talks confidential "for the time being." Von Schumann promptly reported them, and furnished a copy of a DWK draft declaration, to U.S. intelligence. ODI, WIR no. 150, 26 March 1949, OMGUS file 3/430-2/2, BAK. Tägliche Rundschau, 14, 21 April, 6 May 1949; N. Orlow, "Ein Beitrag zum Frieden," ibid., 11 May 1949; Neues Deutschland, 6 May 1949; Tribüne, 8 April 1949.
146. Murphy (Berlin) to Department of State, 26 June 1948, FRUS, 1948 2:921. The most significant work on the subject of Moscow's flirtation with German unity is the controversial book by Wilfried Loth, Stalins ungeliebtes Kind: Warum Moskau die DDR nicht wollte (Berlin, 1994), esp. 14-160.
147. Murphy (Berlin) to Department of State, 26 June 1948, FRUS, 1948 2:921. The most significant work on the subject of Moscow's flirtation with German unity is the controversial book by Wilfried Loth, Stalins ungeliebtes Kind: Warum Moskau die DDR nicht wollte (Berlin, 1994), esp. 14-160.
148. Memorandum, Sterling to Adams and Laukhuff, nd, [late June - early July 1948], POLAD/796, BAK; Murphy to Department of State, 30 June 1948, no. 1552, POLAD/2857/8, BAK; Murphy to Department of State, 20 July 1948, no. 20, POLAD/2865/8, BAK.
149. Report by the Policy Planning Staff, "Position of the United States With Respect to Germany Following the Breakdown of Moscow Discussions," PPS 42, 2 November 1948, FRUS, 1948 2:1242. Analyses of declining Communist strength are found in Weekly Intelligence Reports, OMGUS files 3/430-1/7, 3/430-1/8, 3/430-1/10; 3/430-1/11, BAK. In September the Berlin branch of the Counterintelligence Corps reported a two-month loss of around two hundred SED members in the West Berlin district of Tempelhof. Berlin Situation Report, 17 September 1948, OMGUS file 7/29-2/8, BAK; discussion at Foreign Office, 25 June 1948, no. C5094, FO 371/70497; Frank Roberts minute, 29 June 1948, no. C5215/G, FO 371/70499; "Memorandum for the President" (summary of 25th meeting of National Security Council), 22 October 1948, DDRS, 77(298C).
150. Marshall to Murphy (Berlin) and Bohlen (Paris), 24 November 1948, no. 1865, POLAD/35/32, BAK; Murphy to Marshall, 26 November 1948, FRUS, 1948 2:1268-70.
151. Minutes of a meeting of the secretary of state with the foreign ministers of the United Kingdom and France, Paris, 21 September 1948, FRUS, 1948 2:1178. In commenting on Marshall's optimism, Sir Brian Robertson, who was present at the meeting along with Clay, noted that Marshall had quoted figures that contradicted the information Robertson had previously received. Robertson minute, 23 September 1948, Annex A to no. C8025/G, FO 371/70517; Lt. Col. Edwards (Army Staff Plans and Operations Division) memorandum for the record, "Berlin Airlift," 3 December 1948, Rep. 37, Acc. 2919, 61, LAB.
152. Lovett to Murphy, no. 1691, 5 October 1948, POLAD/35/32, BAK; Draper to Clay, 10 September 1948, no. 89060, Rep. 37, Acc. 2919, 35-37, LAB; Clay to Draper, 28 September 1948, no. CC 6106, Rep. 57, Acc. 2919, 42, LAB. Wolff, Währungsreform in Berlin, 147-92, 233; Teleconference (Washington-Berlin) TT-1756/CC-7227, 29 December 1948, records of EUCOM General Staff, box 525, RG 558. The argument that the Soviets had already done everything they could do was also recited here.
153. At the end of June Army Chief of Staff Omar Bradley concurred in a paper strongly favoring ultimate withdrawal from Berlin. Department of the Army Plans and Operations Division memorandum, "Notes on the Situation in Berlin," 28 June 1948, Rep. 37, Acc. 2919, 57, LAB. The secretary of defense admonished his NSC colleagues to keep "alert to the possibility that some justification might be found for withdrawal of our occupation forces from Berlin without undue loss of prestige." James Forrestal memorandum for the National Security Council, "U.S. Military Courses of Action with Respect to the Situation in Berlin," 26 July 1948, transmitted as NSC-24, 28 July 1948, Rep. 37, Acc. 2919, 56, LAB. For the concerns of the JCS see Kenneth W. Condit, The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: the Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, Vol. 2: 1947-49 (Washington, 1976), 141-44, 150-56.
154. In its report PPS 42, the Policy Planning Staff judged it impossible to supply Berlin indefinitely by air. It then broke a taboo and emphasized the need for an all-German settlement to the Berlin problem, proposing as a basis for discussion mutual withdrawal from Berlin as well as from a portion of Germany. See also Avi Shlaim, The United States and the Berlin Blockade, 1948-49: A Study in Crisis Decision-Making (Berkeley, 1983), 360-61.
155. Lt. Col. Edwards memorandum for the record, "OMGUS Intelligence Report on Berlin Blockade," 30 November 1948, Rep. 37, Acc. 2919, 61, LAB. The arguments by General Hays and Colonel Rodes, making the distinction between "necessary" and "advantageous" supplies, was in direct response to an Army Department query on the significance of Soviet area supplies. It must be said that Washington decision makers could have gotten full information by digesting theater reports and CIA analyses. But this detailed information was not as significant in the policymaking process as the points Clay and Murphy chose to emphasize in teleconferences and cables. Curiously, when Robert Berry's detailed analyses of November 1948 and February 1949 were sent by Murphy to Washington, he had them marked, "Not for Distribution Outside the Department of State." This was an abnormal precaution. Was his aim to hide these reports from skeptics at the Pentagon?
156. For Clay's arguments about threatened catastrophe see Clay to Draper, 17 October 1948, no. CC 6354, Clay to Army Department, 6 November 1948, no. CC 6646, both in Rep. 37, Acc. 2919, 41-42, LAB. Clay to Army Department, 5 January 1949, no. CC 7310, Rep. 37, Acc. 2919, 48-49, LAB. After the conversion finally went through, Reuter declared "Now they can't leave us hanging." Quoted in Wolff, Währungsreform in Berlin, 28. For German opposition to abandoning the parallel currency system see ODI, WIR no. 132, 20 November 1948, Fin. 1-4, OMGUS file 3/430-1/11, BAK; ODI WIR no. 148, 12 March 1949, Fin. 1-3, OMGUS file 3/430-2/2, BAK.
157. Robertson to Foreign Office, 10 August 1948, no. C6531/G, FO 371/70506; Robertson to Foreign Office, 23 September 1948, Annex A to no. C8025/G, FO 371/70517; Robertson to Foreign Office, 8 December 1948, no. C10122, FO 371/70526.
158. Resume of discussion in Foreign Office (German Section), 17 February 1948, minute, Sir William Strang to foreign secretary, 24 February 1948, both in no. C1547/G, FO 371/70489. Record of meeting held in Sir William Strang's room, "British Position in Berlin," 23 April 1948, no. C3580/G, Gilchrist minute, 3 May 1948, no. C3455/G, both FO 371/70492.
159. Wolff, Währungsreform in Berlin, 193-225, 233-44. In mid-November, Bevin authorized Robertson to resume preparatory talks, while reserving final decision on the conversion. Teleconference (Washington-Berlin) TT-1756/CC-7227.
160. Wolff, Währungsreform in Berlin, 234-35, 244-45, 250-52. For text of Stalin's answers to questions posed by the American journalist Kingsbury Smith, see Documents on Germany, 198-99.
161. Wolff, Währungsreform in Berlin, 234-35, 244-45, 250-52. For text of Stalin's answers to questions posed by the American journalist Kingsbury Smith, see Documents on Germany, 198-99.
162. The date of the Soviet surrender was 21 March 1949, when Soviet UN ambassador Yakov Malik outlined to U.S. ambassador Philip Jessup Moscow's terms of capitulation: The Soviets would lift the blockade if the Allies would lift the counterblockade and agree to a Council of Foreign Ministers (CFM) meeting on the German question as a whole. Delay of the surrender until May was due to Western reluctance to give firm guarantees that a West German government would not come into existence in the period between the end of the blockade and the convening of the CFM, or indeed, during the CFM. FRUS, 1949 (Washington, 1974), 3:700-704, 712-15, 717-20.