The Citing of Law Reviews by the Supreme Court: 1971-1999

Indiana Law Journal

Volumn 75, Issue 3, 2000, Pages 1009-1015

  Sirico Jr , Louis J ^a  

^a NONE

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 0345856619     PISSN: 00196665     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Review

References (86)

1. See Louis J. Sirico, Jr. & Jeffrey B. Margulies, The Citing of Law Reviews by the Supreme Court: An Empirical Study, 34 UCLA L. REV. 131 (1986). I later published a similar study on the citation practices of the United States Courts of Appeals and obtained roughly parallel results. See Louis J. Sirico, Jr. & Beth A. Drew, The Citing of Law Reviews by the United States Courts of Appeals: An Empirical Analysis, 45 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1051 (1991). Other empirical studies of judicial citation practices include Neil N. Bernstein, The Supreme Court and Secondary Source Material: 1965 Term, 57 GEO. L.J. 55 (1968); Joseph A. Custer, Citation Practices of the Kansas Supreme Court and Kansas Court of Appeal, 7 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 120 (1998); Wes Daniels, "Far Beyond the Law Reports": Secondary Source Citations in United States Supreme Court Opinions, October Terms 1900, 1940, and 1978, 76 L. LIBR. J. 1, 30-32 (1983); Scott Finet, The Most Frequently Cited Law Reviews and Legal Periodicals, LEGAL REFERENCE SERVICES Q., Nos. 3-4 1989, at 227; Lawrence M. Friedman et al., State Supreme Courts: A Century of Style and Citation, 33 STAN. L. REV. 773 (1981); Laura K. Justiss, A Bibliometric Study of Texas Law Reviews, 85 L. LIBR. J. 407 (1993); Richard G. Kopf, Do Judges Read the Review? A Citation-Counting Study of the Nebraska Law Review and the Nebraska Supreme Court, 1972-1996, 76 NEB. L. REV. 708 (1997); James Leonard, An Analysis of Citations to Authority in Ohio Appellate Decisions Published in 1990, 86 L. LIBR. J. 129 (1994); Douglass B. Maggs, Concerning the Extent to Which the Law Review Contributes to the Development of Court 1977: A Statistical Analysis, 15 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 39, 61 (1979); Richard A. Mann, The North Carolina Supreme Court 1977: A Statistical Analysis, 15 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 39, 61 (1979); Richard A. Mann, The Use of Legal Periodicals by Courts and Journals, 26 JURIMETRICS J. 400 (1986); William H. Manz, The Citation Practices of the New York Court of Appeals, 1850-1993, 43 BUFF. L. REV. 121 (1995); Michael McClintock, The Declining Use of Legal Scholarship by Courts: An Empirical Study, 51 OKLA. L. REV. 659 (1998); John H. Merryman, Toward a Theory of Citations: An Empirical Study of the Citation Practice of the California Supreme Court in 1950, 1960, and 1970, 50 S. CAL. L. REV. 381 (1977); Chester A. Newland, Legal Periodicals and the United States Supreme Court, 7 U. KAN. L. REV. 477, 481-82 (1959); John Scurlock, Scholarship and the Courts, 32 UMKCL. REV. 228, 232-58 (1964); Fritz Snyder, The Citation Practices of the Montana Supreme Court, 57 MONT. L. REV. 453 (1996); Bart Sloan, Note, What Are We Writing for? Student Works as Authority and Their Citation by the Federal Bench, 1986-1990, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 221 (1992).
2. See Louis J. Sirico, Jr. & Jeffrey B. Margulies, The Citing of Law Reviews by the Supreme Court: An Empirical Study, 34 UCLA L. REV. 131 (1986). I later published a similar study on the citation practices of the United States Courts of Appeals and obtained roughly parallel results. See Louis J. Sirico, Jr. & Beth A. Drew, The Citing of Law Reviews by the United States Courts of Appeals: An Empirical Analysis, 45 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1051 (1991). Other empirical studies of judicial citation practices include Neil N. Bernstein, The Supreme Court and Secondary Source Material: 1965 Term, 57 GEO. L.J. 55 (1968); Joseph A. Custer, Citation Practices of the Kansas Supreme Court and Kansas Court of Appeal, 7 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 120 (1998); Wes Daniels, "Far Beyond the Law Reports": Secondary Source Citations in United States Supreme Court Opinions, October Terms 1900, 1940, and 1978, 76 L. LIBR. J. 1, 30-32 (1983); Scott Finet, The Most Frequently Cited Law Reviews and Legal Periodicals, LEGAL REFERENCE SERVICES Q., Nos. 3-4 1989, at 227; Lawrence M. Friedman et al., State Supreme Courts: A Century of Style and Citation, 33 STAN. L. REV. 773 (1981); Laura K. Justiss, A Bibliometric Study of Texas Law Reviews, 85 L. LIBR. J. 407 (1993); Richard G. Kopf, Do Judges Read the Review? A Citation-Counting Study of the Nebraska Law Review and the Nebraska Supreme Court, 1972-1996, 76 NEB. L. REV. 708 (1997); James Leonard, An Analysis of Citations to Authority in Ohio Appellate Decisions Published in 1990, 86 L. LIBR. J. 129 (1994); Douglass B. Maggs, Concerning the Extent to Which the Law Review Contributes to the Development of Court 1977: A Statistical Analysis, 15 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 39, 61 (1979); Richard A. Mann, The North Carolina Supreme Court 1977: A Statistical Analysis, 15 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 39, 61 (1979); Richard A. Mann, The Use of Legal Periodicals by Courts and Journals, 26 JURIMETRICS J. 400 (1986); William H. Manz, The Citation Practices of the New York Court of Appeals, 1850-1993, 43 BUFF. L. REV. 121 (1995); Michael McClintock, The Declining Use of Legal Scholarship by Courts: An Empirical Study, 51 OKLA. L. REV. 659 (1998); John H. Merryman, Toward a Theory of Citations: An Empirical Study of the Citation Practice of the California Supreme Court in 1950, 1960, and 1970, 50 S. CAL. L. REV. 381 (1977); Chester A. Newland, Legal Periodicals and the United States Supreme Court, 7 U. KAN. L. REV. 477, 481-82 (1959); John Scurlock, Scholarship and the Courts, 32 UMKCL. REV. 228, 232-58 (1964); Fritz Snyder, The Citation Practices of the Montana Supreme Court, 57 MONT. L. REV. 453 (1996); Bart Sloan, Note, What Are We Writing for? Student Works as Authority and Their Citation by the Federal Bench, 1986-1990, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 221 (1992).
3. See Louis J. Sirico, Jr. & Jeffrey B. Margulies, The Citing of Law Reviews by the Supreme Court: An Empirical Study, 34 UCLA L. REV. 131 (1986). I later published a similar study on the citation practices of the United States Courts of Appeals and obtained roughly parallel results. See Louis J. Sirico, Jr. & Beth A. Drew, The Citing of Law Reviews by the United States Courts of Appeals: An Empirical Analysis, 45 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1051 (1991). Other empirical studies of judicial citation practices include Neil N. Bernstein, The Supreme Court and Secondary Source Material: 1965 Term, 57 GEO. L.J. 55 (1968); Joseph A. Custer, Citation Practices of the Kansas Supreme Court and Kansas Court of Appeal, 7 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 120 (1998); Wes Daniels, "Far Beyond the Law Reports": Secondary Source Citations in United States Supreme Court Opinions, October Terms 1900, 1940, and 1978, 76 L. LIBR. J. 1, 30-32 (1983); Scott Finet, The Most Frequently Cited Law Reviews and Legal Periodicals, LEGAL REFERENCE SERVICES Q., Nos. 3-4 1989, at 227; Lawrence M. Friedman et al., State Supreme Courts: A Century of Style and Citation, 33 STAN. L. REV. 773 (1981); Laura K. Justiss, A Bibliometric Study of Texas Law Reviews, 85 L. LIBR. J. 407 (1993); Richard G. Kopf, Do Judges Read the Review? A Citation-Counting Study of the Nebraska Law Review and the Nebraska Supreme Court, 1972-1996, 76 NEB. L. REV. 708 (1997); James Leonard, An Analysis of Citations to Authority in Ohio Appellate Decisions Published in 1990, 86 L. LIBR. J. 129 (1994); Douglass B. Maggs, Concerning the Extent to Which the Law Review Contributes to the Development of Court 1977: A Statistical Analysis, 15 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 39, 61 (1979); Richard A. Mann, The North Carolina Supreme Court 1977: A Statistical Analysis, 15 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 39, 61 (1979); Richard A. Mann, The Use of Legal Periodicals by Courts and Journals, 26 JURIMETRICS J. 400 (1986); William H. Manz, The Citation Practices of the New York Court of Appeals, 1850-1993, 43 BUFF. L. REV. 121 (1995); Michael McClintock, The Declining Use of Legal Scholarship by Courts: An Empirical Study, 51 OKLA. L. REV. 659 (1998); John H. Merryman, Toward a Theory of Citations: An Empirical Study of the Citation Practice of the California Supreme Court in 1950, 1960, and 1970, 50 S. CAL. L. REV. 381 (1977); Chester A. Newland, Legal Periodicals and the United States Supreme Court, 7 U. KAN. L. REV. 477, 481-82 (1959); John Scurlock, Scholarship and the Courts, 32 UMKCL. REV. 228, 232-58 (1964); Fritz Snyder, The Citation Practices of the Montana Supreme Court, 57 MONT. L. REV. 453 (1996); Bart Sloan, Note, What Are We Writing for? Student Works as Authority and Their Citation by the Federal Bench, 1986-1990, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 221 (1992).
4. See Louis J. Sirico, Jr. & Jeffrey B. Margulies, The Citing of Law Reviews by the Supreme Court: An Empirical Study, 34 UCLA L. REV. 131 (1986). I later published a similar study on the citation practices of the United States Courts of Appeals and obtained roughly parallel results. See Louis J. Sirico, Jr. & Beth A. Drew, The Citing of Law Reviews by the United States Courts of Appeals: An Empirical Analysis, 45 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1051 (1991). Other empirical studies of judicial citation practices include Neil N. Bernstein, The Supreme Court and Secondary Source Material: 1965 Term, 57 GEO. L.J. 55 (1968); Joseph A. Custer, Citation Practices of the Kansas Supreme Court and Kansas Court of Appeal, 7 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 120 (1998); Wes Daniels, "Far Beyond the Law Reports": Secondary Source Citations in United States Supreme Court Opinions, October Terms 1900, 1940, and 1978, 76 L. LIBR. J. 1, 30-32 (1983); Scott Finet, The Most Frequently Cited Law Reviews and Legal Periodicals, LEGAL REFERENCE SERVICES Q., Nos. 3-4 1989, at 227; Lawrence M. Friedman et al., State Supreme Courts: A Century of Style and Citation, 33 STAN. L. REV. 773 (1981); Laura K. Justiss, A Bibliometric Study of Texas Law Reviews, 85 L. LIBR. J. 407 (1993); Richard G. Kopf, Do Judges Read the Review? A Citation-Counting Study of the Nebraska Law Review and the Nebraska Supreme Court, 1972-1996, 76 NEB. L. REV. 708 (1997); James Leonard, An Analysis of Citations to Authority in Ohio Appellate Decisions Published in 1990, 86 L. LIBR. J. 129 (1994); Douglass B. Maggs, Concerning the Extent to Which the Law Review Contributes to the Development of Court 1977: A Statistical Analysis, 15 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 39, 61 (1979); Richard A. Mann, The North Carolina Supreme Court 1977: A Statistical Analysis, 15 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 39, 61 (1979); Richard A. Mann, The Use of Legal Periodicals by Courts and Journals, 26 JURIMETRICS J. 400 (1986); William H. Manz, The Citation Practices of the New York Court of Appeals, 1850-1993, 43 BUFF. L. REV. 121 (1995); Michael McClintock, The Declining Use of Legal Scholarship by Courts: An Empirical Study, 51 OKLA. L. REV. 659 (1998); John H. Merryman, Toward a Theory of Citations: An Empirical Study of the Citation Practice of the California Supreme Court in 1950, 1960, and 1970, 50 S. CAL. L. REV. 381 (1977); Chester A. Newland, Legal Periodicals and the United States Supreme Court, 7 U. KAN. L. REV. 477, 481-82 (1959); John Scurlock, Scholarship and the Courts, 32 UMKCL. REV. 228, 232-58 (1964); Fritz Snyder, The Citation Practices of the Montana Supreme Court, 57 MONT. L. REV. 453 (1996); Bart Sloan, Note, What Are We Writing for? Student Works as Authority and Their Citation by the Federal Bench, 1986-1990, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 221 (1992).
5. See Louis J. Sirico, Jr. & Jeffrey B. Margulies, The Citing of Law Reviews by the Supreme Court: An Empirical Study, 34 UCLA L. REV. 131 (1986). I later published a similar study on the citation practices of the United States Courts of Appeals and obtained roughly parallel results. See Louis J. Sirico, Jr. & Beth A. Drew, The Citing of Law Reviews by the United States Courts of Appeals: An Empirical Analysis, 45 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1051 (1991). Other empirical studies of judicial citation practices include Neil N. Bernstein, The Supreme Court and Secondary Source Material: 1965 Term, 57 GEO. L.J. 55 (1968); Joseph A. Custer, Citation Practices of the Kansas Supreme Court and Kansas Court of Appeal, 7 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 120 (1998); Wes Daniels, "Far Beyond the Law Reports": Secondary Source Citations in United States Supreme Court Opinions, October Terms 1900, 1940, and 1978, 76 L. LIBR. J. 1, 30-32 (1983); Scott Finet, The Most Frequently Cited Law Reviews and Legal Periodicals, LEGAL REFERENCE SERVICES Q., Nos. 3-4 1989, at 227; Lawrence M. Friedman et al., State Supreme Courts: A Century of Style and Citation, 33 STAN. L. REV. 773 (1981); Laura K. Justiss, A Bibliometric Study of Texas Law Reviews, 85 L. LIBR. J. 407 (1993); Richard G. Kopf, Do Judges Read the Review? A Citation-Counting Study of the Nebraska Law Review and the Nebraska Supreme Court, 1972-1996, 76 NEB. L. REV. 708 (1997); James Leonard, An Analysis of Citations to Authority in Ohio Appellate Decisions Published in 1990, 86 L. LIBR. J. 129 (1994); Douglass B. Maggs, Concerning the Extent to Which the Law Review Contributes to the Development of Court 1977: A Statistical Analysis, 15 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 39, 61 (1979); Richard A. Mann, The North Carolina Supreme Court 1977: A Statistical Analysis, 15 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 39, 61 (1979); Richard A. Mann, The Use of Legal Periodicals by Courts and Journals, 26 JURIMETRICS J. 400 (1986); William H. Manz, The Citation Practices of the New York Court of Appeals, 1850-1993, 43 BUFF. L. REV. 121 (1995); Michael McClintock, The Declining Use of Legal Scholarship by Courts: An Empirical Study, 51 OKLA. L. REV. 659 (1998); John H. Merryman, Toward a Theory of Citations: An Empirical Study of the Citation Practice of the California Supreme Court in 1950, 1960, and 1970, 50 S. CAL. L. REV. 381 (1977); Chester A. Newland, Legal Periodicals and the United States Supreme Court, 7 U. KAN. L. REV. 477, 481-82 (1959); John Scurlock, Scholarship and the Courts, 32 UMKCL. REV. 228, 232-58 (1964); Fritz Snyder, The Citation Practices of the Montana Supreme Court, 57 MONT. L. REV. 453 (1996); Bart Sloan, Note, What Are We Writing for? Student Works as Authority and Their Citation by the Federal Bench, 1986-1990, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 221 (1992).
6. See Louis J. Sirico, Jr. & Jeffrey B. Margulies, The Citing of Law Reviews by the Supreme Court: An Empirical Study, 34 UCLA L. REV. 131 (1986). I later published a similar study on the citation practices of the United States Courts of Appeals and obtained roughly parallel results. See Louis J. Sirico, Jr. & Beth A. Drew, The Citing of Law Reviews by the United States Courts of Appeals: An Empirical Analysis, 45 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1051 (1991). Other empirical studies of judicial citation practices include Neil N. Bernstein, The Supreme Court and Secondary Source Material: 1965 Term, 57 GEO. L.J. 55 (1968); Joseph A. Custer, Citation Practices of the Kansas Supreme Court and Kansas Court of Appeal, 7 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 120 (1998); Wes Daniels, "Far Beyond the Law Reports": Secondary Source Citations in United States Supreme Court Opinions, October Terms 1900, 1940, and 1978, 76 L. LIBR. J. 1, 30-32 (1983); Scott Finet, The Most Frequently Cited Law Reviews and Legal Periodicals, LEGAL REFERENCE SERVICES Q., Nos. 3-4 1989, at 227; Lawrence M. Friedman et al., State Supreme Courts: A Century of Style and Citation, 33 STAN. L. REV. 773 (1981); Laura K. Justiss, A Bibliometric Study of Texas Law Reviews, 85 L. LIBR. J. 407 (1993); Richard G. Kopf, Do Judges Read the Review? A Citation-Counting Study of the Nebraska Law Review and the Nebraska Supreme Court, 1972-1996, 76 NEB. L. REV. 708 (1997); James Leonard, An Analysis of Citations to Authority in Ohio Appellate Decisions Published in 1990, 86 L. LIBR. J. 129 (1994); Douglass B. Maggs, Concerning the Extent to Which the Law Review Contributes to the Development of Court 1977: A Statistical Analysis, 15 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 39, 61 (1979); Richard A. Mann, The North Carolina Supreme Court 1977: A Statistical Analysis, 15 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 39, 61 (1979); Richard A. Mann, The Use of Legal Periodicals by Courts and Journals, 26 JURIMETRICS J. 400 (1986); William H. Manz, The Citation Practices of the New York Court of Appeals, 1850-1993, 43 BUFF. L. REV. 121 (1995); Michael McClintock, The Declining Use of Legal Scholarship by Courts: An Empirical Study, 51 OKLA. L. REV. 659 (1998); John H. Merryman, Toward a Theory of Citations: An Empirical Study of the Citation Practice of the California Supreme Court in 1950, 1960, and 1970, 50 S. CAL. L. REV. 381 (1977); Chester A. Newland, Legal Periodicals and the United States Supreme Court, 7 U. KAN. L. REV. 477, 481-82 (1959); John Scurlock, Scholarship and the Courts, 32 UMKCL. REV. 228, 232-58 (1964); Fritz Snyder, The Citation Practices of the Montana Supreme Court, 57 MONT. L. REV. 453 (1996); Bart Sloan, Note, What Are We Writing for? Student Works as Authority and Their Citation by the Federal Bench, 1986-1990, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 221 (1992).
7. See Louis J. Sirico, Jr. & Jeffrey B. Margulies, The Citing of Law Reviews by the Supreme Court: An Empirical Study, 34 UCLA L. REV. 131 (1986). I later published a similar study on the citation practices of the United States Courts of Appeals and obtained roughly parallel results. See Louis J. Sirico, Jr. & Beth A. Drew, The Citing of Law Reviews by the United States Courts of Appeals: An Empirical Analysis, 45 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1051 (1991). Other empirical studies of judicial citation practices include Neil N. Bernstein, The Supreme Court and Secondary Source Material: 1965 Term, 57 GEO. L.J. 55 (1968); Joseph A. Custer, Citation Practices of the Kansas Supreme Court and Kansas Court of Appeal, 7 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 120 (1998); Wes Daniels, "Far Beyond the Law Reports": Secondary Source Citations in United States Supreme Court Opinions, October Terms 1900, 1940, and 1978, 76 L. LIBR. J. 1, 30-32 (1983); Scott Finet, The Most Frequently Cited Law Reviews and Legal Periodicals, LEGAL REFERENCE SERVICES Q., Nos. 3-4 1989, at 227; Lawrence M. Friedman et al., State Supreme Courts: A Century of Style and Citation, 33 STAN. L. REV. 773 (1981); Laura K. Justiss, A Bibliometric Study of Texas Law Reviews, 85 L. LIBR. J. 407 (1993); Richard G. Kopf, Do Judges Read the Review? A Citation-Counting Study of the Nebraska Law Review and the Nebraska Supreme Court, 1972-1996, 76 NEB. L. REV. 708 (1997); James Leonard, An Analysis of Citations to Authority in Ohio Appellate Decisions Published in 1990, 86 L. LIBR. J. 129 (1994); Douglass B. Maggs, Concerning the Extent to Which the Law Review Contributes to the Development of Court 1977: A Statistical Analysis, 15 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 39, 61 (1979); Richard A. Mann, The North Carolina Supreme Court 1977: A Statistical Analysis, 15 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 39, 61 (1979); Richard A. Mann, The Use of Legal Periodicals by Courts and Journals, 26 JURIMETRICS J. 400 (1986); William H. Manz, The Citation Practices of the New York Court of Appeals, 1850-1993, 43 BUFF. L. REV. 121 (1995); Michael McClintock, The Declining Use of Legal Scholarship by Courts: An Empirical Study, 51 OKLA. L. REV. 659 (1998); John H. Merryman, Toward a Theory of Citations: An Empirical Study of the Citation Practice of the California Supreme Court in 1950, 1960, and 1970, 50 S. CAL. L. REV. 381 (1977); Chester A. Newland, Legal Periodicals and the United States Supreme Court, 7 U. KAN. L. REV. 477, 481-82 (1959); John Scurlock, Scholarship and the Courts, 32 UMKCL. REV. 228, 232-58 (1964); Fritz Snyder, The Citation Practices of the Montana Supreme Court, 57 MONT. L. REV. 453 (1996); Bart Sloan, Note, What Are We Writing for? Student Works as Authority and Their Citation by the Federal Bench, 1986-1990, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 221 (1992).
8. See Louis J. Sirico, Jr. & Jeffrey B. Margulies, The Citing of Law Reviews by the Supreme Court: An Empirical Study, 34 UCLA L. REV. 131 (1986). I later published a similar study on the citation practices of the United States Courts of Appeals and obtained roughly parallel results. See Louis J. Sirico, Jr. & Beth A. Drew, The Citing of Law Reviews by the United States Courts of Appeals: An Empirical Analysis, 45 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1051 (1991). Other empirical studies of judicial citation practices include Neil N. Bernstein, The Supreme Court and Secondary Source Material: 1965 Term, 57 GEO. L.J. 55 (1968); Joseph A. Custer, Citation Practices of the Kansas Supreme Court and Kansas Court of Appeal, 7 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 120 (1998); Wes Daniels, "Far Beyond the Law Reports": Secondary Source Citations in United States Supreme Court Opinions, October Terms 1900, 1940, and 1978, 76 L. LIBR. J. 1, 30-32 (1983); Scott Finet, The Most Frequently Cited Law Reviews and Legal Periodicals, LEGAL REFERENCE SERVICES Q., Nos. 3-4 1989, at 227; Lawrence M. Friedman et al., State Supreme Courts: A Century of Style and Citation, 33 STAN. L. REV. 773 (1981); Laura K. Justiss, A Bibliometric Study of Texas Law Reviews, 85 L. LIBR. J. 407 (1993); Richard G. Kopf, Do Judges Read the Review? A Citation-Counting Study of the Nebraska Law Review and the Nebraska Supreme Court, 1972-1996, 76 NEB. L. REV. 708 (1997); James Leonard, An Analysis of Citations to Authority in Ohio Appellate Decisions Published in 1990, 86 L. LIBR. J. 129 (1994); Douglass B. Maggs, Concerning the Extent to Which the Law Review Contributes to the Development of Court 1977: A Statistical Analysis, 15 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 39, 61 (1979); Richard A. Mann, The North Carolina Supreme Court 1977: A Statistical Analysis, 15 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 39, 61 (1979); Richard A. Mann, The Use of Legal Periodicals by Courts and Journals, 26 JURIMETRICS J. 400 (1986); William H. Manz, The Citation Practices of the New York Court of Appeals, 1850-1993, 43 BUFF. L. REV. 121 (1995); Michael McClintock, The Declining Use of Legal Scholarship by Courts: An Empirical Study, 51 OKLA. L. REV. 659 (1998); John H. Merryman, Toward a Theory of Citations: An Empirical Study of the Citation Practice of the California Supreme Court in 1950, 1960, and 1970, 50 S. CAL. L. REV. 381 (1977); Chester A. Newland, Legal Periodicals and the United States Supreme Court, 7 U. KAN. L. REV. 477, 481-82 (1959); John Scurlock, Scholarship and the Courts, 32 UMKCL. REV. 228, 232-58 (1964); Fritz Snyder, The Citation Practices of the Montana Supreme Court, 57 MONT. L. REV. 453 (1996); Bart Sloan, Note, What Are We Writing for? Student Works as Authority and Their Citation by the Federal Bench, 1986-1990, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 221 (1992).
9. See Louis J. Sirico, Jr. & Jeffrey B. Margulies, The Citing of Law Reviews by the Supreme Court: An Empirical Study, 34 UCLA L. REV. 131 (1986). I later published a similar study on the citation practices of the United States Courts of Appeals and obtained roughly parallel results. See Louis J. Sirico, Jr. & Beth A. Drew, The Citing of Law Reviews by the United States Courts of Appeals: An Empirical Analysis, 45 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1051 (1991). Other empirical studies of judicial citation practices include Neil N. Bernstein, The Supreme Court and Secondary Source Material: 1965 Term, 57 GEO. L.J. 55 (1968); Joseph A. Custer, Citation Practices of the Kansas Supreme Court and Kansas Court of Appeal, 7 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 120 (1998); Wes Daniels, "Far Beyond the Law Reports": Secondary Source Citations in United States Supreme Court Opinions, October Terms 1900, 1940, and 1978, 76 L. LIBR. J. 1, 30-32 (1983); Scott Finet, The Most Frequently Cited Law Reviews and Legal Periodicals, LEGAL REFERENCE SERVICES Q., Nos. 3-4 1989, at 227; Lawrence M. Friedman et al., State Supreme Courts: A Century of Style and Citation, 33 STAN. L. REV. 773 (1981); Laura K. Justiss, A Bibliometric Study of Texas Law Reviews, 85 L. LIBR. J. 407 (1993); Richard G. Kopf, Do Judges Read the Review? A Citation-Counting Study of the Nebraska Law Review and the Nebraska Supreme Court, 1972-1996, 76 NEB. L. REV. 708 (1997); James Leonard, An Analysis of Citations to Authority in Ohio Appellate Decisions Published in 1990, 86 L. LIBR. J. 129 (1994); Douglass B. Maggs, Concerning the Extent to Which the Law Review Contributes to the Development of Court 1977: A Statistical Analysis, 15 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 39, 61 (1979); Richard A. Mann, The North Carolina Supreme Court 1977: A Statistical Analysis, 15 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 39, 61 (1979); Richard A. Mann, The Use of Legal Periodicals by Courts and Journals, 26 JURIMETRICS J. 400 (1986); William H. Manz, The Citation Practices of the New York Court of Appeals, 1850-1993, 43 BUFF. L. REV. 121 (1995); Michael McClintock, The Declining Use of Legal Scholarship by Courts: An Empirical Study, 51 OKLA. L. REV. 659 (1998); John H. Merryman, Toward a Theory of Citations: An Empirical Study of the Citation Practice of the California Supreme Court in 1950, 1960, and 1970, 50 S. CAL. L. REV. 381 (1977); Chester A. Newland, Legal Periodicals and the United States Supreme Court, 7 U. KAN. L. REV. 477, 481-82 (1959); John Scurlock, Scholarship and the Courts, 32 UMKCL. REV. 228, 232-58 (1964); Fritz Snyder, The Citation Practices of the Montana Supreme Court, 57 MONT. L. REV. 453 (1996); Bart Sloan, Note, What Are We Writing for? Student Works as Authority and Their Citation by the Federal Bench, 1986-1990, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 221 (1992).
10. See Louis J. Sirico, Jr. & Jeffrey B. Margulies, The Citing of Law Reviews by the Supreme Court: An Empirical Study, 34 UCLA L. REV. 131 (1986). I later published a similar study on the citation practices of the United States Courts of Appeals and obtained roughly parallel results. See Louis J. Sirico, Jr. & Beth A. Drew, The Citing of Law Reviews by the United States Courts of Appeals: An Empirical Analysis, 45 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1051 (1991). Other empirical studies of judicial citation practices include Neil N. Bernstein, The Supreme Court and Secondary Source Material: 1965 Term, 57 GEO. L.J. 55 (1968); Joseph A. Custer, Citation Practices of the Kansas Supreme Court and Kansas Court of Appeal, 7 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 120 (1998); Wes Daniels, "Far Beyond the Law Reports": Secondary Source Citations in United States Supreme Court Opinions, October Terms 1900, 1940, and 1978, 76 L. LIBR. J. 1, 30-32 (1983); Scott Finet, The Most Frequently Cited Law Reviews and Legal Periodicals, LEGAL REFERENCE SERVICES Q., Nos. 3-4 1989, at 227; Lawrence M. Friedman et al., State Supreme Courts: A Century of Style and Citation, 33 STAN. L. REV. 773 (1981); Laura K. Justiss, A Bibliometric Study of Texas Law Reviews, 85 L. LIBR. J. 407 (1993); Richard G. Kopf, Do Judges Read the Review? A Citation-Counting Study of the Nebraska Law Review and the Nebraska Supreme Court, 1972-1996, 76 NEB. L. REV. 708 (1997); James Leonard, An Analysis of Citations to Authority in Ohio Appellate Decisions Published in 1990, 86 L. LIBR. J. 129 (1994); Douglass B. Maggs, Concerning the Extent to Which the Law Review Contributes to the Development of Court 1977: A Statistical Analysis, 15 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 39, 61 (1979); Richard A. Mann, The North Carolina Supreme Court 1977: A Statistical Analysis, 15 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 39, 61 (1979); Richard A. Mann, The Use of Legal Periodicals by Courts and Journals, 26 JURIMETRICS J. 400 (1986); William H. Manz, The Citation Practices of the New York Court of Appeals, 1850-1993, 43 BUFF. L. REV. 121 (1995); Michael McClintock, The Declining Use of Legal Scholarship by Courts: An Empirical Study, 51 OKLA. L. REV. 659 (1998); John H. Merryman, Toward a Theory of Citations: An Empirical Study of the Citation Practice of the California Supreme Court in 1950, 1960, and 1970, 50 S. CAL. L. REV. 381 (1977); Chester A. Newland, Legal Periodicals and the United States Supreme Court, 7 U. KAN. L. REV. 477, 481-82 (1959); John Scurlock, Scholarship and the Courts, 32 UMKCL. REV. 228, 232-58 (1964); Fritz Snyder, The Citation Practices of the Montana Supreme Court, 57 MONT. L. REV. 453 (1996); Bart Sloan, Note, What Are We Writing for? Student Works as Authority and Their Citation by the Federal Bench, 1986-1990, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 221 (1992).
11. See Louis J. Sirico, Jr. & Jeffrey B. Margulies, The Citing of Law Reviews by the Supreme Court: An Empirical Study, 34 UCLA L. REV. 131 (1986). I later published a similar study on the citation practices of the United States Courts of Appeals and obtained roughly parallel results. See Louis J. Sirico, Jr. & Beth A. Drew, The Citing of Law Reviews by the United States Courts of Appeals: An Empirical Analysis, 45 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1051 (1991). Other empirical studies of judicial citation practices include Neil N. Bernstein, The Supreme Court and Secondary Source Material: 1965 Term, 57 GEO. L.J. 55 (1968); Joseph A. Custer, Citation Practices of the Kansas Supreme Court and Kansas Court of Appeal, 7 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 120 (1998); Wes Daniels, "Far Beyond the Law Reports": Secondary Source Citations in United States Supreme Court Opinions, October Terms 1900, 1940, and 1978, 76 L. LIBR. J. 1, 30-32 (1983); Scott Finet, The Most Frequently Cited Law Reviews and Legal Periodicals, LEGAL REFERENCE SERVICES Q., Nos. 3-4 1989, at 227; Lawrence M. Friedman et al., State Supreme Courts: A Century of Style and Citation, 33 STAN. L. REV. 773 (1981); Laura K. Justiss, A Bibliometric Study of Texas Law Reviews, 85 L. LIBR. J. 407 (1993); Richard G. Kopf, Do Judges Read the Review? A Citation-Counting Study of the Nebraska Law Review and the Nebraska Supreme Court, 1972-1996, 76 NEB. L. REV. 708 (1997); James Leonard, An Analysis of Citations to Authority in Ohio Appellate Decisions Published in 1990, 86 L. LIBR. J. 129 (1994); Douglass B. Maggs, Concerning the Extent to Which the Law Review Contributes to the Development of Court 1977: A Statistical Analysis, 15 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 39, 61 (1979); Richard A. Mann, The North Carolina Supreme Court 1977: A Statistical Analysis, 15 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 39, 61 (1979); Richard A. Mann, The Use of Legal Periodicals by Courts and Journals, 26 JURIMETRICS J. 400 (1986); William H. Manz, The Citation Practices of the New York Court of Appeals, 1850-1993, 43 BUFF. L. REV. 121 (1995); Michael McClintock, The Declining Use of Legal Scholarship by Courts: An Empirical Study, 51 OKLA. L. REV. 659 (1998); John H. Merryman, Toward a Theory of Citations: An Empirical Study of the Citation Practice of the California Supreme Court in 1950, 1960, and 1970, 50 S. CAL. L. REV. 381 (1977); Chester A. Newland, Legal Periodicals and the United States Supreme Court, 7 U. KAN. L. REV. 477, 481-82 (1959); John Scurlock, Scholarship and the Courts, 32 UMKCL. REV. 228, 232-58 (1964); Fritz Snyder, The Citation Practices of the Montana Supreme Court, 57 MONT. L. REV. 453 (1996); Bart Sloan, Note, What Are We Writing for? Student Works as Authority and Their Citation by the Federal Bench, 1986-1990, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 221 (1992).
12. See Louis J. Sirico, Jr. & Jeffrey B. Margulies, The Citing of Law Reviews by the Supreme Court: An Empirical Study, 34 UCLA L. REV. 131 (1986). I later published a similar study on the citation practices of the United States Courts of Appeals and obtained roughly parallel results. See Louis J. Sirico, Jr. & Beth A. Drew, The Citing of Law Reviews by the United States Courts of Appeals: An Empirical Analysis, 45 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1051 (1991). Other empirical studies of judicial citation practices include Neil N. Bernstein, The Supreme Court and Secondary Source Material: 1965 Term, 57 GEO. L.J. 55 (1968); Joseph A. Custer, Citation Practices of the Kansas Supreme Court and Kansas Court of Appeal, 7 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 120 (1998); Wes Daniels, "Far Beyond the Law Reports": Secondary Source Citations in United States Supreme Court Opinions, October Terms 1900, 1940, and 1978, 76 L. LIBR. J. 1, 30-32 (1983); Scott Finet, The Most Frequently Cited Law Reviews and Legal Periodicals, LEGAL REFERENCE SERVICES Q., Nos. 3-4 1989, at 227; Lawrence M. Friedman et al., State Supreme Courts: A Century of Style and Citation, 33 STAN. L. REV. 773 (1981); Laura K. Justiss, A Bibliometric Study of Texas Law Reviews, 85 L. LIBR. J. 407 (1993); Richard G. Kopf, Do Judges Read the Review? A Citation-Counting Study of the Nebraska Law Review and the Nebraska Supreme Court, 1972-1996, 76 NEB. L. REV. 708 (1997); James Leonard, An Analysis of Citations to Authority in Ohio Appellate Decisions Published in 1990, 86 L. LIBR. J. 129 (1994); Douglass B. Maggs, Concerning the Extent to Which the Law Review Contributes to the Development of Court 1977: A Statistical Analysis, 15 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 39, 61 (1979); Richard A. Mann, The North Carolina Supreme Court 1977: A Statistical Analysis, 15 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 39, 61 (1979); Richard A. Mann, The Use of Legal Periodicals by Courts and Journals, 26 JURIMETRICS J. 400 (1986); William H. Manz, The Citation Practices of the New York Court of Appeals, 1850-1993, 43 BUFF. L. REV. 121 (1995); Michael McClintock, The Declining Use of Legal Scholarship by Courts: An Empirical Study, 51 OKLA. L. REV. 659 (1998); John H. Merryman, Toward a Theory of Citations: An Empirical Study of the Citation Practice of the California Supreme Court in 1950, 1960, and 1970, 50 S. CAL. L. REV. 381 (1977); Chester A. Newland, Legal Periodicals and the United States Supreme Court, 7 U. KAN. L. REV. 477, 481-82 (1959); John Scurlock, Scholarship and the Courts, 32 UMKCL. REV. 228, 232-58 (1964); Fritz Snyder, The Citation Practices of the Montana Supreme Court, 57 MONT. L. REV. 453 (1996); Bart Sloan, Note, What Are We Writing for? Student Works as Authority and Their Citation by the Federal Bench, 1986-1990, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 221 (1992).
13. See Louis J. Sirico, Jr. & Jeffrey B. Margulies, The Citing of Law Reviews by the Supreme Court: An Empirical Study, 34 UCLA L. REV. 131 (1986). I later published a similar study on the citation practices of the United States Courts of Appeals and obtained roughly parallel results. See Louis J. Sirico, Jr. & Beth A. Drew, The Citing of Law Reviews by the United States Courts of Appeals: An Empirical Analysis, 45 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1051 (1991). Other empirical studies of judicial citation practices include Neil N. Bernstein, The Supreme Court and Secondary Source Material: 1965 Term, 57 GEO. L.J. 55 (1968); Joseph A. Custer, Citation Practices of the Kansas Supreme Court and Kansas Court of Appeal, 7 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 120 (1998); Wes Daniels, "Far Beyond the Law Reports": Secondary Source Citations in United States Supreme Court Opinions, October Terms 1900, 1940, and 1978, 76 L. LIBR. J. 1, 30-32 (1983); Scott Finet, The Most Frequently Cited Law Reviews and Legal Periodicals, LEGAL REFERENCE SERVICES Q., Nos. 3-4 1989, at 227; Lawrence M. Friedman et al., State Supreme Courts: A Century of Style and Citation, 33 STAN. L. REV. 773 (1981); Laura K. Justiss, A Bibliometric Study of Texas Law Reviews, 85 L. LIBR. J. 407 (1993); Richard G. Kopf, Do Judges Read the Review? A Citation-Counting Study of the Nebraska Law Review and the Nebraska Supreme Court, 1972-1996, 76 NEB. L. REV. 708 (1997); James Leonard, An Analysis of Citations to Authority in Ohio Appellate Decisions Published in 1990, 86 L. LIBR. J. 129 (1994); Douglass B. Maggs, Concerning the Extent to Which the Law Review Contributes to the Development of Court 1977: A Statistical Analysis, 15 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 39, 61 (1979); Richard A. Mann, The North Carolina Supreme Court 1977: A Statistical Analysis, 15 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 39, 61 (1979); Richard A. Mann, The Use of Legal Periodicals by Courts and Journals, 26 JURIMETRICS J. 400 (1986); William H. Manz, The Citation Practices of the New York Court of Appeals, 1850-1993, 43 BUFF. L. REV. 121 (1995); Michael McClintock, The Declining Use of Legal Scholarship by Courts: An Empirical Study, 51 OKLA. L. REV. 659 (1998); John H. Merryman, Toward a Theory of Citations: An Empirical Study of the Citation Practice of the California Supreme Court in 1950, 1960, and 1970, 50 S. CAL. L. REV. 381 (1977); Chester A. Newland, Legal Periodicals and the United States Supreme Court, 7 U. KAN. L. REV. 477, 481-82 (1959); John Scurlock, Scholarship and the Courts, 32 UMKCL. REV. 228, 232-58 (1964); Fritz Snyder, The Citation Practices of the Montana Supreme Court, 57 MONT. L. REV. 453 (1996); Bart Sloan, Note, What Are We Writing for? Student Works as Authority and Their Citation by the Federal Bench, 1986-1990, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 221 (1992).
14. See Louis J. Sirico, Jr. & Jeffrey B. Margulies, The Citing of Law Reviews by the Supreme Court: An Empirical Study, 34 UCLA L. REV. 131 (1986). I later published a similar study on the citation practices of the United States Courts of Appeals and obtained roughly parallel results. See Louis J. Sirico, Jr. & Beth A. Drew, The Citing of Law Reviews by the United States Courts of Appeals: An Empirical Analysis, 45 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1051 (1991). Other empirical studies of judicial citation practices include Neil N. Bernstein, The Supreme Court and Secondary Source Material: 1965 Term, 57 GEO. L.J. 55 (1968); Joseph A. Custer, Citation Practices of the Kansas Supreme Court and Kansas Court of Appeal, 7 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 120 (1998); Wes Daniels, "Far Beyond the Law Reports": Secondary Source Citations in United States Supreme Court Opinions, October Terms 1900, 1940, and 1978, 76 L. LIBR. J. 1, 30-32 (1983); Scott Finet, The Most Frequently Cited Law Reviews and Legal Periodicals, LEGAL REFERENCE SERVICES Q., Nos. 3-4 1989, at 227; Lawrence M. Friedman et al., State Supreme Courts: A Century of Style and Citation, 33 STAN. L. REV. 773 (1981); Laura K. Justiss, A Bibliometric Study of Texas Law Reviews, 85 L. LIBR. J. 407 (1993); Richard G. Kopf, Do Judges Read the Review? A Citation-Counting Study of the Nebraska Law Review and the Nebraska Supreme Court, 1972-1996, 76 NEB. L. REV. 708 (1997); James Leonard, An Analysis of Citations to Authority in Ohio Appellate Decisions Published in 1990, 86 L. LIBR. J. 129 (1994); Douglass B. Maggs, Concerning the Extent to Which the Law Review Contributes to the Development of Court 1977: A Statistical Analysis, 15 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 39, 61 (1979); Richard A. Mann, The North Carolina Supreme Court 1977: A Statistical Analysis, 15 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 39, 61 (1979); Richard A. Mann, The Use of Legal Periodicals by Courts and Journals, 26 JURIMETRICS J. 400 (1986); William H. Manz, The Citation Practices of the New York Court of Appeals, 1850-1993, 43 BUFF. L. REV. 121 (1995); Michael McClintock, The Declining Use of Legal Scholarship by Courts: An Empirical Study, 51 OKLA. L. REV. 659 (1998); John H. Merryman, Toward a Theory of Citations: An Empirical Study of the Citation Practice of the California Supreme Court in 1950, 1960, and 1970, 50 S. CAL. L. REV. 381 (1977); Chester A. Newland, Legal Periodicals and the United States Supreme Court, 7 U. KAN. L. REV. 477, 481-82 (1959); John Scurlock, Scholarship and the Courts, 32 UMKCL. REV. 228, 232-58 (1964); Fritz Snyder, The Citation Practices of the Montana Supreme Court, 57 MONT. L. REV. 453 (1996); Bart Sloan, Note, What Are We Writing for? Student Works as Authority and Their Citation by the Federal Bench, 1986-1990, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 221 (1992).
15. See Louis J. Sirico, Jr. & Jeffrey B. Margulies, The Citing of Law Reviews by the Supreme Court: An Empirical Study, 34 UCLA L. REV. 131 (1986). I later published a similar study on the citation practices of the United States Courts of Appeals and obtained roughly parallel results. See Louis J. Sirico, Jr. & Beth A. Drew, The Citing of Law Reviews by the United States Courts of Appeals: An Empirical Analysis, 45 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1051 (1991). Other empirical studies of judicial citation practices include Neil N. Bernstein, The Supreme Court and Secondary Source Material: 1965 Term, 57 GEO. L.J. 55 (1968); Joseph A. Custer, Citation Practices of the Kansas Supreme Court and Kansas Court of Appeal, 7 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 120 (1998); Wes Daniels, "Far Beyond the Law Reports": Secondary Source Citations in United States Supreme Court Opinions, October Terms 1900, 1940, and 1978, 76 L. LIBR. J. 1, 30-32 (1983); Scott Finet, The Most Frequently Cited Law Reviews and Legal Periodicals, LEGAL REFERENCE SERVICES Q., Nos. 3-4 1989, at 227; Lawrence M. Friedman et al., State Supreme Courts: A Century of Style and Citation, 33 STAN. L. REV. 773 (1981); Laura K. Justiss, A Bibliometric Study of Texas Law Reviews, 85 L. LIBR. J. 407 (1993); Richard G. Kopf, Do Judges Read the Review? A Citation-Counting Study of the Nebraska Law Review and the Nebraska Supreme Court, 1972-1996, 76 NEB. L. REV. 708 (1997); James Leonard, An Analysis of Citations to Authority in Ohio Appellate Decisions Published in 1990, 86 L. LIBR. J. 129 (1994); Douglass B. Maggs, Concerning the Extent to Which the Law Review Contributes to the Development of Court 1977: A Statistical Analysis, 15 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 39, 61 (1979); Richard A. Mann, The North Carolina Supreme Court 1977: A Statistical Analysis, 15 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 39, 61 (1979); Richard A. Mann, The Use of Legal Periodicals by Courts and Journals, 26 JURIMETRICS J. 400 (1986); William H. Manz, The Citation Practices of the New York Court of Appeals, 1850-1993, 43 BUFF. L. REV. 121 (1995); Michael McClintock, The Declining Use of Legal Scholarship by Courts: An Empirical Study, 51 OKLA. L. REV. 659 (1998); John H. Merryman, Toward a Theory of Citations: An Empirical Study of the Citation Practice of the California Supreme Court in 1950, 1960, and 1970, 50 S. CAL. L. REV. 381 (1977); Chester A. Newland, Legal Periodicals and the United States Supreme Court, 7 U. KAN. L. REV. 477, 481-82 (1959); John Scurlock, Scholarship and the Courts, 32 UMKCL. REV. 228, 232-58 (1964); Fritz Snyder, The Citation Practices of the Montana Supreme Court, 57 MONT. L. REV. 453 (1996); Bart Sloan, Note, What Are We Writing for? Student Works as Authority and Their Citation by the Federal Bench, 1986-1990, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 221 (1992).
16. See Louis J. Sirico, Jr. & Jeffrey B. Margulies, The Citing of Law Reviews by the Supreme Court: An Empirical Study, 34 UCLA L. REV. 131 (1986). I later published a similar study on the citation practices of the United States Courts of Appeals and obtained roughly parallel results. See Louis J. Sirico, Jr. & Beth A. Drew, The Citing of Law Reviews by the United States Courts of Appeals: An Empirical Analysis, 45 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1051 (1991). Other empirical studies of judicial citation practices include Neil N. Bernstein, The Supreme Court and Secondary Source Material: 1965 Term, 57 GEO. L.J. 55 (1968); Joseph A. Custer, Citation Practices of the Kansas Supreme Court and Kansas Court of Appeal, 7 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 120 (1998); Wes Daniels, "Far Beyond the Law Reports": Secondary Source Citations in United States Supreme Court Opinions, October Terms 1900, 1940, and 1978, 76 L. LIBR. J. 1, 30-32 (1983); Scott Finet, The Most Frequently Cited Law Reviews and Legal Periodicals, LEGAL REFERENCE SERVICES Q., Nos. 3-4 1989, at 227; Lawrence M. Friedman et al., State Supreme Courts: A Century of Style and Citation, 33 STAN. L. REV. 773 (1981); Laura K. Justiss, A Bibliometric Study of Texas Law Reviews, 85 L. LIBR. J. 407 (1993); Richard G. Kopf, Do Judges Read the Review? A Citation-Counting Study of the Nebraska Law Review and the Nebraska Supreme Court, 1972-1996, 76 NEB. L. REV. 708 (1997); James Leonard, An Analysis of Citations to Authority in Ohio Appellate Decisions Published in 1990, 86 L. LIBR. J. 129 (1994); Douglass B. Maggs, Concerning the Extent to Which the Law Review Contributes to the Development of Court 1977: A Statistical Analysis, 15 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 39, 61 (1979); Richard A. Mann, The North Carolina Supreme Court 1977: A Statistical Analysis, 15 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 39, 61 (1979); Richard A. Mann, The Use of Legal Periodicals by Courts and Journals, 26 JURIMETRICS J. 400 (1986); William H. Manz, The Citation Practices of the New York Court of Appeals, 1850-1993, 43 BUFF. L. REV. 121 (1995); Michael McClintock, The Declining Use of Legal Scholarship by Courts: An Empirical Study, 51 OKLA. L. REV. 659 (1998); John H. Merryman, Toward a Theory of Citations: An Empirical Study of the Citation Practice of the California Supreme Court in 1950, 1960, and 1970, 50 S. CAL. L. REV. 381 (1977); Chester A. Newland, Legal Periodicals and the United States Supreme Court, 7 U. KAN. L. REV. 477, 481-82 (1959); John Scurlock, Scholarship and the Courts, 32 UMKCL. REV. 228, 232-58 (1964); Fritz Snyder, The Citation Practices of the Montana Supreme Court, 57 MONT. L. REV. 453 (1996); Bart Sloan, Note, What Are We Writing for? Student Works as Authority and Their Citation by the Federal Bench, 1986-1990, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 221 (1992).
17. See Louis J. Sirico, Jr. & Jeffrey B. Margulies, The Citing of Law Reviews by the Supreme Court: An Empirical Study, 34 UCLA L. REV. 131 (1986). I later published a similar study on the citation practices of the United States Courts of Appeals and obtained roughly parallel results. See Louis J. Sirico, Jr. & Beth A. Drew, The Citing of Law Reviews by the United States Courts of Appeals: An Empirical Analysis, 45 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1051 (1991). Other empirical studies of judicial citation practices include Neil N. Bernstein, The Supreme Court and Secondary Source Material: 1965 Term, 57 GEO. L.J. 55 (1968); Joseph A. Custer, Citation Practices of the Kansas Supreme Court and Kansas Court of Appeal, 7 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 120 (1998); Wes Daniels, "Far Beyond the Law Reports": Secondary Source Citations in United States Supreme Court Opinions, October Terms 1900, 1940, and 1978, 76 L. LIBR. J. 1, 30-32 (1983); Scott Finet, The Most Frequently Cited Law Reviews and Legal Periodicals, LEGAL REFERENCE SERVICES Q., Nos. 3-4 1989, at 227; Lawrence M. Friedman et al., State Supreme Courts: A Century of Style and Citation, 33 STAN. L. REV. 773 (1981); Laura K. Justiss, A Bibliometric Study of Texas Law Reviews, 85 L. LIBR. J. 407 (1993); Richard G. Kopf, Do Judges Read the Review? A Citation-Counting Study of the Nebraska Law Review and the Nebraska Supreme Court, 1972-1996, 76 NEB. L. REV. 708 (1997); James Leonard, An Analysis of Citations to Authority in Ohio Appellate Decisions Published in 1990, 86 L. LIBR. J. 129 (1994); Douglass B. Maggs, Concerning the Extent to Which the Law Review Contributes to the Development of Court 1977: A Statistical Analysis, 15 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 39, 61 (1979); Richard A. Mann, The North Carolina Supreme Court 1977: A Statistical Analysis, 15 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 39, 61 (1979); Richard A. Mann, The Use of Legal Periodicals by Courts and Journals, 26 JURIMETRICS J. 400 (1986); William H. Manz, The Citation Practices of the New York Court of Appeals, 1850-1993, 43 BUFF. L. REV. 121 (1995); Michael McClintock, The Declining Use of Legal Scholarship by Courts: An Empirical Study, 51 OKLA. L. REV. 659 (1998); John H. Merryman, Toward a Theory of Citations: An Empirical Study of the Citation Practice of the California Supreme Court in 1950, 1960, and 1970, 50 S. CAL. L. REV. 381 (1977); Chester A. Newland, Legal Periodicals and the United States Supreme Court, 7 U. KAN. L. REV. 477, 481-82 (1959); John Scurlock, Scholarship and the Courts, 32 UMKCL. REV. 228, 232-58 (1964); Fritz Snyder, The Citation Practices of the Montana Supreme Court, 57 MONT. L. REV. 453 (1996); Bart Sloan, Note, What Are We Writing for? Student Works as Authority and Their Citation by the Federal Bench, 1986-1990, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 221 (1992).
18. See Louis J. Sirico, Jr. & Jeffrey B. Margulies, The Citing of Law Reviews by the Supreme Court: An Empirical Study, 34 UCLA L. REV. 131 (1986). I later published a similar study on the citation practices of the United States Courts of Appeals and obtained roughly parallel results. See Louis J. Sirico, Jr. & Beth A. Drew, The Citing of Law Reviews by the United States Courts of Appeals: An Empirical Analysis, 45 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1051 (1991). Other empirical studies of judicial citation practices include Neil N. Bernstein, The Supreme Court and Secondary Source Material: 1965 Term, 57 GEO. L.J. 55 (1968); Joseph A. Custer, Citation Practices of the Kansas Supreme Court and Kansas Court of Appeal, 7 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 120 (1998); Wes Daniels, "Far Beyond the Law Reports": Secondary Source Citations in United States Supreme Court Opinions, October Terms 1900, 1940, and 1978, 76 L. LIBR. J. 1, 30-32 (1983); Scott Finet, The Most Frequently Cited Law Reviews and Legal Periodicals, LEGAL REFERENCE SERVICES Q., Nos. 3-4 1989, at 227; Lawrence M. Friedman et al., State Supreme Courts: A Century of Style and Citation, 33 STAN. L. REV. 773 (1981); Laura K. Justiss, A Bibliometric Study of Texas Law Reviews, 85 L. LIBR. J. 407 (1993); Richard G. Kopf, Do Judges Read the Review? A Citation-Counting Study of the Nebraska Law Review and the Nebraska Supreme Court, 1972-1996, 76 NEB. L. REV. 708 (1997); James Leonard, An Analysis of Citations to Authority in Ohio Appellate Decisions Published in 1990, 86 L. LIBR. J. 129 (1994); Douglass B. Maggs, Concerning the Extent to Which the Law Review Contributes to the Development of Court 1977: A Statistical Analysis, 15 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 39, 61 (1979); Richard A. Mann, The North Carolina Supreme Court 1977: A Statistical Analysis, 15 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 39, 61 (1979); Richard A. Mann, The Use of Legal Periodicals by Courts and Journals, 26 JURIMETRICS J. 400 (1986); William H. Manz, The Citation Practices of the New York Court of Appeals, 1850-1993, 43 BUFF. L. REV. 121 (1995); Michael McClintock, The Declining Use of Legal Scholarship by Courts: An Empirical Study, 51 OKLA. L. REV. 659 (1998); John H. Merryman, Toward a Theory of Citations: An Empirical Study of the Citation Practice of the California Supreme Court in 1950, 1960, and 1970, 50 S. CAL. L. REV. 381 (1977); Chester A. Newland, Legal Periodicals and the United States Supreme Court, 7 U. KAN. L. REV. 477, 481-82 (1959); John Scurlock, Scholarship and the Courts, 32 UMKCL. REV. 228, 232-58 (1964); Fritz Snyder, The Citation Practices of the Montana Supreme Court, 57 MONT. L. REV. 453 (1996); Bart Sloan, Note, What Are We Writing for? Student Works as Authority and Their Citation by the Federal Bench, 1986-1990, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 221 (1992).
19. See Louis J. Sirico, Jr. & Jeffrey B. Margulies, The Citing of Law Reviews by the Supreme Court: An Empirical Study, 34 UCLA L. REV. 131 (1986). I later published a similar study on the citation practices of the United States Courts of Appeals and obtained roughly parallel results. See Louis J. Sirico, Jr. & Beth A. Drew, The Citing of Law Reviews by the United States Courts of Appeals: An Empirical Analysis, 45 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1051 (1991). Other empirical studies of judicial citation practices include Neil N. Bernstein, The Supreme Court and Secondary Source Material: 1965 Term, 57 GEO. L.J. 55 (1968); Joseph A. Custer, Citation Practices of the Kansas Supreme Court and Kansas Court of Appeal, 7 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 120 (1998); Wes Daniels, "Far Beyond the Law Reports": Secondary Source Citations in United States Supreme Court Opinions, October Terms 1900, 1940, and 1978, 76 L. LIBR. J. 1, 30-32 (1983); Scott Finet, The Most Frequently Cited Law Reviews and Legal Periodicals, LEGAL REFERENCE SERVICES Q., Nos. 3-4 1989, at 227; Lawrence M. Friedman et al., State Supreme Courts: A Century of Style and Citation, 33 STAN. L. REV. 773 (1981); Laura K. Justiss, A Bibliometric Study of Texas Law Reviews, 85 L. LIBR. J. 407 (1993); Richard G. Kopf, Do Judges Read the Review? A Citation-Counting Study of the Nebraska Law Review and the Nebraska Supreme Court, 1972-1996, 76 NEB. L. REV. 708 (1997); James Leonard, An Analysis of Citations to Authority in Ohio Appellate Decisions Published in 1990, 86 L. LIBR. J. 129 (1994); Douglass B. Maggs, Concerning the Extent to Which the Law Review Contributes to the Development of Court 1977: A Statistical Analysis, 15 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 39, 61 (1979); Richard A. Mann, The North Carolina Supreme Court 1977: A Statistical Analysis, 15 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 39, 61 (1979); Richard A. Mann, The Use of Legal Periodicals by Courts and Journals, 26 JURIMETRICS J. 400 (1986); William H. Manz, The Citation Practices of the New York Court of Appeals, 1850-1993, 43 BUFF. L. REV. 121 (1995); Michael McClintock, The Declining Use of Legal Scholarship by Courts: An Empirical Study, 51 OKLA. L. REV. 659 (1998); John H. Merryman, Toward a Theory of Citations: An Empirical Study of the Citation Practice of the California Supreme Court in 1950, 1960, and 1970, 50 S. CAL. L. REV. 381 (1977); Chester A. Newland, Legal Periodicals and the United States Supreme Court, 7 U. KAN. L. REV. 477, 481-82 (1959); John Scurlock, Scholarship and the Courts, 32 UMKCL. REV. 228, 232-58 (1964); Fritz Snyder, The Citation Practices of the Montana Supreme Court, 57 MONT. L. REV. 453 (1996); Bart Sloan, Note, What Are We Writing for? Student Works as Authority and Their Citation by the Federal Bench, 1986-1990, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 221 (1992).
20. See Louis J. Sirico, Jr. & Jeffrey B. Margulies, The Citing of Law Reviews by the Supreme Court: An Empirical Study, 34 UCLA L. REV. 131 (1986). I later published a similar study on the citation practices of the United States Courts of Appeals and obtained roughly parallel results. See Louis J. Sirico, Jr. & Beth A. Drew, The Citing of Law Reviews by the United States Courts of Appeals: An Empirical Analysis, 45 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1051 (1991). Other empirical studies of judicial citation practices include Neil N. Bernstein, The Supreme Court and Secondary Source Material: 1965 Term, 57 GEO. L.J. 55 (1968); Joseph A. Custer, Citation Practices of the Kansas Supreme Court and Kansas Court of Appeal, 7 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 120 (1998); Wes Daniels, "Far Beyond the Law Reports": Secondary Source Citations in United States Supreme Court Opinions, October Terms 1900, 1940, and 1978, 76 L. LIBR. J. 1, 30-32 (1983); Scott Finet, The Most Frequently Cited Law Reviews and Legal Periodicals, LEGAL REFERENCE SERVICES Q., Nos. 3-4 1989, at 227; Lawrence M. Friedman et al., State Supreme Courts: A Century of Style and Citation, 33 STAN. L. REV. 773 (1981); Laura K. Justiss, A Bibliometric Study of Texas Law Reviews, 85 L. LIBR. J. 407 (1993); Richard G. Kopf, Do Judges Read the Review? A Citation-Counting Study of the Nebraska Law Review and the Nebraska Supreme Court, 1972-1996, 76 NEB. L. REV. 708 (1997); James Leonard, An Analysis of Citations to Authority in Ohio Appellate Decisions Published in 1990, 86 L. LIBR. J. 129 (1994); Douglass B. Maggs, Concerning the Extent to Which the Law Review Contributes to the Development of Court 1977: A Statistical Analysis, 15 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 39, 61 (1979); Richard A. Mann, The North Carolina Supreme Court 1977: A Statistical Analysis, 15 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 39, 61 (1979); Richard A. Mann, The Use of Legal Periodicals by Courts and Journals, 26 JURIMETRICS J. 400 (1986); William H. Manz, The Citation Practices of the New York Court of Appeals, 1850-1993, 43 BUFF. L. REV. 121 (1995); Michael McClintock, The Declining Use of Legal Scholarship by Courts: An Empirical Study, 51 OKLA. L. REV. 659 (1998); John H. Merryman, Toward a Theory of Citations: An Empirical Study of the Citation Practice of the California Supreme Court in 1950, 1960, and 1970, 50 S. CAL. L. REV. 381 (1977); Chester A. Newland, Legal Periodicals and the United States Supreme Court, 7 U. KAN. L. REV. 477, 481-82 (1959); John Scurlock, Scholarship and the Courts, 32 UMKCL. REV. 228, 232-58 (1964); Fritz Snyder, The Citation Practices of the Montana Supreme Court, 57 MONT. L. REV. 453 (1996); Bart Sloan, Note, What Are We Writing for? Student Works as Authority and Their Citation by the Federal Bench, 1986-1990, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 221 (1992).
21. See Sirico & Margulies, supra note 1, at 132-34.
22. See id. at 134-35.
23. See id. at 135-36.
24. See id. at 136-37.
25. The Supreme Court terms run from October to July. Thus, the 1991-93 survey period runs from October 1991 to the end of the term in July 1994.
26. Appendix III, infra, most graphically shows these results.
27. See Sirico & Margulies, supra note 1, at 132 n.3.
28. We counted citations only in memorandum opinions, including concurring opinions and dissents. On the difficulties of counting citations electronically, see McClintock, supra note 1, at 684. For purposes of consistency, we counted a citation only when the citation included the name of the law journal. For example, we would not count an "id." In the Supreme Court opinions, there are very few short forms of citations referring to law journals.
29. Our results are corroborated by a more modest study, McClintock, supra note 1, at 682-95 (using three two-year survey periods and conducting an electronic search of 40 law journals).
30. In descending order of frequency (1981-83), they were the Harvard Law Review, Columbia Law Review, Yale Law Journal, University of Chicago Law Review, Michigan Law Review, University of Pennsylvania Law Review, California Law Review, Virginia Law Review, and New York University Law Review. In this latter period, the Stanford Law Review tied the New York University Law Review for ninth place. In 1971-73, the Stanford Law Review tied for 11th place with the Georgetown Law Journal. See infra Appendix III.
31. In descending order of frequency (1991-93), they were the Harvard Law Review, Columbia Law Review, Yale Law Journal, University of Chicago Law Review, California Law Review, University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Michigan Law Review, and Virginia Law Review. The Stanford Law Review, ranking 11th in 1971- 73, ranked 8th. See infra Appendix III.
32. In descending order of frequency, they were the Harvard Law Review, Yale Law Journal, Columbia Law Review, Michigan Law Review, University of Chicago Law Review, and Virginia Law Review. The Stanford Law Review and the Cornell Law Review tied for seventh place, and the Duke Law Journal and the Vanderbilt Law Review tied for ninth place. None of these four journals were among the top nine in 1971-73. They ranked 11th, 29th, 22nd, and 18th, respectively. See infra Appendix III.
33. For authority for this information and for the information in the rest of this paragraph, see infra Appendix III.
34. See Sirico & Margulies, supra note 1, at 133-34; Sirico & Drew, supra note 1, at 1055.
35. See Sirico & Margulies, supra note 1, at 133-34; Sirico & Drew, supra note 1, at 1055.
36. See infra Appendix III.
37. For a defense of this judicial philosophy, see CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT (1999). Debates over the value of academic legal scholarship and the function of law reviews have yielded an extensive literature - too much to include in a bibliographic footnote. The germinal articles are Fred Rodell, Goodbye to Law Reviews, 23 VA. L. REV. 38 (1936); Fred Rodell, Goodbye to Law Reviews - Revisited, 48 VA. L. REV. 279 (1962). In the current literature, some of the most prominent contributions are Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal Profession, 91 MICH. L. REV. 34 (1992); Kenneth Lasson, Scholarship Amok: Excesses in the Pursuit of Truth and Tenure, 103 HARV. L. REV. 926 (1990); James Lindgren, An Author's Manifesto, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 527 (1994); Michael J. Saks et al., Is There a Growing Gap Among Law, Law Practice, and Legal Scholarship?: A Systematic Comparison of Law Review Articles One Generation Apart, 30 SUFFOLK L. REV. 353 (1996); Special Issue, Law Review Conference, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1117 (1995); Max Steir et al., Law Review Usage and Suggestions for Improvement: A Survey of Attorneys, Professors, and Judges, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1467 (1992); Jean R. Sternlight, Symbiotic Legal Theory and Legal Practice: Advocating a Common Jurisprudence of Law and Practical Applications, 50 U. MIAMI L. REV. 707 (1996); Symposium, Trends in Legal Citations and Scholarship, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 742 (1996).
38. For a defense of this judicial philosophy, see CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT (1999). Debates over the value of academic legal scholarship and the function of law reviews have yielded an extensive literature - too much to include in a bibliographic footnote. The germinal articles are Fred Rodell, Goodbye to Law Reviews, 23 VA. L. REV. 38 (1936); Fred Rodell, Goodbye to Law Reviews - Revisited, 48 VA. L. REV. 279 (1962). In the current literature, some of the most prominent contributions are Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal Profession, 91 MICH. L. REV. 34 (1992); Kenneth Lasson, Scholarship Amok: Excesses in the Pursuit of Truth and Tenure, 103 HARV. L. REV. 926 (1990); James Lindgren, An Author's Manifesto, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 527 (1994); Michael J. Saks et al., Is There a Growing Gap Among Law, Law Practice, and Legal Scholarship?: A Systematic Comparison of Law Review Articles One Generation Apart, 30 SUFFOLK L. REV. 353 (1996); Special Issue, Law Review Conference, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1117 (1995); Max Steir et al., Law Review Usage and Suggestions for Improvement: A Survey of Attorneys, Professors, and Judges, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1467 (1992); Jean R. Sternlight, Symbiotic Legal Theory and Legal Practice: Advocating a Common Jurisprudence of Law and Practical Applications, 50 U. MIAMI L. REV. 707 (1996); Symposium, Trends in Legal Citations and Scholarship, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 742 (1996).
39. For a defense of this judicial philosophy, see CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT (1999). Debates over the
40. For a defense of this judicial philosophy, see CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT (1999). Debates over the value of academic legal scholarship and the function of law reviews have yielded an extensive literature - too much to include in a bibliographic footnote. The germinal articles are Fred Rodell, Goodbye to Law Reviews, 23 VA. L. REV. 38 (1936); Fred Rodell, Goodbye to Law Reviews - Revisited, 48 VA. L. REV. 279 (1962). In the current literature, some of the most prominent contributions are Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal Profession, 91 MICH. L. REV. 34 (1992); Kenneth Lasson, Scholarship Amok: Excesses in the Pursuit of Truth and Tenure, 103 HARV. L. REV. 926 (1990); James Lindgren, An Author's Manifesto, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 527 (1994); Michael J. Saks et al., Is There a Growing Gap Among Law, Law Practice, and Legal Scholarship?: A Systematic Comparison of Law Review Articles One Generation Apart, 30 SUFFOLK L. REV. 353 (1996); Special Issue, Law Review Conference, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1117 (1995); Max Steir et al., Law Review Usage and Suggestions for Improvement: A Survey of Attorneys, Professors, and Judges, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1467 (1992); Jean R. Sternlight, Symbiotic Legal Theory and Legal Practice: Advocating a Common Jurisprudence of Law and Practical Applications, 50 U. MIAMI L. REV. 707 (1996); Symposium, Trends in Legal Citations and Scholarship, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 742 (1996).
41. For a defense of this judicial philosophy, see CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT (1999). Debates over the value of academic legal scholarship and the function of law reviews have yielded an extensive literature - too much to include in a bibliographic footnote. The germinal articles are Fred Rodell, Goodbye to Law Reviews, 23 VA. L. REV. 38 (1936); Fred Rodell, Goodbye to Law Reviews - Revisited, 48 VA. L. REV. 279 (1962). In the current literature, some of the most prominent contributions are Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal Profession, 91 MICH. L. REV. 34 (1992); Kenneth Lasson, Scholarship Amok: Excesses in the Pursuit of Truth and Tenure, 103 HARV. L. REV. 926 (1990); James Lindgren, An Author's Manifesto, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 527 (1994); Michael J. Saks et al., Is There a Growing Gap Among Law, Law Practice, and Legal Scholarship?: A Systematic Comparison of Law Review Articles One Generation Apart, 30 SUFFOLK L. REV. 353 (1996); Special Issue, Law Review Conference, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1117 (1995); Max Steir et al., Law Review Usage and Suggestions for Improvement: A Survey of Attorneys, Professors, and Judges, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1467 (1992); Jean R. Sternlight, Symbiotic Legal Theory and Legal Practice: Advocating a Common Jurisprudence of Law and Practical Applications, 50 U. MIAMI L. REV. 707 (1996); Symposium, Trends in Legal Citations and Scholarship, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 742 (1996).
42. For a defense of this judicial philosophy, see CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT (1999). Debates over the value of academic legal scholarship and the function of law reviews have yielded an extensive literature - too much to include in a bibliographic footnote. The germinal articles are Fred Rodell, Goodbye to Law Reviews, 23 VA. L. REV. 38 (1936); Fred Rodell, Goodbye to Law Reviews - Revisited, 48 VA. L. REV. 279 (1962). In the current literature, some of the most prominent contributions are Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal Profession, 91 MICH. L. REV. 34 (1992); Kenneth Lasson, Scholarship Amok: Excesses in the Pursuit of Truth and Tenure, 103 HARV. L. REV. 926 (1990); James Lindgren, An Author's Manifesto, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 527 (1994); Michael J. Saks et al., Is There a Growing Gap Among Law, Law Practice, and Legal Scholarship?: A Systematic Comparison of Law Review Articles One Generation Apart, 30 SUFFOLK L. REV. 353 (1996); Special Issue, Law Review Conference, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1117 (1995); Max Steir et al., Law Review Usage and Suggestions for Improvement: A Survey of Attorneys, Professors, and Judges, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1467 (1992); Jean R. Sternlight, Symbiotic Legal Theory and Legal Practice: Advocating a Common Jurisprudence of Law and Practical Applications, 50 U. MIAMI L. REV. 707 (1996); Symposium, Trends in Legal Citations and Scholarship, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 742 (1996).
43. For a defense of this judicial philosophy, see CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT (1999). Debates over the value of academic legal scholarship and the function of law reviews have yielded an extensive literature - too much to include in a bibliographic footnote. The germinal articles are Fred Rodell, Goodbye to Law Reviews, 23 VA. L. REV. 38 (1936); Fred Rodell, Goodbye to Law Reviews - Revisited, 48 VA. L. REV. 279 (1962). In the current literature, some of the most prominent contributions are Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal Profession, 91 MICH. L. REV. 34 (1992); Kenneth Lasson, Scholarship Amok: Excesses in the Pursuit of Truth and Tenure, 103 HARV. L. REV. 926 (1990); James Lindgren, An Author's Manifesto, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 527 (1994); Michael J. Saks et al., Is There a Growing Gap Among Law, Law Practice, and Legal Scholarship?: A Systematic Comparison of Law Review Articles One Generation Apart, 30 SUFFOLK L. REV. 353 (1996); Special Issue, Law Review Conference, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1117 (1995); Max Steir et al., Law Review Usage and Suggestions for Improvement: A Survey of Attorneys, Professors, and Judges, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1467 (1992); Jean R. Sternlight, Symbiotic Legal Theory and Legal Practice: Advocating a Common Jurisprudence of Law and Practical Applications, 50 U. MIAMI L. REV. 707 (1996); Symposium, Trends in Legal Citations and Scholarship, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 742 (1996).
44. For a defense of this judicial philosophy, see CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT (1999). Debates over the value of academic legal scholarship and the function of law reviews have yielded an extensive literature - too much to include in a bibliographic footnote. The germinal articles are Fred Rodell, Goodbye to Law Reviews, 23 VA. L. REV. 38 (1936); Fred Rodell, Goodbye to Law Reviews - Revisited, 48 VA. L. REV. 279 (1962). In the current literature, some of the most prominent contributions are Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal Profession, 91 MICH. L. REV. 34 (1992); Kenneth Lasson, Scholarship Amok: Excesses in the Pursuit of Truth and Tenure, 103 HARV. L. REV. 926 (1990); James Lindgren, An Author's Manifesto, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 527 (1994); Michael J. Saks et al., Is There a Growing Gap Among Law, Law Practice, and Legal Scholarship?: A Systematic Comparison of Law Review Articles One Generation Apart, 30 SUFFOLK L. REV. 353 (1996); Special Issue, Law Review Conference, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1117 (1995); Max Steir et al., Law Review Usage and Suggestions for Improvement: A Survey of Attorneys, Professors, and Judges, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1467 (1992); Jean R. Sternlight, Symbiotic Legal Theory and Legal Practice: Advocating a Common Jurisprudence of Law and Practical Applications, 50 U. MIAMI L. REV. 707 (1996); Symposium, Trends in Legal Citations and Scholarship, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 742 (1996).
45. For a defense of this judicial philosophy, see CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT (1999). Debates over the value of academic legal scholarship and the function of law reviews have yielded an extensive literature - too much to include in a bibliographic footnote. The germinal articles are Fred Rodell, Goodbye to Law Reviews, 23 VA. L. REV. 38 (1936); Fred Rodell, Goodbye to Law Reviews - Revisited, 48 VA. L. REV. 279 (1962). In the current literature, some of the most prominent contributions are Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal Profession, 91 MICH. L. REV. 34 (1992); Kenneth Lasson, Scholarship Amok: Excesses in the Pursuit of Truth and Tenure, 103 HARV. L. REV. 926 (1990); James Lindgren, An Author's Manifesto, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 527 (1994); Michael J. Saks et al., Is There a Growing Gap Among Law, Law Practice, and Legal Scholarship?: A Systematic Comparison of Law Review Articles One Generation Apart, 30 SUFFOLK L. REV. 353 (1996); Special Issue, Law Review Conference, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1117 (1995); Max Steir et al., Law Review Usage and Suggestions for Improvement: A Survey of Attorneys, Professors, and Judges, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1467 (1992); Jean R. Sternlight, Symbiotic Legal Theory and Legal Practice: Advocating a Common Jurisprudence of Law and Practical Applications, 50 U. MIAMI L. REV. 707 (1996); Symposium, Trends in Legal Citations and Scholarship, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 742 (1996).
46. For a defense of this judicial philosophy, see CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT (1999). Debates over the value of academic legal scholarship and the function of law reviews have yielded an extensive literature - too much to include in a bibliographic footnote. The germinal articles are Fred Rodell, Goodbye to Law Reviews, 23 VA. L. REV. 38 (1936); Fred Rodell, Goodbye to Law Reviews - Revisited, 48 VA. L. REV. 279 (1962). In the current literature, some of the most prominent contributions are Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal Profession, 91 MICH. L. REV. 34 (1992); Kenneth Lasson, Scholarship Amok: Excesses in the Pursuit of Truth and Tenure, 103 HARV. L. REV. 926 (1990); James Lindgren, An Author's Manifesto, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 527 (1994); Michael J. Saks et al., Is There a Growing Gap Among Law, Law Practice, and Legal Scholarship?: A Systematic Comparison of Law Review Articles One Generation Apart, 30 SUFFOLK L. REV. 353 (1996); Special Issue, Law Review Conference, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1117 (1995); Max Steir et al., Law Review Usage and Suggestions for Improvement: A Survey of Attorneys, Professors, and Judges, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1467 (1992); Jean R. Sternlight, Symbiotic Legal Theory and Legal Practice: Advocating a Common Jurisprudence of Law and Practical Applications, 50 U. MIAMI L. REV. 707 (1996); Symposium, Trends in Legal Citations and Scholarship, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 742 (1996).
47. For a defense of this judicial philosophy, see CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT (1999). Debates over the value of academic legal scholarship and the function of law reviews have yielded an extensive literature - too much to include in a bibliographic footnote. The germinal articles are Fred Rodell, Goodbye to Law Reviews, 23 VA. L. REV. 38 (1936); Fred Rodell, Goodbye to Law Reviews - Revisited, 48 VA. L. REV. 279 (1962). In the current literature, some of the most prominent contributions are Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal Profession, 91 MICH. L. REV. 34 (1992); Kenneth Lasson, Scholarship Amok: Excesses in the Pursuit of Truth and Tenure, 103 HARV. L. REV. 926 (1990); James Lindgren, An Author's Manifesto, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 527 (1994); Michael J. Saks et al., Is There a Growing Gap Among Law, Law Practice, and Legal Scholarship?: A Systematic Comparison of Law Review Articles One Generation Apart, 30 SUFFOLK L. REV. 353 (1996); Special Issue, Law Review Conference, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1117 (1995); Max Steir et al., Law Review Usage and Suggestions for Improvement: A Survey of Attorneys, Professors, and Judges, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1467 (1992); Jean R. Sternlight, Symbiotic Legal Theory and Legal Practice: Advocating a Common Jurisprudence of Law and Practical Applications, 50 U. MIAMI L. REV. 707 (1996); Symposium, Trends in Legal Citations and Scholarship, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 742 (1996).
48. Another question is whether legal scholarship really has grown more theoretical and less practical over the years. In an interesting study, Professor Michael Saks and his colleagues compared two samples of nonstudent law journal articles from nonspecialized law school publications from two periods: 1960 and 1985. See Saks et al., supra note 17, at 361. According to the reviewers, the utility of the articles from one period to another increased most visibly to scholars and "by a marginally significant amount" to judges and legislators; there was "no statistically detectable change" in utility for practitioners. Id. at 369. They found the 1980 articles more critical of existing law and more theoretical, particularly among the elite journals. See id. at 370-71. Yet, as the authors point out, with the proliferation of law journals, there has been an increase in the number of practical articles. See id. The authors conclude: "The top-quintile journals seem to have increasingly become the province of legal scholars and the most experimental kind of scholarship and less a forum for exchanges among legal scholars, practitioners, and judges." Id, at 374. They suggest that if courts look beyond the elite journals, they will find articles that are more useful and more worthy of citation. See id.
49. Another question is whether legal scholarship really has grown more theoretical and less practical over the years. In an interesting study, Professor Michael Saks and his colleagues compared two samples of nonstudent law journal articles from nonspecialized law school publications from two periods: 1960 and 1985. See Saks et al., supra note 17, at 361. According to the reviewers, the utility of the articles from one period to another increased most visibly to scholars and "by a marginally significant amount" to judges and legislators; there was "no statistically detectable change" in utility for practitioners. Id. at 369. They found the 1980 articles more critical of existing law and more theoretical, particularly among the elite journals. See id. at 370-71. Yet, as the authors point out, with the proliferation of law journals, there has been an increase in the number of practical articles. See id. The authors conclude: "The top-quintile journals seem to have increasingly become the province of legal scholars and the most experimental kind of scholarship and less a forum for exchanges among legal scholars, practitioners, and judges." Id, at 374. They suggest that if courts look beyond the elite journals, they will find articles that are more useful and more worthy of citation. See id.
50. Another question is whether legal scholarship really has grown more theoretical and less practical over the years. In an interesting study, Professor Michael Saks and his colleagues compared two samples of nonstudent law journal articles from nonspecialized law school publications from two periods: 1960 and 1985. See Saks et al., supra note 17, at 361. According to the reviewers, the utility of the articles from one period to another increased most visibly to scholars and "by a marginally significant amount" to judges and legislators; there was "no statistically detectable change" in utility for practitioners. Id. at 369. They found the 1980 articles more critical of existing law and more theoretical, particularly among the elite journals. See id. at 370-71. Yet, as the authors point out, with the proliferation of law journals, there has been an increase in the number of practical articles. See id. The authors conclude: "The top-quintile journals seem to have increasingly become the province of legal scholars and the most experimental kind of scholarship and less a forum for exchanges among legal scholars, practitioners, and judges." Id, at 374. They suggest that if courts look beyond the elite journals, they will find articles that are more useful and more worthy of citation. See id.
51. Another question is whether legal scholarship really has grown more theoretical and less practical over the years. In an interesting study, Professor Michael Saks and his colleagues compared two samples of nonstudent law journal articles from nonspecialized law school publications from two periods: 1960 and 1985. See Saks et al., supra note 17, at 361. According to the reviewers, the utility of the articles from one period to another increased most visibly to scholars and "by a marginally significant amount" to judges and legislators; there was "no statistically detectable change" in utility for practitioners. Id. at 369. They found the 1980 articles more critical of existing law and more theoretical, particularly among the elite journals. See id. at 370-71. Yet, as the authors point out, with the proliferation of law journals, there has been an increase in the number of practical articles. See id. The authors conclude: "The top-quintile journals seem to have increasingly become the province of legal scholars and the most experimental kind of scholarship and less a forum for exchanges among legal scholars, practitioners, and judges." Id, at 374. They suggest that if courts look beyond the elite journals, they will find articles that are more useful and more worthy of citation. See id.
52. Another question is whether legal scholarship really has grown more theoretical and less practical over the years. In an interesting study, Professor Michael Saks and his colleagues compared two samples of nonstudent law journal articles from nonspecialized law school publications from two periods: 1960 and 1985. See Saks et al., supra note 17, at 361. According to the reviewers, the utility of the articles from one period to another increased most visibly to scholars and "by a marginally significant amount" to judges and legislators; there was "no statistically detectable change" in utility for practitioners. Id. at 369. They found the 1980 articles more critical of existing law and more theoretical, particularly among the elite journals. See id. at 370-71. Yet, as the authors point out, with the proliferation of law journals, there has been an increase in the number of practical articles. See id. The authors conclude: "The top-quintile journals seem to have increasingly become the province of legal scholars and the most experimental kind of scholarship and less a forum for exchanges among legal scholars, practitioners, and judges." Id, at 374. They suggest that if courts look beyond the elite journals, they will find articles that are more useful and more worthy of citation. See id.
53. Another question is whether legal scholarship really has grown more theoretical and less practical over the years. In an interesting study, Professor Michael Saks and his colleagues compared two samples of nonstudent law journal articles from nonspecialized law school publications from two periods: 1960 and 1985. See Saks et al., supra note 17, at 361. According to the reviewers, the utility of the articles from one period to another increased most visibly to scholars and "by a marginally significant amount" to judges and legislators; there was "no statistically detectable change" in utility for practitioners. Id. at 369. They found the 1980 articles more critical of existing law and more theoretical, particularly among the elite journals. See id. at 370-71. Yet, as the authors point out, with the proliferation of law journals, there has been an increase in the number of practical articles. See id. The authors conclude: "The top-quintile journals seem to have increasingly become the province of legal scholars and the most experimental kind of scholarship and less a forum for exchanges among legal scholars, practitioners, and judges." Id, at 374. They suggest that if courts look beyond the elite journals, they will find articles that are more useful and more worthy of citation. See id.
54. Included in the count are only those per curiam opinions more than a few lines long.
55. There were 963 law journal citations in 1115 opinions. In arriving at the number of opinions, we relied on the calculations appearing in the Harvard Law Review's annual report on the most recent Supreme Court term in a section entitled "The Statistics." See The Supreme Court, 1971 Term, 86 HARV. L. REV. 52, 297 (1972); The Supreme Court, 1972 Term, 87 HARV. L. REV. 57, 303 (1973); The Supreme Court, 1973 Term, 88 HARV. L. REV. 43, 274 (1974).
56. There were 963 law journal citations in 1115 opinions. In arriving at the number of opinions, we relied on the calculations appearing in the Harvard Law Review's annual report on the most recent Supreme Court term in a section entitled "The Statistics." See The Supreme Court, 1971 Term, 86 HARV. L. REV. 52, 297 (1972); The Supreme Court, 1972 Term, 87 HARV. L. REV. 57, 303 (1973); The Supreme Court, 1973 Term, 88 HARV. L. REV. 43, 274 (1974).
57. There were 963 law journal citations in 1115 opinions. In arriving at the number of opinions, we relied on the calculations appearing in the Harvard Law Review's annual report on the most recent Supreme Court term in a section entitled "The Statistics." See The Supreme Court, 1971 Term, 86 HARV. L. REV. 52, 297 (1972); The Supreme Court, 1972 Term, 87 HARV. L. REV. 57, 303 (1973); The Supreme Court, 1973 Term, 88 HARV. L. REV. 43, 274 (1974).
58. There were 767 law journal citations in 1127 opinions. In arriving at the number of opinions, we relied on the calculations appearing in the Harvard Law Review's annual report on the most recent Supreme Court term in a section entitled "The Statistics." The Supreme Court, 1981 Term, 96 HARV. L. REV. 62, 304 (1982); The Supreme Court, 1982 Term, 97 HARV. L. REV. 70, 295 (1983); The Supreme Court, 1983 Term, 98 HARV. L. REV. 87, 307 (1984).
59. There were 767 law journal citations in 1127 opinions. In arriving at the number of opinions, we relied on the calculations appearing in the Harvard Law Review's annual report on the most recent Supreme Court term in a section entitled "The Statistics." The Supreme Court, 1981 Term, 96 HARV. L. REV. 62, 304 (1982); The Supreme Court, 1982 Term, 97 HARV. L. REV. 70, 295 (1983); The Supreme Court, 1983 Term, 98 HARV. L. REV. 87, 307 (1984).
60. There were 767 law journal citations in 1127 opinions. In arriving at the number of opinions, we relied on the calculations appearing in the Harvard Law Review's annual report on the most recent Supreme Court term in a section entitled "The Statistics." The Supreme Court, 1981 Term, 96 HARV. L. REV. 62, 304 (1982); The Supreme Court, 1982 Term, 97 HARV. L. REV. 70, 295 (1983); The Supreme Court, 1983 Term, 98 HARV. L. REV. 87, 307 (1984).
61. There were 577 law journal citations in 772 opinions. In arriving at the number of opinions, we relied on the calculations appearing in the Harvard Law Review's annual report on the most recent Supreme Court term in a section entitled "The Statistics." See The Supreme Court, 1991 Term, 106 HARV. L. REV. 163, 378 (1991); The Supreme Court, 1992 Term, 107 HARV. L. REV. 144, 372 (1993); The Supreme Court, 1993 Term, 108 HARV. L. REV. 139, 372 (1994).
62. There were 577 law journal citations in 772 opinions. In arriving at the number of opinions, we relied on the calculations appearing in the Harvard Law Review's annual report on the most recent Supreme Court term in a section entitled "The Statistics." See The Supreme Court, 1991 Term, 106 HARV. L. REV. 163, 378 (1991); The Supreme Court, 1992 Term, 107 HARV. L. REV. 144, 372 (1993); The Supreme Court, 1993 Term, 108 HARV. L. REV. 139, 372 (1994).
63. There were 577 law journal citations in 772 opinions. In arriving at the number of opinions, we relied on the calculations appearing in the Harvard Law Review's annual report on the most recent Supreme Court term in a section entitled "The Statistics." See The Supreme Court, 1991 Term, 106 HARV. L. REV. 163, 378 (1991); The Supreme Court, 1992 Term, 107 HARV. L. REV. 144, 372 (1993); The Supreme Court, 1993 Term, 108 HARV. L. REV. 139, 372 (1994).
64. There were 271 law journal citations in 579 opinions. In arriving at the number of opinions, we relied on the calculations appearing in the Harvard Law Review's annual report on the most recent Supreme Court term in a section entitled "The Statistics." See The Supreme Court, 1996 Term, 111 HARV. L. REV. 51, 431 (1997); The Supreme Court, 1997 Term, 112 HARV. L. REV. 122, 366 (1998). For the 1998 term, we calculated our own statistics.
65. There were 271 law journal citations in 579 opinions. In arriving at the number of opinions, we relied on the calculations appearing in the Harvard Law Review's annual report on the most recent Supreme Court term in a section entitled "The Statistics." See The Supreme Court, 1996 Term, 111 HARV. L. REV. 51, 431 (1997); The Supreme Court, 1997 Term, 112 HARV. L. REV. 122, 366 (1998). For the 1998 term, we calculated our own statistics.
66. See Sirico & Margulies, supra note 1, at 134-35.
67. Unfortunately, we do not have comparable statistics for the other survey periods.
68. See infra Appendix III. If we calculate the number of citations to the Harvard Law Review per full opinion - counting separately the majority, plurality, per curiam, concurring, and dissenting opinions - there would be 0.152 citations per opinion in the 1971-73 terms, 0.102 citations per opinion in the 1981-83 terms, 0.088 citations per opinion in the 1991-93 terms, and 0.052 citations per opinion in the 1996-98 terms. For the number of citations to the Harvard Law Review, see infra Appendix III. For the calculation of the number of written opinions per term, see supra notes 20-23.
69. See infra Appendices VIII, IX, X.
70. See supra text accompanying note 21.
71. See infra Appendix VIII.
72. See infra Appendix IX.
73. See infra Appendix X.
74. See infra Appendix VIII.
75. See infra Appendix IX; supra note 18.
76. See infra Appendix VIII.
77. See infra Appendix IX.
78. See infra Appendix X.
79. See supra note 18.
80. See infra Appendix V. During the 1971-73 period, the Court cited the UCLA Law Review once. See id. In 1981-83, the Court cited it seven times. See infra Appendix III. In 1991-93, the Court cited it 12 times. See id. In 1996-98, the Court cited it four times. See id.
81. See infra Appendices VI, VII. In 1981-83, the Court cited the Boston College Law Review once. See infra Appendix VI. In 1991-93, the Court cited it once. See infra Appendix VII. In 1996-98, the Court cited it four times. See id. Of course, dealing with such small numbers permits calculating dramatic percentages. In an era of declining citations, it is noteworthy when a journal continues to enjoy roughly the same number of citations during most of the survey periods. Among the top journals, this group includes the California Law Review, Cornell Law Review, Duke Law Journal, and Vanderbilt Law Review. See infra Appendix III.
82. For a graphic presentation of these statistics, see infra Appendices XI, XII. These statistics use the date on the spine of the journal volume as the date of publication. Because journals are regularly published late, the Court relies on recent articles even more than these numbers suggest. We found consistent results in a study of the citation practices of the United States Courts of Appeals. See Sirico & Drew, supra note 1, at 1055-56, 1060. Our findings are also consistent with the citation practices in other scholarly fields. See James Leonard, Seein' the Cites: A Guided Tour of Citation Patterns in Recent American Law Review Articles, 34 ST. Louis U. L.J. 181, 204-05 (1990).
83. For a graphic presentation of these statistics, see infra Appendices XI, XII. These statistics use the date on the spine of the journal volume as the date of publication. Because journals are regularly published late, the Court relies on recent articles even more than these numbers suggest. We found consistent results in a study of the citation practices of the United States Courts of Appeals. See Sirico & Drew, supra note 1, at 1055-56, 1060. Our findings are also consistent with the citation practices in other scholarly fields. See James Leonard, Seein' the Cites: A Guided Tour of Citation Patterns in Recent American Law Review Articles, 34 ST. Louis U. L.J. 181, 204-05 (1990).
84. A corroborating study is Deborah J. Merritt & Melanie Putnam, Judges and Scholars: Do Courts and Scholarly Journals Cite the Same Law Review Articles?, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 871 (1996). It compared the articles most frequently cited by state and federal courts with articles most frequently cited by scholarly journals and found that the two groups of articles diverged dramatically. See id. at 880. According to the study, the two groups differ in four respects: subject matter, scholarly perspective, average prestige of the journals in which they are published, and certain characteristics of the authors (the law schools from which they graduated and whether they held named professorships or chairs). See id. at 897.
85. A corroborating study is Deborah J. Merritt & Melanie Putnam, Judges and Scholars: Do Courts and Scholarly Journals Cite the Same Law Review Articles?, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 871 (1996). It compared the articles most frequently cited by state and federal courts with articles most frequently cited by scholarly journals and found that the two groups of articles diverged dramatically. See id. at 880. According to the study, the two groups differ in four respects: subject matter, scholarly perspective, average prestige of the journals in which they are published, and certain characteristics of the authors (the law schools from which they graduated and whether they held named professorships or chairs). See id. at 897.
86. A corroborating study is Deborah J. Merritt & Melanie Putnam, Judges and Scholars: Do Courts and Scholarly Journals Cite the Same Law Review Articles?, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 871 (1996). It compared the articles most frequently cited by state and federal courts with articles most frequently cited by scholarly journals and found that the two groups of articles diverged dramatically. See id. at 880. According to the study, the two groups differ in four respects: subject matter, scholarly perspective, average prestige of the journals in which they are published, and certain characteristics of the authors (the law schools from which they graduated and whether they held named professorships or chairs). See id. at 897.