An Example of Dynamic (In)Consistency in Symmetric Extensive Form Evolutionary Games

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 30, Issue 2, 2000, Pages 319-326

  Chamberland, Marc ^a   Cressman, Ross ^b  

^a GRINNELL COLLEGE   (United States)

^b WILFRID LAURIER UNIVERSITY   (Canada)

Author keywords

Dynamic stability; Evolutionary games; Extensive form

Indexed keywords

EID: 0345851373     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/game.1999.0716     Document Type: Article

References (11)

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