The Supreme Court in a postmodern world: A flying elephant

Minnesota Law Review

Volumn 84, Issue 3, 2000, Pages 673-711

  Feldman, Stephen M ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TULSA   (United States)

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EID: 0345772813     PISSN: 00265535     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
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References (269)

1. DR. SEUSS, ONE FISH, TWO FISH, RED FISH, BLUE FISH 9 (1960).
2. DUMBO (Walt Disney 1941).
3. Some sources that helpfully discuss modernism include the following: ZYGMUNT BAUMAN, MODERNITY AND THE HOLOCAUST (1989);
4. RICHARD J. BERNSTEIN, BEYOND OBJECTIVISM AND RELATIVISM: SCIENCE, HERMENEUTICS, AND PRAXIS (1983);
5. HANS BLUMENBERG, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE MODERN AGE (Robert M. Wallace trans., 1983) (2d rev. ed. 1976);
6. LOUIS DUPRÉ, PASSAGE TO MODERNITY: AN ESSAY IN THE HERMENEUTICS OF NATURE AND CULTURE (1993);
7. RITA FELSKI, THE GENDER OF MODERNITY (1995);
8. KARL LÖWITH, MEANING IN HISTORY (1949);
9. TED V. MCALLISTER, REVOLT AGAINST MODERNITY (1996);
10. J.G.A. POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT (1975);
11. RICHARD H. POPKIN, THE HISTORY OF SCEPTICISM FROM ERASMUS TO SPINOZA (1979);
12. RICHARD RORTY, PHILOSOPHY AND THE MIRROR OF NATURE (1979);
13. RICHARD TARNAS, THE PASSION OF THE WESTERN MIND (1991);
14. STEPHEN TOULMIN, COSMOPOLIS: THE HIDDEN AGENDA OF MODERNITY (1990);
15. ERIC VOEGELIN, THE NEW SCIENCE OF POLITICS (1952).
16. For discussions of American legal modernism, see Stephen M. Feldman, From Modernism to Postmodernism in American Legal Thought: The Significance of the Warren Court, in THE WARREN COURT: A RETROSPECTIVE 324 (Bernard Schwartz ed., 1996)
17. [hereinafter Feldman, From Modernism],
18. Stephen M. Feldman, From Premodern to Modern American Jurisprudence: The Onset of Positivism, 50 VAND. L. REV. 1387 (1997)
19. [hereinafter Feldman, The Onset].
20. See Feldman, From Modernism, supra note 4, at 329-44;
21. Robert W. Gordon, American Law Through English Eyes: A Century of Nightmares and Noble Dreams, 84 GEO. L.J. 2215, 2218 (1996)
22. (reviewing NEIL DUXBURY, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE (1995)).
23. See generally Pierre Schlag, Law and Phrenology, 110 HARV. L. REV. 877 (1997).
24. See BERNSTEIN, supra note 3, at 16-20 (discussing the "Cartesian Anxiety" in Western philosophy).
25. Some helpful sources focusing on postmodernism include the following: ZYGMUNT BAUMAN, INTIMATIONS OF POSTMODERNITY (1992);
26. STEVEN CONNOR, POSTMODERNIST CULTURE (1989);
27. FEMINISM/POSTMODERNISM (Linda J. Nicholson ed., 1990);
28. NANCY FRASER, UNRULY PRACTICES: POWER, DISCOURSE, AND GENDER IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIAL THEORY (1989);
29. DAVID HARVEY, THE CONDITION OF POSTMODERNITY (1990);
30. ROBERT HOLLINGER, POSTMODERNISM AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES (1994);
31. FREDRIC JAMESON, POSTMODERNISM, OR, THE CULTURAL LOGIC OF LATE CAPITALISM (1991);
32. BARBARA KRUGER, REMOTE CONTROL: POWER, CULTURES, AND THE WORLD OF APPEARANCES (1993);
33. JEAN-FRANÇOIS LYOTARD, THE POSTMODERN CONDITION: A REPORT ON KNOWLEDGE (Geoff Bennington & Brian Massumi trans., Univ. of Minn. Press 1984);
34. CHRISTOPHER NORRIS, WHAT'S WRONG WITH POSTMODERNISM (1990);
35. POSTMODERNISM AND SOCIETY (Roy Boyne & Ali Rattansi eds., 1990).
36. For discussions of postmodern legal scholarship, see generally Stephen M. Feldman, Diagnosing Power: Postmodernism in Legal Scholarship and Judicial Practice (with an Emphasis on the Teague Rule Against New Rules in Habeas Corpus Cases), 88 NW. U. L. REV. 1046 (1994)
37. [hereinafter Feldman, Diagnosing Power],
38. Stephen M. Feldman, The Persistence of Power and the Struggle for Dialogic Standards in Postmodern Constitutional Jurisprudence: Michelman, Habermas, and Civic Republicanism, 81 GEO. L.J. 2243 (1993),
39. Stephen M. Feldman, Playing With the Pieces: Postmodernism in the Lawyer's Toolbox, 85 VA. L. REV. 151 (1999)
40. [hereinafter Feldman, Playing],
41. and Stephen M. Feldman, The Politics of Postmodern Jurisprudence, 95 MICH. L. REV. 166 (1996)
42. [hereinafter Feldman, Politics].
43. I will discuss the relationships among premodern, modern, and post-modern legal thought more extensively in STEPHEN M. FELDMAN, AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT FROM PREMODERNISM TO POSTMODERNISM: AN INTELLECTUAL VOYAGE (forthcoming Mar. 2000).
44. For samples of postmodern legal scholarship, see generally DRUCILLA CORNELL, BEYOND ACCOMMODATION (1991),
45. STANLEY FISH, DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY (1989);
46. J.M. Balkin, What Is a Postmodern Constitutionalism?, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1966 (1992),
47. James Boyle, Is Subjectivity Possible? The Post-Modern Subject in Legal Theory, 62 U. COLO. L. REV. 489 (1991),
48. Anthony D'Amato, Aspects of Deconstruction: The "Easy Case" of the Under-aged President, 84 Nw. U. L. REV. 250 (1989),
49. Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Why Do We Tell the Same Stories?: Law Reform, Critical Librarianship, and the Triple Helix Dilemma, 42 STAN. L. REV. 207 (1989),
50. Tracy E. Higgins, "By Reason of Their Sex": Feminist Theory, Postmodernism, and Justice, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1536 (1995),
51. Robert Justin Lipkin, Can American Constitutional Law Be Postmodern?, 42 BUFF. L. REV. 317 (1994),
52. Francis J. Mootz, III, Postmodern Constitutionalism as Materialism, 91 MICH. L. REV. 515 (1992),
53. Dennis Patterson, Postmodernism/Feminism/Law, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 254 (1992),
54. Peter C. Schanck, Understanding Postmodern Thought and Its Implications for Statutory Interpretation, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 2505, 2508-09 (1992),
55. Pierre Schlag, Normative and Nowhere to Go, 43 STAN. L. REV. 167 (1990),
56. Joan C. Williams, Rorty, Radicalism, Romanticism: The Politics of the Gaze, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 131.
57. See Feldman, Playing, supra note 8, at 151-52.
58. Jean Baudrillard writes: "All that remains to be done is to play with the pieces. Playing with the pieces - that is post-modern." Id. at 151
59. (citing Jean Baudrillard, Game With Vestiges, 5 ON BEACH 19, 24 (1984)).
60. See, e.g., STEPHEN M. FELDMAN, PLEASE DON'T WISH ME A MERRY CHRISTMAS: A CRITICAL HISTORY OF THE SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE (1997)
61. (presenting a critical social narrative of the separation of church and state). It is worth noting, moreover, that different postmodernists often use the term "play" in different ways. See Feldman, Politics, supra note 8, at 185 & n.92 (distinguishing Gadamer's and Derrida's respective uses of the term "play").
62. Mark V. Tushnet, A Republican Chief Justice, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1326, 1328 (1990);
63. see Laura K Ray, A Law Clerk and His Justice: What William Rehnquist Did Not Learn from Robert Jackson, 29 IND. L. REV. 535, 568-69 (1996)
64. (emphasizing Rehnquist's predictability). Tushnet acknowledges, however, that "much the same could be said of almost all of [Rehnquist's] colleagues, with the obvious changes in reference to the platform of the other party in the appropriate cases." Tushnet, supra, at 1328. With regard to Rehnquist, Sue Davis has argued otherwise. See SUE DAVIS, JUSTICE REHNQUIST AND THE CONSTITUTION 36-37, 204-05 (1989).
65. See infra notes 17-64 and accompanying text.
66. See infra notes 65-145 and accompanying text.
67. See infra notes 146-65 and accompanying text.
68. Useful sources on American history, including jurisprudential and legal history, include the following: NEIL DUXBURY, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE (1995);
69. DAVID J. GARROW, LIBERTY AND SEXUALITY: THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY AND THE MAKING OF ROE v. WADE (1994); GODFREY HODGSON, AMERICA IN OUR TIME (1976);
70. RICHARD HOFSTADTER, ANTI-INTELLECTUALISM IN AMERICAN LIFE (1962);
71. LAURA KALMAN, THE STRANGE CAREER OF LEGAL LIBERALISM (1996);
72. GARY MINDA, POSTMODERN LEGAL MOVEMENTS (1995);
73. PETER NOVICK, THAT NOBLE DREAM: THE "OBJECTIVITY QUESTION" AND THE AMERICAN HISTORICAL PROFESSION (1988);
74. JAMES T. PATTERSON, GRAND EXPECTATIONS: THE UNITED STATES, 1945-1974 (1996);
75. BERNARD SCHWARTZ, A HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT (1993);
76. HOWARD ZINN, A PEOPLE'S HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES (1980);
77. Thomas Bender, Politics, Intellect, and the American University, 1945-1995, 126 DAEDULUS 1 (1997);
78. Robert W. Gordon, The Case For (and Against) Harvard, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1231 (1995);
79. Thomas C. Grey, Modern American Legal Thought, 106 YALE L.J. 493 (1996).
80. See, e.g., HODGSON, supra note 17, at 67.
81. See, e.g., id. at 68.
82. Id. at 16.
83. See id. at 157.
84. See id. at 157-58.
85. PATTERSON, supra note 17, at 451.
86. Id. at 452.
87. HODGSON, supra note 17, at 492.
88. See id. at 185.
89. Martin Luther King, Jr., Pilgrimage to Nonviolence, in A TESTAMENT OF HOPE: THE ESSENTIAL WRITINGS OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. 35, 36 (James M. Washington ed., 1986) [hereinafter A TESTAMENT OF HOPE].
90. For a historical overview of the Civil Rights Movement, see generally DAVID J. GARROW, BEARING THE CROSS: MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., AND THE SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE (1986),
91. ROBERT WEISBROT, FREEDOM BOUND: A HISTORY OF AMERICA'S CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT (1990).
92. See also ZINN, supra note 17, at 440-59.
93. Martin Luther King, Jr., An Address Before the National Press Club, in A TESTAMENT OF HOPE, supra note 27, at 99, 103.
94. For a brief summary of King's views, see Stephen M. Feldman, Whose Common Good? Racism in the Political Community, 80 GEO. L.J. 1835, 1866-76 (1992).
95. King, supra note 28, at 103.
96. See HODGSON, supra note 17, at 186-87.
97. Id. at 189.
98. Id.
99. Martin Luther King, Jr., I Have A Dream, in A TESTAMENT OF HOPE, supra note 27, at 219.
100. Malcolm X, The Ballot or the Bullet, in MALCOLM X SPEAKS 23, 26 (George Breitman ed., 1965) (quoting from a talk given by Malcolm X in Cleveland on April 3, 1964).
101. On the relation between King and Malcolm X, see generally JAMES H. CONE, MARTIN AND MALCOLM AND AMERICA (1991).
102. See HODGSON, supra note 17, at 200.
103. See id. (quoting Malcolm X). For a discussion of the Kennedy Administration's role in the March, see id. at 157, 196-97; PATTERSON, supra note 17, at 482-83; ZINN, supra note 17, at 448-49.
104. HODGSON, supra note 17, at 200.
105. See id. at 266.
106. See id. at 224.
107. See id. at 179. On the emergence of the Black Power movement, see GARROW, supra note 17, at 481-525, and WEISBROT, supra note 27, at 196-221.
108. See PATTERSON, supra note 17, at 452.
109. See id.
110. See id.
111. Id. at 453.
112. See HODGSON, supra note 17, at 365, 492; MINDA, supra note 17, at 66; NOVICK, supra note 17, at 415; PATTERSON, supra note 17, at 452-53; see also Mark Tushnet & Katya Lezin, What Really Happened in Brown v. Board of Education, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1867, 1867 (1991) (discussing rights-consciousness).
113. Richard A. Posner, The Decline of Law as an Autonomous Discipline: 1962-1987, 100 HARV. L. REV. 761, 766 (1987).
114. See id. at 769; see also KALMAN, supra note 17, at 239-40 (emphasizing a "collapse of consensus"). Compare GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? 110-56 (1991) (noting that Brown impeded the Civil Rights Movement by inflaming Southern racists, who were able to delay political changes)
115. Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Racial Change, and the Civil Rights Movement, 80 VA. L. REV. 7, 150 (1994) (noting that Brown indirectly aided the Civil Rights Movement by generating violent Southern resistance which in turn aroused apathetic Northern whites to support political change),
116. with RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 758-61 (1975) (arguing that although Brown alone did not change America, it was the central element in social change).
117. Mark Tushnet argues that the Warren Court itself contributed to the dissolution of the Great Society agenda and thus undermined the Court's own legacy. See Mark Tushnet, The Warren Court as History: An Interpretation, in THE WARREN COURT IN HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL PERSPECTIVE 1, 19-21 (Mark Tushnet ed., 1993). For example, the Court's reapportionment decisions shifted political power from conservative rural areas to cities, where the larger populations initially resided. See id. Population growth then shifted to the more conservative and Republican suburbs, however. See id.
118. See Donna Possum, Women Law Professors, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 903, 905-06; Grey, supra note 17, at 505.
119. KALMAN, supra note 17, at 61.
120. Fossum, supra note 48, at 914.
121. See id. at 906 (giving statistics on the number of women law faculty members); see also Bender, supra note 17, at 4-5, 28-29 (discussing the changing demographics since World War II in university professoriates generally).
122. Richard Delgado, Shadowboxing: An Essay on Power, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 813, 818 (1992)
123. (citing Jean Stefancic & Richard Delgado, Outsider Jurisprudence and the Electronic Revolution: Will Technology Help or Hinder the Cause of Law Reform?, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 847 (1991)
124. Mari Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323 (1987)).
125. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
126. See, e.g., DERRICK A. BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIAL JUSTICE 251-54 (1987) (suggesting that the Constitution and American society can be transformed to eliminate economic oppression);
127. Anthony E. Cook, Beyond Critical Legal Studies: The Reconstructive Theology of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., 103 HARV. L. REV. 985, 1015-21 (1990)
128. (proposing that religion both legitimated and delegitimated authority for African-American slaves). But cf. BELL, supra, at 22 (arguing that guarantees of racial equality are transformed into devices to perpetuate the racial status quo). For a discussion of the relationship between the law and social inequities, see JEROLD S. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN MODERN AMERICA 263-306 (1976)
129. Gary Minda, Jurisprudence at Century's End, 43 J. LEGAL EDUC. 27, 35 (1993).
130. For examples of various kinds of outsider jurisprudence, see RUTHANN ROBSON, LESBIAN (OUT)LAW: SURVIVAL UNDER THE RULE OF LAW (1992),
131. PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS (1991),
132. Kathryn Abrams, Hearing the Call of Stories, 79 CAL. L. REV. 971 (1991),
133. Patricia A. Cain, Litigating for Lesbian and Gay Rights: A Legal History, 79 VA. L. REV. 1551 (1993),
134. Ruth Colker, An EmbodCan Two Real Men Eat Quiche Together? Storytelling, Gender-Role Stereotypes, and Legal Protection for Lesbians and Gay Men, 46 U. MIAMI L. REV. 511 (1992).
135. I will offer a more comprehensive exploration of the factors contributing to the emergence of postmodern legal scholarship in a forthcoming book on the history of American legal thought. See FELDMAN, supra note 9; see also Feldman, From Modernism, supra note 4, at 346-52 (focusing on the role of the Warren Court in pushing legal scholarship toward postmodernism).
136. See CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN'S DEVELOPMENT 1-4 (1982) (using the term "different voice" to describe a feminine ethic).
137. Patricia J. Williams, Alchemical Notes: Reconstructing Ideals from Deconstructed Rights, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 401, 410-11 (1987);
138. see Alvin Kernan, Change in the Humanities and Higher Education, in WHAT'S HAPPENED TO THE HUMANITIES? 3, 5-6 (Alvin Kernan ed., 1997) (arguing that a "paradigm shift in higher education" has occurred due to changes in university demographics).
139. The use of narrative and storytelling is an important development of outsider jurisprudence that manifests and reinforces postmodern themes. See BELL, supra note 54 (emphasizing the role of storytelling); Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Sixth Chronicle: Intersections, Essences, and the Dilemma of Social Reform, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 639 (1993) (portraying fictitious conversations between a law professor and student as prototypical examples of storytelling);
140. Richard Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for Narrative, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2411 (1989) (examining the use of story-telling in the struggle for racial reform);
141. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Gaylegal Narratives, 46 STAN. L. REV. 607, 607-08 (1994) (characterizing traditional modernist legal scholarship as a type of storytelling).
142. Robert Cover was one of the first legal scholars to suggest that "law and narrative are inseparably related." Robert M. Cover, Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 5 (1983).
143. For a more extended discussion of postmodern themes in legal scholarship, see Feldman, Diagnosing Power, supra note 8, at 1084-1104.
144. See LOUIS MICHAEL SEIDMAN & MARK V. TUSHNET, REMNANTS OF BELIEF: CONTEMPORARY CONSTITOTIONAL ISSUES 32-34 (1996) (evaluating criticisms of the rights of contract and property as understood in American law).
145. See id. at 23 (emphasizing the importance of a "plausible nonconstitutional baseline of natural rights" during the pre-New Deal era); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION 2-4 (1993) (arguing that the current status quo often is taken as a baseline);
146. Feldman, The Onset, supra note 4, at 1394-1417 (discussing premodern legal science of the nineteenth century as characterized by a belief in natural law principles).
147. See MINDA, supra note 17, at 189-246 (summarizing postmodern jurisprudence); Feldman, From Modernism, supra note 4, at 346-52 (discussing the movement in legal thought from modernism to postmodernism).
148. See, e.g., Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Images of the Outsider in American Law and Culture: Can Free Expression Remedy Systemic Social Ills?, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1258 (1992) (focusing on free speech and the majority's depiction of minority groups in America);
149. Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987) (focusing on the requirement of intent for striking down facially neutral laws under the Equal Protection Clause).
150. In Democracy and Distrust, published in 1980, John Hart Ely persuasively criticized almost every constitutional theory that had been proposed to that time.
151. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980). In turn, Ely's own theory, representation reinforcement, was expeditiously repudiated by others.
152. See, e.g., Paul Brest, The Substance of Process, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 131 (1981) (supporting fundamental values review and criticizing representation reinforcement review);
153. Richard Davies Parker, The Past of Constitutional Theory - And Its Future, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 223 (1981) (evaluating the "conventional" and "new" constitutional theories).
154. Tushnet, supra note 13, at 1328.
155. Paul F. Campos, Advocacy and Scholarship, 81 CAL. L. REV. 817, 855 (1993).
156. Id. at 856; see SEIDMAN & TUSHNET, supra note 59, at 23 ("[T]he impediments to good constitutional argument are structural rather than personal . . . ."); cf. id. at 90 (arguing that current constitutional argument "is almost always divisive").
157. 505 U.S. 833, 1002 (1992).
158. See id. at 844-53.
159. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 116 (1973).
160. Id.
161. Casey, 505 U.S. at 849.
162. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 789 (1997) (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment). Souter attributes the idea of reasoned judgment to Justice Harlan. See id. at 769 (citing Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542-44 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting)). An examination of Harlan's dissent in Poe reveals, however, that while Harlan discusses reason and judgment, he does not use the term "reasoned judgment." See Poe, 367 U.S. at 542-44 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
163. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 854-69.
164. See id. at 869-70.
165. See id. at 854-61.
166. See id.
167. Id. at 864 (emphasis added).
168. Steven Connor observes: In trying to understand our contemporary selves in the moment of the present, there are no safely-detached observation-posts, not in "science," "religion," or even in "history." We are in and of the moment that we are attempting to analyse, in and of the structures we employ to analyse it. One might almost say that this terminal self-consciousness . . . is what characterizes our contemporary or "post-modern" moment.
169. CONNOR, supra note 7, at 5; cf. Morton J. Horwitz, Foreword: The Constitution of Change: Legal Fundamentality Without Fundamentalism, 107 HARV. L. REV. 30, 36-37 (1993) (emphasizing the joint opinion's "highly self-conscious discussion of the question of judicial legitimacy").
170. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 864-69. The Casey Court suggested that over-ruling Roe v. Wade would severely undermine its "legitimacy" in the eyes of the public. See id. at 865.
171. 491 U.S. 397, 420 (1989).
172. See Stephen M. Feldman, Republican Revival/Interpretive Turn, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 679, 725 (discussing the effects of Texas v. Johnson). The decision in Johnson led to national calls for the prohibition of flag desecration pursuant to either a constitutional amendment or a federal statute that would pass constitutional muster.
173. See id. at 725-27. In October 1989, Congress enacted a statute, The Flag Protection Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-131, 103 Stat. 777 (1989), which the Court eventually held to be unconstitutional. See United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 312 (1990).
174. See Johnson, 491 U.S. at 421-22 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (suggesting that the unique position of the flag as a symbol of our nation may justify its protection).
175. Id. at 422.
176. See id. at 423.
177. See id. at 424-25.
178. Id. Rehnquist has used unusual or bizarre references and quotations in other cases. See, e.g., Church of Scientology v. IRS, 484 U.S. 9, 17-18 (1987) (referring to Sir Arthur Conan Doyle's "dog that didn't bark").
179. See Johnson, 491 U.S. at 424-25. 88. 415 U.S. 566, 582 (1974). Goguen had been convicted for violating the Massachusetts law when he "wore a small cloth version of the United States flag sewn to the seat of his trousers." Id. at 568.
180. See id. at 602 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Rehnquist refers to the poetry of John Greenleaf Whittier and Ralph Waldo Emerson, and musical works by John Phillip Sousa, George M. Cohan, and Francis Scott Key. See id.; infra note 92.
181. See 415 U.S. at 601.
182. See id. at 602.
183. In Smith v. Goguen, after the quotation from Emerson, Rehnquist wrote: Oliver Wendell Holmes, Senior, celebrated the flag that had flown on "Old Ironsides" during the War of 1812, and John Greenleaf Whittier made Barbara Frietchie's devotion to the "silken scarf" in the teeth of Stonewall Jackson's ominous threats the central theme of his familiar poem. John Philip Sousa's "Stars and Stripes Forever"
184. George M. Cohan's "It's a Grand Old Flag" are musical celebrations of the flag familiar to adults and children alike.
185. Francis Scott Key's "Star Spangled Banner" is the country's national anthem. Id. at 602 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
186. 523 U.S. 833 (1998).
187. See id. at 836-39.
188. See id. at 854-55.
189. See id. at 860-65 (Scalia, J., concurring).
190. See id. at 860-62.
191. Id. at 846-49, 852-55.
192. See id. at 860-62; Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-22 (1997).
193. See Lewis, 523 U.S. at 860-61 (Scalia, J., concurring).
194. Id. at 861 (paraphrasing Cole Porter, You're the Top (1934),
195. reprinted in THE COMPLETE LYRICS OF COLE PORTER 169 (Robert Kimball ed., 1983)). In a footnote, Scalia added: "For those unfamiliar with classical music, I note that the exemplars of excellence in the text are borrowed from Cole Porter's 'You're the Top,' copyright 1934." Id. at 861 n.1 (Scalia, J., concurring). In Clinton v. City of New York, which held the Line Item Veto Act unconstitutional, Scalia's concurring and dissenting opinion referred to President Nixon as "the Mahatma Ghandi of all impounders." 524 U.S. 417, 468 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring and dissenting). In light of Scalia's use of the same phrase, "the Mahatma Ghandi," in his Lewis concurrence - where he expressly paraphrased Cole Porter and connoted that something was the ultimate or the highest - Scalia apparently meant something similar in the line item veto case. That is, Scalia meant to suggest that Nixon was the ultimate or greatest impounder. For another unusual passage from Scalia, see United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 601-03 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (providing a lengthy quotation from the Virginia Military Institute's The Code of a Gentleman).
196. On pastiche, see JAMESON, supra note 7, at 16, and Sanford Levinson & J.M. Balkin, Law, Music, and Other Performing Arts, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1597, 1639-40 (1991).
197. See Philip Bobbitt, Is Law Politics?, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1233, 1303 (1989);
198. see also generally PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE (1982);
199. PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (1991).
200. Ronald KL. Collins, Outlaw Jurisprudence?, 76 TEX. L. REV. 215, 227 (1997)
201. (reviewing JACQUES DERRIDA & JOHN D. CAPUTO, DECONSTRUCTION IN A NUTSHELL: A CONVERSATION WITH JACQUES DERRIDA (1997)).
202. See Ray, supra note 13, at 571. Marie Ashe writes: "Deconstruction of literary texts has often appeared as an 'infinite regress' within textuality, a dizzying multiplication of rereading upon rereading." Marie Ashe, Inventing Choreographies: Feminism and Deconstruction, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1123, 1125 (1990) (emphasis added).
203. 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
204. See id. at 300-05.
205. See id. at 310 ("Unless they fall within an exception to the general rule, new constitutional rules of criminal procedure will not be applicable to those cases which have become final before the new rules are announced.").
206. See id. at 301-02.
207. 492 U.S. 302, 314-15, 329-30 (1989).
208. See id. at 315, 330. The Court considered two claims. The first was whether a failure to instruct the jury as to mitigating evidence violated the Eighth Amendment. See id. at 307. The Court determined that this did not raise the issue of a new rule, but rather an application of an existing rule. See id. at 315. The second claim was whether "the Eighth Amendment categorically prohibits" execution of a person who is "mentally retarded." Id. at 307. The Court concluded that while it did implicate a new rule, Penry was still entitled to consideration because it fell within the first of the Teague exceptions. See id. at 330; see also Teague, 489 U.S. at 311.
209. See Penry, 492 U.S. at 300, 315.
210. See id. at 352-53 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
211. Id. at 353.
212. 501 U.S. 529 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). This case involved the retroactive application of a rule of constitutional law in the context of a state tax refund. See id. at 532-34.
213. Id. at 549 (citations omitted) (emphasis added and omitted).
214. See Penry, 492 U.S. at 353.
215. 494 U.S. 407 (1990).
216. See id. at 408.
217. Id. at 414 (emphasis added).
218. Id. at 412-13.
219. 486 U.S. 675 (1988).
220. See Butler, 494 U.S. at 410-11.
221. See id. at 408, 411, 414.
222. See id. at 414-15.
223. 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
224. Butler, 494 U.S. at 414.
225. Id. (emphasis added).
226. See id.
227. Id. at 415.
228. Id. (emphasis added).
229. Ann Althouse, Saying What Rights Are - In and Out of Context, 1991 WIS. L. REV. 929, 965.
230. THE TRUMAN SHOW (Paramount 1998).
231. Butler, 494 U.S. at 415 (emphasis added).
232. Rehnquist, in a sense, therefore rejects what Pierre Schlag calls the "theater of the rational," which "is precisely the kind of theater that is grounded in the forgetting of its own theatricality. To play a part in this theater is to rule out the recognition that one is doing theater." Pierre Schlag, Normativity and the Politics of Form, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 801, 884 (1991). Rehnquist, instead, is in the theater of the postmodern.
233. Butler, 494 U.S. at 415 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
234. Justice Brennan wrote in dissent in Butler: The only conclusion discernible from the majority's discussion is that the majority would label "new" any rule of law favoring a state prisoner that can be distinguished from prior precedent on any conceivable basis, legal or factual. The converse of this conclusion is that, in the majority's view, adjudication according to "prevailing" law must consist solely of applying binding precedents to factual disputes that cannot be distinguished from prior cases in any imaginable way. Id. at 421-22 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
235. Id. at 415.
236. See id. at 407.
237. THE TERMINATOR (Orion Pictures 1984).
238. See generally STEVEN JOHNSON, INTERFACE CULTURE 74 (1997) (noting how teenagers playing on-line death and doom games, like Quake and Doom, accompany their bursts of death-dealing fire with "Schwarzenegger-style taunts ('Hasta la vista, baby!')"). Subsequently, Congress amended the habeas corpus statute to be more consistent with the Teague line of cases.
239. See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214, 1217-26 (see especially the codification at 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (Supp. III 1997)).
240. I paraphrase Louis Seidman and Mark Tushnet here. See SEIDMAN & TUSHNET, supra note 59, at 23.
241. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 993-94 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring and dissenting). Scalia's dissent in United States v. Virginia made a similar point in several places. For example, he refers to the Court's equal protection standards - rational basis, intermediate scrutiny, and strict scrutiny - as "made-up tests." United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 570 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting). He added: "These tests are no more scientific than their names suggest, and a further element of randomness is added by the fact that it is largely up to us which test will be applied in each case." Id. at 567. Plus, he argued, with regard to the intermediate scrutiny test, the Justices "essentially apply it when it seems like a good idea to load the dice." Id. at 568.
242. See MARY ANN GLENDON, A NATION UNDER LAWYERS 146 (1994).
243. See id. at 146-48; BERNARD SCHWARTZ, DECISION: HOW THE SUPREME COURT DECIDES CASES 48-55, 256-62 (1996); Tushnet, supra note 13, at 1327. In the words of Jack Balkin, the Court applies in this postmodern era "quasiindustrial methods to the administration of justice." Balkin, supra note 10, at 1983. Rehnquist has admitted that his clerks write the first draft of almost all opinions issued in his name. See SCHWARTZ, supra, at 52. According to Mary Ann Glendon, only Scalia and Stevens supposedly take a "leading role" in writing opinions. See GLENDON, supra note 143, at 146. Bernard Schwartz adds that, contrary to the usual belief that oral argument substantively matters, "the principal purpose of the argument before the Justices is a publicrelations one." SCHWARTZ, supra, at 16.
244. See BAUMAN, supra note 7, at 97-101 (arguing that state domination no longer needs intellectually generated legitimation); Timothy R. Johnson & Andrew D. Martin, The Public's Conditional Response to Supreme Court Decisions, 92 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 299, 299 (1998) (emphasizing the public's acceptance of the Supreme Court as a legitimate institution by drawing on research showing that even individuals who know little about the Court hold it in high regard).
245. But cf. JÜRGEN HABERMAS, LEGITIMATION CRISIS (Thomas McCarthy trans., Beacon Press 1975) (1973) (arguing that economic and political structures are not receiving the needed support of cultural legitimation).
246. JAMESON, supra note 7, at 62 (emphasis added and omitted).
247. It is worth noting that Robert Post, reviewing Fredric Jameson's book on postmodernism, argued that "[t]here is no postmodern law, although there are postmodern commentaries on law." Robert Post, Postmodern Temptations, 4 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 391, 396 (1992) (reviewing JAMESON, supra note 7). Thus, from Post's viewpoint, Supreme Court Justices cannot evince postmodern themes: "We can thus expect a social practice to remain untouched by postmodernism if its participants retain a healthy respect for the authority of the relevant standards of the practice." Post, supra, at 396. My argument, in part, is that at least some of the Justices no longer "retain a healthy respect" for traditional modernist judicial tools or practices even though the Justices continue to use them. Jack Balkin and Jay Mootz seem to disagree about the nature of postmodernism, or at least about the best way to understand postmodernism. Balkin emphasizes the material and cultural elements of postmodernity, while Mootz stresses postmodern theory and intellectual thought. Compare Balkin, supra note 10, with Mootz, supra note 10. To me, a postmodern attitude toward this debate is that they are both right. That is, neither the material and cultural, on one hand, nor the theoretical and intellectual, on the other hand, is preeminent in a full understanding of postmodernism. In particular narratives of postmodernism, one or the other might be highlighted, but the other always remains equally important.
248. See, e.g., DERRIDA & CAPUTO, supra note 104, at 25-28.
249. JOEL C. WEINSHEIMER, GADAMER'S HERMENEUTICS: A READING OF TRUTH AND METHOD 9 (1985).
250. See Cover, supra note 57, at 40, 53 (discussing how courts, in effect, kill legal meaning).
251. Derrida explains that a text is iterable: a text, that is, can be repeated (or read) in different contexts, so its meaning can change. DERRIDA & CAPUTO, supra note 104, at 27-28; J.M. Balkin, Deconstructive Practice and Legal Theory, 96 YALE L.J. 743, 749, 779 (1987).
252. See Feldman, Diagnosing Power, supra note 8, at 1095-96 (explaining how the characteristics of postmodernism help generate themes for postmodern legal scholarship).
253. See supra notes 113-17 and accompanying text.
254. See generally ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION (1997);
255. Eric J. Segall, Justice Scalia, Critical Legal Studies, and the Rule of Law, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 991 (1994) (emphasizing Scalia's advocacy of formalistic approaches).
256. Cf. Post, supra note 147, at 396 ("There is no postmodern law, although there are postmodern commentaries on law.").
257. See KALMAN, supra note 17, at 64 (arguing that law professors and Justices became estranged in the mid-1970s); Balkin, supra note 10, at 1967 (emphasizing distance between Court and scholars); Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal Profession, 91 MICH. L. REV. 34 (1992) (emphasizing a disjunction between law professors and judges; written by a federal judge);
258. Feldman, Diagnosing Power, supra note 8, at 1098-1102 (discussing different orientations of Justices and legal academics toward postmodernism). For examples of Supreme Court Justices denigrating the legal academy, see Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 652-53 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting), and Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 68-69 (Rehnquist, C.J.).
259. See JONATHAN CULLER, ON DECONSTRUCTION 110 (1982);
260. Madeleine Plasencia, Who's Afraid of Humpty Dumpty: Deconstructionist References in Judicial Opinions, 21 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 215, 247 (1997); see also CULLER, supra, at 131-34, 280.
261. See J.M. Balkin, Deconstructive Practice and Legal Theory, 96 YALE L.J. 743, 760-63 (1987);
262. Feldman, Politics, supra note 8, at 185-92.
263. See Plasencia, supra note 157, at 246-47.
264. See, e.g., Jacques Derrida, Force of Law: The "Mystical Foundation of Authority," 11 CARDOZO L. REV. 919 (1990).
265. See id. at 945 ("Deconstruction is justice.").
266. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 128 n.6 (1989), quoted in Segall, supra note 154, at 1015.
267. To be clear, if Supreme Court Justices were to become thoroughgoing postmodern theorists - which, as I have discussed, is highly unlikely - they would recognize more clearly that all textual interpretation is always constrained. For an explanation of the process of textual interpretation, see Feldman, Politics, supra note 8, at 169-84.
268. BAUMAN, supra note 7, at 50; see id. at 201-03 (discussing the post-modern agent or subject). With regard to the question of systemic structures of power, I follow feminists such as Rita Felski and Nancy Fraser who argue for understanding power from multiple perspectives or as operating on multiple axes. See FELSKI, supra note 3, at 32; FRASER, supra note 7, at 10.
269. See Leading Cases, Table II(A), 112 HARV. L. REV. 372 (1998).