Corporate responsibility for environmental damage

Environmental Ethics

Volumn 18, Issue 2, 1996, Pages 195-207

  Corlett, J Angelo ^a  

^a GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

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EID: 0345752172     PISSN: 01634275     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.5840/enviroethics199618232     Document Type: Article

References (52)

1. This essay is concerned with private, profit-making corporations, not public or nonprofit ones.
2. Peter French, "The Corporation as a Moral Person," American Philosophical Quarterly 16 (1979): 205-15; Collective and Corporate Responsibility (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984), pp. 31-47; Larry May, The Morality of Groups (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1987); Raymond S. Pfeiffer, "The Central Distinction in the Theory of Corporate Moral Personhood," Journal of Business Ethics 9 (1990): 473-80; R. E. Ewin, "The Moral Status of the Corporation," Journal of Business Ethics 10 (1991): 749-56.
3. Peter French, "The Corporation as a Moral Person," American Philosophical Quarterly 16 (1979): 205-15; Collective and Corporate Responsibility (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984), pp. 31-47; Larry May, The Morality of Groups (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1987); Raymond S. Pfeiffer, "The Central Distinction in the Theory of Corporate Moral Personhood," Journal of Business Ethics 9 (1990): 473-80; R. E. Ewin, "The Moral Status of the Corporation," Journal of Business Ethics 10 (1991): 749-56.
4. Peter French, "The Corporation as a Moral Person," American Philosophical Quarterly 16 (1979): 205-15; Collective and Corporate Responsibility (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984), pp. 31-47; Larry May, The Morality of Groups (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1987); Raymond S. Pfeiffer, "The Central Distinction in the Theory of Corporate Moral Personhood," Journal of Business Ethics 9 (1990): 473-80; R. E. Ewin, "The Moral Status of the Corporation," Journal of Business Ethics 10 (1991): 749-56.
5. Peter French, "The Corporation as a Moral Person," American Philosophical Quarterly 16 (1979): 205-15; Collective and Corporate Responsibility (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984), pp. 31-47; Larry May, The Morality of Groups (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1987); Raymond S. Pfeiffer, "The Central Distinction in the Theory of Corporate Moral Personhood," Journal of Business Ethics 9 (1990): 473-80; R. E. Ewin, "The Moral Status of the Corporation," Journal of Business Ethics 10 (1991): 749-56.
6. Peter French, "The Corporation as a Moral Person," American Philosophical Quarterly 16 (1979): 205-15; Collective and Corporate Responsibility (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984), pp. 31-47; Larry May, The Morality of Groups (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1987); Raymond S. Pfeiffer, "The Central Distinction in the Theory of Corporate Moral Personhood," Journal of Business Ethics 9 (1990): 473-80; R. E. Ewin, "The Moral Status of the Corporation," Journal of Business Ethics 10 (1991): 749-56.
7. Of omissions, Alvin Goldman writes that "in cases where an agent purposely and consciously refrains from making a certain movement we have clear instances of negative acts. When an agent simply fails to do something, however, without conscious intent or prior awareness, it is not so clear whether or not this should be classed as an act." Alvin Goldman, A Theory of Human Action (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970), p. 48.
8. For an account of an agent's being "at fault," see Joel Feinberg, Doing and Deserving (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970), pp. 187-221. When we speak of corporate harms to the environment or environmental damage by corporations, we might mean one of a number of different things. One sense of "corporate harm" refers to instances in which both corporate collectives and corporate individuals act as morally responsible agents and in which such acts eventuate in the setting back of interests. But there are corporate harms which are caused only by the actions of certain of their individual agents acting "in the name of the corporation. These are corporate harms in a weaker sense than those caused by both corporate collectives and their individual agents. One assumption here is that certain corporate harms are attributable only to corporate individuals and not to the corporations themselves. Another assumption is that it is impossible for a corporate collective to act unless it is by way of a duly recognized agent of that corporation, making it impossible for corporate harms to eventuate from the actions of mere corporations themselves.
9. Descriptions of methodological individualism (of which moral responsibility individualism is a species) are found in D. E. Cooper, "Collective Responsibility," Philosophy 43 (1968): 258-68; J. Angelo Corlett, "Collective Punishment and Public Policy," Journal of Business Ethics 11 (1992): 211-12; and Michael J. Zimmerman, "Sharing Responsibility," American Philosophical Quarterly 22 (1985): 115-22. Michael Zimmerman attributes a kind of methodological individualism to Kurt Baier ( Kurt Baier, "Guilt and Responsibility," in Peter French, ed., Individual and Collective Responsibility [New York: Schenkman Publishing Company, 1972], pp. 37-61). In Collective and Corporate Responsibility, Peter French ascribes a similar position to Karl Popper, F. A. Hayek, and J. W. N. Watkins, respectively (p. 2). Larry May ascribes methodological individualism to Watkins ( Morality of Groups, p. 14). For an assessment of May's book, see J. Angelo Corlett, "Review of Larry May, The Morality of Groups," Journal of Business Ethics 8 (1989): 772, 792, 816. A most illuminating discussion of methodological individualism is found in Margaret Gilbert, On Social Facts (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), pp. 427-36.
10. Descriptions of methodological individualism (of which moral responsibility individualism is a species) are found in D. E. Cooper, "Collective Responsibility," Philosophy 43 (1968): 258-68; J. Angelo Corlett, "Collective Punishment and Public Policy," Journal of Business Ethics 11 (1992): 211-12; and Michael J. Zimmerman, "Sharing Responsibility," American Philosophical Quarterly 22 (1985): 115-22. Michael Zimmerman attributes a kind of methodological individualism to Kurt Baier ( Kurt Baier, "Guilt and Responsibility," in Peter French, ed., Individual and Collective Responsibility [New York: Schenkman Publishing Company, 1972], pp. 37-61). In Collective and Corporate Responsibility, Peter French ascribes a similar position to Karl Popper, F. A. Hayek, and J. W. N. Watkins, respectively (p. 2). Larry May ascribes methodological individualism to Watkins ( Morality of Groups, p. 14). For an assessment of May's book, see J. Angelo Corlett, "Review of Larry May, The Morality of Groups," Journal of Business Ethics 8 (1989): 772, 792, 816. A most illuminating discussion of methodological individualism is found in Margaret Gilbert, On Social Facts (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), pp. 427-36.
11. Descriptions of methodological individualism (of which moral responsibility individualism is a species) are found in D. E. Cooper, "Collective Responsibility," Philosophy 43 (1968): 258-68; J. Angelo Corlett, "Collective Punishment and Public Policy," Journal of Business Ethics 11 (1992): 211-12; and Michael J. Zimmerman, "Sharing Responsibility," American Philosophical Quarterly 22 (1985): 115-22. Michael Zimmerman attributes a kind of methodological individualism to Kurt Baier ( Kurt Baier, "Guilt and Responsibility," in Peter French, ed., Individual and Collective Responsibility [New York: Schenkman Publishing Company, 1972], pp. 37-61). In Collective and Corporate Responsibility, Peter French ascribes a similar position to Karl Popper, F. A. Hayek, and J. W. N. Watkins, respectively (p. 2). Larry May ascribes methodological individualism to Watkins ( Morality of Groups, p. 14). For an assessment of May's book, see J. Angelo Corlett, "Review of Larry May, The Morality of Groups," Journal of Business Ethics 8 (1989): 772, 792, 816. A most illuminating discussion of methodological individualism is found in Margaret Gilbert, On Social Facts (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), pp. 427-36.
12. Descriptions of methodological individualism (of which moral responsibility individualism is a species) are found in D. E. Cooper, "Collective Responsibility," Philosophy 43 (1968): 258-68; J. Angelo Corlett, "Collective Punishment and Public Policy," Journal of Business Ethics 11 (1992): 211-12; and Michael J. Zimmerman, "Sharing Responsibility," American Philosophical Quarterly 22 (1985): 115-22. Michael Zimmerman attributes a kind of methodological individualism to Kurt Baier ( Kurt Baier, "Guilt and Responsibility," in Peter French, ed., Individual and Collective Responsibility [New York: Schenkman Publishing Company, 1972], pp. 37-61). In Collective and Corporate Responsibility, Peter French ascribes a similar position to Karl Popper, F. A. Hayek, and J. W. N. Watkins, respectively (p. 2). Larry May ascribes methodological individualism to Watkins ( Morality of Groups, p. 14). For an assessment of May's book, see J. Angelo Corlett, "Review of Larry May, The Morality of Groups," Journal of Business Ethics 8 (1989): 772, 792, 816. A most illuminating discussion of methodological individualism is found in Margaret Gilbert, On Social Facts (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), pp. 427-36.
13. Descriptions of methodological individualism (of which moral responsibility individualism is a species) are found in D. E. Cooper, "Collective Responsibility," Philosophy 43 (1968): 258-68; J. Angelo Corlett, "Collective Punishment and Public Policy," Journal of Business Ethics 11 (1992): 211-12; and Michael J. Zimmerman, "Sharing Responsibility," American Philosophical Quarterly 22 (1985): 115-22. Michael Zimmerman attributes a kind of methodological individualism to Kurt Baier ( Kurt Baier, "Guilt and Responsibility," in Peter French, ed., Individual and Collective Responsibility [New York: Schenkman Publishing Company, 1972], pp. 37-61). In Collective and Corporate Responsibility, Peter French ascribes a similar position to Karl Popper, F. A. Hayek, and J. W. N. Watkins, respectively (p. 2). Larry May ascribes methodological individualism to Watkins ( Morality of Groups, p. 14). For an assessment of May's book, see J. Angelo Corlett, "Review of Larry May, The Morality of Groups," Journal of Business Ethics 8 (1989): 772, 792, 816. A most illuminating discussion of methodological individualism is found in Margaret Gilbert, On Social Facts (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), pp. 427-36.
14. Descriptions of methodological individualism (of which moral responsibility individualism is a species) are found in D. E. Cooper, "Collective Responsibility," Philosophy 43 (1968): 258-68; J. Angelo Corlett, "Collective Punishment and Public Policy," Journal of Business Ethics 11 (1992): 211-12; and Michael J. Zimmerman, "Sharing Responsibility," American Philosophical Quarterly 22 (1985): 115-22. Michael Zimmerman attributes a kind of methodological individualism to Kurt Baier ( Kurt Baier, "Guilt and Responsibility," in Peter French, ed., Individual and Collective Responsibility [New York: Schenkman Publishing Company, 1972], pp. 37-61). In Collective and Corporate Responsibility, Peter French ascribes a similar position to Karl Popper, F. A. Hayek, and J. W. N. Watkins, respectively (p. 2). Larry May ascribes methodological individualism to Watkins ( Morality of Groups, p. 14). For an assessment of May's book, see J. Angelo Corlett, "Review of Larry May, The Morality of Groups," Journal of Business Ethics 8 (1989): 772, 792, 816. A most illuminating discussion of methodological individualism is found in Margaret Gilbert, On Social Facts (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), pp. 427-36.
15. Descriptions of methodological individualism (of which moral responsibility individualism is a species) are found in D. E. Cooper, "Collective Responsibility," Philosophy 43 (1968): 258-68; J. Angelo Corlett, "Collective Punishment and Public Policy," Journal of Business Ethics 11 (1992): 211-12; and Michael J. Zimmerman, "Sharing Responsibility," American Philosophical Quarterly 22 (1985): 115-22. Michael Zimmerman attributes a kind of methodological individualism to Kurt Baier ( Kurt Baier, "Guilt and Responsibility," in Peter French, ed., Individual and Collective Responsibility [New York: Schenkman Publishing Company, 1972], pp. 37-61). In Collective and Corporate Responsibility, Peter French ascribes a similar position to Karl Popper, F. A. Hayek, and J. W. N. Watkins, respectively (p. 2). Larry May ascribes methodological individualism to Watkins ( Morality of Groups, p. 14). For an assessment of May's book, see J. Angelo Corlett, "Review of Larry May, The Morality of Groups," Journal of Business Ethics 8 (1989): 772, 792, 816. A most illuminating discussion of methodological individualism is found in Margaret Gilbert, On Social Facts (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), pp. 427-36.
16. Descriptions of methodological individualism (of which moral responsibility individualism is a species) are found in D. E. Cooper, "Collective Responsibility," Philosophy 43 (1968): 258-68; J. Angelo Corlett, "Collective Punishment and Public Policy," Journal of Business Ethics 11 (1992): 211-12; and Michael J. Zimmerman, "Sharing Responsibility," American Philosophical Quarterly 22 (1985): 115-22. Michael Zimmerman attributes a kind of methodological individualism to Kurt Baier ( Kurt Baier, "Guilt and Responsibility," in Peter French, ed., Individual and Collective Responsibility [New York: Schenkman Publishing Company, 1972], pp. 37-61). In Collective and Corporate Responsibility, Peter French ascribes a similar position to Karl Popper, F. A. Hayek, and J. W. N. Watkins, respectively (p. 2). Larry May ascribes methodological individualism to Watkins ( Morality of Groups, p. 14). For an assessment of May's book, see J. Angelo Corlett, "Review of Larry May, The Morality of Groups," Journal of Business Ethics 8 (1989): 772, 792, 816. A most illuminating discussion of methodological individualism is found in Margaret Gilbert, On Social Facts (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), pp. 427-36.
17. Frege's law is that "If a declarative sentence 5 has the very same cognitive information content as a declarative sentence S′, then S is informative ('contains an extension of our knowledge') if and only if S′ is (does)." Nathan Salmon, Frege's Puzzle (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1986), p. 57.
18. I assume a realist notion of beliefs and that beliefs are propositional attitudes. For important discussions of anti-realist notions of beliefs as propositional attitudes, see Paul Churchland, Matter and Consciousness, Revised Edition (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1990) and Stephen Schiffer, Remnants of Meaning (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1987).
19. I assume a realist notion of beliefs and that beliefs are propositional attitudes. For important discussions of anti-realist notions of beliefs as propositional attitudes, see Paul Churchland, Matter and Consciousness, Revised Edition (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1990) and Stephen Schiffer, Remnants of Meaning (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1987).
20. This sort of semantic argument is also made in J. Angelo Corlett, Analyzing Social Knowledge (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 1996); "Corporate Punishment and Responsibility," Journal of Social Philosophy (forthcoming).
21. This sort of semantic argument is also made in J. Angelo Corlett, Analyzing Social Knowledge (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 1996); "Corporate Punishment and Responsibility," Journal of Social Philosophy (forthcoming).
22. Ontological versions of holism or collectivism hold that there are irreducible aspects of collectives and that such collectives exist as real entities "over and above" their respective individual constituent members.
23. French, Collective and Corporate Responsibility, chaps. 3-5; May, Morality of Groups, pp. 65-69. For criticisms of these arguments, see J. Angelo Corlett, "Corporate Responsibility and Punishment," Public Affairs Quarterly 2 (1988): 2-3; Victor C. K. Tam, "May on Corporate Responsibility and Punishment," Business and Professional Ethics Journal 8 (1990): 71.
24. French, Collective and Corporate Responsibility, chaps. 3-5; May, Morality of Groups, pp. 65-69. For criticisms of these arguments, see J. Angelo Corlett, "Corporate Responsibility and Punishment," Public Affairs Quarterly 2 (1988): 2-3; Victor C. K. Tam, "May on Corporate Responsibility and Punishment," Business and Professional Ethics Journal 8 (1990): 71.
25. French, Collective and Corporate Responsibility, chaps. 3-5; May, Morality of Groups, pp. 65-69. For criticisms of these arguments, see J. Angelo Corlett, "Corporate Responsibility and Punishment," Public Affairs Quarterly 2 (1988): 2-3; Victor C. K. Tam, "May on Corporate Responsibility and Punishment," Business and Professional Ethics Journal 8 (1990): 71.
26. French, Collective and Corporate Responsibility, chaps. 3-5; May, Morality of Groups, pp. 65-69. For criticisms of these arguments, see J. Angelo Corlett, "Corporate Responsibility and Punishment," Public Affairs Quarterly 2 (1988): 2-3; Victor C. K. Tam, "May on Corporate Responsibility and Punishment," Business and Professional Ethics Journal 8 (1990): 71.
27. I do not use agent here in one of its legal senses.
28. See Goldman, A Theory of Human Action. For some alternative theories of human action, see G. E. M. Anscombe, Intention (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1958); Arthur Danto, Analytical Philosophy of Action (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973); Donald Davidson, Essays on Actions and Events (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980); Lawrence Davis, Theory of Action (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1979); A. I. Meldon, Free Action (New York: Humanities Press, 1961); Richard Taylor, Action and Purpose (Englwood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1966); and Judith J. Thomson, Actions and Other Events (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977).
29. See Goldman, A Theory of Human Action. For some alternative theories of human action, see G. E. M. Anscombe, Intention (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1958); Arthur Danto, Analytical Philosophy of Action (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973); Donald Davidson, Essays on Actions and Events (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980); Lawrence Davis, Theory of Action (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1979); A. I. Meldon, Free Action (New York: Humanities Press, 1961); Richard Taylor, Action and Purpose (Englwood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1966); and Judith J. Thomson, Actions and Other Events (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977).
30. See Goldman, A Theory of Human Action. For some alternative theories of human action, see G. E. M. Anscombe, Intention (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1958); Arthur Danto, Analytical Philosophy of Action (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973); Donald Davidson, Essays on Actions and Events (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980); Lawrence Davis, Theory of Action (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1979); A. I. Meldon, Free Action (New York: Humanities Press, 1961); Richard Taylor, Action and Purpose (Englwood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1966); and Judith J. Thomson, Actions and Other Events (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977).
31. See Goldman, A Theory of Human Action. For some alternative theories of human action, see G. E. M. Anscombe, Intention (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1958); Arthur Danto, Analytical Philosophy of Action (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973); Donald Davidson, Essays on Actions and Events (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980); Lawrence Davis, Theory of Action (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1979); A. I. Meldon, Free Action (New York: Humanities Press, 1961); Richard Taylor, Action and Purpose (Englwood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1966); and Judith J. Thomson, Actions and Other Events (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977).
32. See Goldman, A Theory of Human Action. For some alternative theories of human action, see G. E. M. Anscombe, Intention (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1958); Arthur Danto, Analytical Philosophy of Action (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973); Donald Davidson, Essays on Actions and Events (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980); Lawrence Davis, Theory of Action (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1979); A. I. Meldon, Free Action (New York: Humanities Press, 1961); Richard Taylor, Action and Purpose (Englwood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1966); and Judith J. Thomson, Actions and Other Events (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977).
33. See Goldman, A Theory of Human Action. For some alternative theories of human action, see G. E. M. Anscombe, Intention (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1958); Arthur Danto, Analytical Philosophy of Action (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973); Donald Davidson, Essays on Actions and Events (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980); Lawrence Davis, Theory of Action (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1979); A. I. Meldon, Free Action (New York: Humanities Press, 1961); Richard Taylor, Action and Purpose (Englwood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1966); and Judith J. Thomson, Actions and Other Events (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977).
34. See Goldman, A Theory of Human Action. For some alternative theories of human action, see G. E. M. Anscombe, Intention (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1958); Arthur Danto, Analytical Philosophy of Action (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973); Donald Davidson, Essays on Actions and Events (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980); Lawrence Davis, Theory of Action (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1979); A. I. Meldon, Free Action (New York: Humanities Press, 1961); Richard Taylor, Action and Purpose (Englwood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1966); and Judith J. Thomson, Actions and Other Events (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977).
35. See Goldman, A Theory of Human Action. For some alternative theories of human action, see G. E. M. Anscombe, Intention (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1958); Arthur Danto, Analytical Philosophy of Action (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973); Donald Davidson, Essays on Actions and Events (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980); Lawrence Davis, Theory of Action (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1979); A. I. Meldon, Free Action (New York: Humanities Press, 1961); Richard Taylor, Action and Purpose (Englwood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1966); and Judith J. Thomson, Actions and Other Events (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977).
36. I am not suggesting that there is no agent or event external to or other than the intentional corporate agent in question which is a contributory cause to and shares responsibility for the environmental damage. As Goldman states, "whenever we say that an object, O, is a cause of x, this presupposes that there is a state of O or an event involving O that caused, or was a partial cause, of x." See Goldman, A Theory of Human Action, p. 81.
37. For an interesting discussion of organizations, see Paul Hersey and Kenneth Blandshard, Management of Organizational Behavior, 3rd ed. (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1977); Daniel Katz and Robert Kahn, The Social Psychology of Organizations (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1966).
38. For an interesting discussion of organizations, see Paul Hersey and Kenneth Blandshard, Management of Organizational Behavior, 3rd ed. (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1977); Daniel Katz and Robert Kahn, The Social Psychology of Organizations (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1966).
39. Christopher McMahon, "Managerial Authority," Ethics 100 (1989): 52.
40. Ibid., p. 53.
41. Harry Frankfurt, The Importance of What We Care About (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988). For a Frankfurtian view of corporate moral agency, see Corlett, "Corporate Responsibility and Punishment," pp. 7-14. For discussions of Frankfurt's analysis, see John Martin Fischer, ed., Moral Responsibility (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986); Perspectives on Moral Responsibility (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993).
42. Harry Frankfurt, The Importance of What We Care About (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988). For a Frankfurtian view of corporate moral agency, see Corlett, "Corporate Responsibility and Punishment," pp. 7-14. For discussions of Frankfurt's analysis, see John Martin Fischer, ed., Moral Responsibility (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986); Perspectives on Moral Responsibility (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993).
43. Harry Frankfurt, The Importance of What We Care About (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988). For a Frankfurtian view of corporate moral agency, see Corlett, "Corporate Responsibility and Punishment," pp. 7-14. For discussions of Frankfurt's analysis, see John Martin Fischer, ed., Moral Responsibility (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986); Perspectives on Moral Responsibility (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993).
44. Harry Frankfurt, The Importance of What We Care About (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988). For a Frankfurtian view of corporate moral agency, see Corlett, "Corporate Responsibility and Punishment," pp. 7-14. For discussions of Frankfurt's analysis, see John Martin Fischer, ed., Moral Responsibility (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986); Perspectives on Moral Responsibility (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993).
45. There are higher-order compatibilists who argue that the ability to do otherwise is a necessary condition of freedom. See Keith Lehrer, Metamind (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991). There are also incompatibilists who arrive at the same conclusion. See, for example, Peter van Inwagen, An Essay on Free Will (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983).
46. There are higher-order compatibilists who argue that the ability to do otherwise is a necessary condition of freedom. See Keith Lehrer, Metamind (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991). There are also incompatibilists who arrive at the same conclusion. See, for example, Peter van Inwagen, An Essay on Free Will (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983).
47. For discussions of Karl Marx's claim that under capitalism workers are forced to sell their labor power, see G. A. Cohen, "Are Workers Forced to Sell Their Labour Power?" Philosophy & Public Affairs 14 (1985): 99-105; History, Labour, and Freedom (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), chaps. 13-14; George Brenkert, "Freedom and Private Property in Marx," in M. Cohen, T. Nagel and T. Scanlon, eds., Marx, Justice, and History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980): 80-105; Jeffrey Reiman, "Exploitation, Force, and the Moral Assessment of Capitalism," Philosophy and Public Affairs 16 (1987): 3-43.
48. For discussions of Karl Marx's claim that under capitalism workers are forced to sell their labor power, see G. A. Cohen, "Are Workers Forced to Sell Their Labour Power?" Philosophy & Public Affairs 14 (1985): 99-105; History, Labour, and Freedom (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), chaps. 13-14; George Brenkert, "Freedom and Private Property in Marx," in M. Cohen, T. Nagel and T. Scanlon, eds., Marx, Justice, and History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980): 80-105; Jeffrey Reiman, "Exploitation, Force, and the Moral Assessment of Capitalism," Philosophy and Public Affairs 16 (1987): 3-43.
49. For discussions of Karl Marx's claim that under capitalism workers are forced to sell their labor power, see G. A. Cohen, "Are Workers Forced to Sell Their Labour Power?" Philosophy & Public Affairs 14 (1985): 99-105; History, Labour, and Freedom (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), chaps. 13-14; George Brenkert, "Freedom and Private Property in Marx," in M. Cohen, T. Nagel and T. Scanlon, eds., Marx, Justice, and History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980): 80-105; Jeffrey Reiman, "Exploitation, Force, and the Moral Assessment of Capitalism," Philosophy and Public Affairs 16 (1987): 3-43.
50. For discussions of Karl Marx's claim that under capitalism workers are forced to sell their labor power, see G. A. Cohen, "Are Workers Forced to Sell Their Labour Power?" Philosophy & Public Affairs 14 (1985): 99-105; History, Labour, and Freedom (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), chaps. 13-14; George Brenkert, "Freedom and Private Property in Marx," in M. Cohen, T. Nagel and T. Scanlon, eds., Marx, Justice, and History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980): 80-105; Jeffrey Reiman, "Exploitation, Force, and the Moral Assessment of Capitalism," Philosophy and Public Affairs 16 (1987): 3-43.
51. Under such circumstances, the other conditions of corporate-collective moral liability must be satisfied.
52. An example of a stockholder being justifiably fined and imprisoned might be a case in which severe environmental damage resulted from a CEO's decision, where the stockholder had reasonably clear knowledge that such damage was very likely to happen as the result of the CEO's decision, and where the stockholder intentionally supported the CEO's decision, and had the power to effect significant change concerning the outcome of that CEO's decision, where the CEO was at fault for deciding the way he or she did.