Are Sanctions Meant to Work? The Politics of Creating and Implementing Sanctions Through the United Nations

Global Governance

Volumn 9, Issue 4, 2003, Pages 503-518

  Chesterman, Simon ^a   Pouligny, Béatrice ^a  

^a International Peace Academy

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 0345547407     PISSN: 10752846     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1163/19426720-00904008     Document Type: Review

References (38)

1. This article draws upon insights shared at two meetings on sanctions convened by the International Peace Academy (IPA), in Paris in November 2001 and in London in March 2002. The first meeting was held in partnership with the Center for International Studies and Research (CERI-Sciences-Po), the second with the Royal Institute of International Affairs. The meetings and this publication were made possible by grants from the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade of Canada, the Policy Planning Unit of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the government of Germany, the government of Switzerland, and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office of the United Kingdom. The views expressed here are those of the authors alone.
2. UN Press Release SG/SM/7360, echoing Lloyd Axworthy, "Foreword" in David Cortright and George A. Lopez, The Sanctions Decade: Assessing UN Strategies in the 1990s, a project of the International Peace Academy (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2000), p. ix.
3. SC Res 232 (1966); SC Res 253 (1968); SC Res 277 (1970).
4. SC Res 418 (1977).
5. Cortright and Lopez, The Sanctions Decade.
6. See www.un.org/News/ossg/sanction.htm (accessed 9 July 2003).
7. Cortright and Lopez, The Sanctions Decade, p. 2.
8. This strengthened the sanctions already in place against Haiti. See ibid., p. 94.
9. SCRes 1013 (1995).
10. See www.fourthfreedom.org/pdf/ParisPaper.pdf (accessed 9 July 2003).
11. See, for example, the list of individuals maintained by the Afghanistan Sanctions Committee, available online at www.un.org/Docs/sc/committees/Afghanistan/Afg_list_eng.htm (accessed 9 July 2003).
12. As expert panels and monitoring mechanisms lack power of subpoena, they must rely on the cooperation of states.
13. See, for example, the controversy over the naming of prominent Somaliborn Swedish citizens: Colum Lynch, "U.S. Seeks to Take 6 Names Off UN Sanctions List; Administration Was Criticized for Offering Little Proof That Individuals, Groups Aided Al Qaeda," Washington Post, 22 August 2002. For a detailed discussion of targeted sanctions, see Targeted Financial Sanctions: A Manual for Design and Implementation-Contributions from the Interlaken Process (July 2001), available online at www.smartsanctions.ch (accessed 9 July 2003).
14. See, for example, the controversy over the naming of prominent Somaliborn Swedish citizens: Colum Lynch, "U.S. Seeks to Take 6 Names Off UN Sanctions List; Administration Was Criticized for Offering Little Proof That Individuals, Groups Aided Al Qaeda," Washington Post, 22 August 2002. For a detailed discussion of targeted sanctions, see Targeted Financial Sanctions: A Manual for Design and Implementation-Contributions from the Interlaken Process (July 2001), available online at www.smartsanctions.ch (accessed 9 July 2003).
15. It is not clear, however, that member states want to give the Secretariat such capacity.
16. See note 6 above.
17. Cortright and Lopez, The Sanctions Decade, pp. 118-121. See also Tim Niblock, "Pariah States" and Sanctions in the Middle East (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2001).
18. Cortright and Lopez, The Sanctions Decade, pp. 118-121. See also Tim Niblock, "Pariah States" and Sanctions in the Middle East (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2001).
19. Martin Fletcher and Michael Binyon, "UN and Iraq Edge Towards Accord on Peace Force," The Times, 15 May 1991.
20. Martin Fletcher and Michael Theodoulou, "Baker Says Sanctions Must Stay as Long as Saddam Holds Power," The Times, 23 May 1991.
21. S/22664 (1991). See James Bone, "UK Links Sanctions to Fate of Prisoners," The Times, 4 June 1991; Sarah Helm, "Major Gives UN Warning on Sanctions Against Iraq," Independent, 5 June 1991.
22. S/22664 (1991). See James Bone, "UK Links Sanctions to Fate of Prisoners," The Times, 4 June 1991; Sarah Helm, "Major Gives UN Warning on Sanctions Against Iraq," Independent, 5 June 1991.
23. David D. Caron, "The Legitimacy of the Collective Authority of the Security Council," American Journal of International Law 87, no. 4 (1993): 577.
24. See, for example, SC Res 1382 (2001), extending parts of the program until 30 May 2002.
25. See, for example, SC Res 820 (1993) on FRY, para. 31; SC Res 841 (1993) on Haiti, para. 16; SC Res 883 (1993) on Libya, para. 16; SC Res 1173 (1998) on UNITA, para. 15.
26. SC Res 1267 (1999) (Afghanistan), para. 14. See also Simon Chesterman, Just War or Just Peace? Humanitarian Intervention and International Law (Oxford Monographs in International Law) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 194-95.
27. SC Res 1298 (2000) (Eritrea/Ethiopia), para. 16; SC Res 1306 (2000) (Sierra Leone), para. 6; SC Res 1333 (2000) (Afghanistan), para. 23; SC Res 1343 (2001) (Liberia), paras. 9 and 10.
28. See www.smartsanctions.de (accessed 9 July 2003).
29. See www.smartsanctions.ch (accessed 9 July 2003).
30. SC Res 1390 (2002) (Afghanistan), para. 3. See SC Res 1455 (2003).
31. Cortright and Lopez, The Sanctions Decade, pp. 27-32.
32. See generally Mats Berdal and David M. Malone, eds., Greed and Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars, a project of the International Peace Academy (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2000).
33. Klaus Schlichte, "The Post-Crisis Economic Consequences of Sanctions," paper delivered at the seminar "Sanctions and the Political Economy of Crisis," Paris, 22-23 November 2001.
34. See R.T. Naylor, Patriots and Profiteers: On Economic Warfare, Embargo Busting and State-Sponsored Crime (Toronto: MacClelland & Stewart, 1999).
35. See Michael Pugh, "Protectorates and the Spoils of Peace: Intermestic Manipulations of Political Economy in South-East Europe," in Jung Dietrich, ed., The Political Ecomony of Intrastate Wars (London: Routledge, 2002).
36. The Kurds in Northern Iraq are sometimes cited as an example of a group that may benefit from sanctions.
37. Schlichte, "The Post-Crisis Economic Consequences of Sanctions."
38. A series of reform initiatives have been launched by the Swiss, German, and Swedish governments, referred to variously as the Interlaken, Bonn-Berlin, and Stockholm processes. The Stockholm process is described at www.smartsanctions.se (accessed 9 July 2003). These and other recent initiatives are described in David Cortright and George A. Lopez, Sanctions and the Search for Security: Challenges to UN Action, a project of the International Peace Academy (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2002).