The impact of economic regulation on attempts to curb expense preference behavior: A micro-data analysis of CEO compensation schemes for electric utilities

Energy Economics

Volumn 21, Issue 2, 1999, Pages 185-194

  Mixon Jr , Franklin G ^a   Upadhyaya, Kamal P ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN MISSISSIPPI   (United States)

^b PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Agency theory; CEO compensation schemes; Electric utilities; Expense preference behavior

Indexed keywords

DATA REDUCTION; INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS; LAWS AND LEGISLATION; REGULATORY COMPLIANCE;

AGENCY THEORY; EXPENSE PREFERENCE BEHAVIOR;

ELECTRIC UTILITIES;

COMPENSATION; ECONOMIC PLANNING; ELECTRICITY GENERATION; ELECTRICITY INDUSTRY;

EID: 0345517306     PISSN: 01409883     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0140-9883(98)00020-6     Document Type: Article

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