Money politics and transitions to democracy in East Asia

Asian Survey

Volumn 37, Issue 3, 1997, Pages 213-226

  Pye, Lucian W ^a  

^a MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

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EID: 0345481817     PISSN: 00044687     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/2645659     Document Type: Article

References (22)

1. In making this defense for not dismissing our earlier theories too quickly, I am aware of the common danger of straining at the facts to preserve a theory. Timothy Garton Ash has cited the Polish philosopher Leszek Kolakowski's Law of the Infinite Cornucopia, which states that "there is never a shortage of arguments to support whatever doctrine you want to believe in for whatever reasons," and which Garton Ash modifies to read, "The historian's version of the law is that causes can invariably be found for any event or phenomenon, however extraordinary or unexpected. Whatever happens will be explained." Timothy Garton Ash, "'Neo-Pagan' Poland," New York Review of Books, 43:1 (January 11, 1996), p. 10.
2. An analysis of the relationship of political developments and markets that is close to, but still significantly different from our argument is that of Adam Przeworski in Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).
3. Gerald L. Curtis, Election Campaigning Japanese Style (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971).
4. "Changing Japan," the Economist, January 11, 1997, pp. 19-22.
5. "Japan's Budget Mess," ibid., January 25, 1997, pp. 33-34.
6. To put these sums into perspective it should be noted that Robert Dole, America's champion political fund raiser, in his 35-year career raised only about $100 million. (Charles Babcock and Ruth Marcus, "'Dole Inc.' The Rise of a Money Machine," Washington Post, August 20, 1996, p. 1). The exact amount of "soft money" raised during the 1996 presidential election is hard to determine, in part because of the need of the Democratic National Committee to return substantial "illegal gifts," but the New York Times (January 28, 1997, p. 20) reported that thanks to the financial disclosure laws, "the final score in the orgy of influence-peddling was $141 million in soft money for the Republicans and $122 million for the Democrats." Charles Lewes in the Buying of the President (New York: Avon Books, 1996) makes the cynical argument that American democracy has been sold out to money interests but his figures would suggest that, at least in terms of East Asian standards, the sales price of the American presidency is astonishingly cheap. For a passionate denunciation of the role of money in American politics and some later figures for the 1996 election, see Ronald Dworkin, "The Curse of American Politics," New York Review of Books, 43:16 (October 17, 1996), pp. 19-24.
7. To put these sums into perspective it should be noted that Robert Dole, America's champion political fund raiser, in his 35-year career raised only about $100 million. (Charles Babcock and Ruth Marcus, "'Dole Inc.' The Rise of a Money Machine," Washington Post, August 20, 1996, p. 1). The exact amount of "soft money" raised during the 1996 presidential election is hard to determine, in part because of the need of the Democratic National Committee to return substantial "illegal gifts," but the New York Times (January 28, 1997, p. 20) reported that thanks to the financial disclosure laws, "the final score in the orgy of influence-peddling was $141 million in soft money for the Republicans and $122 million for the Democrats." Charles Lewes in the Buying of the President (New York: Avon Books, 1996) makes the cynical argument that American democracy has been sold out to money interests but his figures would suggest that, at least in terms of East Asian standards, the sales price of the American presidency is astonishingly cheap. For a passionate denunciation of the role of money in American politics and some later figures for the 1996 election, see Ronald Dworkin, "The Curse of American Politics," New York Review of Books, 43:16 (October 17, 1996), pp. 19-24.
8. To put these sums into perspective it should be noted that Robert Dole, America's champion political fund raiser, in his 35-year career raised only about $100 million. (Charles Babcock and Ruth Marcus, "'Dole Inc.' The Rise of a Money Machine," Washington Post, August 20, 1996, p. 1). The exact amount of "soft money" raised during the 1996 presidential election is hard to determine, in part because of the need of the Democratic National Committee to return substantial "illegal gifts," but the New York Times (January 28, 1997, p. 20) reported that thanks to the financial disclosure laws, "the final score in the orgy of influence-peddling was $141 million in soft money for the Republicans and $122 million for the Democrats." Charles Lewes in the Buying of the President (New York: Avon Books, 1996) makes the cynical argument that American democracy has been sold out to money interests but his figures would suggest that, at least in terms of East Asian standards, the sales price of the American presidency is astonishingly cheap. For a passionate denunciation of the role of money in American politics and some later figures for the 1996 election, see Ronald Dworkin, "The Curse of American Politics," New York Review of Books, 43:16 (October 17, 1996), pp. 19-24.
9. To put these sums into perspective it should be noted that Robert Dole, America's champion political fund raiser, in his 35-year career raised only about $100 million. (Charles Babcock and Ruth Marcus, "'Dole Inc.' The Rise of a Money Machine," Washington Post, August 20, 1996, p. 1). The exact amount of "soft money" raised during the 1996 presidential election is hard to determine, in part because of the need of the Democratic National Committee to return substantial "illegal gifts," but the New York Times (January 28, 1997, p. 20) reported that thanks to the financial disclosure laws, "the final score in the orgy of influence-peddling was $141 million in soft money for the Republicans and $122 million for the Democrats." Charles Lewes in the Buying of the President (New York: Avon Books, 1996) makes the cynical argument that American democracy has been sold out to money interests but his figures would suggest that, at least in terms of East Asian standards, the sales price of the American presidency is astonishingly cheap. For a passionate denunciation of the role of money in American politics and some later figures for the 1996 election, see Ronald Dworkin, "The Curse of American Politics," New York Review of Books, 43:16 (October 17, 1996), pp. 19-24.
10. President Kim seemed to agree with the industrialists when he indicated that he would probably pardon any industrialist convicted of making "donations" to his predecessors. New York Times, February 2, 1996, p. A4. The trials, however, did result in four industrialists being given prison sentences, and it is not clear that President Kim would follow through with his promise of pardons.
11. Shim Jae Hoon, "Politics as Unusual," Far Eastern Economic Review, February 1, 1996, p. 24.
12. The KMT's reputation for corruption came mainly from the actions of low level officials, especially the police, who in their dealings with the public demanded various forms of bribes. For the sordid record of the police in Shanghai during the KMT period, see Frederic Wakeman, Jr., Policing Shanghai 1927-1937 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995). The top leadership was also suspected of graft but the two with the darkest reputations, H. H. Kung and T. V. Soong, were supposed to have personally profited from their government connections to the tune of $2-$4 million, small sums in comparison not just with Japanese and Korean practices but even with the current levels of Chinese corruption.
13. Michael Weisskopf and Keith B. Richburg, "Taiwan, in Courting U.S. Officials Reflect Yearning for Recognition," Washington Post, November 12, 1996, p. A6.
14. Hilton L. Root, Small Countries, Big Lessons: Governance and the Rise of East Asia" (Hong Kong and New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 47.
15. For details on the spread of corruption during the reform process, see: X. L. Ding, The Decline of Communism in China: Legitimacy Crisis, 1977-1989 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994); and Leslie Holmes, The End of Communist Power: Anti-Corruption Campaigns and Legitimation Crisis (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993). For an attempt to put the problems of corruption of the Deng era into the context of both the history of corruption in China and generalized administrative theory, see Ting Gong, The Politics of Corruption in Contemporary China: An Analysis of Policy Outcomes (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1994).
16. For details on the spread of corruption during the reform process, see: X. L. Ding, The Decline of Communism in China: Legitimacy Crisis, 1977-1989 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994); and Leslie Holmes, The End of Communist Power: Anti-Corruption Campaigns and Legitimation Crisis (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993). For an attempt to put the problems of corruption of the Deng era into the context of both the history of corruption in China and generalized administrative theory, see Ting Gong, The Politics of Corruption in Contemporary China: An Analysis of Policy Outcomes (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1994).
17. For details on the spread of corruption during the reform process, see: X. L. Ding, The Decline of Communism in China: Legitimacy Crisis, 1977-1989 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994); and Leslie Holmes, The End of Communist Power: Anti-Corruption Campaigns and Legitimation Crisis (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993). For an attempt to put the problems of corruption of the Deng era into the context of both the history of corruption in China and generalized administrative theory, see Ting Gong, The Politics of Corruption in Contemporary China: An Analysis of Policy Outcomes (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1994).
18. Economist, "Rotten Roots," February 3, 1996, p. 30.
19. I am indebted to David Zweig for these figures.
20. There has been a tendency to think of China as having a unique set of problems because its huge and inefficient state enterprises have to carry such a burden of support services for their employees, but historically the establishment of company towns was a common feature of early capitalism throughout the world. See Anthony Sampson, Company Man: The Rise and Fall of Corporate Life (New York: HarperCollins, 1995); and "Company Towns: The Strange Death of Corporationville," Economist, December 23, 1995-January 5, 1996, pp. 73-75.
21. There has been a tendency to think of China as having a unique set of problems because its huge and inefficient state enterprises have to carry such a burden of support services for their employees, but historically the establishment of company towns was a common feature of early capitalism throughout the world. See Anthony Sampson, Company Man: The Rise and Fall of Corporate Life (New York: HarperCollins, 1995); and "Company Towns: The Strange Death of Corporationville," Economist, December 23, 1995-January 5, 1996, pp. 73-75.
22. Edward Steinfeld reported that the Anshan Iron and Steel state enterprise pays more in taxes to Beijing than the national government raises from the entire province of Guangdong with all of its prosperous VTEs and private enterprises. Part of the secret of this richest province of South China is that its successful enterprises are generally tax exempt. No one is quite sure who is ultimately responsible for the huge "state-owned" enterprises but there are people in Beijing who insist on getting tax revenues from them, and who therefore make sure that "loans are advanced to them when needed. In a sense, the state enterprises are huge "tax cows" to be milked by the state, while the VTEs are successful tax-exempt enterprises whose profits go to the banks to be passed on to the otherwise bankrupt state enterprises. (Edward Steinfeld, "Property Rights and Performance in Chinese State-Owned Enterprise Reform," Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Government, Harvard University, 1996.)