Reforming Corporatism: The French Banking Policy Community, 1941–1990

West European Politics

Volumn 16, Issue 2, 1993, Pages 122-143

  Coleman, William D ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0345224036     PISSN: 01402382     EISSN: 17439655     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/01402389308424964     Document Type: Article

References (54)

1. See Ethan B. Kapstein, ‘Resolving the Regulator's Dilemma: International Coordination of Banking Regulations’, International Organization, Vol.43 (1989), pp.323–47.
2. Michel Aglietta, Anton Brender and Virginie Coudert, Globalisation financière: l'Aventure obligée (Paris: Economica, 1990), pp.186–7.
3. Michael Moran's studies of Britain and of other countries provide significant inspiration for this study. In particular, see his study of British banking in the 1970s and early 1980s, The Politics of Banking, 2nd ed. (London Macmillan, 1986), of changes in US, Japanese and British securities markets, The Politics of the Financial Services Revolution: The USA, UK and Japan (London: Macmillan, 1991), and related studies: ‘Investor Protection and the Culture of Capitalism’, in Leigh Hancher and Moran (eds.), Capitalism, Culture and Economic Regulation (Oxford: OUP, 1989); ‘Regulating Britain, Regulating America: Corporatism and the Securities Industry’, in Colin Crouch and Ronald Dore (eds.), Corporatism and Accountability: Organized Interests in British Public Life (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990).
4. Alan Cawson, Corporatism and Political Theory (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986), p.38. For our purposes, it is important to note that Moran works with the Cawson definition as well.
5. This argument is developed at length in Moran's latest work, The Politics of Financial Services.
6. The impact of some of these processes on financial markets is discussed in Joel Dussaint and Jean-Jacques Santini, ‘Les mutations du système financier français depuis le début des années 80’, Notes Bleues (Février 1990) and Philip G. Cerny, ‘The “Little Big Bang” in Paris: Financial Market Deregulation in a Dirigiste System’, European Journal of Political Research, Vol.17 (1989), pp.169–92.
7. Fritz Scharpf, ‘Decision Rules, Decision Styles and Policy Choices’, Journal of Theoretical Politics 1/2 (1990), pp. 149–76.
8. The discussion of a continuum in regulation ranging from individual self-discipline by firms to state-centred regulation is found in J.J. Boddewyn, ‘Advertising Self-Regulation: organization structures in Belgium, Canada, France and the United Kingdom’, in W. Streeck and P.C. Schmitter (eds.), Private Interest Government (London: Sage, 1985) and in W.D. Coleman, ‘Self-Regulation in the Canadian Securities Industry: A Case Study of the Investment Dealers Association of Canada’, Canadian Public Administration, Vol.32 (1989), pp.503–23.
9. Claire Andrieu, La Banque sous l'Occupation: Paradoxes de l'hisioire d'une profession (Paris: Presses de la Fondation nationale de science politique, 1990), p.34.
10. Ibid., pp.111ff.
11. Ibid., p.115.
12. Jean Bouvier, ‘The Banque de France and the State from 1850 to the Present Day’, in G. Toniolo (ed.), Central Banks’ Independence in Historical Perspective (NY: de Gruyter, 1988), p.87. Andrieu notes that the counter-attack by the Banque de France was led by its Directeur d'Etudes, Jean Bolgert, a Protestant, who harboured little sympathy for authoritarian state structures or corporatism, [L‘Occupation, p.205].
13. The savings banks (caisses d'épargne) had had their own special regulatory arrangements since 1899, the Banques populaires since 1917, and the caisses of the Credit agricole mutuel since 1920. The authorities at the time were satisfied with these arrangements and saw no reason to change.
14. Penaud indicates that this definition included brokers, securities dealers, foreign exchange operators, cheque or discount houses, and eventually finance houses, leasing operations, factoring firms and so on. Raymond Penaud, Les institutions financières françaises, 2nd ed. (Paris: Editions La Revue Banque, 1982).
15. It is interesting to note as well that this French approach of defining credit establishments in broad terms and then making a distinction between deposit-taking banks and other financial establishments has influenced heavily EC policy, particularly as seen in the Second Banking Directive.
16. Pierre Dupont, Le contrôle des banques et la direction du crédit en France (Paris: Dunod, 1952), p.133.
17. Two of these represented local and regional banks and the other four larger Parisian-based banks. Andrieu, l'Occupation, p.185.
18. Dupont, Le contrôle des banques, p.35.
19. Ibid., p.39.
20. The chair of the committee was elected by the members. Traditionally, it came from the state-owned specialised financial institutions, to wit, the President of the Crédit fonder.
21. Michel Vasseur, Droit et Economie Bancaires: Institutions bancaires, Fasdcule B (Paris: Les Cours de Droit, 1985), p.521.
22. In addition, other changes in the law blurred the former sharp distinction between formulation and implementation in the policy community. The CCB gained some powers that clearly fell into the category of rule-making. These included the right to classify banks into categories, to authorise them to enter non-banking activities, and to fix solvability and liquidity ratios.
23. Claus Offe, ‘The Attribution of Public Status to Interest Groups: Observations on the West German Case’, in S. Berger (ed.), Organizing Interests in Western Europe (Cambridge: CUP, 1981).
24. Such dispositions had existed in the 1941 law and such powers were actually conferred on the APB by a regulation in 1944. However, the association never exercised this authority preferring the route of ‘moral suasion’ which it saw as more consistent with its associative tradition. Vasseur, Institutions bancaires, pp.214–15. The 1945 law probably acknowledged this preference of the association.
25. Scharpf, ‘Decision Rules’, (note 7) p.152.
26. Ibid., p.458.
27. Jean Bouvier, Un siècle de banque française (Paris: Hachette, 1973), pp.95–6.
28. H. Bonin, l'argent en France depuis 1880: banquiers, financiers, épargnants (Paris: Masson, 1989), p.45 and Colette Voisin, ‘Le système bancaire françèais: vingt ans de mutations’, Regards sur l'actualité. No.128 (1987), pp.3–5.
29. E.g., Francois Bloch-Lainé became President of Credit Lyonnais, Maurice Lauré of the Société Générale, and Pierre Ledoux of the BNP. Bonin, l'argent en France, p.45.
30. Ibid., pp.55–8 and André Gueslin, Le Credit Mutuel (Strasbourg: Editions Coprur, 1982), p.346.
31. Voisin, ‘Vingt ans’, p.11.
32. Conseil national du Crédit, Rapport annuel 1983 (Paris: CNC, 1983), p.125.
33. Jean-Pierre Petit, ‘Le système bancaire françèaís’, Notes bleues, No. 521 (31 Dec. 1990–6 Jan. 1991).
34. A useful summary of the CRB's powers may be found in its 1989 report to the CNC (Paris: CNC, 1990), pp.8–15.
35. Vasseur, Institutions bancaires, pp.515.
36. In an interview with the secretary-general of the CRB, it was noted that of the 32 meetings of the committee until the end of 1990, the minister had attended but three. One of these was the inaugural session and the other two were in Dec. 1985 when the questions of banks taking equity positions in non-banking firms and of the issuing of several new financial instruments were discussed. The presence or absence of the minister can be divined by noting who signed the decision of the committee. This evidence is contained in the yearly reports of the CRB/CNC.
37. Institutions bancaires, p.574.
38. These include the Caisse nationale de Credit agricole, the Chambre syndicale des Banques populaies, the Confederation nationale du Credit mutuel, the Caisse centrale de Credit cooperatif, the Federation centrale du Credit mutuel agricole et rural, and the Centre national des Caisses d'épargne et de prévoyance.
39. Interviews at the Commission bancaire, Dec. 1990.
40. In Germany, the four leading banking associations representing private banks, savings banks, financial co-operatives, and public-sector banks respectively have a semi-formal organization, the Zentral Kreditausschuß, for dealing with common questions. In contrast to AFEC, the ZKA is not comprehensive of the whole banking sector, is not compulsory, was not created by state legislation, and does not have its own staff.
41. Daniel Lebègue and Philippe Jurgensen, Le Trésor et la politique financiére (Paris: Montchrestien, 1988), p.215.
42. Association française des etablissements de crédit, Statuts (Paris: AFEC, 1987) and interview with AFEC, 25 Oct. 1990.
43. In interviews with AFEC and with other associations, it was clear that unless AFB agreed, AFEC was unlikely to adopt a position on an issue.
44. Interviews with the central organisations were conducted in Nov. and Dec. 1990.
45. These normally include representatives from the central bank, the banking supervisor, and the responsible ministry. See ‘l'élaboration du droit bancaire européen’, Bulletin de la Commission Bancaire, No. 3 (Nov. 1990).
46. Thomas Le Vignan, ‘Les Finances et “Bruxelles’”, Pouvoirs, No.53 (1990), pp.84–85.
47. Moran, Politics of Banking; ‘Regulating Britain, Regulating America’; Financial Services Revolution (all note 3).
48. Martin Boddy and Christine Lambert, ‘Corporatist Interest Intermediation: Government-Building Society Relations in the UK’, in Colin Crouch and Ronald Dore (eds.), Corporatism and Accountability: Organized Interests in British Public Life (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990).
49. See W.D. Coleman, ‘The Banking Policy Community and Financial Change’, in Coleman and Grace Skogstad (eds.), Policy Communities and Policy-Making in Canada: A Structural Approach (Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman, 1990), pp.91–117; and ‘Self-Regulation in the Canadian Securities Industry’.
50. Leigh Hancher and Michael Moran, ‘Organising Regulatory Space’, in Hancher and Moran (eds.), Capitalism, pp.271–99.
51. Jean Marcou, ‘Le corporatisme contre le corporatisme: Etude des stratégies corporatistes sous Vichy’, in Dominique Colas (ed.), l'Etat et les Corporatismes (Paris: PUF, 1988), p.87.
52. See e.g. the argument in Frank L. Wilson, ‘Les groupes d'intdrêt sous la Cinquiéme République: Test de trois modèles de l'interaction entre groupes et gouvemement’, Revue française de Science politique 33/2 (1983), p.253.
53. Jack Hayward, The State and the Market Economy: Institutional Patriotism and Economic Intervention in France (Brighton: Wheatsheaf, 1986), p.20.
54. Bruno Jobert, ‘La version française du corporatisme: définition et implications pour la modernisation de l'Etat dans une économic en crise’, in Dominique Colas (ed)., l'Etat et les Corporatismes (Paris: PUF, 1988), p.8.