Holding Intergovernmental Institutions to Account

Ethics and International Affairs

Volumn 17, Issue 1, 2003, Pages 69-80

  Woods, Ngaire ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0345135439     PISSN: 08926794     EISSN: 17477093     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1747-7093.2003.tb00419.x     Document Type: Article

References (29)

1. Meltzer Commission, “Report of the International Financial Institutions Advisory Commission” (Washington, D.C., 2000); available at www.house.gov/jec/ imf/meltzer.htm.
2. David Held, “Law of States, Law of Peoples: Three Models of Sovereignty,” Legal Theory 8 (March 2002), pp. 1–44.
3. This is more elegantly argued by Robert A. Dahl,“Can International Organizations Be Democratic? A Skeptic's View,”in Ian Shapiro and Casiano Hacker-Cordón, eds., Democracy's Edges (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 33.
4. Devesh Kapur,“Who Gets to Run the World?” Foreign Policy (November/December 2000), pp. 44–50
5. Miles Kahler, Leadership Selection in the Major Multi-laterals (Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 2001).
6. Mary Locke,“Funding the IMF: The Debate in the U.S. Congress,” Finance and Development 37 (September 2000), pp. 56–59.
7. Catherine Gwin,“U.S. Relations with the World Bank, 1945–1992,” in Devesh Kapur, John Prior Lewis, and Richard Charles Webb, eds., The World Bank: Its First Half Century, vol. 2 (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1997), pp. 195–274.
8. Devesh Kapur, “Expansive Agendas and Weak Instruments: Governance Related Conditionalities of the International Financial Institutions,” Journal of Policy Reform 4, no. 3 (2001), pp. 207–241.
9. World Trade Organization, “Multilateral Agreements on Trade in Goods,” 1994; available at www.wto.org/ english/docs_e/legal_e/legal_e.htm#goods.
10. See Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann,“The Transformation of the World Trading System through the 1994 Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,” European Journal of International Law 6, no. 2 (1995); available at www.ejil.org/journal/Vol6/No2/art1.html.
11. Paul Collier, “Learning from Failure: The International Financial Institutions as Agencies of Restraint in Africa,” in Andreas Schedler, Larry Diamond, and Marc Plattner, eds., The Self-Restraining State: Power and Accountability in New Democracies (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1999), pp. 313–332.
12. See my argument against this form of governance in Ngaire Woods, “Global Governance and the Role of Institutions,” in David Held and Anthony McGrew, eds., Governing Globalization: Power, Authority and Global Governance (Malden, Mass.: Polity Press, 2002), pp. 25–45.
13. See House of Commons Treasury Committee, “International Monetary Fund: A Blueprint for Parliamentary Accountability: Government Response to the Committee's Fourth Report of Session 2000–01,” November 26, 2001, House of Commons Paper no. 379 (London: The Stationery Office, 2001); available at www.parliament.uk/commons/selcom/trepnt08.htm
14. Bretton Woods Project Proposal to the House of Commons Development Committee, “International Development: Appendices to the Minutes of Evidence,” Appendix 2, February 10, 2000 (London: The Stationery Office, 2000); available at www.parliament. the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/cm199900/cmselect/ cmintdev/251/251ap03.htm
15. Bank Information Center, “Who is Governing the Governors? Globalization, Governance, and Democracy” (Washington, D.C.: 2000); available at www.bicusa.org/ptoc/htm/ jordan_governance.htm.
16. Indeed, the Commonwealth Secretariat's review of the role of parliaments in holding governments to account makes no mention of overseeing international institutions. See Commonwealth, “Activities” available at www.thecommonwealth.org/activities/democ.html.
17. Sam Daws and Frances Stewart, Global Challenges: An Economic and Social Security Council at the United Nations (London: Christian Aid, 2000)
18. proposes such a forum for different, more expansive rather than accountability purposes, as does Erskine Childers, “An Agenda for Peace and an Agenda for Development: The Security Council and the Economic and Social Council in the UN Reform Process” (speech given at “Colloquium on the United Nations at Fifty: Whither the Next Fifty Years?” European Parliament, Brussells, September 8, 1995); available at www.globalpolicy.org/ resource/pubs/childer2.htm.
19. The counter case has been forcefully argued in Thomas Pogge, “Achieving Democracy,” Ethics & International Affairs 15, no. 1 (2001), pp. 3–23
20. Thomas W. Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights: Cosmopolitan Responsibilities and Reforms (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2002)
21. Charles Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations, rev. ed. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999).
22. See Corporación Andina de Fomento, “About CAF,” September 11, 2002; available at www.caf.com/view/index.asp?ms=0&pageMs=4306.
23. We can contrast the experience of the Latin American Reserve Fund and its difficulties in increasing its members' contributions. See Latin American Reserve Fund, “Who Are We?” available at www.comunidadandina.org/ ingles/who/flar.htm.
24. Jos´ de Gregorio et al., An Independent and Accountable IMF (Geneva: International Centre for Monetary and Banking Studies, 1999)
25. Great Britain Department for International Development, Eliminating World Poverty: Making Globalization Work for the Poor: White Paper on International Development (London: The Stationery Office, 2000).
26. Kunibert Raffer, “Introducing Financial Accountability at the IBRD: An Overdue and Necessary Reform” (paper presented at the conference “Reinventing the World Bank,” May 14–16, 1999, Northwestern University, Ill.); available at www.worldbank.nwu.edu/ papers/raffer.rtf.
27. These points are made by Daniel Bradlow. See Working Group on Institutional Reform in Global Financial Governance, “Report of October 2002 Meeting” available at users.ox.ac.uk/~ntwoods/wg3.htm.
28. Devesh Kapur, “Who Gets to Run the World?”
29. Kahler, Leadership Selection in the Major Multilaterals.