Collaborative Institutions, Belief-Systems, and Perceived Policy Effectiveness

Political Research Quarterly

Volumn 56, Issue 3, 2003, Pages 309-323

  Lubell, Mark ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0345059862     PISSN: 10659129     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/106591290305600306     Document Type: Review

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