On the emergence of new growers' associations: Self-selection versus countervailing power

European Review of Agricultural Economics

Volumn 29, Issue 2, 2002, Pages 255-269

  Hendrikse, George ^a   Bijman, Jos ^b  

^a ERASMUS UNIVERSITY   (Netherlands)

^b WAGENINGEN UNIVERSITY   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

Countervailing power; Growers' association; Incomplete contracts; Member heterogeneity; Self selection

Indexed keywords

EID: 0345016330     PISSN: 01651587     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/eurrag/29.2.255     Document Type: Review

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