Gaming the regulator: A survey

Electricity Journal

Volumn 16, Issue 10, 2003, Pages 68-80

  Jamasb, Tooraj ^a   Nillesen, Paul ^b   Pollitt, Michael ^c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE   (United Kingdom)

^b NUON   (Netherlands)

^c UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

NATURAL MONOPOLIES; PERFORMANCE;

EID: 0344981419     PISSN: 10406190     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.tej.2003.09.008     Document Type: Article

References (23)

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