Trade-related labor and environment agreements?

Journal of International Economic Law

Volumn 5, Issue 4, 2002, Pages 791-819

  Thomas, C ^a  

^a FORDHAM UNIVERSITY   (United States)

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EID: 0344944701     PISSN: 13693034     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/jiel/5.4.791     Document Type: Article

References (160)

1. Whether or not to incorporate labor standards into the international trade regime has been a long-standing subject of debate. The international trade regime initially envisioned after World War II would explicitly have incorporated labor standards. See Art. 7, Havana Charter for an International Trade Organization (1948) ('The Members recognize that unfair labour conditions, particularly in production for export, create difficulties in international trade, and accordingly, each Member shall take whatever action may be appropriate and feasible to eliminate such conditions within its territory.'). That movement failed, and subsequent proposals for inclusion of labor standards in the regime that developed apparently failed to win approval by the other contracting parties. Addle Blackett, 'Whither Social Clause? Human Rights, Trade Theory and Treaty Interpretation', 31 Colum Hum Rts L Rev (1999) 1, n 14 (quoting US Commission on Foreign Economic Policy, Staff Papers 437-38 (1954)). Earlier attempts to establish a WTO Committee on Trade and Labor never took root. Steve Charnovitz, 'Trade, Employment and Labor Standards', 11 Temp. Int'l & Comp. LJ 131, 163 (1997).
2. Whether or not to incorporate labor standards into the international trade regime has been a long-standing subject of debate. The international trade regime initially envisioned after World War II would explicitly have incorporated labor standards. See Art. 7, Havana Charter for an International Trade Organization (1948) ('The Members recognize that unfair labour conditions, particularly in production for export, create difficulties in international trade, and accordingly, each Member shall take whatever action may be appropriate and feasible to eliminate such conditions within its territory.'). That movement failed, and subsequent proposals for inclusion of labor standards in the regime that developed apparently failed to win approval by the other contracting parties. Addle Blackett, 'Whither Social Clause? Human Rights, Trade Theory and Treaty Interpretation', 31 Colum Hum Rts L Rev (1999) 1, n 14 (quoting US Commission on Foreign Economic Policy, Staff Papers 437-38 (1954)). Earlier attempts to establish a WTO Committee on Trade and Labor never took root. Steve Charnovitz, 'Trade, Employment and Labor Standards', 11 Temp. Int'l & Comp. LJ 131, 163 (1997).
3. The agreement establishing the WTO observes in its preamble the importance of 'the optimal use of the world's resources in accordance with the objective of sustainable development, seeking ... to protect and preserve the environment ...'. Preamble, Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (1995). Despite this recognition, however, the WTO has not affirmatively incorporated international environmental standards, although it does provide 'negative rights' - provisions under which governments are allowed to take environmental measures which might restrict trade. For a fuller discussion of these provisions, see Chantal Thomas, 'Should the WTO Incorporate Labor and Environmental Standards?', Wash & Lee L Rev (2002) (forthcoming). The WTO Committee on Trade and the Environment has undertaken the role of clarifying the relationship between WTO rules and multilateral environmental agreements. The Committee has not reached definitive conclusions, but the most recent WTO Ministerial Conference committed to negotiations on the matter, and requested a report by the Committee on certain aspects of the relationship between trade and the environment for the Fifth WTO Ministerial to be held in 2003. See Ministerial Declaration, paras 31-33, adopted on 14 November 2001 (WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1). This significant forward step in determining the relationship between trade and environmental law is still consistent with the 'institutional competence' argument that the two bodies of law should reside in separate institutional mechanisms, and is to be distinguished from the affirmative incorporation of environmental standards.
4. World Trade Organization, Trading into the Future 46 (1999).
5. World Trade Organization, Trading into the Future 46 (1999) (emphasis added).
6. World Trade Organization, Trading into the Future 51 (1999) (emphasis added).
7. See generally John H. Jackson, 'The Perils of Globalization and the World Trading System', 24 Fordham Int'l LJ 471 (2000); see also John H. Jackson, 'Global Economics and International Economic Law', 1 JIEL 1 (1998).
8. See generally John H. Jackson, 'The Perils of Globalization and the World Trading System', 24 Fordham Int'l LJ 471 (2000); see also John H. Jackson, 'Global Economics and International Economic Law', 1 JIEL 1 (1998).
9. By the time the Uruguay Round began in the 1980s, the importance of internationally provided services led for a call to include services in the regulatory scope of international trade law. Jack W. Flader, Jr, 'A Call for a General Agreement on Trade in Services') 3 Transnat'l Law 661 (1990).
10. Jagdish Bhagwati's wry play on the acronym - asserting that 'TRIPs' could also be understood to mean the 'Tangentially-Related Intellectual Property Rights Agreement' - also makes the point. See Robert P. Merges, 'Battle of Lateralisms: Intellectual Property and Trade', 8 B U Int'l LJ 239, 240 n 2 (1990).
11. See below, n 35.
12. Moreover, the rights themselves may be dismantled as governments seek competitive advantage: a phenomenon known as the 'race to the bottom'. See Joel P. Trachtman, 'International Regulatory Competition, Externalization, and Jurisdiction', 34 Harv Int'l LJ 47 (1993).
13. World Trade Organization, Trading into the Future (1999) ('New internationally-agreed trade rules for intellectual property rights were seen as a way to introduce more order and predictability, and for disputes to be settled more systematically.') Prior to the Uruguay Round, multilateral instruments for intellectual property protection were administered by the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), but WIPO was widely viewed as insufficiently effectual. Brent W. Sadler, 'Intellectual Property Protection Through International Trade', 14 Hous J Int'l L 393, 400-01 (1992).
14. World Trade Organization, Trading into the Future (1999) ('New internationally-agreed trade rules for intellectual property rights were seen as a way to introduce more order and predictability, and for disputes to be settled more systematically.') Prior to the Uruguay Round, multilateral instruments for intellectual property protection were administered by the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), but WIPO was widely viewed as insufficiently effectual. Brent W. Sadler, 'Intellectual Property Protection Through International Trade', 14 Hous J Int'l L 393, 400-01 (1992).
15. IP underenforcement also provided a partial justification for US development of forceful unilateral mechanisms to pursue its interests in international IP law. Donald E. deKieffer, 'US Trade Policy Regarding Intellectual Property Matters' in George R. Stewart et al. (eds), International Trade and Intellectual Property: The Search for a Balanced System 97 (1994).
16. Brent W. Sadler, 'Intellectual Property Protection Through International Trade', 14 Hous J Int'l L 393, 400-01 (1992). The incorporation of intellectual property into the trade regime enhanced its enforceability in three ways. First, the degree of uniformity in IP protections would increase as a result of the accession of all GATT members to a negotiated set of 'core' protections. Second, international IP disputes could be addressed through the trade regime's dispute settlement system. Third, cross-sectoral links in the larger system would improve the efficacy of both negotiations and enforcement; if a complainant prevailed on IP grounds it could impose sanctions on the respondent in non-IP sectors.
17. For a more detailed discussion of enforcement within international labor and environmental law, see Chantal Thomas, 'Should the WTO Incorporate Labor and Environmental Standards?', above n 2.
18. The article does not frontally address the question of incorporating human rights into the WTO, but many labor and environment rights may be deemed to be human rights. For a discussion of this issue, see Chantal Thomas, International Human Rights and Trade (manuscript on file with author).
19. See, e.g., Paulsen K. Vandevert, 'The Uruguay Round and the World Trade Organization: A New Era Dawns in the Private Law of International Customs and Trade', 31 Case W Res J Int'l L 107 (1999).
20. More sophisticated commentators reject this distinction. See, e.g., John H. Jackson, 'International Economic Law: Reflections on the "Boiler room" of International Relations', 10 Am U J Int'l L & Pol'y 595, 597 (1995) ('International Economic Law (IEL) cannot be separated or compartmentalized from general or "public" international law. The activities and cases relating to IEL contain much practice which is relevant to general principles of international law, especially concerning treaty law and practice.')
21. The law governing international (or domestic) contracts is a prime example of private law. For a discussion of international contract principles, see Joseph M. Perillo, 'Force Majeure and Hardship under the Unidroit Principles of International Commercial Contracts', 5 Tul J Int'l & Comp L 5 (1997); Luiz Olavo Baptista, 'The Unidroit Principles for International Commercial Law Project: Aspects of International Private Law', 69 Tul L Rev 1209 (1995). The 'public-private' distinction in and of itself has come under extensive scrutiny. See, e.g., Robert L. Hale, 'Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non- Coercive State', 38 Pol Sci Q 470 (1923); Duncan Kennedy, 'From the Will Theory to the Principle of Private Autonomy', 100 Colum L Rev 94, 107 (2000). Although the critique of the public-private distinction is warranted, the point I am making here is that even accepting this distinction on its own terms, it has not been accurately applied to international trade law.
22. The law governing international (or domestic) contracts is a prime example of private law. For a discussion of international contract principles, see Joseph M. Perillo, 'Force Majeure and Hardship under the Unidroit Principles of International Commercial Contracts', 5 Tul J Int'l & Comp L 5 (1997); Luiz Olavo Baptista, 'The Unidroit Principles for International Commercial Law Project: Aspects of International Private Law', 69 Tul L Rev 1209 (1995). The 'public-private' distinction in and of itself has come under extensive scrutiny. See, e.g., Robert L. Hale, 'Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non- Coercive State', 38 Pol Sci Q 470 (1923); Duncan Kennedy, 'From the Will Theory to the Principle of Private Autonomy', 100 Colum L Rev 94, 107 (2000). Although the critique of the public-private distinction is warranted, the point I am making here is that even accepting this distinction on its own terms, it has not been accurately applied to international trade law.
23. The law governing international (or domestic) contracts is a prime example of private law. For a discussion of international contract principles, see Joseph M. Perillo, 'Force Majeure and Hardship under the Unidroit Principles of International Commercial Contracts', 5 Tul J Int'l & Comp L 5 (1997); Luiz Olavo Baptista, 'The Unidroit Principles for International Commercial Law Project: Aspects of International Private Law', 69 Tul L Rev 1209 (1995). The 'public-private' distinction in and of itself has come under extensive scrutiny. See, e.g., Robert L. Hale, 'Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non- Coercive State', 38 Pol Sci Q 470 (1923); Duncan Kennedy, 'From the Will Theory to the Principle of Private Autonomy', 100 Colum L Rev 94, 107 (2000). Although the critique of the public-private distinction is warranted, the point I am making here is that even accepting this distinction on its own terms, it has not been accurately applied to international trade law.
24. The law governing international (or domestic) contracts is a prime example of private law. For a discussion of international contract principles, see Joseph M. Perillo, 'Force Majeure and Hardship under the Unidroit Principles of International Commercial Contracts', 5 Tul J Int'l & Comp L 5 (1997); Luiz Olavo Baptista, 'The Unidroit Principles for International Commercial Law Project: Aspects of International Private Law', 69 Tul L Rev 1209 (1995). The 'public-private' distinction in and of itself has come under extensive scrutiny. See, e.g., Robert L. Hale, 'Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non- Coercive State', 38 Pol Sci Q 470 (1923); Duncan Kennedy, 'From the Will Theory to the Principle of Private Autonomy', 100 Colum L Rev 94, 107 (2000). Although the critique of the public-private distinction is warranted, the point I am making here is that even accepting this distinction on its own terms, it has not been accurately applied to international trade law.
25. See Robert Howse and Makau Mutua, Protecting Human Rights in a Global Economy: Challenges for the World Trade Organization 19 (Int'l Centre for Human Rts & Democratic Dev, Policy Paper, 2000).
26. See, e.g., Detlev Vagts and John H. Jackson, Book Review, 'Law and Its Limitations in the GATT Multilateral Trade System', 82 Am J Int'l L 653, 653-54 (1988). This pragmatic approach flowed from a 'cosmopolitan' approach to international law and policy. See David Kennedy, 'The International Style in Post-War Law & Policy', 7 Utah L Rev 6 (1994).
27. See, e.g., Detlev Vagts and John H. Jackson, Book Review, 'Law and Its Limitations in the GATT Multilateral Trade System', 82 Am J Int'l L 653, 653-54 (1988). This pragmatic approach flowed from a 'cosmopolitan' approach to international law and policy. See David Kennedy, 'The International Style in Post-War Law & Policy', 7 Utah L Rev 6 (1994).
28. Pockets of entrenched non-compliance included industrialized-country disregard for GATT disciplines on textiles and agriculture. See Olivier Long, 'Law and Its Limitations in the GATT Multilateral Trade System' 56 (1985). If developing countries had a less glaring problem with formal compliance, it was because they argued that the principle of 'special and differential treatment' should exempt them from many GATT rules. See Robert E. Hudec, Developing Countries in the GATT Legal System 30 (1987); Chantal Thomas, 'Balance-of-Payments Crises in the Developing World: Balancing Trade, Finance and Development in the New Economic Order', 15 Am U Int'l L Rev 1249, 1259-60 (2000).
29. Pockets of entrenched non-compliance included industrialized-country disregard for GATT disciplines on textiles and agriculture. See Olivier Long, 'Law and Its Limitations in the GATT Multilateral Trade System' 56 (1985). If developing countries had a less glaring problem with formal compliance, it was because they argued that the principle of 'special and differential treatment' should exempt them from many GATT rules. See Robert E. Hudec, Developing Countries in the GATT Legal System 30 (1987); Chantal Thomas, 'Balance-of-Payments Crises in the Developing World: Balancing Trade, Finance and Development in the New Economic Order', 15 Am U Int'l L Rev 1249, 1259-60 (2000).
30. Pockets of entrenched non-compliance included industrialized-country disregard for GATT disciplines on textiles and agriculture. See Olivier Long, 'Law and Its Limitations in the GATT Multilateral Trade System' 56 (1985). If developing countries had a less glaring problem with formal compliance, it was because they argued that the principle of 'special and differential treatment' should exempt them from many GATT rules. See Robert E. Hudec, Developing Countries in the GATT Legal System 30 (1987); Chantal Thomas, 'Balance-of-Payments Crises in the Developing World: Balancing Trade, Finance and Development in the New Economic Order', 15 Am U Int'l L Rev 1249, 1259-60 (2000).
31. Kenneth W. Abbott, 'The Many Faces of International Legalization', 92 Am Soc'y Int'l L Proc 58 (1998); Miquel Montana i Mora, 'A GATT with Teeth: Law Wins over Politics in the Resolution of International Trade Disputes', 31 Colum J Transnat'l L 103 (1993); Sylvia Ostry, 'Reinforcing the WTO' 21 (1998); G. Richard Shell, 'Trade Legalism and International Relations Theory: An Analysis of the World Trade Organization', Duke LJ 833 (1995) ('[T]he new WTO system represents a stunning victory for international trade "legalists" in their running debate with trade "pragmatists". . .'); Chantal Thomas, above n 21, at 1249, 1250 ('[I]nstitutionally, the order has moved away from "pragmatism" and towards "legalism."').
32. Kenneth W. Abbott, 'The Many Faces of International Legalization', 92 Am Soc'y Int'l L Proc 58 (1998); Miquel Montana i Mora, 'A GATT with Teeth: Law Wins over Politics in the Resolution of International Trade Disputes', 31 Colum J Transnat'l L 103 (1993); Sylvia Ostry, 'Reinforcing the WTO' 21 (1998); G. Richard Shell, 'Trade Legalism and International Relations Theory: An Analysis of the World Trade Organization', Duke LJ 833 (1995) ('[T]he new WTO system represents a stunning victory for international trade "legalists" in their running debate with trade "pragmatists". . .'); Chantal Thomas, above n 21, at 1249, 1250 ('[I]nstitutionally, the order has moved away from "pragmatism" and towards "legalism."').
33. Kenneth W. Abbott, 'The Many Faces of International Legalization', 92 Am Soc'y Int'l L Proc 58 (1998); Miquel Montana i Mora, 'A GATT with Teeth: Law Wins over Politics in the Resolution of International Trade Disputes', 31 Colum J Transnat'l L 103 (1993); Sylvia Ostry, 'Reinforcing the WTO' 21 (1998); G. Richard Shell, 'Trade Legalism and International Relations Theory: An Analysis of the World Trade Organization', Duke LJ 833 (1995) ('[T]he new WTO system represents a stunning victory for international trade "legalists" in their running debate with trade "pragmatists". . .'); Chantal Thomas, above n 21, at 1249, 1250 ('[I]nstitutionally, the order has moved away from "pragmatism" and towards "legalism."').
34. Kenneth W. Abbott, 'The Many Faces of International Legalization', 92 Am Soc'y Int'l L Proc 58 (1998); Miquel Montana i Mora, 'A GATT with Teeth: Law Wins over Politics in the Resolution of International Trade Disputes', 31 Colum J Transnat'l L 103 (1993); Sylvia Ostry, 'Reinforcing the WTO' 21 (1998); G. Richard Shell, 'Trade Legalism and International Relations Theory: An Analysis of the World Trade Organization', Duke LJ 833 (1995) ('[T]he new WTO system represents a stunning victory for international trade "legalists" in their running debate with trade "pragmatists". . .'); Chantal Thomas, above n 21, at 1249, 1250 ('[I]nstitutionally, the order has moved away from "pragmatism" and towards "legalism."').
35. Kenneth W. Abbott, 'The Many Faces of International Legalization', 92 Am Soc'y Int'l L Proc 58 (1998); Miquel Montana i Mora, 'A GATT with Teeth: Law Wins over Politics in the Resolution of International Trade Disputes', 31 Colum J Transnat'l L 103 (1993); Sylvia Ostry, 'Reinforcing the WTO' 21 (1998); G. Richard Shell, 'Trade Legalism and International Relations Theory: An Analysis of the World Trade Organization', Duke LJ 833 (1995) ('[T]he new WTO system represents a stunning victory for international trade "legalists" in their running debate with trade "pragmatists". . .'); Chantal Thomas, above n 21, at 1249, 1250 ('[I]nstitutionally, the order has moved away from "pragmatism" and towards "legalism."').
36. On the positive side, the view is that the WTO's authoritativeness will promote labor and environment standards more effectively than any other available mechanism. See Gregory Shaffer, 'WTO Blue-Green Blues: The Impact of US Domestic Politics on Trade- Labor, Trade-Environment Linkages for the WTO's Future', 24 Fordham Int'l LJ 608 (2000). On the negative side, the fear is that without integration, trade standards will be enforced at the expense of labor and environmental standards. See, e.g., Chantell Taylor, 'NAFTA, GATT, and the Current Free Trade System: A Dangerous Double Standard for Workers' Rights', 28 Denv J Int'l L & Pol'y 401 (2000).
37. On the positive side, the view is that the WTO's authoritativeness will promote labor and environment standards more effectively than any other available mechanism. See Gregory Shaffer, 'WTO Blue-Green Blues: The Impact of US Domestic Politics on Trade- Labor, Trade-Environment Linkages for the WTO's Future', 24 Fordham Int'l LJ 608 (2000). On the negative side, the fear is that without integration, trade standards will be enforced at the expense of labor and environmental standards. See, e.g., Chantell Taylor, 'NAFTA, GATT, and the Current Free Trade System: A Dangerous Double Standard for Workers' Rights', 28 Denv J Int'l L & Pol'y 401 (2000).
38. If the 'public international law' system has historically been associated with an aspiration towards a formal and consistent ordering of states and norms, in which interstate disputes are resolved by some judicial or quasi-judicial process (a role assigned to the International Court of Justice within the United Nations system), then the WTO is more 'public' than most 'public' institutions. Cf. Kenneth W. Abbott, 'GATT as a Public Institution: The Uruguay Round and Beyond', 18 Brook. J Int'l L 31 (1992). The public international law system now seems more 'pragmatic' than does the international trade regime. Whereas the WTO regularly and vigorously employs its dispute settlement system, the primary enforcement strategy for public international standards (like labor and the environment) is the so-called 'soft law' approach. Gunther F. Handl et al., 'A Hard Look At Soft Law', 82 Am Soc'y Int'l L Proc 371 (1988). A related argument could be made that the WTO as a forum is less appropriate for public decisions than are the fora of the United Nations and other public bodies. Both fora are populated mainly by governments, but the UN in the past has benefited more from participation and input by nongovernmental organizations than has the WTO. Commentators have criticized the WTO as possessing 'technocratic' leanings. See, e.g., Paul B. Stephan, 'The New International Law - Legitimacy, Accountability, Authority, and Freedom in the New Global Order', 70 U Colo L Rev 1555, 1560 (1999). The WTO has made some efforts to reject that image. The WTO General Council adopted a set of 'guidelines for arrangements on relations with non-governmental organizations'. See Decision adopted by the General Council on 18 July 1996, WT/L/162. This effort has stalled somewhat, however. For a general discussion see Jeffrey L. Dunoff, 'The WTO in Transition: Of Constituents, Competence and Coherence', 33 Geo Wash Int'l L Rev 979 (2000).
39. If the 'public international law' system has historically been associated with an aspiration towards a formal and consistent ordering of states and norms, in which interstate disputes are resolved by some judicial or quasi-judicial process (a role assigned to the International Court of Justice within the United Nations system), then the WTO is more 'public' than most 'public' institutions. Cf. Kenneth W. Abbott, 'GATT as a Public Institution: The Uruguay Round and Beyond', 18 Brook. J Int'l L 31 (1992). The public international law system now seems more 'pragmatic' than does the international trade regime. Whereas the WTO regularly and vigorously employs its dispute settlement system, the primary enforcement strategy for public international standards (like labor and the environment) is the so-called 'soft law' approach. Gunther F. Handl et al., 'A Hard Look At Soft Law', 82 Am Soc'y Int'l L Proc 371 (1988). A related argument could be made that the WTO as a forum is less appropriate for public decisions than are the fora of the United Nations and other public bodies. Both fora are populated mainly by governments, but the UN in the past has benefited more from participation and input by nongovernmental organizations than has the WTO. Commentators have criticized the WTO as possessing 'technocratic' leanings. See, e.g., Paul B. Stephan, 'The New International Law - Legitimacy, Accountability, Authority, and Freedom in the New Global Order', 70 U Colo L Rev 1555, 1560 (1999). The WTO has made some efforts to reject that image. The WTO General Council adopted a set of 'guidelines for arrangements on relations with non-governmental organizations'. See Decision adopted by the General Council on 18 July 1996, WT/L/162. This effort has stalled somewhat, however. For a general discussion see Jeffrey L. Dunoff, 'The WTO in Transition: Of Constituents, Competence and Coherence', 33 Geo Wash Int'l L Rev 979 (2000).
40. If the 'public international law' system has historically been associated with an aspiration towards a formal and consistent ordering of states and norms, in which interstate disputes are resolved by some judicial or quasi-judicial process (a role assigned to the International Court of Justice within the United Nations system), then the WTO is more 'public' than most 'public' institutions. Cf. Kenneth W. Abbott, 'GATT as a Public Institution: The Uruguay Round and Beyond', 18 Brook. J Int'l L 31 (1992). The public international law system now seems more 'pragmatic' than does the international trade regime. Whereas the WTO regularly and vigorously employs its dispute settlement system, the primary enforcement strategy for public international standards (like labor and the environment) is the so-called 'soft law' approach. Gunther F. Handl et al., 'A Hard Look At Soft Law', 82 Am Soc'y Int'l L Proc 371 (1988). A related argument could be made that the WTO as a forum is less appropriate for public decisions than are the fora of the United Nations and other public bodies. Both fora are populated mainly by governments, but the UN in the past has benefited more from participation and input by nongovernmental organizations than has the WTO. Commentators have criticized the WTO as possessing 'technocratic' leanings. See, e.g., Paul B. Stephan, 'The New International Law - Legitimacy, Accountability, Authority, and Freedom in the New Global Order', 70 U Colo L Rev 1555, 1560 (1999). The WTO has made some efforts to reject that image. The WTO General Council adopted a set of 'guidelines for arrangements on relations with non-governmental organizations'. See Decision adopted by the General Council on 18 July 1996, WT/L/162. This effort has stalled somewhat, however. For a general discussion see Jeffrey L. Dunoff, 'The WTO in Transition: Of Constituents, Competence and Coherence', 33 Geo Wash Int'l L Rev 979 (2000).
41. If the 'public international law' system has historically been associated with an aspiration towards a formal and consistent ordering of states and norms, in which interstate disputes are resolved by some judicial or quasi-judicial process (a role assigned to the International Court of Justice within the United Nations system), then the WTO is more 'public' than most 'public' institutions. Cf. Kenneth W. Abbott, 'GATT as a Public Institution: The Uruguay Round and Beyond', 18 Brook. J Int'l L 31 (1992). The public international law system now seems more 'pragmatic' than does the international trade regime. Whereas the WTO regularly and vigorously employs its dispute settlement system, the primary enforcement strategy for public international standards (like labor and the environment) is the so-called 'soft law' approach. Gunther F. Handl et al., 'A Hard Look At Soft Law', 82 Am Soc'y Int'l L Proc 371 (1988). A related argument could be made that the WTO as a forum is less appropriate for public decisions than are the fora of the United Nations and other public bodies. Both fora are populated mainly by governments, but the UN in the past has benefited more from participation and input by nongovernmental organizations than has the WTO. Commentators have criticized the WTO as possessing 'technocratic' leanings. See, e.g., Paul B. Stephan, 'The New International Law - Legitimacy, Accountability, Authority, and Freedom in the New Global Order', 70 U Colo L Rev 1555, 1560 (1999). The WTO has made some efforts to reject that image. The WTO General Council adopted a set of 'guidelines for arrangements on relations with non-governmental organizations'. See Decision adopted by the General Council on 18 July 1996, WT/L/162. This effort has stalled somewhat, however. For a general discussion see Jeffrey L. Dunoff, 'The WTO in Transition: Of Constituents, Competence and Coherence', 33 Geo Wash Int'l L Rev 979 (2000).
42. Robert E. Hudec, The New WTO Dispute Settlement Procedure: An Overview of the First Three Years', 8 Minn J Global Trade 1, 14 (1999).
43. Para 20, WTO, Singapore Ministerial Declaration, WT/MIN(96)/DEC, adopted 13 December 1996, 36 ILM 220 (1997). Controversy and disagreement run high over the matter, however. 'WTO: Business Groups Say Too Early for WTO to Set Framework for Competition Policy', BNA International Trade Daily News (14 September 1999). This can be distinguished from the recent WTO commitment to negotiate the relationship between WTO rules and existing environmental agreements, rather than to establish a WTO environment agreement. See Ministerial Declaration, paras 31-33, adopted on 14 November 2001 (WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1).
44. Para 20, WTO, Singapore Ministerial Declaration, WT/MIN(96)/DEC, adopted 13 December 1996, 36 ILM 220 (1997). Controversy and disagreement run high over the matter, however. 'WTO: Business Groups Say Too Early for WTO to Set Framework for Competition Policy', BNA International Trade Daily News (14 September 1999). This can be distinguished from the recent WTO commitment to negotiate the relationship between WTO rules and existing environmental agreements, rather than to establish a WTO environment agreement. See Ministerial Declaration, paras 31-33, adopted on 14 November 2001 (WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1).
45. Para 20, WTO, Singapore Ministerial Declaration, WT/MIN(96)/DEC, adopted 13 December 1996, 36 ILM 220 (1997). Controversy and disagreement run high over the matter, however. 'WTO: Business Groups Say Too Early for WTO to Set Framework for Competition Policy', BNA International Trade Daily News (14 September 1999). This can be distinguished from the recent WTO commitment to negotiate the relationship between WTO rules and existing environmental agreements, rather than to establish a WTO environment agreement. See Ministerial Declaration, paras 31-33, adopted on 14 November 2001 (WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1).
46. See Preamble, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (avowing a commitment to 'expanding the production and exchange of goods'); Preamble, Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (1995) (establishing a commitment to 'expanding the production of and trade in goods and services').
47. See, e.g., Office of the United States Trade Representative Report on Trade Expansion Priorities Pursuant to. Executive Order 13116 ('Super 301'), 66 Fed Reg 23064-01 (2001) (identifying eleven 'trade expansion priorities', among which are included five IP issues). Joel R. Reidenberg, 'Trade, TRIPS and NAFTA', 4 Fordham Intell Prop Media & Ent LJ 283 (1993). The argument likens IP rights to traditional property rights and argues that their enforcement is a necessary prerequisite to efficient market function. F. Scott Kieff, 'Property Rights and Property Rules for Commercializing Inventions', 85 Minn L Rev 697 (2001). Of course, a strong argument can be made that IP enforcement does not expand, but rather impedes, international trade. This argument would reject the analogy of IP rights to traditional property rights, and would instead liken IP rights to monopoly rights. See Laurinda L. Hicks and James R. Holbein, 'Convergence of National Intellectual Property Norms in International Trading Agreements', 12 Am U J Int'l L & Pol'y 769 (1997) ('There is an inherent conflict... between the free circulation of goods and services across countries' borders and the exclusive right of intellectual property owners to explore their creation at the exclusion of others, thus restricting the free circulation of goods and services within the common market.'). Since the monopoly keeps prices high, world demand - and therefore world trade - in these sectors remains lower than it would be if greater competition were allowed. See, e.g., Ruth G. Okediji, 'Copyright and Public Welfare in Global Perspective', 7 Ind J Global Legal Stud 117 (1999). In fact, there is a real rift in perspective that tracks the North-South divide. See Marshall A. Leafier, 'Protecting United States Intellectual Property Abroad: Toward a New Multilateralism', 76 Iowa L Rev 273, 282 (1991). Despite this divide, the view of IP protection as a facilitator, rather than inhibitor, of international trade prevailed and culminated in the TRIPs agreement. See, e.g., Evelyn Su, 'The Winners and the Losers: The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights and its Effects on Developing Countries', 23 Hous J Int'l L 169 (2000).
48. See, e.g., Office of the United States Trade Representative Report on Trade Expansion Priorities Pursuant to. Executive Order 13116 ('Super 301'), 66 Fed Reg 23064-01 (2001) (identifying eleven 'trade expansion priorities', among which are included five IP issues). Joel R. Reidenberg, 'Trade, TRIPS and NAFTA', 4 Fordham Intell Prop Media & Ent LJ 283 (1993). The argument likens IP rights to traditional property rights and argues that their enforcement is a necessary prerequisite to efficient market function. F. Scott Kieff, 'Property Rights and Property Rules for Commercializing Inventions', 85 Minn L Rev 697 (2001). Of course, a strong argument can be made that IP enforcement does not expand, but rather impedes, international trade. This argument would reject the analogy of IP rights to traditional property rights, and would instead liken IP rights to monopoly rights. See Laurinda L. Hicks and James R. Holbein, 'Convergence of National Intellectual Property Norms in International Trading Agreements', 12 Am U J Int'l L & Pol'y 769 (1997) ('There is an inherent conflict... between the free circulation of goods and services across countries' borders and the exclusive right of intellectual property owners to explore their creation at the exclusion of others, thus restricting the free circulation of goods and services within the common market.'). Since the monopoly keeps prices high, world demand - and therefore world trade - in these sectors remains lower than it would be if greater competition were allowed. See, e.g., Ruth G. Okediji, 'Copyright and Public Welfare in Global Perspective', 7 Ind J Global Legal Stud 117 (1999). In fact, there is a real rift in perspective that tracks the North-South divide. See Marshall A. Leafier, 'Protecting United States Intellectual Property Abroad: Toward a New Multilateralism', 76 Iowa L Rev 273, 282 (1991). Despite this divide, the view of IP protection as a facilitator, rather than inhibitor, of international trade prevailed and culminated in the TRIPs agreement. See, e.g., Evelyn Su, 'The Winners and the Losers: The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights and its Effects on Developing Countries', 23 Hous J Int'l L 169 (2000).
49. See, e.g., Office of the United States Trade Representative Report on Trade Expansion Priorities Pursuant to. Executive Order 13116 ('Super 301'), 66 Fed Reg 23064-01 (2001) (identifying eleven 'trade expansion priorities', among which are included five IP issues). Joel R. Reidenberg, 'Trade, TRIPS and NAFTA', 4 Fordham Intell Prop Media & Ent LJ 283 (1993). The argument likens IP rights to traditional property rights and argues that their enforcement is a necessary prerequisite to efficient market function. F. Scott Kieff, 'Property Rights and Property Rules for Commercializing Inventions', 85 Minn L Rev 697 (2001). Of course, a strong argument can be made that IP enforcement does not expand, but rather impedes, international trade. This argument would reject the analogy of IP rights to traditional property rights, and would instead liken IP rights to monopoly rights. See Laurinda L. Hicks and James R. Holbein, 'Convergence of National Intellectual Property Norms in International Trading Agreements', 12 Am U J Int'l L & Pol'y 769 (1997) ('There is an inherent conflict... between the free circulation of goods and services across countries' borders and the exclusive right of intellectual property owners to explore their creation at the exclusion of others, thus restricting the free circulation of goods and services within the common market.'). Since the monopoly keeps prices high, world demand - and therefore world trade - in these sectors remains lower than it would be if greater competition were allowed. See, e.g., Ruth G. Okediji, 'Copyright and Public Welfare in Global Perspective', 7 Ind J Global Legal Stud 117 (1999). In fact, there is a real rift in perspective that tracks the North-South divide. See Marshall A. Leafier, 'Protecting United States Intellectual Property Abroad: Toward a New Multilateralism', 76 Iowa L Rev 273, 282 (1991). Despite this divide, the view of IP protection as a facilitator, rather than inhibitor, of international trade prevailed and culminated in the TRIPs agreement. See, e.g., Evelyn Su, 'The Winners and the Losers: The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights and its Effects on Developing Countries', 23 Hous J Int'l L 169 (2000).
50. See, e.g., Office of the United States Trade Representative Report on Trade Expansion Priorities Pursuant to. Executive Order 13116 ('Super 301'), 66 Fed Reg 23064-01 (2001) (identifying eleven 'trade expansion priorities', among which are included five IP issues). Joel R. Reidenberg, 'Trade, TRIPS and NAFTA', 4 Fordham Intell Prop Media & Ent LJ 283 (1993). The argument likens IP rights to traditional property rights and argues that their enforcement is a necessary prerequisite to efficient market function. F. Scott Kieff, 'Property Rights and Property Rules for Commercializing Inventions', 85 Minn L Rev 697 (2001). Of course, a strong argument can be made that IP enforcement does not expand, but rather impedes, international trade. This argument would reject the analogy of IP rights to traditional property rights, and would instead liken IP rights to monopoly rights. See Laurinda L. Hicks and James R. Holbein, 'Convergence of National Intellectual Property Norms in International Trading Agreements', 12 Am U J Int'l L & Pol'y 769 (1997) ('There is an inherent conflict... between the free circulation of goods and services across countries' borders and the exclusive right of intellectual property owners to explore their creation at the exclusion of others, thus restricting the free circulation of goods and services within the common market.'). Since the monopoly keeps prices high, world demand - and therefore world trade - in these sectors remains lower than it would be if greater competition were allowed. See, e.g., Ruth G. Okediji, 'Copyright and Public Welfare in Global Perspective', 7 Ind J Global Legal Stud 117 (1999). In fact, there is a real rift in perspective that tracks the North-South divide. See Marshall A. Leafier, 'Protecting United States Intellectual Property Abroad: Toward a New Multilateralism', 76 Iowa L Rev 273, 282 (1991). Despite this divide, the view of IP protection as a facilitator, rather than inhibitor, of international trade prevailed and culminated in the TRIPs agreement. See, e.g., Evelyn Su, 'The Winners and the Losers: The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights and its Effects on Developing Countries', 23 Hous J Int'l L 169 (2000).
51. See, e.g., Office of the United States Trade Representative Report on Trade Expansion Priorities Pursuant to. Executive Order 13116 ('Super 301'), 66 Fed Reg 23064-01 (2001) (identifying eleven 'trade expansion priorities', among which are included five IP issues). Joel R. Reidenberg, 'Trade, TRIPS and NAFTA', 4 Fordham Intell Prop Media & Ent LJ 283 (1993). The argument likens IP rights to traditional property rights and argues that their enforcement is a necessary prerequisite to efficient market function. F. Scott Kieff, 'Property Rights and Property Rules for Commercializing Inventions', 85 Minn L Rev 697 (2001). Of course, a strong argument can be made that IP enforcement does not expand, but rather impedes, international trade. This argument would reject the analogy of IP rights to traditional property rights, and would instead liken IP rights to monopoly rights. See Laurinda L. Hicks and James R. Holbein, 'Convergence of National Intellectual Property Norms in International Trading Agreements', 12 Am U J Int'l L & Pol'y 769 (1997) ('There is an inherent conflict... between the free circulation of goods and services across countries' borders and the exclusive right of intellectual property owners to explore their creation at the exclusion of others, thus restricting the free circulation of goods and services within the common market.'). Since the monopoly keeps prices high, world demand - and therefore world trade - in these sectors remains lower than it would be if greater competition were allowed. See, e.g., Ruth G. Okediji, 'Copyright and Public Welfare in Global Perspective', 7 Ind J Global Legal Stud 117 (1999). In fact, there is a real rift in perspective that tracks the North-South divide. See Marshall A. Leafier, 'Protecting United States Intellectual Property Abroad: Toward a New Multilateralism', 76 Iowa L Rev 273, 282 (1991). Despite this divide, the view of IP protection as a facilitator, rather than inhibitor, of international trade prevailed and culminated in the TRIPs agreement. See, e.g., Evelyn Su, 'The Winners and the Losers: The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights and its Effects on Developing Countries', 23 Hous J Int'l L 169 (2000).
52. See, e.g., Office of the United States Trade Representative Report on Trade Expansion Priorities Pursuant to. Executive Order 13116 ('Super 301'), 66 Fed Reg 23064-01 (2001) (identifying eleven 'trade expansion priorities', among which are included five IP issues). Joel R. Reidenberg, 'Trade, TRIPS and NAFTA', 4 Fordham Intell Prop Media & Ent LJ 283 (1993). The argument likens IP rights to traditional property rights and argues that their enforcement is a necessary prerequisite to efficient market function. F. Scott Kieff, 'Property Rights and Property Rules for Commercializing Inventions', 85 Minn L Rev 697 (2001). Of course, a strong argument can be made that IP enforcement does not expand, but rather impedes, international trade. This argument would reject the analogy of IP rights to traditional property rights, and would instead liken IP rights to monopoly rights. See Laurinda L. Hicks and James R. Holbein, 'Convergence of National Intellectual Property Norms in International Trading Agreements', 12 Am U J Int'l L & Pol'y 769 (1997) ('There is an inherent conflict... between the free circulation of goods and services across countries' borders and the exclusive right of intellectual property owners to explore their creation at the exclusion of others, thus restricting the free circulation of goods and services within the common market.'). Since the monopoly keeps prices high, world demand - and therefore world trade - in these sectors remains lower than it would be if greater competition were allowed. See, e.g., Ruth G. Okediji, 'Copyright and Public Welfare in Global Perspective', 7 Ind J Global Legal Stud 117 (1999). In fact, there is a real rift in perspective that tracks the North-South divide. See Marshall A. Leafier, 'Protecting United States Intellectual Property Abroad: Toward a New Multilateralism', 76 Iowa L Rev 273, 282 (1991). Despite this divide, the view of IP protection as a facilitator, rather than inhibitor, of international trade prevailed and culminated in the TRIPs agreement. See, e.g., Evelyn Su, 'The Winners and the Losers: The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights and its Effects on Developing Countries', 23 Hous J Int'l L 169 (2000).
53. Preamble, Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (1995).
54. Recently, a study commissioned by the WTO Committee on Trade and Environment found that, although environmental protection does increase production cost, its 'competitiveness effect' is ultimately minor. Håkan Nordström and Scott Vaughan, WTO Special Study, Trade and Environment 39 (1999). The report found that compliance costs are likely to be offset by cost-saving efficiency gains elsewhere in the production process. Id at 50-62 (1999). In addition, the report found that, 'environmental regulations are at most of secondary importance for international investment decisions', so that most industries did 'not migrat[e] from developed to developing countries to reduce environmental compliance costs'. Id, 73-79. With respect to labor regulation, some commentators have argued that many labor protections will have little or no impact on the cost of production. A state's commitment to protecting the right to freedom of association, for example, imposes no immediate cost on producers. See Clyde Summers, 'The Battle in Seattle: Free Trade, Labor Rights, and Societal Values', 22 U Pa J Int'l Econ L 61, 67 (2001). The long-term validity of this argument is questionable, however. Increased freedom of association may well lead to increased union formation, which will in turn lead to increased success in the introduction of certain concessions to labor, such as increased wages and safety measures and decreased workweeks. Such concessions would almost certainly raise the marginal cost of labor. The common assumption is that increasing the cost of labor will increase the overall cost of production, and therefore will tend to increase price. Increased price will in turn tend to decrease consumption and therefore trade volume. Yet this assumption need not hold - increased labor costs need not increase overall production costs. On the contrary, improving labor conditions tends to increase labor productivity so that output per cost unit of labor actually increases. See OECD, Trade, Employment, and Labour Standards: A Study of Core Workers' Rights and International Trade 80-82 (1996); see also Blackett, above n 1, at 49 (1999).
55. Recently, a study commissioned by the WTO Committee on Trade and Environment found that, although environmental protection does increase production cost, its 'competitiveness effect' is ultimately minor. Håkan Nordström and Scott Vaughan, WTO Special Study, Trade and Environment 39 (1999). The report found that compliance costs are likely to be offset by cost-saving efficiency gains elsewhere in the production process. Id at 50-62 (1999). In addition, the report found that, 'environmental regulations are at most of secondary importance for international investment decisions', so that most industries did 'not migrat[e] from developed to developing countries to reduce environmental compliance costs'. Id, 73-79. With respect to labor regulation, some commentators have argued that many labor protections will have little or no impact on the cost of production. A state's commitment to protecting the right to freedom of association, for example, imposes no immediate cost on producers. See Clyde Summers, 'The Battle in Seattle: Free Trade, Labor Rights, and Societal Values', 22 U Pa J Int'l Econ L 61, 67 (2001). The long-term validity of this argument is questionable, however. Increased freedom of association may well lead to increased union formation, which will in turn lead to increased success in the introduction of certain concessions to labor, such as increased wages and safety measures and decreased workweeks. Such concessions would almost certainly raise the marginal cost of labor. The common assumption is that increasing the cost of labor will increase the overall cost of production, and therefore will tend to increase price. Increased price will in turn tend to decrease consumption and therefore trade volume. Yet this assumption need not hold - increased labor costs need not increase overall production costs. On the contrary, improving labor conditions tends to increase labor productivity so that output per cost unit of labor actually increases. See OECD, Trade, Employment, and Labour Standards: A Study of Core Workers' Rights and International Trade 80-82 (1996); see also Blackett, above n 1, at 49 (1999).
56. Recently, a study commissioned by the WTO Committee on Trade and Environment found that, although environmental protection does increase production cost, its 'competitiveness effect' is ultimately minor. Håkan Nordström and Scott Vaughan, WTO Special Study, Trade and Environment 39 (1999). The report found that compliance costs are likely to be offset by cost-saving efficiency gains elsewhere in the production process. Id at 50-62 (1999). In addition, the report found that, 'environmental regulations are at most of secondary importance for international investment decisions', so that most industries did 'not migrat[e] from developed to developing countries to reduce environmental compliance costs'. Id, 73-79. With respect to labor regulation, some commentators have argued that many labor protections will have little or no impact on the cost of production. A state's commitment to protecting the right to freedom of association, for example, imposes no immediate cost on producers. See Clyde Summers, 'The Battle in Seattle: Free Trade, Labor Rights, and Societal Values', 22 U Pa J Int'l Econ L 61, 67 (2001). The long-term validity of this argument is questionable, however. Increased freedom of association may well lead to increased union formation, which will in turn lead to increased success in the introduction of certain concessions to labor, such as increased wages and safety measures and decreased workweeks. Such concessions would almost certainly raise the marginal cost of labor. The common assumption is that increasing the cost of labor will increase the overall cost of production, and therefore will tend to increase price. Increased price will in turn tend to decrease consumption and therefore trade volume. Yet this assumption need not hold - increased labor costs need not increase overall production costs. On the contrary, improving labor conditions tends to increase labor productivity so that output per cost unit of labor actually increases. See OECD, Trade, Employment, and Labour Standards: A Study of Core Workers' Rights and International Trade 80-82 (1996); see also Blackett, above n 1, at 49 (1999).
57. Recently, a study commissioned by the WTO Committee on Trade and Environment found that, although environmental protection does increase production cost, its 'competitiveness effect' is ultimately minor. Håkan Nordström and Scott Vaughan, WTO Special Study, Trade and Environment 39 (1999). The report found that compliance costs are likely to be offset by cost-saving efficiency gains elsewhere in the production process. Id at 50-62 (1999). In addition, the report found that, 'environmental regulations are at most of secondary importance for international investment decisions', so that most industries did 'not migrat[e] from developed to developing countries to reduce environmental compliance costs'. Id, 73-79. With respect to labor regulation, some commentators have argued that many labor protections will have little or no impact on the cost of production. A state's commitment to protecting the right to freedom of association, for example, imposes no immediate cost on producers. See Clyde Summers, 'The Battle in Seattle: Free Trade, Labor Rights, and Societal Values', 22 U Pa J Int'l Econ L 61, 67 (2001). The long-term validity of this argument is questionable, however. Increased freedom of association may well lead to increased union formation, which will in turn lead to increased success in the introduction of certain concessions to labor, such as increased wages and safety measures and decreased workweeks. Such concessions would almost certainly raise the marginal cost of labor. The common assumption is that increasing the cost of labor will increase the overall cost of production, and therefore will tend to increase price. Increased price will in turn tend to decrease consumption and therefore trade volume. Yet this assumption need not hold - increased labor costs need not increase overall production costs. On the contrary, improving labor conditions tends to increase labor productivity so that output per cost unit of labor actually increases. See OECD, Trade, Employment, and Labour Standards: A Study of Core Workers' Rights and International Trade 80-82 (1996); see also Blackett, above n 1, at 49 (1999).
58. This sentiment was expressed in the first address by a head of the United Nations Environmental Programme to the World Trade Organization. See Statement by Klaus Topfer, Executive Director, UNEP to the WTO Symposium, Trade, Environment and Sustainable Development, Geneva, 17 March 1998.
59. See, e.g., Geoffrey Palmer, 'New Ways to Make International Environmental Law', 86 Am J Int'l L 259 (1992) ('there is no political will to take decisions that will give us the tools to do the job').
60. See, e.g., TRIPs Art. 2(1) (incorporating into TRIPs the patent and trademark rules from the Paris Convention, Arts 1-12 & 19); TRIPs Art. 9 (incorporating into TRIPs the copyright rules from the Berne Convention, Arts 1-21 excepting Article 6bis on 'moral rights').
61. See, e.g., TRIPs Art. 10(1) (specifying that the copyright rules of the Berne Convention apply to '[c]omputer programs'); TRIPs Art. 27(1) (specifying that the patent rules apply to both 'product' and 'process' patents); TRIPs Arts. 41-61 (specifying provisions for enforcement).
62. See, e.g., TRIPs Arts. 22-24 (establishing rules for geographical indications).
63. See Paul H. Brietzke, 'Insurgents in the "New" International Law', 13 Wis Int'l LJ 1,7 (1994); see also Oscar Schachter, 'The Existence of Nonbinding International Agreements', 71 Am J Int'l L 296 (1977).
64. See Paul H. Brietzke, 'Insurgents in the "New" International Law', 13 Wis Int'l LJ 1,7 (1994); see also Oscar Schachter, 'The Existence of Nonbinding International Agreements', 71 Am J Int'l L 296 (1977).
65. Tamlyn Hunt, 'People or Power: A Comparison of Realist and Social Constructivist Approaches to Climate Change Remediation Negotiations', 6 UCLA J Int'l L & Foreign Aff 265, 277 (2001) (describing a 'soft social constructivism' that 'looks to the role of non-state actors, in the form of transnational advocacy networks (TANs), epistemic communities (ECs or transnational epistemic communities, TECs), or nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in defining international law'); Stephanie Farrior, 'Trafficking in Women and Children for Prostitution: Making It Live up to Its Potential', 10 Harv Hum Rts J 213, 253 (1997) ('Concerted action and close cooperation among a range of governmental and nongovernmental bodies are integral to curbing trafficking for prostitution'). Examples of such efforts abound in both international labor law and international environmental law. See, e.g., Katherine Van Wezel Stone, 'To the Yukon and Beyond: Local Laborers in a Global Labor Market', 3 J Small & Emerging Bus L 93 (1999) ('Soft regulation refers to a regulatory regime that is comprised of an interwoven network of private sector actors and voluntary associations acting within the context of market forces to establish and enforce rules of conduct. In the area of labor rights, one would look to labor activists, trade unionists, enlightened firm managers, academics, and progressive political leaders to fashion such a regime.'); 'Developing a Culture of Compliance in the International Environmental Regime', 27 Envtl L Rep 10402 (August 1997) (arguing that the publicity campaigns of NGOs, in part resulting from lawsuits, play an important role in increasing compliance with international environmental law).
66. Tamlyn Hunt, 'People or Power: A Comparison of Realist and Social Constructivist Approaches to Climate Change Remediation Negotiations', 6 UCLA J Int'l L & Foreign Aff 265, 277 (2001) (describing a 'soft social constructivism' that 'looks to the role of non-state actors, in the form of transnational advocacy networks (TANs), epistemic communities (ECs or transnational epistemic communities, TECs), or nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in defining international law'); Stephanie Farrior, 'Trafficking in Women and Children for Prostitution: Making It Live up to Its Potential', 10 Harv Hum Rts J 213, 253 (1997) ('Concerted action and close cooperation among a range of governmental and nongovernmental bodies are integral to curbing trafficking for prostitution'). Examples of such efforts abound in both international labor law and international environmental law. See, e.g., Katherine Van Wezel Stone, 'To the Yukon and Beyond: Local Laborers in a Global Labor Market', 3 J Small & Emerging Bus L 93 (1999) ('Soft regulation refers to a regulatory regime that is comprised of an interwoven network of private sector actors and voluntary associations acting within the context of market forces to establish and enforce rules of conduct. In the area of labor
67. Tamlyn Hunt, 'People or Power: A Comparison of Realist and Social Constructivist Approaches to Climate Change Remediation Negotiations', 6 UCLA J Int'l L & Foreign Aff 265, 277 (2001) (describing a 'soft social constructivism' that 'looks to the role of non-state actors, in the form of transnational advocacy networks (TANs), epistemic communities (ECs or transnational epistemic communities, TECs), or nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in defining international law'); Stephanie Farrior, 'Trafficking in Women and Children for Prostitution: Making It Live up to Its Potential', 10 Harv Hum Rts J 213, 253 (1997) ('Concerted action and close cooperation among a range of governmental and nongovernmental bodies are integral to curbing trafficking for prostitution'). Examples of such efforts abound in both international labor law and international environmental law. See, e.g., Katherine Van Wezel Stone, 'To the Yukon and Beyond: Local Laborers in a Global Labor Market', 3 J Small & Emerging Bus L 93 (1999) ('Soft regulation refers to a regulatory regime that is comprised of an interwoven network of private sector actors and voluntary associations acting within the context of market forces to establish and enforce rules of conduct. In the area of labor rights, one would look to labor activists, trade unionists, enlightened firm managers, academics, and progressive political leaders to fashion such a regime.'); 'Developing a Culture of Compliance in the International Environmental Regime', 27 Envtl L Rep 10402 (August 1997) (arguing that the publicity campaigns of NGOs, in part resulting from lawsuits, play an important role in increasing compliance with international environmental law).
68. Tamlyn Hunt, 'People or Power: A Comparison of Realist and Social Constructivist Approaches to Climate Change Remediation Negotiations', 6 UCLA J Int'l L & Foreign Aff 265, 277 (2001) (describing a 'soft social constructivism' that 'looks to the role of non-state actors, in the form of transnational advocacy networks (TANs), epistemic communities (ECs or transnational epistemic communities, TECs), or nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in defining international law'); Stephanie Farrior, 'Trafficking in Women and Children for Prostitution: Making It Live up to Its Potential', 10 Harv Hum Rts J 213, 253 (1997) ('Concerted action and close cooperation among a range of governmental and nongovernmental bodies are integral to curbing trafficking for prostitution'). Examples of such efforts abound in both international labor law and international environmental law. See, e.g., Katherine Van Wezel Stone, 'To the Yukon and Beyond: Local Laborers in a Global Labor Market', 3 J Small & Emerging Bus L 93 (1999) ('Soft regulation refers to a regulatory regime that is comprised of an interwoven network of private sector actors and voluntary associations acting within the context of market forces to establish and enforce rules of conduct. In the area of labor rights, one would look to labor activists, trade unionists, enlightened firm managers, academics, and progressive political leaders to fashion such a regime.'); 'Developing a Culture of Compliance in the International Environmental Regime', 27 Envtl L Rep 10402 (August 1997) (arguing that the publicity campaigns of NGOs, in part resulting from lawsuits, play an important role in increasing compliance with international environmental law).
69. The fact-finding and reporting capabilities of the United Nations Human Rights Commission, the International Labor Organization, and the United Nations Environment Programme all exemplify this approach.
70. Moral pressure results from the repeated recognition of a state's obligation to comply as part of its responsibility as a member of the international community, as well as from the principles of justice or equity that underlie a given principle. Thomas M. Franck and Dennis M. Sughrue, 'The International Role of Equity-as-Fairness', 81 Geo LJ 563 (1993). Political pressure results from the disapproval a state will encounter both from other states and from its own citizens if it fails to comply. See Louis Henkin, How Nations Behave: Law and Foreign Policy (2d ed. 1979) ('almost all nations observe almost all principles of international law and almost all of their obligations almost all of the time.') Id, at 47 (italics in original); Harold H. Koh, 'How Is International Human Rights Law Enforced?' 74 Ind LJ 1397 (1999). States have a political incentive to comply in order to avoid such disruption. Thomas M. Franck, 'Legitimacy in the International System', 82 Am J Int'l L 705 (1988). Behavioral pressures arise to the extent to which a state has acquired an administrative apparatus that creates a 'habit' of implementation. It may be easier for a state to filter an obligation through this apparatus, conducting regulatory 'business as usual', than for a state to adopt, maintain, and justify a recalcitrant stance. Henkin at 51-52; Harold H. Koh, 'Bringing International Law Home', 35 Hous L Rev 623, 626 (1998); Harold H. Koh, 'How Is International Human Rights Law Enforced?' 74 Ind LJ 1397, 1400-01 (1999).
71. Moral pressure results from the repeated recognition of a state's obligation to comply as part of its responsibility as a member of the international community, as well as from the principles of justice or equity that underlie a given principle. Thomas M. Franck and Dennis M. Sughrue, 'The International Role of Equity-as-Fairness', 81 Geo LJ 563 (1993). Political pressure results from the disapproval a state will encounter both from other states and from its own citizens if it fails to comply. See Louis Henkin, How Nations Behave: Law and Foreign Policy (2d ed. 1979) ('almost all nations observe almost all principles of international law and almost all of their obligations almost all of the time.') Id, at 47 (italics in original); Harold H. Koh, 'How Is International Human Rights Law Enforced?' 74 Ind LJ 1397 (1999). States have a political incentive to comply in order to avoid such disruption. Thomas M. Franck, 'Legitimacy in the International System', 82 Am J Int'l L 705 (1988). Behavioral pressures arise to the extent to which a state has acquired an administrative apparatus that creates a 'habit' of implementation. It may be easier for a state to filter an obligation through this apparatus, conducting regulatory 'business as usual', than for a state to adopt, maintain, and justify a recalcitrant stance. Henkin at 51-52; Harold H. Koh, 'Bringing International Law Home', 35 Hous L Rev 623, 626 (1998); Harold H. Koh, 'How Is International Human Rights Law Enforced?' 74 Ind LJ 1397, 1400-01 (1999).
72. Moral pressure results from the repeated recognition of a state's obligation to comply as part of its responsibility as a member of the international community, as well as from the principles of justice or equity that underlie a given principle. Thomas M. Franck and Dennis M. Sughrue, 'The International Role of Equity-as-Fairness', 81 Geo LJ 563 (1993). Political pressure results from the disapproval a state will encounter both from other states and from its own citizens if it fails to comply. See Louis Henkin, How Nations Behave: Law and Foreign Policy (2d ed. 1979) ('almost all nations observe almost all principles of international law and almost all of their obligations almost all of the time.') Id, at 47 (italics in original); Harold H. Koh, 'How Is International Human Rights Law Enforced?' 74 Ind LJ 1397 (1999). States have a political incentive to comply in order to avoid such disruption. Thomas M. Franck, 'Legitimacy in the International System', 82 Am J Int'l L 705 (1988). Behavioral pressures arise to the extent to which a state has acquired an administrative apparatus that creates a 'habit' of implementation. It may be easier for a state to filter an obligation through this apparatus, conducting regulatory 'business as usual', than for a state to adopt, maintain, and justify a recalcitrant stance. Henkin at 51-52; Harold H. Koh, 'Bringing International Law Home', 35 Hous L Rev 623, 626 (1998); Harold H. Koh, 'How Is International Human Rights Law Enforced?' 74 Ind LJ 1397, 1400-01 (1999).
73. Moral pressure results from the repeated recognition of a state's obligation to comply as part of its responsibility as a member of the international community, as well as from the principles of justice or equity that underlie a given principle. Thomas M. Franck and Dennis M. Sughrue, 'The International Role of Equity-as-Fairness', 81 Geo LJ 563 (1993). Political pressure results from the disapproval a state will encounter both from other states and from its own citizens if it fails to comply. See Louis Henkin, How Nations Behave: Law and Foreign Policy (2d ed. 1979) ('almost all nations observe almost all principles of international law and almost all of their obligations almost all of the time.') Id, at 47 (italics in original); Harold H. Koh, 'How Is International Human Rights Law Enforced?' 74 Ind LJ 1397 (1999). States have a political incentive to comply in order to avoid such disruption. Thomas M. Franck, 'Legitimacy in the International System', 82 Am J Int'l L 705 (1988). Behavioral pressures arise to the extent to which a state has acquired an administrative apparatus that creates a 'habit' of implementation. It may be easier for a state to filter an obligation through this apparatus, conducting regulatory 'business as usual', than for a state to adopt, maintain, and justify a recalcitrant stance. Henkin at 51-52; Harold H. Koh, 'Bringing International Law Home', 35 Hous L Rev 623, 626 (1998); Harold H. Koh, 'How Is International Human Rights Law Enforced?' 74 Ind LJ 1397, 1400-01 (1999).
74. Moral pressure results from the repeated recognition of a state's obligation to comply as part of its responsibility as a member of the international community, as well as from the principles of justice or equity that underlie a given principle. Thomas M. Franck and Dennis M. Sughrue, 'The International Role of Equity-as-Fairness', 81 Geo LJ 563 (1993). Political pressure results from the disapproval a state will encounter both from other states and from its own citizens if it fails to comply. See Louis Henkin, How Nations Behave: Law and Foreign Policy (2d ed. 1979) ('almost all nations observe almost all principles of international law and almost all of their obligations almost all of the time.') Id, at 47 (italics in original); Harold H. Koh, 'How Is International Human Rights Law Enforced?' 74 Ind LJ 1397 (1999). States have a political incentive to comply in order to avoid such disruption. Thomas M. Franck, 'Legitimacy in the International System', 82 Am J Int'l L 705 (1988). Behavioral pressures arise to the extent to which a state has acquired an administrative apparatus that creates a 'habit' of implementation. It may be easier for a state to filter an obligation through this apparatus, conducting regulatory 'business as usual', than for a state to adopt, maintain, and justify a recalcitrant stance. Henkin at 51-52; Harold H. Koh, 'Bringing International Law Home', 35 Hous L Rev 623, 626 (1998); Harold H. Koh, 'How Is International Human Rights Law Enforced?' 74 Ind LJ 1397, 1400-01 (1999).
75. Moral pressure results from the repeated recognition of a state's obligation to comply as part of its responsibility as a member of the international community, as well as from the principles of justice or equity that underlie a given principle. Thomas M. Franck and Dennis M. Sughrue, 'The International Role of Equity-as-Fairness', 81 Geo LJ 563 (1993). Political pressure results from the disapproval a state will encounter both from other states and from its own citizens if it fails to comply. See Louis Henkin, How Nations Behave: Law and Foreign Policy (2d ed. 1979) ('almost all nations observe almost all principles of international law and almost all of their obligations almost all of the time.') Id, at 47 (italics in original); Harold H. Koh, 'How Is International Human Rights Law Enforced?' 74 Ind LJ 1397 (1999). States have a political incentive to comply in order to avoid such disruption. Thomas M. Franck, 'Legitimacy in the International System', 82 Am J Int'l L 705 (1988). Behavioral pressures arise to the extent to which a state has acquired an administrative apparatus that creates a 'habit' of implementation. It may be easier for a state to filter an obligation through this apparatus, conducting regulatory 'business as usual', than for a state to adopt, maintain, and justify a recalcitrant stance. Henkin at 51-52; Harold H. Koh, 'Bringing International Law Home', 35 Hous L Rev 623, 626 (1998); Harold H. Koh, 'How Is International Human Rights Law Enforced?' 74 Ind LJ 1397, 1400-01 (1999).
76. This is one of the reasons that international labor law expert Virginia Leary has argued labor rights are among the better-denned rights of public international law. Virginia A. Leary, 'Workers' Rights and International Trade: The Social Clause (GATT, ILO, NAFTA, US Laws)', in Jagdish Bhagwati and Robert E. Hudec (eds), 2 Fair Trade and Harmonization: Prerequisites for Free Trade? Legal Analysis 177, 181, 187 (1996).
77. ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, adopted 18 June 1998, 37 ILM 1233 (1998).
78. See Background to the ILO Declaration, available at http://ilo.org/public/english/standards/decl/declaration/background/index.htm (describing the 1996 WTO Singapore Declaration to be the WTO Ministerial Conference as providing 'the opportunity for a second step to be taken.').
79. OECD, Trade, Employment, and Labour Standards: A Study of Core Workers' Rights and International Trade 26 (1996).
80. Gary S. Fields, 'International Labour Standards and Economic Interdependence' (reviewing International Labour Standards and Economic Interdependence (Sengenberger and Campbell (eds), 1994)), 49 Indus & Lab Rel Rev 571, 572 (1996).
81. Gary S. Fields, 'International Labour Standards and Economic Interdependence' (reviewing International Labour Standards and Economic Interdependence (Sengenberger and Campbell (eds), 1994)), 49 Indus & Lab Rel Rev 571, 572 (1996).
82. Blackett, above n 1, at 32-34 (1999).
83. This foundation exists despite the fact that the ILO does not explicitly allude to any specific preceding instruments. For a discussion of this point, as well as a thorough exposition of the basis in preceding international labor law for the ILO Declarataion, see Blackett, above n 1, at 13-25 (1999).
84. See OECD, Trade, Employment, and Labour Standards: A Study of Core Workers' Rights and International Trade 26 (1996); Blackett, above n 1 at 15. Some development advocates have argued that the labor 'core' unfairly emphasizes standards that impose compliance pressure on developing countries, such as child labor, and ignores standards that are violated in developed countries, such as those relating to migrant labor.
85. See OECD, Trade, Employment, and Labour Standards: A Study of Core Workers' Rights and International Trade 26 (1996); Blackett, above n 1 at 15. Some development advocates have argued that the labor 'core' unfairly emphasizes standards that impose compliance pressure on developing countries, such as child labor, and ignores standards that are violated in developed countries, such as those relating to migrant labor.
86. Stockholm Declaration, Principle 1. For a comprehensive elaboration of this principle, see Edith Brown Weiss, In Fairness to Future Generations: International Law, Common Patrimony, and Intergenerational Equity (1989).
87. Rio Declaration, Principles 1, 7, 15 and 16 respectively. For an incisive analysis and distillation of the Stockholm and Rio Declarations, and the World Charter described below, see Parvez Hassan, 'Toward an International Covenant on Environment and Development', in Alex Beehler, 'Lessons Learned from UNCED', 87 Am. Soc'y Int'l L. Proc. 508, 514 (1993). The 1982 World Charter for Nature 'enounces a series of general principles intended to guide the actions of States, of international organizations and even of individuals, with respect to nature'. Marc Pallemaerts, 'International Environmental Law in the Age of Sustainable Development: A Critical Assessment of the UNCED Process', 15 JL & Com 623, 627 (1996). The World Charter establishes the principles of respect for and non-impairment of nature, including by 'warfare or other hostile activities'; preservation of 'genetic viability on the earth'; the conservation of 'land and sea'; and sustainable development. World Charter for Nature, Arts 1-5 'General Principles'. There are also notable and influential blueprints that have been drafted by key quasi-governmental and non-governmental environmental groups. For example, the IUCN, or World Conservation Union, spearheaded a negotiation that resulted in a 1995 Draft International Covenant on Environment and Development, which sought to establish a single framework for all environmental treaties. World Conservation Union, Draft International Covenant on Environment and Development (1995, updated in 1999). For an introduction to this document, see Nicholas A. Robinson, 'IUCN's Proposed Covenant on Environment and Development', 13 Pace Envtl L Rev 133 (1995). The Earth Charter is an extraordinary document initiated by NGOs at the fifth anniversary of the Rio Conference. See Earth Charter Commission, The Earth Charter Initiative Handbook (2001). It sets out a comprehensive set of principles on 'respect and care for the community of life'; 'ecological integrity'; ' and economic justice'; and 'democracy, non-violence and peace'. The so-called 'Bruntland Commission' report went a considerable distance toward establishing the principle of sustainable development. See World Commission on Environment and Development, Our Common Future (1987).
88. Rio Declaration, Principles 1, 7, 15 and 16 respectively. For an incisive analysis and distillation of the Stockholm and Rio Declarations, and the World Charter described below, see Parvez Hassan, 'Toward an International Covenant on Environment and Development', in Alex Beehler, 'Lessons Learned from UNCED', 87 Am. Soc'y Int'l L. Proc. 508, 514 (1993). The 1982 World Charter for Nature 'enounces a series of general principles intended to guide the actions of States, of international organizations and even of individuals, with respect to nature'. Marc Pallemaerts, 'International Environmental Law in the Age of Sustainable Development: A Critical Assessment of the UNCED Process', 15 JL & Com 623, 627 (1996). The World Charter establishes the principles of respect for and non-impairment of nature, including by 'warfare or other hostile activities'; preservation of 'genetic viability on the earth'; the conservation of 'land and sea'; and sustainable development. World Charter for Nature, Arts 1-5 'General Principles'. There are also notable and influential blueprints that have been drafted by key quasi-governmental and non-governmental environmental groups. For example, the IUCN, or World Conservation Union, spearheaded a negotiation that resulted in a 1995 Draft International Covenant on Environment and Development, which sought to establish a single framework for all environmental treaties. World Conservation Union, Draft International Covenant on Environment and Development (1995, updated in 1999). For an introduction to this document, see Nicholas A. Robinson, 'IUCN's Proposed Covenant on Environment and Development', 13 Pace Envtl L Rev 133 (1995). The Earth Charter is an extraordinary document initiated by NGOs at the fifth anniversary of the Rio Conference. See Earth Charter Commission, The Earth Charter Initiative Handbook (2001). It sets out a comprehensive set of principles on 'respect and care for the community of life'; 'ecological integrity'; ' and economic justice'; and 'democracy, non-violence and peace'. The so-called 'Bruntland Commission' report went a considerable distance toward establishing the principle of sustainable development. See World Commission on Environment and Development, Our Common Future (1987).
89. Rio Declaration, Principles 1, 7, 15 and 16 respectively. For an incisive analysis and distillation of the Stockholm and Rio Declarations, and the World Charter described below, see Parvez Hassan, 'Toward an International Covenant on Environment and Development', in Alex Beehler, 'Lessons Learned from UNCED', 87 Am. Soc'y Int'l L. Proc. 508, 514 (1993). The 1982 World Charter for Nature 'enounces a series of general principles intended to guide the actions of States, of international organizations and even of individuals, with respect to nature'. Marc Pallemaerts, 'International Environmental Law in the Age of Sustainable Development: A Critical Assessment of the UNCED Process', 15 JL & Com 623, 627 (1996). The World Charter establishes the principles of respect for and non-impairment of nature, including by 'warfare or other hostile activities'; preservation of 'genetic viability on the earth'; the conservation of 'land and sea'; and sustainable development. World Charter for Nature, Arts 1-5 'General Principles'. There are also notable and influential blueprints that have been drafted by key quasi-governmental and non-governmental environmental groups. For example, the IUCN, or World Conservation Union, spearheaded a negotiation that resulted in a 1995 Draft International Covenant on Environment and Development, which sought to establish a single framework for all environmental treaties. World Conservation Union, Draft International Covenant on Environment and Development (1995, updated in 1999). For an introduction to this document, see Nicholas A. Robinson, 'IUCN's Proposed Covenant on Environment and Development', 13 Pace Envtl L Rev 133 (1995). The Earth Charter is an extraordinary document initiated by NGOs at the fifth anniversary of the Rio Conference. See Earth Charter Commission, The Earth Charter Initiative Handbook (2001). It sets out a comprehensive set of principles on 'respect and care for the community of life'; 'ecological integrity'; ' and economic justice'; and 'democracy, non-violence and peace'. The so-called 'Bruntland Commission' report went a considerable distance toward establishing the principle of sustainable development. See World Commission on Environment and Development, Our Common Future (1987).
90. Rio Declaration, Principles 1, 7, 15 and 16 respectively. For an incisive analysis and distillation of the Stockholm and Rio Declarations, and the World Charter described below, see Parvez Hassan, 'Toward an International Covenant on Environment and Development', in Alex Beehler, 'Lessons Learned from UNCED', 87 Am. Soc'y Int'l L. Proc. 508, 514 (1993). The 1982 World Charter for Nature 'enounces a series of general principles intended to guide the actions of States, of international organizations and even of individuals, with respect to nature'. Marc Pallemaerts, 'International Environmental Law in the Age of Sustainable Development: A Critical Assessment of the UNCED Process', 15 JL & Com 623, 627 (1996). The World Charter establishes the principles of respect for and non-impairment of nature, including by 'warfare or other hostile activities'; preservation of 'genetic viability on the earth'; the conservation of 'land and sea'; and sustainable development. World Charter for Nature, Arts 1-5 'General Principles'. There are also notable and influential blueprints that have been drafted by key quasi-governmental and non-governmental environmental groups. For example, the IUCN, or World Conservation Union, spearheaded a negotiation that resulted in a 1995 Draft International Covenant on Environment and Development, which sought to establish a single framework for all environmental treaties. World Conservation Union, Draft International Covenant on Environment and Development (1995, updated in 1999). For an introduction to this document, see Nicholas A. Robinson, 'IUCN's Proposed Covenant on Environment and Development', 13 Pace Envtl L Rev 133 (1995). The Earth Charter is an extraordinary document initiated by NGOs at the fifth anniversary of the Rio Conference. See Earth Charter Commission, The Earth Charter Initiative Handbook (2001). It sets out a comprehensive set of principles on 'respect and care for the community of life'; 'ecological integrity'; ' and economic justice'; and 'democracy, non-violence and peace'. The so-called 'Bruntland Commission' report went a considerable distance toward establishing the principle of sustainable development. See World Commission on Environment and Development, Our Common Future (1987).
91. Rio Declaration, Principles 1, 7, 15 and 16 respectively. For an incisive analysis and distillation of the Stockholm and Rio Declarations, and the World Charter described below, see Parvez Hassan, 'Toward an International Covenant on Environment and Development', in Alex Beehler, 'Lessons Learned from UNCED', 87 Am. Soc'y Int'l L. Proc. 508, 514 (1993). The 1982 World Charter for Nature 'enounces a series of general principles intended to guide the actions of States, of international organizations and even of individuals, with respect to nature'. Marc Pallemaerts, 'International Environmental Law in the Age of Sustainable Development: A Critical Assessment of the UNCED Process', 15 JL & Com 623, 627 (1996). The World Charter establishes the principles of respect for and non-impairment of nature, including by 'warfare or other hostile activities'; preservation of 'genetic viability on the earth'; the conservation of 'land and sea'; and sustainable development. World Charter for Nature, Arts 1-5 'General Principles'. There are also notable and influential blueprints that have been drafted by key quasi-governmental and non-governmental environmental groups. For example, the IUCN, or World Conservation Union, spearheaded a negotiation that resulted in a 1995 Draft International Covenant on Environment and Development, which sought to establish a single framework for all environmental treaties. World Conservation Union, Draft International Covenant on Environment and Development (1995, updated in 1999). For an introduction to this document, see Nicholas A. Robinson, 'IUCN's Proposed Covenant on Environment and Development', 13 Pace Envtl L Rev 133 (1995). The Earth Charter is an extraordinary document initiated by NGOs at the fifth anniversary of the Rio Conference. See Earth Charter Commission, The Earth Charter Initiative Handbook (2001). It sets out a comprehensive set of principles on 'respect and care for the community of life'; 'ecological integrity'; ' and economic justice'; and 'democracy, non-violence and peace'. The so-called 'Bruntland Commission' report went a considerable distance toward establishing the principle of sustainable development. See World Commission on Environment and Development, Our Common Future (1987).
92. See generally Philippe Sands (ed.), Greening International Law (Earthscan, 1993).
93. See, e.g., Chantal Thomas, 'Customary International Law and State Taxation of Corporate Income: The Case for the Separate Accounting Method', 14 Berkeley Int'l LJ 99 (1996).
94. Report of the Appellate Body, EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones) 16 January 1998 (WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R comparing the European Communities position in favor of a strong reading of the precautionary approach (para 16) with the United States rejection of the view that the principle constitutes customary international law at all (para 43; with Canada's middle view that the precautionary approach is an 'emerging principle of international law' which 'in the future' will crystallize) n.60.
95. Indeed, the proliferation of agreements seems to be viewed by international environmentalists as a good thing. Palmer, above n 37, at 259 ('If we consider the new instruments that have developed the international law for the environment in the last twenty years, we would be pardoned for thinking that the record is a good one.')
96. This relationship was defined by Wesley Hohfeld as a 'jural correlative'. See Wesley Hohfeld, 'Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning', 23 Yale LJ 16 (1913) (listing as jural correlatives rights vs duties, privileges vs no-rights, powers vs liabilities, and immunities vs disabilities).
97. Art. 23, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, UN GAOR 3d Sess, UN Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948) ('Everyone has the right to work, to free choice of employment, to just and favourable conditions of work and to protection against unemployment.'); Art. 6(1), International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, opened for signature 16 December 1966, 993 UNTS 3, 6 (entered into force 3 January 1976) ('The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right to work, which includes the right of everyone to the opportunity to gain his living by work which he freely chooses or accepts').
98. Principle 1, Declaration of the UN Conference on the Human Environment, 16 June 1972, UN Doc. A/Conf.48/14/Rev.1, reprinted in 11 ILM 1416 (1972) ('Man has the fundamental right to freedom, equality and adequate conditions of life, in an environment of a quality that permits a life of dignity and well-being, and he bears a solemn responsibility to protect and improve the environment for present and future generations'); see also Art. 1, Declaration of Bizkaia on the Right to the Environment, UN Educational, Social, and Cultural Organization, UN Doc. 30C/INF.11 (24 September 1999) ('Everyone has the right, individually or in association with others, to enjoy a healthy and ecologically balanced environment').
99. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, 20 Mar 1883, 13 UST. 2, 828 UNTS 107, as last revised at the Stockholm Revision Conference, 14 July 1967, 21 UST. 1538, 828 UNTS 303.
100. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, 9 September 1886, as last revised at Paris, 24 July 1971, 25 UST. 1341, 828 UNTS 221.
101. Contracting parties to the Paris Convention, for example, were states that had adopted one of the following: the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property as revised at Stockholm on 14 July 1967; the Paris Convention as revised at Lisbon on 31 October 1958; the Paris Convention as revised at London on 2 June 1934; or the Paris Convention as revised at The Hague on 6 November 1925. Contracting parties to the Berne Convention, likewise, were states that adopted one of the following: the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works as revised at Paris on 24 July 1971; the Berne Convention as revised at Stockholm on 14 July 1967; the Berne Convention as revised at Brussels on 26 June 1948; the Berne Convention as revised at Rome on 2 June 1928; or the Berne Convention as revised at Berlin on 13 November 1908.
102. Ruth Okediji, Toward an International Fair Use Doctrine', 39 Colum J Transnat'l L 75, 145-46 (2000).
103. Robert J. Gutowski, 'The Marriage of Intellectual Property and International Trade in the TRIPS Agreement: Strange Bedfellows or a Match Made in Heaven?', 47 Buff L Rev 713, 724 (1999) ('The stark distinction between South Africa's and Peru's application of the well-known mark requirement of Article 6bis of the Paris Convention [described in this article] highlights the problems of the Paris-Berne regime: lack of harmonization, disparate national treatment, and deficient enforcement and dispute resolution provisions.')
104. Robert P. Merges, 'Battle of Lateralisms: Intellectual Property and Trade', 8 BU Int'l LJ 239, 242 (1990) ('The proposed GATT intellectual property code, which attempts to provide more substantive guidelines, has met with stiff opposition from some members of the Paris Convention, in part because of its specificity on certain matters (e.g., pharmaceutical patents)').
105. Robert W. Kastenmeier and David Beier, 'International Trade and Intellectual Property: Promise, Risks, and Reality', 22 Vand J Transnat'l L 285, 291 (1989) (observing that '[c]reating norms and standards for intellectual property would be the most important and difficult area' of upcoming TRIPs negotiations); Joel R. Reidenberg, 'Trade, Trips and NAFTA', 4 Fordham Intell Prop Media & Ent LJ 283, 283, 285 (1993) 285 (citing as problems with TRIPS that 'traditional rights now being enshrined in TRIPS are also at odds with emerging national trends' and that '[n]ew technologies do not fit neatly within traditional forms of intellectual property.').
106. Robert W. Kastenmeier and David Beier, 'International Trade and Intellectual Property: Promise, Risks, and Reality', 22 Vand J Transnat'l L 285, 291 (1989) (observing that '[c]reating norms and standards for intellectual property would be the most important and difficult area' of upcoming TRIPs negotiations); Joel R. Reidenberg, 'Trade, Trips and NAFTA', 4 Fordham Intell Prop Media & Ent LJ 283, 283, 285 (1993) 285 (citing as problems with TRIPS that 'traditional rights now being enshrined in TRIPS are also at odds with emerging national trends' and that '[n]ew technologies do not fit neatly within traditional forms of intellectual property.').
107. Art. I, GATT 1947 ('any advantage ... granted by any contracting party to any product originating in or destined for any other country shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the like product originating in or destined for the territories of all other contracting parties').
108. Art. III, GATT 1947 ('internal ... laws ... should not be applied to imported or domestic products so as to afford protection to domestic production').
109. The NAFTA 'side agreements' - the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation and the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation - present an alternative model for international dispute settlement. Rather than alleging government A alleging that government B has harmed A's residents, under this model A alleges that B has harmed its own residents. The North American side agreements require NAFTA members to adhere to and fulfil their own labor and environmental laws. The side agreements provide procedures - primarily fact-finding and reporting procedures - for investigating an allegation by representatives of one member that another member has failed to enforce its own laws. See generally Ralph H. Folsom et al., NAFTA (2000).
110. Alan E. Boyle, 'State Responsibility for Breach of Obligations to Protect the Global Environment', in Control Over Compliance with International Law 65-80 (William E. Butler ed., 1991); Patricia W. Birnie and Alan E. Boyle, International Law and the Environment 92 (1992); Henry W. McGee, Jr and Timothy W. Woolsey, 'Transboundary Dispute Resolution as a Process and Access to Justice for Private Litigants', 20 UCLA J. Envtl. L. & Pol'y 109 (2000); Jonathan B. Wiener, 'Global Environmental Regulation', 108 Yale LJ 677 (1999).
111. Alan E. Boyle, 'State Responsibility for Breach of Obligations to Protect the Global Environment', in Control Over Compliance with International Law 65-80 (William E. Butler ed., 1991); Patricia W. Birnie and Alan E. Boyle, International Law and the Environment 92 (1992); Henry W. McGee, Jr and Timothy W. Woolsey, 'Transboundary Dispute Resolution as a Process and Access to Justice for Private Litigants', 20 UCLA J. Envtl. L. & Pol'y 109 (2000); Jonathan B. Wiener, 'Global Environmental Regulation', 108 Yale LJ 677 (1999).
112. Alan E. Boyle, 'State Responsibility for Breach of Obligations to Protect the Global Environment', in Control Over Compliance with International Law 65-80 (William E. Butler ed., 1991); Patricia W. Birnie and Alan E. Boyle, International Law and the Environment 92 (1992); Henry W. McGee, Jr and Timothy W. Woolsey, 'Transboundary Dispute Resolution as a Process and Access to Justice for Private Litigants', 20 UCLA J. Envtl. L. & Pol'y 109 (2000); Jonathan B. Wiener, 'Global Environmental Regulation', 108 Yale LJ 677 (1999).
113. Alan E. Boyle, 'State Responsibility for Breach of Obligations to Protect the Global Environment', in Control Over Compliance with International Law 65-80 (William E. Butler ed., 1991); Patricia W. Birnie and Alan E. Boyle, International Law and the Environment 92 (1992); Henry W. McGee, Jr and Timothy W. Woolsey, 'Transboundary Dispute Resolution as a Process and Access to Justice for Private Litigants', 20 UCLA J. Envtl. L. & Pol'y 109 (2000); Jonathan B. Wiener, 'Global Environmental Regulation', 108 Yale LJ 677 (1999).
114. Preamble, ILO Constitution.
115. See 'United States - Taxes on Petroleum and Certain Imported Substances', 34 BISD 136 (1988). For a more recent version of this concept, see para 8.148, Report of the Panel, United States - Tax Treatment for 'Foreign Sales Corporations' Aug. 2001, WT/DS108/RW ('We consider that a measure pursuant to which the use of domestic - but not imported - products contributes to obtaining an advantage has an impact on the conditions of competition between domestic and imported products and thus "affects" the internal "use" of imported products, even if the measure allows for other means to obtain the advantage, such as the use of domestic inputs other than products'); see also para 60 Report of the Appellate Body, United States - Tax Treatment for 'Foreign Sales Corporations', January 2002 WT/DS108/AB/RW.
116. See 'United States - Taxes on Petroleum and Certain Imported Substances', 34 BISD 136 (1988). For a more recent version of this concept, see para 8.148, Report of the Panel, United States - Tax Treatment for 'Foreign Sales Corporations' Aug. 2001, WT/DS108/RW ('We consider that a measure pursuant to which the use of domestic - but not imported - products contributes to obtaining an advantage has an impact on the conditions of competition between domestic and imported products and thus "affects" the internal "use" of imported products, even if the measure allows for other means to obtain the advantage, such as the use of domestic inputs other than products'); see also para 60 Report of the Appellate Body, United States - Tax Treatment for 'Foreign Sales Corporations', January 2002 WT/DS108/AB/RW.
117. See 'United States - Taxes on Petroleum and Certain Imported Substances', 34 BISD 136 (1988). For a more recent version of this concept, see para 8.148, Report of the Panel, United States - Tax Treatment for 'Foreign Sales Corporations' Aug. 2001, WT/DS108/RW ('We consider that a measure pursuant to which the use of domestic - but not imported - products contributes to obtaining an advantage has an impact on the conditions of competition between domestic and imported products and thus "affects" the internal "use" of imported products, even if the measure allows for other means to obtain the advantage, such as the use of domestic inputs other than products'); see also para 60 Report of the Appellate Body, United States - Tax Treatment for 'Foreign Sales Corporations', January 2002 WT/DS108/AB/RW.
118. One could abandon any conception of direct harm, and adopt a much more altruistic understanding. That is, labor and environmental violations abroad harm me insofar as I want the interests of justice to be served worldwide. This more extreme challenge is precisely the one posed by the international human rights movement.
119. See Art. 7, Havana Charter for an International Trade Organization (1948).
120. The Dispute Settlement Understanding provides that '[w]here a panel or the Appellate Body concludes that a measure is inconsistent with a covered agreement, it shall recommend that the Member concerned bring the measure into conformity with that agreement.' Art. 19(1), Dispute Settlement Understanding. The 'Member concerned' must do so within a 'reasonable period of time' generally not exceeding fifteen months from the date of adoption of the finding. Id. at Art. 21(3).
121. Article 22 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding provides that 'If the Member concerned fails to bring the measure found to be inconsistent with a covered agreement into compliance ..., within the reasonable period of time determined ..., any party having invoked dispute settlement procedures may request authorization from the DSB to suspend the application to the Member concerned of concessions or other obligations under the covered agreements ... The DSB ... shall grant [such] authorization ... within 30 days of the expiry of the reasonable period of time unless the DSB decides by consensus to reject the request.' Art. 22(2) & 22(6), Dispute Settlement Understanding.
122. Norbert Horn, 'Normative Problems of a New International Economic Order', 16 J World Trade L 338; Jack Donnelly, 'In Search of the Unicorn: The Jurisprudence and Politics of the Right to Development', 15 Cal W Int'l L J 473 (1985). But see Philip Alston, 'The Shortcomings of a "Garfield the Cat" Approach to the Right to Development', 15 Cal W Int'l L J 510 (1985); Philip Alston, 'Making Space for Human Rights: The Case of the Right to Development', 1 Harv Hum Rts YB 3 (1988).
123. Norbert Horn, 'Normative Problems of a New International Economic Order', 16 J World Trade L 338; Jack Donnelly, 'In Search of the Unicorn: The Jurisprudence and Politics of the Right to Development', 15 Cal W Int'l L J 473 (1985). But see Philip Alston, 'The Shortcomings of a "Garfield the Cat" Approach to the Right to Development', 15 Cal W Int'l L J 510 (1985); Philip Alston, 'Making Space for Human Rights: The Case of the Right to Development', 1 Harv Hum Rts YB 3 (1988).
124. Norbert Horn, 'Normative Problems of a New International Economic Order', 16 J World Trade L 338; Jack Donnelly, 'In Search of the Unicorn: The Jurisprudence and Politics of the Right to Development', 15 Cal W Int'l L J 473 (1985). But see Philip Alston, 'The Shortcomings of a "Garfield the Cat" Approach to the Right to Development', 15 Cal W Int'l L J 510 (1985); Philip Alston, 'Making Space for Human Rights: The Case of the Right to Development', 1 Harv Hum Rts YB 3 (1988).
125. Norbert Horn, 'Normative Problems of a New International Economic Order', 16 J World Trade L 338; Jack Donnelly, 'In Search of the Unicorn: The Jurisprudence and Politics of the Right to Development', 15 Cal W Int'l L J 473 (1985). But see Philip Alston, 'The Shortcomings of a "Garfield the Cat" Approach to the Right to Development', 15 Cal W Int'l L J 510 (1985); Philip Alston, 'Making Space for Human Rights: The Case of the Right to Development', 1 Harv Hum Rts YB 3 (1988).
126. For a discussion of the dynamics that have enabled European integration, see Pavlos Eleftheriadis, 'The European Constitution and Cosmopolitan Ideals', 7 Colum. J. Eur L 21 (2001); Roger J. Goebel 'The European Union Grows: Constitutional Impact of Accession of Austria', Finland and Sweden, 18 Fordham Int'l LJ 1092 (1995).
127. For a discussion of the dynamics that have enabled European integration, see Pavlos Eleftheriadis, 'The European Constitution and Cosmopolitan Ideals', 7 Colum. J. Eur L 21 (2001); Roger J. Goebel 'The European Union Grows: Constitutional Impact of Accession of Austria', Finland and Sweden, 18 Fordham Int'l LJ 1092 (1995).
128. The costs could be more benign, however, and could be associated with the difficulty of reaching agreement on a specific practice, even where states are committed to the principle. For example, states may all desire to take measures to improve wildlife conservation, but they may differ in their preferences for what means to take towards that end. Vagueness and ambiguity, in other words, yield not only transactional costs but also real transactional benefits. However, such qualities are not exclusive to soft law principles. As discussed above, vagueness and ambiguity are also widely characteristic of 'core' or 'framing' principles of binding legal systems, whether international or domestic.
129. For a thorough discussion of the stance of current WTO law on 'social' measures, see Chantal Thomas, 'Should the WTO Incorporate Labor and Environmental Standards?', above, n 2. The relationship between trade and the environment is currently under negotiation by the WTO Members. See above note 2.
130. For a thorough discussion of the stance of current WTO law on 'social' measures, see Chantal Thomas, 'Should the WTO Incorporate Labor and Environmental Standards?', above, n 2. The relationship between trade and the environment is currently under negotiation by the WTO Members. See above note 2.
131. See id.
132. Article XX(b) currently reads 'necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health'.
133. Article XX(g) currently reads 'relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consumption'.
134. Article XX(e) currently reads 'relating to the products of prison labour'.
135. The SPS Agreement currently reads '[m] embers have the right to take sanitary and phytosanitary measures necessary for the protection of human, animal or plant life or health, provided that such measures are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Agreement.' Art. 2(1), SPS Agreement.
136. The matter is currently under negotiation by the WTO Members. See above note 2.
137. In fact, this is the condition on which both of the WTO's 'anti-environment' cases (the Shrimp-Turtle and Clean Air Act cases) were decided - not the substantive provision itself. For a discussion of this aspect of WTO law, see Sheila Foster, The WTO's Antidiscrimination Jurisprudence (manuscript on file with author); John O. McGinnis and Mark L. Movsesian, 'The World Trade Constitution', 114 Harv L Rev 511 (2000).
138. In fact, this is the condition on which both of the WTO's 'anti-environment' cases (the Shrimp-Turtle and Clean Air Act cases) were decided - not the substantive provision itself. For a discussion of this aspect of WTO law, see Sheila Foster, The WTO's Antidiscrimination Jurisprudence (manuscript on file with author); John O. McGinnis and Mark L. Movsesian, 'The World Trade Constitution', 114 Harv L Rev 511 (2000).
139. The same results might be achieved simply by obtaining a shift in interpretive approach. Explicit amendment is preferable to interpretive shift, however, since it is more secure, and since one then avoids accusations that the dispute settlement body is adding to or changing the textual obligations.
140. Steve Charnovitz, 'Trade, Employment and Labour Standards: The OECD Study and Recent Developments in the Trade and Labor Standards Debate', 11 Temp Int'l & Comp LJ 131 (1997); UNEP, Global Environmental Outlook, Chapter 1 (2000). Recently calls have emerged from environmental circles for the establishment of a World Environment Organization. See Daniel C. Esty, TheValue of Creating a Global Environmental Organization Annual Review (2000).
141. Steve Charnovitz, 'Trade, Employment and Labour Standards: The OECD Study and Recent Developments in the Trade and Labor Standards Debate', 11 Temp Int'l & Comp LJ 131 (1997); UNEP, Global Environmental Outlook, Chapter 1 (2000). Recently calls have emerged from environmental circles for the establishment of a World Environment Organization. See Daniel C. Esty, TheValue of Creating a Global Environmental Organization Annual Review (2000).
142. Steve Charnovitz, 'Trade, Employment and Labour Standards: The OECD Study and Recent Developments in the Trade and Labor Standards Debate', 11 Temp Int'l & Comp LJ 131 (1997); UNEP, Global Environmental Outlook, Chapter 1 (2000). Recently calls have emerged from environmental circles for the establishment of a World Environment Organization. See Daniel C. Esty, TheValue of Creating a Global Environmental Organization Annual Review (2000).
143. Textiles is a sector whose production is labor-intensive, and in which countries featuring an abundance of low-cost labor therefore may enjoy a competitive advantage.
144. Agricultural production depends significantly on natural resources and so also provides poor countries with a potential competitive advantage.
145. See Robert E. Hudec, Developing Countries in the GATT Legal System 143-45 (1987).
146. See Brenda A. Jacobs, Integration of the US Textile Quota Program into WTO Rules, 1075 PLI/Corp 359, 361 (1998) ('Despite all the fiery rhetoric and loud laments by the US domestic industry, three years after implementation of the WTO Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC), a point by which the gradual process should be yielding some tangible effects, in fact import restraints in this sector are tighter than ever.'); Mark Ritchie and Kristin Dawkins, 'WTO Food and Agricultural Rules: Sustainable Agriculture and the Human Right to Food', 9 Minn J Global Trade 9 (2000) (noting that 'the intensity and sensitivity of agricultural issues is greater than in the past and that agricultural issues would be the dominant and most difficult issue' in upcoming WTO negotiations).
147. See Brenda A. Jacobs, Integration of the US Textile Quota Program into WTO Rules, 1075 PLI/Corp 359, 361 (1998) ('Despite all the fiery rhetoric and loud laments by the US domestic industry, three years after implementation of the WTO Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC), a point by which the gradual process should be yielding some tangible effects, in fact import restraints in this sector are tighter than ever.'); Mark Ritchie and Kristin Dawkins, 'WTO Food and Agricultural Rules: Sustainable Agriculture and the Human Right to Food', 9 Minn J Global Trade 9 (2000) (noting that 'the intensity and sensitivity of agricultural issues is greater than in the past and that agricultural issues would be the dominant and most difficult issue' in upcoming WTO negotiations).
148. For example, the US withdrew from the international environmental agreement on climate change. See John J. Fialka, 'Nations Approve Rules for Kyoto Pact Without US', Wall St. J. (24 July 2001) at A2. As for international labor law, the US has failed to approve agreements that are often described as 'core' documents of the International Labor Organizations, and that establish the rights to collective bargaining and to freedom from discrimination in employment. See ILO, Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize Convention, adopted 7 September 1948, 68 UNTS 17 (No 87) [hereinafter Freedom of Association Convention]; ILO, Right to Organize and Collective Bargaining Convention, adopted 1 July 1949, 96 UNTS 257 (No 98); ILO, Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention, adopted 25 June 1958, 362 UNTS 31 (No 111). These conventions are all reflected in the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, adopted 18 June 1998, 37 ILM 1233 (1998). See also Virginia A. Leary, above, n 46, at 177, 188 (describing the 'shameful record that places the United States among the countries that have ratified the fewest ILO conventions').
149. For example, the US withdrew from the international environmental agreement on climate change. See John J. Fialka, 'Nations Approve Rules for Kyoto Pact Without US', Wall St. J. (24 July 2001) at A2. As for international labor law, the US has failed to approve agreements that are often described as 'core' documents of the International Labor Organizations, and that establish the rights to collective bargaining and to freedom from discrimination in employment. See ILO, Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize Convention, adopted 7 September 1948, 68 UNTS 17 (No 87) [hereinafter Freedom of Association Convention]; ILO, Right to Organize and Collective Bargaining Convention, adopted 1 July 1949, 96 UNTS 257 (No 98); ILO, Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention, adopted 25 June 1958, 362 UNTS 31 (No 111). These conventions are all reflected in the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, adopted 18 June 1998, 37 ILM 1233 (1998). See also Virginia A. Leary, above, n 46, at 177, 188 (describing the 'shameful record that places the United States among the countries that have ratified the fewest ILO conventions').
150. For example, the US withdrew from the international environmental agreement on climate change. See John J. Fialka, 'Nations Approve Rules for Kyoto Pact Without US', Wall St. J. (24 July 2001) at A2. As for international labor law, the US has failed to approve agreements that are often described as 'core' documents of the International Labor Organizations, and that establish the rights to collective bargaining and to freedom from discrimination in employment. See ILO, Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize Convention, adopted 7 September 1948, 68 UNTS 17 (No 87) [hereinafter Freedom of Association Convention]; ILO, Right to Organize and Collective Bargaining Convention, adopted 1 July 1949, 96 UNTS 257 (No 98); ILO, Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention, adopted 25 June 1958, 362 UNTS 31 (No 111). These conventions are all reflected in the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, adopted 18 June 1998, 37 ILM 1233 (1998). See also Virginia A. Leary, above, n 46, at 177, 188 (describing the 'shameful record that places the United States among the countries that have ratified the fewest ILO conventions').
151. At the time of Uruguay Round negotiations, many developing-country governments staunchly opposed the incorporation of intellectual property rights. The argument sounded quite similar to those made in the context of the labor and environment debates.
152. See Chantal Thomas, above, n 22, at 1249.
153. Textiles and agriculture were two notable such sectors. See Agreement on Agriculture, 15 April 1994, WTO Agreement, Annex 1A; Agreement on Textiles and Clothing, 15 April 1994, WTO Agreement, Annex 1A. Negotiations on both of these topics were staunchly opposed by trade groups in the United States who had an interest in maintaining the status quo of high protectionist barriers to imports. See, e.g., Edmund W. Sim, 'Derailing the Fast-Track for International Trade Agreements', 5 Fla Int'l LJ 471 (1990) (noting that '[e]mbittered textile lobbyists threatened to "do whatever is necessary" ' to forestall concessions on textiles, and, although some agricultural sectors supported trade negotiations in the hopes of increasing their overseas market share, others were 'implacable opponents of the Uruguay Round').
154. The WTO in its most recent Ministerial Conference committed to negotiations on the relationship between trade law and existing multilateral environmental agreements. See WTO Ministerial Declaration, paras 31-33, adopted on 14 November 2001 (WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1).
155. See Edith Brown Weiss, 'Introductory Note on United Nations Conference on Environment and Development', 31 ILM 814-16 (1992).
156. See Chantal Thomas, 'Should the WTO Incorporate Labor and Environmental Standards?', above, n 2 (discussing the funding mechanisms of the Montreal Protocol).
157. The ILO has a broad technical assistance mandate (see http://www.ilo.org/public/english/about/index.htm).
158. While there are funding facilities and technical assistance provided by many labor and environment agreements, the commitments to them are not always fully executed, and even at fully executed levels they fall below most forecasts of the requisite amount. Summary of the Co-Chairs Meeting on the Third Replenishment of the Global Environment Facility Trust Fund, Paris, France, February 2002 (available on http://gefweb.org/Replenishment). An important observation is that, in many cases, integrating trade, labor and environment would impose no new obligations on member states. Particularly with
159. While there are funding facilities and technical assistance provided by many labor and environment agreements, the commitments to them are not always fully executed, and even at fully executed levels they fall below most forecasts of the requisite amount. Summary of the Co-Chairs Meeting on the Third Replenishment of the Global Environment Facility Trust Fund, Paris, France, February 2002 (available on http://gefweb.org/Replenishment). An important observation is that, in many cases, integrating trade, labor and environment would impose no new obligations on member states. Particularly with respect to the most salient international agreements on labor and the environment, most rich and poor countries have become parties. See Clyde Summers, above, n 35, at 61, 67 ('It is ironic that Egypt, Brazil, Indonesia and Pakistan, which were among those most vocal in opposing the [proposal to incorporate labor discussions into WTO talks in Seattle] have ratified conventions on all of these subjects, with the exception of Pakistan's failure to ratify a convention on child labor. They expressed outrage that [President] Clinton would suggest ... that they should be required to observe the conventions that they had ratified.') As Jose Alvarez has argued, however, state accession to international law instruments may be conditional precisely on their relatively weak enforceability, and the relatively high autonomy in determining compliance that results. Jose E. Alvarez, 'How Not to Link: Institutional Conundrums of an Expanded Trade Regime', Widener L Symp J 1 (2001). The North-South divide often obscures the diversity of opinions and positions within the developing-country world. Although developing-country blocs often resist the enhancement of environmental and labor principles in international negotiations, some national and local governments and civil society groups take a different point of view.
160. While there are funding facilities and technical assistance provided by many labor and environment agreements, the commitments to them are not always fully executed, and even at fully executed levels they fall below most forecasts of the requisite amount. Summary of the Co-Chairs Meeting on the Third Replenishment of the Global Environment Facility Trust Fund, Paris, France, February 2002 (available on http://gefweb.org/Replenishment). An important observation is that, in many cases, integrating trade, labor and environment would impose no new obligations on member states. Particularly with respect to the most salient international agreements on labor and the environment, most rich and poor countries have become parties. See Clyde Summers, above, n 35, at 61, 67 ('It is ironic that Egypt, Brazil, Indonesia and Pakistan, which were among those most vocal in opposing the [proposal to incorporate labor discussions into WTO talks in Seattle] have ratified conventions on all of these subjects, with the exception of Pakistan's failure to ratify a convention on child labor. They expressed outrage that [President] Clinton would suggest ... that they should be required to observe the conventions that they had ratified.') As Jose Alvarez has argued, however, state accession to international law instruments may be conditional precisely on their relatively weak enforceability, and the relatively high autonomy in determining compliance that results. Jose E. Alvarez, 'How Not to Link: Institutional Conundrums of an Expanded Trade Regime', Widener L Symp J 1 (2001). The North-South divide often obscures the diversity of opinions and positions within the developing-country world. Although developing-country blocs often resist the enhancement of environmental and labor principles in international negotiations, some national and local governments and civil society groups take a different point of view.