Investment decisions, financial flows, and self-enforcing contracts

International Economic Review

Volumn 44, Issue 4, 2003, Pages 1359-1382

  Sigouin, Christian ^a  

^a Dept of Electrical and Computer Engineering   (Canada)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0344549743     PISSN: 00206598     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1468-2354.t01-1-00113     Document Type: Review

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