Transboundary renewable resource management: A dynamic game with differing noncooperative payoffs

Marine Resource Economics

Volumn 11, Issue 4, 1996, Pages 239-245

  Ferrara, Ida ^a   Missios, Paul C ^a  

^a YORK UNIVERSITY   (Canada)

Author keywords

Nash bargaining; Self enforcing cooperative agreements; Trans boundary renewable resources

Indexed keywords

EID: 0344446319     PISSN: 07381360     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1086/mre.11.4.42629168     Document Type: Article

References (7)

1. Clark, C.W. 1976. Mathematical Bioeconomics: The Optimal Management of Renewable Resources. New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
2. Kaitala, V., and M. Pohjola. 1988. Optimal Recovery of a Shared Resource Stock: A Differential Game Model with Efficient Memory Equilibria. Natural Resource Modeling 3(1): 91-119.
3. Munro, G.R. 1979. The Optimal Management of Transboundary Renewable Resources. Canadian Journal of Economics 12(3): 355-76.
4. Munro, G.R., and R.L. Stokes. 1989. The Canada-United States Pacific Salmon Treaty. Canadian Oceans Policy: National Strategies and the New Law of the Sea. D. McRae and G.R. Munro, eds., pp. 17-35. Vancouver: U.B.C. Press.
5. Nash, J.F. 1953. Two-Person Cooperative Games. Econometrica 21: 128-40.
6. Plourde, C., and D. Yeung. 1989. Harvesting of a Transboundary Replenishable Fish Stock: A Non-Cooperative Game Solution. Marine Resource Economics 6(1): 57-70.
7. Vislie, J. 1987. On the Optimal Management of Transboundary Renewable Resources: A Comment on Munro's Paper. Canadian Journal of Economics 20(4): 870-75.